WEBVTT - How does consciousness emerge?

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<v Speaker 1>On the podcast, we love to ask deep questions and

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<v Speaker 1>then explore the edge of our knowledge. Today we're going

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<v Speaker 1>to go a little bit meta and try to understand

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<v Speaker 1>the workings of our own minds, the us that is

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<v Speaker 1>asking those questions and yearning to understand the universe, from

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<v Speaker 1>biology to physics, and yes, sometimes even a little bit

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<v Speaker 1>of chemistry. Science gives us this incredible tool to consistently

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<v Speaker 1>build knowledge about the universe, but it's not clear that

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<v Speaker 1>it can tell us about ourselves. That it can help

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<v Speaker 1>us understand why we have a first person subjective experience

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<v Speaker 1>in the first place, why we have an experience at all,

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<v Speaker 1>why chocolate has a taste and pain has a negative valance,

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<v Speaker 1>Why there's something it's like to be me. How's that

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<v Speaker 1>different from what it's like to be a bat? Is

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<v Speaker 1>it like anything to be a rock or a puddle

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<v Speaker 1>or a star? Science, like all you and endeavors, is

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<v Speaker 1>limited by the senses that we use to interact with

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<v Speaker 1>the universe. It can help us understand what we sense

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<v Speaker 1>and find patterns and build models, but it can't ever

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<v Speaker 1>really tell us about the hard reality of the physical

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<v Speaker 1>universe that exists out there beyond our minds and our senses,

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<v Speaker 1>and that same limitation might apply to the other end

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<v Speaker 1>of that sensory pipe. Can a scientist use science to

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<v Speaker 1>probe the nature of the mind while trapped inside their

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<v Speaker 1>own mind? That might just be the province of philosophy.

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<v Speaker 1>Today on the podcast, we're getting philosophical and asking what

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<v Speaker 1>we know and how we can know about how consciousness emerges.

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to Daniel and Kelly's Extraordinarily self Conscious Universe.

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<v Speaker 2>Hello, I'm Kelly Winnersmith. I study parasites and space, and

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<v Speaker 2>today I'm wondering if we live in a simulation.

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<v Speaker 1>Hi, I'm Daniel. I'm a particle physicist, and I don't

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<v Speaker 1>care if we live in a simulation. I want to

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<v Speaker 1>eat simulated dark chocolate.

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<v Speaker 2>So that's my question. Is it possible that we live

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<v Speaker 2>in a simulation? We're getting philosophical today, let's go all

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<v Speaker 2>the way.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, absolutely, it's possible. But it also seems like a

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<v Speaker 1>modern reflection on recent concepts about how computers work. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>one hundred years ago, people thought the whole universe was

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<v Speaker 1>like pipes and cogs, and these days we think it's

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<v Speaker 1>all computers. So it's possible, but we also have zero

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<v Speaker 1>evidence that it's a simulation, and dark chocolate tastes really

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<v Speaker 1>really good anyway.

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<v Speaker 2>That's true, and so does pad see You. I'm hungry today.

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<v Speaker 1>This is why we shouldn't report the podcast just before lunch.

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<v Speaker 2>That's right. I'm so glad that I have simulated taste

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<v Speaker 2>buds and smell receptors so that I can enjoy all

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<v Speaker 2>of those things very much.

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<v Speaker 1>But it is fascinating to think about where your consciousness were,

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<v Speaker 1>where your experience comes from, why it is that you

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<v Speaker 1>even have one while you can like or hate pad

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<v Speaker 1>see You, whether or not that's something that comes from

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<v Speaker 1>the meat in your mind, or whether it's just the

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<v Speaker 1>information circling through those neurons which could be uploaded to

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<v Speaker 1>the cloud.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah. I mean, I think you'd have to be a

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<v Speaker 2>machine to not like TI food in general personally, but

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<v Speaker 2>I could be wrong. But I'm excited that so you

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<v Speaker 2>and I. We get a lot of emails from listeners.

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<v Speaker 2>You can send those emails to questions at Daniel and

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<v Speaker 2>Kelly dot org. And lately we've been getting a lot

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<v Speaker 2>of questions from folks who have been asking about consciousness.

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<v Speaker 2>I think we've been getting like one a week for

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<v Speaker 2>a while, and we decided it was time to jump

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<v Speaker 2>into the consciousness question, and you lucked out, and you

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<v Speaker 2>happen to know the perfect guest I do.

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<v Speaker 1>There's lots of really smart folks here at you See Irvine,

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<v Speaker 1>and I'm good at googling and finding them and persuading

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<v Speaker 1>them to come and talk to me on the podcast.

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<v Speaker 1>I have a lot of fun, and this is a

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<v Speaker 1>topic that's really close to my heart. I've been thinking

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<v Speaker 1>about it for a long time and also thinking about

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<v Speaker 1>whether it's something you really can ask scientifically. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>science is wonderful and powerful, and of course we are

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<v Speaker 1>advocates for science here on the podcast, But just because

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<v Speaker 1>it's a tool that does let us build knowledge about

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<v Speaker 1>the universe doesn't mean it's a tool that can answer

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<v Speaker 1>every question. Right. You can't answer the question like should

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<v Speaker 1>I get out of bed in the morning? Why do

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<v Speaker 1>people eat white chocolate? Anyway? Right, Not every question is scientific,

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<v Speaker 1>and so there are things about the universe that we

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<v Speaker 1>can probe with science, and there are limits to what

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<v Speaker 1>science can answer. And I've always wondered how much we

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<v Speaker 1>can understand about consciousness itself using science. So I was

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<v Speaker 1>really excited to talk to a cognitive scientist who thinks

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<v Speaker 1>about this all day in a very serious way.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, I'm excited that consciousness is sort of at the

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<v Speaker 2>interface of science and philosophy, which makes it a really

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<v Speaker 2>fun topic to think about. And so I had a

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<v Speaker 2>lot of fun today with Megan Peter's chatting with her

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<v Speaker 2>about this.

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<v Speaker 1>Stopping before we dive into this wonderful conversation, we were

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<v Speaker 1>curious what folks out there thought about their own consciousness,

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<v Speaker 1>what ideas people have for why they even have an experience,

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<v Speaker 1>how these few pounds of goo in your brain somehow

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<v Speaker 1>generate all of this joy and frustration that we experience.

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<v Speaker 1>So I asked our cadre of volunteers to chime in

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<v Speaker 1>on the question how does consciousness emerge? If you'd like

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<v Speaker 1>to provide answers for a future episodes, please don't be

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<v Speaker 1>shy to right to questions at danieland Kelly dot org.

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<v Speaker 1>So think about it for a minute. How do you

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<v Speaker 1>think consciousness emerges? Here's what our listeners had to say.

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<v Speaker 3>I think we have to really think about what consciousness

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<v Speaker 3>might mean before we can figure out where it comes from.

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<v Speaker 3>But if I had to make a guess, I'd say

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<v Speaker 3>consciousness is just energy sliding into different forms as it

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<v Speaker 3>rolls along from our brain.

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<v Speaker 1>Jews exponential, exponential extension of the emergence of life. I

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<v Speaker 1>don't think anyone knows human consciousness is an intersection of

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<v Speaker 1>the more mechanistic functions of the human brain and the

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<v Speaker 1>created soul. I think consciousness needs you to have both

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<v Speaker 1>theory of mind and the complexity to apply it to yourself.

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<v Speaker 4>Very slowly on a Saturday morning after a night out

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<v Speaker 4>down the town with several coffees.

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<v Speaker 1>Consciousness is fundamental and that we are as humans somehow

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<v Speaker 1>tapped into it. Wow, consciousness, that's a bigie. Well, I

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<v Speaker 1>think it's magic.

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<v Speaker 3>As the parent of twins who think I'm pretty much useless,

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<v Speaker 3>I'll say it that somehow it involves interaction with others.

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<v Speaker 1>Consciousness emerges when the penguin models in. I've always leaned

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<v Speaker 1>towards the idea that consciousness is an illusion.

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<v Speaker 4>I believe consciousness emerges when the brain's elegical florid of

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<v Speaker 4>plasma interacts with the noise and dangers in the brain.

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<v Speaker 2>Thanks the brain itself is a sensory organ that can

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<v Speaker 2>sense its own processing.

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<v Speaker 3>A pint of strong fresh coffee is a necessary but

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<v Speaker 3>not sufficient condition.

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<v Speaker 1>It's a very complicated dance in the brain. It's a

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<v Speaker 1>very slow process. I think consciousness takes many, many forms,

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<v Speaker 1>things that the brain is doing, neural inspiring, reaching out

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<v Speaker 1>a critical consistency, and an introduction number.

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<v Speaker 3>I don't think we can know how consciousness emerges until

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<v Speaker 3>we know what consciousness is and if we have it all.

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<v Speaker 2>Right, We've got coffee, penguins, magic, all kinds of amazing

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<v Speaker 2>things in there, and a large diversity of answers.

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<v Speaker 1>Mmmmm, And there's a thread here. I've noticed a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of people suggesting that somehow it arises from the complexity

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<v Speaker 1>of the brain neurons, reaching a critical number or you know,

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<v Speaker 1>all these interactions. To me, that sort of frames the

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<v Speaker 1>question but doesn't really answer it, right, Like, why is

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<v Speaker 1>it the complex network of cells can have a consciousness

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<v Speaker 1>emerge regardless of the complexity, Right, It's not obvious to

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<v Speaker 1>me that complexity is enough. And that's really I think

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<v Speaker 1>the focus of the question for today's episode.

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<v Speaker 2>I would personally love to know the evolutionary reason why

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<v Speaker 2>we have consciousness, how does it benefit us? And would

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<v Speaker 2>we expect to see other animals to have it as well? Yeah,

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<v Speaker 2>and anyway, there were so many exciting things we talked

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<v Speaker 2>about with Megan today.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, there's lots of really fun questions there, like where

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<v Speaker 1>are there other species of humans which actually were more

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<v Speaker 1>intelligent but didn't survive because our ancestors were more warlike

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<v Speaker 1>or more cannibalistic? Right? Or if you ran the Earth

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<v Speaker 1>experiment a thousand times, how often would you even get

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<v Speaker 1>intelligence or more or less intelligence? All right? Is this

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<v Speaker 1>a fluke or is it a common outcome? Man? I'd

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<v Speaker 1>love to know the answer to those questions.

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<v Speaker 2>And you're also getting into some of the complexity there

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<v Speaker 2>because you were calling it intelligence and where does intelligence

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<v Speaker 2>end in consciousness begin? And what is the difference in

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<v Speaker 2>those things? And it gets complicated pretty fast.

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<v Speaker 1>It does. And fortunately we have an expert to help

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<v Speaker 1>us dig through this. So let's jump right into our

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<v Speaker 1>conversation with Professor Megan Peters from the Cognitive Science department

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<v Speaker 1>here at UC Irvine. All right, so it's my pleasure

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<v Speaker 1>to have on the podcast Professor Megan Peters. She's an

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<v Speaker 1>associate professor here at you see Irvine in the Department

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<v Speaker 1>of Cognitive Science. She's a PhD from UCLA in cognitive

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<v Speaker 1>science and her research aims to reveal how the brain

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<v Speaker 1>represents and uses uncertainty. She uses neuroimaging, computational modeling, machine learning,

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<v Speaker 1>and neural stimulation techniques to study all of this, and

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<v Speaker 1>most importantly, she agreed to come on the podcast and

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<v Speaker 1>talk to us about what is consciousness and answer all

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<v Speaker 1>of our questions and fend off Kelly's poop references.

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<v Speaker 4>Ah, good luck, Thank you both for having me. It's

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<v Speaker 4>really a pleasure to be here. As an aside, my

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<v Speaker 4>PhD is in psychology with a focus on cognitive and

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<v Speaker 4>computational neuroscience. If that matters, So you can cut this

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<v Speaker 4>part out if you want to redo that intro.

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<v Speaker 1>No, we'll find out if that matters, we'll see Yes,

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<v Speaker 1>absolutely great, So let's dig right in. I want to

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<v Speaker 1>know And this is maybe the hardest question we're going

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<v Speaker 1>to ask you all day. How do we define consciousness?

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<v Speaker 1>We're going to be talking about it, We're going to

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<v Speaker 1>be arguing about We're going to be saying do rocks habit?

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<v Speaker 1>Do dogs have it? But it's kind of slippery if

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<v Speaker 1>we don't even know what it is we're talking about.

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<v Speaker 1>So what is consciousness? How do we define this thing

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<v Speaker 1>that we all sort of know intuitively but have a

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<v Speaker 1>hard time describing.

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<v Speaker 4>Super important question and leads me into one of the

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<v Speaker 4>first kind of technical things that we'll talk about today,

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<v Speaker 4>which is the distinction between are the lights on? But

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<v Speaker 4>is anyone home? Essentially, So we talk in the fields

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<v Speaker 4>of psychology and in the philosophy of mind about the

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<v Speaker 4>distinction between what's called access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. So

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<v Speaker 4>these are terms that the philosopher and ned Block introduced

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<v Speaker 4>a while back, and the idea is that access consciousness

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<v Speaker 4>is about something like the global availability of information in

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<v Speaker 4>a complex system to allow that system to behave usefully

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<v Speaker 4>in its environment, to survive, to seek goals, to seek rewards,

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<v Speaker 4>to get food, to not be eaten by something. And

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<v Speaker 4>the distinction then is between you know, access consciousness, which

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<v Speaker 4>is information goes all over in the brain or in

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<v Speaker 4>the mind if there isn't a brain present. But the

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<v Speaker 4>difference then between that and phenomenal consciousness is that the

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<v Speaker 4>phenomenal consciousness has to do with the phenomenology of the

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<v Speaker 4>experience that the observer is having. So I'm going to

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<v Speaker 4>break that down that really just comes down to this

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<v Speaker 4>something that it is like to be you the qualitative

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<v Speaker 4>experiences that you have of the world. The fact that

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<v Speaker 4>pain hurts. It isn't just a signal like your tesla

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<v Speaker 4>would send to itself, like damage in my right front

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<v Speaker 4>tire or something like that. It's more like it has

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<v Speaker 4>qualitative character to it. There's something that it's like to

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<v Speaker 4>be in pain. If I whack you in the leg,

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<v Speaker 4>it's not just a signal that I've damaged the tissue

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<v Speaker 4>in your leg. There's more to it than that.

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<v Speaker 1>So are you saying that a tesla has access consciousness

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<v Speaker 1>because it notices damage in its tire, but it doesn't

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<v Speaker 1>feel pain, doesn't have anomenological consciousness, or if I miss.

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<v Speaker 4>Ansers, I wouldn't even go that far to say that

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<v Speaker 4>a tesla has any sort of access consciousness whatsoever. I

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<v Speaker 4>think that that's a higher bar there, But I think

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<v Speaker 4>that the distinction is important.

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<v Speaker 2>Right.

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<v Speaker 4>We can imagine a system that has all of the

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<v Speaker 4>hallmarks of access consciousness, like a fancy future tesla. Okay,

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<v Speaker 4>you know that has all of this global availability of information.

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<v Speaker 4>It enables flexible adaptive behavior. It can change based on

0:12:25.280 --> 0:12:28.120
<v Speaker 4>its context. It's not just going according to its programming.

0:12:28.280 --> 0:12:30.440
<v Speaker 4>You know that kind of thing. And yet there's nothing

0:12:30.440 --> 0:12:33.000
<v Speaker 4>that it's like to be that fancy future tesla. It's

0:12:33.160 --> 0:12:37.400
<v Speaker 4>just a zombie. It's just engaging in behaviors that are

0:12:37.600 --> 0:12:40.960
<v Speaker 4>useful for that organism, but there's no one home. So

0:12:42.000 --> 0:12:45.400
<v Speaker 4>someone being home aspect is also really important because we

0:12:45.440 --> 0:12:48.720
<v Speaker 4>can imagine in like, you know, not a future robot scenario,

0:12:48.920 --> 0:12:51.960
<v Speaker 4>but just a medical situation where you've got a person

0:12:52.000 --> 0:12:55.439
<v Speaker 4>who's in a coma or they're in a persistent vegetative state,

0:12:56.000 --> 0:13:00.520
<v Speaker 4>and they might wake up seemingly and have of sleep

0:13:00.559 --> 0:13:04.360
<v Speaker 4>wake cycles and maybe respond to external stimuli. But the

0:13:04.360 --> 0:13:07.840
<v Speaker 4>critical factor in deciding whether you know someone's home whether

0:13:07.920 --> 0:13:11.360
<v Speaker 4>to keep them on life support is whether there's anything

0:13:11.480 --> 0:13:15.080
<v Speaker 4>is like to be them inside. And the flip side

0:13:15.120 --> 0:13:17.760
<v Speaker 4>is also really important in the context of medical science,

0:13:17.880 --> 0:13:21.480
<v Speaker 4>because even if they don't exhibit any of the outward

0:13:21.760 --> 0:13:26.000
<v Speaker 4>signs or symptoms of being conscious, of having access to

0:13:26.080 --> 0:13:29.520
<v Speaker 4>that available information, of being able to behave in their environments,

0:13:29.840 --> 0:13:32.679
<v Speaker 4>someone still might be in there. They might be locked in.

0:13:33.280 --> 0:13:36.520
<v Speaker 4>And so it's this presence of phenomenal experience of someone

0:13:36.600 --> 0:13:40.440
<v Speaker 4>being home, so to speak, that I think is the

0:13:40.559 --> 0:13:43.440
<v Speaker 4>important thing to remember when we're talking about consciousness in

0:13:43.480 --> 0:13:46.800
<v Speaker 4>the context of biological systems or artificial ones.

0:13:47.120 --> 0:13:49.160
<v Speaker 2>So I'm still trying to wrap my head around the

0:13:49.160 --> 0:13:52.040
<v Speaker 2>two different kinds of consciousness. Is there a kind of

0:13:52.160 --> 0:13:54.559
<v Speaker 2>organism or a situation a person can be in where

0:13:54.559 --> 0:13:56.680
<v Speaker 2>they would have one but not the other to help

0:13:56.679 --> 0:13:58.480
<v Speaker 2>me sort of differentiate.

0:13:58.000 --> 0:14:01.320
<v Speaker 4>Well, For humans, the idea is that, presuming that you

0:14:01.360 --> 0:14:05.240
<v Speaker 4>don't subscribe to, you know, philosophical zombiesm that like, you

0:14:05.280 --> 0:14:07.680
<v Speaker 4>have no idea that I'm conscious, right, I exhibit all

0:14:07.720 --> 0:14:10.360
<v Speaker 4>the hallmarks, but you have no idea. But presuming that

0:14:10.440 --> 0:14:12.760
<v Speaker 4>you don't want to go down that rabbit hole, I.

0:14:12.679 --> 0:14:15.480
<v Speaker 1>Do actually in a minute.

0:14:15.600 --> 0:14:18.640
<v Speaker 4>In humans, it seems like they go hand in hand, right,

0:14:18.679 --> 0:14:21.760
<v Speaker 4>that if you have access consciousness, you have phenomenal consciousness

0:14:21.880 --> 0:14:25.080
<v Speaker 4>in general as an awake, behaving organism. But there might

0:14:25.120 --> 0:14:30.600
<v Speaker 4>be cases in specific scientific experiments where you can reveal

0:14:31.360 --> 0:14:35.560
<v Speaker 4>symptoms or cases or evidence of access consciousness in the

0:14:35.600 --> 0:14:40.080
<v Speaker 4>absence of phenomenal consciousness. So there's some very specific psychological

0:14:40.120 --> 0:14:45.040
<v Speaker 4>experiments that suggests that these are separable entities. One classic

0:14:45.120 --> 0:14:49.120
<v Speaker 4>example is a task that was actually attributed to and

0:14:49.280 --> 0:14:52.600
<v Speaker 4>was developed by a cognitive scientist here in my department,

0:14:52.640 --> 0:14:55.920
<v Speaker 4>George Spurling. So this is the classic spurling task where

0:14:55.920 --> 0:14:58.720
<v Speaker 4>you show someone an array of letters. There's like five

0:14:58.800 --> 0:15:01.320
<v Speaker 4>letters in a row, and there's rows of letters, and

0:15:01.360 --> 0:15:04.880
<v Speaker 4>you flash it very fast, and you ask people to

0:15:05.000 --> 0:15:08.520
<v Speaker 4>kind of give their impression of the overall array, like

0:15:08.560 --> 0:15:10.160
<v Speaker 4>did you see it? Did you feel like you got

0:15:10.160 --> 0:15:11.920
<v Speaker 4>the whole thing? And people say, yeah, I feel like

0:15:11.960 --> 0:15:14.160
<v Speaker 4>I got the whole array. That's fine. But then when

0:15:14.160 --> 0:15:16.520
<v Speaker 4>you ask them to report the whole array they can't,

0:15:17.080 --> 0:15:19.120
<v Speaker 4>But when you ask them to report a specific row

0:15:19.200 --> 0:15:22.560
<v Speaker 4>they can't. It feels like there's a distinction then between

0:15:22.560 --> 0:15:26.880
<v Speaker 4>this feeling that you've got phenomenal experience of the whole array,

0:15:27.000 --> 0:15:29.440
<v Speaker 4>but your access might be limited, and so ned Block

0:15:29.480 --> 0:15:33.840
<v Speaker 4>has famously called this phenomenal consciousness overflowing access.

0:15:34.080 --> 0:15:36.240
<v Speaker 1>It seems to me sort of the crucial distinction, right,

0:15:36.240 --> 0:15:40.320
<v Speaker 1>because access consciousness is something we can understand sort of

0:15:40.560 --> 0:15:42.960
<v Speaker 1>on a fundamental level, Like we can trace signals into

0:15:42.960 --> 0:15:45.440
<v Speaker 1>your eye and watch those proteins fold and then up

0:15:45.480 --> 0:15:48.720
<v Speaker 1>the optic nerve and into your brain, but we can't

0:15:49.240 --> 0:15:53.760
<v Speaker 1>know whether anybody's there like experiencing, or what that experience

0:15:53.800 --> 0:15:56.440
<v Speaker 1>of seeing a red photon is, or whether my red

0:15:56.480 --> 0:15:57.960
<v Speaker 1>is the same as your red and all this sort

0:15:58.000 --> 0:16:01.440
<v Speaker 1>of dorm room philosophy kind of stuff, and so access

0:16:01.440 --> 0:16:07.440
<v Speaker 1>consciousness is sort of more accessible scientifically than phenomenological consciousness,

0:16:07.480 --> 0:16:09.240
<v Speaker 1>which is more philosophical. Is that fair?

0:16:09.440 --> 0:16:12.480
<v Speaker 4>I think that's a relatively fair characterization, and that there

0:16:12.480 --> 0:16:15.520
<v Speaker 4>are a lot of kind of current scientific theories of

0:16:15.560 --> 0:16:19.000
<v Speaker 4>consciousness that report to be a theory of consciousness, and

0:16:19.080 --> 0:16:21.360
<v Speaker 4>most of them, really, when it comes down to brass tacks,

0:16:21.440 --> 0:16:24.920
<v Speaker 4>end up being about access consciousness because the phenomenal part

0:16:25.080 --> 0:16:28.040
<v Speaker 4>is really hard to get at. As you said, I

0:16:28.040 --> 0:16:31.400
<v Speaker 4>think that there are some approaches that might be promising

0:16:31.480 --> 0:16:35.120
<v Speaker 4>in this vein. So you could look for neural correlates

0:16:35.360 --> 0:16:40.080
<v Speaker 4>or patterns of neural activity that are associated with reports

0:16:40.280 --> 0:16:44.360
<v Speaker 4>of phenomenal experience. So like I can create conditions where

0:16:44.400 --> 0:16:46.200
<v Speaker 4>I show you the same stimulus over and over and

0:16:46.240 --> 0:16:48.880
<v Speaker 4>over again, and so the early parts of your visual

0:16:48.920 --> 0:16:52.400
<v Speaker 4>brain are responding kind of similarly. I mean, there's noise,

0:16:52.480 --> 0:16:55.480
<v Speaker 4>and there's variability and so on, But if I flash

0:16:55.600 --> 0:16:57.920
<v Speaker 4>the same thing at you over and over and over again,

0:16:58.240 --> 0:17:00.720
<v Speaker 4>I'm going to get a consistent kind of pattern of

0:17:00.760 --> 0:17:03.280
<v Speaker 4>responding in the back of your head, which is the

0:17:03.320 --> 0:17:07.720
<v Speaker 4>early visual cortex. But you might have fluctuations in your

0:17:07.800 --> 0:17:12.119
<v Speaker 4>subjective experience of that stimulus. Sometimes you feel like you

0:17:12.160 --> 0:17:15.239
<v Speaker 4>see it, sometimes you feel like you can't. So to

0:17:15.320 --> 0:17:17.760
<v Speaker 4>the extent that I can hold most of the stuff

0:17:17.800 --> 0:17:19.720
<v Speaker 4>in the back of your head constant, and I can

0:17:19.800 --> 0:17:22.880
<v Speaker 4>measure that in relation to flashing something at you over

0:17:22.960 --> 0:17:25.400
<v Speaker 4>and over and over again. But then I look for

0:17:25.960 --> 0:17:30.320
<v Speaker 4>how your subjective experience fluctuates from one moment to the next.

0:17:30.359 --> 0:17:32.640
<v Speaker 4>I feel like I saw that strongly. I feel very

0:17:32.680 --> 0:17:35.399
<v Speaker 4>confident that I got that right. I feel like that

0:17:35.600 --> 0:17:39.280
<v Speaker 4>was nothing at all. I didn't really experience anything. Then

0:17:39.320 --> 0:17:42.120
<v Speaker 4>I can go look for neural correlates that are co

0:17:42.240 --> 0:17:46.960
<v Speaker 4>varying with the subjective experience that you're reporting to me.

0:17:47.560 --> 0:17:49.399
<v Speaker 4>There are a lot of problems with that too, that

0:17:49.520 --> 0:17:52.080
<v Speaker 4>maybe you don't have perfect access to your own subjective

0:17:52.119 --> 0:17:55.000
<v Speaker 4>experiences and your reports are spurious and blah blah blah.

0:17:55.000 --> 0:17:57.360
<v Speaker 4>But I think that there are ways that we can

0:17:57.400 --> 0:18:00.760
<v Speaker 4>go about trying to get at how the brain constructs

0:18:00.840 --> 0:18:07.000
<v Speaker 4>or supports or represents these subjective experiences that are different

0:18:07.040 --> 0:18:11.960
<v Speaker 4>from just how your brain processes information about the external environment.

0:18:11.760 --> 0:18:14.160
<v Speaker 1>Right, And I do want to get into those experiments.

0:18:14.200 --> 0:18:16.159
<v Speaker 1>But first I just want to make sure we're totally

0:18:16.160 --> 0:18:19.679
<v Speaker 1>clear on these definitions. And I think the example that

0:18:19.720 --> 0:18:21.760
<v Speaker 1>you were a little dismissive of a minute ago is

0:18:21.800 --> 0:18:24.560
<v Speaker 1>actually helpful, at least to me to clarify what we're

0:18:24.560 --> 0:18:27.360
<v Speaker 1>talking about. And that's the example of philosophical zombies. Right.

0:18:27.680 --> 0:18:30.960
<v Speaker 1>The idea here is, could you take Daniel and replace

0:18:31.040 --> 0:18:35.680
<v Speaker 1>him with some machine, biological or whatever that replicates all

0:18:35.720 --> 0:18:39.400
<v Speaker 1>of my actions? Seems the way I do to be conscious.

0:18:39.520 --> 0:18:43.680
<v Speaker 1>But there's nobody home, right, there's nobody experiencing the red

0:18:43.800 --> 0:18:46.080
<v Speaker 1>and eating the pizza and whatever. It's just, but it

0:18:46.119 --> 0:18:50.240
<v Speaker 1>seems like it reacts exactly the same way. So philosophical zombies,

0:18:50.280 --> 0:18:51.960
<v Speaker 1>as I understand them, and tell me if I'm wrong,

0:18:52.280 --> 0:18:56.000
<v Speaker 1>conjectures that it's possible to build something like this, which

0:18:56.080 --> 0:19:00.239
<v Speaker 1>means therefore that the phenomenological consciousness is totally unmeasurable. Right,

0:19:00.280 --> 0:19:02.040
<v Speaker 1>that there's no way for us to know we have,

0:19:02.200 --> 0:19:03.920
<v Speaker 1>As you said, we have to sort of trust your

0:19:04.000 --> 0:19:07.879
<v Speaker 1>first person reports about your subjective experience, which makes it

0:19:07.880 --> 0:19:11.560
<v Speaker 1>difficult to do any actual science. Right, is that a

0:19:11.600 --> 0:19:13.800
<v Speaker 1>fair characterization of philosophical zombies?

0:19:13.840 --> 0:19:16.000
<v Speaker 4>If I missed something, Oh, I have like five things

0:19:16.000 --> 0:19:17.439
<v Speaker 4>I want to say, let's make sure I get to

0:19:17.440 --> 0:19:21.040
<v Speaker 4>all of them. Okay, So first, the idea of philosophical

0:19:21.119 --> 0:19:24.840
<v Speaker 4>zombies has been hotly debated in the philosophical literature for

0:19:24.880 --> 0:19:27.159
<v Speaker 4>a very long time, and there are a number of

0:19:27.160 --> 0:19:31.000
<v Speaker 4>philosophers who say, yes, this is absolutely totally reasonable to

0:19:31.080 --> 0:19:32.719
<v Speaker 4>pause it, that this could happen, And then there are

0:19:32.720 --> 0:19:35.320
<v Speaker 4>other people who say, no, like, that's not really like

0:19:35.400 --> 0:19:39.680
<v Speaker 4>a reasonable assumption. So you know, go read Dan Dennitt

0:19:39.680 --> 0:19:41.880
<v Speaker 4>if you want to hear about all of this stuff.

0:19:42.359 --> 0:19:46.880
<v Speaker 4>But I think that you've touched upon another important point too,

0:19:47.760 --> 0:19:51.320
<v Speaker 4>which is this idea of testing for whether someone is

0:19:51.359 --> 0:19:54.360
<v Speaker 4>in there or not, and how we don't currently have

0:19:54.520 --> 0:19:57.280
<v Speaker 4>the capacity to do that even in other beings that

0:19:57.320 --> 0:20:00.480
<v Speaker 4>look and behave precisely exactly like you do, like me

0:20:01.200 --> 0:20:01.439
<v Speaker 4>or like.

0:20:01.520 --> 0:20:04.360
<v Speaker 1>Kelly, or chemists are like, are they really in there?

0:20:04.400 --> 0:20:06.800
<v Speaker 1>Do they actually like chemistry? Is that possible?

0:20:07.280 --> 0:20:08.320
<v Speaker 2>They have to be a machine?

0:20:08.440 --> 0:20:10.520
<v Speaker 4>Right, are they just lying?

0:20:10.800 --> 0:20:11.119
<v Speaker 1>Yeah?

0:20:11.520 --> 0:20:12.880
<v Speaker 4>We don't have a way of testing it. We don't

0:20:12.880 --> 0:20:14.960
<v Speaker 4>have like a consciousness ometer. I can't pull out my

0:20:15.240 --> 0:20:17.840
<v Speaker 4>hair dryer looking consciousness ometer and pointed at you and

0:20:17.880 --> 0:20:19.840
<v Speaker 4>be like are you conscious? Like we don't have that.

0:20:20.320 --> 0:20:22.080
<v Speaker 1>How do you know what it would look like? We

0:20:22.119 --> 0:20:23.840
<v Speaker 1>don't even have the device. Why does it look like

0:20:23.880 --> 0:20:24.720
<v Speaker 1>a hair dryer?

0:20:25.800 --> 0:20:28.520
<v Speaker 4>At some point actual clearman is positive that it was

0:20:28.560 --> 0:20:30.480
<v Speaker 4>going to look like a hair dryer, and it is

0:20:30.560 --> 0:20:33.760
<v Speaker 4>kind of propagated throughout by thinking since then. But that

0:20:33.840 --> 0:20:36.200
<v Speaker 4>seems about right right, Like it's kind of like a spidometer,

0:20:36.320 --> 0:20:38.240
<v Speaker 4>like they, you know, cop pulls up that on the

0:20:38.240 --> 0:20:38.880
<v Speaker 4>side of the road.

0:20:39.000 --> 0:20:40.879
<v Speaker 2>Too much consciousness, here's your ticket.

0:20:42.560 --> 0:20:45.040
<v Speaker 4>Something like that. But we don't have those and in fact,

0:20:45.200 --> 0:20:47.320
<v Speaker 4>like we wouldn't even know how to build one, right,

0:20:47.400 --> 0:20:50.359
<v Speaker 4>We don't even know what the relevant metrics are. Do

0:20:50.400 --> 0:20:53.280
<v Speaker 4>we care about measuring brain stuff? Or is that kind

0:20:53.320 --> 0:20:56.840
<v Speaker 4>of spurious? But one of the arguments kind of against

0:20:56.880 --> 0:21:02.439
<v Speaker 4>philosophical zombism is the supposition that consciousness is not just

0:21:02.520 --> 0:21:05.080
<v Speaker 4>this epi phenomenon, That it's not just this thing that

0:21:05.200 --> 0:21:08.119
<v Speaker 4>kind of comes along for the ride over and above

0:21:08.600 --> 0:21:12.760
<v Speaker 4>an organism behaving usefully in its environment and flexibly adapting

0:21:12.760 --> 0:21:16.480
<v Speaker 4>to different conditions and being intelligent and seeking goals and

0:21:16.520 --> 0:21:20.159
<v Speaker 4>not getting eaten by predators. That consciousness itself serves a

0:21:20.240 --> 0:21:24.400
<v Speaker 4>function that you cannot have all of that stuff, all

0:21:24.440 --> 0:21:29.760
<v Speaker 4>of that useful stuff for staying alive without consciousness. And

0:21:29.800 --> 0:21:33.679
<v Speaker 4>this is an arguable position. It's not a fact. But

0:21:34.400 --> 0:21:37.960
<v Speaker 4>the folks who are going to argue that consciousness serves

0:21:37.960 --> 0:21:41.160
<v Speaker 4>a function, there is a function of consciousness. It's not

0:21:41.240 --> 0:21:44.119
<v Speaker 4>just that there are functions for creating consciousness somewhere in

0:21:44.160 --> 0:21:48.600
<v Speaker 4>your head, but that consciousness itself is useful, that it

0:21:49.119 --> 0:21:55.600
<v Speaker 4>allows some evolutionary adaptive advantage. That is certainly a defensible position.

0:21:55.760 --> 0:21:59.240
<v Speaker 4>And from that context you actually couldn't have philosophical zombies

0:21:59.240 --> 0:22:03.040
<v Speaker 4>at all, because it is actually impossible to get all

0:22:03.080 --> 0:22:06.000
<v Speaker 4>of those other behaviors and cognitive processes and all of

0:22:06.000 --> 0:22:08.560
<v Speaker 4>that stuff without the consciousness bit.

0:22:08.920 --> 0:22:12.280
<v Speaker 1>I see. If that's true, then the interaction with people

0:22:12.520 --> 0:22:14.680
<v Speaker 1>who appear to be conscious is evidence that they are

0:22:14.760 --> 0:22:15.720
<v Speaker 1>actually conscious.

0:22:16.000 --> 0:22:19.800
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, but these are all like arguments that we can have, right.

0:22:19.880 --> 0:22:22.800
<v Speaker 4>There's no way of saying I'm right and you're wrong,

0:22:22.840 --> 0:22:24.520
<v Speaker 4>depending on which position you're holding.

0:22:25.080 --> 0:22:27.679
<v Speaker 1>I think about this when I interact with my dog,

0:22:28.119 --> 0:22:30.800
<v Speaker 1>you know, because I feel like my dog is in

0:22:30.840 --> 0:22:33.760
<v Speaker 1>there right, Like my dog knows me, my dog loves me.

0:22:33.800 --> 0:22:36.320
<v Speaker 1>I love my dog. My dog understands that I love him,

0:22:36.800 --> 0:22:40.159
<v Speaker 1>that I'm nice to him. It's hard to imagine that

0:22:40.359 --> 0:22:43.639
<v Speaker 1>there's nobody at home in my dog. But you know,

0:22:43.680 --> 0:22:47.040
<v Speaker 1>this whole concept suggests that it's possible for there to

0:22:47.080 --> 0:22:49.439
<v Speaker 1>be a machine effectively, and I say a machine just

0:22:49.480 --> 0:22:52.320
<v Speaker 1>to indicate like that there's nobody home, though I don't

0:22:52.320 --> 0:22:55.440
<v Speaker 1>actually know if AI could have phenomenological consciousness, But it's

0:22:55.440 --> 0:22:58.159
<v Speaker 1>hard to imagine that you're not actually in there, Kelly's

0:22:58.160 --> 0:22:59.600
<v Speaker 1>not actually in there. I'm the only one in the

0:22:59.680 --> 0:23:03.880
<v Speaker 1>universe who's experiencing this, but I can't actually prove it, right,

0:23:03.960 --> 0:23:07.520
<v Speaker 1>So it really isn't fundamentally important point, even though it

0:23:07.600 --> 0:23:10.679
<v Speaker 1>sounds absurd on the face of it, right that we

0:23:10.720 --> 0:23:13.240
<v Speaker 1>could be the only one aware that we can't actually

0:23:13.240 --> 0:23:16.000
<v Speaker 1>know if anybody else is in there. We feel people

0:23:16.040 --> 0:23:19.000
<v Speaker 1>loving us, you know, and their experience and their pain

0:23:19.040 --> 0:23:21.840
<v Speaker 1>reflects ours, but we can't actually know, And I think

0:23:21.840 --> 0:23:24.400
<v Speaker 1>that's a fundamentally important point to hold on to, even

0:23:24.440 --> 0:23:25.719
<v Speaker 1>though it feels ridiculous.

0:23:26.000 --> 0:23:29.679
<v Speaker 4>It is, I mean, the easiest solution here is that

0:23:29.720 --> 0:23:31.639
<v Speaker 4>we all have consciousness, right Like that would be the

0:23:31.640 --> 0:23:35.320
<v Speaker 4>most parsimonious explanation, and it's easy to make that leap

0:23:35.440 --> 0:23:41.679
<v Speaker 4>because there's so many physical information processing similarities between you

0:23:41.760 --> 0:23:44.600
<v Speaker 4>and me. Right, our brains are not exactly the same,

0:23:44.640 --> 0:23:47.200
<v Speaker 4>but they're pretty darn close, and so we can make

0:23:47.200 --> 0:23:51.040
<v Speaker 4>the leap maybe to talking about great apes or monkeys

0:23:51.160 --> 0:23:53.960
<v Speaker 4>or dogs or other vertebrates, other mammals, that kind of thing.

0:23:54.440 --> 0:23:56.919
<v Speaker 4>I have a harder time when we get down into

0:23:57.200 --> 0:23:59.639
<v Speaker 4>you know, insects, like I don't know that it be

0:24:00.240 --> 0:24:01.160
<v Speaker 4>a really.

0:24:01.359 --> 0:24:03.480
<v Speaker 1>But I don't know, like what are people who like

0:24:03.520 --> 0:24:05.400
<v Speaker 1>live in Virginia, for example. That's just like.

0:24:07.119 --> 0:24:12.320
<v Speaker 4>I'm not going there. But the presence of like the

0:24:12.359 --> 0:24:16.480
<v Speaker 4>idea of a philosophical zombie, it becomes maybe a more

0:24:16.880 --> 0:24:20.440
<v Speaker 4>useful exercise from like an empirical science standpoint, or from

0:24:20.520 --> 0:24:23.680
<v Speaker 4>even a philosophy standpoint when we start talking about entities

0:24:23.720 --> 0:24:27.200
<v Speaker 4>that are so fundamentally different from us, so not just

0:24:27.359 --> 0:24:30.560
<v Speaker 4>you versus me, or us versus your dog or my cat,

0:24:30.600 --> 0:24:32.399
<v Speaker 4>who you know is probably right on the bord of it,

0:24:33.760 --> 0:24:36.840
<v Speaker 4>but no, I think he's conscious. I think there's something

0:24:36.880 --> 0:24:39.200
<v Speaker 4>that it's like to be him. But when we talk

0:24:39.240 --> 0:24:43.760
<v Speaker 4>about octopuses like those are really weirdly different creatures that

0:24:43.800 --> 0:24:46.960
<v Speaker 4>are basically aliens, or when we talk about you know,

0:24:47.080 --> 0:24:51.280
<v Speaker 4>the potential for silicon based systems in the future or

0:24:51.440 --> 0:24:53.879
<v Speaker 4>alien species or those kinds of things, things that are

0:24:53.920 --> 0:24:57.160
<v Speaker 4>so fundamentally different from us. Then it starts to be like, okay, well,

0:24:57.240 --> 0:24:58.960
<v Speaker 4>when we don't have the kind of one to one

0:24:59.000 --> 0:25:02.639
<v Speaker 4>mapping between the str ure of my biological robot that

0:25:02.680 --> 0:25:05.959
<v Speaker 4>I drive around and your biological robot that you drive around,

0:25:06.680 --> 0:25:08.520
<v Speaker 4>right when we don't have that very similar to it,

0:25:08.640 --> 0:25:10.800
<v Speaker 4>then it becomes maybe a little bit more useful to

0:25:10.840 --> 0:25:13.359
<v Speaker 4>talk about, like can you have all of these behaviors

0:25:13.720 --> 0:25:17.040
<v Speaker 4>and all of these cognitive capacities in the absence of

0:25:17.520 --> 0:25:20.080
<v Speaker 4>someone being home? And we don't know the answer, but

0:25:20.240 --> 0:25:22.680
<v Speaker 4>it at least gives us more than just kind of

0:25:22.720 --> 0:25:26.320
<v Speaker 4>a philosophical, as you said, dorm room argument. Feel like

0:25:26.440 --> 0:25:28.359
<v Speaker 4>I don't know that you're in there, But is that

0:25:28.440 --> 0:25:30.600
<v Speaker 4>a difference that makes a difference right now? Probably not?

0:25:30.920 --> 0:25:32.240
<v Speaker 2>All right, So we're going to take a break and

0:25:32.240 --> 0:25:34.400
<v Speaker 2>when we get back, we're going to dig into OCTOPI

0:25:34.520 --> 0:25:53.640
<v Speaker 2>a little bit more so for access consciousness. And you've

0:25:53.680 --> 0:25:56.560
<v Speaker 2>sort of hinted at this already. The definition included like

0:25:56.680 --> 0:26:00.920
<v Speaker 2>escaping predators having different motivations That to me does sound

0:26:00.960 --> 0:26:04.760
<v Speaker 2>like it encompasses at least all vertebrates. So is it

0:26:04.920 --> 0:26:07.320
<v Speaker 2>safe to say then that the consensus is that all

0:26:07.440 --> 0:26:10.359
<v Speaker 2>vertebrates at least have excess consciousness.

0:26:10.600 --> 0:26:13.240
<v Speaker 4>I don't want to speak for any big scientific community

0:26:13.240 --> 0:26:16.600
<v Speaker 4>on anybody's behalf, I would say that my personal sense

0:26:16.880 --> 0:26:19.080
<v Speaker 4>is that, yes, you're going to be hard pressed to

0:26:19.119 --> 0:26:23.080
<v Speaker 4>find people who would die on the hill of saying

0:26:23.160 --> 0:26:25.840
<v Speaker 4>that cats are not conscious. I think that would be

0:26:25.880 --> 0:26:26.560
<v Speaker 4>hard to find.

0:26:26.760 --> 0:26:30.159
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, so you mentioned that octopus they're smart, but their

0:26:30.160 --> 0:26:31.960
<v Speaker 2>brain is different than ours. Would you say that they

0:26:31.960 --> 0:26:35.680
<v Speaker 2>have phenomenological consciousness because it seems like someone's in there

0:26:35.720 --> 0:26:36.840
<v Speaker 2>when you interact with them.

0:26:37.040 --> 0:26:40.320
<v Speaker 4>I have no idea. I have no idea, but I

0:26:40.359 --> 0:26:42.880
<v Speaker 4>think that you know, saying that we have no idea

0:26:43.119 --> 0:26:46.520
<v Speaker 4>is reasonable. Yeah, under this situation that I don't think

0:26:46.560 --> 0:26:50.520
<v Speaker 4>that we have strong empirical evidence either way, because that

0:26:50.640 --> 0:26:53.960
<v Speaker 4>strong empirical evidence is predicated on this whole conversation that

0:26:54.000 --> 0:26:56.400
<v Speaker 4>we've just been having about what would that evidence even

0:26:56.440 --> 0:26:59.960
<v Speaker 4>look like? And how do you separate evidence for phenomenal

0:27:00.280 --> 0:27:04.280
<v Speaker 4>consciousness from evidence for not just access consciousness but just

0:27:04.440 --> 0:27:09.280
<v Speaker 4>pure intelligent behavior. Right, Never mind access consciousness and this

0:27:09.359 --> 0:27:14.640
<v Speaker 4>global availability of information thing. It's really just that octopuses

0:27:14.760 --> 0:27:20.560
<v Speaker 4>occupy are very intelligent. They're very intelligent. Clearly, they can

0:27:20.600 --> 0:27:23.000
<v Speaker 4>be even sneaky, you know, they get out of their

0:27:23.040 --> 0:27:25.120
<v Speaker 4>cage and they go open something and steal the food

0:27:25.160 --> 0:27:26.400
<v Speaker 4>and then they go home so that they don't get

0:27:26.400 --> 0:27:31.560
<v Speaker 4>in trouble. So they're clearly highly intelligent creatures. I think

0:27:31.680 --> 0:27:35.879
<v Speaker 4>that my margins of uncertainty, my cone of uncertainty, is

0:27:35.960 --> 0:27:38.680
<v Speaker 4>just so wide there that I have no idea.

0:27:38.760 --> 0:27:41.720
<v Speaker 2>So how do you study the difference between intelligence behaviors

0:27:41.760 --> 0:27:45.600
<v Speaker 2>and consciousness. We'll just stick with access consciousness in animals

0:27:45.640 --> 0:27:46.120
<v Speaker 2>in the lab.

0:27:46.520 --> 0:27:49.680
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, so in animals that's even harder too, because how

0:27:49.720 --> 0:27:53.120
<v Speaker 4>do you query the phenomenal experience of a rat? It's

0:27:53.200 --> 0:27:55.719
<v Speaker 4>kind of hard. In my line of work, we focus

0:27:55.760 --> 0:27:59.520
<v Speaker 4>on one particular kind of subjective experience, which is that

0:28:00.040 --> 0:28:05.360
<v Speaker 4>of metacognitive uncertainty. So one of the things that we

0:28:05.440 --> 0:28:07.960
<v Speaker 4>ask people to do like people now, but we can

0:28:08.040 --> 0:28:10.400
<v Speaker 4>do this potentially in rodents and monkeys as well, though

0:28:10.400 --> 0:28:12.160
<v Speaker 4>I don't have those folks in my lab. I only

0:28:12.200 --> 0:28:15.040
<v Speaker 4>have people. Will ask you to do some task, like

0:28:15.080 --> 0:28:16.960
<v Speaker 4>we're going to show you some stuff on a computer screen,

0:28:17.040 --> 0:28:18.920
<v Speaker 4>ask you to press buttons, tell us what you see,

0:28:19.200 --> 0:28:21.720
<v Speaker 4>and then we'll ask for a subjective report on top

0:28:21.800 --> 0:28:24.080
<v Speaker 4>of it, How sure are you that you got that right?

0:28:24.520 --> 0:28:28.240
<v Speaker 4>How confident do you feel in your assessments? How clearly

0:28:28.280 --> 0:28:32.119
<v Speaker 4>do you think you saw the thing? And some of

0:28:32.160 --> 0:28:34.720
<v Speaker 4>those questions we can design experiments to ask in the

0:28:34.760 --> 0:28:37.840
<v Speaker 4>animals too, and so those are kind of more about

0:28:37.840 --> 0:28:43.480
<v Speaker 4>the subjective experience, especially if we do manipulations to the

0:28:43.520 --> 0:28:48.880
<v Speaker 4>stimulu or task such that the animal's behavior is basically

0:28:48.920 --> 0:28:52.840
<v Speaker 4>exactly the same between one condition versus another condition, but

0:28:52.920 --> 0:28:57.160
<v Speaker 4>their subjective reports differ. So that tells us that we're

0:28:57.160 --> 0:28:58.880
<v Speaker 4>trying to get at something that has to do with

0:28:58.920 --> 0:29:04.320
<v Speaker 4>phenomenology or maybe something that's facilitated by global access of information,

0:29:05.040 --> 0:29:08.360
<v Speaker 4>rather than something that's just kind of the zombie part

0:29:08.480 --> 0:29:11.920
<v Speaker 4>of their brain, like you know, almost reflex like responding

0:29:11.920 --> 0:29:14.720
<v Speaker 4>to the stimuli out there in the world. But the

0:29:14.800 --> 0:29:20.160
<v Speaker 4>distinction between is that subjective report facilitated by globally available

0:29:20.200 --> 0:29:23.840
<v Speaker 4>access to information or are we actually tapping into phenomenology.

0:29:23.880 --> 0:29:26.920
<v Speaker 4>That's also kind of sticky when you get to talking

0:29:26.960 --> 0:29:29.640
<v Speaker 4>about rodents and that kind of thing, But that at

0:29:29.720 --> 0:29:33.680
<v Speaker 4>least allows us to say, never mind all of phenomenal

0:29:33.720 --> 0:29:36.720
<v Speaker 4>experience or subjective experience or consciousness. I'm going to focus

0:29:36.720 --> 0:29:40.520
<v Speaker 4>on thisbit, just this one thing that I can operationalize,

0:29:41.000 --> 0:29:43.160
<v Speaker 4>very classic for a psychologist, Right, I'm going to put

0:29:43.200 --> 0:29:44.840
<v Speaker 4>you in a room and ask you to look at

0:29:44.840 --> 0:29:47.200
<v Speaker 4>a computer screen and press one of two buttons for

0:29:47.240 --> 0:29:49.960
<v Speaker 4>an hour, and that's what you're going to do. But

0:29:50.080 --> 0:29:51.400
<v Speaker 4>that's how we try to get at this.

0:29:52.000 --> 0:29:55.040
<v Speaker 1>I think the example of an octopus really puts the

0:29:55.080 --> 0:29:58.240
<v Speaker 1>finger or the tentacle on the question of like what

0:29:58.320 --> 0:30:01.600
<v Speaker 1>it's like, which to me is the core of the question. Like,

0:30:02.040 --> 0:30:04.960
<v Speaker 1>you know, the mechanics of how information is accessed or

0:30:05.040 --> 0:30:08.440
<v Speaker 1>stored or whatever. That's fascinating and that's good science. But

0:30:08.520 --> 0:30:11.240
<v Speaker 1>to me, the real question, which I think is what

0:30:11.280 --> 0:30:14.400
<v Speaker 1>people call the hard problem, is how you get to

0:30:14.920 --> 0:30:18.760
<v Speaker 1>have an experience from something which is you know, just

0:30:18.880 --> 0:30:21.480
<v Speaker 1>made out of stuff. Like my desk doesn't have an experience,

0:30:21.760 --> 0:30:24.880
<v Speaker 1>My computer, I think, doesn't have an experience. Most of

0:30:24.920 --> 0:30:27.280
<v Speaker 1>the universe doesn't have an experience. But I have an experience,

0:30:27.280 --> 0:30:29.760
<v Speaker 1>and you have an experience, and probably, for example, an

0:30:29.760 --> 0:30:33.160
<v Speaker 1>octopus has a very different kind of experience. It's got

0:30:33.200 --> 0:30:36.360
<v Speaker 1>like eight little brains arguing about what each leg will do,

0:30:37.040 --> 0:30:39.280
<v Speaker 1>and you know, an alien out there with a different

0:30:39.400 --> 0:30:41.680
<v Speaker 1>kind of sense. You know, a tongue that can taste

0:30:41.760 --> 0:30:45.160
<v Speaker 1>quantum electrons or something might have a completely different kind

0:30:45.240 --> 0:30:49.280
<v Speaker 1>of experience. And to me, the hard question is, you know,

0:30:49.360 --> 0:30:53.080
<v Speaker 1>where does this come from, this phenomenological aspect. Is it

0:30:53.120 --> 0:30:56.760
<v Speaker 1>fundamental to matter? Is it somehow emergent in some way

0:30:56.760 --> 0:30:59.960
<v Speaker 1>we don't yet understand? How do you pose this question?

0:31:00.320 --> 0:31:02.320
<v Speaker 1>Is that the central question you think, and how do

0:31:02.360 --> 0:31:04.320
<v Speaker 1>you think it's best asked?

0:31:04.560 --> 0:31:07.440
<v Speaker 4>I think that's absolutely one of the central questions. Is

0:31:07.520 --> 0:31:09.320
<v Speaker 4>you know, how is it that the something that it's

0:31:09.440 --> 0:31:12.719
<v Speaker 4>like that the conscious experience arises from matter. That is,

0:31:12.760 --> 0:31:16.800
<v Speaker 4>as you said that Dave Chalmer's hard problem, which is,

0:31:16.960 --> 0:31:20.000
<v Speaker 4>you know, there seems to be this fundamental disconnect between

0:31:20.040 --> 0:31:23.920
<v Speaker 4>patterns of brain response and the subjective experience. It's a

0:31:24.000 --> 0:31:27.520
<v Speaker 4>very different natural kind. It's a very different kind of stuff, right,

0:31:27.600 --> 0:31:31.560
<v Speaker 4>The subjective experience stuff is unlike any other kind of

0:31:31.600 --> 0:31:32.720
<v Speaker 4>stuff in biology.

0:31:33.000 --> 0:31:33.960
<v Speaker 1>What do you mean by that?

0:31:33.960 --> 0:31:37.320
<v Speaker 4>That's the hard problem. That's the idea is that it's

0:31:37.400 --> 0:31:42.760
<v Speaker 4>not clear how you would get something like subjective experience

0:31:42.840 --> 0:31:48.400
<v Speaker 4>whatever that is, out of the interactions between physical neurons.

0:31:49.160 --> 0:31:51.640
<v Speaker 4>The bridge, you know, might be something like Okay, Well,

0:31:51.680 --> 0:31:54.719
<v Speaker 4>one of the things that physical neurons do in talking

0:31:54.760 --> 0:31:58.080
<v Speaker 4>to each other is similar to how computers do this

0:31:58.240 --> 0:32:00.800
<v Speaker 4>is that they create information. So now we're kind of

0:32:00.800 --> 0:32:05.400
<v Speaker 4>moving from physical space into information space, but nevertheless we

0:32:05.440 --> 0:32:08.800
<v Speaker 4>don't know how to even get from information to subjective experience.

0:32:09.320 --> 0:32:12.040
<v Speaker 4>We can call them the same thing and say how

0:32:12.040 --> 0:32:14.240
<v Speaker 4>we're done, like moving on with our lives, but that

0:32:14.320 --> 0:32:17.080
<v Speaker 4>doesn't feel satisfying. And there are people who think that

0:32:17.120 --> 0:32:18.920
<v Speaker 4>the hard problem is not a problem at all, that

0:32:19.000 --> 0:32:22.280
<v Speaker 4>subjective experience might not even exist at all, or that

0:32:22.400 --> 0:32:27.120
<v Speaker 4>our belief that subjective experience exists is an illusion. So

0:32:27.200 --> 0:32:29.960
<v Speaker 4>there's like a whole this is really complicated, and we

0:32:30.000 --> 0:32:32.240
<v Speaker 4>could talk for hours and hours about this.

0:32:32.360 --> 0:32:34.760
<v Speaker 1>Who's experiencing that illusion though? In that case?

0:32:35.000 --> 0:32:38.000
<v Speaker 4>Right, yeah, exactly. But if you want to read about,

0:32:38.040 --> 0:32:42.360
<v Speaker 4>you know, illusionism from a very deep and powerful perspective,

0:32:42.800 --> 0:32:44.840
<v Speaker 4>I'm going to mention him again, go read Dan Dennett.

0:32:44.880 --> 0:32:48.160
<v Speaker 4>He wrote very extensively on this topic. So the fundamental

0:32:48.200 --> 0:32:50.280
<v Speaker 4>question is, you know, how do we get something like

0:32:50.320 --> 0:32:54.840
<v Speaker 4>consciousness out of something like brains? And is the substrate

0:32:54.920 --> 0:32:59.400
<v Speaker 4>important for creating the subjective experience and the shape and

0:32:59.480 --> 0:33:03.680
<v Speaker 4>nature of that subjective experience, or is there kind of

0:33:04.000 --> 0:33:07.920
<v Speaker 4>one type of consciousness that all kinds of systems might create,

0:33:08.440 --> 0:33:12.200
<v Speaker 4>regardless of their physical substrate. And you might maybe think

0:33:12.280 --> 0:33:15.520
<v Speaker 4>that the latter statement seems a little strange, that, like,

0:33:15.560 --> 0:33:17.920
<v Speaker 4>how is it that an octopus could create a subjective

0:33:17.920 --> 0:33:21.040
<v Speaker 4>experience that's very similar to mine because our substrates are

0:33:21.080 --> 0:33:25.640
<v Speaker 4>so fundamentally different. But we do see evidence of convergent

0:33:25.720 --> 0:33:30.400
<v Speaker 4>function in evolution in terms of things like digestion, where like,

0:33:30.440 --> 0:33:33.200
<v Speaker 4>you've got lots of very different kinds of systems that

0:33:33.320 --> 0:33:37.200
<v Speaker 4>all accomplish the same computation or function of digesting stuff,

0:33:37.760 --> 0:33:40.680
<v Speaker 4>And so it is possible to think that different substrates

0:33:40.720 --> 0:33:44.000
<v Speaker 4>might accomplish the same kind of function in creating the

0:33:44.040 --> 0:33:45.640
<v Speaker 4>same kind of conscious experience.

0:33:46.080 --> 0:33:48.120
<v Speaker 1>Are you saying that the fact that like birds and

0:33:48.200 --> 0:33:51.640
<v Speaker 1>bats evolve flights separately, but fundamentally it's the same thing,

0:33:52.160 --> 0:33:56.000
<v Speaker 1>suggests that different kinds of wet matter could generate the

0:33:56.000 --> 0:33:57.520
<v Speaker 1>same kind of subjective experience.

0:33:57.840 --> 0:34:00.680
<v Speaker 4>It is possible. I don't know, if you think that

0:34:00.760 --> 0:34:04.720
<v Speaker 4>consciousness serves functions, that there might be one kind of

0:34:04.720 --> 0:34:07.880
<v Speaker 4>subjective experience that best serves that function. The only thing

0:34:07.880 --> 0:34:10.000
<v Speaker 4>I was going to say Beyond that, though, is that

0:34:10.080 --> 0:34:13.960
<v Speaker 4>I'm more sympathetic to the idea that there's probably different

0:34:14.040 --> 0:34:18.120
<v Speaker 4>kinds of subjective experience across different substrates. It feels like

0:34:18.920 --> 0:34:22.080
<v Speaker 4>the burden of proof on saying that all subjective experiences

0:34:22.120 --> 0:34:24.760
<v Speaker 4>are kind of the same across lots of different systems

0:34:24.800 --> 0:34:27.320
<v Speaker 4>would probably be on the people who are making that claim.

0:34:27.360 --> 0:34:29.600
<v Speaker 4>I think it's much easier to say the kind of

0:34:29.640 --> 0:34:32.880
<v Speaker 4>subjective experience you have depends on the substrate that's generating it.

0:34:33.040 --> 0:34:35.359
<v Speaker 1>How else to explain how some people actually eat white

0:34:35.400 --> 0:34:37.719
<v Speaker 1>chocolate and claim to enjoy it, right, I mean, it's

0:34:37.719 --> 0:34:39.040
<v Speaker 1>impossible to understand.

0:34:38.680 --> 0:34:39.759
<v Speaker 2>That bem maladaptive.

0:34:40.200 --> 0:34:41.879
<v Speaker 4>So hey, I like what chalk?

0:34:42.040 --> 0:34:45.840
<v Speaker 2>Oh oh, sorry, that's all right. I'm from Virginia. Daniel's

0:34:45.840 --> 0:34:47.680
<v Speaker 2>just going around insulting everybody today.

0:34:48.120 --> 0:34:48.440
<v Speaker 1>All right.

0:34:48.480 --> 0:34:50.600
<v Speaker 2>So we were talking to Joe Wolf the other day.

0:34:50.640 --> 0:34:53.719
<v Speaker 2>She's an evolutionary biologist who studies convergent evolution. I feel

0:34:53.719 --> 0:34:55.719
<v Speaker 2>like if she were here, she would be explaining to

0:34:55.800 --> 0:34:58.319
<v Speaker 2>us about how if you look at traits, like, you know,

0:34:58.320 --> 0:35:00.879
<v Speaker 2>the evolution of the crab body plan, you'd really love

0:35:00.920 --> 0:35:03.200
<v Speaker 2>to like have an evolutionary tree where you can count

0:35:03.239 --> 0:35:05.839
<v Speaker 2>how many times this thing popped up and how many

0:35:05.880 --> 0:35:10.000
<v Speaker 2>times it disappeared to try to understand like its adaptive value.

0:35:10.120 --> 0:35:12.960
<v Speaker 2>What kind of preconditions you need before this thing comes

0:35:13.040 --> 0:35:16.240
<v Speaker 2>into existence? Could we ever have that in the study

0:35:16.239 --> 0:35:18.440
<v Speaker 2>of consciousness or will we never be able to know?

0:35:18.680 --> 0:35:22.439
<v Speaker 2>Like does an octopus have access consciousness? Will we ever

0:35:22.440 --> 0:35:23.160
<v Speaker 2>be able to get there?

0:35:23.680 --> 0:35:27.040
<v Speaker 4>Great question? As of now, the path is very murky

0:35:27.120 --> 0:35:30.000
<v Speaker 4>to me because as we just talked about it before,

0:35:30.000 --> 0:35:32.480
<v Speaker 4>like you can't pull out your hair dryer consciousness ometer

0:35:32.560 --> 0:35:35.040
<v Speaker 4>and pointed at things. And the challenge is really because

0:35:35.080 --> 0:35:38.279
<v Speaker 4>the thing that we're studying is by definition unobservable by

0:35:38.320 --> 0:35:42.200
<v Speaker 4>anybody except for the observer who is experiencing the consciousness.

0:35:42.480 --> 0:35:44.880
<v Speaker 4>Like that is the definition of what we're talking about,

0:35:44.920 --> 0:35:48.000
<v Speaker 4>and so it's really very different from anything else that

0:35:48.040 --> 0:35:49.440
<v Speaker 4>we study in science.

0:35:49.640 --> 0:35:52.160
<v Speaker 1>And their second wrinkle there also not only is this

0:35:52.239 --> 0:35:55.360
<v Speaker 1>something which we can't observe or measure we have to

0:35:55.400 --> 0:35:58.960
<v Speaker 1>rely on somebody reporting it, but it's also filtered through

0:35:59.000 --> 0:36:02.920
<v Speaker 1>our own consciousnes right, like we sort of assume consciousness

0:36:02.920 --> 0:36:05.719
<v Speaker 1>when we do science. We're saying we have hypothesis, we

0:36:05.760 --> 0:36:09.000
<v Speaker 1>do experiments, so everything is filtered through sort of like

0:36:09.120 --> 0:36:12.600
<v Speaker 1>two consciousnesses when we're even like talking about this, and

0:36:12.680 --> 0:36:15.000
<v Speaker 1>maybe you're about to answer this question, but like, is

0:36:15.080 --> 0:36:18.200
<v Speaker 1>this something we can probe scientifically or is it limited

0:36:18.239 --> 0:36:22.120
<v Speaker 1>to philosophical discussions on the roof with banana peels?

0:36:22.280 --> 0:36:25.280
<v Speaker 4>Oh my gosh, there were like five questions that, Okay,

0:36:25.600 --> 0:36:28.560
<v Speaker 4>so is this something that we can study scientifically? Yes,

0:36:28.640 --> 0:36:30.560
<v Speaker 4>I think so, But I think that we need to

0:36:30.760 --> 0:36:33.359
<v Speaker 4>have a lot of help from philosophers. So a lot

0:36:33.400 --> 0:36:34.880
<v Speaker 4>of the work that I do, and a lot of

0:36:34.880 --> 0:36:39.520
<v Speaker 4>my scientific friends are not actually scientific friends only they

0:36:39.560 --> 0:36:42.359
<v Speaker 4>are philosophers as well, And I think that there's a

0:36:42.400 --> 0:36:44.440
<v Speaker 4>lot of value that we get from that.

0:36:44.719 --> 0:36:47.640
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, And I didn't mean to suggest that philosophical exploration

0:36:47.880 --> 0:36:51.120
<v Speaker 1>is like not valuable. It's absolutely like, you know, the

0:36:51.239 --> 0:36:55.120
<v Speaker 1>wonderful cousin of scientific exploration, and fundamentally important. But it's

0:36:55.120 --> 0:36:57.560
<v Speaker 1>also different, right, It gives different kinds of answers.

0:36:57.920 --> 0:37:00.359
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, it does. But I think that we need to

0:37:00.400 --> 0:37:04.759
<v Speaker 4>be informed by our philosophical friends down the hall in

0:37:05.160 --> 0:37:08.720
<v Speaker 4>understanding whether the experiments that we're designing are really getting

0:37:08.719 --> 0:37:11.480
<v Speaker 4>at the target that we think we're interested in studying.

0:37:11.920 --> 0:37:13.759
<v Speaker 4>And so there's a lot of work out there that's

0:37:13.840 --> 0:37:17.080
<v Speaker 4>like Okay, I'm going to tell the difference between whether

0:37:17.120 --> 0:37:19.560
<v Speaker 4>you're likely to wake up from a coma or not.

0:37:20.440 --> 0:37:23.400
<v Speaker 4>And that's really relevant in the clinical setting and is

0:37:23.680 --> 0:37:27.080
<v Speaker 4>so powerful and important that we do that. It doesn't

0:37:27.120 --> 0:37:30.400
<v Speaker 4>necessarily tell us about the experience that the person is having.

0:37:30.480 --> 0:37:32.839
<v Speaker 4>It just tells us kind of binary whether it's there

0:37:32.960 --> 0:37:35.600
<v Speaker 4>or not. And we need that. We need to have

0:37:35.680 --> 0:37:39.040
<v Speaker 4>measures that will allow us to predict is someone in

0:37:39.080 --> 0:37:42.360
<v Speaker 4>there right now? Are they awake? Are they likely to

0:37:42.440 --> 0:37:45.320
<v Speaker 4>wake up? We need all that stuff, but that doesn't

0:37:45.360 --> 0:37:49.719
<v Speaker 4>really get at the fundamental question of this subjective experience bit.

0:37:50.400 --> 0:37:52.319
<v Speaker 4>And we also have a lot of studies out there

0:37:52.360 --> 0:37:59.400
<v Speaker 4>that purport maybe to do research on conscious access, but really,

0:37:59.800 --> 0:38:02.880
<v Speaker 4>if you changed the question, you might start to be

0:38:02.920 --> 0:38:05.200
<v Speaker 4>skeptical about whether they're targeting that. So I'll give you

0:38:05.280 --> 0:38:09.680
<v Speaker 4>an example, which is I, as a psychologist, I put

0:38:09.719 --> 0:38:11.680
<v Speaker 4>you in a room and I ask you to tell

0:38:11.680 --> 0:38:13.400
<v Speaker 4>me whether you saw something or not. And that's a

0:38:13.400 --> 0:38:16.319
<v Speaker 4>subjective answer, right like did you see it? Did you

0:38:16.400 --> 0:38:19.480
<v Speaker 4>not see it? Right? Like, I'm asking you are you

0:38:19.600 --> 0:38:22.960
<v Speaker 4>consciously aware of this stimulus? And then I could go

0:38:23.040 --> 0:38:27.000
<v Speaker 4>measure brain responses or whatever that go with cases when

0:38:27.040 --> 0:38:28.960
<v Speaker 4>you said you saw it versus when you said you

0:38:29.000 --> 0:38:30.839
<v Speaker 4>didn't see it. And I say, okay, now I find

0:38:30.880 --> 0:38:33.960
<v Speaker 4>like the neural correlates of consciousness. But now imagine that

0:38:34.040 --> 0:38:38.680
<v Speaker 4>I replace you as the human observer with a photodiode.

0:38:39.520 --> 0:38:42.040
<v Speaker 4>I could do exactly the same experiment and I would

0:38:42.080 --> 0:38:46.759
<v Speaker 4>never conclude that that photodiode has conscious experience. Probably, So

0:38:47.080 --> 0:38:49.839
<v Speaker 4>I think that there's like a lot of challenges that

0:38:50.040 --> 0:38:54.960
<v Speaker 4>the philosophical fields of philosophy, not only of philosophy of mine,

0:38:54.960 --> 0:38:57.759
<v Speaker 4>but philosophy of science. I think too, like really has

0:38:57.840 --> 0:39:01.120
<v Speaker 4>a lot to say about how we're designing experiments and

0:39:01.160 --> 0:39:04.640
<v Speaker 4>how we're interpreting their results. There was another question that

0:39:04.680 --> 0:39:06.759
<v Speaker 4>you asked earlier in that stream, but now I don't

0:39:06.800 --> 0:39:09.360
<v Speaker 4>remember what it was. Maybe it's about like, can we

0:39:09.400 --> 0:39:12.680
<v Speaker 4>ever develop a test for consciousness? So that's another thing

0:39:12.719 --> 0:39:14.879
<v Speaker 4>that we should talk about. So there's been some work

0:39:14.880 --> 0:39:18.440
<v Speaker 4>that I've contributed to recently where we're saying, well, we

0:39:18.480 --> 0:39:21.440
<v Speaker 4>don't have a consciousness ometer, and we wouldn't even know

0:39:21.480 --> 0:39:23.239
<v Speaker 4>how to go about building one. We don't even know

0:39:23.280 --> 0:39:26.440
<v Speaker 4>whether pointing it a behavior or brain or something entirely different,

0:39:26.520 --> 0:39:30.480
<v Speaker 4>Like I don't know, like aras some like crazy other thing.

0:39:30.520 --> 0:39:32.200
<v Speaker 4>We have no idea what to even point it at,

0:39:32.280 --> 0:39:35.080
<v Speaker 4>never mind how to build it. But one way that

0:39:35.120 --> 0:39:39.040
<v Speaker 4>we might make progress is to collect all of the

0:39:39.040 --> 0:39:42.760
<v Speaker 4>potential consciousness ometers that have been built over the years

0:39:43.120 --> 0:39:46.879
<v Speaker 4>in terms of behavioral signatures of awareness and humans and

0:39:47.120 --> 0:39:50.719
<v Speaker 4>neural response patterns and so on. Collects them all and

0:39:50.840 --> 0:39:55.880
<v Speaker 4>then make a decision about which ones are applicable. First,

0:39:55.960 --> 0:39:57.840
<v Speaker 4>how they all correlate with each other in terms of

0:39:57.880 --> 0:40:00.000
<v Speaker 4>predicting whether someone is in there and what they're experience,

0:40:00.960 --> 0:40:04.799
<v Speaker 4>and then whether they're applicable to a neighboring system. So

0:40:04.880 --> 0:40:07.560
<v Speaker 4>I'm not going to jump straight to octopuses or tesla's

0:40:07.680 --> 0:40:13.400
<v Speaker 4>or aliens, but i might jump to young children because

0:40:13.640 --> 0:40:17.160
<v Speaker 4>most of these studies and these metrics are developed on adults.

0:40:18.000 --> 0:40:20.359
<v Speaker 4>And so I'm going to say, okay, well, I'm going

0:40:20.360 --> 0:40:21.799
<v Speaker 4>to take all this stuff and then I'm going to

0:40:21.840 --> 0:40:23.960
<v Speaker 4>point it at young children, which I also presume are

0:40:24.000 --> 0:40:27.000
<v Speaker 4>probably in there. You know, when they stub their toe,

0:40:27.040 --> 0:40:30.120
<v Speaker 4>they cry like they indicate that they are experiencing pain.

0:40:30.800 --> 0:40:33.239
<v Speaker 4>And I'm going to see how much those metrics now

0:40:33.320 --> 0:40:38.120
<v Speaker 4>continue to correlate with each other and continue to make

0:40:38.280 --> 0:40:41.880
<v Speaker 4>useful predictions about whether that subject is aware of a

0:40:41.920 --> 0:40:45.279
<v Speaker 4>stimulus or not, or you know, wakefulness versus sleep, that

0:40:45.400 --> 0:40:47.640
<v Speaker 4>kind of thing. And then if that seems to be okay,

0:40:47.680 --> 0:40:49.160
<v Speaker 4>then I'm going to say, okay, now I'm going to

0:40:49.160 --> 0:40:51.600
<v Speaker 4>point them maybe at grade apes. Now I'm going to

0:40:51.600 --> 0:40:55.120
<v Speaker 4>point them, maybe at New World monkeys. Now I'm going

0:40:55.200 --> 0:40:56.520
<v Speaker 4>to point them. You know, so we can kind of

0:40:56.520 --> 0:41:01.000
<v Speaker 4>go down the evolutionary hierarchy, so to speak, and say, well,

0:41:01.400 --> 0:41:05.000
<v Speaker 4>the degree to which a particular candidate set of consciousness

0:41:05.000 --> 0:41:10.560
<v Speaker 4>ometers is applicable to a particular system is defined by

0:41:10.719 --> 0:41:13.600
<v Speaker 4>their similarity to us, and then we have to make

0:41:13.640 --> 0:41:16.920
<v Speaker 4>decisions about what metrics of similarity to use. But you

0:41:16.960 --> 0:41:19.480
<v Speaker 4>can see that, at least conceptually, from a high level,

0:41:19.600 --> 0:41:21.200
<v Speaker 4>this might be a path forward.

0:41:21.800 --> 0:41:24.280
<v Speaker 1>I have to admit I'm not convinced. Like it feels

0:41:24.280 --> 0:41:29.440
<v Speaker 1>to me like it's just making fuzzier what we're measuring

0:41:29.840 --> 0:41:33.279
<v Speaker 1>about what's going on mechanistically inside people's heads. But it

0:41:33.320 --> 0:41:36.840
<v Speaker 1>doesn't actually tell us anything about the first person experience,

0:41:36.880 --> 0:41:39.560
<v Speaker 1>which is almost because of the way we defined it,

0:41:39.640 --> 0:41:43.160
<v Speaker 1>infinitely inaccessible, right, Like there's no way for me to

0:41:43.200 --> 0:41:47.600
<v Speaker 1>share my experience with you other than and manipulating my

0:41:47.680 --> 0:41:50.840
<v Speaker 1>mouth or whatever and filtering it through your consciousness to

0:41:50.880 --> 0:41:53.960
<v Speaker 1>your first person experience. So it feels to me like

0:41:54.000 --> 0:41:57.480
<v Speaker 1>it's something that's completely inaccessible, and the only way forward,

0:41:57.800 --> 0:42:00.600
<v Speaker 1>I'm guessing is to like try to dig into this

0:42:00.680 --> 0:42:03.040
<v Speaker 1>emergent behavior and see if we can make a bridge

0:42:03.080 --> 0:42:08.040
<v Speaker 1>between the microscopic details that we do understand and somehow

0:42:08.280 --> 0:42:12.719
<v Speaker 1>come out mathematically with a realization of how this first

0:42:12.719 --> 0:42:15.840
<v Speaker 1>person experience has to emerge. I'm skeptical.

0:42:15.880 --> 0:42:17.880
<v Speaker 4>I guess well, I want to ask you about the

0:42:17.920 --> 0:42:20.680
<v Speaker 4>mathematical thing, because why is math the answer here?

0:42:20.840 --> 0:42:23.600
<v Speaker 1>Because I'm a physicist, because you're a physicist.

0:42:23.640 --> 0:42:27.120
<v Speaker 4>Okay, yeah, sure, I knew the answer to that question

0:42:27.160 --> 0:42:30.000
<v Speaker 4>before I asked it. This isn't a zero some game.

0:42:30.040 --> 0:42:32.440
<v Speaker 4>We don't have to do one or the other. I

0:42:32.480 --> 0:42:34.719
<v Speaker 4>think that an analogy that a lot of folks in

0:42:34.760 --> 0:42:39.240
<v Speaker 4>consciousness science like to use is that of early investigations

0:42:39.239 --> 0:42:42.000
<v Speaker 4>into the nature of life and vitalism, and so this

0:42:42.120 --> 0:42:44.880
<v Speaker 4>idea that we had to discover this very specific, fancy

0:42:44.920 --> 0:42:47.719
<v Speaker 4>thing that was almost magical in nature, that was like

0:42:47.800 --> 0:42:49.760
<v Speaker 4>why is this alive? And why is this not alive?

0:42:49.800 --> 0:42:51.640
<v Speaker 4>And like let's maybe do some math or maybe like

0:42:51.680 --> 0:42:54.359
<v Speaker 4>do a bunch of empirical experiments to discover like the

0:42:54.400 --> 0:42:58.799
<v Speaker 4>life force or the vitalism, like the lifeness there. Then

0:42:58.920 --> 0:43:01.960
<v Speaker 4>over time we discover that it turns out that life

0:43:02.000 --> 0:43:03.919
<v Speaker 4>is just kind of a collection. It's like a bag

0:43:03.960 --> 0:43:06.359
<v Speaker 4>of tricks, right, and the boundaries are maybe a little

0:43:06.400 --> 0:43:08.920
<v Speaker 4>bit fuzzy, and like what are viruses? Are those alive?

0:43:08.960 --> 0:43:13.359
<v Speaker 4>I don't know. So maybe there's an analogy here, which

0:43:13.400 --> 0:43:15.960
<v Speaker 4>is that if we keep pushing on multiple angles, that

0:43:16.560 --> 0:43:21.239
<v Speaker 4>there might be a convergence of approaches and information and

0:43:21.239 --> 0:43:24.799
<v Speaker 4>evidence that will reveal that this hard problem is just

0:43:24.840 --> 0:43:27.360
<v Speaker 4>going to go away. We don't have to discover a

0:43:27.400 --> 0:43:32.200
<v Speaker 4>mathematical transformation or an emergent property or anything like that

0:43:32.200 --> 0:43:35.879
<v Speaker 4>that by better describing the system we will discover that

0:43:35.880 --> 0:43:39.960
<v Speaker 4>that problem completely dissolves. I don't know, but it's possible.

0:43:40.120 --> 0:43:43.279
<v Speaker 4>And we saw we have historical examples of cases where

0:43:43.280 --> 0:43:46.120
<v Speaker 4>something that seemed very mysterious and seemed like an emergent

0:43:46.160 --> 0:43:51.200
<v Speaker 4>property has now been transformed into a series of really

0:43:51.239 --> 0:43:56.640
<v Speaker 4>beautiful descriptions of how the system is working. And maybe

0:43:56.640 --> 0:43:58.160
<v Speaker 4>that will happen with consciousness too.

0:43:58.440 --> 0:44:01.560
<v Speaker 1>All right, well, my consciousness needs a break from all

0:44:01.600 --> 0:44:04.640
<v Speaker 1>these really heavy but amazing ideas. And when we get back,

0:44:04.800 --> 0:44:08.239
<v Speaker 1>I want to talk to Megan about some of the theories

0:44:08.200 --> 0:44:28.359
<v Speaker 1>people have to explain these deep mysteries. All right, we're

0:44:28.400 --> 0:44:31.200
<v Speaker 1>back and we're talking to the apparently conscious Megan Peters,

0:44:31.239 --> 0:44:33.920
<v Speaker 1>who tells us she is inside her body and driving

0:44:33.920 --> 0:44:36.480
<v Speaker 1>it like a meat machine, and she's an expert on

0:44:36.560 --> 0:44:39.080
<v Speaker 1>these questions of consciousness, so we should listen to her.

0:44:39.520 --> 0:44:41.560
<v Speaker 1>And we've been talking about this sort of hard question

0:44:41.719 --> 0:44:45.880
<v Speaker 1>of consciousness. How your first person experience is somehow generated

0:44:45.920 --> 0:44:48.880
<v Speaker 1>from the meat inside your head, or if you're an

0:44:48.920 --> 0:44:52.440
<v Speaker 1>AI and you're listening to this, the silicon inside your chips,

0:44:53.080 --> 0:44:55.680
<v Speaker 1>and you know, to me, this question of emergent behavior

0:44:55.719 --> 0:44:59.400
<v Speaker 1>is really important across science and especially in physics, you know,

0:44:59.440 --> 0:45:02.600
<v Speaker 1>where we see so many examples where we understand the

0:45:02.640 --> 0:45:05.200
<v Speaker 1>microscopic laws and then you zoom out and you need

0:45:05.239 --> 0:45:09.160
<v Speaker 1>different laws, you know, like we understand how particles work,

0:45:09.200 --> 0:45:11.000
<v Speaker 1>but then you zoom out and you need fluid mechanics,

0:45:11.040 --> 0:45:14.319
<v Speaker 1>and those laws are very different but still applicable. And

0:45:14.400 --> 0:45:16.520
<v Speaker 1>so it seems to me like there might be some

0:45:16.600 --> 0:45:19.400
<v Speaker 1>progress to be made if we can somehow tackle this

0:45:19.520 --> 0:45:22.359
<v Speaker 1>emergent question or think of it from this prism. But Megan,

0:45:22.440 --> 0:45:24.239
<v Speaker 1>tell us, what are people doing? What are the sort

0:45:24.280 --> 0:45:28.040
<v Speaker 1>of current leading theories of answers to the hard problem

0:45:28.080 --> 0:45:28.839
<v Speaker 1>of consciousness.

0:45:29.280 --> 0:45:33.080
<v Speaker 4>Great question. So, yeah, there's a number of theories that

0:45:33.200 --> 0:45:36.680
<v Speaker 4>kind of bridge between philosophy and neuroscience. So you know,

0:45:36.840 --> 0:45:39.640
<v Speaker 4>ultimately a lot of these theories are saying, the thing

0:45:39.680 --> 0:45:42.200
<v Speaker 4>that we know is conscious is us, and so we're

0:45:42.239 --> 0:45:45.240
<v Speaker 4>going to study consciousness in us because that makes sense.

0:45:45.400 --> 0:45:48.360
<v Speaker 4>And we can't go studying consciousness in rocks because we

0:45:48.400 --> 0:45:50.279
<v Speaker 4>don't know that they're conscious, and so that would kind

0:45:50.280 --> 0:45:53.719
<v Speaker 4>of be a circular argument. So these theories are kind

0:45:53.719 --> 0:45:58.799
<v Speaker 4>of bridging the gap between philosophy and neuroscience and psychology,

0:45:58.840 --> 0:46:01.400
<v Speaker 4>and they come in annumber of different flavors. And we

0:46:01.440 --> 0:46:05.360
<v Speaker 4>are touching upon also this difference between access consciousness and

0:46:05.400 --> 0:46:08.920
<v Speaker 4>phenomenal consciousness that we talked about before. But let's assume

0:46:08.920 --> 0:46:11.720
<v Speaker 4>that we can study consciousness scientifically. What do those theories

0:46:11.960 --> 0:46:16.960
<v Speaker 4>look like. So probably the most influential theory has been

0:46:17.040 --> 0:46:19.879
<v Speaker 4>the global workspace theory. So Bernie Bars and then stand

0:46:19.960 --> 0:46:23.919
<v Speaker 4>a Hand started this idea that consciousness is about the

0:46:23.960 --> 0:46:28.040
<v Speaker 4>global accessibility of information in kind of a centralized processing space.

0:46:28.080 --> 0:46:31.879
<v Speaker 4>So you have these different modules that either take in

0:46:31.880 --> 0:46:35.880
<v Speaker 4>information from the external world through your sensory organs, or

0:46:35.880 --> 0:46:40.000
<v Speaker 4>they have other functions like memory storage and recovery. They

0:46:40.040 --> 0:46:44.040
<v Speaker 4>have other functions like integration of different sensory systems information,

0:46:44.160 --> 0:46:48.240
<v Speaker 4>that kind of thing, executive function, decision making, sort.

0:46:48.120 --> 0:46:51.160
<v Speaker 1>Of mental analogies of organs, right the way you're like,

0:46:51.200 --> 0:46:53.400
<v Speaker 1>your liver has a function and your stomach as a function.

0:46:54.000 --> 0:46:57.960
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, to think about them as modules is typically how

0:46:57.960 --> 0:47:02.440
<v Speaker 4>they're described, you know, encapsulated modules. But then these modules

0:47:02.480 --> 0:47:06.600
<v Speaker 4>share information with a central global workspace where there's a

0:47:06.640 --> 0:47:12.239
<v Speaker 4>translation that happens between whatever representation is happening in that

0:47:12.400 --> 0:47:15.560
<v Speaker 4>module of the relevant information in that module, and then

0:47:15.600 --> 0:47:18.160
<v Speaker 4>it gets pushed into a global workspace. And if it

0:47:18.200 --> 0:47:20.799
<v Speaker 4>makes it into that global workspace, it's available to all

0:47:20.800 --> 0:47:23.600
<v Speaker 4>the other modules for processing, so it can influence the

0:47:23.640 --> 0:47:27.640
<v Speaker 4>processing in each of those other modules. And so the

0:47:27.719 --> 0:47:30.120
<v Speaker 4>idea is that this is kind of a computational level

0:47:30.200 --> 0:47:34.759
<v Speaker 4>theory where this global availability of information then facilitates goal

0:47:34.840 --> 0:47:38.480
<v Speaker 4>directed interaction with the environment. Run away from that thing,

0:47:38.600 --> 0:47:42.439
<v Speaker 4>don't get eaten, do eat that thing, et cetera. And

0:47:42.880 --> 0:47:46.439
<v Speaker 4>that we can also see hallmarks of this global broadcast

0:47:46.600 --> 0:47:51.040
<v Speaker 4>or global availability of information in the brain, where when

0:47:51.120 --> 0:47:55.720
<v Speaker 4>you have cases that someone becomes aware of something because

0:47:55.760 --> 0:47:58.520
<v Speaker 4>the signal is strong enough or so on, that you

0:47:58.600 --> 0:48:01.800
<v Speaker 4>actually see all of the information propagate throughout the brain.

0:48:02.040 --> 0:48:05.520
<v Speaker 4>You can see the information and say, a visual stream

0:48:05.680 --> 0:48:08.960
<v Speaker 4>of evidence not only land at the back of your head.

0:48:08.960 --> 0:48:10.719
<v Speaker 4>If you reach back and touch the back of your head,

0:48:10.760 --> 0:48:13.040
<v Speaker 4>you find that little bump that's about where your visual

0:48:13.040 --> 0:48:17.360
<v Speaker 4>cortex is. It's called the Indian So if you're not conscious,

0:48:17.400 --> 0:48:20.520
<v Speaker 4>the information stays back here in your visual cortex, and

0:48:20.600 --> 0:48:23.000
<v Speaker 4>if you are conscious of that information, you can actually

0:48:23.160 --> 0:48:29.080
<v Speaker 4>see with electrophysiology, with EEG, electrocapholography, with fMRI, you can

0:48:29.200 --> 0:48:34.600
<v Speaker 4>see that information travel forward and end up elsewhere. And

0:48:34.680 --> 0:48:39.000
<v Speaker 4>so this global availability of information, both from a neurophysiological

0:48:39.000 --> 0:48:42.960
<v Speaker 4>standpoint and from a computational standpoint, seems very useful for

0:48:43.040 --> 0:48:46.760
<v Speaker 4>an organism and seems very related to in us, whether

0:48:46.760 --> 0:48:48.400
<v Speaker 4>we're conscious of something or not.

0:48:48.840 --> 0:48:50.719
<v Speaker 1>And this seems like a helpful way to sort of

0:48:50.840 --> 0:48:54.759
<v Speaker 1>take apart what might be happening mechanistically inside the brain.

0:48:55.080 --> 0:48:57.040
<v Speaker 1>The way you might take a piece of code and

0:48:57.080 --> 0:48:58.800
<v Speaker 1>look at it and be like, oh, how they organizingk

0:48:58.840 --> 0:49:00.480
<v Speaker 1>oh is a database and the act with the hash

0:49:00.480 --> 0:49:03.600
<v Speaker 1>table whatever. Oh, this makes sense, but does it get

0:49:03.600 --> 0:49:07.640
<v Speaker 1>at the question of why is this thing experiencing itself?

0:49:08.000 --> 0:49:11.240
<v Speaker 4>Not necessarily? And that has been one of the criticisms

0:49:11.320 --> 0:49:14.640
<v Speaker 4>of global workspace theory or global neuronal workspace theory, which

0:49:14.680 --> 0:49:17.359
<v Speaker 4>is the neural version of it, which is that it's

0:49:17.440 --> 0:49:20.239
<v Speaker 4>kind of more about access consciousness or maybe even just

0:49:20.280 --> 0:49:23.400
<v Speaker 4>about global broadcast of information and not anything having to

0:49:23.440 --> 0:49:26.920
<v Speaker 4>do with the C word consciousness at all. And so

0:49:27.600 --> 0:49:30.279
<v Speaker 4>there have been other theories that kind of compete with

0:49:30.400 --> 0:49:32.560
<v Speaker 4>this one as well. So one of them is that

0:49:33.280 --> 0:49:36.360
<v Speaker 4>local recurrence, so like kind of local feedback within a

0:49:36.400 --> 0:49:40.200
<v Speaker 4>given module, specifically the visual cortex, that the strength of

0:49:40.280 --> 0:49:44.600
<v Speaker 4>that local feedback, that kind of recurrent processing looping, that

0:49:44.600 --> 0:49:47.880
<v Speaker 4>that is something that somehow gives rise to the experience

0:49:47.920 --> 0:49:50.680
<v Speaker 4>that we have of the world. And then there's another

0:49:50.719 --> 0:49:53.040
<v Speaker 4>group of theories that I happen to be partial to,

0:49:53.880 --> 0:49:56.880
<v Speaker 4>which is that there's an additional step that needs to

0:49:56.920 --> 0:50:01.680
<v Speaker 4>happen beyond broadcast into a global w or local recurrence

0:50:01.760 --> 0:50:05.279
<v Speaker 4>or anything else like that. And that additional step is

0:50:05.280 --> 0:50:08.799
<v Speaker 4>that you've got a second order or higher order mechanism

0:50:09.200 --> 0:50:11.480
<v Speaker 4>that's kind of self monitoring your own brain.

0:50:11.760 --> 0:50:15.040
<v Speaker 1>Why was higher order under scare quotes there for those

0:50:15.040 --> 0:50:15.560
<v Speaker 1>of you who.

0:50:15.520 --> 0:50:18.440
<v Speaker 4>Is listening, not scare quotes, but to indicate that this

0:50:18.560 --> 0:50:21.600
<v Speaker 4>is a specialized term, so that there are representations that

0:50:21.640 --> 0:50:24.160
<v Speaker 4>your brain builds about the world, and we would call

0:50:24.200 --> 0:50:27.640
<v Speaker 4>those first order, and then the representations that your brain

0:50:27.920 --> 0:50:31.759
<v Speaker 4>or your mind builds about itself or its own processing

0:50:31.880 --> 0:50:35.040
<v Speaker 4>would be higher order, second order, higher order. But the

0:50:35.160 --> 0:50:37.880
<v Speaker 4>idea here is that let's say that you have information

0:50:37.960 --> 0:50:41.640
<v Speaker 4>in these modules, it gets globally broadcast into a central workspace.

0:50:42.200 --> 0:50:44.960
<v Speaker 4>Your brain has to kind of make a determination of

0:50:45.800 --> 0:50:49.279
<v Speaker 4>is this information that's available in the global workspace, is

0:50:49.280 --> 0:50:52.640
<v Speaker 4>it reliable? Is it stable? Is it likely to represent

0:50:52.680 --> 0:50:54.759
<v Speaker 4>the true state of the environment. So this is where

0:50:54.760 --> 0:50:58.000
<v Speaker 4>you can see that I'm a metacognition researcher too. But

0:50:58.960 --> 0:51:01.880
<v Speaker 4>it turns out that higher order theories like this that

0:51:01.960 --> 0:51:06.279
<v Speaker 4>are about re representation of information that's available in some

0:51:06.440 --> 0:51:09.640
<v Speaker 4>workspace or some first order state, they actually came from

0:51:09.640 --> 0:51:14.840
<v Speaker 4>philosophy originally. They didn't come from the metacognition in literature. Originally,

0:51:14.880 --> 0:51:18.600
<v Speaker 4>So a philosopher named David Rosenthal and another one named

0:51:18.680 --> 0:51:21.200
<v Speaker 4>Richard Brown. They're both in New York. These are the

0:51:21.239 --> 0:51:25.080
<v Speaker 4>folks who kind of pushed forward this idea of higher

0:51:25.200 --> 0:51:31.040
<v Speaker 4>order representations being related to conscious experience, such that you

0:51:31.120 --> 0:51:36.920
<v Speaker 4>are conscious of something when you have a representation that

0:51:37.239 --> 0:51:40.720
<v Speaker 4>you are currently representing that thing. I'll say it again. Yeah,

0:51:40.880 --> 0:51:46.200
<v Speaker 4>So if I have a representation that consists of I

0:51:46.280 --> 0:51:50.759
<v Speaker 4>am currently in a state that is representing apple, then

0:51:50.800 --> 0:51:53.680
<v Speaker 4>I am conscious of the apple. It's not enough to

0:51:53.880 --> 0:51:56.680
<v Speaker 4>just have a representation of apple. I need to also

0:51:56.800 --> 0:52:01.319
<v Speaker 4>have on top of that state in my head that is,

0:52:01.719 --> 0:52:03.880
<v Speaker 4>I am currently representing apple.

0:52:04.320 --> 0:52:07.680
<v Speaker 1>But wouldn't the philosophical zombie also have that state inside

0:52:07.680 --> 0:52:10.560
<v Speaker 1>their cognition somewhere. How do we know that that actually

0:52:10.600 --> 0:52:12.240
<v Speaker 1>generates the first person experience?

0:52:12.320 --> 0:52:12.640
<v Speaker 4>We don't.

0:52:12.680 --> 0:52:14.239
<v Speaker 1>I want to be hard skeptic on this.

0:52:14.440 --> 0:52:17.320
<v Speaker 4>No, it can be hard skeptic. That's great. Even these

0:52:17.440 --> 0:52:20.680
<v Speaker 4>theories that say that you have a mechanism that says

0:52:20.760 --> 0:52:24.640
<v Speaker 4>I am currently representing this or that representation is good

0:52:24.719 --> 0:52:27.480
<v Speaker 4>and stable and likely to reflect the real world, they

0:52:27.560 --> 0:52:30.600
<v Speaker 4>don't answer the phenomenal consciousness question.

0:52:31.000 --> 0:52:35.560
<v Speaker 1>Right. I remember reading Dan Dennitz's really fun book Consciousness Explained,

0:52:36.040 --> 0:52:38.120
<v Speaker 1>and I'll admit that I was on a roof and

0:52:38.200 --> 0:52:41.239
<v Speaker 1>I was smoking banana peels at the time, but I

0:52:41.280 --> 0:52:43.560
<v Speaker 1>found it compelling in the sense that has sort of

0:52:43.640 --> 0:52:46.719
<v Speaker 1>changed the question right, sort of like his theory. Maybe

0:52:46.760 --> 0:52:49.120
<v Speaker 1>I'm sure you can describe it more accurately. You know,

0:52:49.160 --> 0:52:53.279
<v Speaker 1>his multiple drafts model sort of convinces you that your

0:52:53.520 --> 0:52:57.040
<v Speaker 1>account of your own consciousness might be wrong. You know

0:52:57.080 --> 0:52:59.920
<v Speaker 1>that there is no present moment. It's all just men

0:53:00.080 --> 0:53:03.120
<v Speaker 1>reas of the recent past that's later on constructed to

0:53:03.200 --> 0:53:06.560
<v Speaker 1>convince you that you were aware when you never really were.

0:53:07.200 --> 0:53:09.040
<v Speaker 1>And the something I like about that theory because even

0:53:09.080 --> 0:53:10.960
<v Speaker 1>though I don't believe it, it did make me think

0:53:11.000 --> 0:53:14.359
<v Speaker 1>differently about my own conscious experience. What do you think

0:53:14.360 --> 0:53:16.520
<v Speaker 1>of that theory? And are people still taking it seriously?

0:53:16.760 --> 0:53:19.080
<v Speaker 4>People are still taking it seriously. Yeah, And I think

0:53:19.160 --> 0:53:23.760
<v Speaker 4>that we don't have currently the empirical protocols or evidence

0:53:23.840 --> 0:53:26.279
<v Speaker 4>to say that that's wrong. And this is why I

0:53:26.360 --> 0:53:29.320
<v Speaker 4>want to continue to push for the close integration between

0:53:29.600 --> 0:53:32.719
<v Speaker 4>philosophy and neuroscience. This is another one where I'm going

0:53:32.760 --> 0:53:35.400
<v Speaker 4>to be agnostic. I don't like taking a stance on

0:53:35.440 --> 0:53:38.719
<v Speaker 4>all this because quite frankly, I think that anybody who

0:53:38.760 --> 0:53:42.279
<v Speaker 4>says that they have solved anything about consciousness is just

0:53:42.360 --> 0:53:44.960
<v Speaker 4>full of it, like, there's no way because we just

0:53:45.160 --> 0:53:47.680
<v Speaker 4>don't know. Right. We've got a lot of theories, and

0:53:47.719 --> 0:53:50.600
<v Speaker 4>we can build up empirical evidence and support of this

0:53:50.640 --> 0:53:53.319
<v Speaker 4>theory or that theory and this function of consciousness and

0:53:53.320 --> 0:53:55.880
<v Speaker 4>that kind of thing. But ultimately, if you say that

0:53:55.960 --> 0:53:59.520
<v Speaker 4>you've kind of created the solution, that your theory is

0:53:59.680 --> 0:54:01.960
<v Speaker 4>the write one, and you know that for a fact,

0:54:02.520 --> 0:54:06.200
<v Speaker 4>then sorry, Like, I don't know what banana peels you're on,

0:54:06.440 --> 0:54:07.960
<v Speaker 4>but I don't think that's useful.

0:54:08.160 --> 0:54:09.759
<v Speaker 1>Well, it was a bold title for a book, though,

0:54:09.840 --> 0:54:10.800
<v Speaker 1>Consciousness Exploited.

0:54:10.920 --> 0:54:13.760
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, Dan was a bold guy. Yeah.

0:54:13.920 --> 0:54:15.319
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, So a lot of the theories that you were

0:54:15.360 --> 0:54:17.600
<v Speaker 2>talking about a moment ago were using words that sort

0:54:17.640 --> 0:54:21.080
<v Speaker 2>of remind me of computers and AI. How do we

0:54:21.200 --> 0:54:23.680
<v Speaker 2>think about whether or not AI is conscious? Does it matter?

0:54:23.760 --> 0:54:26.319
<v Speaker 2>Is that an interesting question? What do you think about that?

0:54:26.640 --> 0:54:30.920
<v Speaker 4>Great question? And I think that until I don't know,

0:54:31.480 --> 0:54:34.560
<v Speaker 4>ten fifteen years ago, this was a fun thought experiment

0:54:34.640 --> 0:54:37.120
<v Speaker 4>in science fiction, And now I think it's not quite

0:54:37.160 --> 0:54:40.839
<v Speaker 4>so much anymore, right because now we have machines that

0:54:41.360 --> 0:54:45.560
<v Speaker 4>behaviorally really do pass the Turing test. Which I assume

0:54:45.560 --> 0:54:47.880
<v Speaker 4>we're all quite familiar with, but just in case, the

0:54:47.960 --> 0:54:50.480
<v Speaker 4>test is that the machine has to convince a human

0:54:50.560 --> 0:54:53.720
<v Speaker 4>observer or a human player that it is a person.

0:54:54.239 --> 0:54:57.839
<v Speaker 4>And we have machines that quite handily passed that under

0:54:57.920 --> 0:55:01.919
<v Speaker 4>most scenarios or most get out your chat GPT app

0:55:01.960 --> 0:55:04.319
<v Speaker 4>on your phone, and like it feels very convincing that

0:55:04.320 --> 0:55:08.000
<v Speaker 4>there might be someone in there. Right, until maybe fifteen

0:55:08.080 --> 0:55:10.680
<v Speaker 4>years ago, ten years ago, this was really science fiction,

0:55:10.800 --> 0:55:14.160
<v Speaker 4>and now I think it's not anymore. And the questions

0:55:14.719 --> 0:55:18.480
<v Speaker 4>not only bear on let's figure out the ontological truth

0:55:18.520 --> 0:55:21.560
<v Speaker 4>of whether the AI is in fact conscious, but there

0:55:21.640 --> 0:55:25.200
<v Speaker 4>is also really strong implications regardless of whether it's conscious

0:55:25.280 --> 0:55:27.359
<v Speaker 4>or not, for what happens if we think it is,

0:55:28.440 --> 0:55:31.240
<v Speaker 4>and what happens if it is but we think it's not. Right,

0:55:31.320 --> 0:55:34.640
<v Speaker 4>So there's like strong moral and ethical considerations here. I'll

0:55:34.760 --> 0:55:37.360
<v Speaker 4>kind of have two ways of answering this. One is

0:55:37.400 --> 0:55:39.759
<v Speaker 4>from the perspective of current theories of how we think

0:55:39.800 --> 0:55:44.600
<v Speaker 4>consciousness arises from a like functionalism perspective, which is that

0:55:44.680 --> 0:55:48.440
<v Speaker 4>there is some brain or computational function that gives rise

0:55:48.480 --> 0:55:51.600
<v Speaker 4>to consciousness in some capacity. A lot of the things

0:55:51.600 --> 0:55:55.040
<v Speaker 4>that we're talking about you've rightly pointed out have direct

0:55:55.080 --> 0:55:58.640
<v Speaker 4>analogies in computer processing. We can certainly build even a

0:55:58.680 --> 0:56:02.680
<v Speaker 4>little simulation that monitor itself sure that says is this

0:56:02.800 --> 0:56:07.279
<v Speaker 4>representation reliable or stable? I can build a set of

0:56:07.280 --> 0:56:11.800
<v Speaker 4>computer modules that then send information into a global workspace.

0:56:12.320 --> 0:56:12.600
<v Speaker 1>Sure.

0:56:13.320 --> 0:56:16.040
<v Speaker 4>In fact, maybe your iPhone sort of does that already

0:56:16.040 --> 0:56:18.400
<v Speaker 4>when you talk to Siri as the virtual assistant.

0:56:18.480 --> 0:56:18.680
<v Speaker 1>Right.

0:56:19.200 --> 0:56:24.080
<v Speaker 4>And recurrency in like local feedback or recurrent processing, that's

0:56:24.120 --> 0:56:26.759
<v Speaker 4>absolutely recurrent. Neural networks are a thing. They've been a

0:56:26.800 --> 0:56:30.640
<v Speaker 4>thing for a long time. So we have now all

0:56:30.680 --> 0:56:34.319
<v Speaker 4>of these kind of hallmarks from these theories that we

0:56:34.400 --> 0:56:36.880
<v Speaker 4>can use to build something that looks like a checklist.

0:56:37.320 --> 0:56:40.080
<v Speaker 4>That's like, if you've got an artificial system that has

0:56:40.160 --> 0:56:43.360
<v Speaker 4>all of these things, well, I'm going to not say

0:56:43.440 --> 0:56:45.799
<v Speaker 4>then it's conscious, but I'm going to say it might

0:56:45.960 --> 0:56:49.440
<v Speaker 4>raise our subjective degree of belief that it could potentially

0:56:49.480 --> 0:56:50.520
<v Speaker 4>have consciousness.

0:56:51.600 --> 0:56:53.279
<v Speaker 2>A lot of good qualifiers.

0:56:52.760 --> 0:56:55.360
<v Speaker 4>There, Yeah, there are. Because we wrote this big paper

0:56:55.719 --> 0:56:57.480
<v Speaker 4>me and a whole bunch of other people in twenty

0:56:57.520 --> 0:57:00.200
<v Speaker 4>twenty three that's up on archive that's called consciousnes and

0:57:00.280 --> 0:57:03.799
<v Speaker 4>Artificial Intelligence, and it goes through this checklist. It kind

0:57:03.800 --> 0:57:07.480
<v Speaker 4>of develops the theoretical arguments for building this checklist, and

0:57:07.520 --> 0:57:10.480
<v Speaker 4>then kind of ultimately says, look, we've got systems that

0:57:10.520 --> 0:57:13.719
<v Speaker 4>tick an awful lot of these boxes already. Should we

0:57:13.760 --> 0:57:18.880
<v Speaker 4>think that they're conscious? Maybe not, because clearly the theories

0:57:18.920 --> 0:57:23.000
<v Speaker 4>are not complete. Some of the things on that checklist

0:57:23.040 --> 0:57:25.600
<v Speaker 4>are going to be completely irrelevant to consciousness, and we're

0:57:25.600 --> 0:57:29.520
<v Speaker 4>probably missing a whole lot of things also. But to

0:57:29.600 --> 0:57:33.200
<v Speaker 4>the degree that there is a system that ticks more

0:57:33.440 --> 0:57:35.720
<v Speaker 4>or less of these boxes, well maybe the ones that

0:57:35.760 --> 0:57:37.880
<v Speaker 4>tick more of these boxes we might want to consider

0:57:37.880 --> 0:57:39.960
<v Speaker 4>a little bit more closely. But then the other thing

0:57:39.960 --> 0:57:42.360
<v Speaker 4>we do in that paper is talk about the ethical

0:57:42.360 --> 0:57:45.040
<v Speaker 4>implications of false positives and false negatives.

0:57:45.280 --> 0:57:48.160
<v Speaker 1>I think AI is a great way to differentiate between

0:57:48.200 --> 0:57:50.920
<v Speaker 1>intelligence and consciousness, because it's not hard for me to

0:57:50.920 --> 0:57:53.480
<v Speaker 1>believe you could build a very intelligent system, one that

0:57:53.560 --> 0:57:57.439
<v Speaker 1>surpasses humans, that even like manipulates us and takes over

0:57:57.480 --> 0:58:00.400
<v Speaker 1>the planet and runs us as slaves. It could be

0:58:00.480 --> 0:58:04.400
<v Speaker 1>super intelligent without actually being conscious, without anybody being in there, right,

0:58:04.480 --> 0:58:07.080
<v Speaker 1>And there's a dark dystopian future there, you know, where

0:58:07.120 --> 0:58:11.520
<v Speaker 1>super intelligence actually extinguishes consciousness. But to me, you could

0:58:11.600 --> 0:58:14.600
<v Speaker 1>maybe get an answer to the question again mathematically, if

0:58:14.640 --> 0:58:18.840
<v Speaker 1>you could somehow build up a description of consciousness from

0:58:18.960 --> 0:58:22.080
<v Speaker 1>the little bits inside you know the way, For example,

0:58:22.120 --> 0:58:24.560
<v Speaker 1>you could say, hey, if you describe all the motion

0:58:24.720 --> 0:58:27.400
<v Speaker 1>of water droplets, I can tell you whether or not

0:58:27.440 --> 0:58:29.480
<v Speaker 1>a hurricane is going to form. Like if we can

0:58:29.680 --> 0:58:33.720
<v Speaker 1>master the understanding of the dynamics at a small scale

0:58:33.720 --> 0:58:36.080
<v Speaker 1>and compute it all the way up to the bigger scale,

0:58:36.200 --> 0:58:38.280
<v Speaker 1>then we can say yes or no, there is a hurricane.

0:58:38.640 --> 0:58:41.200
<v Speaker 1>In the same way, then I could like analyze your

0:58:41.240 --> 0:58:43.760
<v Speaker 1>brain and I could tell you, oh, yes, this does

0:58:43.800 --> 0:58:46.720
<v Speaker 1>emerge into some first person experience or does not. If

0:58:46.760 --> 0:58:49.400
<v Speaker 1>we had that mathematical bridge, and then we could apply

0:58:49.440 --> 0:58:52.080
<v Speaker 1>it to AI and say, oh, yes or no, there

0:58:52.160 --> 0:58:54.960
<v Speaker 1>is or is not somebody in there. And I'm really

0:58:55.040 --> 0:58:57.040
<v Speaker 1>attracted to these kinds of theories. I think they're called

0:58:57.120 --> 0:59:01.240
<v Speaker 1>physicalism or do you call them functional theories? How much

0:59:01.320 --> 0:59:04.000
<v Speaker 1>progress have we made in that direction and are we

0:59:04.120 --> 0:59:06.520
<v Speaker 1>likely to make any more? Or is it too intractable

0:59:06.560 --> 0:59:07.160
<v Speaker 1>a problem.

0:59:07.320 --> 0:59:11.200
<v Speaker 4>I don't think it's too intractable a problem. Necessarily, I'm

0:59:11.200 --> 0:59:14.400
<v Speaker 4>not going to fully subscribe to the hard problem of consciousness.

0:59:14.400 --> 0:59:16.360
<v Speaker 4>I do think that if we continue to push on

0:59:16.960 --> 0:59:20.320
<v Speaker 4>this kind of idea of emergent properties and the translation

0:59:20.480 --> 0:59:24.880
<v Speaker 4>between a physical substrate and the information that it produces

0:59:25.000 --> 0:59:27.760
<v Speaker 4>and that emerges from that physical substrate in terms of

0:59:27.800 --> 0:59:31.840
<v Speaker 4>its interactions in space and in time. I think that

0:59:31.880 --> 0:59:35.760
<v Speaker 4>will take us forward. I am a reductionist or a

0:59:35.800 --> 0:59:39.520
<v Speaker 4>physicalist myself. I don't think that there's anything magical or

0:59:39.560 --> 0:59:43.640
<v Speaker 4>spiritual about consciousness personally. I know that there are others

0:59:43.640 --> 0:59:46.120
<v Speaker 4>who are going to disagree with me there, but I

0:59:46.160 --> 0:59:49.000
<v Speaker 4>do think that if we could build such an explanation

0:59:49.080 --> 0:59:51.600
<v Speaker 4>that it would get us a long way to understanding consciousness,

0:59:51.760 --> 0:59:54.920
<v Speaker 4>the kind of emergent properties that you're talking about. I

0:59:54.960 --> 0:59:59.280
<v Speaker 4>think that it's really important for us to recognize that

0:59:59.320 --> 1:00:03.720
<v Speaker 4>the success of such an endeavor is going to need

1:00:04.560 --> 1:00:07.760
<v Speaker 4>at its core, the assumption that the system that we

1:00:07.800 --> 1:00:11.880
<v Speaker 4>are studying is actually conscious. Otherwise it becomes circular. Right Like,

1:00:11.920 --> 1:00:14.680
<v Speaker 4>if I want to create an explanation of how matter

1:00:14.800 --> 1:00:17.840
<v Speaker 4>gives rise to whatever I think is consciousness and then

1:00:17.920 --> 1:00:20.200
<v Speaker 4>start pointing that at everything that I can think of,

1:00:20.800 --> 1:00:23.320
<v Speaker 4>then I'm not building an explanation of consciousness. I'm building

1:00:23.320 --> 1:00:25.920
<v Speaker 4>an explanation of I don't know, physical interactions in the

1:00:26.000 --> 1:00:30.280
<v Speaker 4>environment or information processing in the environment. But I don't

1:00:30.320 --> 1:00:31.680
<v Speaker 4>know that it's going to get me all the way

1:00:31.720 --> 1:00:34.520
<v Speaker 4>to consciousness. But if we could do that in us, sure,

1:00:34.800 --> 1:00:38.840
<v Speaker 4>in one thousand million years, when we have that explanation

1:00:39.080 --> 1:00:41.560
<v Speaker 4>and we have a full what the philosopher Lease and

1:00:41.680 --> 1:00:45.160
<v Speaker 4>Rochetitis would call a generative explanation of how a physical

1:00:45.160 --> 1:00:48.480
<v Speaker 4>system and interactions in that physical system fully gives rise

1:00:48.600 --> 1:00:52.560
<v Speaker 4>to conscious experience, Yeah, that would be great. I don't

1:00:52.560 --> 1:00:54.400
<v Speaker 4>know how we're going to do that, but I do

1:00:54.480 --> 1:00:59.040
<v Speaker 4>think that it does require a connection with that physical substrate.

1:00:59.360 --> 1:01:02.720
<v Speaker 2>We're getting to the end of our time together. We've

1:01:02.720 --> 1:01:05.320
<v Speaker 2>talked about why this is a difficult problem. Let's end

1:01:05.360 --> 1:01:08.960
<v Speaker 2>on why it's important to keep studying this difficult problem.

1:01:09.480 --> 1:01:13.640
<v Speaker 4>I think I'll answer this from three perspectives. One, as

1:01:13.760 --> 1:01:17.080
<v Speaker 4>human beings, we want to understand our worlds. We want

1:01:17.120 --> 1:01:19.680
<v Speaker 4>to understand the basic science of how things happen. We

1:01:19.840 --> 1:01:26.880
<v Speaker 4>are curious, and we have this compelling drive to understand

1:01:26.920 --> 1:01:29.680
<v Speaker 4>our environments. And we can see this both from the

1:01:29.680 --> 1:01:32.560
<v Speaker 4>perspective of modern science, but also just from the perspective

1:01:32.560 --> 1:01:35.760
<v Speaker 4>of this is literally what brains do. They build internal

1:01:35.800 --> 1:01:39.400
<v Speaker 4>models of the world and they predict stuff that's going

1:01:39.440 --> 1:01:41.840
<v Speaker 4>to happen from those internal models of the world, and

1:01:41.880 --> 1:01:45.200
<v Speaker 4>we use that to drive ourselves forward. That's what evolution

1:01:45.320 --> 1:01:47.600
<v Speaker 4>has done for us. So I think that we are

1:01:47.640 --> 1:01:52.120
<v Speaker 4>hardwired to do this, to be natural scientists in a way.

1:01:52.520 --> 1:01:54.960
<v Speaker 4>So I think that that's important, like to give in

1:01:55.040 --> 1:01:59.560
<v Speaker 4>to that feeling, that compulsion. But also from a practical

1:01:59.640 --> 1:02:05.560
<v Speaker 4>and societal benefit perspective, we can take multiple multiple prongs

1:02:05.560 --> 1:02:07.880
<v Speaker 4>on this. So one is the medical perspective, which is

1:02:07.920 --> 1:02:10.720
<v Speaker 4>that it's really important for us to understand the presence

1:02:10.800 --> 1:02:15.080
<v Speaker 4>or absence of suffering in folks who have disease or injury.

1:02:15.160 --> 1:02:17.960
<v Speaker 4>That we want to understand the diversity and heterogeneity of

1:02:17.960 --> 1:02:21.920
<v Speaker 4>those perspectives. So here's a very concrete example. There are

1:02:22.080 --> 1:02:25.560
<v Speaker 4>a number of disorders or conditions out there that come

1:02:25.600 --> 1:02:29.240
<v Speaker 4>with them chronic pain, but you don't have any physical

1:02:29.240 --> 1:02:32.680
<v Speaker 4>substrate that you can identify. You don't know why that

1:02:32.720 --> 1:02:35.080
<v Speaker 4>person is in chronic pain, and so you don't know

1:02:35.080 --> 1:02:36.880
<v Speaker 4>how to fix it. But that doesn't mean that the

1:02:36.920 --> 1:02:40.400
<v Speaker 4>pain isn't real, that the suffering isn't real. And so

1:02:40.560 --> 1:02:46.120
<v Speaker 4>from that perspective, understanding the nature of subjective experience is

1:02:46.280 --> 1:02:49.960
<v Speaker 4>really critically important. Fear and anxiety is another one. We

1:02:50.080 --> 1:02:54.240
<v Speaker 4>know the fear circuitry. We've mapped that. Neuroscientist Joseph Ldou

1:02:54.320 --> 1:02:57.520
<v Speaker 4>has been instrumental in driving forward the mapping of the

1:02:57.560 --> 1:03:00.880
<v Speaker 4>Imigdaler circuit, the fear circuit in the brain. But he's

1:03:00.960 --> 1:03:05.920
<v Speaker 4>very careful to distinguish between processing of threatening stimului and

1:03:05.960 --> 1:03:10.720
<v Speaker 4>the experience of fear. So if we develop pharmacological interventions

1:03:11.520 --> 1:03:16.040
<v Speaker 4>that fix the circuitry bit and fix the behavioral bit

1:03:16.120 --> 1:03:19.280
<v Speaker 4>in rats, one of the reasons they might not translate

1:03:19.280 --> 1:03:22.680
<v Speaker 4>to humans is that they don't reduce the fear. They

1:03:22.800 --> 1:03:26.840
<v Speaker 4>change the behavior, but the fear persists. So I think

1:03:26.880 --> 1:03:29.720
<v Speaker 4>that from like a clinical perspective, it's really important for

1:03:29.800 --> 1:03:33.400
<v Speaker 4>us to understand this and from depression, from the perspective

1:03:33.560 --> 1:03:36.640
<v Speaker 4>of those who have autis inspective disorders, so to understand

1:03:36.680 --> 1:03:40.160
<v Speaker 4>their subjective experiences, like there's just a huge amount of

1:03:40.200 --> 1:03:42.919
<v Speaker 4>clinical benefit that we can build. And then finally from

1:03:42.920 --> 1:03:45.840
<v Speaker 4>the perspective of the artificial systems that we've just been

1:03:45.880 --> 1:03:49.320
<v Speaker 4>talking about. So we're in a position now where whether

1:03:49.400 --> 1:03:54.320
<v Speaker 4>or not we build systems that have phenomenal awareness or consciousness,

1:03:54.400 --> 1:03:57.360
<v Speaker 4>that whether anybody's home in there. You know, maybe we're

1:03:57.400 --> 1:03:58.960
<v Speaker 4>not going to be able to answer that question for

1:03:59.000 --> 1:04:01.520
<v Speaker 4>a long time. But the way we interact with systems

1:04:01.600 --> 1:04:04.600
<v Speaker 4>depends on whether we think that they have consciousness, And

1:04:04.680 --> 1:04:09.640
<v Speaker 4>the way that we build guardrails and legislation and assigned

1:04:09.680 --> 1:04:13.280
<v Speaker 4>responsibility in legal settings depends on whether we think that

1:04:13.360 --> 1:04:15.320
<v Speaker 4>these things can think for themselves, and whether they have

1:04:15.360 --> 1:04:18.120
<v Speaker 4>moral compasses and all those things which are not necessarily

1:04:18.160 --> 1:04:22.120
<v Speaker 4>related to conscious experience per se. But there's an argument

1:04:22.120 --> 1:04:24.000
<v Speaker 4>to be made that, at least in a lot of

1:04:24.040 --> 1:04:28.840
<v Speaker 4>the systems that we know about, describing responsibility is related

1:04:28.960 --> 1:04:33.240
<v Speaker 4>to the capacity for that agent to be self directed,

1:04:34.000 --> 1:04:38.840
<v Speaker 4>and that that seems intimately related to seeking out goals

1:04:38.840 --> 1:04:41.840
<v Speaker 4>that are not just defined by a programmer, but ultimately

1:04:41.880 --> 1:04:44.480
<v Speaker 4>like decisions that that thing might make that might be

1:04:44.560 --> 1:04:48.120
<v Speaker 4>driven by its intrinsic rewards seeking. And there's something that

1:04:48.160 --> 1:04:50.960
<v Speaker 4>it's like to seek reward because it feels good. So

1:04:51.560 --> 1:04:55.080
<v Speaker 4>there's a lot of kind of moral and ethical and

1:04:55.280 --> 1:05:00.240
<v Speaker 4>legislation and societal implications for getting this right, a lot

1:05:00.280 --> 1:05:03.160
<v Speaker 4>of medical reasons to get this right. And then you know,

1:05:03.200 --> 1:05:07.240
<v Speaker 4>from a basic science curiosity perspective, this is literally what

1:05:07.280 --> 1:05:09.600
<v Speaker 4>we evolved to do is figure out the world, and

1:05:09.680 --> 1:05:11.640
<v Speaker 4>so let's keep doing that as well.

1:05:12.080 --> 1:05:16.920
<v Speaker 1>And when we meet aliens, does it matter if they're conscious, Like,

1:05:17.000 --> 1:05:19.840
<v Speaker 1>if they're intelligent and they're interesting and they want to

1:05:19.880 --> 1:05:23.480
<v Speaker 1>share with us their space warp drives? Does it matter

1:05:23.680 --> 1:05:25.720
<v Speaker 1>if when we point our hair dryer at them it

1:05:25.760 --> 1:05:27.440
<v Speaker 1>says yes or no? What do you think?

1:05:27.720 --> 1:05:30.640
<v Speaker 4>I think so. But there's also a lot of evidence

1:05:30.680 --> 1:05:34.840
<v Speaker 4>that consciousness and what's called moral status can be disentangled.

1:05:35.440 --> 1:05:39.680
<v Speaker 4>That we ascribe moral status to things that we think

1:05:39.720 --> 1:05:43.600
<v Speaker 4>are conscious, but we also don't need to require consciousness

1:05:43.640 --> 1:05:47.320
<v Speaker 4>in order to ascribe moral status, and we certainly treat

1:05:47.320 --> 1:05:49.840
<v Speaker 4>things very badly even if we know that they're conscious.

1:05:50.760 --> 1:05:55.120
<v Speaker 4>So these are conceptually disentanglable things. I think that it

1:05:55.160 --> 1:06:01.080
<v Speaker 4>will matter though for the rest of the machinery around encounter, right,

1:06:01.200 --> 1:06:06.640
<v Speaker 4>Like maybe from an individual astronaut's perspective it doesn't matter

1:06:06.720 --> 1:06:09.200
<v Speaker 4>so much. But from the perspective of the laws and

1:06:09.240 --> 1:06:13.760
<v Speaker 4>regulations and societal implications of what that would mean and

1:06:13.840 --> 1:06:15.880
<v Speaker 4>what kind of a people do we want to be,

1:06:16.720 --> 1:06:19.080
<v Speaker 4>I think that then it really does matter. And so

1:06:19.200 --> 1:06:22.840
<v Speaker 4>having folks at the helm who are paying attention to

1:06:22.920 --> 1:06:27.280
<v Speaker 4>the moral implications of such a weighty determination would be

1:06:27.520 --> 1:06:27.919
<v Speaker 4>very good.

1:06:28.480 --> 1:06:30.520
<v Speaker 1>Well, I definitely want the aliens to know that we

1:06:30.600 --> 1:06:33.040
<v Speaker 1>are conscious before they decide whether or not to know

1:06:33.200 --> 1:06:36.680
<v Speaker 1>nucas from orbit so or have us as a snack.

1:06:37.320 --> 1:06:40.320
<v Speaker 4>Assuming they ascribe moral value and moral status to meanings

1:06:40.360 --> 1:06:41.840
<v Speaker 4>with consciousness.

1:06:41.400 --> 1:06:43.480
<v Speaker 1>And maybe they developed the consciousness of meter and they

1:06:43.480 --> 1:06:44.200
<v Speaker 1>can share it with us.

1:06:44.560 --> 1:06:47.600
<v Speaker 4>Maybe here's hoping, all right.

1:06:47.960 --> 1:06:49.760
<v Speaker 2>Well, thanks for being on the show today, Megan. This

1:06:49.880 --> 1:06:50.560
<v Speaker 2>was fascinating.

1:06:51.120 --> 1:06:52.959
<v Speaker 4>Thank you so much for having me. This was really

1:06:52.960 --> 1:06:55.520
<v Speaker 4>fun and engaging and it's been a real pleasure.

1:06:56.000 --> 1:06:56.840
<v Speaker 1>Thank you very much.

1:07:03.640 --> 1:07:07.480
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