1 00:00:00,280 --> 00:00:02,920 Speaker 1: This is what President Trump said in a video message 2 00:00:02,920 --> 00:00:07,200 Speaker 1: on Wednesday. Mob violence goes against everything I believe in 3 00:00:07,800 --> 00:00:12,280 Speaker 1: and everything our movement stands for. No true supporter of 4 00:00:12,360 --> 00:00:16,680 Speaker 1: mind could ever endorse political violence. And this is what 5 00:00:16,720 --> 00:00:20,040 Speaker 1: Trump said at a rally on January six, before a 6 00:00:20,040 --> 00:00:24,840 Speaker 1: mob of pro Trump supporters stormed the capital. Our country 7 00:00:24,840 --> 00:00:28,960 Speaker 1: has had enough. We will not take it anymore. And 8 00:00:29,040 --> 00:00:33,080 Speaker 1: that's what this is all about. You. We're going to 9 00:00:34,400 --> 00:00:38,680 Speaker 1: walk down Pennsylvania Avenue. I love Pennsylvania Avenue, and we're 10 00:00:38,680 --> 00:00:43,040 Speaker 1: going to the Capitol because you'll never take back our 11 00:00:43,080 --> 00:00:46,199 Speaker 1: country with weakness. You have to show strength, and you 12 00:00:46,240 --> 00:00:50,000 Speaker 1: have to be strong. Can Trump be prosecuted for that 13 00:00:50,080 --> 00:00:53,639 Speaker 1: inflammatory speech urging the crowd to go to the capital 14 00:00:53,720 --> 00:00:57,360 Speaker 1: and demand legislator's address his baseless claims of voter fraud? 15 00:00:57,640 --> 00:01:00,320 Speaker 1: Joining me as Sharene SNAr, a professor at for the 16 00:01:00,360 --> 00:01:03,760 Speaker 1: Law School who studies the legal treatment of political violence, 17 00:01:04,440 --> 00:01:08,120 Speaker 1: Let's start with the broad question first, Can President Trump 18 00:01:08,120 --> 00:01:12,039 Speaker 1: be prosecuted for inciting the riot? So the standard for 19 00:01:12,680 --> 00:01:17,280 Speaker 1: incitement is a high standard under criminal law. And you 20 00:01:17,319 --> 00:01:18,760 Speaker 1: know the first thing I would say is that we 21 00:01:18,800 --> 00:01:23,040 Speaker 1: should separate out the criminal prosecution question from the question 22 00:01:23,120 --> 00:01:27,959 Speaker 1: of whether he incited the riot in a broader moral 23 00:01:28,200 --> 00:01:32,919 Speaker 1: or political sense, or even in terms of the impeachment 24 00:01:32,920 --> 00:01:36,720 Speaker 1: proceedings against him, but in terms of a criminal prosecution, 25 00:01:37,280 --> 00:01:41,399 Speaker 1: because of a nine Supreme Court decision in a case 26 00:01:41,440 --> 00:01:46,800 Speaker 1: called Brandenburg the Ohio, the standard for prosecuting somebody for 27 00:01:46,880 --> 00:01:50,840 Speaker 1: advocacy of violence is high. You have to show both 28 00:01:51,000 --> 00:01:56,400 Speaker 1: that their speech was intended to produce imminent lawless action 29 00:01:56,680 --> 00:01:59,560 Speaker 1: and that it was likely to produce that kind of action. 30 00:02:00,000 --> 00:02:03,160 Speaker 1: So there are questions about whether what the president said 31 00:02:03,320 --> 00:02:05,440 Speaker 1: in the context in which he said it could meet 32 00:02:05,440 --> 00:02:07,880 Speaker 1: that standard. So could a case be made out here? 33 00:02:08,320 --> 00:02:10,760 Speaker 1: I think there's a case to be made, in part 34 00:02:10,840 --> 00:02:13,399 Speaker 1: not just from the words, but also from the context 35 00:02:13,440 --> 00:02:16,359 Speaker 1: in which he made the comments that he did at 36 00:02:16,440 --> 00:02:20,040 Speaker 1: the rally immediately proceeding the invasion of the capital. And 37 00:02:20,160 --> 00:02:22,359 Speaker 1: so it's not just the language is taking back our 38 00:02:22,400 --> 00:02:25,959 Speaker 1: country strings and so forth, but also the fact that 39 00:02:26,080 --> 00:02:29,399 Speaker 1: the crowd that he was speaking to were shouting fight 40 00:02:29,520 --> 00:02:32,720 Speaker 1: for Trump, Fight for Trump at the time. But it 41 00:02:32,800 --> 00:02:37,080 Speaker 1: will also rest on facts we don't fully know right now. So, 42 00:02:37,160 --> 00:02:40,200 Speaker 1: for instance, the more it can be shown that the 43 00:02:40,240 --> 00:02:44,760 Speaker 1: president had knowledge that groups were planning of an invasion 44 00:02:44,760 --> 00:02:47,120 Speaker 1: of the capital in the days before the attack, or 45 00:02:47,240 --> 00:02:48,960 Speaker 1: you know that they were already groups like the Proud 46 00:02:49,000 --> 00:02:51,919 Speaker 1: Boys in DC they're fighting with police on the eve 47 00:02:51,960 --> 00:02:55,480 Speaker 1: of the attacks, then it could strengthen the case that 48 00:02:55,560 --> 00:03:00,840 Speaker 1: he intended violence to result from his remarks. In investigation, 49 00:03:00,919 --> 00:03:04,359 Speaker 1: a grand jury could subpoena internal White House documents and 50 00:03:04,440 --> 00:03:08,880 Speaker 1: even question White House aids to find out what Trump 51 00:03:08,960 --> 00:03:12,359 Speaker 1: said or new prior to the riot. Would that help 52 00:03:12,480 --> 00:03:15,880 Speaker 1: determine his intent? If it emerges from that that he 53 00:03:16,040 --> 00:03:21,040 Speaker 1: had a strong knowledge of the plans of certain groups 54 00:03:21,080 --> 00:03:22,920 Speaker 1: that we're coming to d C to be part of 55 00:03:22,960 --> 00:03:27,360 Speaker 1: the protest, then that can help show that what he 56 00:03:27,480 --> 00:03:31,880 Speaker 1: intended by, you know, asking followers to fight for him 57 00:03:31,919 --> 00:03:33,840 Speaker 1: and to be strong, you know, with more than just 58 00:03:33,960 --> 00:03:37,680 Speaker 1: people protests. How likely is it that a president or 59 00:03:37,720 --> 00:03:40,520 Speaker 1: a former president, because we assume that this is going 60 00:03:40,560 --> 00:03:44,280 Speaker 1: to be handled by the Justice Department under Joe Biden, 61 00:03:44,640 --> 00:03:48,880 Speaker 1: that a former president would be prosecuted. That's hard to 62 00:03:48,920 --> 00:03:52,200 Speaker 1: say because it is the unprecedented. But so much of 63 00:03:52,200 --> 00:03:56,360 Speaker 1: what we are seeing now is is unprecedented, and there's 64 00:03:56,360 --> 00:04:00,520 Speaker 1: not a pattern or historical example. I mean, recent times 65 00:04:00,680 --> 00:04:02,960 Speaker 1: that we can draw, and so I think I'd rather 66 00:04:03,040 --> 00:04:06,480 Speaker 1: not speculate about the likelihood of prosecution. Some of it 67 00:04:06,720 --> 00:04:10,360 Speaker 1: turns on the decision making by his attorneys and turns 68 00:04:10,400 --> 00:04:12,920 Speaker 1: on the political context. So there's a lot that could 69 00:04:13,000 --> 00:04:15,400 Speaker 1: go into that kind of decision. Could some of the 70 00:04:15,480 --> 00:04:20,960 Speaker 1: other speakers at the rally be prosecuted, for example, Rudy Giuliani, 71 00:04:21,080 --> 00:04:25,760 Speaker 1: Trump's personal attorney, let's have trial by combat. So the 72 00:04:25,839 --> 00:04:29,040 Speaker 1: words of Giuliani that really stand out are the reference 73 00:04:29,080 --> 00:04:33,839 Speaker 1: to trial by combat. He can still argue that what 74 00:04:34,240 --> 00:04:36,520 Speaker 1: he meant by that, and in the context of the sentence, 75 00:04:36,520 --> 00:04:40,400 Speaker 1: it's actually not entirely clear. He could argue that that 76 00:04:40,520 --> 00:04:44,120 Speaker 1: was not a reference to literal physical combat, um, but 77 00:04:44,279 --> 00:04:46,600 Speaker 1: a reference to combat in the same way that we 78 00:04:47,200 --> 00:04:51,279 Speaker 1: often use the word fight to mean a struggle. You know, 79 00:04:51,360 --> 00:04:55,240 Speaker 1: combat certainly does have a more militaristic connotation even than 80 00:04:55,440 --> 00:04:58,159 Speaker 1: than fight. But there is a defense there that the 81 00:04:58,200 --> 00:05:01,279 Speaker 1: intent was not literally in citing people to break down 82 00:05:01,279 --> 00:05:03,479 Speaker 1: the doors of the capital. What did that charges of 83 00:05:03,560 --> 00:05:11,240 Speaker 1: seditious conspiracy. Seditious conspiracy requires people agreeing either to overthrow 84 00:05:11,279 --> 00:05:16,320 Speaker 1: the government or opposed federal authority by force, including preventing 85 00:05:16,320 --> 00:05:19,800 Speaker 1: the execution of federal law. And so the argument I 86 00:05:19,839 --> 00:05:23,680 Speaker 1: suppose would be that if the president agreed to use 87 00:05:23,920 --> 00:05:27,279 Speaker 1: force to prevent a certification of the Electoral College votes, 88 00:05:27,560 --> 00:05:32,040 Speaker 1: that would amount to interrupting a lawful federal process in 89 00:05:32,120 --> 00:05:35,560 Speaker 1: terms of the statute. But you would have to show 90 00:05:36,360 --> 00:05:40,600 Speaker 1: more than the fact that the president wanted the certification 91 00:05:40,720 --> 00:05:44,400 Speaker 1: not to happen. You would have to show some agreement 92 00:05:44,720 --> 00:05:49,200 Speaker 1: with others to impede that process through force. And so again, 93 00:05:49,600 --> 00:05:52,080 Speaker 1: it's not just engaging in a series of actions to 94 00:05:52,120 --> 00:05:55,320 Speaker 1: be legitimize the election, or even to invite right wing 95 00:05:55,600 --> 00:05:59,960 Speaker 1: support right wing militants, but specifically to prevent a certification 96 00:06:00,080 --> 00:06:04,839 Speaker 1: through force. So seditious conspiracy that might be a charge 97 00:06:04,960 --> 00:06:11,520 Speaker 1: that's better suited to the rioters themselves. I think certainly 98 00:06:11,600 --> 00:06:15,479 Speaker 1: the conduct of some of the rioters um falls within 99 00:06:15,520 --> 00:06:18,839 Speaker 1: that description. But I also think we need to be 100 00:06:18,920 --> 00:06:24,480 Speaker 1: careful of using seditious conspiracy charges. And um that's because 101 00:06:24,560 --> 00:06:27,760 Speaker 1: we do have a long history of using sedition laws 102 00:06:27,760 --> 00:06:31,960 Speaker 1: to suppress descent descent, and while the people who invaded 103 00:06:32,000 --> 00:06:35,440 Speaker 1: a capital were not engaging in merely peaceful protests, we 104 00:06:35,480 --> 00:06:39,120 Speaker 1: should be careful about normalizing a framework UM that is 105 00:06:39,120 --> 00:06:43,080 Speaker 1: connected to the suppression of ideas and that um is 106 00:06:43,200 --> 00:06:49,600 Speaker 1: likely to uh to perhaps have its strongest effect on 107 00:06:49,600 --> 00:06:52,160 Speaker 1: on others. And you know, I would note in that 108 00:06:52,360 --> 00:06:54,320 Speaker 1: context that it was just a few months back that 109 00:06:54,360 --> 00:06:58,560 Speaker 1: the Attorney General was suggesting using sedition conspiracy charges against 110 00:06:58,640 --> 00:07:03,240 Speaker 1: people in the police protests. UM. And you know, in 111 00:07:03,279 --> 00:07:06,080 Speaker 1: the past, the successful uses of that charge have been 112 00:07:06,120 --> 00:07:12,880 Speaker 1: against Puerto Rican nationalist, radical anarchists, Muslims. The government has 113 00:07:12,920 --> 00:07:16,040 Speaker 1: tried to use that charge against white supremacists and at 114 00:07:16,120 --> 00:07:18,679 Speaker 1: least a couple of high profile cases over the past 115 00:07:19,040 --> 00:07:23,760 Speaker 1: thirty forty years UM, but UH, multiple prosecutions ended in 116 00:07:23,800 --> 00:07:26,680 Speaker 1: dismissal of charges or acquittal. UM. So we do need 117 00:07:26,720 --> 00:07:29,840 Speaker 1: to be careful about the the longer term and more 118 00:07:29,880 --> 00:07:34,520 Speaker 1: systemic consequences of any expanded use of position charges. That 119 00:07:34,600 --> 00:07:38,720 Speaker 1: brings me to the question of of domestic terrorism. And 120 00:07:39,000 --> 00:07:42,800 Speaker 1: many people are saying, well, the FBI couldn't investigate here 121 00:07:43,400 --> 00:07:47,720 Speaker 1: because they can investigate for domestic terrorism unless the case 122 00:07:47,800 --> 00:07:51,880 Speaker 1: has been opened. So I think there's some misinformation about 123 00:07:52,240 --> 00:07:56,560 Speaker 1: the scope of federal authority of including to to launch 124 00:07:56,600 --> 00:08:01,840 Speaker 1: investigations and the FBI guideline for investigations, which is Essentially, 125 00:08:01,960 --> 00:08:04,600 Speaker 1: the UM you know, the closest thing to a charter 126 00:08:04,760 --> 00:08:09,800 Speaker 1: or framework for for their authority, UH, has a fairly 127 00:08:09,920 --> 00:08:16,200 Speaker 1: low standard when it comes to initiating investigations UM. In 128 00:08:16,240 --> 00:08:20,120 Speaker 1: the context of of speech. UM. So, for instance, the 129 00:08:20,280 --> 00:08:26,640 Speaker 1: FBI can open an assessment into potential illegal activity without 130 00:08:26,720 --> 00:08:33,160 Speaker 1: having to show any particular factual basis for suspicions. So, 131 00:08:34,480 --> 00:08:37,040 Speaker 1: and that's assessment. That's a form of investigative authority that 132 00:08:37,080 --> 00:08:39,880 Speaker 1: allows the FBI to look at social media posts and 133 00:08:40,200 --> 00:08:44,079 Speaker 1: even send out informants um to to target particular individuals. UM. 134 00:08:44,160 --> 00:08:47,720 Speaker 1: So that's the set of powers that is available to 135 00:08:47,760 --> 00:08:51,199 Speaker 1: the FBI, even in the absence of a specific factual 136 00:08:52,080 --> 00:08:55,520 Speaker 1: basis a predication we're thinking that an individual is about 137 00:08:55,559 --> 00:08:59,120 Speaker 1: to engage in or in violence um. And Similarly, there 138 00:08:59,160 --> 00:09:01,600 Speaker 1: is a restriction UM in the sense that the FBI 139 00:09:01,720 --> 00:09:07,840 Speaker 1: is not supposed to engage investigations solely on account of speech. 140 00:09:08,800 --> 00:09:11,720 Speaker 1: But the way that the FBI interprets that is it's 141 00:09:11,760 --> 00:09:15,640 Speaker 1: not solely on account of speech if there is a 142 00:09:15,679 --> 00:09:20,800 Speaker 1: concern that a group is interested in violence. So that UH, 143 00:09:21,000 --> 00:09:23,520 Speaker 1: you know, those investigative authorities are already quite broad, and 144 00:09:23,640 --> 00:09:28,319 Speaker 1: the lack of a domestic terrorism Uh, you know, process 145 00:09:28,320 --> 00:09:32,680 Speaker 1: for designating organizations, you know as domestic charish organizations is 146 00:09:32,720 --> 00:09:36,040 Speaker 1: not an impediment to that already very large authority. So 147 00:09:36,720 --> 00:09:40,679 Speaker 1: is there a difference between the act itself, what we 148 00:09:40,800 --> 00:09:45,120 Speaker 1: saw that he did, and whether or not the proof 149 00:09:45,120 --> 00:09:48,760 Speaker 1: of intent is there? Yeah, Well, I think it's one 150 00:09:48,760 --> 00:09:52,720 Speaker 1: thing to say that the president bears moral and political 151 00:09:52,760 --> 00:09:56,560 Speaker 1: responsibility for instigating the violence. There's no question in my 152 00:09:56,679 --> 00:09:59,160 Speaker 1: mind that the comments made not just at the day 153 00:09:59,160 --> 00:10:01,760 Speaker 1: of the rally, but in the preceding months, and you know, 154 00:10:01,800 --> 00:10:05,560 Speaker 1: for that matter, the entire campaign of delegitimizing the election. 155 00:10:06,120 --> 00:10:10,600 Speaker 1: Um that the president bears responsibility for what unfolded. But 156 00:10:10,960 --> 00:10:15,079 Speaker 1: that's a separate question from whether the intent required by this, 157 00:10:15,400 --> 00:10:19,440 Speaker 1: you know, the constitutional tests of it isn't. The Senator 158 00:10:19,520 --> 00:10:24,840 Speaker 1: Dick Durbin plans to reintroduce a domestic terrorism bill after 159 00:10:24,920 --> 00:10:29,240 Speaker 1: the inauguration. Tell me what your opinion is of the 160 00:10:29,280 --> 00:10:33,520 Speaker 1: need for domestic terrorism bill. I think if there's legislation 161 00:10:33,880 --> 00:10:39,480 Speaker 1: that is intended to increase awareness and information as to 162 00:10:39,559 --> 00:10:42,400 Speaker 1: how the government has responded domestic terrorism. So some of 163 00:10:42,400 --> 00:10:47,600 Speaker 1: the bills are primarily about understanding the law enforcement response 164 00:10:47,800 --> 00:10:53,000 Speaker 1: for example, UM. And so that's that's one thing. But 165 00:10:53,240 --> 00:10:56,680 Speaker 1: if the bill is intended, and some of the bills, 166 00:10:56,800 --> 00:10:59,199 Speaker 1: new domestic terrorism bills that have been introduced over the 167 00:10:59,280 --> 00:11:04,560 Speaker 1: last year so are intended to create a new, broad, 168 00:11:04,679 --> 00:11:09,600 Speaker 1: federal domestic terrorism criminal charge. And my view of that 169 00:11:10,000 --> 00:11:14,520 Speaker 1: is both that the charge wouldn't be necessary because there 170 00:11:14,559 --> 00:11:19,400 Speaker 1: are numerous uh criminal charges that can already be brought 171 00:11:20,040 --> 00:11:25,360 Speaker 1: to prosecute domestic terrorism, but also that creating a new 172 00:11:25,480 --> 00:11:30,440 Speaker 1: charge UM has problems. And you know, again the context 173 00:11:30,480 --> 00:11:35,600 Speaker 1: here is that terrorism and security laws have you've been 174 00:11:35,679 --> 00:11:39,840 Speaker 1: used most vigorously against people of color and those who 175 00:11:40,200 --> 00:11:45,360 Speaker 1: challenge the prevailing racial and socio economic order. So you 176 00:11:45,400 --> 00:11:48,240 Speaker 1: might think you're aiming at white supremacists by creating a 177 00:11:48,240 --> 00:11:52,640 Speaker 1: new charge, UM, But that same charge ends up then 178 00:11:52,760 --> 00:11:58,200 Speaker 1: being deployed against folks protesting police brutality, or indigenous protesters 179 00:11:58,760 --> 00:12:02,040 Speaker 1: responding to oil pipeline in their communities and and things 180 00:12:02,080 --> 00:12:06,560 Speaker 1: of that sort. So there's a danger in creating broad 181 00:12:06,640 --> 00:12:09,439 Speaker 1: new terrorism charges. And if that's the nature of a 182 00:12:09,480 --> 00:12:15,640 Speaker 1: domestic terrorism proposal, that's problematics. Do you think that the 183 00:12:15,800 --> 00:12:21,280 Speaker 1: investigations into domestic terrorism since nine eleven to date, do 184 00:12:21,320 --> 00:12:23,880 Speaker 1: you think a lot of them have gone too far 185 00:12:24,080 --> 00:12:28,760 Speaker 1: or gone astray. Well, they're two separate but related issues. 186 00:12:28,880 --> 00:12:34,120 Speaker 1: So on the one hand, the FBI has not sufficiently 187 00:12:34,320 --> 00:12:40,840 Speaker 1: prioritized investigations into white supremacists violence, and not just the FBI, 188 00:12:40,920 --> 00:12:46,000 Speaker 1: but the security agencies more broadly failed to consider it 189 00:12:46,200 --> 00:12:48,319 Speaker 1: a threat for a very long time, you know, when 190 00:12:48,360 --> 00:12:51,800 Speaker 1: they sort of relatedly recognized it as a threat. Um, 191 00:12:51,880 --> 00:12:55,599 Speaker 1: you know, as after years of some of these organizations 192 00:12:55,800 --> 00:13:00,320 Speaker 1: UM already um, you know, working for many it's kind 193 00:13:00,360 --> 00:13:03,240 Speaker 1: of below the radar. So there's been on the one hand, 194 00:13:03,240 --> 00:13:06,880 Speaker 1: of failure to prioritize white supremacists violence. You know. On 195 00:13:06,920 --> 00:13:09,480 Speaker 1: the other hand, we've seen that even with respect to 196 00:13:09,520 --> 00:13:13,000 Speaker 1: domestic groups that have absolutely no international time UM, there 197 00:13:13,040 --> 00:13:17,640 Speaker 1: have been concerns about intrusive FBI investigations. So in two 198 00:13:17,640 --> 00:13:21,599 Speaker 1: thousands ten, the Justice Department Inspector General, which is a 199 00:13:21,640 --> 00:13:27,240 Speaker 1: watchdog agency within the Department UH published a review where 200 00:13:27,400 --> 00:13:32,200 Speaker 1: it looked at UH FBI investigations of anti war groups, 201 00:13:32,400 --> 00:13:35,720 Speaker 1: of animals rights, environmental organizations, and other groups on the left, 202 00:13:36,160 --> 00:13:40,000 Speaker 1: and it found that in some of those investigations there 203 00:13:40,000 --> 00:13:44,040 Speaker 1: has been a very very thin basis for launching the investigation, 204 00:13:44,080 --> 00:13:47,559 Speaker 1: and that those investigations continued, um, even when it became 205 00:13:47,559 --> 00:13:49,640 Speaker 1: apparent that people were not planning any um, you know, 206 00:13:49,640 --> 00:13:54,800 Speaker 1: anything illegal. Um. So there's good reason to be concerned 207 00:13:54,920 --> 00:13:58,920 Speaker 1: about investigations. And and I don't think that that that's 208 00:13:58,920 --> 00:14:06,240 Speaker 1: concerned uh to segregate domestic from international terrorism. In other words, Uh, 209 00:14:06,440 --> 00:14:12,480 Speaker 1: the FBI's investigations have been broad, um and concerning with 210 00:14:12,600 --> 00:14:18,480 Speaker 1: respect both too uh perceived Muslim threats as well as 211 00:14:18,960 --> 00:14:24,080 Speaker 1: with respect to various left wings um you know stories. 212 00:14:24,120 --> 00:14:28,560 Speaker 1: You know, the FBI you know investigative report on black 213 00:14:28,680 --> 00:14:31,440 Speaker 1: identity extremists um from a couple of years ago being 214 00:14:31,680 --> 00:14:34,360 Speaker 1: kind of one example of the very broad framing of 215 00:14:34,480 --> 00:14:38,880 Speaker 1: protests and descent when it comes from say, racial sources protesters, 216 00:14:39,200 --> 00:14:41,720 Speaker 1: um uh the you know. But on the other hand, 217 00:14:41,800 --> 00:14:45,440 Speaker 1: those concerns are paired with a concern that the FBI 218 00:14:45,560 --> 00:14:49,680 Speaker 1: hasn't provided sufficient attention into white supremacists, which they now 219 00:14:49,720 --> 00:14:55,440 Speaker 1: be lately recognized as the most significant threats domestically. Thanks 220 00:14:55,440 --> 00:14:58,800 Speaker 1: for being on the Bloomberg Law Show. That's Sharene SNAr, 221 00:14:58,960 --> 00:15:01,840 Speaker 1: professor at stamp In Law School who studies the legal 222 00:15:01,880 --> 00:15:06,880 Speaker 1: treatment of political violence, even Before last week's violence at 223 00:15:06,880 --> 00:15:10,600 Speaker 1: the Capitol, lawmakers and civil rights advocates had been pressuring 224 00:15:10,720 --> 00:15:14,080 Speaker 1: social media platforms to crack down on posts that encourage 225 00:15:14,160 --> 00:15:17,760 Speaker 1: violence or hatred. While regulators in Europe have passed laws 226 00:15:17,800 --> 00:15:20,920 Speaker 1: finding companies that failed to act on hate speech, the 227 00:15:21,040 --> 00:15:24,840 Speaker 1: US has largely left regulation to the companies. After the violence, 228 00:15:24,880 --> 00:15:28,880 Speaker 1: Twitter suspended President Trump's account permanently due to the quote 229 00:15:29,040 --> 00:15:33,160 Speaker 1: risk of further incitement of violence. Facebook and Instagram, which 230 00:15:33,200 --> 00:15:36,360 Speaker 1: it owns, has suspended Trump until at least the January 231 00:15:36,440 --> 00:15:40,520 Speaker 1: twenty inauguration of President elect Joe Biden, arguing that Trump 232 00:15:40,560 --> 00:15:43,440 Speaker 1: intended to use his time left in office to undermine 233 00:15:43,480 --> 00:15:47,000 Speaker 1: the peaceful transition of power. Joining me is Snanaorall, a 234 00:15:47,080 --> 00:15:49,360 Speaker 1: professor at m I T and director of the m 235 00:15:49,400 --> 00:15:52,600 Speaker 1: I T Initiative on the Digital Economy. His new book 236 00:15:52,680 --> 00:15:56,600 Speaker 1: is called The Hype Machine. What did social media tell 237 00:15:56,680 --> 00:16:01,080 Speaker 1: you about the Capital riots? Before last when day? Well, 238 00:16:01,120 --> 00:16:04,680 Speaker 1: there was a lot of chatter on social media about 239 00:16:05,160 --> 00:16:08,640 Speaker 1: you know, meeting for a march, about storming the Capitol. 240 00:16:09,320 --> 00:16:12,120 Speaker 1: There was a lot of q and on chatter about 241 00:16:12,240 --> 00:16:16,480 Speaker 1: taking the capital, about fighting. You know, a lot of 242 00:16:16,480 --> 00:16:20,440 Speaker 1: it is done in the form of allusion you alluding 243 00:16:20,480 --> 00:16:26,040 Speaker 1: to violence. Sometimes it's quite explicit. Uh, there was a 244 00:16:26,040 --> 00:16:31,640 Speaker 1: lot of violent chatter on parlor Um and even on 245 00:16:31,720 --> 00:16:36,520 Speaker 1: other more mainstream social media. There was there were clear indications. 246 00:16:37,160 --> 00:16:42,040 Speaker 1: Did the authorities just miss it or did they misinterpret it? 247 00:16:42,040 --> 00:16:45,360 Speaker 1: It's a very good question. I think the question as 248 00:16:45,360 --> 00:16:49,920 Speaker 1: to why the FBI, the Capitol Police, Homeland Security and 249 00:16:49,960 --> 00:16:53,320 Speaker 1: so on, we're not more prepared on Wednesday is a 250 00:16:53,480 --> 00:16:58,040 Speaker 1: very important open question because I think that uh, you know, 251 00:16:58,160 --> 00:17:01,040 Speaker 1: all of the signs were there in all of the 252 00:17:01,120 --> 00:17:05,320 Speaker 1: known channels, and it would be it's very hard for 253 00:17:05,320 --> 00:17:09,160 Speaker 1: me to believe that it was just missed, uh for 254 00:17:09,200 --> 00:17:13,160 Speaker 1: some reason. There now appears to be some reports that 255 00:17:13,200 --> 00:17:19,040 Speaker 1: the FBI did issue some warnings before the attack, right, 256 00:17:19,320 --> 00:17:22,040 Speaker 1: So so it's hard for me to understand where the 257 00:17:22,040 --> 00:17:26,800 Speaker 1: communication failure happened. Because there's also reports that the d 258 00:17:27,080 --> 00:17:30,119 Speaker 1: D and other authorities in the National Guard offered assistance 259 00:17:30,160 --> 00:17:34,720 Speaker 1: and it was declined multiple times. The information assistance in 260 00:17:34,840 --> 00:17:39,359 Speaker 1: terms of saying, hey, we're seeing chatter, uh, you should 261 00:17:39,359 --> 00:17:43,679 Speaker 1: be more prepared, and or the actual physical um, you know, 262 00:17:44,040 --> 00:17:50,280 Speaker 1: assistance of of you know, more personnel, how that was 263 00:17:50,440 --> 00:17:54,199 Speaker 1: lost in the channing communication. I don't know, but I 264 00:17:54,240 --> 00:17:58,920 Speaker 1: think a full investigation is warranted because given the amount 265 00:17:59,040 --> 00:18:06,199 Speaker 1: of chatter in advance, it was surprising to see the 266 00:18:06,280 --> 00:18:10,680 Speaker 1: Capitol not prepared for what happened on Wednesday. Now we're 267 00:18:10,720 --> 00:18:14,080 Speaker 1: getting a lot of warnings about what might happen on 268 00:18:14,560 --> 00:18:19,920 Speaker 1: inauguration Day. What are you seeing now on social media? Well, 269 00:18:19,960 --> 00:18:24,400 Speaker 1: I think that there are ample warnings that continue that 270 00:18:24,680 --> 00:18:29,200 Speaker 1: things may happen on the on the and on the 271 00:18:29,320 --> 00:18:36,040 Speaker 1: twentie and I would be very surprised if the inauguration 272 00:18:36,280 --> 00:18:39,520 Speaker 1: we're not more prepared than the Capitol on Wednesday. Um, 273 00:18:40,880 --> 00:18:45,280 Speaker 1: there is no excuse for not being prepared on inauguration 274 00:18:45,359 --> 00:18:49,120 Speaker 1: Day and in fact in the next several days leading 275 00:18:49,160 --> 00:18:51,919 Speaker 1: up to the inauguration. Given the amount of attention that 276 00:18:52,000 --> 00:18:54,159 Speaker 1: has been brought to this, and given the amount of 277 00:18:54,280 --> 00:18:58,639 Speaker 1: conversation that happens on social media about about this, I 278 00:18:58,680 --> 00:19:05,200 Speaker 1: should add that there's also talk of additional uh. I 279 00:19:05,240 --> 00:19:08,919 Speaker 1: guess you could call them threats against state capitals, and 280 00:19:08,960 --> 00:19:12,000 Speaker 1: so this isn't limited to Washington, d C. But needs 281 00:19:12,040 --> 00:19:15,359 Speaker 1: to be taken seriously across the country. Is it one group, 282 00:19:15,720 --> 00:19:18,359 Speaker 1: is it a lot of groups? I mean, how many 283 00:19:18,400 --> 00:19:22,080 Speaker 1: actors are there here? Well, I think that it's it's 284 00:19:22,119 --> 00:19:25,320 Speaker 1: difficult to say. There are a lot of bill defined 285 00:19:25,880 --> 00:19:30,639 Speaker 1: groups and or people who are unaffiliated that are privy 286 00:19:30,720 --> 00:19:33,879 Speaker 1: to information that are being put out by groups. I 287 00:19:33,880 --> 00:19:36,520 Speaker 1: think one group that obviously comes to mind is q 288 00:19:36,720 --> 00:19:41,480 Speaker 1: and on. Obviously has been banned by Facebook, and Facebook 289 00:19:41,520 --> 00:19:45,240 Speaker 1: started cleaning out to and on content prior even to 290 00:19:45,320 --> 00:19:49,400 Speaker 1: the election, but they continue to have a voice on 291 00:19:49,520 --> 00:19:53,680 Speaker 1: parlor and in other places. Before Parlor was a home 292 00:19:53,720 --> 00:19:56,440 Speaker 1: for this kind of communications, four chan and eight chan 293 00:19:56,640 --> 00:20:01,160 Speaker 1: were channels where you could find this type of content. 294 00:20:01,720 --> 00:20:07,680 Speaker 1: So q and on is one loosely organized group UM 295 00:20:07,720 --> 00:20:12,800 Speaker 1: that is not really a formal organization so much as 296 00:20:12,880 --> 00:20:16,720 Speaker 1: a set of ideals and ideas that are spread on 297 00:20:16,760 --> 00:20:21,120 Speaker 1: social media and elsewhere that have um gained a lot 298 00:20:21,119 --> 00:20:25,000 Speaker 1: of traction in recent years. You've written that false news 299 00:20:25,040 --> 00:20:29,240 Speaker 1: travels farther and faster and more broadly than the truth online. 300 00:20:29,640 --> 00:20:32,919 Speaker 1: Explain what you mean by that. Yeah, So, we published 301 00:20:33,119 --> 00:20:37,680 Speaker 1: a ten year study on the cover of Science magazine 302 00:20:37,960 --> 00:20:41,840 Speaker 1: in March that studied all of the true and false 303 00:20:42,000 --> 00:20:45,639 Speaker 1: verified news stories that had ever spread on Twitter in 304 00:20:45,680 --> 00:20:48,560 Speaker 1: those ten years, and what we found was that the 305 00:20:48,680 --> 00:20:52,680 Speaker 1: false news traveled farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than 306 00:20:52,720 --> 00:20:55,840 Speaker 1: the truth in every category of information that we studied, 307 00:20:56,240 --> 00:21:00,239 Speaker 1: and that false political news was especially viral. And so 308 00:21:00,640 --> 00:21:06,119 Speaker 1: that presents an important challenge because false narratives can create 309 00:21:06,200 --> 00:21:09,560 Speaker 1: false beliefs and people can act on those false beliefs 310 00:21:10,200 --> 00:21:15,879 Speaker 1: uh and debunking of that falsity rarely catches up to 311 00:21:16,040 --> 00:21:21,400 Speaker 1: the lie. And therefore, if you have false narratives, for instance, 312 00:21:21,440 --> 00:21:27,760 Speaker 1: around election integrity or fraud during the election, uh, and 313 00:21:27,840 --> 00:21:31,119 Speaker 1: if you use those narratives to convince people that the 314 00:21:31,160 --> 00:21:34,200 Speaker 1: election was stolen and that they must quote unquote fight, 315 00:21:35,280 --> 00:21:40,160 Speaker 1: that that can really rile people up and create the 316 00:21:40,240 --> 00:21:43,360 Speaker 1: types of outcomes that we saw on Wednesday. Why does 317 00:21:43,400 --> 00:21:48,280 Speaker 1: the false news travel so fast and is accepted so readily? 318 00:21:49,440 --> 00:21:52,919 Speaker 1: So we had a number of hypotheses. At first, we 319 00:21:53,000 --> 00:21:57,639 Speaker 1: thought that, well, maybe false news spreaders have more followers, 320 00:21:57,800 --> 00:22:00,000 Speaker 1: or maybe they follow more people, or maybe there are 321 00:22:00,280 --> 00:22:04,480 Speaker 1: more often verified accounts, or they've been on Twitter longer, etcetera. 322 00:22:04,520 --> 00:22:07,160 Speaker 1: And we checked each one of these in turn, and 323 00:22:07,320 --> 00:22:11,359 Speaker 1: the opposite was true. False news spreaters have fewer followers followed, 324 00:22:11,400 --> 00:22:14,159 Speaker 1: fewer people, have been on Twitter for less time. Or 325 00:22:14,240 --> 00:22:17,040 Speaker 1: less often verified and so on, and so we had 326 00:22:17,080 --> 00:22:19,280 Speaker 1: to come up with other explanations. And what we looked 327 00:22:19,320 --> 00:22:24,480 Speaker 1: at was the emotional content and the novelty of the information. 328 00:22:24,680 --> 00:22:28,320 Speaker 1: And what we found was that false news is shocking, 329 00:22:28,960 --> 00:22:33,640 Speaker 1: it's novel. And when you read the cognitive science literature, 330 00:22:33,840 --> 00:22:37,640 Speaker 1: you find that human attention is drawn to novelty things 331 00:22:37,640 --> 00:22:40,880 Speaker 1: that are new in the environment because that's what's going 332 00:22:40,920 --> 00:22:43,600 Speaker 1: to update our beliefs about the state of the world. 333 00:22:43,680 --> 00:22:46,200 Speaker 1: And when you read the sociology literature, what you find 334 00:22:46,280 --> 00:22:49,719 Speaker 1: is that we gain in status when we share novel 335 00:22:49,760 --> 00:22:53,320 Speaker 1: information because we're seen as being in the know or 336 00:22:53,359 --> 00:22:57,680 Speaker 1: having access to inside information quote unquote, and so we 337 00:22:57,760 --> 00:23:00,760 Speaker 1: tend to have And when we look that the emotions, 338 00:23:00,800 --> 00:23:04,760 Speaker 1: we found that the false news was blood boiling, it 339 00:23:04,840 --> 00:23:08,920 Speaker 1: was anger inducing, it was shocking, it was disgusting, stallacious, 340 00:23:09,640 --> 00:23:13,240 Speaker 1: and that gets our attention and then we feel the 341 00:23:13,359 --> 00:23:16,639 Speaker 1: knee jerk urge to share it, and that's what drives 342 00:23:16,680 --> 00:23:21,160 Speaker 1: false news to be uh more viral. That's so interesting 343 00:23:21,400 --> 00:23:25,520 Speaker 1: the social media platforms, what are they doing, if anything, 344 00:23:25,800 --> 00:23:29,320 Speaker 1: to stop the false narratives? Well, I mean, I think 345 00:23:29,359 --> 00:23:32,399 Speaker 1: that you can see that in the last six months 346 00:23:32,960 --> 00:23:36,679 Speaker 1: they have stepped up their efforts to address the spread 347 00:23:36,680 --> 00:23:41,280 Speaker 1: of information. A year ago or so, Mark Zuckerberg gave 348 00:23:41,320 --> 00:23:44,879 Speaker 1: a speech in sort of Georgetown at elector and he said, 349 00:23:44,960 --> 00:23:47,040 Speaker 1: we don't want to be the arbiters of truth. We 350 00:23:47,080 --> 00:23:49,960 Speaker 1: don't want to have any uh, you know, sort of 351 00:23:50,200 --> 00:23:54,240 Speaker 1: role in that. But I think the pressure mounted and 352 00:23:54,720 --> 00:23:57,199 Speaker 1: uh in the last six months or so leading up 353 00:23:57,200 --> 00:24:01,640 Speaker 1: to the election, the social media platform began moderating content 354 00:24:01,800 --> 00:24:07,000 Speaker 1: a lot more proactively and aggressively, and they implemented several 355 00:24:07,000 --> 00:24:14,080 Speaker 1: different policies, including, for instance, Twitter forcing you to quote 356 00:24:14,080 --> 00:24:17,200 Speaker 1: tweet instead of retweet without thinking, nudging you to read 357 00:24:17,240 --> 00:24:22,320 Speaker 1: the article before you retweet it, m de emphasizing false 358 00:24:22,680 --> 00:24:29,840 Speaker 1: misinformation public health misinformation in search results, demonetizing fake news 359 00:24:29,920 --> 00:24:33,600 Speaker 1: on WhatsApp. Facebook limited the number of reshares of any 360 00:24:33,640 --> 00:24:37,080 Speaker 1: type of information to try and blow all information down. First, 361 00:24:37,160 --> 00:24:42,280 Speaker 1: they limited to five than one reshares. And so now 362 00:24:42,840 --> 00:24:47,920 Speaker 1: what you see is them taking even more visible actions, 363 00:24:48,200 --> 00:24:52,359 Speaker 1: which culminated in the banning of Donald Trump's account by 364 00:24:52,560 --> 00:24:56,360 Speaker 1: uh not just Facebook and Twitter, but also Pinterest, snapchat, 365 00:24:57,040 --> 00:25:01,400 Speaker 1: um and other places. And so it's sort of boiled 366 00:25:01,520 --> 00:25:05,160 Speaker 1: to come to a head now I think I should 367 00:25:05,200 --> 00:25:09,560 Speaker 1: point out that when Twitter band Donald Trump's account, UH, 368 00:25:09,680 --> 00:25:13,560 Speaker 1: they used to tweets as a justification which were frankly, 369 00:25:13,680 --> 00:25:17,960 Speaker 1: much more innocuous than the content he had put out beforehand, 370 00:25:18,440 --> 00:25:24,480 Speaker 1: and because Twitter's policy was reactive instead of proactive, they 371 00:25:24,520 --> 00:25:29,520 Speaker 1: were caught off guard banning the account on what some 372 00:25:30,000 --> 00:25:34,960 Speaker 1: might argue was innocuous grounds. And so that provides UH 373 00:25:35,240 --> 00:25:39,800 Speaker 1: fodder for the argument that this is censorship. Is absurd 374 00:25:39,840 --> 00:25:43,440 Speaker 1: that you would ban on an account on these two tweets. 375 00:25:43,440 --> 00:25:45,840 Speaker 1: But their argument is that in the content, in the 376 00:25:45,880 --> 00:25:49,840 Speaker 1: broader context of all the content, the repeated misinformation, the 377 00:25:49,880 --> 00:25:55,720 Speaker 1: repeated calls to violence, um, and UH incendiary content, that's 378 00:25:55,800 --> 00:25:58,800 Speaker 1: the justification for the band. I think now what we 379 00:25:58,880 --> 00:26:02,040 Speaker 1: have to be careful about is what has been termed 380 00:26:02,040 --> 00:26:05,280 Speaker 1: the Splinternet, the sort of tearing a part of our 381 00:26:05,440 --> 00:26:10,639 Speaker 1: human social network into different factions, where conservatives go to 382 00:26:10,800 --> 00:26:15,560 Speaker 1: parlor and you know, liberals maybe go to other social networks. 383 00:26:16,119 --> 00:26:20,040 Speaker 1: After the band, what you saw was Trump allies condemning 384 00:26:20,080 --> 00:26:23,720 Speaker 1: the band and then saying, like for instance, Mark Levine 385 00:26:23,840 --> 00:26:27,800 Speaker 1: rush Limbaugh Um, what some might call fringe conservatives who 386 00:26:27,840 --> 00:26:32,520 Speaker 1: have a large following, saying I'm voluntarily suspending my account 387 00:26:32,560 --> 00:26:35,560 Speaker 1: on Twitter, follow me on Parlor and rumble and let's 388 00:26:35,560 --> 00:26:39,000 Speaker 1: have the conversation there. Uh. And so we have to 389 00:26:39,040 --> 00:26:42,800 Speaker 1: be very careful about this splintering of our civil society 390 00:26:42,880 --> 00:26:46,359 Speaker 1: because any student of negotiation knows that in order to 391 00:26:46,400 --> 00:26:50,439 Speaker 1: achieve collaboration, cooperation, and even empathy, you have to have 392 00:26:50,560 --> 00:26:54,439 Speaker 1: common ground. And if we split into these factions with 393 00:26:54,600 --> 00:26:59,200 Speaker 1: different sets of information, uh, they're seeing completely different narratives 394 00:26:59,240 --> 00:27:01,600 Speaker 1: and never talk think to each other, that empathy is 395 00:27:01,640 --> 00:27:06,560 Speaker 1: hard to achieve. There was action taken against Parlor. Is 396 00:27:06,600 --> 00:27:10,639 Speaker 1: that going to stop it being means of communication? I 397 00:27:10,680 --> 00:27:14,920 Speaker 1: don't think so. So, you know, Amazon removed it from 398 00:27:14,920 --> 00:27:19,000 Speaker 1: its hosting services. As soon as that happened, people said, oh, 399 00:27:19,040 --> 00:27:23,800 Speaker 1: this is big tech, uh, controlling the Internet. And I 400 00:27:23,880 --> 00:27:26,159 Speaker 1: predicted that they would get a new hosting service than 401 00:27:26,200 --> 00:27:28,439 Speaker 1: they did. So they announced today that they've gotten a 402 00:27:28,480 --> 00:27:32,200 Speaker 1: new hosting service, so they really weren't disrupted for that long. 403 00:27:32,440 --> 00:27:36,960 Speaker 1: There's they're always going to be um, you know, hosting 404 00:27:37,000 --> 00:27:42,239 Speaker 1: services that are willing to host services like Parlor. I 405 00:27:42,280 --> 00:27:49,680 Speaker 1: think more dangerous than the shutting down of of Parlor 406 00:27:50,480 --> 00:27:59,439 Speaker 1: is the bifurcation of civil society into completely unconnected UH factions. 407 00:27:59,560 --> 00:28:02,200 Speaker 1: If you want to try to stop you know, these 408 00:28:02,280 --> 00:28:05,600 Speaker 1: kinds of violent communications, and yet you don't want to 409 00:28:05,640 --> 00:28:10,679 Speaker 1: bifurcate the communication lines. What you to do? Well? I 410 00:28:10,720 --> 00:28:12,320 Speaker 1: think there are a number of things that we need 411 00:28:12,359 --> 00:28:14,040 Speaker 1: to be doing. And by the way, you know, I 412 00:28:14,080 --> 00:28:18,720 Speaker 1: write extensively in my book about how we UH sort 413 00:28:18,760 --> 00:28:21,520 Speaker 1: of move forward to achieve the promise of social media 414 00:28:21,560 --> 00:28:25,000 Speaker 1: and avoid the peril. There are so many important conversations 415 00:28:25,000 --> 00:28:28,600 Speaker 1: that we need to be having about antitrust, federal privacy, legislation, 416 00:28:29,160 --> 00:28:33,680 Speaker 1: election integrity, the spread of misinformation, UH and so on, 417 00:28:33,880 --> 00:28:36,280 Speaker 1: all of which you know, I think are important parts 418 00:28:36,280 --> 00:28:39,000 Speaker 1: of this conversation. But I think two things in particular 419 00:28:39,440 --> 00:28:42,320 Speaker 1: relate to your specific question, And the first is that 420 00:28:42,400 --> 00:28:48,680 Speaker 1: the platforms need to create UH comprehensive, systematic and transparent 421 00:28:49,120 --> 00:28:54,280 Speaker 1: content moderation policies. So far, they've been quite reactive. I'll 422 00:28:54,320 --> 00:28:58,320 Speaker 1: just point to the Hunter Biden email scandal and how 423 00:28:58,320 --> 00:29:01,760 Speaker 1: Twitter handled that. They first they banned it, then they 424 00:29:01,760 --> 00:29:04,440 Speaker 1: allowed it, then they changed their rules in order to 425 00:29:04,560 --> 00:29:10,240 Speaker 1: justify the specific decisions that they had made. That's completely backwards. 426 00:29:10,240 --> 00:29:13,040 Speaker 1: What the platforms need to do is to write down 427 00:29:13,640 --> 00:29:19,600 Speaker 1: very specific, detailed, comprehensive and transparent content moderation policies UH, 428 00:29:19,680 --> 00:29:22,719 Speaker 1: and they need to consult experts in writing those policies 429 00:29:22,920 --> 00:29:25,160 Speaker 1: so that they can have a debate about the policies 430 00:29:25,560 --> 00:29:28,360 Speaker 1: rather than the specific decisions on a given account or 431 00:29:28,360 --> 00:29:32,520 Speaker 1: a given tweet or posts. UM. Secondly, I think that 432 00:29:32,640 --> 00:29:37,360 Speaker 1: this UH magnifies to a great degree the need for 433 00:29:37,480 --> 00:29:41,760 Speaker 1: interoperability between the networks. I argue very strongly for this 434 00:29:41,880 --> 00:29:44,200 Speaker 1: in my book. And what I mean is that you 435 00:29:44,240 --> 00:29:47,600 Speaker 1: take the anti trust case against Facebook. The argument there 436 00:29:47,680 --> 00:29:49,760 Speaker 1: is that Facebook is a monopoly and we should break 437 00:29:49,760 --> 00:29:53,760 Speaker 1: them up. But the social media economy runs on network effects, 438 00:29:53,800 --> 00:29:55,920 Speaker 1: which means that the value of a platform is a 439 00:29:55,920 --> 00:29:59,000 Speaker 1: function of the number of users that has and economies 440 00:29:59,040 --> 00:30:02,280 Speaker 1: that run on network of facts tend toward market concentration. 441 00:30:02,680 --> 00:30:05,160 Speaker 1: So if you break up the market leader, you're just 442 00:30:05,240 --> 00:30:08,200 Speaker 1: going to tip the next Facebook like company into into 443 00:30:08,280 --> 00:30:13,760 Speaker 1: market dominance. But what could achieve competition in the social 444 00:30:13,760 --> 00:30:20,360 Speaker 1: media economy is UH interoperability and social network portability. So UH, 445 00:30:20,760 --> 00:30:23,600 Speaker 1: when a o L merged with Time Warner, what we 446 00:30:23,680 --> 00:30:28,160 Speaker 1: did was we required a o l's instant messenger to 447 00:30:28,240 --> 00:30:32,920 Speaker 1: become interoperable with Yahoo Messenger and MSN Messenger and accept 448 00:30:33,360 --> 00:30:37,920 Speaker 1: messages going across. That made their market share go down 449 00:30:37,960 --> 00:30:43,040 Speaker 1: from six to fifty and then they seeded the entire 450 00:30:43,120 --> 00:30:48,000 Speaker 1: market to New Entrance three years later. And interoperability therefore 451 00:30:48,760 --> 00:30:52,120 Speaker 1: would help create competition in the social media economy, but 452 00:30:52,760 --> 00:30:56,760 Speaker 1: it would also help stitch the networks together in a 453 00:30:56,760 --> 00:30:59,560 Speaker 1: way that you could send messages from one network to 454 00:30:59,600 --> 00:31:03,360 Speaker 1: another so they weren't completely bifurcated. So in this way, 455 00:31:03,560 --> 00:31:09,120 Speaker 1: interoperability could not only help create structural reforms that create 456 00:31:09,160 --> 00:31:11,920 Speaker 1: the competition we want to see in the social media economy, 457 00:31:12,160 --> 00:31:15,640 Speaker 1: but they could also help mend the networks so that 458 00:31:15,920 --> 00:31:20,280 Speaker 1: we remain connected in a world where people want to 459 00:31:20,360 --> 00:31:23,360 Speaker 1: choose different services thanks to Non that's a Non, a 460 00:31:23,440 --> 00:31:26,240 Speaker 1: royal professor at m I T. His book is called 461 00:31:26,480 --> 00:31:28,840 Speaker 1: The Hype Machine. And that's it for the sedition of 462 00:31:28,840 --> 00:31:32,000 Speaker 1: the Bloomberg Laws Show. I'm June Grosso and you're listening 463 00:31:32,040 --> 00:31:32,680 Speaker 1: to Bloomberg