1
00:00:03,320 --> 00:00:09,840
Speaker 1: From Bloomberg News and iHeartRadio. It's the big take. I'm

2
00:00:09,840 --> 00:00:14,120
Speaker 1: West Ksova today. The suspect in the classified documents leak

3
00:00:14,280 --> 00:00:18,560
Speaker 1: maybe in custody, but the global fallout is far from over.

4
00:00:24,120 --> 00:00:27,760
Speaker 1: The US intelligence community can breathe a small sigh of

5
00:00:27,800 --> 00:00:31,880
Speaker 1: relief with the arrest of Jack to Shah, the Massachusetts

6
00:00:31,960 --> 00:00:35,840
Speaker 1: Air National guardsmen suspected in one of the most damaging

7
00:00:35,960 --> 00:00:41,160
Speaker 1: breaches of classified material in years, but sealing the leak

8
00:00:41,520 --> 00:00:45,400
Speaker 1: won't be enough to satisfy the UK, Israel, and other

9
00:00:45,560 --> 00:00:46,960
Speaker 1: close US allies.

10
00:00:47,440 --> 00:00:50,920
Speaker 2: The State Department is downplaying the conversations it's having with

11
00:00:51,040 --> 00:00:53,680
Speaker 2: foreign governments about the leaks, but that's not what we're

12
00:00:53,720 --> 00:00:54,880
Speaker 2: hearing from foreign capitals.

13
00:00:55,160 --> 00:00:59,320
Speaker 1: Bloomberg's Courtney McBride reports that the Biden administration is working

14
00:00:59,440 --> 00:01:03,000
Speaker 1: fast to calm anger that so many shared secrets were

15
00:01:03,040 --> 00:01:07,200
Speaker 1: made public and explained to allies how a low ranking

16
00:01:07,280 --> 00:01:10,119
Speaker 1: twenty one year old could have gotten access to such

17
00:01:10,160 --> 00:01:17,080
Speaker 1: sensitive files in the first place. Court There's been a

18
00:01:17,080 --> 00:01:20,920
Speaker 1: whole lot of reporting about these leaks and what's in them,

19
00:01:21,040 --> 00:01:25,000
Speaker 1: and it's still moving pretty quickly. Can you just give

20
00:01:25,120 --> 00:01:29,120
Speaker 1: us a brief sum up about what they contained?

21
00:01:30,360 --> 00:01:33,600
Speaker 2: Well, The leaks include a lot of documents that appear

22
00:01:33,880 --> 00:01:38,840
Speaker 2: to come mostly from the Pentagon and include US assessments

23
00:01:38,880 --> 00:01:43,040
Speaker 2: of Ukraine's prospects in its defense against Russia, as well

24
00:01:43,080 --> 00:01:46,039
Speaker 2: as some intelligence that the US appears to have collected

25
00:01:46,080 --> 00:01:50,240
Speaker 2: on its own allies and partners. Some of the information

26
00:01:50,440 --> 00:01:55,680
Speaker 2: on partners in particular has caused some diplomatic consternation, and

27
00:01:55,720 --> 00:01:59,240
Speaker 2: the State Department is trying to help to repair some

28
00:01:59,520 --> 00:02:01,040
Speaker 2: ties may have been a bit freed.

29
00:02:01,880 --> 00:02:04,760
Speaker 1: And that's really what we're talking about today, is that

30
00:02:05,520 --> 00:02:08,920
Speaker 1: it's one thing for this information to come out, but

31
00:02:09,040 --> 00:02:12,480
Speaker 1: it's another thing or what it means for the US's

32
00:02:12,600 --> 00:02:15,840
Speaker 1: relationship with all these other countries and the kind of

33
00:02:16,000 --> 00:02:18,359
Speaker 1: trust that they have in each other when it comes

34
00:02:18,440 --> 00:02:21,600
Speaker 1: not just as spying, but the keeping track of that

35
00:02:21,680 --> 00:02:23,360
Speaker 1: information so it doesn't go public.

36
00:02:24,680 --> 00:02:27,359
Speaker 2: Absolutely. I think several of the foreign officials with whom

37
00:02:27,360 --> 00:02:30,280
Speaker 2: we spoke said that it was not particularly surprising that

38
00:02:30,360 --> 00:02:33,160
Speaker 2: the US was doing this kind of data collection, but

39
00:02:33,240 --> 00:02:36,000
Speaker 2: what was really concerning was that it didn't manage to

40
00:02:36,080 --> 00:02:41,320
Speaker 2: keep that information private. So there's certainly concerns about the

41
00:02:41,320 --> 00:02:44,200
Speaker 2: intelligence that allies and partners might share with the United

42
00:02:44,240 --> 00:02:47,200
Speaker 2: States perhaps being compromised because the US is not being

43
00:02:47,240 --> 00:02:49,640
Speaker 2: as cautious as it ought to be, and there's a

44
00:02:49,639 --> 00:02:51,840
Speaker 2: lot of fence mending that seems to be happening behind

45
00:02:51,840 --> 00:02:52,280
Speaker 2: the scenes.

46
00:02:52,919 --> 00:02:56,240
Speaker 1: Can you describe a little bit about what other governments

47
00:02:56,240 --> 00:02:58,480
Speaker 1: have come forward to say so.

48
00:02:58,600 --> 00:03:02,959
Speaker 2: Some have expressed concern learn that the US assessments of

49
00:03:03,360 --> 00:03:08,320
Speaker 2: Russia's prospects against Ukraine and of Ukraine's own shortcomings in

50
00:03:08,360 --> 00:03:13,079
Speaker 2: the cases of air defense and ammunition are particularly damaging

51
00:03:13,560 --> 00:03:16,800
Speaker 2: that they could embolden Russia to seize on those weaknesses

52
00:03:17,160 --> 00:03:21,000
Speaker 2: in Ukraine's abilities. I think one of the most damaging

53
00:03:21,280 --> 00:03:23,880
Speaker 2: elements of the leak, particularly in the view of a

54
00:03:23,880 --> 00:03:26,280
Speaker 2: lot of the US allies and partners who are along

55
00:03:26,320 --> 00:03:30,079
Speaker 2: with Washington providing extensive support to Ukraine as it attempts

56
00:03:30,080 --> 00:03:33,640
Speaker 2: to defend against Russia, was this sense that the US

57
00:03:33,680 --> 00:03:36,480
Speaker 2: does not have a lot of confidence in Ukraine's ability

58
00:03:36,520 --> 00:03:39,800
Speaker 2: to continue to hold off the Russian onslaught. They pointed

59
00:03:39,840 --> 00:03:45,400
Speaker 2: to specific information about Ukraine's lack of air defense, capability

60
00:03:46,280 --> 00:03:52,560
Speaker 2: to intercept incoming Russian missiles, and just the shortage of ammunition,

61
00:03:52,800 --> 00:03:57,240
Speaker 2: which has been fairly widely reported. But this really validated

62
00:03:57,280 --> 00:03:59,600
Speaker 2: some of that reporting in a way that the US

63
00:03:59,640 --> 00:04:01,320
Speaker 2: government and has avoided.

64
00:04:00,880 --> 00:04:06,120
Speaker 1: Doing, Courtney. Aside from the information that is in these

65
00:04:06,200 --> 00:04:10,480
Speaker 1: leaked documents, there's been a big conversation about the danger

66
00:04:10,520 --> 00:04:15,560
Speaker 1: of adversaries finding out how this information got out.

67
00:04:15,840 --> 00:04:18,719
Speaker 2: Absolutely, I think the level of detail contained in the

68
00:04:18,760 --> 00:04:22,240
Speaker 2: documents about Russia in particular puts at risk what the

69
00:04:22,279 --> 00:04:25,440
Speaker 2: intelligence community refers to as sources and methods, and so

70
00:04:25,640 --> 00:04:29,880
Speaker 2: the fear is that US intelligence sources, whether they're spies

71
00:04:30,160 --> 00:04:35,120
Speaker 2: or Russian officials, are at risk that Moscow could find

72
00:04:35,120 --> 00:04:38,080
Speaker 2: them and take them out of Commission Courtney.

73
00:04:38,120 --> 00:04:40,039
Speaker 1: We're going to talk a lot more about that in

74
00:04:40,080 --> 00:04:42,840
Speaker 1: a minute, but let's take a moment and talk about

75
00:04:43,000 --> 00:04:46,520
Speaker 1: the suspect in the case, Jack to Sharah, and what

76
00:04:46,680 --> 00:04:49,200
Speaker 1: he's alleged to have done. And I should point out

77
00:04:49,240 --> 00:04:52,839
Speaker 1: here that everything we're talking about here that he's alleged

78
00:04:52,880 --> 00:04:55,400
Speaker 1: to have done are just that there are allegations. None

79
00:04:55,440 --> 00:04:56,600
Speaker 1: of this has been proven.

80
00:04:57,480 --> 00:04:59,839
Speaker 2: Jack to Shara is a twenty one year old member

81
00:05:00,080 --> 00:05:04,240
Speaker 2: the Massachusetts Air National Guard whose specialty was in the

82
00:05:04,240 --> 00:05:08,039
Speaker 2: information systems area. He had a security clearance as part

83
00:05:08,080 --> 00:05:10,520
Speaker 2: of his role, and so he would have had access

84
00:05:10,520 --> 00:05:13,200
Speaker 2: to at least some sensitive information and.

85
00:05:13,080 --> 00:05:16,360
Speaker 1: The way he allegedly leaked these documents was kind of unusual.

86
00:05:16,880 --> 00:05:20,120
Speaker 2: Yes, Instead of going to a journalist as some leakers

87
00:05:20,160 --> 00:05:23,440
Speaker 2: have done in the past, Tashera initially shared these very

88
00:05:23,480 --> 00:05:27,440
Speaker 2: sensitive documents on discord, which is a platform that's used

89
00:05:27,480 --> 00:05:31,600
Speaker 2: by gamers, in a small group that he was unofficially leading.

90
00:05:31,960 --> 00:05:35,880
Speaker 2: And in this discord chat group, in addition to video games,

91
00:05:36,160 --> 00:05:40,160
Speaker 2: the members would talk about patriotism, about God, about guns,

92
00:05:40,279 --> 00:05:44,359
Speaker 2: and as the investigation proceeds, this may factor into to

93
00:05:44,400 --> 00:05:46,760
Speaker 2: share his alleged motives for leaking the information.

94
00:05:48,160 --> 00:05:52,279
Speaker 1: Oftentimes it takes a long time to identify a leaker,

95
00:05:52,520 --> 00:05:55,279
Speaker 1: and they found him if he is indeed the person

96
00:05:55,279 --> 00:05:58,200
Speaker 1: who leaked these documents, pretty quickly they did.

97
00:05:58,400 --> 00:06:02,000
Speaker 2: It was definitely a usual in these types of cases.

98
00:06:02,200 --> 00:06:04,520
Speaker 2: He does not seem to have covered his tracks, perhaps

99
00:06:04,560 --> 00:06:07,520
Speaker 2: as well as past leakers have done, and so it

100
00:06:07,560 --> 00:06:12,200
Speaker 2: was very quick process for journalists, law enforcement, and even

101
00:06:12,240 --> 00:06:16,200
Speaker 2: other independent investigators to identify and locate him.

102
00:06:16,640 --> 00:06:18,760
Speaker 1: There's one thing that I think a lot of people

103
00:06:19,080 --> 00:06:22,320
Speaker 1: find curious, which is that some of the numbers having

104
00:06:22,360 --> 00:06:26,400
Speaker 1: to do with war casualties in Ukraine appear to have

105
00:06:26,440 --> 00:06:30,560
Speaker 1: been doctored to show that there were more Ukrainian casualties

106
00:06:30,839 --> 00:06:33,200
Speaker 1: and fewer Russian casualties.

107
00:06:33,880 --> 00:06:36,120
Speaker 2: Yes, I mean, I think that has been really the

108
00:06:36,160 --> 00:06:40,279
Speaker 2: discrepancy between presumably the original documents and those that have

109
00:06:40,320 --> 00:06:42,320
Speaker 2: been shared that a lot of folks have seized on.

110
00:06:43,040 --> 00:06:46,200
Speaker 1: Does that suggest that perhaps there might have been some

111
00:06:46,560 --> 00:06:48,000
Speaker 1: Russian involvement here.

112
00:06:48,160 --> 00:06:50,320
Speaker 2: In our reporting, officials have told us that they have

113
00:06:50,440 --> 00:06:53,400
Speaker 2: not ruled out the possibility that Russia was involved. We've

114
00:06:53,440 --> 00:06:57,200
Speaker 2: spoken to some intelligence experts who said that there's a

115
00:06:57,240 --> 00:07:01,960
Speaker 2: concern that the Russian security Service could have used Americans

116
00:07:02,120 --> 00:07:05,920
Speaker 2: as unwitting pawns in an effort to obtain and disseminate

117
00:07:06,120 --> 00:07:07,560
Speaker 2: our very sensitive information.

118
00:07:08,400 --> 00:07:11,560
Speaker 1: You right about how there are some pretty awkward conversations

119
00:07:11,560 --> 00:07:14,360
Speaker 1: going on behind the scenes. Joe Biden was recently in

120
00:07:14,400 --> 00:07:17,680
Speaker 1: the UK and South Korea's president's coming to Washington later

121
00:07:17,760 --> 00:07:21,440
Speaker 1: this month, and he's got some explaining to do, doesn't he.

122
00:07:22,120 --> 00:07:26,480
Speaker 2: Absolutely. I think beyond the content of the leaked documents,

123
00:07:26,920 --> 00:07:30,800
Speaker 2: the real challenge is what it shows about the US's

124
00:07:30,880 --> 00:07:34,720
Speaker 2: ability to secure its information and the information of its

125
00:07:34,760 --> 00:07:39,640
Speaker 2: allies and partners. There are some uncomfortable conversations happening in

126
00:07:39,680 --> 00:07:44,040
Speaker 2: the US and foreign capitals as these governments really try

127
00:07:44,080 --> 00:07:47,920
Speaker 2: to understand what happened. But at the same time, as

128
00:07:48,000 --> 00:07:51,520
Speaker 2: we've reported, so many of these countries rely very heavily

129
00:07:51,640 --> 00:07:56,000
Speaker 2: on US intelligence collection, and so while they can express frustration,

130
00:07:56,640 --> 00:07:59,520
Speaker 2: they can seek assurances from the US that this sort

131
00:07:59,560 --> 00:08:02,440
Speaker 2: of thing will happen again. They're in something of a

132
00:08:02,480 --> 00:08:05,560
Speaker 2: tough spot and that they have to continue to rely

133
00:08:05,640 --> 00:08:08,640
Speaker 2: on the US and trust that this won't happen again.

134
00:08:09,520 --> 00:08:13,160
Speaker 1: Can you describe some of those uncomfortable conversations. What do

135
00:08:13,240 --> 00:08:17,440
Speaker 1: we know about what US diplomats, even the President may

136
00:08:17,440 --> 00:08:21,120
Speaker 1: be telling their counterparts in other capitals.

137
00:08:21,480 --> 00:08:24,920
Speaker 2: So the State Department is downplaying the conversations it's having

138
00:08:25,000 --> 00:08:27,640
Speaker 2: with foreign governments about the leagues, but that's not what

139
00:08:27,680 --> 00:08:31,200
Speaker 2: we're hearing from foreign capitals. In fact, many of them

140
00:08:31,240 --> 00:08:37,160
Speaker 2: are deeply frustrated. This goes beyond embarrassment. This is a

141
00:08:37,280 --> 00:08:41,080
Speaker 2: real breach in their view, not just a breach of trust.

142
00:08:41,120 --> 00:08:44,559
Speaker 2: I think it comes as no surprise to most observers

143
00:08:44,559 --> 00:08:48,319
Speaker 2: of the national security environment that the US conducts surveillance

144
00:08:48,520 --> 00:08:51,520
Speaker 2: on even its closest friends, But the fact that this

145
00:08:51,600 --> 00:08:55,199
Speaker 2: information got out I think is particularly troubling for many

146
00:08:55,600 --> 00:08:59,640
Speaker 2: One example, is Israel, one of the US's closest allies,

147
00:09:00,040 --> 00:09:04,680
Speaker 2: has expressed concern over the apparent US surveillance of Mosad,

148
00:09:04,960 --> 00:09:07,160
Speaker 2: it's intelligence agency, and.

149
00:09:07,160 --> 00:09:09,120
Speaker 1: What did the documents have to say about that?

150
00:09:09,720 --> 00:09:14,160
Speaker 2: Israel has been experiencing popular protests over proposed changes to

151
00:09:14,559 --> 00:09:18,960
Speaker 2: the country's judicial system, and the documents leaked from the

152
00:09:19,080 --> 00:09:24,360
Speaker 2: US indicate agency support for popular protest. So the understanding

153
00:09:24,400 --> 00:09:27,680
Speaker 2: that we have from our reporting is that the Israelis

154
00:09:27,679 --> 00:09:31,960
Speaker 2: are not necessarily bothered so much by the content of

155
00:09:32,000 --> 00:09:36,240
Speaker 2: the leaks, but the fact of the CIA's surveillance of Mosad.

156
00:09:37,960 --> 00:09:40,280
Speaker 1: When we come back all the other countries that are

157
00:09:40,320 --> 00:09:43,559
Speaker 1: demanding answers from the Biden administration.

158
00:09:51,480 --> 00:09:54,800
Speaker 3: On the intelligence leaks, what I can tell you is this,

159
00:09:55,000 --> 00:09:57,719
Speaker 3: we have engaged with our allies and partners since these

160
00:09:57,800 --> 00:10:02,319
Speaker 3: leaks came out, and we you've done so at high levels,

161
00:10:02,360 --> 00:10:06,760
Speaker 3: and we have made clear our commitment to safeguarding intelligence

162
00:10:06,800 --> 00:10:10,080
Speaker 3: and our commitment to our security partnerships. What I've heard

163
00:10:10,120 --> 00:10:14,360
Speaker 3: so far, at least, is an appreciation for the steps

164
00:10:14,400 --> 00:10:18,199
Speaker 3: that we're taking, and it's not affected our cooperation. I

165
00:10:18,320 --> 00:10:21,040
Speaker 3: just haven't seen that.

166
00:10:20,000 --> 00:10:23,320
Speaker 1: That Secretary of State Anthony Blincoln trying to put his

167
00:10:23,600 --> 00:10:27,160
Speaker 1: best foot forward in a difficult situation. Courtney, we talked

168
00:10:27,160 --> 00:10:31,960
Speaker 1: about leaks involving two US allies, Ukraine in Israel. What

169
00:10:32,040 --> 00:10:35,440
Speaker 1: about the UK, which is of course probably the United

170
00:10:35,480 --> 00:10:37,120
Speaker 1: States most important ally.

171
00:10:37,760 --> 00:10:41,720
Speaker 2: So part of the US UK special relationship involves a

172
00:10:41,760 --> 00:10:46,800
Speaker 2: considerable amount of intelligence sharing, and we understood from the

173
00:10:46,920 --> 00:10:50,840
Speaker 2: UK that this was a particularly troubling incident for them

174
00:10:51,000 --> 00:10:52,640
Speaker 2: and that they were going to press it with the

175
00:10:52,720 --> 00:10:56,080
Speaker 2: United States. That being said, the White House has claimed

176
00:10:56,160 --> 00:10:58,720
Speaker 2: that the leaks did not even come up during a

177
00:10:58,960 --> 00:11:02,959
Speaker 2: conversation between President Biden and Prime Minister Sunak.

178
00:11:03,640 --> 00:11:05,720
Speaker 1: And so even though the White House and the State

179
00:11:05,720 --> 00:11:07,920
Speaker 1: Department are kind of downplaying it, it's clear that they're

180
00:11:07,920 --> 00:11:10,320
Speaker 1: burning up the phone lines here. And you're right too

181
00:11:10,400 --> 00:11:13,880
Speaker 1: that there are other allies involved that may not have

182
00:11:13,920 --> 00:11:18,200
Speaker 1: gotten sensitive material leak, but who nevertheless don't want to

183
00:11:18,240 --> 00:11:19,960
Speaker 1: be named in a classified trove.

184
00:11:21,679 --> 00:11:25,079
Speaker 2: Of course, you know, there are any number of allies

185
00:11:25,120 --> 00:11:29,800
Speaker 2: and partners who feed information into the US and benefit

186
00:11:29,960 --> 00:11:33,559
Speaker 2: from US intelligence collection, whether it's Washington alerting them of

187
00:11:34,000 --> 00:11:38,000
Speaker 2: threats abroad or at home, and the leaks covered US

188
00:11:38,040 --> 00:11:41,760
Speaker 2: allies and partners around the world from France to Egypt

189
00:11:41,880 --> 00:11:45,560
Speaker 2: to South Korea. South Korean president is coming to Washington

190
00:11:45,840 --> 00:11:49,080
Speaker 2: to meet with President Biden for a previously scheduled meeting

191
00:11:49,280 --> 00:11:52,000
Speaker 2: that now will have an additional complicated element.

192
00:11:52,480 --> 00:11:55,040
Speaker 1: And China also made an appearance in the documents.

193
00:11:55,240 --> 00:11:59,480
Speaker 2: Yes, there are reports that the documents include information on

194
00:11:59,559 --> 00:12:03,520
Speaker 2: additional Chinese spy balloons, as well as details about China's

195
00:12:03,559 --> 00:12:05,800
Speaker 2: military capabilities and readiness.

196
00:12:06,200 --> 00:12:09,640
Speaker 1: You mentioned Egypt, and that was one of the leak

197
00:12:09,720 --> 00:12:13,440
Speaker 1: documents that made me sit up in my chair. What

198
00:12:13,600 --> 00:12:14,959
Speaker 1: exactly did that contain?

199
00:12:15,800 --> 00:12:19,640
Speaker 2: So that document suggested that Egypt was planning to sell

200
00:12:19,679 --> 00:12:23,120
Speaker 2: weapons to Russia, and this was something that Egyptian President

201
00:12:23,400 --> 00:12:27,240
Speaker 2: Abdel Fatal Cisi vehemently denied. But that was, as you said,

202
00:12:27,280 --> 00:12:30,960
Speaker 2: one of the more surprising elements of this trove, because.

203
00:12:30,640 --> 00:12:33,079
Speaker 1: That would be a big deal. Egypt has been an

204
00:12:33,080 --> 00:12:35,840
Speaker 1: alley of the US and receives quite a bit of

205
00:12:36,120 --> 00:12:39,160
Speaker 1: annual foreign aid from the United States.

206
00:12:39,480 --> 00:12:43,319
Speaker 2: Absolutely, and Russia, of course, is subject to all manner

207
00:12:43,400 --> 00:12:46,520
Speaker 2: of sanctions and arms purchasing restrictions.

208
00:12:47,120 --> 00:12:50,800
Speaker 1: Courtney, this term five Eyes has been coming up in

209
00:12:50,840 --> 00:12:53,640
Speaker 1: connection with these leak documents. This is a very well

210
00:12:53,720 --> 00:12:58,400
Speaker 1: known organization inside the intelligence and foreign policy community, but

211
00:12:58,679 --> 00:13:00,400
Speaker 1: I think a lot of US don't really know very

212
00:13:00,480 --> 00:13:02,280
Speaker 1: much about it. What is Five Eyes?

213
00:13:02,840 --> 00:13:10,200
Speaker 2: Five Eyes is a particularly intensive intelligence sharing alliance involving

214
00:13:10,280 --> 00:13:14,200
Speaker 2: the US, the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. This

215
00:13:14,320 --> 00:13:17,800
Speaker 2: is sort of the closest intel relationship that the United

216
00:13:17,800 --> 00:13:18,760
Speaker 2: States has.

217
00:13:19,200 --> 00:13:21,120
Speaker 1: And what does this organization.

218
00:13:20,800 --> 00:13:25,640
Speaker 2: Do exactly what it sounds like, share intelligence that the

219
00:13:25,720 --> 00:13:31,560
Speaker 2: various agencies in each respective country collect about threats and

220
00:13:31,640 --> 00:13:33,760
Speaker 2: other relevant information around the world.

221
00:13:34,440 --> 00:13:37,080
Speaker 1: And so what is your reporting telling you about? What

222
00:13:37,120 --> 00:13:41,199
Speaker 1: the conversation among the Five Eyes nations has been since

223
00:13:41,240 --> 00:13:42,720
Speaker 1: these documents have come to light.

224
00:13:43,400 --> 00:13:46,479
Speaker 2: So this is perhaps the most awkward set of conversations

225
00:13:46,559 --> 00:13:51,320
Speaker 2: because these are the closest US intelligence partners. These countries

226
00:13:51,360 --> 00:13:56,640
Speaker 2: are providing particularly sensitive information, and the risk posed by

227
00:13:56,760 --> 00:14:00,080
Speaker 2: a leak from the United States is not just a

228
00:14:00,080 --> 00:14:02,840
Speaker 2: reputational or an informational risk for the United States, but

229
00:14:02,880 --> 00:14:05,280
Speaker 2: it's also for those countries that may have been the

230
00:14:05,320 --> 00:14:06,840
Speaker 2: sources of some of that information.

231
00:14:07,360 --> 00:14:10,720
Speaker 1: A courtney, I suppose it's easy to criticize this leak

232
00:14:10,800 --> 00:14:14,640
Speaker 1: sitting from another capital when it's not yours, But I imagine

233
00:14:14,679 --> 00:14:18,360
Speaker 1: these other countries too, know that they could one day

234
00:14:18,760 --> 00:14:21,880
Speaker 1: be the ones having to explain an intelligence leak.

235
00:14:22,440 --> 00:14:25,680
Speaker 2: Absolutely, I mean, it's happened before, and unfortunately, it probably

236
00:14:25,680 --> 00:14:28,880
Speaker 2: will happen again. All of these countries recognize that they

237
00:14:29,040 --> 00:14:33,280
Speaker 2: too are vulnerable to both human error or human leaks,

238
00:14:33,480 --> 00:14:38,280
Speaker 2: and perhaps technological hacking. And so while they are privately

239
00:14:38,560 --> 00:14:42,080
Speaker 2: rebuking the United States and seeking those assurances that the

240
00:14:42,160 --> 00:14:45,440
Speaker 2: US is taking all appropriate measures to prevent it from

241
00:14:45,480 --> 00:14:48,520
Speaker 2: happening again, they recognize that they could be in this

242
00:14:48,560 --> 00:14:50,120
Speaker 2: position themselves.

243
00:14:50,520 --> 00:14:54,160
Speaker 1: After the break. Will these leaks blow over or will

244
00:14:54,200 --> 00:15:00,240
Speaker 1: they cause lasting damage in America's relationships with its allies?

245
00:15:07,760 --> 00:15:09,360
Speaker 1: Are you concerned about the League?

246
00:15:09,920 --> 00:15:13,920
Speaker 4: Well, I'm not concerned about the League because and I'm

247
00:15:13,960 --> 00:15:18,240
Speaker 4: concerned and it happened, but there's nothing contemporaneous, so I'm

248
00:15:18,280 --> 00:15:22,080
Speaker 4: aware of that is of Great Counselorence Accordney.

249
00:15:22,120 --> 00:15:25,160
Speaker 1: At first, there was a lot of discussion about how

250
00:15:25,640 --> 00:15:28,920
Speaker 1: someone so junior could have access to this material, but

251
00:15:29,160 --> 00:15:32,080
Speaker 1: it seems that it's fairly common for that to happen.

252
00:15:32,520 --> 00:15:32,920
Speaker 1: It is.

253
00:15:33,160 --> 00:15:36,840
Speaker 2: You know, there are roughly three million people with security

254
00:15:36,880 --> 00:15:41,440
Speaker 2: clearances according to our reporting, and very young members of

255
00:15:41,640 --> 00:15:45,840
Speaker 2: the US military require access to sensitive information in order

256
00:15:45,880 --> 00:15:47,040
Speaker 2: to do their jobs.

257
00:15:47,280 --> 00:15:49,960
Speaker 1: And I imagine they go through quite extensive background.

258
00:15:49,640 --> 00:15:53,680
Speaker 2: Checks, yes, and there are periodic reviews of security clearances

259
00:15:53,720 --> 00:15:58,360
Speaker 2: to ensure that people are not compromised financially or otherwise.

260
00:15:58,960 --> 00:16:00,800
Speaker 1: And yet, as we've learned and over the years, and

261
00:16:00,840 --> 00:16:03,840
Speaker 1: we're learning again now, that isn't always enough.

262
00:16:04,360 --> 00:16:06,960
Speaker 2: That's right, And you know, I think investigators are going

263
00:16:07,000 --> 00:16:10,880
Speaker 2: to dig very very deeply into potential motives in this case,

264
00:16:11,120 --> 00:16:13,880
Speaker 2: and you know that could affect the way that they

265
00:16:14,080 --> 00:16:16,040
Speaker 2: assess clearances going forward.

266
00:16:16,560 --> 00:16:18,920
Speaker 1: You had said, how all these countries know it could

267
00:16:18,960 --> 00:16:21,320
Speaker 1: happen to them, and so that sort of tempers what

268
00:16:21,360 --> 00:16:24,760
Speaker 1: they want to say publicly in criticizing the US. The

269
00:16:24,880 --> 00:16:29,280
Speaker 1: nature of this leak, though, seems so different from other

270
00:16:29,520 --> 00:16:33,640
Speaker 1: national security breaches, where perhaps you would have a long

271
00:16:33,760 --> 00:16:37,600
Speaker 1: time spy who had been caught a senior person. This

272
00:16:37,840 --> 00:16:41,160
Speaker 1: was allegedly a young man twenty one years old who

273
00:16:41,280 --> 00:16:44,080
Speaker 1: very casually was able to get this stuff and share

274
00:16:44,120 --> 00:16:47,280
Speaker 1: it on a platform for gamers. Is the way this

275
00:16:47,400 --> 00:16:51,760
Speaker 1: information came out. One of the things that's alarming other

276
00:16:51,920 --> 00:16:55,480
Speaker 1: nations that it was just so easy apparently for this stuff,

277
00:16:55,680 --> 00:16:57,840
Speaker 1: this very sensitive stuff, to come to light.

278
00:16:58,440 --> 00:17:00,480
Speaker 2: You know, I think there are a lot of questions

279
00:17:00,840 --> 00:17:03,720
Speaker 2: about the level of access this person appears to have had,

280
00:17:04,200 --> 00:17:07,800
Speaker 2: the number of supervisory officials who who may have dropped

281
00:17:07,840 --> 00:17:10,080
Speaker 2: the ball, and I think that as part of the

282
00:17:10,160 --> 00:17:13,600
Speaker 2: Justice Department investigation, which is a criminal inquiry, and the

283
00:17:13,640 --> 00:17:17,520
Speaker 2: Defense Department's own internal assessment, we may hear quite a

284
00:17:17,520 --> 00:17:17,920
Speaker 2: bit more.

285
00:17:18,359 --> 00:17:22,119
Speaker 1: I mean, talk a little bit about how information this

286
00:17:22,320 --> 00:17:26,040
Speaker 1: sensitive is usually handled, who's allowed to see it, and

287
00:17:26,080 --> 00:17:28,600
Speaker 1: how someone like this could possibly ever even come into

288
00:17:28,640 --> 00:17:31,080
Speaker 1: contact with it. There are a.

289
00:17:31,080 --> 00:17:36,120
Speaker 2: Lot of protocols that go into handling of classified documents.

290
00:17:36,560 --> 00:17:40,359
Speaker 2: There are escalating levels of classification, and thus a smaller

291
00:17:40,480 --> 00:17:43,560
Speaker 2: number of people have access to it, and many of

292
00:17:43,560 --> 00:17:48,000
Speaker 2: these documents are clearly marked, numbered, tracked very carefully, so

293
00:17:48,080 --> 00:17:50,800
Speaker 2: that raises a lot of questions about the ability of

294
00:17:50,960 --> 00:17:54,960
Speaker 2: this person to not only access, but perhaps remove these

295
00:17:55,000 --> 00:17:56,840
Speaker 2: documents from a secure facility.

296
00:17:57,440 --> 00:18:00,280
Speaker 1: The other thing that's very interesting about this was how

297
00:18:00,440 --> 00:18:05,440
Speaker 1: many countries and different sorts of intelligence this encompass, so

298
00:18:05,600 --> 00:18:08,840
Speaker 1: that it wasn't as though this person had limited access

299
00:18:08,840 --> 00:18:11,600
Speaker 1: to something he should or stumbled across it, but seemed

300
00:18:11,640 --> 00:18:15,840
Speaker 1: to have access to a very wide range of classified material.

301
00:18:16,520 --> 00:18:19,159
Speaker 2: There are a lot of different sources of intelligence in

302
00:18:19,160 --> 00:18:22,400
Speaker 2: the United States. There are eighteen different organizations that make

303
00:18:22,520 --> 00:18:24,840
Speaker 2: up the US intelligence community, and of.

304
00:18:24,760 --> 00:18:27,760
Speaker 1: Course the government generates a lot of reports, and so

305
00:18:27,880 --> 00:18:30,879
Speaker 1: that means a lot of classified documents out there and

306
00:18:30,960 --> 00:18:33,720
Speaker 1: a lot of people who are cleared to see them.

307
00:18:34,040 --> 00:18:37,520
Speaker 2: Absolutely. Our reporting indicates that there are about three million

308
00:18:37,520 --> 00:18:39,640
Speaker 2: people in the United States with security clearances.

309
00:18:40,600 --> 00:18:42,800
Speaker 1: One thing that's gotten a lot of attention was that

310
00:18:42,840 --> 00:18:46,439
Speaker 1: some of these documents had classification markings on them that

311
00:18:46,640 --> 00:18:50,240
Speaker 1: said that they weren't to be shared with foreign allies.

312
00:18:51,160 --> 00:18:54,800
Speaker 2: Yes, the Defense Department and the intelligence community used a

313
00:18:54,880 --> 00:18:59,360
Speaker 2: variety of different designations, not necessarily always on classified materials.

314
00:18:59,400 --> 00:19:03,560
Speaker 2: Sometimes there's are contracting documents that indicate that they should

315
00:19:03,560 --> 00:19:06,840
Speaker 2: not be shared with foreign nationals. It's not necessarily about adversaries.

316
00:19:06,840 --> 00:19:09,600
Speaker 2: But there are certain documents that, for whatever reason, are

317
00:19:09,600 --> 00:19:12,720
Speaker 2: deemed sensitive enough that they should be viewed and handled

318
00:19:12,720 --> 00:19:13,800
Speaker 2: only by US citizens.

319
00:19:14,480 --> 00:19:18,560
Speaker 1: So it's not necessarily a significant thing that those markings

320
00:19:18,600 --> 00:19:21,280
Speaker 1: were on there, that there were specially sensitive.

321
00:19:21,560 --> 00:19:23,760
Speaker 2: Not necessarily, but you know, there are any number of

322
00:19:23,760 --> 00:19:25,880
Speaker 2: additional markings that could indicate that they are.

323
00:19:26,680 --> 00:19:30,320
Speaker 1: We've talked a lot about this investigation, both to find

324
00:19:30,320 --> 00:19:33,119
Speaker 1: the leader and also to find out how we got it.

325
00:19:33,400 --> 00:19:35,800
Speaker 1: And really the point there, I suppose, is to seal

326
00:19:35,880 --> 00:19:39,080
Speaker 1: the leaks so it can't happen again. What usually happens

327
00:19:39,119 --> 00:19:42,000
Speaker 1: in a situation like this, How do they then review

328
00:19:42,080 --> 00:19:45,240
Speaker 1: what they're doing and try to tighten the screws on intelligence?

329
00:19:46,040 --> 00:19:49,640
Speaker 2: Well, there are different avenues of the investigation. As we said,

330
00:19:49,680 --> 00:19:52,400
Speaker 2: the Justice Department has the lead on the criminal investigation,

331
00:19:52,480 --> 00:19:56,360
Speaker 2: but the Defense Department and different constituent organizations are really

332
00:19:56,440 --> 00:19:59,239
Speaker 2: going to look at their own processes, whether it is

333
00:19:59,680 --> 00:20:04,000
Speaker 2: look at who was supervising this person in the particular unit,

334
00:20:04,280 --> 00:20:07,639
Speaker 2: you know, how much information the unit itself had access to.

335
00:20:07,960 --> 00:20:10,479
Speaker 2: All of those protocols are going to be examined, and

336
00:20:10,520 --> 00:20:14,040
Speaker 2: often individuals have to go through a periodic review of

337
00:20:14,040 --> 00:20:17,560
Speaker 2: their own security clearance and you may see additional sort

338
00:20:17,560 --> 00:20:20,240
Speaker 2: of follow up investigations of individuals.

339
00:20:21,000 --> 00:20:24,040
Speaker 1: Is there something that the US is going to have

340
00:20:24,119 --> 00:20:26,200
Speaker 1: to do to win back trust?

341
00:20:26,560 --> 00:20:28,200
Speaker 2: I don't know that there's necessarily going to be a

342
00:20:28,280 --> 00:20:30,720
Speaker 2: quid pro quo. I think there will certainly be some

343
00:20:30,840 --> 00:20:34,800
Speaker 2: mea culpas issued. But you know, as our reporting found,

344
00:20:35,359 --> 00:20:38,080
Speaker 2: many countries both understand that the shoe could be on

345
00:20:38,119 --> 00:20:40,720
Speaker 2: the other foot, but also know that there is no

346
00:20:40,840 --> 00:20:44,359
Speaker 2: substitute for the intelligence that they gain from the United States,

347
00:20:44,359 --> 00:20:46,159
Speaker 2: and so they have to assume a certain amount of

348
00:20:46,280 --> 00:20:48,240
Speaker 2: risk in order to benefit from that.

349
00:20:49,359 --> 00:20:53,000
Speaker 1: Stories like this are always fascinating to read. You get

350
00:20:53,000 --> 00:20:57,600
Speaker 1: a glimpse behind the curtain into this secret world. We've

351
00:20:57,640 --> 00:21:01,320
Speaker 1: talked about these kind of difficult conversations that the US

352
00:21:01,440 --> 00:21:04,359
Speaker 1: now has to have with allies. But ultimately does this

353
00:21:04,640 --> 00:21:07,879
Speaker 1: cause real damage or is it just a moment of

354
00:21:08,080 --> 00:21:11,200
Speaker 1: sort of excitement that dissipates over time.

355
00:21:11,720 --> 00:21:15,040
Speaker 2: I don't know that it necessarily causes severe damage to

356
00:21:15,680 --> 00:21:20,560
Speaker 2: the alliance on partnership relationships, but there are serious risks

357
00:21:20,600 --> 00:21:26,160
Speaker 2: for Ukraine in the publication of confidential US assessments of

358
00:21:26,640 --> 00:21:30,320
Speaker 2: the war situation, you know, one analyst suggested that the

359
00:21:30,440 --> 00:21:33,840
Speaker 2: US has now increased the risk to Ukraine by allowing

360
00:21:33,880 --> 00:21:37,720
Speaker 2: its assessments of Ukraine's weaknesses to become public, and so

361
00:21:38,359 --> 00:21:42,479
Speaker 2: it should, as a result, increase assistance to help Ukraine

362
00:21:42,520 --> 00:21:46,960
Speaker 2: to mitigate that risk, whether that's additional air defense capability

363
00:21:47,240 --> 00:21:49,720
Speaker 2: or some other measures that they really need to help.

364
00:21:50,560 --> 00:21:52,919
Speaker 1: Courtney mcbriene, Thanks so much for coming on the show,

365
00:21:53,119 --> 00:21:56,440
Speaker 1: Thanks for having me, Thanks for listening to us here

366
00:21:56,480 --> 00:21:59,080
Speaker 1: at The Big Take. It's a daily podcast from Bloomberg

367
00:21:59,119 --> 00:22:03,440
Speaker 1: and iHeartRadio. For more shows from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app,

368
00:22:03,600 --> 00:22:06,879
Speaker 1: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen. And we'd love to

369
00:22:06,920 --> 00:22:10,120
Speaker 1: hear from you. Email us questions or comments to Big

370
00:22:10,160 --> 00:22:14,199
Speaker 1: Take at Bloomberg dot net. The supervising producer of The

371
00:22:14,200 --> 00:22:18,399
Speaker 1: Big Take and the producer of this episode is Vicky Bergalina.

372
00:22:18,760 --> 00:22:22,639
Speaker 1: Our senior producer is Katherine Fink. Raphael M. Sely is

373
00:22:22,680 --> 00:22:26,800
Speaker 1: our engineer. Our original music was composed by Leo Sidron.

374
00:22:27,240 --> 00:22:30,920
Speaker 1: I'm West Kasova. We'll be back tomorrow with another Big Take.