Speaker 1: Bloomberg Audio Studios, podcasts, radio news. Sir Secretary, thank you
Speaker 1: very much for being here. Good to be with you.
Speaker 2: We've heard from the President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense,
Speaker 2: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I'm curious at this point
Speaker 2: what your understanding is of the case this administration has
Speaker 2: made for the US going to war against Iran.
Speaker 1: Well, look, the case keeps shifting. But the first thing
Speaker 1: to say is this, from my perspective, once our men
Speaker 1: and women in uniform are engaged in an operation or
Speaker 1: in war, my first thought is for their safety and
Speaker 1: for their success, irrespective of what I think about how
Speaker 1: we got there or even where this is going. So
Speaker 1: that's primarily what I'm thinking of. But having said that,
Speaker 1: we've heard, you know, number of shifting rationales. But I
Speaker 1: think it's important to take into account that we've got
Speaker 1: to be able to hold multiple truths in our head
Speaker 1: at the same time. Is it a good thing that
Speaker 1: this iahtola is gone, Yes, terrible tyrant. Is it a
Speaker 1: good thing potentially at least that Iran's nuclear program is
Speaker 1: I guess reobliterated because apparently it was obliterated last June,
Speaker 1: But maybe not so much because they had to reobliterate it,
Speaker 1: or it's missile program diminished, or it's navy sunk. Yes,
Speaker 1: But to do that and to take on the extraordinary
Speaker 1: risks that go with it without having made the case
Speaker 1: with the American people with citing imminent threats that apparently
Speaker 1: didn't exist, I think that's problematic. And the chances of
Speaker 1: unintended consequences taking hold in any situation like this are
Speaker 1: very real, very serious for our partners and allies in
Speaker 1: the region, and for ourselves, and of course with the
Speaker 1: Iranian people. I think a big question that everyone has is, Okay,
Speaker 1: have we done regime change in Iran or just iotola change,
Speaker 1: which is the way it looks right now.
Speaker 2: You brought up the argument that there was an inminate
Speaker 2: threat in years past, you'd warned the amount of weeks
Speaker 2: before Ron could develop fissile uranium. Is that an argument
Speaker 2: that's persuasive to you so much as that's been made
Speaker 2: by the ministration that there it's.
Speaker 1: An ironic argument in a number of ways. First, as
Speaker 1: I said, they claim to have obliterated the nuclear fissile
Speaker 1: material program back in June, and now we're told, actually, no,
Speaker 1: we didn't. And A number of US warned at the
Speaker 1: time that one of the reasons why military action against
Speaker 1: the nuclear program might not do the trick is that
Speaker 1: the Iranians were likely to start to rebuild, maybe rebuild
Speaker 1: deeper underground where we couldn't get at it. Whether that
Speaker 1: was happening or to what extent, I don't know, because
Speaker 1: I'm not privy to that information, but at least that
Speaker 1: seems to be part of the rationale. The deeper irony,
Speaker 1: of course, is that we never should have been in
Speaker 1: this position, insofar as the agreement that the President Obama
Speaker 1: reached the Iran Nuclear Dealer, so called JCPOA, put Iran's
Speaker 1: nuclear program in a box. It made sure that Iran
Speaker 1: could not produce the facile material needed for nuclear weapon
Speaker 1: in less than a year, and so if they chose
Speaker 1: to break out of the box and go for that,
Speaker 1: we'd see it, and we'd have plenty of time to
Speaker 1: be able to do something about it. President Trump tore
Speaker 1: up that agreement, said he'd replace it with something better.
Speaker 1: He never did, and that's the road that we then
Speaker 1: wound up on that led to in some ways to
Speaker 1: where we are today with Iran, yes dramatically advancing its
Speaker 1: production of facile material, so that that breakout time moved
Speaker 1: from one year to a couple of weeks. But you
Speaker 1: don't only need fysile material, actually need a weapon too,
Speaker 1: And I think, as has been publicly reported our intelligence
Speaker 1: agencies and others, the IEA continue to conclude that Iran
Speaker 1: has not made a decision to actually weaponize if and
Speaker 1: when they do, or if and when they did, most
Speaker 1: estimates had that timeline a couple of years. There are
Speaker 1: different kinds of weapons, less sophisticated ones you could build
Speaker 1: on a quicker timeline. But the bottom line is that
Speaker 1: on the nuclear side there was no imminent threat. There
Speaker 1: was though the fact that, yes, in terms of facil
Speaker 1: material production, they'd gone from the Obama deal more than
Speaker 1: a year to a few weeks.
Speaker 2: The Supreme Leader who's been killed, of course, warned in
Speaker 2: the run up to this that if there were US strikes,
Speaker 2: the US risked a wider regional war. How has what's
Speaker 2: played out over these last few days, How does that
Speaker 2: compare to what you expected would happen here? I imagine
Speaker 2: in your old jobs there were planning meetings and war
Speaker 2: games in which you kind of tried to figure out
Speaker 2: what might happen here as we see this war, widen,
Speaker 2: is that in keeping with what you expected when you
Speaker 2: heard the Supreme Leader warned.
Speaker 1: Them, well, look, it's certainly something that should have been anticipated.
Speaker 1: And one of the striking features so far is that
Speaker 1: Iran has launched far more missiles and far more drones
Speaker 1: at the Arab countries in the Gulf and in the
Speaker 1: region that it has even at Israel, disproportionately so. And
Speaker 1: in part that's too because we have bases and presence there.
Speaker 1: But they've gone beyond that. They've gone at infrastructure that
Speaker 1: these countries have, the oil infrastructure. They want to try
Speaker 1: to inflict so much pain that we can't sustain the effort.
Speaker 1: And that's something that should have been anticipated. And David,
Speaker 1: I think we're looking at a couple of things going
Speaker 1: forward in terms of where does this go and how
Speaker 1: does this end? And it seems to me that there
Speaker 1: are two critical factors to look at. Markets and munitions. Markets.
Speaker 1: Where are the oil markets, where's the stock market, where's
Speaker 1: the bond market? I know President Trump is very attentive
Speaker 1: to those. And if they go in a southernly direction
Speaker 1: and stay that way, or in the case of oil
Speaker 1: in a northernly direction. That's going to be possibly a
Speaker 1: limited factor. Then munitions, there's there's really a race on
Speaker 1: to figure out who expends their munitions first and fastest.
Speaker 1: The Iranians put us in a position where we've used
Speaker 1: up a lot of interceptors to deal with defense or
Speaker 1: even our offensive missiles to take out their their launchers,
Speaker 1: or conversely, did they run out and we still have
Speaker 1: need Again, I don't know the numbers here, I'm not
Speaker 1: privy to that, but it is something we have to
Speaker 1: be very very attentive to because these things are not
Speaker 1: in infinite supply. The production times are very long, and
Speaker 1: of course we're also using very in many cases very
Speaker 1: expensive weapons to take down twenty thousand dollars drones. That's
Speaker 1: not a good equation if you keep that going over time.
Speaker 1: What I'm worried about. One of the things I'm worried about,
Speaker 1: and this gets to the second and third order consequences,
Speaker 1: is we so deplete our arsenal and it takes a
Speaker 1: long time to rebuild it that that puts US in
Speaker 1: a disadvantageous position when it comes to say a China
Speaker 1: or a Russia. All of those things need to be
Speaker 1: factored in. And again it's one of the reasons why
Speaker 1: if you're going to undertake something like this, you've got
Speaker 1: to make sure that you've factored all of that in.
Speaker 1: And again it really should start with explaining to the
Speaker 1: American people why you're doing something, why it's necessary. Why
Speaker 1: now do.
Speaker 2: You see an off ramp anywhere at this point?
Speaker 1: I do in the sense that one, as I said,
Speaker 1: I think the off ramp and if we'll be governed
Speaker 1: by this question of munitions and markets, and then what
Speaker 1: is that off ramp? I think the President may simply
Speaker 1: declare victory. He'll say, got rid of the Ayatola. We
Speaker 1: diminished or degraded or destroyed their their nuclear program. Again again,
Speaker 1: we did the same thing to the missile program. We
Speaker 1: did the same thing to the navy. And as to
Speaker 1: the regime, well over the Iranian people, good luck to them.
Speaker 1: Hope they succeed, and if they don't, it's their fault.
Speaker 1: If they do, we'll we'll take the credit. How Iran
Speaker 1: response to that remains to be seen, and for the
Speaker 1: for the regime survival of success. Right now, the expectation
Speaker 1: seems to be at least as has been reported that
Speaker 1: the Iatola Sun is his successor. He's very tied into
Speaker 1: the IRGC, and so you may have a situation where,
Speaker 1: much as we want and everyone should want to see
Speaker 1: a change in that regime, we have, you know, regime
Speaker 1: changed without regime change, status quo, status status quo, and
Speaker 1: even potentially even worse because it may simply ultimately reinforce
Speaker 1: the IRGC, the military as a specialized military. And part
Speaker 1: of the problem with these things is that it's very
Speaker 1: hard to produce regime change from outside. You can't bomb
Speaker 1: your way to it. We've had a lot of experience
Speaker 1: with that, and not such good experience over the last
Speaker 1: twenty years. It's not so likely to come from the streets,
Speaker 1: even with extraordinarily courageous Iranian people. It's more likely to
Speaker 1: come from kind of within the palace. And then it
Speaker 1: could go in any one of you know, multiple directions.
Speaker 1: You could get more pragmatic people, not good guys, but
Speaker 1: more pragmatic people who are open to, you know, curbing
Speaker 1: the excesses of the regime, focusing at home instead of
Speaker 1: focusing abroad doing deals. But right now it looks more
Speaker 1: likely that you're going to have hardliners, and you know,
Speaker 1: the who had a song way back in the sixties
Speaker 1: or seventies. You know, here's to the new boss, same
Speaker 1: as the old boss that seem used to be right
Speaker 1: now at least where we're headed.
Speaker 2: You've warned of the dangers of US intervention many times.
Speaker 2: Twenty twenty four, you spoke at the Council on Form relations.
Speaker 2: He said, effectively, I think if we looked the last
Speaker 2: twenty years, our experiments in regime change have not exactly
Speaker 2: been resounding successes. CNN is reporting that the US is
Speaker 2: considering arming the Kurds in Iron. Bloomberg hasn't confirmed that reporting.
Speaker 2: When you hear that, what red flags does that raise
Speaker 2: for you?
Speaker 1: Oh? The red flag it raises is this could be
Speaker 1: Syria reducts, or it could be Libya reducts. You've got
Speaker 1: you know Iran as a country where you know, the
Speaker 1: Shites make up less than half of the population. You
Speaker 1: have all sorts of other groups, including Kurds, Azari's others,
Speaker 1: who make up the bulk of the population. You could
Speaker 1: see the country fracturing, imploding, or even exploding with refugees
Speaker 1: and migration, with the exporting of some of their problems,
Speaker 1: with extremist groups taking hold in one part or another.
Speaker 1: It's incredibly fraud and incredibly dangerous. And as sympathetic as
Speaker 1: I am to the Curs who've been incredible partners for us,
Speaker 1: incredibly brave, I don't think that getting into the business
Speaker 1: of arming these groups is ultimately going to be a
Speaker 1: good thing. And then you're going to have other countries
Speaker 1: that pick their partners inside, and again you wind up
Speaker 1: with something like Syria, something like Libya.
Speaker 2: Let's talk a bit about diplomacy, the president posted on
Speaker 2: truth Social they want to talk prefer to the Iranians.
Speaker 2: I said, too late? Is it too late for there
Speaker 2: to be a diplomatic solution or to have those conversations
Speaker 2: at this point?
Speaker 1: I I think it's never too late for diplomacy. The
Speaker 1: question is is there a good moment? Is this the
Speaker 1: right moment for it? I would hope so, because on
Speaker 1: one level, the Iranians have never been weaker, at least
Speaker 1: not in recent memory, militarily, politically at home, diplomatically abroad
Speaker 1: and so, and their proxies are for the most part
Speaker 1: gone or vastly diminished. So that's why I was hopeful
Speaker 1: before this, uh this action started, that maybe they actually
Speaker 1: would get a renewed nuclear deal because Iran was had
Speaker 1: a very weak hand to play. So there I think
Speaker 1: there is a possibility of doing that. Whether the new
Speaker 1: whatever the new regime is or the continuation of the existing
Speaker 1: regimes is ready to do that, wants to do that
Speaker 1: to be determined. It also depends on what the what
Speaker 1: the Trump administration wants to do, and I imagine Israel
Speaker 1: is going to have a say in this as well.
Speaker 2: As the administration was marshaling all of this military might
Speaker 2: to the Middle East, you had Jared Kushner, the President's
Speaker 2: son in law, Steve Witkoff, his longtime friend now on
Speaker 2: void to many conflicts and regions, meeting in Geneva in
Speaker 2: meetings mediated by the Omanis. Do you think that those
Speaker 2: were good faith conversations when you look at it now
Speaker 2: in hindsight.
Speaker 1: Look, I can't. It's hard for me to tell, not
Speaker 1: being in the room, not being privy to those conversations.
Speaker 1: I certainly want to believe, So I don't know. As
Speaker 1: you know, I think Jared Kushner and Steve Woodkoff are
Speaker 1: very able nego, but it was not clear to me
Speaker 1: that the expertise was also with them, which is very necessary.
Speaker 1: When you're dealing with nuclear matters. When we did the JCPOA,
Speaker 1: we had very senior diplomats, but we had tremendous technical
Speaker 1: expertise at hand, because you know, it's complicated stuff and
Speaker 1: you want to make sure you're not making a mistake.
Speaker 1: So I'm not sure who was actually in the room
Speaker 1: and whether the people in the room could fully evaluate
Speaker 1: and assess is this a good deal? Is this a
Speaker 1: bad deal? And I've heard different versions of what the
Speaker 1: Iranians were actually willing to do, not willing to do,
Speaker 1: different versions of what we were willing to do or
Speaker 1: not willing to do. Not being there, it's hard to tell.
Speaker 1: But you know, David, when President Trump tore up the
Speaker 1: JCPOA back in the day first term, he said he
Speaker 1: wanted to replace it with a better deal, and I
Speaker 1: think there was actually an opportunity to do that because
Speaker 1: Iran was in so much of a weaker position now
Speaker 1: than it was back when President Obama negotiated the deal.
Speaker 2: You, of course, are a professional diplomat. You've dealt with
Speaker 2: the Iranians directly, and I'm curious if you think that,
Speaker 2: Steve Witkoff, Jared Kirsch, we're at some sort of inherent
Speaker 2: disadvantage in those talks because you had professional diplomats on
Speaker 2: one side and they were on the other. This isn't
Speaker 2: what they've done their entire lives.
Speaker 1: Look, a number of the Iranians have been doing this
Speaker 1: for a long time, and we when we change administrations,
Speaker 1: we change out the people who are doing these doing
Speaker 1: these issues, and there's a certain learning curve and you
Speaker 1: have to get up to speed and become genuinely expert
Speaker 1: in things. Again, That's why I think it's so important
Speaker 1: to make sure that you have the experts with you,
Speaker 1: because they have they're the continuity. The Iranians have continuity
Speaker 1: because it's usually the same cash to characters. The same
Speaker 1: guys have been doing this for a long time. Auranchi,
Speaker 1: the Foreign Minister, was Zerif's the then Foreign minister's deputy
Speaker 1: back then, so he knows what he's doing.
Speaker 2: I'm curious what you are thinking as you watch the
Speaker 2: chaos unfolding in the Middle East, particularly with Americans who
Speaker 2: would like to leave and are being told different things.
Speaker 2: It seems like there is no easy out, for lack
Speaker 2: of a better two, for them to get out of
Speaker 2: the region. What has happened there is you see, and
Speaker 2: what needs to happen to make it so that Americans
Speaker 2: can get back to the United States.
Speaker 1: Well, it's not very America first to put American citizens last,
Speaker 1: and that seems to be what happened. I mean, it
Speaker 1: was not until days into this that the administration thought
Speaker 1: about maybe getting some planes out there to try to
Speaker 1: get people out. A little bit late, and when people
Speaker 1: at least initially were asking for help, calling for help,
Speaker 1: the answer they got was basically, get out, but we
Speaker 1: can't help you. After October seventh, In the days immediately
Speaker 1: after October seventh, we surged charter airplanes to Israel, boats,
Speaker 1: cruise ships that could ferry the tens potentially tens of
Speaker 1: thousands of dual nationals who were there out of harm's
Speaker 1: way to Cyprus. When it came to boats, and as
Speaker 1: long as the airport was operating to various places, the
Speaker 1: boats were there because we thought the airports might be
Speaker 1: be shut down. All of that happened very quickly, and
Speaker 1: this was in response to something we obviously didn't know
Speaker 1: it was coming. And so I think doing this after
Speaker 1: the fact in a not very planned way, especially when
Speaker 1: you're the initiator, is unfortunate.
Speaker 2: You've noted in the past that during war games, something's
Speaker 2: come up where if there were to be this kind
Speaker 2: of chaos in Iran, the regime might move uranium to
Speaker 2: different places across the country. And going back to what
Speaker 2: you were talking about a moment ago, the prospects of
Speaker 2: there being a Libya esque or Syria esque civil war,
Speaker 2: how worried should we be about that nuclear material being
Speaker 2: effectively scattered across this country and they're being next to
Speaker 2: no accountability for a where it is and be into
Speaker 2: whose hands it falls.
Speaker 1: Yeah, I think that's a real concern. I would assume
Speaker 1: that the remaining material and again I don't know. We've
Speaker 1: seen lots of reports that it's likely that they were
Speaker 1: able to preserve safe guard a lot of urseraneum, but
Speaker 1: I don't know that for a fact. I would assume
Speaker 1: that they've tried to disperse it, as you said, presumably
Speaker 1: in places that the regime has some control over. But
Speaker 1: if a country winds up in some kind of civil war, yeah,
Speaker 1: that's a real concern and something that we have to
Speaker 1: factor into our thinking. If we're going to start, you know,
Speaker 1: dropping matches there in terms of arming various groups, we
Speaker 1: better watch out in terms of getting what we wish for.
Speaker 1: But you know, of course, you've seen extraordinarily courageous people
Speaker 1: beyond imagination who are out in the streets looking for change,
Speaker 1: getting mowed down by this regime. And we all want
Speaker 1: to see a different future for them, different leadership for them.
Speaker 1: But it's very very hard, if not impossible, to do
Speaker 1: that from the outside, as we were saying, And the
Speaker 1: risks now are that instead of having a change, having
Speaker 1: a transition, you have an implosion, and then maybe even
Speaker 1: an explosion that has real effects outside the country. We
Speaker 1: have partners in the region. I was talking earlier about
Speaker 1: how one of the limiting factors on this, you know,
Speaker 1: goes to munitions. Our partners in the region have far
Speaker 1: fewer interceptors air defense interceptors than we do. If it
Speaker 1: gets to the point where they're running out, and the
Speaker 1: Iranians have enough to continue going at their infrastructure, at
Speaker 1: their people, I think there's going to be a pretty
Speaker 1: strong demand signal on the administration to take an off
Speaker 1: ramp to stop. We've had other second and third order
Speaker 1: consequences here at the very time when Russia is really
Speaker 1: reaching a weak point because of its dependence on oil
Speaker 1: to fuel its war economy, it's revenues. The government's revenues
Speaker 1: are down almost twenty percent, in large part because the
Speaker 1: price of oil has gone down. It's having more trouble
Speaker 1: exploiting oil because of sanctions and restrictions that we put
Speaker 1: on technology. That's been a huge and growing factor. And
Speaker 1: the thing to do now, ideally would be to squeeze
Speaker 1: the shadow fleet that they have that's going around the world,
Speaker 1: and that's the one thing that's able to keep them going.
Speaker 1: At the very time when that's possible, and that that
Speaker 1: might force putin to finally cut a deal on Ukraine,
Speaker 1: they get a lifeline. And the lifeline is the price
Speaker 1: of oil is going up, and the value of that
Speaker 1: shadow fleet oil is going up, and people will need
Speaker 1: it and want to buy it. The Europeans, in turn,
Speaker 1: having moved away from Russian gas, are now more dependent
Speaker 1: on the Middle East, and if that gets tied up,
Speaker 1: if the Straits of Hormuz remain problematic, that's going to
Speaker 1: put a lot of pressure on them. So mapping out,
Speaker 1: gaming out, planning out, and then making sure you have
Speaker 1: something in place to deal with all of these second
Speaker 1: and third order effects usually important. It's not at all
Speaker 1: clear to me that that was done.
Speaker 2: From where we sit today, are you confident that the
Speaker 2: US can extricate itself from this without putting boots on
Speaker 2: the ground in run.
Speaker 1: It depends what the objective is. I think that yes.
Speaker 1: In short, as I said a moment ago, you know,
Speaker 1: the President could theoretically declare victory tomorrow and claim that,
Speaker 1: you know, severe damage was done to the regime, to
Speaker 1: the missiles, to the nuclear program, to the Navy, and
Speaker 1: say and call it a day. But then for what
Speaker 1: Most of that stuff ultimately can be rebuilt, and absent
Speaker 1: a change in the governance in the regime, which right
Speaker 1: now in this moment doesn't seem to be forthcoming huge
Speaker 1: risk without the support of the well without the in
Speaker 1: effect of buying from the American people, that leaves us
Speaker 1: actually potentially for some time and as strategically we can
Speaker 1: position with regard for example, to China, Russia, because our
Speaker 1: own stockpiles of critical long range position guided weapons are down,
Speaker 1: our air defense stockpile interceptors is down. That's usually usually questionable,
Speaker 1: but that is I think that is an off ramp
Speaker 1: that's available to the President if he wants to take it.
Speaker 2: As you've pointed out President Trump pulled out of the
Speaker 2: Iron Nuclear Deal during his first term when you were
Speaker 2: Secretary of State, there was an effort to reanimate that,
Speaker 2: to get another iteration of it. What were the challenges
Speaker 2: of that and why was it the case that in
Speaker 2: twenty twenty two of those talks broke down.
Speaker 1: Look, we tried very hard to get back to the deal.
Speaker 1: But at that point in time, and especially with the
Speaker 1: passage of time, there were two things that were critical.
Speaker 1: One was that, of course the Iranians, not without reason,
Speaker 1: said how can we trust anything. We could do it,
Speaker 1: We can do a deal, and then maybe the President
Speaker 1: Biden's successor does exactly what President Trump does. So there
Speaker 1: was a limiting factor there. But the bigger limiting factor
Speaker 1: was getting the Iranians to agree to terms that we
Speaker 1: deemed necessary and sufficient to make the deal the right
Speaker 1: deal to do, and in particular re extending the timelines
Speaker 1: the constraints that the original deal had in them on
Speaker 1: the nuclear program. We couldn't get to where we thought
Speaker 1: we needed to be to make it worthwhile. And we
Speaker 1: were doing it in partnership, in very close partnership with
Speaker 1: our European friends and allies. With the French, with the British,
Speaker 1: with the Germans, with the European Union, something that hadn't
Speaker 1: been the case in the immediate previous years. And I
Speaker 1: think we all agreed that the deal that the Iranians
Speaker 1: were willing to sign on to was simply not adequate.
Speaker 1: I wish we could have gotten there, But more than that,
Speaker 1: I wish the President Trump had not torn up the
Speaker 1: original deal. We'd be in a very different position, in
Speaker 1: a very different world.
Speaker 2: Do you feel it all like perfection shouldn't be the
Speaker 2: enemy of the good here, that it would have been
Speaker 2: wiser to find some sort of deal with them.
Speaker 1: Yeah, Look, you have to make You always have to
Speaker 1: make judgments about these things, and you have to make
Speaker 1: judgments about whether, yes, the good enough is good enough.
Speaker 1: And it was our judgment, our estimation, that we weren't there,
Speaker 1: but you know were We continued to stay at it,
Speaker 1: but the Iranians in that moment were not moving sufficiently
Speaker 1: to get us to where we needed to be.
Speaker 2: I want to ask you about something that your successor
Speaker 2: said this week. Secretary State Marco Rubia was talking about
Speaker 2: the motivations for this war. He said Israel was planting
Speaker 2: attacks that could lead to reprisals on American troops, so
Speaker 2: the US had to get involved militarily. He since walked
Speaker 2: that back a bit, But what does that say to
Speaker 2: you about the relationship between the US and Israel and
Speaker 2: the influence that the US has over Israeli policy.
Speaker 1: Look, this has been a long story when it comes
Speaker 1: to Iran, and back during the Obama administration, the Israelis
Speaker 1: were pushing President Obama to take military action against Iran
Speaker 1: and were warning that they would do it themselves if
Speaker 1: he didn't, and he wouldn't because he thought the better
Speaker 1: way to get at the nuclear program, which is what
Speaker 1: we were focused on, was through very muscular diplomacy backed
Speaker 1: up by very very strong sanctions that we rallied the
Speaker 1: world to put in place, and then we got the
Speaker 1: Iran Nuclear Agreement. In the days after the October seventh
Speaker 1: attack on Israel, the horrific attack on Israel by Hamas,
Speaker 1: the Israelis were insisting that in the north Hezbolah from
Speaker 1: Lebanon was about to attack and they wanted to strike
Speaker 1: preemptively against Hezbolah. And President Biden said, look, well, we're
Speaker 1: with you, will always be with you in defending Israel
Speaker 1: and if you're attacked, were there, but we're not there
Speaker 1: if you're going to start something, And we came within
Speaker 1: about thirty minutes of having a war in the North
Speaker 1: based on bad information that the Israelis had about an
Speaker 1: imminent attack from Hezbolah. We were able to avert that,
Speaker 1: but the President Biden was very insistent, We're not going
Speaker 1: to do something that you initiate, that you start. It's
Speaker 1: very different than defending Israel one it's been attacked. I
Speaker 1: can't speak to what the dynamic was this time. I
Speaker 1: heard that. Then it was walked back. The President said
Speaker 1: it was the other way around. There's been a shifting rationale,
Speaker 1: a shifting explanation for why this, why now? And again
Speaker 1: that's why it's so important to have ideally laid this
Speaker 1: out before the American people and our partners and allies.
Speaker 1: We might have had less friction with them if there
Speaker 1: was a compelling case to be made to make sure
Speaker 1: that we laid that out in advance and had them
Speaker 1: with us on the takeoff, not mid flight or on
Speaker 1: the landing.
Speaker 2: You have faced protesters when you've given speeches. I remember
Speaker 2: there was an interruption in the press briefing room at
Speaker 2: the State Department when you were giving remarks, and the
Speaker 2: criticism you faced has been you and the administration. The
Speaker 2: Bide administration effectively gave cover to Israel and Prime Minister
Speaker 2: and Yahoo for them to prosecute the war that they
Speaker 2: prosecuted in gods that led to seventy five thousand people dying.
Speaker 2: In hindsight, do you regret not exerting more pressure on
Speaker 2: or trying to do more to constrain Yes, Israel, but
Speaker 2: principally the Prime Minister in that war.
Speaker 1: Look, David, when there's been such terrible loss, such terrible suffering,
Speaker 1: when so many innocent people Alastaini, men, women and children
Speaker 1: lost their lives, You're always going to ask yourself. I
Speaker 1: always ask myself, could we should we have done something different?
Speaker 1: And we had to make judgments in the moment to
Speaker 1: try to achieve a number of objectives, and in a
Speaker 1: way I should. I should really start with where we ended,
Speaker 1: which is we ended with a ceasefire that we handed
Speaker 1: off to the Trump administration. We ended with the hostages
Speaker 1: coming out, prisoners being released from Israeli jails, tens of
Speaker 1: thousands of trucks going into Gaza, I wish that.
Speaker 2: Was a mutual achievement between the BID and the Trump.
Speaker 1: Well, I think it was. It was largely President Biden's,
Speaker 1: but I'm very thankful for the role that Steve wood
Speaker 1: Cooff in particular played and supporting that in the moment,
Speaker 1: and that's what we were able to hand off and
Speaker 1: then in that in that agreement, in the ceasefire agreement,
Speaker 1: it was it was for six weeks, and during those
Speaker 1: six weeks, the notion was that the parties would negotiate
Speaker 1: the terms of an enduring ceasefire. That didn't happen. They
Speaker 1: went back to war, and then finally President eight or
Speaker 1: nine months later landed the currencies fire. But do I
Speaker 1: wish that we could have gotten that sooner with less suffering. Absolutely,
Speaker 1: But there were a lot of things that were going
Speaker 1: on that we had to factor in. One was we
Speaker 1: were trying, obviously to make sure that October seventh could
Speaker 1: never happen again. And October seventh was almost written off
Speaker 1: immediately by much of the world, starting practically on October eighth,
Speaker 1: and you had to traumatize Israeli society, and then now
Speaker 1: you've had a traumatized Palestinian broader society from October athon,
Speaker 1: but we wanted to make sure that couldn't happen again.
Speaker 1: We wanted to avert a wider war which would have
Speaker 1: caused even more death, destruction and suffering and probably would
Speaker 1: have prolonged Gaza even more. And so that meant making sure,
Speaker 1: among other things, that there was a strong deterrent in place,
Speaker 1: including Israel's deterrent. To say it would be aggressors who
Speaker 1: were prepared to jump in pile in because they thought
Speaker 1: Israel was down, if not out, has Bollah, Iran, the Huthis, etc.
Speaker 1: Don't do it, and so we had to preserve Israel's
Speaker 1: de turn we wanted to get. We thought the best
Speaker 1: way to end this was through the deal that we
Speaker 1: ultimately got, the sees fire and hostage deal. But part
Speaker 1: of the problem was part of the challenge was that
Speaker 1: Hamas was constantly strong arming things because of two factors. One,
Speaker 1: it thought the cavalry was eventually going to come to
Speaker 1: the rescue the Iranians has Belah, et cetera. And until
Speaker 1: it was clear, and that didn't happen until really September
Speaker 1: of twenty twenty four, with the death of Nasralla, with
Speaker 1: other leaders who were taken out by the Israelis with
Speaker 1: the decimation, if not well or diminishment at least of
Speaker 1: hesblat self. That wasn't clear till then, and that notion
Speaker 1: of the cavalry company the rescue was still there. The
Speaker 1: second thing that was really problematic was that, and we
Speaker 1: know this from all the information we had, Hamas was
Speaker 1: looking for any gaps between us in Israel and Israel's
Speaker 1: other supporters, and as soon as they saw something emerge,
Speaker 1: they would step back. So in public it was critical
Speaker 1: that we preserve as much solidarity as possible, even as
Speaker 1: in private we were hammering them every single day on
Speaker 1: humanitterran assistance for Palestinian people, on civilian casualties, and of
Speaker 1: course they were operating in a unique environment where Hamas
Speaker 1: was hiding among and below all of the civilian infrastructure
Speaker 1: and civilians themselves in schools and mosque and hospitals. That
Speaker 1: doesn't excuse some of the actions that Israel took in
Speaker 1: trying to get at Hamas, not at Palestinians, but it
Speaker 1: is necessary to understand that that was part of the environment.
Speaker 1: I also think, at the end of the day, this
Speaker 1: is just my judgment and I may be wrong. That
Speaker 1: this was perceived in Israel among the vast majority of
Speaker 1: the population, not just Prime Netnyaho people in his government,
Speaker 1: but the vast majority of the population, including many who
Speaker 1: don't like him at all, to be an existential matter,
Speaker 1: and irrespective of what we did or anyone else did,
Speaker 1: they were likely to continue with or without us. So
Speaker 1: for us, it was how do we try, how do
Speaker 1: we bring this to an end as quickly and effectively
Speaker 1: as possible, again making sure that it's not likely to
Speaker 1: happen again, averting a wider war, and all the while
Speaker 1: trying to look out for people who are caught in
Speaker 1: this horrific crossfire.
Speaker 2: Is it wrong to look at this as a continuum
Speaker 2: that Prime Minister Netnya, who's able to prosecute the war
Speaker 2: in the way in which he wanted, that led him
Speaker 2: to feel them bold enough to take these strikes in
Speaker 2: concert with the United States.
Speaker 1: Certainly there's a profound connection there, because I think in
Speaker 1: the past he has probably been reluctant to go at
Speaker 1: Iran directly because of the threat of retaliation a response
Speaker 1: from Hesbolah, but with Hesbolah vastly to Mintic, even though
Speaker 1: they did respond not in such a significant way, and
Speaker 1: by the way, something truly remarkable. The president, the Prime
Speaker 1: Minister of Lebanon denounced Hesbolov for getting into this and
Speaker 1: firing it at Israel. That's remarkable. But for sure, I
Speaker 1: think the Israeli is Yes, we're in a position where
Speaker 1: something they hesitated to do in the past, that is
Speaker 1: direct confrontation with Iran because of the likelihood that others
Speaker 1: would get in and go at them, that was taken
Speaker 1: away and that did open the door to them doing
Speaker 1: what they've done.
Speaker 2: I want to wrap up with where this leaves us,
Speaker 2: where this leaves the world. And Prime Minister Mark Karney
Speaker 2: of Canada spoke recently and he said this is just
Speaker 2: another example of what he's talked about before, this rupture
Speaker 2: in the global order that that's happened on two counts here.
Speaker 2: There have been two failures. The first of which was
Speaker 2: the multilateral institutions that we've relied on weren't able to
Speaker 2: constrain Iran effectively.
Speaker 1: That's one.
Speaker 2: The second is you have the US and Israel now
Speaker 2: going it together without the consent of the UN or
Speaker 2: other multi latteral institute. Do you agree with him as
Speaker 2: he talks about the way that that hegemony. The global
Speaker 2: order has changed. Look, we're very much at an inflection
Speaker 2: point in.
Speaker 1: The global order, in the rules based order that we
Speaker 1: spent eighty years building up, and that was premised on
Speaker 1: one I think profound insight, and that was enlightened self interest,
Speaker 1: the notion that the success and strength of others would
Speaker 1: be our own as well, and we were able to
Speaker 1: build a system that avoided other countries ganging up against us,
Speaker 1: as is usually the case when one country rises above
Speaker 1: the others. We had new markets for all the stuff
Speaker 1: we wanted to sell. We had new partners to deal
Speaker 1: with different conflicts, different problems. We had new allies to
Speaker 1: deter aggression, especially with NATO. And now that system is
Speaker 1: being put in for now at least in the dust
Speaker 1: bin and being replaced with They're different versions of this.
Speaker 1: Some people believe that the president's engaged in going back
Speaker 1: to a spheres of influenced world where the Russians do
Speaker 1: what they want and they're part of the world, The
Speaker 1: Chinese do what they want, except maybe on the economic
Speaker 1: issues in their part, and we do what we want
Speaker 1: to do in our part, particularly in the Western hemisphere.
Speaker 1: And then you've got these problematic areas that are dealt
Speaker 1: with by force. That's a profound thing, and that's what's
Speaker 1: happening now. But I think at the same time, and
Speaker 1: this is what's maybe most frustrating of all in the
Speaker 1: Middle East, is that there's also an extraordinary opportunity, if
Speaker 1: very big, if this does produce some kind of real
Speaker 1: change in Iran, then you have the prospect of a
Speaker 1: region that heads in a very different direction, that is
Speaker 1: integrated with its people, it's moving back and forth, it's
Speaker 1: economies integrated, greater success, greater prosperity for folks. But there
Speaker 1: remains one cat to that vision besides how Iran resolves,
Speaker 1: and that's the question of Israelis and Palestinians. The truly
Speaker 1: big vision right now would be to actually resolve that question,
Speaker 1: not to try to put it under the rug. Yet. Again,
Speaker 1: the bottom line is this, there are roughly seven million
Speaker 1: Jews in Israel, They're about two million Arabs, five million
Speaker 1: Palestinians between the West Bank and Gaza. No one is
Speaker 1: going anywhere, despite the efforts of some on both sides
Speaker 1: to make that happen. And so tell me how this ends.
Speaker 1: I don't see how this ends without some kind of
Speaker 1: genuine political accommodation that realizes the rights of Palestinians. This
Speaker 1: is the moment for that big vision because that brings
Speaker 1: with it something incredibly powerful, normalization of relations between Israel
Speaker 1: and Saudi Arabia, and then potentially other countries will follow suit,
Speaker 1: from Cutter to Indonesia. And then if the Iranian problem
Speaker 1: is diminished and Iran really has to face a choice
Speaker 1: between being a pariah gadfly or mending its ways, I
Speaker 1: think that's the most likely way we're actually going to
Speaker 1: see real change. Unfortunately, tragically, given the trauma on all
Speaker 1: sides after October seventh, on the Israeli side and among Palestinians,
Speaker 1: it's awfully hard to get there. But that's where you
Speaker 1: need people of vision to try to move things in
Speaker 1: that direction. There is actually an opportunity to do that.
Speaker 1: I worry that that opportunity will not be will not
Speaker 1: be seized, and we're going to just see a continuation
Speaker 1: among Israelis and Palestinians and also Iran is again likely
Speaker 1: in this moment, if I had to bet again, we're
Speaker 1: replacing one Iatola for another, and the nature of the
Speaker 1: regime in this moment doesn't seem likely to change. I hope,
Speaker 1: I'm pleasantly surprised and the Iranians get the leadership that
Speaker 1: they deserve. But the jury's very much out on that.
Speaker 2: Something you warned about during your tenure Secretary of State
Speaker 2: was the role that China could play in subverting or
Speaker 2: reinventing the international order. How do you think about that
Speaker 2: now in this moment, Well, you know, s reporse a vacuum.
Speaker 1: If we're disengaged, if we're not leading in the effort
Speaker 1: to shape that order, then China's going to fill the void.
Speaker 1: I'll give you one example. At the during the Biden administration,
Speaker 1: the President took the lead in working with all of
Speaker 1: the frontier AI companies on getting voluntary commitments on safety
Speaker 1: and security for these AI artificial intelligence products that were
Speaker 1: being rolled out, to make sure that they were adequately tested,
Speaker 1: that there was transparency, and that the guardrails were put
Speaker 1: in against the misuse. For abuse is something that has
Speaker 1: such extraordinary positive potential but also has real potential downsides.
Speaker 1: And then we took that around the world and we
Speaker 1: got the G seven to endorse it. We went to
Speaker 1: the United Nations, we got the first resolution ever on
Speaker 1: artificial intelligence from the entire United Nations. We were leading
Speaker 1: the effort to carry AI forward in a way that
Speaker 1: would be that would conform to our norms and basically
Speaker 1: have them adopted by the world. Then the administration got
Speaker 1: out of that business and said, no, it's just the
Speaker 1: wild West, and it's too important that our companies be
Speaker 1: able to do whatever they want to do whenever they
Speaker 1: want to do it, however they want to do it,
Speaker 1: because the competition with China is what matters the most.
Speaker 1: But who picked up the banner on AI safety and security?
Speaker 1: China did. There was a conference in Shanghai. Many of
Speaker 1: the other AI players from the United Kingdom to Singapore
Speaker 1: or to others were there. And China may be the
Speaker 1: one that's shaping some of these norms and rules, but
Speaker 1: it's liking not to ours. So you know, there's a
Speaker 1: as I've seen it again and again and again, if
Speaker 1: we're disengaged, if we're not leading, then either someone else is,
Speaker 1: and most likely that's going to be China or no
Speaker 1: one else is, and then you're going to have a
Speaker 1: vacuum is filled by bad things before it's filled with
Speaker 1: good things. The flip side of that coin, David is
Speaker 1: We've got to be doing it with allies and partners.
Speaker 1: We need in all of these problem areas to be
Speaker 1: working in concert, whether it's dealing with the problems that
Speaker 1: China poses. Were much stronger when we're allied and partner
Speaker 1: we successfully align countries around the world in dealing with
Speaker 1: some of the challenges the China post economically and on technology.
Speaker 1: When dealing with China loan we're twenty or twenty five
Speaker 1: percent of world GDP. When we're aligned with the Europeans,
Speaker 1: with Japan, Korea, India, we're suddenly fifty or sixty percent.
Speaker 1: That's a lot harder, bigger weight that China has to
Speaker 1: account for. And what I worry now is that as
Speaker 1: a result of so many of the decisions that the
Speaker 1: administration has taken that have alienated allies and partners that
Speaker 1: have treated them worse than our adversaries, we're heading to
Speaker 1: a world where as much as these other countries want
Speaker 1: to work with us, they are looking for ways to
Speaker 1: work around us to make sure that they're never caught
Speaker 1: in this position again where the United States can bully
Speaker 1: them into doing something it wants and they don't want.
Speaker 1: Seventy percent of Germans in a poll the other day
Speaker 1: said said they see the United States as an adversary.
Speaker 1: Sixteen percent of Europeans now see US not as a
Speaker 1: friendly country. Similar numbers when it comes to Canada and Mexico,
Speaker 1: similar numbers when it comes to South Korea, Japan. That's
Speaker 1: not going to be a good world for the United
Speaker 1: States in the first instance. Yes, someone might take a
Speaker 1: knee because they have no choice, but then they're going
Speaker 1: to make sure that they do everything possible not to
Speaker 1: put themselves in that position again where the United States,
Speaker 1: where the tariff can hammer them into doing something that's
Speaker 1: not in their interest. Their limits to that the US
Speaker 1: financial system is so central and so strong that their
Speaker 1: limits to how far you can work away from or
Speaker 1: around the United States. But that's what we're seeing, and
Speaker 1: that's not a world, in my judgment, that's in our interest.
Speaker 2: Last question is what this war and around means for
Speaker 2: President Trump's other ambitions, be that Cuba, be that Greenland,
Speaker 2: continued project in Venezuela. How do you think about what
Speaker 2: this mayriorment not lead to.
Speaker 1: Well, in some ways, Around's the outlier, because these other
Speaker 1: areas that you just mentioned are all within what would
Speaker 1: be our so called sphere of influence. And that's why
Speaker 1: I said, you know before, what we're seeing is at
Speaker 1: least is one of the shifts I think we're seeing
Speaker 1: is the President seems to see the world in terms
Speaker 1: of these spheres of influence, and anything within our sphere
Speaker 1: we should, in one way or another control, And there's
Speaker 1: kind of a very nineteenth century view that actually controlling
Speaker 1: the territory is the most most important thing, never mind
Speaker 1: that there's absolutely no need to do that. I mean,
Speaker 1: in the case of Greenland, simply asking would have gotten
Speaker 1: the right answer in terms of putting more military forces
Speaker 1: there or striking deals on their raw materials. But that
Speaker 1: world is spheres of influence world where the big guys
Speaker 1: on the block, and it is guys in this view,
Speaker 1: get to do what they want in their area. That's
Speaker 1: the way things were for much of the latter part
Speaker 1: of the nineteenth century. But it didn't end well. We
Speaker 1: ultimately end up with World War One. What happens, the
Speaker 1: big countries always want more elbow room, and so they
Speaker 1: rub up against the other the other sphere, and that
Speaker 1: produces conflict the smaller countries within a sphere, they get
Speaker 1: to a point where they don't like it, and they
Speaker 1: band together and try to build their own strength to
Speaker 1: take on the hegemon the people within the country exerting
Speaker 1: that hegemony. Typically it's in non democratic countries. They conclude
Speaker 1: that this is not the life that I want to live,
Speaker 1: and rebel against it. And then if you have a
Speaker 1: system where you've got these these spheres of influence, and
Speaker 1: one of these shares is controlled by a democracy like
Speaker 1: the United States, and the others are controlled by autocracies,
Speaker 1: the autocracies, at the end of the day, can't abide
Speaker 1: the success of democracies because in a world of instantaneous communications,
Speaker 1: their people get to see what's happening and conclude, oh,
Speaker 1: life looks a lot better there, And so they that's
Speaker 1: going to be a constant incentive for them to try
Speaker 1: to take us down, pull us down by meddling in
Speaker 1: our elections, by trying to foment societal conflict. Except so,
Speaker 1: that is not a recipe as I see it, for
Speaker 1: a world of peace, for a world devoid of conflict,
Speaker 1: for a world in which the United States can do
Speaker 1: everything that it needs to do to be successful. One
Speaker 1: last thing is this, As much as I'm concerned about
Speaker 1: the diminishment of our alliances and our partnerships, the moving
Speaker 1: away from enlightened self interest, the move toward shies of influence,
Speaker 1: or some people have talked about building empire. I'm equally concerned, David,
Speaker 1: with another alliance that's been shattered, and that's an internal alliance.
Speaker 1: When we started the twentieth century, there was not a
Speaker 1: major pursuit of science in which the United States led
Speaker 1: the world. By the time we got to the twenty
Speaker 1: first century, there was not a major pursuit in science
Speaker 1: and technology where the United States did not lead the world.
Speaker 1: That didn't happen by accident. It happened because we built
Speaker 1: an alliance between the federal government, universities, research institutions, national labs.
Speaker 1: The amount of GDP that we dedicated to research and
Speaker 1: development went from about one and a half percent after
Speaker 1: World War II to by the time President Biden left office,
Speaker 1: three and a half percent, and that produced extraordinary innovation.
Speaker 1: Coupled with this welcome mat for the best and brightest
Speaker 1: from around the world who would do their studies here,
Speaker 1: Attracted by being with the best and brightest and an
Speaker 1: open system. Then they stayed around and created things that
Speaker 1: made us a leader in all of these fields, which
Speaker 1: redounded to our economy and redounded to our national security.
Speaker 1: As that system is being blown up, I think that
Speaker 1: may be the biggest threat of all to sustaining America's
Speaker 1: place of strength, of leadership and power. I'm gratified that
Speaker 1: the Congress has resisted a number of these cuts that
Speaker 1: the administration has been pushing, but a lot of damage
Speaker 1: has been has been done. You know, when Mark Zuckerberg
Speaker 1: was trying to hire the best AI talent in the country,
Speaker 1: what about nine or ten months ago, taking it from
Speaker 1: other companies in the United States, there was a first
Speaker 1: group of eleven people who he brought on board his ship.
Speaker 1: And I looked at the list of eleven people and
Speaker 1: it was kind of striking, and I checked into it
Speaker 1: to see if I was right, and indeed, yes, every
Speaker 1: single one of those was an immigrant, attracted again by
Speaker 1: the system that we had put in place to attract
Speaker 1: the best and vice to fund the work that they
Speaker 1: were doing to the benefit of our companies, of our people,
Speaker 1: of our country. If we lose that, we lose a lot.
Speaker 2: Mister Secretary, thank you very much.
Speaker 1: Great to be with you.