1 00:00:01,920 --> 00:00:05,240 Speaker 1: This deal was in many ways a proxy fight between 2 00:00:05,600 --> 00:00:08,840 Speaker 1: the US and China or the future of you know, technology, 3 00:00:08,880 --> 00:00:12,800 Speaker 1: dominance and technology kind of control. This very small country 4 00:00:13,039 --> 00:00:14,160 Speaker 1: got caught in the middle. 5 00:00:15,360 --> 00:00:19,000 Speaker 2: Bloomberg's Jordan Robertson and Drake Bennett are back on the 6 00:00:19,040 --> 00:00:22,439 Speaker 2: show with another wild Who done it? They reported for 7 00:00:22,560 --> 00:00:26,720 Speaker 2: Business Week. This time it's about China's tech giant Huawei 8 00:00:26,720 --> 00:00:31,000 Speaker 2: and the company's extraordinary efforts to out maneuver its competitors 9 00:00:31,200 --> 00:00:34,000 Speaker 2: to build a five G network in Denmark. 10 00:00:34,640 --> 00:00:36,720 Speaker 3: So how did this information that's supposed to be some 11 00:00:36,760 --> 00:00:39,640 Speaker 3: of the most protected information of the company get out 12 00:00:39,720 --> 00:00:41,960 Speaker 3: to the last people in the world who should have 13 00:00:42,000 --> 00:00:42,560 Speaker 3: known it. 14 00:00:42,560 --> 00:00:44,559 Speaker 1: It wasn't until they actually got to look at his 15 00:00:44,680 --> 00:00:47,280 Speaker 1: laptop that they were able to piece together. Oh, here's 16 00:00:47,280 --> 00:00:47,919 Speaker 1: what happened. 17 00:00:53,840 --> 00:00:58,320 Speaker 2: I'm West Kasova today on the Big Take, microphones, drones, 18 00:00:58,840 --> 00:01:08,720 Speaker 2: and the search for mole. Jordan, your story starts with 19 00:01:08,880 --> 00:01:12,720 Speaker 2: Denmark looking to upgrade its telecommunication system. 20 00:01:13,120 --> 00:01:16,360 Speaker 1: Right just twenty nineteen, Denmark is looking to upgrade it's 21 00:01:16,360 --> 00:01:19,800 Speaker 1: telecommunications network to five G and in fact, Denmark is 22 00:01:19,840 --> 00:01:21,919 Speaker 1: going to be one of the first countries in Europe 23 00:01:22,040 --> 00:01:24,880 Speaker 1: to upgrade to five G. Now they have two choices. 24 00:01:25,080 --> 00:01:29,040 Speaker 1: There's Erickson from Sweden and there's Huawei from China. Now 25 00:01:29,120 --> 00:01:32,200 Speaker 1: Huawei is the incumbent. Huawei has in some ways the 26 00:01:32,240 --> 00:01:37,119 Speaker 1: advantage because Huawei had supplied the Danish Telecom, Denmark's biggest 27 00:01:37,120 --> 00:01:41,840 Speaker 1: telecommunications provider, with equipment since twenty thirteen. Huawei was already there. 28 00:01:41,920 --> 00:01:43,800 Speaker 1: Huawei was already in country. 29 00:01:43,880 --> 00:01:46,839 Speaker 2: And in fact, Huawei was across a lot of countries 30 00:01:46,959 --> 00:01:50,120 Speaker 2: in Europe, in Asia. They had become a really dominant 31 00:01:50,160 --> 00:01:52,160 Speaker 2: player in this field. Is that right. 32 00:01:52,600 --> 00:01:56,600 Speaker 1: Huawei had expanded aggressively outside of China over the preceding decade, 33 00:01:57,000 --> 00:01:59,360 Speaker 1: providing three G and four G networks to the UK, 34 00:02:00,040 --> 00:02:02,800 Speaker 1: of course, to Denmark and just throughout Europe. So Huawei 35 00:02:02,840 --> 00:02:04,960 Speaker 1: was a very big player in ways that it never 36 00:02:05,160 --> 00:02:07,280 Speaker 1: was really in the United States. You know, Huawei never 37 00:02:07,320 --> 00:02:10,400 Speaker 1: really made that jump fully to the US. There's certainly 38 00:02:10,440 --> 00:02:12,440 Speaker 1: Huawei equipment in the US, but it was not nearly 39 00:02:12,480 --> 00:02:15,640 Speaker 1: as pervasive as it was in parts of Europe. So 40 00:02:15,720 --> 00:02:19,760 Speaker 1: Denmark goes shopping for a five G provider. Huawei was 41 00:02:19,800 --> 00:02:22,240 Speaker 1: already supplying its three G and four G equipment, but 42 00:02:22,280 --> 00:02:23,959 Speaker 1: there were all of a sudden, there were these national 43 00:02:23,960 --> 00:02:27,600 Speaker 1: security concerns. The Trump administration was kind of pounding the table, 44 00:02:28,000 --> 00:02:31,160 Speaker 1: telling anybody who would listen, don't buy Huawei, go with 45 00:02:31,240 --> 00:02:34,160 Speaker 1: a Nordic beat up company, Go with the Sweden's Erickson, 46 00:02:34,280 --> 00:02:37,600 Speaker 1: or go with you know, Finland's Nokia. Go with anybody 47 00:02:37,639 --> 00:02:38,360 Speaker 1: but Huawei. 48 00:02:40,200 --> 00:02:44,480 Speaker 2: And why were they so insistent about not using Huawei. 49 00:02:44,840 --> 00:02:48,600 Speaker 1: The US argument was that China could use this equipment, 50 00:02:48,680 --> 00:02:51,240 Speaker 1: and not just it's the equipment, but the people that 51 00:02:51,320 --> 00:02:55,160 Speaker 1: come with this equipment to facilitate spying. That is true, 52 00:02:55,280 --> 00:02:58,359 Speaker 1: China could do that. In twenty twenty one, we published 53 00:02:58,360 --> 00:03:02,160 Speaker 1: a story outlining an incident, a previously secret incident that 54 00:03:02,240 --> 00:03:05,840 Speaker 1: had happened in Australia in twenty twelve, which really gave 55 00:03:06,040 --> 00:03:10,680 Speaker 1: rise to the fears among Western allies, the US, Australia, 56 00:03:10,800 --> 00:03:14,200 Speaker 1: you know, chief among them, the suspicion that Huawei would 57 00:03:14,400 --> 00:03:17,560 Speaker 1: be used by China to spy was not just hypothetical. 58 00:03:17,639 --> 00:03:20,520 Speaker 1: This incident in twenty twelve, the short version of it 59 00:03:20,560 --> 00:03:24,679 Speaker 1: is the Australian Intelligence Services detected a breach, a very 60 00:03:24,680 --> 00:03:29,000 Speaker 1: significant breach of Australia's telecommunication systems, and what they discovered 61 00:03:29,120 --> 00:03:33,520 Speaker 1: was that China was inserting malware into the official Huawei 62 00:03:33,600 --> 00:03:38,680 Speaker 1: updates that were applied to systems in Australia's telecommunications network 63 00:03:39,000 --> 00:03:42,800 Speaker 1: by Huawei technicians. So Australia detects this major breach of 64 00:03:42,840 --> 00:03:46,880 Speaker 1: its telecommunications systems in twenty twelve, it informs the Americans, 65 00:03:47,160 --> 00:03:50,080 Speaker 1: and what happens was that was essentially the starting pistol 66 00:03:50,160 --> 00:03:53,440 Speaker 1: for the US, Australia and other Western nations to kind 67 00:03:53,440 --> 00:03:55,520 Speaker 1: of raise the red flag and say, whoa, this isn't 68 00:03:55,600 --> 00:03:58,520 Speaker 1: just hypothetical that Huawei could be used to spy. Is 69 00:03:58,600 --> 00:04:02,760 Speaker 1: actually happening, and it's happened in a really sophisticated, stealthy, 70 00:04:02,800 --> 00:04:05,800 Speaker 1: hard to detect way that you could really only do 71 00:04:05,920 --> 00:04:09,880 Speaker 1: if you have insiders control over that networking equipment. 72 00:04:10,200 --> 00:04:12,240 Speaker 2: And what did Huawei say about that at. 73 00:04:12,120 --> 00:04:15,320 Speaker 1: The time when we reported on that story, Huawei issued 74 00:04:15,400 --> 00:04:17,600 Speaker 1: US a statement saying they'd never been told of a breach, 75 00:04:17,760 --> 00:04:21,719 Speaker 1: and you know, our information was that US intelligence and 76 00:04:21,760 --> 00:04:25,279 Speaker 1: Australian intelligence assessed, you know, this was an insider operation. 77 00:04:25,440 --> 00:04:29,160 Speaker 1: This was not necessarily the Chinese government going to Huawei 78 00:04:29,200 --> 00:04:32,479 Speaker 1: and asking permission, but that this was an infiltration of 79 00:04:32,560 --> 00:04:37,599 Speaker 1: Huawei's service technicians by Chinese intelligence. In twenty twelve, and 80 00:04:37,640 --> 00:04:40,839 Speaker 1: twenty thirteen. What Denmark decided to do was they said, 81 00:04:40,880 --> 00:04:43,000 Speaker 1: we like what Huawei's talking about. We want to go 82 00:04:43,040 --> 00:04:46,560 Speaker 1: with Huawei equipment, but we're going to subject the equipment 83 00:04:46,839 --> 00:04:50,039 Speaker 1: to a very rigorous review. In the UK with the 84 00:04:50,040 --> 00:04:53,480 Speaker 1: British Signals Intelligence had set up a special testing lab 85 00:04:53,560 --> 00:04:57,480 Speaker 1: with Huawei to look for back doors or secret pathways 86 00:04:57,520 --> 00:05:00,760 Speaker 1: into a product that would otherwise be undetectable. It was 87 00:05:00,839 --> 00:05:03,680 Speaker 1: not a bad solution and it was an interesting compromise 88 00:05:03,760 --> 00:05:06,680 Speaker 1: that we don't have many other examples of. China has 89 00:05:06,720 --> 00:05:11,760 Speaker 1: consistently denied using Huawei for any intelligence collection or cyber 90 00:05:11,800 --> 00:05:14,839 Speaker 1: attacks or things like that. Every country says that the 91 00:05:14,880 --> 00:05:17,960 Speaker 1: information that we had, of course was very strong, including 92 00:05:17,960 --> 00:05:21,719 Speaker 1: on the record comments from former senior US officials describing 93 00:05:21,760 --> 00:05:24,760 Speaker 1: this breach, describing the intelligence and really describing for the 94 00:05:24,800 --> 00:05:29,039 Speaker 1: first time the origin, if you will, of Western concerns 95 00:05:29,040 --> 00:05:32,719 Speaker 1: about Huawei. But Denmark had a more nuanced view of this. 96 00:05:32,880 --> 00:05:36,200 Speaker 1: They said, just as China could use Huawei to spy 97 00:05:36,440 --> 00:05:39,960 Speaker 1: on Denmark, so too could the US with any of 98 00:05:40,000 --> 00:05:44,360 Speaker 1: its allied countries products as well. So Denmark was equally 99 00:05:44,400 --> 00:05:48,400 Speaker 1: suspicious about US approved products as it was China. 100 00:05:48,400 --> 00:05:53,359 Speaker 3: Approved products, and there was a reason for that. Around 101 00:05:53,360 --> 00:05:56,479 Speaker 3: the time our story takes place, Denmark was going through 102 00:05:56,839 --> 00:06:00,120 Speaker 3: a kind of painful reckoning with its own intelligence and 103 00:06:00,160 --> 00:06:04,200 Speaker 3: services and its relationship with the American NSA, and it 104 00:06:04,279 --> 00:06:09,000 Speaker 3: was revealed that Denmark had basically allowed the NSA American 105 00:06:09,080 --> 00:06:12,359 Speaker 3: signals intelligence to tap into these cables that transit the 106 00:06:12,360 --> 00:06:16,719 Speaker 3: country to spy on the leaders of allies of ours, 107 00:06:17,360 --> 00:06:20,680 Speaker 3: including Germany and Sweden and others. And so there was 108 00:06:20,720 --> 00:06:25,719 Speaker 3: good reason for Danish government officials to take with a 109 00:06:25,760 --> 00:06:28,960 Speaker 3: grain of salt this idea that China is the only 110 00:06:29,160 --> 00:06:34,080 Speaker 3: country that would you use a friendly tech company and 111 00:06:34,200 --> 00:06:37,520 Speaker 3: pair it with their intelligence apparatus. 112 00:06:37,000 --> 00:06:39,279 Speaker 1: To piggyback on that. I mean, Denmark was closer to 113 00:06:39,320 --> 00:06:43,760 Speaker 1: some of these highly sensitive intelligence operations than many countries are. 114 00:06:43,800 --> 00:06:46,680 Speaker 1: So Denmark knew all too well. You know what the 115 00:06:46,800 --> 00:06:49,520 Speaker 1: US is capable of, and what any country is capable 116 00:06:49,560 --> 00:06:52,640 Speaker 1: of if they have access to the telecommunications equipment and 117 00:06:52,680 --> 00:06:54,920 Speaker 1: the people who run it. So when Drake and I 118 00:06:55,000 --> 00:06:58,599 Speaker 1: were reporting this and visiting, you know, Copenhagen and talking 119 00:06:58,600 --> 00:07:01,880 Speaker 1: to people, what we found was this very firm belief 120 00:07:02,160 --> 00:07:05,320 Speaker 1: among senior Danish government officials that they weren't going to 121 00:07:05,320 --> 00:07:08,279 Speaker 1: take sides in this Huawei battle. I mean, despite the 122 00:07:08,320 --> 00:07:11,440 Speaker 1: fact that Denmark is obviously a very close Western ally 123 00:07:11,520 --> 00:07:13,360 Speaker 1: it's a part of NATO and part of the U. 124 00:07:13,960 --> 00:07:17,000 Speaker 1: On this matter, you know, Denmark was not going to 125 00:07:17,160 --> 00:07:19,920 Speaker 1: just roll over to the US demands and they were 126 00:07:19,920 --> 00:07:21,440 Speaker 1: going to have a bake off and they were really 127 00:07:21,480 --> 00:07:24,200 Speaker 1: going to see who's who's going to win this, Ericsson 128 00:07:24,320 --> 00:07:26,080 Speaker 1: from Sweden or Huawei from China. 129 00:07:26,520 --> 00:07:28,440 Speaker 3: You know. The other thing is that Huawei's equipment is 130 00:07:28,520 --> 00:07:31,480 Speaker 3: good gear, you know, and it's cheap, So I think 131 00:07:31,520 --> 00:07:34,200 Speaker 3: if you're setting all this stuff aside, it's like a 132 00:07:34,240 --> 00:07:37,520 Speaker 3: good choice. You've got these sort of political considerations on 133 00:07:37,560 --> 00:07:41,000 Speaker 3: both sides, and then you know you have this Danish 134 00:07:41,000 --> 00:07:43,640 Speaker 3: company TDC trying to kind of decide on the merits 135 00:07:43,680 --> 00:07:44,040 Speaker 3: as well. 136 00:07:44,640 --> 00:07:48,720 Speaker 1: Twenty years ago, Wawei's equipment was seen as knockoff, low quality, 137 00:07:49,280 --> 00:07:52,200 Speaker 1: obviously low costs as well. But a lot has changed 138 00:07:52,240 --> 00:07:54,840 Speaker 1: in the last two decades and Huawei's equipment is state 139 00:07:54,880 --> 00:07:57,880 Speaker 1: of the art. They have very very good customer service. 140 00:07:58,240 --> 00:08:00,840 Speaker 1: Huawei will ship as many people to your country into 141 00:08:00,880 --> 00:08:03,400 Speaker 1: your facility as you need to solve whatever problem you 142 00:08:03,560 --> 00:08:06,840 Speaker 1: need solved. And there were many people inside TDC, Denmark's 143 00:08:06,840 --> 00:08:09,640 Speaker 1: biggest telecom that were very happy with wahweih and had 144 00:08:09,680 --> 00:08:10,600 Speaker 1: been for many years. 145 00:08:11,440 --> 00:08:14,880 Speaker 2: And Drake, maybe you could tell us why upgrading from 146 00:08:15,280 --> 00:08:19,560 Speaker 2: four G to five G is such a big undertaking 147 00:08:19,960 --> 00:08:23,239 Speaker 2: and why getting this choice right mattered so much. 148 00:08:23,880 --> 00:08:27,240 Speaker 3: So this was a big deal for some reasons that 149 00:08:27,280 --> 00:08:30,640 Speaker 3: were technological and some reasons that were sort of political. 150 00:08:31,240 --> 00:08:34,160 Speaker 3: As Jordan mentioned, Denmark was one of the first European 151 00:08:34,200 --> 00:08:37,520 Speaker 3: countries to make this upgrade to five G. The promise 152 00:08:37,520 --> 00:08:40,319 Speaker 3: of five G is really that it's going to be faster, 153 00:08:40,920 --> 00:08:44,200 Speaker 3: more reliable. There's not going to be really any delay 154 00:08:44,240 --> 00:08:46,960 Speaker 3: at all. You can put a lot more devices on 155 00:08:47,000 --> 00:08:50,440 Speaker 3: the network, there's a lot more bandwidth. The bottom line 156 00:08:50,480 --> 00:08:52,680 Speaker 3: is just that it's going to be a real step 157 00:08:52,760 --> 00:08:55,000 Speaker 3: change from what we have now and in ways that'll 158 00:08:55,080 --> 00:08:58,199 Speaker 3: kind of allow different kinds of devices to be on 159 00:08:58,280 --> 00:08:59,320 Speaker 3: the cellular network. 160 00:09:00,800 --> 00:09:04,160 Speaker 2: Here we have what Jordan describes as this bakeoff between 161 00:09:04,880 --> 00:09:08,800 Speaker 2: ericson the kind of hometown favorite and Huawei to get 162 00:09:08,840 --> 00:09:11,480 Speaker 2: this five G contract and so what happens from there. 163 00:09:12,160 --> 00:09:17,400 Speaker 3: So the negotiations stretch through the winter of twenty eighteen 164 00:09:17,440 --> 00:09:20,800 Speaker 3: twenty nineteen, and then we come to the end of 165 00:09:20,840 --> 00:09:23,760 Speaker 3: the process, with sort of the bidder end of this process. 166 00:09:24,040 --> 00:09:25,840 Speaker 3: Both sides have put in what's supposed to be their 167 00:09:25,880 --> 00:09:30,199 Speaker 3: best and final offers. This information is very highly sensitive 168 00:09:30,360 --> 00:09:34,480 Speaker 3: at TDC, the Danish Telecom. A couple weeks after both 169 00:09:34,520 --> 00:09:38,520 Speaker 3: sides have submitted their best and final offers, Huawei suddenly, 170 00:09:38,800 --> 00:09:41,000 Speaker 3: in the wee hours of the morning, turns in a 171 00:09:41,200 --> 00:09:44,520 Speaker 3: revised bid. And that's a little weird in and of itself. 172 00:09:44,679 --> 00:09:47,440 Speaker 3: But the thing that's really weird about it, and very 173 00:09:47,800 --> 00:09:53,400 Speaker 3: suggestive is that while Huawei's earlier bid was higher than Erickson's, 174 00:09:53,600 --> 00:09:58,040 Speaker 3: the new one is just under Ericson's bid, so just 175 00:09:58,200 --> 00:10:02,400 Speaker 3: enough to be the winner. And that day, the Huawei 176 00:10:02,640 --> 00:10:06,160 Speaker 3: country manager, a man named Jason Lan, whose job it 177 00:10:06,200 --> 00:10:08,560 Speaker 3: is to get this contract and who has used the 178 00:10:08,640 --> 00:10:11,600 Speaker 3: sort of ample resources of Huawei to try to whine 179 00:10:11,640 --> 00:10:13,800 Speaker 3: and dine his way to get it, he asks for 180 00:10:13,800 --> 00:10:17,840 Speaker 3: a meeting with a senior executive at TDC, the Danish Telecom. 181 00:10:18,280 --> 00:10:21,240 Speaker 3: The two get to the meeting and Lan, who normally 182 00:10:21,320 --> 00:10:24,959 Speaker 3: is this kind of solicitous guy, Land seemed like a 183 00:10:25,040 --> 00:10:30,040 Speaker 3: totally different person, has this extremely uncharacteristic swagger, while the 184 00:10:30,080 --> 00:10:33,480 Speaker 3: TDC executive, a guy named Jens Alos, doesn't sort of 185 00:10:33,480 --> 00:10:36,680 Speaker 3: say specifically what it is that Land says. According to 186 00:10:37,360 --> 00:10:39,920 Speaker 3: a statement Alos gave to his security team, this is 187 00:10:39,960 --> 00:10:43,400 Speaker 3: extremely alarming to Alos, who basically cuts the meeting short 188 00:10:43,440 --> 00:10:45,200 Speaker 3: after just a few minutes and goes back to the 189 00:10:45,200 --> 00:10:48,560 Speaker 3: office and launches an investigation. So how did this information 190 00:10:48,640 --> 00:10:50,880 Speaker 3: that's supposed to be some of the most protected information 191 00:10:50,880 --> 00:10:53,200 Speaker 3: in the company get out to kind of like the 192 00:10:53,280 --> 00:10:55,480 Speaker 3: last people in the world who should have known it. 193 00:10:56,960 --> 00:11:01,199 Speaker 2: After the break, TDC goes looking for a possible leaker 194 00:11:01,520 --> 00:11:13,040 Speaker 2: inside their operation Jordan. Right before the break, we heard 195 00:11:13,440 --> 00:11:16,840 Speaker 2: how these Danish executives found out that Huawei may have 196 00:11:16,880 --> 00:11:21,880 Speaker 2: gotten information about their competitors' bid and they launched this investigation. 197 00:11:22,679 --> 00:11:24,679 Speaker 2: What did they do? How'd they go about trying to 198 00:11:24,720 --> 00:11:26,360 Speaker 2: find a suspected leaker? 199 00:11:27,000 --> 00:11:30,280 Speaker 1: So the first thing that TDC did was they homed 200 00:11:30,280 --> 00:11:33,280 Speaker 1: in on the actual ericson bid document. This was a 201 00:11:33,320 --> 00:11:36,320 Speaker 1: set of documents that existed on TDC's network but was 202 00:11:36,440 --> 00:11:39,920 Speaker 1: very closely protected. It was a restricted access list. Only 203 00:11:39,960 --> 00:11:43,080 Speaker 1: about a dozen people had authorized access to it. And 204 00:11:43,280 --> 00:11:47,480 Speaker 1: at first they don't necessarily assume it's a person or 205 00:11:47,520 --> 00:11:49,839 Speaker 1: it could be a hacker. They don't know. All they 206 00:11:49,880 --> 00:11:53,280 Speaker 1: know is that this information leaked. When you buy equipment 207 00:11:53,320 --> 00:11:55,440 Speaker 1: from a company like Huawei or Ericson or anybody else, 208 00:11:55,480 --> 00:11:57,520 Speaker 1: you don't just get the equipment, you get the people too, 209 00:11:57,760 --> 00:12:01,040 Speaker 1: Like you get the service technicians essentially come and work 210 00:12:01,040 --> 00:12:04,200 Speaker 1: on your campus to service and maintain this equipment. So 211 00:12:04,440 --> 00:12:06,560 Speaker 1: one of the first things that you know, the TDC 212 00:12:06,720 --> 00:12:10,400 Speaker 1: security team considered was was there a hack. Did one 213 00:12:10,440 --> 00:12:13,280 Speaker 1: of these Huawei employees that you know walks freely throughout 214 00:12:13,280 --> 00:12:16,520 Speaker 1: the TDC offices, did they install malware? Did they go 215 00:12:16,600 --> 00:12:18,800 Speaker 1: into a room that they weren't supposed to, you know, 216 00:12:19,000 --> 00:12:22,520 Speaker 1: was there an insider of that variety? And secondarily what 217 00:12:22,559 --> 00:12:26,040 Speaker 1: they considered was did somebody who had legitimate access to 218 00:12:26,040 --> 00:12:29,240 Speaker 1: this file did they intentionally leak it? So at the beginning, 219 00:12:29,240 --> 00:12:32,440 Speaker 1: there were two parallel investigations, and that led to the 220 00:12:32,480 --> 00:12:37,120 Speaker 1: security team asking for and receiving the executives' cell phones, 221 00:12:37,480 --> 00:12:40,280 Speaker 1: their laptops, and what they were looking for was evidence 222 00:12:40,320 --> 00:12:42,760 Speaker 1: of potential hack. Now they didn't find one. 223 00:12:43,120 --> 00:12:44,880 Speaker 3: And while they're doing all this, while they're getting everyone's 224 00:12:44,960 --> 00:12:48,200 Speaker 3: laptops and cell phones, they're trying to keep secret the 225 00:12:48,240 --> 00:12:50,920 Speaker 3: fact that there is this investigation, what the investigation is for. 226 00:12:51,000 --> 00:12:54,120 Speaker 3: So it's this very delicate operation. The security team at 227 00:12:54,160 --> 00:12:58,319 Speaker 3: TDC who's carrying out the investigation works in this subterranean room. 228 00:12:58,920 --> 00:13:02,320 Speaker 3: They're basically trying to investigate the leadership of the company 229 00:13:02,640 --> 00:13:05,760 Speaker 3: that they work for without letting them know that that's 230 00:13:05,800 --> 00:13:08,319 Speaker 3: what they're doing. Among other things, it kind of makes 231 00:13:08,480 --> 00:13:11,199 Speaker 3: the folks on the security team, who are kind of 232 00:13:11,240 --> 00:13:13,559 Speaker 3: paranoid guys to begin with. It's a lot of former 233 00:13:14,240 --> 00:13:18,840 Speaker 3: intelligence officers, former cops. It makes them even more jumpy 234 00:13:19,160 --> 00:13:19,800 Speaker 3: than usual. 235 00:13:20,679 --> 00:13:24,040 Speaker 1: A hack would have been the easier breach to investigate. 236 00:13:24,440 --> 00:13:27,240 Speaker 1: If there's a hack, you can identify the device that 237 00:13:27,320 --> 00:13:29,880 Speaker 1: was compromised, you could identify the account that was compromised, 238 00:13:29,880 --> 00:13:32,960 Speaker 1: and you can close those holes. What TDC's security team 239 00:13:33,040 --> 00:13:36,480 Speaker 1: landed on, however, was the far worse option, which was 240 00:13:36,800 --> 00:13:39,440 Speaker 1: there is a mole. There is a leaker inside this 241 00:13:39,520 --> 00:13:44,480 Speaker 1: company who is intentionally sharing very secret information about Ericson's 242 00:13:44,480 --> 00:13:48,080 Speaker 1: bid with Huawei to help Whahwei win this contract. The 243 00:13:48,120 --> 00:13:50,840 Speaker 1: only people who had access to that information were some 244 00:13:50,920 --> 00:13:53,400 Speaker 1: of the most senior executives at the company. So that 245 00:13:53,520 --> 00:13:56,680 Speaker 1: is a very concerning prospect because the folks on this 246 00:13:56,720 --> 00:13:59,040 Speaker 1: security team they didn't know who to trust. 247 00:14:00,320 --> 00:14:03,800 Speaker 2: And Drake the security team went to great lengths to 248 00:14:04,480 --> 00:14:07,439 Speaker 2: not only disguise the fact that they were doing this investigation, 249 00:14:07,559 --> 00:14:11,360 Speaker 2: but to actually protect the equipment that they were using 250 00:14:11,440 --> 00:14:13,480 Speaker 2: to try to find the suspected leaker. 251 00:14:14,160 --> 00:14:16,480 Speaker 3: A lot of what the security team was doing was 252 00:14:16,920 --> 00:14:21,440 Speaker 3: looking at this hardware for signs of infiltration, and so 253 00:14:21,960 --> 00:14:25,520 Speaker 3: every night after they'd done that, they would box them 254 00:14:25,600 --> 00:14:30,080 Speaker 3: up in these big, kind of rugged military style crates 255 00:14:30,720 --> 00:14:34,880 Speaker 3: and then drive them to downtown Copenhagen and wheel them 256 00:14:34,880 --> 00:14:38,640 Speaker 3: into this bank vault at Danska Bank so that they 257 00:14:38,720 --> 00:14:42,320 Speaker 3: could be safe off the site of TDC's offices for 258 00:14:42,400 --> 00:14:45,960 Speaker 3: the night. Despite all of these precautions they're taking, members 259 00:14:46,000 --> 00:14:48,160 Speaker 3: of the team start to get the distinct impression that 260 00:14:48,200 --> 00:14:53,800 Speaker 3: they also are being investigated or surveilled, and there's evidence 261 00:14:53,840 --> 00:14:59,440 Speaker 3: that they were right. They discovered these microphones in the 262 00:14:59,520 --> 00:15:02,600 Speaker 3: TDC boardroom that really weren't supposed to be there, and 263 00:15:02,640 --> 00:15:05,640 Speaker 3: nobody could quite explain how they had gotten there. 264 00:15:06,040 --> 00:15:09,520 Speaker 2: Who did they think was listening in on them? 265 00:15:09,840 --> 00:15:12,840 Speaker 3: I mean, they never figured out who installed the microphones. 266 00:15:13,400 --> 00:15:17,320 Speaker 3: The suspicion was that these were not folks inside TDC. 267 00:15:17,440 --> 00:15:19,800 Speaker 3: This wasn't people at TDC trying to find out about 268 00:15:19,800 --> 00:15:22,520 Speaker 3: the investigation. That's when they decided they needed to move 269 00:15:22,560 --> 00:15:26,000 Speaker 3: the entire investigation off site. They decamped to this fifteenth 270 00:15:26,080 --> 00:15:30,240 Speaker 3: floor room that's on the water and Copenhagen has got 271 00:15:30,240 --> 00:15:33,280 Speaker 3: this very beautiful, dramatic location with views of the shore. 272 00:15:33,760 --> 00:15:36,520 Speaker 2: But even after moving, they still had this feeling that 273 00:15:36,960 --> 00:15:38,160 Speaker 2: they were being watched. 274 00:15:38,760 --> 00:15:41,200 Speaker 3: Yeah, and this gets us to one of the kind 275 00:15:41,200 --> 00:15:44,680 Speaker 3: of most eerie sort of occurrences in the story, which 276 00:15:44,720 --> 00:15:47,960 Speaker 3: is that one night after the team has gone home, 277 00:15:48,320 --> 00:15:53,480 Speaker 3: like twelve twenty am, there's a security guard who's making 278 00:15:53,520 --> 00:15:56,920 Speaker 3: his rounds and he sees these bright lights and realizes 279 00:15:56,960 --> 00:15:59,240 Speaker 3: that he's looking at a drone hundreds of feet up 280 00:15:59,240 --> 00:16:01,360 Speaker 3: in the air, and as he watches, it kind of 281 00:16:01,400 --> 00:16:05,760 Speaker 3: like maneuvers around for several minutes and then descends kind 282 00:16:05,760 --> 00:16:08,120 Speaker 3: of out of sight to the ground. 283 00:16:08,280 --> 00:16:11,960 Speaker 2: And it's hovering right outside the window of the investigator's office. 284 00:16:12,120 --> 00:16:15,240 Speaker 3: That's right exactly. And the investigators and they get to 285 00:16:15,440 --> 00:16:17,680 Speaker 3: work the next day and sort of learn this story, 286 00:16:17,720 --> 00:16:20,720 Speaker 3: realize that they've left the blinds open in this window 287 00:16:20,760 --> 00:16:24,320 Speaker 3: and there's actually this giant whiteboard as part of the 288 00:16:24,320 --> 00:16:26,480 Speaker 3: documents that we base this on, like a photo of it, 289 00:16:26,520 --> 00:16:29,120 Speaker 3: where they've kind of laid out this giant chart of 290 00:16:29,160 --> 00:16:32,240 Speaker 3: connections everything they're looking at in their investigation. 291 00:16:34,720 --> 00:16:37,160 Speaker 2: So if the drone had a camera, they fear that 292 00:16:37,240 --> 00:16:38,480 Speaker 2: it could have been photographed. 293 00:16:38,680 --> 00:16:40,520 Speaker 3: Yeah, I mean, the idea is that this would have 294 00:16:40,520 --> 00:16:42,200 Speaker 3: been visible to that drone. 295 00:16:42,600 --> 00:16:45,360 Speaker 1: Yeah, it wasn't just a drone. The security team also 296 00:16:45,400 --> 00:16:48,360 Speaker 1: starts to believe that it too, is being followed. You know, 297 00:16:48,480 --> 00:16:51,320 Speaker 1: some members of that security team begin to see the 298 00:16:51,360 --> 00:16:54,440 Speaker 1: same people pop up around town. In one case, one 299 00:16:54,480 --> 00:16:57,120 Speaker 1: of the members of the security team saw a woman 300 00:16:57,240 --> 00:17:00,440 Speaker 1: in a bar who appeared to be taking photos of him. 301 00:17:00,760 --> 00:17:05,080 Speaker 1: When he confronted her, she hurried away. When he and 302 00:17:05,200 --> 00:17:07,520 Speaker 1: his group sat back down again at the bar, a 303 00:17:07,600 --> 00:17:10,479 Speaker 1: different woman enters the bar and appeared to be listening 304 00:17:10,480 --> 00:17:13,520 Speaker 1: to their conversation. The security team could never prove that 305 00:17:13,600 --> 00:17:16,359 Speaker 1: these events were related, but they had the strong suspicion 306 00:17:16,440 --> 00:17:18,560 Speaker 1: that they were. Whether it was the drone, whether it 307 00:17:18,640 --> 00:17:20,560 Speaker 1: was the women in the bar, this was a series 308 00:17:20,600 --> 00:17:23,119 Speaker 1: of events that just really kind of culminated in this 309 00:17:23,359 --> 00:17:27,720 Speaker 1: growing fear and suspicion that this investigation had a lot 310 00:17:27,760 --> 00:17:30,359 Speaker 1: more elements to it than they had originally been aware. 311 00:17:31,000 --> 00:17:36,080 Speaker 2: So Jordan. Eventually, the security team starts to make headway 312 00:17:36,240 --> 00:17:40,920 Speaker 2: looking through all the records, all the different devices, and 313 00:17:40,960 --> 00:17:45,520 Speaker 2: they think they found the potential person who was leaking 314 00:17:45,560 --> 00:17:46,200 Speaker 2: this information. 315 00:17:46,920 --> 00:17:48,879 Speaker 1: They home in on a suspect. You know, one of 316 00:17:48,920 --> 00:17:51,720 Speaker 1: the other big characters in this story is a guy 317 00:17:51,800 --> 00:17:55,159 Speaker 1: named Dove Goldstein. Dove Goldstein had worked at TDC for 318 00:17:55,200 --> 00:17:57,840 Speaker 1: many years. He had risen through the ranks. He worked 319 00:17:57,880 --> 00:18:00,000 Speaker 1: in the finance department, and he worked on big project 320 00:18:00,240 --> 00:18:03,560 Speaker 1: He worked on special projects. He worked on the contracts 321 00:18:03,560 --> 00:18:07,679 Speaker 1: for these big network infrastructure upgrades. He was considered a 322 00:18:07,720 --> 00:18:11,119 Speaker 1: trusted executive reporting to the chief financial officer. There had 323 00:18:11,160 --> 00:18:15,320 Speaker 1: been suspicions raised about this person because he was asking questions, 324 00:18:15,400 --> 00:18:18,840 Speaker 1: he was on their radar screen, But it wasn't until 325 00:18:18,840 --> 00:18:21,520 Speaker 1: they actually got to look at his laptop that they 326 00:18:21,560 --> 00:18:23,960 Speaker 1: were able to piece together. Oh, here's what happened, And 327 00:18:24,040 --> 00:18:27,360 Speaker 1: the way Dove Goldstein enters this story is that when 328 00:18:27,400 --> 00:18:31,560 Speaker 1: the security team began looking at his history, in his calendar, 329 00:18:31,880 --> 00:18:35,200 Speaker 1: in his text messages, in his emails, what they saw 330 00:18:35,320 --> 00:18:38,960 Speaker 1: was a very deep and growing relationship with Jason Land, 331 00:18:39,359 --> 00:18:43,480 Speaker 1: Huawei's country manager for Denmark, and the communications that TDC's 332 00:18:43,520 --> 00:18:48,160 Speaker 1: security team unearthed really showed a very clear pattern around 333 00:18:48,200 --> 00:18:50,680 Speaker 1: when the negotiations were heating up and while he was 334 00:18:50,680 --> 00:18:53,920 Speaker 1: getting ready to either make a big presentation to TDC 335 00:18:54,520 --> 00:18:58,520 Speaker 1: or submit like a preliminary bid, the communications between Jason 336 00:18:58,560 --> 00:19:00,879 Speaker 1: and Dove heated up as well. They would meet for 337 00:19:01,400 --> 00:19:03,840 Speaker 1: lengthy dinners. In one case, there was a four and 338 00:19:03,840 --> 00:19:06,520 Speaker 1: a half hour dinner at a very expensive restaurant in 339 00:19:06,600 --> 00:19:10,280 Speaker 1: central Copenhagen, so there was a relationship there. What TDC 340 00:19:10,440 --> 00:19:14,800 Speaker 1: security team found in analyzing Dove Goldstein's laptop was Dove 341 00:19:14,840 --> 00:19:18,120 Speaker 1: Goldstein opened some files on his computer that he wasn't 342 00:19:18,160 --> 00:19:22,119 Speaker 1: supposed to have. This included Erickson's bid. He sets a 343 00:19:22,160 --> 00:19:24,879 Speaker 1: meeting with Jason Land, he goes to that meeting, he 344 00:19:24,960 --> 00:19:27,480 Speaker 1: brings the laptop with that information that he had just 345 00:19:27,600 --> 00:19:31,399 Speaker 1: opened to that meeting, and he is recorded on CCTV 346 00:19:31,680 --> 00:19:35,639 Speaker 1: the building CCTV system leaving for the meeting, returning from 347 00:19:35,680 --> 00:19:38,400 Speaker 1: the meeting with this Lenovo laptop under his arm. 348 00:19:39,119 --> 00:19:43,560 Speaker 2: So he wasn't supposed to have that detailed information about 349 00:19:43,680 --> 00:19:45,760 Speaker 2: Ericson's bid. How did he get it? 350 00:19:46,280 --> 00:19:49,000 Speaker 1: What the security team found was that Dove Goldstein had 351 00:19:49,040 --> 00:19:53,280 Speaker 1: received this information from his boss, the company's chief financial officer, 352 00:19:53,560 --> 00:19:56,960 Speaker 1: a guy named Steve Postwa. This information was easier for 353 00:19:57,040 --> 00:19:59,400 Speaker 1: him to get because he was in many of these meetings. 354 00:19:59,400 --> 00:20:02,120 Speaker 1: He was not on the five G committee that ultimately 355 00:20:02,119 --> 00:20:04,960 Speaker 1: made the decision, but he was the company's CFO. Our 356 00:20:05,040 --> 00:20:09,119 Speaker 1: reporting found that while TDC's security team found evidence that 357 00:20:09,800 --> 00:20:12,640 Speaker 1: the CFO had shared the information with his subordinate, they 358 00:20:12,640 --> 00:20:15,800 Speaker 1: did not find evidence that he knew that that information 359 00:20:15,880 --> 00:20:19,639 Speaker 1: had then subsequently been shared. Nevertheless, this was considered the 360 00:20:19,680 --> 00:20:20,399 Speaker 1: smoking gun. 361 00:20:21,920 --> 00:20:27,520 Speaker 2: And Drake, why would Gov Goldstein's boss share that information 362 00:20:27,600 --> 00:20:28,000 Speaker 2: with him? 363 00:20:28,119 --> 00:20:31,080 Speaker 3: Yeah, I mean that's a great question. We don't know. 364 00:20:31,640 --> 00:20:35,720 Speaker 2: So Drake, what happened then when it was discovered that 365 00:20:36,040 --> 00:20:37,920 Speaker 2: Huawei had received this information? 366 00:20:38,280 --> 00:20:42,200 Speaker 3: So TDC decides pretty quickly in their investigation that they 367 00:20:42,400 --> 00:20:45,959 Speaker 3: can't do business with Huawei after what they've learned, and 368 00:20:46,040 --> 00:20:49,840 Speaker 3: communicate this to Huawei in kind of provisional way and 369 00:20:49,880 --> 00:20:52,680 Speaker 3: then do it in an official way. At this breakfast 370 00:20:52,720 --> 00:20:57,240 Speaker 3: meeting where Jason Land is there. Other Huawei executives have 371 00:20:57,320 --> 00:21:00,120 Speaker 3: flown in to be there. From the sound of it 372 00:21:00,280 --> 00:21:04,159 Speaker 3: was a pretty intense meeting. According to you know, a 373 00:21:04,200 --> 00:21:07,520 Speaker 3: statement that TDC executive made to the security team after 374 00:21:07,560 --> 00:21:11,080 Speaker 3: the fact, there were these kind of veiled threats of 375 00:21:11,520 --> 00:21:16,440 Speaker 3: the difficulties that Danish companies would have in China should 376 00:21:16,800 --> 00:21:21,359 Speaker 3: the deal go against Huawei, But TDC sticks with its 377 00:21:21,400 --> 00:21:23,119 Speaker 3: decision to go with Erickson. 378 00:21:23,960 --> 00:21:26,920 Speaker 2: Jordan, how do you and Drake know all of these details? 379 00:21:26,960 --> 00:21:29,840 Speaker 2: You have a lot of information about secret meetings and 380 00:21:29,880 --> 00:21:32,240 Speaker 2: the inner workings of a security team that's doing an 381 00:21:32,280 --> 00:21:35,040 Speaker 2: internal investigation. How were you able to find all of 382 00:21:35,080 --> 00:21:35,520 Speaker 2: this out? 383 00:21:36,280 --> 00:21:38,760 Speaker 1: So, Drake and I, you know, not only spoke with 384 00:21:39,080 --> 00:21:41,520 Speaker 1: about a half dozen people who were either involved with 385 00:21:41,720 --> 00:21:44,560 Speaker 1: or briefed about the findings of this investigation, but we 386 00:21:44,560 --> 00:21:49,240 Speaker 1: were also able to review extensive internal documentation from TDC 387 00:21:49,840 --> 00:21:53,639 Speaker 1: describing the investigation and its conclusions, you know, And this 388 00:21:53,720 --> 00:21:58,000 Speaker 1: included investigator's notes, This included reports that were prepared for 389 00:21:58,359 --> 00:22:03,200 Speaker 1: briefings to the board and to TDC's CEO and other executives. 390 00:22:03,359 --> 00:22:06,560 Speaker 1: A lot of our reporting comes from those documents, you know, 391 00:22:06,600 --> 00:22:09,639 Speaker 1: and the interviews with those people involved with or briefed 392 00:22:09,640 --> 00:22:10,679 Speaker 1: about the investigation. 393 00:22:11,440 --> 00:22:14,320 Speaker 2: And Drake, what did TDC say about your reporting? 394 00:22:14,680 --> 00:22:19,000 Speaker 3: TDC didn't respond in detail to the very detailed questions 395 00:22:19,040 --> 00:22:21,679 Speaker 3: we sent over to them. They did send us a 396 00:22:21,720 --> 00:22:25,480 Speaker 3: statement that read, we recognize some of the things in 397 00:22:25,560 --> 00:22:29,200 Speaker 3: Bloomberg's findings from our own files. We conducted a broad 398 00:22:29,200 --> 00:22:33,600 Speaker 3: and deep investigation, and all appropriate measures were taken Accordingly. 399 00:22:34,280 --> 00:22:37,119 Speaker 3: None of the employees directly mentioned by Bloomberg work for 400 00:22:37,160 --> 00:22:39,879 Speaker 3: the company today and Jordan. 401 00:22:39,960 --> 00:22:44,600 Speaker 2: That raises the question what happened to Dove Goldstein and 402 00:22:44,800 --> 00:22:48,400 Speaker 2: to his boss, the chief financial officer of TDC. 403 00:22:49,119 --> 00:22:53,359 Speaker 1: Shortly after the security team submitted its findings to the 404 00:22:53,400 --> 00:22:58,000 Speaker 1: executive you know staff at TDC. Dove Goldstein's boss, Steve Postwor, 405 00:22:58,080 --> 00:23:01,440 Speaker 1: the chief financial officer, he left the company. TDC announced 406 00:23:01,440 --> 00:23:04,520 Speaker 1: his departure in March of that year, just a few 407 00:23:04,520 --> 00:23:07,000 Speaker 1: weeks after you know, a lot of this was happening. 408 00:23:07,200 --> 00:23:09,840 Speaker 1: They did not provide a reason for his departure. Dove 409 00:23:09,920 --> 00:23:13,960 Speaker 1: Goldstein left a short time after. We reached both men separately, 410 00:23:14,040 --> 00:23:16,040 Speaker 1: and they both declined to comment for the story. 411 00:23:17,000 --> 00:23:19,080 Speaker 2: And what about Huawei? What do they have to say 412 00:23:19,160 --> 00:23:19,680 Speaker 2: about this? 413 00:23:20,240 --> 00:23:24,320 Speaker 1: We sent haweih very detailed statements of our findings. They 414 00:23:24,400 --> 00:23:28,040 Speaker 1: declined to address specific questions, but issued us a statement 415 00:23:28,119 --> 00:23:31,679 Speaker 1: saying that Huawei complies with applicable laws and regulations and 416 00:23:31,760 --> 00:23:35,159 Speaker 1: strives for the highest standards of business conduct. We deny 417 00:23:35,240 --> 00:23:39,399 Speaker 1: any wrongdoing. Jason Land, who is still a Huawei employee, 418 00:23:39,560 --> 00:23:43,320 Speaker 1: issued us a statement through a personal attorney. Land quote 419 00:23:43,760 --> 00:23:46,679 Speaker 1: believes that he has acted in compliance with all applicable 420 00:23:46,760 --> 00:23:51,200 Speaker 1: laws and regulations at all times. Land's lawyer describes Land's 421 00:23:51,240 --> 00:23:55,439 Speaker 1: relationship with Goldstein as quote of a professional nature and 422 00:23:55,520 --> 00:23:59,000 Speaker 1: one that was appropriate in the circumstances. Our reporting shows 423 00:23:59,040 --> 00:24:00,680 Speaker 1: he continues to work for them this day. 424 00:24:01,359 --> 00:24:04,439 Speaker 2: When we come back, Huawei turns its attention to winning 425 00:24:04,480 --> 00:24:14,639 Speaker 2: five G contracts across the globe. 426 00:24:15,520 --> 00:24:15,720 Speaker 3: Drake. 427 00:24:15,800 --> 00:24:19,520 Speaker 2: So what's happened since with Huawei they're still trying to 428 00:24:19,560 --> 00:24:23,440 Speaker 2: pursue these contracts in other countries? How is that going well? 429 00:24:23,480 --> 00:24:26,639 Speaker 3: I think the moment that we're writing about here marks 430 00:24:26,640 --> 00:24:30,080 Speaker 3: a kind of high water mark for Huawei. Before they 431 00:24:30,119 --> 00:24:33,840 Speaker 3: really were winning a lot of contracts, taking business away 432 00:24:33,840 --> 00:24:37,440 Speaker 3: from their competitors in all over the world, and afterward 433 00:24:37,800 --> 00:24:40,840 Speaker 3: that's changed. It's more that this is indicative of a 434 00:24:40,840 --> 00:24:44,800 Speaker 3: certain kind of behavior that I think has alarmed business 435 00:24:44,880 --> 00:24:48,080 Speaker 3: leaders and government officials in all sorts of countries for 436 00:24:48,160 --> 00:24:51,760 Speaker 3: some time now, and so in the years since, you've 437 00:24:51,800 --> 00:24:56,439 Speaker 3: seen Huawei lose deals kind of all over the place, 438 00:24:56,560 --> 00:25:00,440 Speaker 3: and you've actually seen governments in Europe and elsewhere put 439 00:25:00,480 --> 00:25:04,119 Speaker 3: in place policies where Huawei gear cannot be used in 440 00:25:04,200 --> 00:25:08,040 Speaker 3: their telecom infrastructure, especially in sensitive parts of it, and 441 00:25:08,080 --> 00:25:09,960 Speaker 3: in some instances has to be taken out. 442 00:25:10,480 --> 00:25:13,080 Speaker 2: And is that in direct response to this sort of 443 00:25:13,160 --> 00:25:17,000 Speaker 2: pressure from the US that were describing earlier to discourage 444 00:25:17,040 --> 00:25:18,360 Speaker 2: the use of Huawei equipment. 445 00:25:18,800 --> 00:25:21,480 Speaker 1: Part of it is that the US has put extraordinary 446 00:25:21,480 --> 00:25:25,040 Speaker 1: pressure on its allies to not use Huawei equipment, especially 447 00:25:25,040 --> 00:25:27,560 Speaker 1: for five G, which is a special type of technology 448 00:25:27,680 --> 00:25:31,120 Speaker 1: that requires lots and lots of maintenance by the equipment vendors. 449 00:25:31,119 --> 00:25:33,560 Speaker 1: So like you don't just get Huawei equipment, you get 450 00:25:33,560 --> 00:25:36,119 Speaker 1: their people as well. So the US has put amazing 451 00:25:36,160 --> 00:25:38,240 Speaker 1: amount of pressure on its allies to not use WAWEH 452 00:25:38,240 --> 00:25:40,520 Speaker 1: and that's had an effect with five G in North 453 00:25:40,520 --> 00:25:43,879 Speaker 1: America and Western Europe. However, if you look around the world, 454 00:25:44,320 --> 00:25:47,240 Speaker 1: Huawei still has close to a third of the market 455 00:25:47,280 --> 00:25:52,840 Speaker 1: total market share worldwide for telecommunications infrastructure equipment, right, and 456 00:25:52,880 --> 00:25:54,359 Speaker 1: if you look at a map of the world, you 457 00:25:54,440 --> 00:25:57,359 Speaker 1: see Asia, you see Russia, you see Latin America, you 458 00:25:57,400 --> 00:26:00,479 Speaker 1: see Africa, right like you see giant parts of the 459 00:26:00,480 --> 00:26:04,879 Speaker 1: globe that are firmly in Huawei's corner, and where Huawei 460 00:26:05,080 --> 00:26:08,040 Speaker 1: did get five G deals, where Huawei still has a 461 00:26:08,080 --> 00:26:11,600 Speaker 1: really commanding presence. So Ericson and Nokia, for all of 462 00:26:11,600 --> 00:26:14,800 Speaker 1: their successes in Western Europe and North America, with five G, 463 00:26:15,200 --> 00:26:19,040 Speaker 1: they're far from the lead. And there's no indication that 464 00:26:19,080 --> 00:26:21,760 Speaker 1: these you know, these two Nordic companies will be able 465 00:26:21,800 --> 00:26:25,200 Speaker 1: to catch up Tohuawei anytime soon despite some of these setbacks. 466 00:26:26,320 --> 00:26:28,439 Speaker 2: Jordan, What are we supposed to make of this? This 467 00:26:28,640 --> 00:26:32,119 Speaker 2: was one five G deal, a fairly small one in 468 00:26:32,320 --> 00:26:36,760 Speaker 2: one country, and yet obviously has had big repercussions. What 469 00:26:36,800 --> 00:26:41,400 Speaker 2: does this say about these larger forces between the US 470 00:26:41,440 --> 00:26:44,360 Speaker 2: and China and West versus East. 471 00:26:44,760 --> 00:26:48,080 Speaker 1: This deal was in many ways a proxy fight between 472 00:26:48,440 --> 00:26:51,680 Speaker 1: the US and China or the future of you know, technology, 473 00:26:51,720 --> 00:26:55,640 Speaker 1: dominance and technology kind of control. This very small country 474 00:26:55,880 --> 00:26:57,000 Speaker 1: got caught in the middle. 475 00:26:57,320 --> 00:26:57,480 Speaker 3: You know. 476 00:26:57,560 --> 00:26:59,520 Speaker 1: One way to think about this is that this was 477 00:26:59,560 --> 00:27:03,240 Speaker 1: like round one. This was over five G. There will 478 00:27:03,280 --> 00:27:07,359 Speaker 1: be other generations of telecommunications technology and what the Denmark 479 00:27:07,480 --> 00:27:10,360 Speaker 1: incident showed is that a lot of these countries don't 480 00:27:10,400 --> 00:27:12,720 Speaker 1: want to be bullied around by the US like they 481 00:27:12,800 --> 00:27:16,000 Speaker 1: want to be independent, they want to maintain that independence. 482 00:27:16,440 --> 00:27:18,600 Speaker 1: One thing that is clear is that even though the 483 00:27:18,680 --> 00:27:23,040 Speaker 1: US was successful throughout North America and Western Europe in 484 00:27:23,240 --> 00:27:28,320 Speaker 1: dampening interest in Huawei's technology, that doesn't mean Huawei is dead. 485 00:27:28,480 --> 00:27:31,439 Speaker 1: Far from it. Hahwei still has a commanding lead in 486 00:27:31,480 --> 00:27:35,439 Speaker 1: telecommunications infrastructure around the world, and there will be another 487 00:27:35,880 --> 00:27:38,840 Speaker 1: infrastructure bidding in a few years and another after that. 488 00:27:39,040 --> 00:27:40,800 Speaker 1: This will not be the last time that we've heard 489 00:27:41,200 --> 00:27:43,320 Speaker 1: of this kind of proxy fight between the US and 490 00:27:43,400 --> 00:27:45,480 Speaker 1: China over telecommunications infrastructure. 491 00:27:46,720 --> 00:27:49,520 Speaker 2: Jordan Drake, thanks so much for coming on the show. 492 00:27:49,960 --> 00:27:54,639 Speaker 2: Thanks Wes, Thanks for listening to us here at The 493 00:27:54,640 --> 00:27:57,760 Speaker 2: Big Take. It's a daily podcast from Bloomberg and iHeartRadio. 494 00:27:58,000 --> 00:28:02,320 Speaker 2: For more shows from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, 495 00:28:02,400 --> 00:28:04,959 Speaker 2: or wherever you listen, and we'd love to hear from you. 496 00:28:05,160 --> 00:28:08,360 Speaker 2: Email us questions or comments to Big Take at Bloomberg 497 00:28:08,400 --> 00:28:11,679 Speaker 2: dot net. The supervising producer of The Big Take is 498 00:28:11,760 --> 00:28:16,119 Speaker 2: Vicky Bergalina. Our senior producer is Catherine Fink. Our producers 499 00:28:16,119 --> 00:28:20,320 Speaker 2: are Moe Barrow and Michael Falero. Hilde Garcia is our engineer. 500 00:28:20,760 --> 00:28:24,879 Speaker 2: Our original music was composed by Leo Sidrin. I'm West Kesova. 501 00:28:25,080 --> 00:28:27,320 Speaker 2: We'll be back tomorrow with another big take.