WEBVTT - Tech News: What a hack!

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from iHeartRadio. Hey there,

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<v Speaker 1>and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host Jonathan Strickland.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm an executive producer with iHeart Podcasts. And how the

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<v Speaker 1>tech are you? It's time for the tech news for

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<v Speaker 1>the week ending July fifth, twenty twenty four. And y'all.

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<v Speaker 1>One of the tricky things about designing a website is

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<v Speaker 1>that you can't know which browsers your users are going

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<v Speaker 1>to be relying upon when they visit it. So you

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<v Speaker 1>might build a site that works great in certain current browsers,

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<v Speaker 1>but if you go back a generation or three, maybe

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<v Speaker 1>things aren't quite so seamless. But you still have people

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<v Speaker 1>out there who are relying on those browsers. So what

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<v Speaker 1>do you do. Do you try and design for the

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<v Speaker 1>lowest common denominator. Well, for many web designers, one work

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<v Speaker 1>around for this problem resided on an online code library

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<v Speaker 1>called polyfilm. The project is an open source one that

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<v Speaker 1>would put JavaScript code up on a polyfil account and

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<v Speaker 1>that would allow websites to include just a particular URL

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<v Speaker 1>link in the website design, and the library would work

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<v Speaker 1>with older browsers and allow them to display web pages

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<v Speaker 1>properly so that you know, you would still see the

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<v Speaker 1>way the web page was supposed to be laid out,

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<v Speaker 1>So it offloaded a lot of work for web designers.

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<v Speaker 1>You could just include this link and it would do

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<v Speaker 1>the work for you. But then earlier this year, a

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<v Speaker 1>Chinese company called finuln Ul or Funnel maybe it's funnel

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<v Speaker 1>funnel makes more sense anyway, they purchased both the GitHub

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<v Speaker 1>account that hosted this library, as well as the domain

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<v Speaker 1>name for the polyfil site, and last week a cybersecurity

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<v Speaker 1>company called Sansec alerted the world that what you to

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<v Speaker 1>be that JavaScript code is now code that redirects visits

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<v Speaker 1>to other websites, mainly ones related to porn or gambling.

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<v Speaker 1>That's not great. The security firm also said that the

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<v Speaker 1>code was designed so that it wasn't redirecting all the time,

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<v Speaker 1>and this was probably an effort to hide the fact

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<v Speaker 1>it was doing it at all, right, Like if it

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<v Speaker 1>was only doing it in certain hours, then it was

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<v Speaker 1>going to avoid detection longer. But it wasn't long before

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<v Speaker 1>various web companies began to block the domain entirely, and

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<v Speaker 1>the guy who first built polypill posted a message urging

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<v Speaker 1>website administrators to remove links to the Online Code Library.

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<v Speaker 1>Ours Technica's Dan Goodin reports that nearly four hundred thousand

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<v Speaker 1>sites are still linked to the library despite these warnings,

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<v Speaker 1>including sites that are connected to the US federal government,

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<v Speaker 1>which is a big old wompwomp. So these aren't just

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<v Speaker 1>little independent websites out there that are falling victim to this.

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<v Speaker 1>Some of those websites are connected to assive companies and

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<v Speaker 1>other organizations, you know, groups that should absolutely prioritize removing

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<v Speaker 1>malicious links and code from their web pages. But I

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<v Speaker 1>can't bust the USA's chops too much on this because,

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<v Speaker 1>as good In reveals in his article, more than half

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<v Speaker 1>of all the websites that are still linking to Polythyl

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<v Speaker 1>are actually in Germany, which is a big old achluliba.

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<v Speaker 1>In the end, this story shows that supply chain attacks

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<v Speaker 1>can really be effective. So that's when hackers aren't targeting

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<v Speaker 1>end companies, organizations, or individuals. Instead they target the tools

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<v Speaker 1>and services that those end targets are relying upon. So

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<v Speaker 1>you poison the supply chain and you hit a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of targets. It's also a black mark against Chinese companies

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<v Speaker 1>continuing to cause chaos online. Speaking of supply chain attacks.

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<v Speaker 1>What happens when the company that you count on for

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<v Speaker 1>added security is the target of hackers. That's a question

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<v Speaker 1>folks are asking after authe au Thhy, a two factor

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<v Speaker 1>authentication app, got hit by hackers. More specifically, the company

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<v Speaker 1>that makes Authee, a company called Twilio, revealed that hackers

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<v Speaker 1>had managed to access a limited amount of customer information,

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<v Speaker 1>apparently limited to just around thirty three million cell phone numbers. Now.

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<v Speaker 1>Authee is an app that generates codes meant to authenticate

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<v Speaker 1>users as they log into various services. I actually have

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<v Speaker 1>an Authee account so that I can log into Twitch,

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<v Speaker 1>for example. So I think there's a certain assumption among

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<v Speaker 1>users that the service is also secure because it exists

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<v Speaker 1>solely to aid in the security of other services. You

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<v Speaker 1>think if it's a company that's in the security business,

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<v Speaker 1>it should be pretty safe. And yet Twillio has confirmed

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<v Speaker 1>that hackers access to and quote unquote unauthenticated endpoint to

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<v Speaker 1>steal the list of customer phone numbers. While that information

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<v Speaker 1>has limited value, it does mean that the hackers might

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<v Speaker 1>rely on the data to conduct phishing attacks, or more

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<v Speaker 1>likely sell the data for cheap on a black market

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<v Speaker 1>where other people can use it for phishing attacks and such.

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<v Speaker 1>We're not done with hacking news yet. A group called

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<v Speaker 1>Shiny Hunters says its attack on Ticketmaster landed the group

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<v Speaker 1>some really valuable information. I'm talking seriously valuable, like more

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<v Speaker 1>than twenty two billion dollars valuable. And as such, the

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<v Speaker 1>group has increased its initial ransom demand, which was originally

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<v Speaker 1>one million dollars, up to eight million dollars. It has,

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<v Speaker 1>in the mortal words of Darth Vader, altered the deal.

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<v Speaker 1>Pray they do not alter it further. So what's going

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<v Speaker 1>on here? All right? So the hackers breached Ticketmasters systems

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<v Speaker 1>back in May, I'm pretty sure I talked about on

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<v Speaker 1>our previous news episode, and in the process, the hackers

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<v Speaker 1>were able to access a ton of information, and that

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<v Speaker 1>includes around four hundred and forty thousand tickets to Taylor

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<v Speaker 1>Swift shows. You know, she's like the hottest ticket in town,

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<v Speaker 1>no matter what town it is. And the hackers have

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<v Speaker 1>all the information they need to do stuff like produce

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<v Speaker 1>fraudulent but working tickets. They could do that because they

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<v Speaker 1>have all the data. So imagine that you show up

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<v Speaker 1>to a Swift concert and then you find out that

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<v Speaker 1>your legitimate ticket that you purchased months ago no longer

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<v Speaker 1>works because you know someone else has beaten you to it,

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<v Speaker 1>and this is a ticket you purchased for some ungodly

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<v Speaker 1>amount of money, because, let's face it, Ticketmaster is a

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<v Speaker 1>real beast of a company, and it also has beastly

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<v Speaker 1>convenience and processing fees to boot. But because hackers were

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<v Speaker 1>able to steal your ticket information, they produced a copy.

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<v Speaker 1>Maybe they produced a whole bunch of different copies. Maybe

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<v Speaker 1>they scalped all those tickets to unsuspecting buyers. There could

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<v Speaker 1>be one hundred other people who bought your ticket information

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<v Speaker 1>and they're also stuck waiting outside because whomever got there

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<v Speaker 1>first is currently sitting in your seat and they're waiting

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<v Speaker 1>for blank Space to start playing. That's actually the only

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<v Speaker 1>Taylor Swift song I know off the top of my head. Anyway,

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<v Speaker 1>the hackers also have information about all the people who

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<v Speaker 1>have bought tickets. They have personal identifiable information, and that

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<v Speaker 1>could mean that they could reach out to the customers

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<v Speaker 1>and pose as ticket Master. They could say, hey, we

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<v Speaker 1>have recovered your tickets. They were part of this breach,

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<v Speaker 1>but we have it. We need to secure x amount

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<v Speaker 1>of money in order to send you the updated information

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<v Speaker 1>and they're just exploiting you. That's a possibility. Maybe they

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<v Speaker 1>sell your information online and other hackers use your information

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<v Speaker 1>to conduct spear phishing campaigns against you. I mean, if

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<v Speaker 1>you're the sort of person who has spent hundreds or

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<v Speaker 1>one thousands of dollars on a concert ticket, then you

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<v Speaker 1>could end up being a very attractive target for exploitation

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<v Speaker 1>down the line. According to hack Read, the stolen information

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<v Speaker 1>includes nearly a billion sales orders and half a billion

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<v Speaker 1>unique email addresses, plus four hundred million encrypted credit cards

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<v Speaker 1>records with partial details unencrypted. Now, the encrypted credit card

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<v Speaker 1>information at the very least means the hackers don't have

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<v Speaker 1>immediate access to that information. Encryption is a tough thing

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<v Speaker 1>to break us, particularly if you're using really good encryption,

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<v Speaker 1>so they might not be able to ever get that

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<v Speaker 1>credit card information. But this is a really ugly hack

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<v Speaker 1>that has affected millions of Ticketmaster customers. So what's the

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<v Speaker 1>company going to do? Well? I do not know, but

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<v Speaker 1>I bet this is not going to look good in

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<v Speaker 1>the antitrust lawsuit that the US government has brought against

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<v Speaker 1>Live Nation, which is Ticketmaster's parent company. Now, do you

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<v Speaker 1>think we're done with hacker stories this week, don't bank

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<v Speaker 1>on it literally. Ransomware hackers targeted the Patelco credit Union

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<v Speaker 1>in California. According to John Broadkin of Ours Technica, we're

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<v Speaker 1>going to have a lot of Ours Technica stories for

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<v Speaker 1>the second half of this episode. But apparently the hackers

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<v Speaker 1>used a phishing email to trick someone within the organization

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<v Speaker 1>to activate malware that quickly began encrypting data in Patelco's systems,

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<v Speaker 1>and it locked that information away from the credit union.

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<v Speaker 1>Just as the credit card information being encrypted means that

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<v Speaker 1>hackers can't easily get to the credit cards. Well, if

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<v Speaker 1>hackers in encrypt all of an organization's data on their

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<v Speaker 1>systems and their servers, then the organization has no access

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<v Speaker 1>to their legitimate information. So among the many services that

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<v Speaker 1>have been disrupted by this massive attack are online banking,

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<v Speaker 1>which is a big one. The actual attack happened on

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<v Speaker 1>June twenty ninth, and the credit union chose to shut

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<v Speaker 1>down several of its services sort of as a protective

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<v Speaker 1>measure to prevent the hack from spreading throughout the entire system. So,

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<v Speaker 1>according to the credit Union, that includes stuff like quote transactions, transfers, payments,

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<v Speaker 1>and deposits end quote, you know, the basic functionality of

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<v Speaker 1>a bank, So direct deposits were also affected, but according

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<v Speaker 1>to the bank, cash and check deposits are still working,

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<v Speaker 1>So that sounds like for the time being, Patelco customers

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<v Speaker 1>will have to go to a physical location in order

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<v Speaker 1>to make deposits or withdrawals. They may also have had

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<v Speaker 1>their personal information compromises part of this attack. In fact,

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<v Speaker 1>patel coasys you should assume that's the case. They have

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<v Speaker 1>also said that the credit union will work with law

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<v Speaker 1>enforcement to provide protection to those customers. Now, if I

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<v Speaker 1>were to guess, I would say that would be things

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<v Speaker 1>like credit protection and maybe some id theft protection that

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<v Speaker 1>will last for like a year. That's a pretty common

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<v Speaker 1>thing that companies will offer in the wake of a

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<v Speaker 1>breach like this, but this is a particularly bad one.

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<v Speaker 1>It does really illustrate the fact that companies need to

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<v Speaker 1>really drill home the proper security measures that employees need

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<v Speaker 1>to follow in order to avoid these kinds of attacks.

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<v Speaker 1>Hackers will take any advantage they can to do this

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<v Speaker 1>sort of thing, and they will target organizations that are

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<v Speaker 1>particularly vulnerable like banking. Medical organizations are another big one,

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<v Speaker 1>because there's a huge incentive for the company to pay

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<v Speaker 1>off the ransom and get regain access to all that information.

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<v Speaker 1>But as I've always said, keep in mind, paying the

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<v Speaker 1>ransom is typically a bad idea. One, there's no guarantee

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<v Speaker 1>you're going to get everything back, or that the hackers

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<v Speaker 1>aren't going to keep copies of all the information and

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<v Speaker 1>then sell it on the black market. Two. Paying the

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<v Speaker 1>ransom sends the message, hey, these attacks work, they make money,

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<v Speaker 1>and then hackers will just step it up. So paying

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<v Speaker 1>ransoms is typically pretty bad. But at the same time,

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<v Speaker 1>if it's a mission critical kind of thing, I get

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<v Speaker 1>how it's hard to just shrug your shoulders and say, well,

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<v Speaker 1>we're just going to take a loss on this one. Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>we're going to take a quick break. When we come back,

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<v Speaker 1>we've got some more tech news stories to cover. Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>we're back, and we've got some more Ours Technica stories,

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<v Speaker 1>because there were a ton of good ones this week.

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<v Speaker 1>So Ashley Bellinger of Ours Technica, she's actually got a

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<v Speaker 1>couple of stories in this week's episode, has a disturbing

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<v Speaker 1>piece about AI and it's titled AI trains on kids

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<v Speaker 1>photos even when parents use strict privacy settings. So this

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<v Speaker 1>piece is all about how AI companies with image generators

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<v Speaker 1>have been using posted photos across the web to train

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<v Speaker 1>those models, even in cases where the platforms that are

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<v Speaker 1>hosting these photos have specific rules against data scraping, or

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<v Speaker 1>platforms where parents have settings where they can opt into

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<v Speaker 1>denying permission for the use of their children's pictures so

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<v Speaker 1>they can explicitly say I do not want these photos

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<v Speaker 1>used for anything else. And yet it appears that these

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<v Speaker 1>image generator models have still been using those kinds of

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<v Speaker 1>images to train up and that's awful. It is an

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<v Speaker 1>enormous violation of privacy. And researchers with the Human Rights

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<v Speaker 1>Watch have discovered that these companies have hundreds of photos

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<v Speaker 1>of children from vulnerable populations. That makes us even more horrifying.

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<v Speaker 1>It's not just kids, which is already bad enough, but

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<v Speaker 1>kids from disadvantaged communities where they don't have access to

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<v Speaker 1>the kinds of tools or services that others might have

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<v Speaker 1>to fight this kind of thing. Not that fighting it

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<v Speaker 1>is that easy in the first place, but it's even

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<v Speaker 1>harder for these folks. So the researcher said that the

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<v Speaker 1>metadata connected to these images sometimes also includes personal information

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<v Speaker 1>about the children, which is obviously an even bigger privacy

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<v Speaker 1>and security risk, and the generator also creates images based

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<v Speaker 1>off these reference photos. Right Like image generator companies say

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<v Speaker 1>that their AI isn't plagiarizing off of other people, just

0:13:31.679 --> 0:13:35.760
<v Speaker 1>as AI text generator companies say that the text generator

0:13:35.800 --> 0:13:39.680
<v Speaker 1>doesn't plagiarize. But there have been plenty of cases where

0:13:39.679 --> 0:13:43.840
<v Speaker 1>people have pointed out, hey, that's not entirely true. Like

0:13:43.920 --> 0:13:47.280
<v Speaker 1>you can spot elements that seem to be directly lifted

0:13:47.320 --> 0:13:50.920
<v Speaker 1>from source material, and if not directly lifted, so heavily

0:13:51.080 --> 0:13:54.480
<v Speaker 1>influenced by that source material as to constitute a copy.

0:13:54.679 --> 0:13:57.959
<v Speaker 1>So I think it's really important to read this piece.

0:13:58.000 --> 0:14:01.680
<v Speaker 1>There's a lot more that Ashley Bellinger writes about in

0:14:01.800 --> 0:14:05.080
<v Speaker 1>her article. I highly recommend reading it again. That's on

0:14:05.160 --> 0:14:07.240
<v Speaker 1>ours Technico if you want to check out the full

0:14:07.280 --> 0:14:11.880
<v Speaker 1>story now. She also has a piece titled tool Preventing

0:14:11.960 --> 0:14:16.960
<v Speaker 1>Aimmicry Cracked Artists Wonder What's next. This is kind of

0:14:16.960 --> 0:14:19.840
<v Speaker 1>related because it also has to do with AI generation

0:14:20.160 --> 0:14:23.960
<v Speaker 1>and specifically image generation. So as the headline indicates, a

0:14:24.000 --> 0:14:29.160
<v Speaker 1>tool that some online artists use called Glaze has recently

0:14:29.560 --> 0:14:31.880
<v Speaker 1>been called into question as to whether or not it

0:14:32.000 --> 0:14:36.320
<v Speaker 1>is a really great defense So glaze works by inserting

0:14:36.400 --> 0:14:40.520
<v Speaker 1>data into images, and that data alters the images in

0:14:40.560 --> 0:14:43.560
<v Speaker 1>ways that aren't noticeable by humans. In a way, you

0:14:43.560 --> 0:14:46.760
<v Speaker 1>could say it corrupts the information of the image itself.

0:14:46.800 --> 0:14:51.040
<v Speaker 1>And a computer that's scanning these images doesn't know that

0:14:51.200 --> 0:14:55.880
<v Speaker 1>the superfluous data isn't necessary. It thinks it's part of

0:14:56.280 --> 0:14:59.800
<v Speaker 1>the image. Because computers aren't looking at pictures, they're looking

0:14:59.840 --> 0:15:04.160
<v Speaker 1>at the information that makes up that picture and replicating

0:15:04.320 --> 0:15:07.600
<v Speaker 1>or working off of that. So if you're poisoning the

0:15:07.640 --> 0:15:12.640
<v Speaker 1>images by inserting some meaningless information that doesn't really show

0:15:12.760 --> 0:15:15.960
<v Speaker 1>up in the finished picture when you're looking at as

0:15:15.960 --> 0:15:18.560
<v Speaker 1>a human being, then the computer thinks, oh, well, this

0:15:18.640 --> 0:15:22.000
<v Speaker 1>is a necessary component of this kind of image for

0:15:22.120 --> 0:15:25.600
<v Speaker 1>this particular style. Like it's looking at the metadata and saying, oh,

0:15:25.640 --> 0:15:27.880
<v Speaker 1>this is the artist who created this image. If someone

0:15:27.920 --> 0:15:30.360
<v Speaker 1>asks me to create an image in the style of

0:15:30.720 --> 0:15:33.480
<v Speaker 1>this artist, I will take this data in an effort

0:15:33.560 --> 0:15:37.600
<v Speaker 1>to produce that kind of image. But because of the poison, right,

0:15:37.680 --> 0:15:40.960
<v Speaker 1>because of the superfluous data, it might take that noise

0:15:41.160 --> 0:15:44.160
<v Speaker 1>and boost the noise. So what you'll end up with

0:15:44.440 --> 0:15:48.760
<v Speaker 1>is an image that does not look like the reference material,

0:15:49.040 --> 0:15:51.240
<v Speaker 1>which is that's the whole point of glaze. It's to

0:15:51.640 --> 0:15:55.400
<v Speaker 1>poison the reference material so that artists can retain their

0:15:55.520 --> 0:15:58.840
<v Speaker 1>unique styles and not worry about computers copying it. But

0:15:58.960 --> 0:16:01.320
<v Speaker 1>now there are a pair of orobloms facing artists who

0:16:01.360 --> 0:16:03.920
<v Speaker 1>want to use glaze. So one is just that doing

0:16:03.960 --> 0:16:07.320
<v Speaker 1>so requires going through an approvals process with Glaze, and

0:16:07.400 --> 0:16:10.359
<v Speaker 1>the demand for the tool has exceeded the team's capacity

0:16:10.400 --> 0:16:13.520
<v Speaker 1>for keeping up with those requests, so there's a bottleneck there.

0:16:13.760 --> 0:16:16.200
<v Speaker 1>The other problem is that some researchers have come forward

0:16:16.240 --> 0:16:19.760
<v Speaker 1>saying that Glaze's methods aren't really bulletproof and that AI

0:16:19.840 --> 0:16:23.520
<v Speaker 1>will inevitably evolve to defeat these protections. So it's kind

0:16:23.560 --> 0:16:25.960
<v Speaker 1>of like a seesaw approach, and we've actually seen that

0:16:26.040 --> 0:16:29.320
<v Speaker 1>in other security measures like captures are a great example.

0:16:29.480 --> 0:16:32.280
<v Speaker 1>You know, experts would design a new test that in

0:16:32.360 --> 0:16:35.840
<v Speaker 1>theory is easy for humans to do but hard for machines.

0:16:36.000 --> 0:16:40.280
<v Speaker 1>But then eventually the computer scientists train up machines so

0:16:40.320 --> 0:16:42.920
<v Speaker 1>that they can do these tests as well as are

0:16:42.920 --> 0:16:45.760
<v Speaker 1>sometimes even better than humans can, and it requires a

0:16:45.800 --> 0:16:49.120
<v Speaker 1>complete redesign of the capture test, and so it goes.

0:16:49.400 --> 0:16:51.760
<v Speaker 1>The same thing could be going on in image generating

0:16:51.800 --> 0:16:54.160
<v Speaker 1>AI and the efforts to foil it and again. To

0:16:54.240 --> 0:16:57.400
<v Speaker 1>learn more about this, read Bellinger's article on ours Tetnica.

0:16:57.480 --> 0:16:59.960
<v Speaker 1>She does a phenomenal job breaking it all down again.

0:17:00.080 --> 0:17:05.679
<v Speaker 1>That's titled tool Preventing AI mimicry. Cracked artists wonder what's next? Now,

0:17:05.720 --> 0:17:07.920
<v Speaker 1>I'm sure all of y'all out there had the experience

0:17:07.920 --> 0:17:10.280
<v Speaker 1>of setting up a new television and scrolling through all

0:17:10.280 --> 0:17:11.919
<v Speaker 1>the options to find out how the heck you can

0:17:11.960 --> 0:17:15.040
<v Speaker 1>turn off motion smoothing. This is that feature that removes

0:17:15.119 --> 0:17:17.560
<v Speaker 1>motion blur, and that might look great if you're watching

0:17:17.560 --> 0:17:20.280
<v Speaker 1>a live sports event, but for everything else, well, a

0:17:20.320 --> 0:17:23.400
<v Speaker 1>lot of people really hate that effect, including me. This

0:17:23.440 --> 0:17:26.040
<v Speaker 1>is what gives everything that kind of soap opera look.

0:17:26.520 --> 0:17:28.919
<v Speaker 1>You could argue that the reason why classic films and

0:17:28.920 --> 0:17:31.879
<v Speaker 1>television look the way they do really becomes part of

0:17:31.920 --> 0:17:34.919
<v Speaker 1>a combination of limitations on the technology as well as

0:17:34.960 --> 0:17:38.360
<v Speaker 1>the costs of production. But it means that we have

0:17:38.640 --> 0:17:43.440
<v Speaker 1>certain concepts that we associate with what looks like cinema

0:17:43.640 --> 0:17:47.919
<v Speaker 1>or looks like TV, and motion smoothing kind of violates that. Well,

0:17:48.119 --> 0:17:52.800
<v Speaker 1>back in early June, Roku turned on motion smoothing by

0:17:52.800 --> 0:17:55.680
<v Speaker 1>default and there's no way to turn it off, which

0:17:55.680 --> 0:17:58.600
<v Speaker 1>has prompted William Joel of The Verge to write a

0:17:58.720 --> 0:18:02.600
<v Speaker 1>very entertaining piece title Dear Roku, you ruined my TV.

0:18:03.080 --> 0:18:06.639
<v Speaker 1>So Joel writes about how Roku has removed the choice

0:18:06.640 --> 0:18:10.440
<v Speaker 1>from users, forcing them an experience that many people do

0:18:10.480 --> 0:18:13.000
<v Speaker 1>not like. Well worth the read. It's over on the Verge.

0:18:13.119 --> 0:18:15.800
<v Speaker 1>Go check that out. Particularly, you should read it if

0:18:15.800 --> 0:18:17.800
<v Speaker 1>you happen to be an executive at Roku and you're

0:18:17.800 --> 0:18:20.919
<v Speaker 1>wondering why your customers are so agitated. It's been a

0:18:21.000 --> 0:18:24.120
<v Speaker 1>year since Meta launched its competitor to x, formerly known

0:18:24.119 --> 0:18:27.359
<v Speaker 1>as Twitter. Meta's platform is called Threads, which takes its

0:18:27.440 --> 0:18:30.920
<v Speaker 1>name from earlier abandoned Meta projects, and this week Mark

0:18:31.000 --> 0:18:33.440
<v Speaker 1>Zuckerberg announced that Threads hit one hundred and seventy five

0:18:33.480 --> 0:18:36.600
<v Speaker 1>million users, which is impressive but also shows that Meta

0:18:36.680 --> 0:18:39.240
<v Speaker 1>users have not been adopting Threads as quickly as they

0:18:39.280 --> 0:18:42.840
<v Speaker 1>have other platforms like Instagram. Zuckerberg did not go into

0:18:42.840 --> 0:18:45.439
<v Speaker 1>detail on stuff like daily users or anything like that,

0:18:45.560 --> 0:18:47.520
<v Speaker 1>and if I were a betting man, I would wager

0:18:47.600 --> 0:18:50.280
<v Speaker 1>that the reason Zuckerberg did not share those numbers is

0:18:50.280 --> 0:18:53.399
<v Speaker 1>that they aren't very impressive, because I'm guessing on a

0:18:53.480 --> 0:18:56.280
<v Speaker 1>daily basis, people just aren't going to threads that much. Yes,

0:18:56.320 --> 0:18:58.800
<v Speaker 1>there's one hundred and seventy five million users total, but

0:18:58.840 --> 0:19:02.000
<v Speaker 1>how many of those are going to threads regularly? So

0:19:02.040 --> 0:19:04.639
<v Speaker 1>the question is will Threads gain more purchase and user

0:19:04.680 --> 0:19:08.119
<v Speaker 1>mind share? And also how is X doing during all

0:19:08.200 --> 0:19:11.199
<v Speaker 1>this stuff? Honestly, I have no clue. My perception is

0:19:11.200 --> 0:19:14.520
<v Speaker 1>that things that X aren't going great, but that's largely

0:19:14.800 --> 0:19:18.280
<v Speaker 1>down to how you know, there's these ongoing challenges the

0:19:18.280 --> 0:19:21.360
<v Speaker 1>company is facing when it comes to convincing advertisers that

0:19:21.520 --> 0:19:24.119
<v Speaker 1>the ads they are paying for are not going to

0:19:24.160 --> 0:19:27.960
<v Speaker 1>show up next to hate speech. In November twenty twenty three,

0:19:28.320 --> 0:19:32.000
<v Speaker 1>Amazon launched an ambitious product called Astro, which is a

0:19:32.040 --> 0:19:35.840
<v Speaker 1>home robot, a little wheeled CTC robot that can roll

0:19:35.880 --> 0:19:38.399
<v Speaker 1>around your house and keep an eye, well, you know,

0:19:38.480 --> 0:19:41.560
<v Speaker 1>keep a keep cameras and sensors on how things are going.

0:19:41.720 --> 0:19:45.439
<v Speaker 1>And the company also introduced an enterprise version of that

0:19:45.560 --> 0:19:49.440
<v Speaker 1>bought Astro for business, so it's a device intended for

0:19:49.680 --> 0:19:53.240
<v Speaker 1>corporations and such. Now, less than a year after launch,

0:19:53.440 --> 0:19:57.919
<v Speaker 1>Amazon has announced is discontinuing the enterprise version. Customers that

0:19:57.960 --> 0:20:00.320
<v Speaker 1>bought one will receive a full refund, which is around

0:20:00.359 --> 0:20:03.240
<v Speaker 1>twenty three hundred and fifty bucks plus a few hundred

0:20:03.240 --> 0:20:06.560
<v Speaker 1>dollars in credit because their security system is going to

0:20:06.600 --> 0:20:09.880
<v Speaker 1>stop working. Once Amazon shuts down the servers on September

0:20:09.920 --> 0:20:14.360
<v Speaker 1>twenty fifth, it will brick these little robots. The company

0:20:14.359 --> 0:20:17.399
<v Speaker 1>has said it will continue to develop robotics for the home,

0:20:17.600 --> 0:20:20.320
<v Speaker 1>so it sounds like the consumer version of Astro will

0:20:20.320 --> 0:20:22.879
<v Speaker 1>continue to receive support at least for now, and that

0:20:22.960 --> 0:20:26.200
<v Speaker 1>Amazon is apparently working on successors to that twenty twenty

0:20:26.240 --> 0:20:30.280
<v Speaker 1>three model. As for Astro, for business models, they cannot

0:20:30.359 --> 0:20:34.040
<v Speaker 1>be switched to work as consumer versions, so Amazon is

0:20:34.080 --> 0:20:37.360
<v Speaker 1>sending customers shipping label so they can ship off these

0:20:37.480 --> 0:20:41.640
<v Speaker 1>former security robots back off to Amazon so they can

0:20:41.640 --> 0:20:44.359
<v Speaker 1>go to the recycling center, which seems like a pretty

0:20:44.400 --> 0:20:47.280
<v Speaker 1>sad fate for the cute little fillers. Okay, that's it

0:20:47.440 --> 0:20:49.560
<v Speaker 1>for the tech news for the week ending July fifth,

0:20:49.600 --> 0:20:52.800
<v Speaker 1>twenty twenty four. I hope you are all well and

0:20:52.840 --> 0:21:02.399
<v Speaker 1>I'll talk to you again really soon. Tech Stuff is

0:21:02.440 --> 0:21:07.000
<v Speaker 1>an iHeartRadio production. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the

0:21:07.040 --> 0:21:10.639
<v Speaker 1>iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your

0:21:10.720 --> 0:21:11.399
<v Speaker 1>favorite shows,