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Speaker 1: Welcome to Stuff to Blow your Mind from how Stuff

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Speaker 1: Works dot com. Hey, welcome to Stuff to Blow your Mind.

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Speaker 1: My name is Robert Lamb and I'm Joe McCormick and Robert.

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Speaker 1: I got a question for you, Kenny. Have you ever

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Speaker 1: wondered if it's possible to create a piece of digital information,

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Speaker 1: like a computer file, a bit of computer code, a

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Speaker 1: computer virus that could literally kill or injure somebody. Oh,

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Speaker 1: of course I have. I mean having watched and enjoyed

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Speaker 1: such films as The Ring, as Video Drone, like, just

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Speaker 1: the idea of there being some sort of in these

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Speaker 1: cases media, But we can easily extrapolate that to to

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Speaker 1: digital media or just digital information. You can't help but think,

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Speaker 1: is there is there something like that that could exist

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Speaker 1: that would have a devastating or even lethal effect on

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Speaker 1: anyone who interacted with it? Yeah, video file, audio file,

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Speaker 1: computer program, something that comes out of the digital interface

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Speaker 1: and actually harms you. Well, it's not hard to see

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Speaker 1: how you could harm somebody indirectly with something like that.

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Speaker 1: One example would be a computer virus that takes down

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Speaker 1: a lot of systems or causes widespread economic damage. That's

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Speaker 1: been happening since the eighties as well discussed. Yeah, certainly so.

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Speaker 1: Widespread economic damage means people lose their jobs, and statistically

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Speaker 1: we know that that will indirectly lead to some number

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Speaker 1: of deaths above the mean mortality rate. But I mean

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Speaker 1: something more direct obviously, you know, I'm talking about the

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Speaker 1: cyborg ninja kind of stuff, But take away the cyborg ninja,

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Speaker 1: I'm not talking about robot assassins or at least personal

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Speaker 1: data like that's been another big one to write. I've

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Speaker 1: seen accounts where people have said this individual is potentially

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Speaker 1: suicidal over the leakage of the images, video or personal information. Sure,

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Speaker 1: that's the devastating effect of digital gossip. But couldn't malicious

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Speaker 1: hacker injured or assassinate somebody just with a digital file

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Speaker 1: directly a piece of computer code video? Yeah, I mean,

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Speaker 1: this is of course an increasingly important consideration, you know,

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Speaker 1: because we just look at all the things around us

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Speaker 1: that are becoming connected to the Internet that you know,

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Speaker 1: years ago, I would have thought, why would I need my,

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Speaker 1: uh let's say, my thermostat to be connected to the internet.

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Speaker 1: It seems crazy, and yet here I am in the future.

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Speaker 1: Especially during the cold months, I enjoyed waking up grabbing

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Speaker 1: my phone and adjusting the thermostat, warming up the house.

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Speaker 1: And at the same time, I'm thinking, is this a

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Speaker 1: little crazy that this electric you know, gas powered fire

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Speaker 1: in my home is now controlled by a device that

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Speaker 1: is connected to the internet and all the horrors of

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Speaker 1: the Internet. I end up just having to like stick,

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Speaker 1: you know, push that out of my brain and just

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Speaker 1: focus on the fact, Oh I can before I get

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Speaker 1: out of bed, I can, I can make it a

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Speaker 1: little warmer. Now. Fortunately, there are limits to what you're

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Speaker 1: amostatic can do. Right, You're not worried about some crazy

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Speaker 1: kid on four Chan deciding that he wants to cook

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Speaker 1: you alive and turning your house thermostat up to five

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Speaker 1: hundred degrees. But the more we think about a smart house,

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Speaker 1: like there was some horrible sci fi movie that came

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Speaker 1: out years and years ago, and it had a smart

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Speaker 1: house that where the robot you know, goes completely how

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Speaker 1: on everybody, and it had like a terminator arm that

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Speaker 1: hangs from the ceiling and like travels around the house. Uh. I,

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Speaker 1: As I keep thinking back to that, the more interconnected

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Speaker 1: our homes become, and now that you know, the whole

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Speaker 1: idea of like your house becoming self aware and killing

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Speaker 1: you is one thing. But yeah, just the idea that

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Speaker 1: all these things are connected, at least in a small way,

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Speaker 1: to everyone else in the world, it can be a

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Speaker 1: little much. This was explored to great effect in the

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Speaker 1: wonderful Stephen King movie Maximum Overdrive. I'm just kidding, not

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Speaker 1: not such a great movie, but the premises all our

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Speaker 1: machines turn against us, right, our consumer technology, from truck

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Speaker 1: to household appliances start trying to kill us. I think

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Speaker 1: in the movie it's aliens, right, I can't remember in

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Speaker 1: the movie. In the book, I mean the short story rather,

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Speaker 1: it was delightfully vague. Um. And then of course Maximum

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Speaker 1: Overdrive the film as its own experience. But I guarantee

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Speaker 1: you there's got to be a script out there where

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Speaker 1: someone has taken Maximum Overdrive, or at least trucks the

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Speaker 1: original story and upgraded it to the you know, the

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Speaker 1: so called Internet of things. Yeah, and the most obvious

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Speaker 1: analogy from the movie is going to be autonomous vehicles.

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Speaker 1: Autonomous vehicles if have if they have the wrong security exploits,

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Speaker 1: if people can manipulate them in the wrong ways, it's

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Speaker 1: not hard at all to see how they can be deadly.

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Speaker 1: But I want to get even more insidious about devices

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Speaker 1: that we personally hold in our hands and used to

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Speaker 1: mediate our relationship with regular information like text and video.

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Speaker 1: And you know ideas. I've got an archived Wired magazine

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Speaker 1: article enti idled hackers assault epilepsy patients via computer and

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Speaker 1: this is from March two thousand eight. And what happened

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Speaker 1: in this uh incident is that somebody attacked an epilepsy

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Speaker 1: support message board hosted by a group called the Epilepsy Foundation.

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Speaker 1: And just to read a quote about what happened quote,

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Speaker 1: the incident, possibly the first computer attack to inflict physical

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Speaker 1: harm on the victims, began Saturday, March twenty two, when

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Speaker 1: attackers used a script to post hundreds of messages embedded

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Speaker 1: with flashing, animated gifts. The attackers turned to a more

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Speaker 1: effective tactic on Sunday, injecting JavaScript into some posts that

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Speaker 1: redirected users browsers to a page with a more complex

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Speaker 1: image designed to trigger seizures in both photosensitive and pattern

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Speaker 1: sensitive epileptics. And then later in the article they note

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Speaker 1: and this is worth noting, epilepsy effects about fifty million

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Speaker 1: people worldwide, but only about three percent of those people

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Speaker 1: are photosensitive, meaning you've often heard, you know, the old

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Speaker 1: Pokemon story that flashing lights or flashing images can cause

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Speaker 1: seizures and people with epilepsy. That is true for some

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Speaker 1: people with epilepsy, but not all. So the risk here

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Speaker 1: is not necessarily like a wide attack where you just

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Speaker 1: end up hitting that small percentage of people who are affected.

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Speaker 1: But what have you targeted it after a specific individual?

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Speaker 1: And this is apparently happened. Now we have this story

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Speaker 1: from twenty sixteen where there's an American journalist named Kurt

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Speaker 1: Aikenwald who was known publicly to have photosensitive epilepsy. And

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Speaker 1: during the election, so he's a political journalist and of

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Speaker 1: course being a political journalist you make enemies, and somebody

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Speaker 1: who did not like his political coverage sent him a

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Speaker 1: series of tweets with strobing light images. Uh and allegedly

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Speaker 1: this caused a seizure. And so he is now a

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Speaker 1: witnessed in a criminal prosecution against these digital attackers who

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Speaker 1: attacked his physical body. And we're able to cause a

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Speaker 1: physical injury with just information through an interface. It's interesting

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Speaker 1: that it took place on Twitter too, because I mean,

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Speaker 1: Twitter is known to be this place where like a

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Speaker 1: lot of the Internet where where people feel like they

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Speaker 1: can be just as nasty and awful as they possibly

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Speaker 1: can without any repercussions. And and here we see a

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Speaker 1: situation where it ends up transcending nearly the hurting of

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Speaker 1: feelings or or psychological damage, but actual physical attack. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: But while almost anybody can be psychologically harmed by information

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Speaker 1: received through an interface, it's really difficult in general to

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Speaker 1: physically harm somebody with information received through a standard you know,

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Speaker 1: digital media interface. It's really rare. Like, there is this

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Speaker 1: one specific exploit in the brains of three percent of

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Speaker 1: people or so who have epilepsy. That means that certain

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Speaker 1: types of light images projected on a screen can cause

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Speaker 1: physical injury or it can trigger a seizure. Not everybody's epileptic, not,

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Speaker 1: not all people with epilepsy have this condition, so it's

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Speaker 1: it's pretty rare. But this is one neurological vulnerability to

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Speaker 1: information based weapons built right into some of our brains.

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Speaker 1: Most of the time, for most people, the brain is

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Speaker 1: very secure, right, It's it's hard to cause direct injury

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Speaker 1: to somebody's body, or steal their innermost secrets, or do

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Speaker 1: anything like that with information interfaces alone. But today, we

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Speaker 1: want to talk about how that state of affairs is

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Speaker 1: very likely changing, and it may be changing very soon,

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Speaker 1: because we want to talk about the coming age of

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Speaker 1: neuro security. And the crazy thing here is that we're

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Speaker 1: not talking about something that may come to pass. We're

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Speaker 1: talking about, as you'll see, as we discussed this further,

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Speaker 1: this is something that is definitely going to happen, that

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Speaker 1: needs to happen, an inevitable next step. Yeah, and unless

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Speaker 1: basically life or technological progress on Earth stops right now.

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Speaker 1: This is not a singularity issue. This is not This

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Speaker 1: is a very near future concern, yes, and and very

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Speaker 1: very plausible based on things that we already have today.

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Speaker 1: So there are several different things that you could call

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Speaker 1: neuro security. One thing would be using neuroscience principles in

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Speaker 1: the general field of security, right protecting your borders with

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Speaker 1: f m r I brain scanners during border stop interrogations

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Speaker 1: or something right picking up say, for instance, if you

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Speaker 1: could use this technology to pick up on like extreme

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Speaker 1: levels of nervousness that might need to be inspected with

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Speaker 1: additional questions, or if it was even possible to tell

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Speaker 1: that there was some sort of malicious intent or stocking

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Speaker 1: up your t s A. The ranks of your t

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Speaker 1: s A agents with scanners. I mean, like from the

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Speaker 1: movie Scanners Psychic Psychic t s A. Okay, yes, it's

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Speaker 1: basically scanner cops, the sequel to My God. You're right,

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Speaker 1: scanner cops. Can you imagine the faces they make while

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Speaker 1: you're standing in line? But that make flying better because

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Speaker 1: it makes it funnier or worse because it'd be even creepier.

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Speaker 1: Probably creepy, I'm guessing creepy. Sorry, Well, that's an interesting subject,

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Speaker 1: but a subject for a different day. Today, we're talking

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Speaker 1: about the security of our biological information systems, essentially applying

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Speaker 1: computer cybersecurity principles to your brain and your nervous system. Now,

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Speaker 1: you might be asking, that sounds ridiculous. Why would you

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Speaker 1: ever talk about that? I mean, that's that's just such

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Speaker 1: a weird sci fi scenario. Nothing like that's ever gonna happen,

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Speaker 1: right right, I mean to bring up scanners again. It

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Speaker 1: just makes me think of the first Scanners movie that

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Speaker 1: at the time I thought ridiculous moment where the scanners

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Speaker 1: are interfacing with the computer with their brain, and that

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Speaker 1: threw me completely out of the movie because I'm because

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Speaker 1: I'm like, all right, you you. I'm on board with

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Speaker 1: brain to brain the psychic connections, but you're throwing me

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Speaker 1: off when I'm trying to imagine a brain to machine

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Speaker 1: connection that's just purely based on psychic power. It does

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Speaker 1: seem to violate the magic of the film, right, It

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Speaker 1: gets it gets the mythology out of whack because there's

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Speaker 1: a scene in the movie Scanners where one of the

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Speaker 1: scanners he gets on a telephone and he calls into

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Speaker 1: a computer system and he reads the mind of the

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Speaker 1: computer system. Yeah, and he wasn't even making facts machine

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Speaker 1: noises with his mouth. That that I would have been

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Speaker 1: on board with, but yeah, not the way Cronenberg decided

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Speaker 1: to to display it. Michael Ironside could have sold those

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Speaker 1: facts machine noises with his mouth, but not the guy

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Speaker 1: they had play in the Here. So we're going to

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Speaker 1: talk about a particular study that I'll get to a

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Speaker 1: couple different times in this episode. But actually it might

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Speaker 1: be wrong to call it a study because it's really

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Speaker 1: more an attempt at definitions, right, trying to lay out

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Speaker 1: what the concept of neuro security would be and what

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Speaker 1: are some things we need to watch out for. And

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Speaker 1: so this was published in two thousand nine in the

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Speaker 1: journal Neurosurgical Focus. It's called neuro Security, Security and Privacy

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Speaker 1: for Neural Devices from Tamara Dinning, Yoki Matsuka, and tada

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Speaker 1: Yoshi Kono. So the authors of this paper note that

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Speaker 1: there are three primary goals in computer security. You've got confidentiality, integrity,

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Speaker 1: and availability. So confidentiality means what you think it does.

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Speaker 1: It means an attacker of your computer system should not

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Speaker 1: be able to exploit the device to learn or expose

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Speaker 1: private information. Standard example would be hacker steals your bank

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Speaker 1: account info, or your private emails or your private photos. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: these are essentially externalizations of my private thoughts, and I

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Speaker 1: don't want anyone to have access to either exactly now.

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Speaker 1: The next one was integrity. Integrity means that an attacker

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Speaker 1: should not be able to quote change device settings or

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Speaker 1: initiate unauthorized operations. In other words, the attackers should not

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Speaker 1: be able to use this device whatever it is, computer,

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Speaker 1: cell phone, anything like that. Should not be able to

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Speaker 1: use it for their own purposes or change what the

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Speaker 1: device does for the primary user. An example here might

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Speaker 1: be that a hacker could take over your computer to

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Speaker 1: turn it into a bot. That's part of a bot

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Speaker 1: net to have a d D O S attack against

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Speaker 1: some website. Maybe they had a bad meal at Olive Garden.

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Speaker 1: They want to take down the Olive Garden homepage, so

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Speaker 1: they hijack your computer and make your computer one of

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Speaker 1: many computers that bombard Olive Garden with with requests to

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Speaker 1: load the page. Okay, and obviously I would not want

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Speaker 1: that to happen in my brain, either to change the

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Speaker 1: settings on my brain and ultimately change my behavior, change

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Speaker 1: my motivations, like even if it's done in a very

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Speaker 1: slap dash awkward way, like you know, hands out of

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Speaker 1: my brains exactly. So the last one is availability. Availability

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Speaker 1: means that the attackers should not be able to destroy

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Speaker 1: or disable the device or do anything that would render

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Speaker 1: it unavailable to the user. Classic example, hackered deletes all

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Speaker 1: your files or alters the computer's boot procedures so that

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Speaker 1: it won't load your operating system on startup and it

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Speaker 1: just becomes useless. Likewise, I don't want anyone to strategically

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Speaker 1: remove memories from my brain, to wipe my memories from

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Speaker 1: my brain, or to even temporarily deactivate certain cognitive centers

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Speaker 1: or networks in my brain. Yeah. Now, in these examples

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Speaker 1: you're talking about, you're talking about sort of whole brain functionality,

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Speaker 1: but there could be dire consequences for much lower stakes questions.

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Speaker 1: Somebody might not necessarily be able to disable your entire brain.

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Speaker 1: But in a minute, we're going to talk about some

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Speaker 1: particular types of neuro technology. And in many of these cases,

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Speaker 1: for example, just disabling your neuro technology could have devastating

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Speaker 1: consequences for you. They wouldn't have to be able to

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Speaker 1: turn off your brain. They might just be able to

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Speaker 1: turn off your neural implant at a time and place

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Speaker 1: that would make you very vulnerable or could hurt you.

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Speaker 1: I experienced something like this the the weekend. I had

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Speaker 1: to drive to a major phone service providers m brick

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Speaker 1: and mortar store that I'd never been to before, and

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Speaker 1: I had to do it without a functional phone. So

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Speaker 1: I had managed I ended up printing out the wrong

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Speaker 1: directions map quest or you know whatever map program I

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Speaker 1: I used. It's amazing how dependently could come. Yeah, so

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Speaker 1: in a way, it was it was like a part

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Speaker 1: of my brain was not functioning because the phone was

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Speaker 1: not functioning. You have offloaded part of your traditional capability

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Speaker 1: something maybe ten or fifteen years ago, you would have

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Speaker 1: probably had better internal mechanisms for locating a store you

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Speaker 1: needed to get to. Uh, And now you've said, well,

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Speaker 1: I don't have to worry about that anymore. That's in

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Speaker 1: this peripheral that I used to supplement my brain. But

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Speaker 1: if the peripheral breaks, you're you're messed up. Now. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: and that is technology that exists, you know, quite literally,

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Speaker 1: you know, arms distance away from the brain. But the

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Speaker 1: thing is we're seeing the technology creep increasingly closer to

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Speaker 1: the brain. And then what happens when that stuff goes

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Speaker 1: offline or becomes compromised. So to quote the authors of

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Speaker 1: the study I mentioned, they say, quote, we define neuro

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Speaker 1: security as the protection of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of

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Speaker 1: neural devices from malicious parties, with the goal of preserving

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Speaker 1: the safety of a person's neural mechanisms, neural computation, and

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Speaker 1: free will. Now we're going to look directly at some

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Speaker 1: of the neural technologies that might be vulnerable to security

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Speaker 1: concerns like this. But before we do that, I think

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Speaker 1: we should look more broadly at the idea of information security,

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Speaker 1: because if you're not all that familiar with the history

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Speaker 1: of the Internet. It might be kind of puzzling to you, like,

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Speaker 1: why is the Internet so horrible in terms of security?

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Speaker 1: We we've got this global thing, what would you even

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Speaker 1: call it? Would you call it a technology? We've got

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Speaker 1: this global information civilization that is just terrible. It is

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Speaker 1: just terrible in terms of security. There there is not

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Speaker 1: an overarching strategy to keep everything safe. I keep thinking

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Speaker 1: of it like the cat's cradle that you create with

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Speaker 1: the with the length of string and your fingers, and you,

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Speaker 1: you know, you interweave your fingers and you create a

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Speaker 1: pattern so that the Internet in this case, it's not

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Speaker 1: the string, it's not the fingers. It couldn't exist this

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Speaker 1: without the string and the fingers. It's ultimately that shape.

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Speaker 1: You know. That's kind of a loose way I think

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Speaker 1: about it. Well, maybe we should take a quick break

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Speaker 1: and when we get back, we can look at how

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Speaker 1: the Internet ended up becoming so vulnerable to security concerns.

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Speaker 1: All right, we're back, So, yes, how did the Internet

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Speaker 1: end up becoming so vulnerable? Now? This is on one

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Speaker 1: thing to take me on a trip on fear and

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Speaker 1: paranoia memory lane, And I'll try and keep this this

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Speaker 1: fun too. I guess if if you're a fan of

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Speaker 1: like Halt and catch fire, it's kind of fun to

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Speaker 1: think of it in those terms. But yeah, I mean,

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Speaker 1: on one hand, it's an easy question to ask because

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Speaker 1: we live in a day where we have ransomware attacks,

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Speaker 1: identity theft, docsining, invasion of privacy. But on the other hand,

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Speaker 1: so many of us were born into this system of

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Speaker 1: the internet, or you know, or we if you're like me,

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Speaker 1: you entered into it during college, and it's easy to

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Speaker 1: just assume that the systems that run the world and

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Speaker 1: the organizations that were in the world haven't figured out

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Speaker 1: to some extent. You know, you expect the bank to

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Speaker 1: be secure, You expect some security to to be in place.

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Speaker 1: There are some rather significant security options to be in place,

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Speaker 1: so you would assume that the the virtual bank would

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Speaker 1: be much the same. Right if you were to just

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Speaker 1: find out that there are human sized holes in the

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Speaker 1: bank vault that keeps your money, that would be rather surprising.

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Speaker 1: It's not surprising at all to find out that there

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Speaker 1: are hacker sized holes in the digital systems that protect

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Speaker 1: your private information. I mean, how many times now if

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Speaker 1: we had the story about some online retailer or maybe

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Speaker 1: even physical retailer that you did business with and they

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Speaker 1: have your credit card number. They got hacked, and now

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Speaker 1: your information belongs to somebody out there and you have

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Speaker 1: to get a new credit card or something like that. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: and I think we can all relate to that kind

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Speaker 1: of anxiety. Yeah. Now, I mentioned earlier that that so

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Speaker 1: many of us were a number of our listeners here

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Speaker 1: were born into the Internet age. So I'm going to

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Speaker 1: try and put this in turn, like the origins of

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Speaker 1: the Internet, in terms of something that maybe more of

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Speaker 1: us could understand, but then not maybe not the younger people,

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Speaker 1: but for a number of you out there. I bet

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Speaker 1: you can remember the day that your mom joined Facebook.

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Speaker 1: So you remember the realization that oh crap, this this

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Speaker 1: internet thing, this this really is for everyone. It's that

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Speaker 1: horrible moment where something that you and your friends do

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Speaker 1: online that you think of as not real life comes

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Speaker 1: crashing into real life and you realize like, ohhh, this

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Speaker 1: is connected to the same universe where I live. Yeah, yeah,

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Speaker 1: I remember. There was like a sharp contrast, certainly between

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Speaker 1: the MySpace aide. Remember what it felt like to be

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Speaker 1: on my Space was totally different than the early stages

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Speaker 1: of Facebook, which was, which was completely different from what

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Speaker 1: Facebook would become in terms of you know, just earlier

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Speaker 1: models just felt like, oh, I'm just surrounded by like

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Speaker 1: minded people who share my my same sort of attitude

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Speaker 1: on life and and values about what's important. And granted,

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Speaker 1: there's there was already a certain amount of bubble construction there,

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Speaker 1: but but yeah, we we just we we had expectations

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Speaker 1: about what this this technology was and who this technology

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Speaker 1: was for, And the same situation really applies to the

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Speaker 1: Internet as a whole. It's architects did not build it

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Speaker 1: from the ground up as a global system for the masses,

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Speaker 1: a cat's cradle weaved around the fingers of so many computers. No,

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Speaker 1: they designed it as an online community for a few

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Speaker 1: dozen researchers. It was a research project. It was like, Hey,

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Speaker 1: we've got these computers at different universities and institutions. What

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Speaker 1: if we could link them together so they could trade information?

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Speaker 1: Would that be weird? I don't think that. Maybe some

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Speaker 1: people did, but it doesn't seem like generally they predicted

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Speaker 1: that this would become a hub of commerce and recreation

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Speaker 1: for everybody on the planet. Yeah, I mean, it's you

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Speaker 1: can you can't help, but compare it to say empires, right,

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Speaker 1: can you imagine you have uh, you know Genghis Khan

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Speaker 1: and he's sitting around and uh and they're saying, hey, Genghis,

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Speaker 1: what's up? And he said, oh, not much. I got

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Speaker 1: this idea though, I'm going to call it the Mongol Empire. Huh.

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Speaker 1: And this is how it's gonna work. This is how

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Speaker 1: we're gonna incorporate trade and the and this is how

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Speaker 1: we're gonna value different religions. And there was whoa, you

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Speaker 1: haven't even none of this stuff is even conquered yet.

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Speaker 1: What are you talking about, like the people who found

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Speaker 1: these these major movements and organizations? Like how often is

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Speaker 1: the complete structure baked into the original design? Almost never?

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Speaker 1: Each step is improvised. So you've got to make decisions

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Speaker 1: about design. You make design decisions on the fly as

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Speaker 1: issues come up. And the Internet was sort of the

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Speaker 1: same way. Yeah, you gotta leave it to Kubla to

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Speaker 1: figure out the rest. So um, there's a wonderful Washington

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Speaker 1: Post article that that that goes into this in depth.

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Speaker 1: It's titled a Flaw in the Design and uh And

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Speaker 1: I'll include a link to this on the landing page

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Speaker 1: for this episode it's Stuff to Blow your Mind dot com.

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Speaker 1: In the article, the author speaks with such Internet forefathers

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Speaker 1: as M. I. T scientists David D. Clark, David H. Crocker,

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Speaker 1: and Vinton G. Surf. They point out that they thought

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Speaker 1: they could simply exclude untrustworthy people. Is that great, We'll

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Speaker 1: just we'll just keep the security risks off of the Internet. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: So when they thought about security, and they did think

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Speaker 1: a little bit about security, they thought about it mainly

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Speaker 1: in terms of protecting the system from outside intruders or

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Speaker 1: military threats. So there's a quonderful quote in this article

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Speaker 1: from Surf, and he says, quote, we didn't focus on

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Speaker 1: how you could wreck this system intentionally. You could argue

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Speaker 1: with hindsight that we should have, but getting this thing

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Speaker 1: to work at all was non trivial. They dealt with

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Speaker 1: problems as they arose, and the problems then we're making

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Speaker 1: it work, and now this is going to have some

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Speaker 1: very interesting parallels once we start talking about neurotechnology again.

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Speaker 1: They also point out that at the time there really

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Speaker 1: wasn't much of value in the Internet. Uh. The analogy

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Speaker 1: they make again to the bank people break into banks

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Speaker 1: despite the security because or the attempt to break in

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Speaker 1: because there's money there, because there's something of value, right,

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Speaker 1: You wouldn't break into a bank vault or you know,

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Speaker 1: risk prison time for a bank vault that was full

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Speaker 1: of what transcripts of messages back and forth between academics. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: I mean, unless you're just in it for the pure

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Speaker 1: artistry of it. But that rarely seems to be the

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Speaker 1: case outside of like a Hollywood movie. But then, of course,

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Speaker 1: in the early days of computers, you did start actually

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Speaker 1: encountering security threats. Yeah. The big one that really changed

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Speaker 1: everything was the Morris worm attack. Crashed thousands of machines,

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Speaker 1: It got millions of dollars in damage, and it helped us.

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Speaker 1: You're in the multibillion dollar computer security business. Bless the

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Speaker 1: maker and his water. Yeah, I mean at this point

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Speaker 1: that the party was over. Oh by the way. Interestingly enough,

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Speaker 1: the article also points out that the big idea behind

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Speaker 1: the Internet is at least partially attributed to American engineer

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Speaker 1: Paul Barron, who worked for the Rand Corporation at the time,

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Speaker 1: and he saw the need for a communication system that

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Speaker 1: would function after a nuclear at strike on the United

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Speaker 1: States that would help us with eight efforts help us

430
00:24:39,119 --> 00:24:44,000
Speaker 1: preserve democratic governance and even enable a counter strike, all

431
00:24:44,040 --> 00:24:47,240
Speaker 1: in order to help quote the survivors of the Holocaust

432
00:24:47,480 --> 00:24:54,680
Speaker 1: to shuck their ashes and reconstruct the economy swiftly. What yeah, um,

433
00:24:54,720 --> 00:25:00,000
Speaker 1: I mean that bringing this Cold War mentality to the Internet. Uh,

434
00:25:00,560 --> 00:25:05,880
Speaker 1: it's so crazy thinking about the way contextual frames completely

435
00:25:06,040 --> 00:25:09,680
Speaker 1: shift around the technologies that we create. Yeah. And the

436
00:25:09,760 --> 00:25:14,520
Speaker 1: crazy thing too is that every time there's a headline about, say,

437
00:25:14,560 --> 00:25:18,440
Speaker 1: meddling in elections with the you know, with with various

438
00:25:18,640 --> 00:25:24,080
Speaker 1: online initiatives, or hacking initiatives, or the recent ransomware attack,

439
00:25:24,560 --> 00:25:27,240
Speaker 1: it makes me realize, well, this is this is what

440
00:25:27,400 --> 00:25:30,320
Speaker 1: cyber war looks like. This is this is the shape

441
00:25:30,680 --> 00:25:34,040
Speaker 1: of global cyber warfare. And you look back and here's

442
00:25:34,040 --> 00:25:36,320
Speaker 1: this guy dreaming of the The Internet is this thing

443
00:25:36,960 --> 00:25:40,040
Speaker 1: outside of war, this thing that's just a communication system.

444
00:25:40,040 --> 00:25:44,720
Speaker 1: It helps rebound from assaults by by various estates. But

445
00:25:44,800 --> 00:25:48,200
Speaker 1: it's also this is creating the Internet in the context

446
00:25:48,200 --> 00:25:51,119
Speaker 1: of thinking about international warfare, but thinking about it in

447
00:25:51,200 --> 00:25:56,800
Speaker 1: terms of overt frontal warfare, missile bombardments and troop advancements

448
00:25:56,800 --> 00:25:59,440
Speaker 1: and all the traditional types of war people knew about,

449
00:26:00,280 --> 00:26:04,320
Speaker 1: not realizing that the Internet would enable a state of

450
00:26:04,760 --> 00:26:09,320
Speaker 1: constant covert war between great powers that would just be

451
00:26:10,200 --> 00:26:16,040
Speaker 1: constantly secretly or semi secretly undermining one another. Yeah, and

452
00:26:16,040 --> 00:26:17,959
Speaker 1: there would the kind of this gray area about how

453
00:26:18,080 --> 00:26:19,840
Speaker 1: how you respond? How do you how do you react?

454
00:26:19,840 --> 00:26:22,240
Speaker 1: How does what are the rules of cyber warfare? And

455
00:26:22,280 --> 00:26:26,080
Speaker 1: people still haven't figured that out. So that Washington Post

456
00:26:26,200 --> 00:26:29,159
Speaker 1: article is a great exploration of Internet security history. But

457
00:26:29,240 --> 00:26:32,000
Speaker 1: the basic answer to our initial question is this, you know,

458
00:26:32,040 --> 00:26:34,320
Speaker 1: why is the Internet when of the Internet end up

459
00:26:34,320 --> 00:26:36,800
Speaker 1: becoming so vulnerable? It's because the Internet wasn't built to

460
00:26:36,840 --> 00:26:40,239
Speaker 1: be secure. All security concerns are an add on an

461
00:26:40,320 --> 00:26:45,240
Speaker 1: aftermarket edition a patch. Security is always difficult, especially when

462
00:26:45,240 --> 00:26:48,359
Speaker 1: it wasn't baked into the design and and and with

463
00:26:48,440 --> 00:26:51,320
Speaker 1: these systems that we're talking about, it almost never is.

464
00:26:51,920 --> 00:26:54,760
Speaker 1: We see the same situation occurring with with some of

465
00:26:54,800 --> 00:26:59,159
Speaker 1: the gadgets and implants and proposed neural technologies we're going

466
00:26:59,200 --> 00:27:02,120
Speaker 1: to discuss, because a primary goal ends up to being

467
00:27:02,160 --> 00:27:05,479
Speaker 1: what to aid the patient to somehow to achieve the

468
00:27:05,520 --> 00:27:08,240
Speaker 1: goal of the device or the technology. Right, if you're

469
00:27:08,320 --> 00:27:13,800
Speaker 1: designing neurotechnology to help regain some lost functionality and somebody

470
00:27:13,840 --> 00:27:16,560
Speaker 1: with a brain injury or a body injury, or to

471
00:27:16,800 --> 00:27:20,199
Speaker 1: cure some kind of neurodegenerative disease, or at least offset

472
00:27:20,280 --> 00:27:24,560
Speaker 1: it's negative effects. Security. I mean, that's just such a

473
00:27:24,600 --> 00:27:28,200
Speaker 1: far down the road concern. You're you're worried about fixing

474
00:27:28,240 --> 00:27:32,000
Speaker 1: people's problems and helping their lives. That's what you're worried about.

475
00:27:32,359 --> 00:27:34,040
Speaker 1: And it's the same thing you talked about with the

476
00:27:34,080 --> 00:27:37,760
Speaker 1: Internet earlier, that you know, people were just wondering if

477
00:27:37,760 --> 00:27:40,680
Speaker 1: they could make it work. Security is so far down

478
00:27:40,720 --> 00:27:45,000
Speaker 1: the list of concerns. Yeah again, security becomes this add on.

479
00:27:45,080 --> 00:27:48,040
Speaker 1: It's this thing that you you you end up implementing

480
00:27:48,160 --> 00:27:53,199
Speaker 1: or worrying about once the threat becomes more apparent. Oh yeah, security,

481
00:27:53,800 --> 00:27:56,520
Speaker 1: not not in the kool aid man sense of oh yeah,

482
00:27:56,560 --> 00:27:59,199
Speaker 1: but like the oh yeah, oh yeah, this there's a

483
00:27:59,240 --> 00:28:01,320
Speaker 1: man sized hole in the wall. We need to do

484
00:28:01,400 --> 00:28:03,639
Speaker 1: something about this. So I want to go back to

485
00:28:03,680 --> 00:28:06,959
Speaker 1: that paper I mentioned earlier in Neurosurgical Focus from two

486
00:28:07,000 --> 00:28:10,160
Speaker 1: thousand nine, where they try to lay out a framework

487
00:28:10,240 --> 00:28:14,399
Speaker 1: for approaching the topic of neuro security. And so the

488
00:28:14,440 --> 00:28:18,439
Speaker 1: authors make the point that neurotechnology is becoming more effective

489
00:28:19,240 --> 00:28:21,880
Speaker 1: and one of the things that we can draw out

490
00:28:21,920 --> 00:28:25,000
Speaker 1: from this is that as it becomes more effective, it's

491
00:28:25,000 --> 00:28:28,200
Speaker 1: going to become more useful, And as it becomes more useful,

492
00:28:28,440 --> 00:28:31,960
Speaker 1: it's going to become more widespread. And is it becomes

493
00:28:31,960 --> 00:28:35,200
Speaker 1: more widespread, it will be more fully integrated into our

494
00:28:35,200 --> 00:28:37,920
Speaker 1: bodies and our lives. And so there are a lot

495
00:28:37,920 --> 00:28:42,080
Speaker 1: of current and potential uses of neurotechnology. One thing would

496
00:28:42,080 --> 00:28:46,520
Speaker 1: be treating brain disorders. Another thing might be making paralyzed

497
00:28:46,560 --> 00:28:50,760
Speaker 1: limbs usable again, or allowing users to control robotic limbs

498
00:28:50,760 --> 00:28:55,080
Speaker 1: with thoughts alone. One thing might be remote controlling robots

499
00:28:55,120 --> 00:28:58,120
Speaker 1: with thoughts. That's a fun one. Another one might be

500
00:28:58,400 --> 00:29:03,000
Speaker 1: enhancing human cognitant of capacity. So up until the present,

501
00:29:03,600 --> 00:29:06,920
Speaker 1: most research into the safety of neurotechnology is focused on

502
00:29:07,000 --> 00:29:11,600
Speaker 1: making sure the device itself doesn't hurt you when it's

503
00:29:11,640 --> 00:29:15,479
Speaker 1: functioning the way it's supposed to write. Safety concerns are

504
00:29:15,520 --> 00:29:19,320
Speaker 1: about making sure that the intended use of the neuro

505
00:29:19,360 --> 00:29:22,560
Speaker 1: technology is safe. And this makes sense because back in

506
00:29:22,600 --> 00:29:24,800
Speaker 1: two thousand nine, at the time this paper was published,

507
00:29:24,960 --> 00:29:28,440
Speaker 1: most of these devices were number one, contained in lab environments,

508
00:29:28,480 --> 00:29:30,440
Speaker 1: you know, they're just not getting out into the wild

509
00:29:30,560 --> 00:29:34,360
Speaker 1: very much. And number two were self contained systems, meaning

510
00:29:34,440 --> 00:29:38,680
Speaker 1: that they had very little limited transaction with the other

511
00:29:38,840 --> 00:29:42,680
Speaker 1: information systems in the outside world. Back when you had

512
00:29:42,720 --> 00:29:46,040
Speaker 1: an Apple two and no Internet connection, you're probably not

513
00:29:46,040 --> 00:29:47,960
Speaker 1: going to get a virus, right unless you're one of

514
00:29:48,000 --> 00:29:51,440
Speaker 1: the very few unlucky people to get handed and infected

515
00:29:51,480 --> 00:29:53,800
Speaker 1: floppy disk and you stick it into your disk drive.

516
00:29:54,560 --> 00:29:57,920
Speaker 1: Of course, once you start connecting your computers to the Internet,

517
00:29:58,160 --> 00:30:02,240
Speaker 1: your security vulnerability goes way up. Uh. And here's a

518
00:30:02,280 --> 00:30:07,480
Speaker 1: cybersecurity mantraid posit for you. The more your device plays outdoors,

519
00:30:07,880 --> 00:30:12,280
Speaker 1: the more vulnerable it is. Yeah. And this means that

520
00:30:12,400 --> 00:30:15,080
Speaker 1: as a device gets connected to the Internet, interacts with

521
00:30:15,120 --> 00:30:19,600
Speaker 1: a larger number of devices, adds wireless capabilities, all all

522
00:30:19,640 --> 00:30:22,080
Speaker 1: those things, there are more ways for it to be

523
00:30:22,120 --> 00:30:27,040
Speaker 1: compromised by malicious adversaries. And as devices become more useful

524
00:30:27,080 --> 00:30:30,080
Speaker 1: and more widely adopted, they tend to play outdoors more

525
00:30:30,080 --> 00:30:32,640
Speaker 1: and more. If and so, what the authors are saying

526
00:30:32,720 --> 00:30:35,840
Speaker 1: is that if we don't design robust security features in

527
00:30:35,880 --> 00:30:38,440
Speaker 1: them from the get go, we could end up with

528
00:30:38,560 --> 00:30:41,680
Speaker 1: neurotech that works like the Internet we just talked about,

529
00:30:41,760 --> 00:30:45,320
Speaker 1: where it's it's an ad hoc system of security fixes

530
00:30:45,360 --> 00:30:50,120
Speaker 1: It's this constant race between security updates and malicious hackers,

531
00:30:50,400 --> 00:30:52,720
Speaker 1: and every time the bad guys pull ahead, they have

532
00:30:52,760 --> 00:30:56,120
Speaker 1: the ability to bring a little taste of doom with them,

533
00:30:56,720 --> 00:30:59,360
Speaker 1: except this time the target isn't your computer or even

534
00:30:59,480 --> 00:31:03,400
Speaker 1: your bank account or your Facebook account. It's your nervous system.

535
00:31:03,440 --> 00:31:07,240
Speaker 1: And people probably will not find that acceptable, the victims

536
00:31:07,240 --> 00:31:10,400
Speaker 1: of such accounts. That is, because inevitably the trend we

537
00:31:10,480 --> 00:31:13,360
Speaker 1: see is that there will be somebody who decides that

538
00:31:13,480 --> 00:31:16,680
Speaker 1: such an attack on an individual is a good idea

539
00:31:16,800 --> 00:31:19,400
Speaker 1: for whatever kind of whatever reasons they have, or just

540
00:31:19,440 --> 00:31:24,200
Speaker 1: sort of the the impersonal nature of online victimization. Oh yeah,

541
00:31:24,240 --> 00:31:26,000
Speaker 1: I mean, of course they're going to be motives. One

542
00:31:26,040 --> 00:31:29,400
Speaker 1: of the things the authors point out is just straightforward cruelty.

543
00:31:29,640 --> 00:31:33,080
Speaker 1: Think of the cruelty, both random and targeted, that we've

544
00:31:33,080 --> 00:31:37,480
Speaker 1: talked about of those epilepsy strobe attacks. I mean, that's

545
00:31:37,520 --> 00:31:40,239
Speaker 1: just sick. But apparently people think that's okay to do.

546
00:31:40,720 --> 00:31:43,800
Speaker 1: There are people out there who are willing to inflict

547
00:31:43,840 --> 00:31:46,320
Speaker 1: injury on others because they think they can get away

548
00:31:46,360 --> 00:31:50,280
Speaker 1: with it. But then think about the possible financial and

549
00:31:50,320 --> 00:31:54,120
Speaker 1: blackmail incentives that would be open to someone who compromised

550
00:31:54,200 --> 00:32:00,480
Speaker 1: your brain itself, and then think about malicious interfering that

551
00:32:00,600 --> 00:32:04,479
Speaker 1: is self directed. One example of this might be UH,

552
00:32:04,520 --> 00:32:06,040
Speaker 1: in a minute, we're going to talk about the idea

553
00:32:06,040 --> 00:32:10,280
Speaker 1: of deep brain stimulation or DBS. But there's a possibility,

554
00:32:10,320 --> 00:32:14,920
Speaker 1: for example, of neurotech users to hack their own devices

555
00:32:15,480 --> 00:32:18,360
Speaker 1: in an act of harmful self medication. So in the

556
00:32:18,440 --> 00:32:22,600
Speaker 1: same way that you might abuse a prescription for painkillers,

557
00:32:23,160 --> 00:32:27,160
Speaker 1: you could potentially abuse your neuro technology using it in

558
00:32:27,160 --> 00:32:30,080
Speaker 1: a way that it's not intended that could be harmful

559
00:32:30,120 --> 00:32:32,120
Speaker 1: to you in the long run but feels good in

560
00:32:32,160 --> 00:32:34,640
Speaker 1: the present. Well, or to frame that another way, you

561
00:32:34,680 --> 00:32:36,560
Speaker 1: could you could have a situation from where people are

562
00:32:36,600 --> 00:32:40,360
Speaker 1: optimizing that their technology in a way that demand does

563
00:32:40,440 --> 00:32:42,880
Speaker 1: not approve of. Yeah, you could have that, or you

564
00:32:42,920 --> 00:32:46,680
Speaker 1: could have One example is overclocking computers. Right, people want

565
00:32:46,680 --> 00:32:49,440
Speaker 1: to over clock their CPUs. Sometimes you see people messing

566
00:32:49,440 --> 00:32:51,200
Speaker 1: around with their hardware and it means that you know,

567
00:32:51,320 --> 00:32:54,120
Speaker 1: I know I can get more power out of my

568
00:32:54,240 --> 00:32:58,120
Speaker 1: CPU if I if I make some adjustments to what

569
00:32:58,280 --> 00:33:01,600
Speaker 1: it will allow itself to do. But that comes along

570
00:33:01,600 --> 00:33:04,560
Speaker 1: with risks, right, you could risk overheating your computer or

571
00:33:04,600 --> 00:33:07,760
Speaker 1: something like that. If people decide they want to do

572
00:33:07,840 --> 00:33:11,320
Speaker 1: the same thing with their brains. Yeah. Yeah, then I

573
00:33:11,320 --> 00:33:16,120
Speaker 1: mean basically you could say, I'm going to trade the

574
00:33:16,160 --> 00:33:19,680
Speaker 1: potential to have more power in my brain with the

575
00:33:19,720 --> 00:33:23,040
Speaker 1: potential for some risk. Yeah. I mean people do that

576
00:33:23,080 --> 00:33:26,880
Speaker 1: every day when they they look at various pharmaceutical ways

577
00:33:26,960 --> 00:33:31,000
Speaker 1: to potentially augment their brain for the completion of a

578
00:33:31,080 --> 00:33:33,920
Speaker 1: task or some sort of creative endeavor. And reminds me.

579
00:33:34,000 --> 00:33:37,400
Speaker 1: I believe it was Jimmy Page of led Zeppelin who

580
00:33:37,440 --> 00:33:40,480
Speaker 1: has in some interviews like look back on past drug

581
00:33:40,600 --> 00:33:44,280
Speaker 1: use and and said, well, yeah, that was probably too much,

582
00:33:44,400 --> 00:33:47,720
Speaker 1: but look at what I got done. Look look at

583
00:33:47,720 --> 00:33:50,720
Speaker 1: the work that came out during that time. I'm not

584
00:33:50,760 --> 00:33:52,640
Speaker 1: sure if this is something he said or this was

585
00:33:52,720 --> 00:33:56,600
Speaker 1: commentary on his life, but I mean you could see

586
00:33:56,600 --> 00:33:58,960
Speaker 1: someone making the argument with technology to say, yeah, I

587
00:33:59,040 --> 00:34:04,400
Speaker 1: overclocked my uh neural augmentations, but look what I got done, right,

588
00:34:05,280 --> 00:34:09,560
Speaker 1: Sure did a lot of homework, so you could say,

589
00:34:09,600 --> 00:34:11,839
Speaker 1: and I think the authors of this two thousand nine

590
00:34:11,920 --> 00:34:14,120
Speaker 1: articles say that we're at a similar stage in the

591
00:34:14,160 --> 00:34:18,000
Speaker 1: evolution of neural engineering as we were at the inception

592
00:34:18,080 --> 00:34:21,440
Speaker 1: of the Internet. Neuro Security is not really much of

593
00:34:21,480 --> 00:34:25,319
Speaker 1: an issue today, but it could be a huge, massively

594
00:34:25,400 --> 00:34:29,000
Speaker 1: important concern in the near future. And the consequence of

595
00:34:29,040 --> 00:34:31,319
Speaker 1: a neuro security breach can be a lot worse than

596
00:34:31,360 --> 00:34:34,600
Speaker 1: a breach of Internet security. Instead of protecting the software

597
00:34:34,640 --> 00:34:38,520
Speaker 1: on somebody's computer, you're protecting a humans ability to think

598
00:34:38,680 --> 00:34:42,400
Speaker 1: and enjoy good health. Right, Yeah, you're getting far because

599
00:34:42,440 --> 00:34:44,959
Speaker 1: because that's the thing, right, when all these bad things happen,

600
00:34:45,000 --> 00:34:47,680
Speaker 1: So you suffer, even an identity threat, you can always say, well, hey,

601
00:34:48,000 --> 00:34:51,880
Speaker 1: at least nobody was hurt. At least I didn't you know,

602
00:34:51,920 --> 00:34:55,440
Speaker 1: nobody physically attacked me. But here we see that line

603
00:34:56,280 --> 00:35:00,719
Speaker 1: somewhat erased. So a few current trends in neuro technology

604
00:35:00,840 --> 00:35:04,920
Speaker 1: that are definitely going to up the stakes and increase

605
00:35:05,000 --> 00:35:08,799
Speaker 1: the risks. One of these things is wireless connectivity. The

606
00:35:08,880 --> 00:35:11,799
Speaker 1: authors in this paper they recognize that security vulnerabilities do

607
00:35:11,920 --> 00:35:17,000
Speaker 1: exist in wireless implanted medical devices, and in past research

608
00:35:17,040 --> 00:35:20,480
Speaker 1: they demonstrated that a hacker could certainly compromise the security

609
00:35:20,480 --> 00:35:23,200
Speaker 1: and privacy of such a device, such as a two

610
00:35:23,239 --> 00:35:27,760
Speaker 1: thousand three model implanted cardiac defibrillator. You see, you could

611
00:35:28,000 --> 00:35:32,120
Speaker 1: they found using homemade, low cost equipment wireless lee change

612
00:35:32,160 --> 00:35:36,280
Speaker 1: a patient's therapies, disable those therapies, or induce a life

613
00:35:36,280 --> 00:35:39,560
Speaker 1: threatening heart rhythm. And they and this was a two

614
00:35:39,560 --> 00:35:42,200
Speaker 1: thousand and two thousand nine publication, but the things have

615
00:35:42,280 --> 00:35:44,120
Speaker 1: moved on a bit since then. But even then at

616
00:35:44,120 --> 00:35:46,399
Speaker 1: the time they said, look, the current risk is very low,

617
00:35:46,719 --> 00:35:49,120
Speaker 1: but such threats have to be taken into account with

618
00:35:49,160 --> 00:35:54,320
Speaker 1: future designs. So there's increasing wireless connectivity of all types

619
00:35:54,360 --> 00:35:59,279
Speaker 1: of implanted devices, including neural peripherals. But the other thing

620
00:35:59,320 --> 00:36:02,560
Speaker 1: we need to take into account for increasing security risks

621
00:36:02,640 --> 00:36:06,680
Speaker 1: is the increasing complexity of these devices. The more a

622
00:36:06,800 --> 00:36:11,000
Speaker 1: device does, the more there is to worry about from

623
00:36:11,000 --> 00:36:14,160
Speaker 1: a security concern. Yeah, and this is an area where

624
00:36:14,200 --> 00:36:16,200
Speaker 1: I to make sense to this. I keep thinking about

625
00:36:16,200 --> 00:36:19,560
Speaker 1: a chessboard. In a chess game, as many of you

626
00:36:19,640 --> 00:36:23,440
Speaker 1: might be aware, Like chess has a set number of pieces,

627
00:36:24,080 --> 00:36:28,800
Speaker 1: a set playing field, and uh in a set rule system.

628
00:36:28,840 --> 00:36:31,359
Speaker 1: And people have been playing with these limitations for a

629
00:36:31,360 --> 00:36:34,160
Speaker 1: long time, and in doing so they've kind of figured out,

630
00:36:34,360 --> 00:36:36,480
Speaker 1: you know, all the basic moves that can take place

631
00:36:36,520 --> 00:36:40,320
Speaker 1: early in the game and it it's opening the openings. Yeah,

632
00:36:40,520 --> 00:36:42,279
Speaker 1: and you it takes a while to get to that

633
00:36:42,320 --> 00:36:45,360
Speaker 1: point where you're actually in fresh territory where you're playing

634
00:36:45,800 --> 00:36:49,399
Speaker 1: a game that has not been played before. So it's chess.

635
00:36:49,480 --> 00:36:51,680
Speaker 1: Is not like a modern board game where the board

636
00:36:51,680 --> 00:36:53,640
Speaker 1: game comes out and then they might have a new rule,

637
00:36:53,680 --> 00:36:57,080
Speaker 1: suit supplement, or a new expansion, and each time a

638
00:36:57,080 --> 00:36:59,879
Speaker 1: new expansion comes out, ohops, they broke the game will

639
00:37:00,000 --> 00:37:02,799
Speaker 1: a bit or the rules, this rule clashes with this

640
00:37:02,880 --> 00:37:05,560
Speaker 1: older rule, and we need somebody to to weigh in

641
00:37:05,640 --> 00:37:09,240
Speaker 1: and tell us, uh, you know how we actually play

642
00:37:09,280 --> 00:37:12,840
Speaker 1: the game. Now, Chess doesn't change. Chess remains the same,

643
00:37:13,800 --> 00:37:17,759
Speaker 1: and our our our world of interconnected devices does not

644
00:37:18,400 --> 00:37:21,080
Speaker 1: stay the same. It changes. It is a It is

645
00:37:21,120 --> 00:37:25,280
Speaker 1: a modern board game that gets gets a larger playing field,

646
00:37:25,320 --> 00:37:30,279
Speaker 1: gets more pieces and more complex rules pretty much every day. Now,

647
00:37:30,400 --> 00:37:33,759
Speaker 1: I think we should zero in on some specific examples

648
00:37:34,080 --> 00:37:38,759
Speaker 1: of neurotechnologies. One would be robotic limbs. Now, I think

649
00:37:38,800 --> 00:37:41,640
Speaker 1: this is a great example of something that has made

650
00:37:42,040 --> 00:37:45,440
Speaker 1: enormous strides just in the past couple of decades. Robotic

651
00:37:45,520 --> 00:37:49,200
Speaker 1: limbs are not the future, this is the present. Multiple

652
00:37:49,280 --> 00:37:54,040
Speaker 1: labs and inter organizational projects have already created robotic limbs

653
00:37:54,080 --> 00:37:57,680
Speaker 1: that can be controlled directly by brain activity, just like

654
00:37:57,719 --> 00:37:59,920
Speaker 1: the muscles and a natural limb, and these things are

655
00:38:00,280 --> 00:38:03,799
Speaker 1: better all the time. That's right. Now, to go back

656
00:38:03,800 --> 00:38:06,440
Speaker 1: in time just a little bit back in two thousand thirteen,

657
00:38:06,680 --> 00:38:10,880
Speaker 1: Bertold Meyer wrote an article for Wired titled ethical questions

658
00:38:10,880 --> 00:38:14,600
Speaker 1: are Looming for prosthetics. Now. Meyer had a unique insight

659
00:38:14,680 --> 00:38:17,840
Speaker 1: in this article because he wears a prosthetic arm himself,

660
00:38:18,160 --> 00:38:20,880
Speaker 1: and he tried out many different models over the years,

661
00:38:21,239 --> 00:38:23,239
Speaker 1: so he's not you know, he's an insider when it

662
00:38:23,280 --> 00:38:26,560
Speaker 1: comes to prosthetics and the use of high tech prosthetics.

663
00:38:26,600 --> 00:38:28,800
Speaker 1: So at the time he was using an i limb

664
00:38:29,000 --> 00:38:31,480
Speaker 1: which connected to his iPhone, which of course was connected

665
00:38:31,480 --> 00:38:34,799
Speaker 1: to the Internet, and he wrote, technically, a part of

666
00:38:34,840 --> 00:38:37,960
Speaker 1: my body has become hackable and uh, and he pointed

667
00:38:38,000 --> 00:38:41,720
Speaker 1: to concerns by crime futurist Mark Goodman, also a Wired writer,

668
00:38:42,160 --> 00:38:45,360
Speaker 1: and Mark Goodman covered the fact had previously covered the

669
00:38:45,360 --> 00:38:49,120
Speaker 1: fact that hackers had developed a Bluetooth device that can

670
00:38:49,160 --> 00:38:53,480
Speaker 1: cause portable insulin pumps used by certain diabetics to give

671
00:38:53,520 --> 00:38:56,800
Speaker 1: their where a lethal dose. Oh yeah, this is another

672
00:38:56,840 --> 00:38:59,919
Speaker 1: one of the vulnerabilities of hackable implanted devices that don't

673
00:39:00,040 --> 00:39:03,640
Speaker 1: even necessarily connect to the nervous system or the brain right.

674
00:39:03,800 --> 00:39:05,600
Speaker 1: And if anyone out there is a fan of the

675
00:39:05,840 --> 00:39:09,239
Speaker 1: TV show Homeland, there's actually a plot involving in a

676
00:39:10,400 --> 00:39:14,680
Speaker 1: vice presidential assassination attempt in the show U utilizing just

677
00:39:14,719 --> 00:39:16,800
Speaker 1: such a strategy. I've never watched that show is a

678
00:39:16,840 --> 00:39:19,160
Speaker 1: good I enjoyed. I only watched the first two seasons,

679
00:39:19,160 --> 00:39:22,680
Speaker 1: but I enjoyed it. So Meyer argues that we we

680
00:39:22,719 --> 00:39:26,080
Speaker 1: have to recognize and address such hacking sensitivities before the

681
00:39:26,080 --> 00:39:30,200
Speaker 1: technology is widely adopted and hacking becomes a full fledged threat,

682
00:39:30,280 --> 00:39:33,000
Speaker 1: which just is exactly what we've been we've been saying

683
00:39:33,040 --> 00:39:35,840
Speaker 1: over again. So Myer's on the same page as the

684
00:39:35,880 --> 00:39:38,440
Speaker 1: authors of this article we were talking about earlier that

685
00:39:38,520 --> 00:39:40,160
Speaker 1: they're saying. The main thing is we got to get

686
00:39:40,200 --> 00:39:42,960
Speaker 1: ahead of it. We've got to start thinking about neurosecurity

687
00:39:43,080 --> 00:39:46,440
Speaker 1: before these threats really become an issue. Now, there are

688
00:39:46,440 --> 00:39:49,200
Speaker 1: plenty of labs that have been working on robotic limbs,

689
00:39:49,719 --> 00:39:52,440
Speaker 1: thought controlled robotic limbs. One more example I wanted to

690
00:39:52,480 --> 00:39:54,359
Speaker 1: mention there was a good article in the New York

691
00:39:54,400 --> 00:39:59,680
Speaker 1: Times in May about the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics

692
00:39:59,719 --> 00:40:02,840
Speaker 1: Lab where they've got this robotic arm. It's got twenty

693
00:40:02,840 --> 00:40:06,200
Speaker 1: six joints and it can curl up to forty five pounds.

694
00:40:06,880 --> 00:40:09,840
Speaker 1: Is that more than my biological arm concurl. I wonder

695
00:40:10,960 --> 00:40:13,399
Speaker 1: get into an arm wrestling contest with one of these

696
00:40:13,800 --> 00:40:15,480
Speaker 1: robot arms. I don't know. I feel like we're getting

697
00:40:15,480 --> 00:40:20,640
Speaker 1: into the weight of human hair scenarios. Well, anyway, these

698
00:40:20,680 --> 00:40:23,840
Speaker 1: things it's controlled entirely by the brain, and so it

699
00:40:24,000 --> 00:40:27,520
Speaker 1: is just that you connect this to what your natural

700
00:40:27,560 --> 00:40:30,880
Speaker 1: neural impulses would be, and you can't. You don't have

701
00:40:30,920 --> 00:40:34,560
Speaker 1: to operate any external controls or machinery. You just control

702
00:40:34,640 --> 00:40:37,760
Speaker 1: it with your brain. There was also a good article

703
00:40:37,800 --> 00:40:40,040
Speaker 1: I saw and wired from last year. I think about

704
00:40:40,040 --> 00:40:45,000
Speaker 1: President Obama just freaking out when he was watching somebody

705
00:40:45,080 --> 00:40:48,880
Speaker 1: control a prosthetic arm with his brain. Uh, he like

706
00:40:48,960 --> 00:40:53,440
Speaker 1: couldn't contain his glee. Yeah, I mean, it's it's amazing,

707
00:40:53,560 --> 00:40:56,719
Speaker 1: Like and that's the thing that the technology has so

708
00:40:56,760 --> 00:41:01,040
Speaker 1: many wonderful applications, um and and all of these additional

709
00:41:01,080 --> 00:41:03,680
Speaker 1: threats kind of come second to that at least when

710
00:41:03,719 --> 00:41:05,920
Speaker 1: you're you're focusing on the wonder Yeah. And so there

711
00:41:05,960 --> 00:41:08,480
Speaker 1: are a couple ways you could say that neural devices

712
00:41:08,880 --> 00:41:12,080
Speaker 1: would come into limb control. So one of them would

713
00:41:12,120 --> 00:41:15,759
Speaker 1: be restoring the use of a disabled limb, Like if

714
00:41:15,800 --> 00:41:19,080
Speaker 1: you have some kind of neurological damage or disease that

715
00:41:19,120 --> 00:41:21,319
Speaker 1: means you still have an arm or a leg, but

716
00:41:21,480 --> 00:41:24,480
Speaker 1: that you can't control it with your brain. One thing

717
00:41:24,480 --> 00:41:27,560
Speaker 1: a neural device could do is give that control back

718
00:41:27,560 --> 00:41:30,200
Speaker 1: to you. Another thing would be that you've lost the

719
00:41:30,320 --> 00:41:32,760
Speaker 1: arm or the limb and that you have a robotic

720
00:41:32,840 --> 00:41:35,920
Speaker 1: replacement that you can control with your brain. Yeah, these

721
00:41:35,960 --> 00:41:38,319
Speaker 1: are These are two possibilities that that come up time

722
00:41:38,320 --> 00:41:41,640
Speaker 1: and time again in you know, wired magazine articles and

723
00:41:41,640 --> 00:41:47,200
Speaker 1: another cool uh cool, you know forward facing technological publications.

724
00:41:47,200 --> 00:41:49,319
Speaker 1: Now we've mentioned a couple of arms, but that they're

725
00:41:49,360 --> 00:41:52,640
Speaker 1: prosthetic legs too, right, Yes, I was looking around. I

726
00:41:52,640 --> 00:41:57,040
Speaker 1: came across Blatchford's links prosthetic and this communicates from knee

727
00:41:57,040 --> 00:42:00,280
Speaker 1: to ankle four times a second. So it's a stem

728
00:42:00,280 --> 00:42:03,560
Speaker 1: in which the foot and knee of the prosthetic limb

729
00:42:03,600 --> 00:42:06,960
Speaker 1: work to work together to predict how it's where is

730
00:42:07,000 --> 00:42:09,960
Speaker 1: going to move and respond to the position. And this

731
00:42:10,080 --> 00:42:13,759
Speaker 1: too features a bluetooth connection to a smartphone to help

732
00:42:13,840 --> 00:42:17,960
Speaker 1: manage this interaction to like uh ad just settings and

733
00:42:18,000 --> 00:42:20,239
Speaker 1: things like that. Yeah, so I mean, I guess that

734
00:42:20,360 --> 00:42:24,040
Speaker 1: doesn't rely on the smartphone CPU to do it's computation.

735
00:42:24,200 --> 00:42:26,759
Speaker 1: I guess that would be difficult. Um, my understanding is

736
00:42:26,800 --> 00:42:30,480
Speaker 1: that this was about like tweaking performance. Okay, so but

737
00:42:30,560 --> 00:42:32,520
Speaker 1: it's easy. That's the thing when you can see a

738
00:42:32,560 --> 00:42:35,560
Speaker 1: lot of these technologies. Perhaps they start with using a

739
00:42:36,239 --> 00:42:39,200
Speaker 1: wireless connection to tweak performance, but then it becomes more right,

740
00:42:39,239 --> 00:42:42,480
Speaker 1: then it becomes about downloading new firmware. Then it becomes

741
00:42:42,480 --> 00:42:47,160
Speaker 1: about actually using the computational power of the device or

742
00:42:47,239 --> 00:42:51,799
Speaker 1: the cloud even to control the prosthetic. All right, so

743
00:42:51,840 --> 00:42:53,960
Speaker 1: maybe it's time to think about what would be the

744
00:42:54,000 --> 00:42:59,120
Speaker 1: security concerns of a robotic limb or a neurotechnologically enabled limb.

745
00:43:00,400 --> 00:43:03,160
Speaker 1: One thing I got to think about is the concept

746
00:43:03,200 --> 00:43:07,160
Speaker 1: of a ransomware attack. So we've recently seen ransomware attacks

747
00:43:07,200 --> 00:43:09,760
Speaker 1: all over the world, right. I think they're now saying

748
00:43:09,800 --> 00:43:13,600
Speaker 1: that the North Korean government might be behind these ransomware

749
00:43:13,640 --> 00:43:16,640
Speaker 1: attacks that have hit like the British NHS and all

750
00:43:16,680 --> 00:43:19,399
Speaker 1: these other places. As of this recording, I believe there

751
00:43:19,440 --> 00:43:21,919
Speaker 1: is some speculation that that might be the case. But

752
00:43:22,440 --> 00:43:26,920
Speaker 1: I was reading an expert, an expert who was saying well,

753
00:43:27,120 --> 00:43:29,200
Speaker 1: we're still looking at it, so okay. But the basic

754
00:43:29,239 --> 00:43:32,560
Speaker 1: concept of ransomware attack is you know, I've seen this

755
00:43:32,640 --> 00:43:37,440
Speaker 1: on relatives computers before, where you boot up Oh yeah,

756
00:43:37,640 --> 00:43:39,840
Speaker 1: like you. I mean, this is a classic type of attack.

757
00:43:39,880 --> 00:43:43,240
Speaker 1: You boot up your computer and there's a message that says,

758
00:43:43,280 --> 00:43:48,640
Speaker 1: like from Microsoft Anti Virus Protection or something, Uh, your

759
00:43:48,719 --> 00:43:51,560
Speaker 1: system is not secure. You must pay to renew your

760
00:43:51,640 --> 00:43:54,800
Speaker 1: anti virus license in order to boot up your system,

761
00:43:55,239 --> 00:43:57,319
Speaker 1: and they ask for your credit card number, and so

762
00:43:57,360 --> 00:44:01,279
Speaker 1: they're they're holding your technology hostage. In that case, they're

763
00:44:01,280 --> 00:44:04,040
Speaker 1: pretending to be somebody legitimate, but they could just come

764
00:44:04,120 --> 00:44:06,280
Speaker 1: right out and say, look, I've got all your files.

765
00:44:06,320 --> 00:44:08,360
Speaker 1: I'm not going to let you into your phone unless

766
00:44:08,360 --> 00:44:10,680
Speaker 1: you give me a hundred bucks. And that was basically

767
00:44:10,760 --> 00:44:15,440
Speaker 1: how this this recent want to cry um ransom bot attack. Right.

768
00:44:15,680 --> 00:44:20,680
Speaker 1: But imagine if this was applied to neurotechnology that re

769
00:44:20,800 --> 00:44:23,960
Speaker 1: enabled you to move your limbs. So let's say you're

770
00:44:23,960 --> 00:44:28,080
Speaker 1: out hiking with your amazing robotic legs. You've lost control

771
00:44:28,120 --> 00:44:30,440
Speaker 1: of your legs, or you lost your legs in an accident.

772
00:44:30,480 --> 00:44:32,680
Speaker 1: You've got robotic legs, and you're out walking around in

773
00:44:32,719 --> 00:44:35,920
Speaker 1: the mountains and suddenly they lock in place and refuse

774
00:44:36,000 --> 00:44:38,840
Speaker 1: to move. And then you get a text message demanding

775
00:44:38,880 --> 00:44:41,840
Speaker 1: a ransom payment of five hundred dollars worth of bitcoin

776
00:44:42,120 --> 00:44:45,360
Speaker 1: or your attacker will not unlock your legs. What do

777
00:44:45,400 --> 00:44:47,440
Speaker 1: you do? You you gotta at least take a chance

778
00:44:47,480 --> 00:44:49,919
Speaker 1: that they're going to make good on the promise. Yeah,

779
00:44:49,960 --> 00:44:54,080
Speaker 1: I mean, it's amazing how how sci fi things can

780
00:44:54,120 --> 00:44:57,400
Speaker 1: get so quickly. I mean that that's really does not

781
00:44:57,520 --> 00:45:01,080
Speaker 1: seem all that far fetched to me. Another thing might be,

782
00:45:01,280 --> 00:45:04,439
Speaker 1: how about a confidentiality attack, so that that lass type

783
00:45:04,440 --> 00:45:08,280
Speaker 1: of remember the three categories we mentioned earlier of neuro

784
00:45:08,320 --> 00:45:12,239
Speaker 1: security categories, you want to protect to the availability, the confidentiality,

785
00:45:12,280 --> 00:45:15,359
Speaker 1: and the integrity. That would be an availability attack, right

786
00:45:15,400 --> 00:45:17,480
Speaker 1: they say you will not be able to use your

787
00:45:17,520 --> 00:45:21,920
Speaker 1: device unless you pay up. You could have a confidentiality attack.

788
00:45:21,960 --> 00:45:24,520
Speaker 1: That would be a skimming attack on your robotic arms.

789
00:45:24,560 --> 00:45:27,680
Speaker 1: Say an attacker gains control of your robotic arms, then

790
00:45:27,760 --> 00:45:31,080
Speaker 1: uses motion data to infer what you're typing whenever you

791
00:45:31,200 --> 00:45:34,240
Speaker 1: use your fingers to type a message. Or how about

792
00:45:34,280 --> 00:45:37,600
Speaker 1: an integrity attack the attacker literally makes you punch or

793
00:45:37,680 --> 00:45:41,040
Speaker 1: choke yourself, or punch or choke others by taking control

794
00:45:41,120 --> 00:45:44,080
Speaker 1: of your robotic hands. Well, this reminds me of a

795
00:45:44,200 --> 00:45:46,480
Speaker 1: video clip that I actually included in the notes here.

796
00:45:46,719 --> 00:45:48,759
Speaker 1: I'm not sure if you've seen this, but it was

797
00:45:48,800 --> 00:45:50,680
Speaker 1: just a was a gentleman on a believe of French

798
00:45:50,719 --> 00:45:55,120
Speaker 1: news program showing off a prosthetic arm and he activates

799
00:45:55,120 --> 00:45:57,040
Speaker 1: and it it begins to malfunction, and it just kind

800
00:45:57,040 --> 00:46:00,279
Speaker 1: of starts pounding on the table and then pounding on

801
00:46:00,320 --> 00:46:02,759
Speaker 1: the man's thigh and he can't get it to turn off.

802
00:46:03,160 --> 00:46:06,120
Speaker 1: So you can easily imagine where even something wouldn't have

803
00:46:06,160 --> 00:46:09,760
Speaker 1: to be is is is uh as precise as making

804
00:46:09,760 --> 00:46:12,920
Speaker 1: you go karate chop crazy on people around you. But

805
00:46:12,920 --> 00:46:15,120
Speaker 1: what have you just started making your arm, you know,

806
00:46:15,320 --> 00:46:19,319
Speaker 1: go into sort of spasms that that could be bad enough,

807
00:46:19,440 --> 00:46:21,640
Speaker 1: especially I mean if you were driving a car at

808
00:46:21,640 --> 00:46:23,719
Speaker 1: the time, if you were if you were giving a

809
00:46:24,160 --> 00:46:28,520
Speaker 1: public presentation. Uh, there any number of scenarios were just uh,

810
00:46:29,040 --> 00:46:31,640
Speaker 1: the utter malfunction of the device would be bad enough. Now,

811
00:46:31,640 --> 00:46:33,280
Speaker 1: I know a lot of you out there are probably

812
00:46:33,320 --> 00:46:36,920
Speaker 1: thinking like, well, I wouldn't I wouldn't get a robotic

813
00:46:36,960 --> 00:46:39,200
Speaker 1: limb like that if there are risks like this. But

814
00:46:39,520 --> 00:46:43,200
Speaker 1: you're probably not putting yourself really in the frame of

815
00:46:43,280 --> 00:46:46,680
Speaker 1: mind that that somebody who has lost control of a

816
00:46:46,719 --> 00:46:50,319
Speaker 1: limb or lost a limb would experience. I mean, imagine

817
00:46:50,640 --> 00:46:54,840
Speaker 1: not having that ability and having the technological capability to

818
00:46:54,880 --> 00:46:57,920
Speaker 1: regain it. This is not something that I think people

819
00:46:57,960 --> 00:47:02,080
Speaker 1: can really be faulted for wanting. No, I mean, I

820
00:47:02,080 --> 00:47:04,560
Speaker 1: mean that's the thing, like is the is the if

821
00:47:04,600 --> 00:47:07,960
Speaker 1: it improves the technology, it makes the technology better able

822
00:47:08,080 --> 00:47:09,920
Speaker 1: to you know, let an in a visual cope with

823
00:47:09,960 --> 00:47:13,400
Speaker 1: a lost limb, and then is that that technology becomes

824
00:47:13,440 --> 00:47:16,759
Speaker 1: the standard. Of course people are going to adapt it. Yeah,

825
00:47:17,239 --> 00:47:19,760
Speaker 1: this is the thing people are gonna want for good reason.

826
00:47:19,920 --> 00:47:23,680
Speaker 1: And it's definitely, especially at the beginning, going to seem

827
00:47:23,719 --> 00:47:26,960
Speaker 1: like the risks are very low, and hopefully they will be. Yeah.

828
00:47:27,680 --> 00:47:30,440
Speaker 1: So uh, I do want to say here, you know,

829
00:47:30,800 --> 00:47:33,919
Speaker 1: when it comes to hackable prosthetic limbs, it isn't all

830
00:47:34,160 --> 00:47:37,480
Speaker 1: black mirror paranoia. There is a lighter side as well,

831
00:47:37,800 --> 00:47:40,680
Speaker 1: and this is where the Lego Prosthetic Arm comes into play.

832
00:47:40,680 --> 00:47:45,719
Speaker 1: Designed by Chicago based Colombian designer Carlos Alturo Torres, and

833
00:47:45,760 --> 00:47:49,239
Speaker 1: it's a modular system that allows children to customize their

834
00:47:49,239 --> 00:47:52,560
Speaker 1: own prosthetics. So this is a lesson in engineering programming

835
00:47:52,920 --> 00:47:55,920
Speaker 1: and a way to help them overcome the social isolation

836
00:47:55,960 --> 00:47:59,000
Speaker 1: they might feel over their condition. So I just found

837
00:47:59,040 --> 00:48:01,560
Speaker 1: it to be an interesting little side note. Well, yeah,

838
00:48:01,600 --> 00:48:05,080
Speaker 1: we already mentioned in a perhaps dangerous or detrimental context

839
00:48:05,239 --> 00:48:09,160
Speaker 1: the idea of hacking your own neuro pros theses, which

840
00:48:09,600 --> 00:48:11,359
Speaker 1: that that could certainly be the case. But I can

841
00:48:11,400 --> 00:48:13,880
Speaker 1: also see hacking your own neuro pros thesis to be

842
00:48:13,960 --> 00:48:17,520
Speaker 1: something that's very like fun and adventurous and exciting. I

843
00:48:17,520 --> 00:48:20,000
Speaker 1: guess it would just depend on what the risks and

844
00:48:20,000 --> 00:48:22,800
Speaker 1: and the dangers were. Oh man, what have we reached

845
00:48:22,800 --> 00:48:24,680
Speaker 1: the point to just have a little fun with it?

846
00:48:24,719 --> 00:48:27,279
Speaker 1: What have they a hacked? Either you hack it or

847
00:48:27,320 --> 00:48:30,440
Speaker 1: you know, someone outside hacks your prosthetic arm and it

848
00:48:30,480 --> 00:48:33,840
Speaker 1: makes a hand puppet and then it's able to talk

849
00:48:34,120 --> 00:48:36,719
Speaker 1: specifically in the void. Who is the famous hand puppet here?

850
00:48:37,239 --> 00:48:39,160
Speaker 1: I don't know. It would do kind of like a

851
00:48:39,280 --> 00:48:42,280
Speaker 1: kind of like a you know, a cartoony Spanish accent

852
00:48:42,360 --> 00:48:45,520
Speaker 1: to the to the talking hand. You know what I'm talking.

853
00:48:45,719 --> 00:48:48,880
Speaker 1: I don't know what you're talking about, Senior Wins. Is

854
00:48:48,920 --> 00:48:51,960
Speaker 1: that I don't know? No, I have no idea anyway,

855
00:48:52,000 --> 00:48:54,560
Speaker 1: I can't help but imagine like a hacked robotic arm

856
00:48:54,640 --> 00:48:57,560
Speaker 1: suddenly just becoming this little talking fifth It's like that

857
00:48:57,920 --> 00:49:00,840
Speaker 1: it starts screaming at you. So add that to the

858
00:49:00,920 --> 00:49:05,680
Speaker 1: list of near future concerns. Well, I can think of

859
00:49:05,719 --> 00:49:07,640
Speaker 1: a good one is that you'd hack your own arm

860
00:49:07,760 --> 00:49:10,279
Speaker 1: to just make it, at random intervals throughout the day

861
00:49:10,320 --> 00:49:14,680
Speaker 1: throw up the rock horns. Then you'd have no warning

862
00:49:14,680 --> 00:49:16,520
Speaker 1: when it was going to happen. You just say, like,

863
00:49:16,880 --> 00:49:19,040
Speaker 1: fair warning to all my friends and family. Every now

864
00:49:19,080 --> 00:49:20,920
Speaker 1: and then, I'm going to rock out. You've got to

865
00:49:20,960 --> 00:49:22,880
Speaker 1: get the horns or every now and then I may

866
00:49:22,920 --> 00:49:25,960
Speaker 1: just flip you off. It's not because I don't like you,

867
00:49:26,000 --> 00:49:29,080
Speaker 1: it's just I've been hacked. Sorry. Uh, it becomes a

868
00:49:29,080 --> 00:49:33,360
Speaker 1: great excuse. So yeah, there are multiple sides definitely to

869
00:49:34,000 --> 00:49:37,719
Speaker 1: having systems that are flexible and can be manipulated. I mean,

870
00:49:37,760 --> 00:49:40,440
Speaker 1: you could see that as a security risk, which it

871
00:49:40,480 --> 00:49:42,359
Speaker 1: probably is, but you can also see it as an

872
00:49:42,360 --> 00:49:46,160
Speaker 1: opportunity for people to express their themselves and and try

873
00:49:46,239 --> 00:49:49,960
Speaker 1: new things with their own bodies. Indeed, well, in that note,

874
00:49:49,960 --> 00:49:51,719
Speaker 1: you know, we should take a quick break and when

875
00:49:51,719 --> 00:49:54,239
Speaker 1: we come back, we will get into some some some

876
00:49:54,320 --> 00:50:05,400
Speaker 1: other possible areas where neuro technology could become hacked. Alright,

877
00:50:05,400 --> 00:50:09,279
Speaker 1: we're back, okay, Robert. One more type of neurotechnology that

878
00:50:09,400 --> 00:50:13,239
Speaker 1: is highlighted in this original paper on neuro security is

879
00:50:13,320 --> 00:50:16,640
Speaker 1: the concept of deep brain stimulation. Yes, now we I

880
00:50:16,640 --> 00:50:18,720
Speaker 1: think we've talked about this some of the podcast before,

881
00:50:19,239 --> 00:50:24,040
Speaker 1: but deep brain stimulation is basically putting electrodes deep inside

882
00:50:24,040 --> 00:50:28,920
Speaker 1: the brain to stimulate certain regions with electrical impulses. It's

883
00:50:29,120 --> 00:50:31,919
Speaker 1: uh in the basic idea is fairly simple. Of course,

884
00:50:31,960 --> 00:50:34,680
Speaker 1: the implementation is very complex. Yeah. We get into this

885
00:50:34,719 --> 00:50:37,840
Speaker 1: in our brain to brain communication episode, which I'll include

886
00:50:37,840 --> 00:50:39,720
Speaker 1: a link to on the landing page for this episode

887
00:50:39,719 --> 00:50:42,080
Speaker 1: of stuffitably your Mind dot Com. But yeah, essentially you

888
00:50:42,120 --> 00:50:44,319
Speaker 1: have sort of the external version, it's kort of the

889
00:50:44,360 --> 00:50:48,440
Speaker 1: god helmet scenario right where you're doing, you know, electromagnetic

890
00:50:48,440 --> 00:50:52,120
Speaker 1: cranial stimulation, and then the idea of of actually putting

891
00:50:52,360 --> 00:50:56,439
Speaker 1: the the the the the the devices inside the head

892
00:50:56,560 --> 00:51:00,520
Speaker 1: actually having implants in the brain that are manipulating cognitive Yeah,

893
00:51:00,560 --> 00:51:04,040
Speaker 1: and there's all kinds of uses of putting electrodes in

894
00:51:04,080 --> 00:51:07,359
Speaker 1: the brain. Deep brain stimulation specifically is is putting them

895
00:51:07,440 --> 00:51:10,279
Speaker 1: deep down in there to help with multiple types of

896
00:51:10,320 --> 00:51:14,239
Speaker 1: chronic medical conditions. Specifically, it's been effective at dealing with

897
00:51:14,280 --> 00:51:18,160
Speaker 1: Parkinson's disease and with tremors what you might see called

898
00:51:18,239 --> 00:51:23,160
Speaker 1: essential tremor, but also contains uses that have been tried out,

899
00:51:23,200 --> 00:51:26,120
Speaker 1: such as for treating major depression or for chronic pain.

900
00:51:27,160 --> 00:51:32,960
Speaker 1: And so obviously, the better we get at correcting problems

901
00:51:33,000 --> 00:51:37,480
Speaker 1: that begin in the brain with with electrical impulses, that

902
00:51:37,480 --> 00:51:39,880
Speaker 1: that is a great thing for the people who suffer

903
00:51:39,920 --> 00:51:44,239
Speaker 1: from these conditions. But when you're putting the capability to

904
00:51:44,320 --> 00:51:48,320
Speaker 1: send electrical impulses deep within the brain in the hands

905
00:51:48,320 --> 00:51:51,800
Speaker 1: of a piece of technology, you want to make really

906
00:51:51,840 --> 00:51:54,960
Speaker 1: sure that that technology is doing what it's supposed to do.

907
00:51:55,719 --> 00:51:57,600
Speaker 1: As you can guess, there could be a lot of

908
00:51:57,640 --> 00:52:02,560
Speaker 1: problems with unwanted electrical mulation of the brain. And one

909
00:52:02,600 --> 00:52:05,279
Speaker 1: thing I just want to quote a paragraph from the

910
00:52:05,320 --> 00:52:08,920
Speaker 1: two thousand nine paper we mentioned quote, the hacker strategy

911
00:52:09,200 --> 00:52:11,840
Speaker 1: does not need to be too sophisticated if he or

912
00:52:11,880 --> 00:52:15,080
Speaker 1: she only wants to cause harm. It is possible to

913
00:52:15,160 --> 00:52:19,480
Speaker 1: cause cell death or the formation of meaningless neural pathways

914
00:52:19,760 --> 00:52:24,720
Speaker 1: by bombarding the brain with random signals. Alternately, a hacker

915
00:52:24,840 --> 00:52:29,239
Speaker 1: might wirelessly prevent the device from operating as intended. We

916
00:52:29,360 --> 00:52:33,359
Speaker 1: must also ensure that the deep brain stimulators protect the

917
00:52:33,440 --> 00:52:38,640
Speaker 1: feelings and emotions of patients from external observation. So you

918
00:52:38,640 --> 00:52:40,600
Speaker 1: can see there are a lot of avenues here. Also,

919
00:52:40,680 --> 00:52:43,359
Speaker 1: deep brain stimulation was one of the things we had

920
00:52:43,360 --> 00:52:45,799
Speaker 1: in mind when we talked about the idea of of

921
00:52:46,000 --> 00:52:49,280
Speaker 1: illicit or dangerous self use, like if you are self

922
00:52:49,320 --> 00:52:54,319
Speaker 1: administering patterns of electrical impulses that may feel pleasurable to

923
00:52:54,360 --> 00:52:56,200
Speaker 1: you at the moment, but could be harmful to you

924
00:52:56,239 --> 00:52:58,600
Speaker 1: in the long run. And of course this this is

925
00:52:58,600 --> 00:53:01,200
Speaker 1: another another area we can imagine it being hacked for

926
00:53:01,400 --> 00:53:03,880
Speaker 1: you know, on both sides, someone saying, all right, I

927
00:53:03,920 --> 00:53:06,520
Speaker 1: know this device was just about you know, treating a disorder,

928
00:53:06,520 --> 00:53:08,200
Speaker 1: but I'm I'm going to tinker with it, and now

929
00:53:08,239 --> 00:53:12,719
Speaker 1: it gives me orgasms when I push a button. But

930
00:53:12,480 --> 00:53:15,040
Speaker 1: then the reverse of that, of course, is someone actually

931
00:53:15,080 --> 00:53:19,160
Speaker 1: monkeying with your cognitive performance. Yeah, uh yeah. And you

932
00:53:19,200 --> 00:53:22,319
Speaker 1: can only think as things like this become more complex,

933
00:53:23,120 --> 00:53:27,200
Speaker 1: there will be more and more opportunities for dangerous exploits

934
00:53:27,239 --> 00:53:31,520
Speaker 1: as well. You know, basically, the possibility for dangerous exploits

935
00:53:31,560 --> 00:53:35,720
Speaker 1: seems to track along with the potential for helping the brain.

936
00:53:36,080 --> 00:53:38,479
Speaker 1: Right as we as we have more power to heal,

937
00:53:38,840 --> 00:53:41,040
Speaker 1: we have more power to destroy. You see that with

938
00:53:41,040 --> 00:53:43,640
Speaker 1: any technology, right You see those parallel tracks of the

939
00:53:43,880 --> 00:53:48,120
Speaker 1: beneficial applications for humanity and then the negative, self destructive ones. Totally,

940
00:53:48,280 --> 00:53:50,919
Speaker 1: it's a it's a nuclear power at the neural level. Yeah,

941
00:53:50,960 --> 00:53:54,839
Speaker 1: it's it's chemistry. You know, the same advancements that gave

942
00:53:54,920 --> 00:53:58,520
Speaker 1: us all the beneficial applications of chemistry also produced chemical weapons. So,

943
00:53:59,760 --> 00:54:01,799
Speaker 1: uh so I want to look at one more potential

944
00:54:02,719 --> 00:54:07,279
Speaker 1: neurotechnology that could have great rewards and great risks. And

945
00:54:07,360 --> 00:54:11,160
Speaker 1: so this one is going to be cognitive augmentation. So

946
00:54:11,360 --> 00:54:15,600
Speaker 1: one commonly discussed example is memory augmentation. This comes with

947
00:54:15,640 --> 00:54:18,759
Speaker 1: its own benefits and risks. The risks are fairly obvious.

948
00:54:19,440 --> 00:54:22,319
Speaker 1: If you have the capability to augment memory, you may

949
00:54:22,360 --> 00:54:25,480
Speaker 1: also have the capability to degrade a race or alter

950
00:54:25,600 --> 00:54:30,719
Speaker 1: existing memories, or to create false memories or impressions. Uh

951
00:54:30,760 --> 00:54:35,000
Speaker 1: and and alter the entire integrity of a person's memory system.

952
00:54:35,120 --> 00:54:39,800
Speaker 1: But I got another idea, what about computational upgrades? Assuming

953
00:54:39,800 --> 00:54:41,799
Speaker 1: such a thing as ever possible. We we don't really

954
00:54:41,800 --> 00:54:44,239
Speaker 1: know if it is, but we'll assume for now that

955
00:54:44,320 --> 00:54:48,560
Speaker 1: it could be possible to upgrade the brain's ability to say,

956
00:54:48,600 --> 00:54:52,799
Speaker 1: do math or you or computational reasoning. Okay, just an

957
00:54:52,880 --> 00:54:55,920
Speaker 1: implant that boosts some sort of cognitive function in your

958
00:54:55,920 --> 00:54:59,480
Speaker 1: brain at your point being like either you're you're you're

959
00:54:59,520 --> 00:55:03,360
Speaker 1: handling of mathematics or your memory, etcetera. Yeah, So, Robert,

960
00:55:03,360 --> 00:55:06,440
Speaker 1: I got a scenario for you. Somebody offers you a

961
00:55:06,480 --> 00:55:11,799
Speaker 1: free surgery that they say has a chance of increasing

962
00:55:11,800 --> 00:55:15,239
Speaker 1: your i Q by twenty five points. Would you take it?

963
00:55:16,160 --> 00:55:18,719
Speaker 1: Mm hmmm, I don't know that. That's pretty good, Uh,

964
00:55:18,840 --> 00:55:22,319
Speaker 1: pretty good odds of success. Yeah, you don't have to answer. Now.

965
00:55:22,640 --> 00:55:24,640
Speaker 1: I got one to make it a little more obvious

966
00:55:25,920 --> 00:55:28,160
Speaker 1: if you if you're a person out there who's listening,

967
00:55:28,160 --> 00:55:31,400
Speaker 1: and you'd say, hell, no, you know, I'm not messing

968
00:55:31,400 --> 00:55:33,440
Speaker 1: around with my brain. I like my brain the way

969
00:55:33,440 --> 00:55:35,560
Speaker 1: it is. I'm not going to introduce all these risks.

970
00:55:36,000 --> 00:55:39,200
Speaker 1: Then consider this, What if everybody else around you has

971
00:55:39,280 --> 00:55:43,920
Speaker 1: taken this. Yeah, so all of your friends, your co workers,

972
00:55:43,960 --> 00:55:47,680
Speaker 1: everybody in your professional circle, all of your professional rivals,

973
00:55:48,239 --> 00:55:50,759
Speaker 1: they all take the upgrade. This is a This is

974
00:55:50,760 --> 00:55:53,479
Speaker 1: a big issue in trans humanist thought. You know, who

975
00:55:53,480 --> 00:55:55,799
Speaker 1: gets to be trans human? And what does it mean

976
00:55:55,840 --> 00:55:58,880
Speaker 1: to say no to some sort of trans human experience

977
00:55:59,280 --> 00:56:03,239
Speaker 1: such as a you know, a surgical implant that that

978
00:56:03,360 --> 00:56:06,520
Speaker 1: boost your cognitive ability. Well, I'm just talking about voluntary willingness.

979
00:56:06,560 --> 00:56:09,520
Speaker 1: So of course the question of who this is available

980
00:56:09,560 --> 00:56:11,800
Speaker 1: to is a big question, But it's a different question

981
00:56:12,320 --> 00:56:14,920
Speaker 1: I'm saying. Let's let's just assume we're in a crazy

982
00:56:14,960 --> 00:56:18,520
Speaker 1: scenario where it's freely available to everyone, and the only

983
00:56:18,600 --> 00:56:22,200
Speaker 1: question is do you want it? Will you voluntarily take it?

984
00:56:23,040 --> 00:56:25,879
Speaker 1: I'm not sure you're you're in the situation where if

985
00:56:25,880 --> 00:56:28,560
Speaker 1: you're if you're the first person, you'd probably say like, no,

986
00:56:28,719 --> 00:56:31,040
Speaker 1: I don't think I want that, it's too weird. If

987
00:56:31,080 --> 00:56:34,120
Speaker 1: you're the last person, you would probably be desperate to

988
00:56:34,200 --> 00:56:38,960
Speaker 1: catch up, Right, Would you voluntarily choose to remain at

989
00:56:39,000 --> 00:56:42,279
Speaker 1: a cognitive deficit to everybody else around you who has

990
00:56:42,360 --> 00:56:45,279
Speaker 1: upgraded themselves. I mean that's the thing. People are going

991
00:56:45,320 --> 00:56:47,000
Speaker 1: to take the risk. People are going to be hungry

992
00:56:47,080 --> 00:56:49,200
Speaker 1: enough to take the risk. Some people are going to

993
00:56:49,239 --> 00:56:51,959
Speaker 1: be comfortable enough not to but for how long? Yeah,

994
00:56:51,960 --> 00:56:54,840
Speaker 1: this is where we get into a scenario of something

995
00:56:54,880 --> 00:56:57,399
Speaker 1: that I would call maybe this isn't the best term

996
00:56:57,440 --> 00:56:59,400
Speaker 1: for it, but I'm going to try this out. The

997
00:56:59,560 --> 00:57:04,880
Speaker 1: term is irresistible availability, and so I'm going to posit

998
00:57:05,000 --> 00:57:09,759
Speaker 1: that bring computer interfaces and certain types of neural augmentation

999
00:57:10,280 --> 00:57:14,640
Speaker 1: cognitive augmentation, if they're possible, they are going to fall

1000
00:57:14,719 --> 00:57:18,800
Speaker 1: into this category of irresistible availability. So I would say,

1001
00:57:18,840 --> 00:57:23,240
Speaker 1: you know, consumer technology that looks scary at first tends

1002
00:57:23,280 --> 00:57:25,480
Speaker 1: to go through several phases. Of course, you've got the

1003
00:57:25,560 --> 00:57:27,920
Speaker 1: lab phase, right, You've got the alpha and beta phase.

1004
00:57:28,200 --> 00:57:32,000
Speaker 1: It's fairly contained, constrained. It's testing with people who are

1005
00:57:32,160 --> 00:57:35,120
Speaker 1: part who are in on the game basically, and then

1006
00:57:35,200 --> 00:57:36,960
Speaker 1: you've got to you've got a release, and you've got

1007
00:57:37,040 --> 00:57:40,520
Speaker 1: early adopters. These are people who are technologically adventurous and

1008
00:57:40,560 --> 00:57:43,480
Speaker 1: they start using this new thing. They tend to like

1009
00:57:43,600 --> 00:57:46,920
Speaker 1: to show off its advantages. They're more willing to accept

1010
00:57:47,080 --> 00:57:49,840
Speaker 1: risks that are, you know, that haven't been worked out yet.

1011
00:57:49,840 --> 00:57:51,920
Speaker 1: They're willing to get along with the kinks that haven't

1012
00:57:51,960 --> 00:57:56,080
Speaker 1: been solved. Then the intermediate adopters weighed in and at

1013
00:57:56,160 --> 00:58:00,400
Speaker 1: some point a new technology that originally seemed scary weird

1014
00:58:00,440 --> 00:58:05,920
Speaker 1: and unnecessary reaches a tipping point of convenience advantage and

1015
00:58:06,000 --> 00:58:09,440
Speaker 1: widespread adoption. And I would say there's definitely a social

1016
00:58:09,520 --> 00:58:13,640
Speaker 1: element to this. It's not just the true, you know,

1017
00:58:13,800 --> 00:58:17,960
Speaker 1: financial or time convenience it provides, but it's the fact

1018
00:58:18,040 --> 00:58:22,160
Speaker 1: that everybody else is doing it. And at some point

1019
00:58:22,200 --> 00:58:24,560
Speaker 1: it goes from something that I don't need and that

1020
00:58:24,680 --> 00:58:28,920
Speaker 1: scares me to something I couldn't imagine living without. And

1021
00:58:28,960 --> 00:58:31,680
Speaker 1: you can see this in many in many contexts. You

1022
00:58:31,800 --> 00:58:35,240
Speaker 1: think back to cell phones. How cell phones went from

1023
00:58:35,320 --> 00:58:39,440
Speaker 1: a like weird and unnecessary thing that extravagance. Yeah, like

1024
00:58:39,600 --> 00:58:42,280
Speaker 1: characters and movies had cell phones, especially in their car.

1025
00:58:42,360 --> 00:58:46,680
Speaker 1: Remember when I still enjoy watching like, you know, eighties

1026
00:58:46,720 --> 00:58:49,080
Speaker 1: films where there's a super villain of some sort in

1027
00:58:49,120 --> 00:58:51,480
Speaker 1: a crappy be movie. Of course they have that big,

1028
00:58:51,480 --> 00:58:55,320
Speaker 1: bulky car phone. You're like, Oh, imagine a world which

1029
00:58:55,560 --> 00:58:57,800
Speaker 1: someone makes a phone call from their car. Do you

1030
00:58:57,800 --> 00:59:01,680
Speaker 1: remember when paying for something online with a credit card

1031
00:59:01,960 --> 00:59:07,440
Speaker 1: was this really weird, scary and unnecessary thing. I specifically

1032
00:59:07,480 --> 00:59:10,920
Speaker 1: remember that thing, like, why would anybody ever use a

1033
00:59:10,960 --> 00:59:14,280
Speaker 1: credit card to pay for something on the internet. That's insane? Yeah,

1034
00:59:14,320 --> 00:59:16,160
Speaker 1: that's that's what you do. You call an eight hundred

1035
00:59:16,240 --> 00:59:19,680
Speaker 1: number and credit card that way, and then think about

1036
00:59:19,800 --> 00:59:24,000
Speaker 1: maybe mobile banking and transactions, ride sharing apps like Uber

1037
00:59:24,080 --> 00:59:28,080
Speaker 1: and lift. You just think about this progression from scary

1038
00:59:28,120 --> 00:59:34,000
Speaker 1: and unnecessary to fundamental. It's the progress of irresistible availability.

1039
00:59:34,120 --> 00:59:37,480
Speaker 1: And I very much think that neurotechnology could easily go

1040
00:59:37,600 --> 00:59:40,880
Speaker 1: in the same direction as it because the advantage has

1041
00:59:40,920 --> 00:59:44,440
Speaker 1: become more clear as the risks sort of get blurry

1042
00:59:44,560 --> 00:59:46,760
Speaker 1: and and go out of focus because so many people

1043
00:59:46,800 --> 00:59:50,320
Speaker 1: are using it. Uh, it just starts to look more

1044
00:59:50,360 --> 00:59:52,680
Speaker 1: and more like something that you can't go without. And

1045
00:59:52,720 --> 00:59:55,640
Speaker 1: then once you've tried it, you're in the pool. Yeah.

1046
00:59:55,680 --> 00:59:57,480
Speaker 1: I mean, I just keep thinking back to flying, like

1047
00:59:57,520 --> 01:00:00,840
Speaker 1: if if if flying makes sense and an airline, then

1048
01:00:00,880 --> 01:00:04,520
Speaker 1: everything makes sense. Yeah. You're clearly defining the will of

1049
01:00:04,560 --> 01:00:08,600
Speaker 1: God by getting in this machine and ascending like a bird. Um.

1050
01:00:08,640 --> 01:00:11,200
Speaker 1: So yeah, everything else is on the table too. Yeah. Man,

1051
01:00:11,280 --> 01:00:13,720
Speaker 1: And they don't even try to make it pleasant anymore,

1052
01:00:14,320 --> 01:00:16,760
Speaker 1: and people still can't stop doing it. Yeah, like they

1053
01:00:16,760 --> 01:00:18,720
Speaker 1: don't have to sugarcoat it. Yeah, you're in a flying

1054
01:00:18,760 --> 01:00:21,480
Speaker 1: death machine. I'm on board. Well, actually, to speak of

1055
01:00:21,480 --> 01:00:25,120
Speaker 1: death machines, of course, the classic comparison here is the car,

1056
01:00:25,240 --> 01:00:29,000
Speaker 1: the automobile, which is far more potentially deadly than just

1057
01:00:29,040 --> 01:00:32,040
Speaker 1: flying on an airline. Yeah. Imagine cars were new and

1058
01:00:32,080 --> 01:00:36,120
Speaker 1: nobody drove them, and they were just brand new invention,

1059
01:00:36,240 --> 01:00:41,000
Speaker 1: just now being debuted. And they told you, Okay, on average,

1060
01:00:41,080 --> 01:00:43,720
Speaker 1: about thirty three thousand people a year are going to

1061
01:00:43,880 --> 01:00:47,200
Speaker 1: die in these machines in the United States alone. Do

1062
01:00:47,240 --> 01:00:50,200
Speaker 1: you want one? Yeah, you would, you would say, I

1063
01:00:50,240 --> 01:00:53,640
Speaker 1: don't know. That sounds kind of dangerous. But the thing

1064
01:00:53,720 --> 01:00:57,440
Speaker 1: is we were born into this world. We're born into

1065
01:00:57,480 --> 01:00:59,480
Speaker 1: the world of the automobile, and so you just take

1066
01:00:59,520 --> 01:01:01,840
Speaker 1: it for granted. Yeah, these are the these are this

1067
01:01:01,920 --> 01:01:04,640
Speaker 1: is the roll of the dice we take every day.

1068
01:01:04,720 --> 01:01:07,560
Speaker 1: So of course it's normal. The convenience creeps in, the

1069
01:01:07,600 --> 01:01:11,520
Speaker 1: widespread adoption makes it look normal and okay, and so

1070
01:01:11,800 --> 01:01:16,520
Speaker 1: it's irresistible availability. It's just ubiquitous and you can't get

1071
01:01:16,560 --> 01:01:20,000
Speaker 1: around it. Yeah, and even things that are not available

1072
01:01:20,040 --> 01:01:23,640
Speaker 1: to everyone just become increasingly normal. Like I keep thinking

1073
01:01:23,680 --> 01:01:27,640
Speaker 1: back to uh too, like Time magazine headlines about test

1074
01:01:27,680 --> 01:01:31,240
Speaker 1: tube babies back in seven nineties. Oh yeah, the like

1075
01:01:31,280 --> 01:01:34,920
Speaker 1: original stigma about IVF. Yeah, and of course that has

1076
01:01:35,000 --> 01:01:39,920
Speaker 1: become It just became increasingly normal, just increasingly every day,

1077
01:01:39,960 --> 01:01:43,160
Speaker 1: like today. It's just another reproductive option that's on the table.

1078
01:01:43,400 --> 01:01:45,840
Speaker 1: And I mean, I think that was also influenced then

1079
01:01:46,000 --> 01:01:50,280
Speaker 1: by by social social stigma and certainly like misogyny, certain

1080
01:01:50,320 --> 01:01:54,000
Speaker 1: ideas about about you know, people trying to control what

1081
01:01:54,080 --> 01:01:58,800
Speaker 1: women's bodies are for. But yes, there is Yeah, just

1082
01:01:58,880 --> 01:02:04,360
Speaker 1: the technological ask act alone certainly has become more more accepted. Yeah,

1083
01:02:04,400 --> 01:02:07,280
Speaker 1: so it seems undeniable that will see the same thing

1084
01:02:07,360 --> 01:02:11,320
Speaker 1: occur with these various the idea of neural implants. Yeah,

1085
01:02:12,000 --> 01:02:15,160
Speaker 1: and this stuff may becoming a lot sooner than we think.

1086
01:02:15,200 --> 01:02:18,400
Speaker 1: So we we've talked about how there's already deep brain

1087
01:02:18,520 --> 01:02:22,160
Speaker 1: stimulation and robotic limbs. These are already in development. They

1088
01:02:22,320 --> 01:02:25,560
Speaker 1: already in some cases work pretty well. It's just a

1089
01:02:25,640 --> 01:02:28,440
Speaker 1: question of them being deployed more in the wild and

1090
01:02:28,480 --> 01:02:33,360
Speaker 1: becoming more widely available. But the question of cognitive augmentation,

1091
01:02:33,440 --> 01:02:36,240
Speaker 1: that's still more of a future concern. We haven't really

1092
01:02:36,280 --> 01:02:41,400
Speaker 1: discovered any strong entry ways into that arena of technology yet,

1093
01:02:41,600 --> 01:02:44,200
Speaker 1: but we could be closing that gap really fast, is

1094
01:02:44,240 --> 01:02:48,840
Speaker 1: what I'm saying. So, how about neural lace elon musk Oh, yeah,

1095
01:02:48,960 --> 01:02:51,400
Speaker 1: the neural lace. I love this idea because of course

1096
01:02:51,480 --> 01:02:54,480
Speaker 1: that the the The guy who coined the term neural

1097
01:02:54,560 --> 01:02:57,360
Speaker 1: lace is sci fi author Ian in Banks, one of

1098
01:02:57,400 --> 01:03:00,560
Speaker 1: my personal favorites always comes back to the Banks here. Yeah,

1099
01:03:00,600 --> 01:03:03,440
Speaker 1: and in his books, there's the culture which is this

1100
01:03:03,640 --> 01:03:08,640
Speaker 1: uh anarco utopian um far future society, and everybody in

1101
01:03:08,680 --> 01:03:13,400
Speaker 1: the culture has all these transhumanist adaptation such as like

1102
01:03:13,520 --> 01:03:16,360
Speaker 1: drug glands that they can they can gland various substances

1103
01:03:16,360 --> 01:03:18,600
Speaker 1: to change how they're feeling, and they all have this

1104
01:03:18,680 --> 01:03:22,120
Speaker 1: neural lace that enhances cognitive ability and kind of gives

1105
01:03:22,120 --> 01:03:25,400
Speaker 1: them a Basically, they're they're they're tied into a vast

1106
01:03:25,880 --> 01:03:28,360
Speaker 1: sea of information that they can call up as they need.

1107
01:03:28,680 --> 01:03:31,480
Speaker 1: So basically the idea is it is a way of

1108
01:03:31,680 --> 01:03:36,280
Speaker 1: robustly connecting the brain to the external information systems of

1109
01:03:36,320 --> 01:03:39,720
Speaker 1: the Internet or whatever their future version of the Internet is. Yeah,

1110
01:03:39,720 --> 01:03:42,560
Speaker 1: it would be like Google Brain. Yeah, uh yeah. So

1111
01:03:42,640 --> 01:03:46,440
Speaker 1: that's pretty close to what Musque seems to have in mind. Obviously,

1112
01:03:46,480 --> 01:03:48,880
Speaker 1: we're not there yet, but we do have prototypes of

1113
01:03:48,920 --> 01:03:52,360
Speaker 1: this sort of technology. It's it's nowhere near uh In

1114
01:03:52,520 --> 01:03:57,120
Speaker 1: in Banks level yet, but in March, Elon Musk was

1115
01:03:57,160 --> 01:04:01,640
Speaker 1: in the news promoting this new neurotext artupp called neural Link,

1116
01:04:01,680 --> 01:04:04,880
Speaker 1: which he basically plans to use as the vanguard of

1117
01:04:04,920 --> 01:04:08,680
Speaker 1: the coming neuro cyborg movement. And the idea of the

1118
01:04:08,720 --> 01:04:12,200
Speaker 1: neural lace is really the short version is it's this

1119
01:04:12,400 --> 01:04:17,080
Speaker 1: ultrafined mesh material that can be injected into the brain

1120
01:04:17,200 --> 01:04:19,600
Speaker 1: case with the needles. You get the needle inside the

1121
01:04:19,600 --> 01:04:23,520
Speaker 1: skull and you inject this mesh material over the outside

1122
01:04:23,520 --> 01:04:26,360
Speaker 1: of the brain, where it naturally unfurls to cover the

1123
01:04:26,400 --> 01:04:30,440
Speaker 1: outer surface of the cortices, and from here it melds

1124
01:04:30,520 --> 01:04:35,080
Speaker 1: with the brain and can offer supposedly extremely precise electrical

1125
01:04:35,120 --> 01:04:38,880
Speaker 1: feedback and electrical control of brain activity what they would

1126
01:04:38,920 --> 01:04:44,120
Speaker 1: call a quote direct cortical interface. And supposedly trial versions

1127
01:04:44,120 --> 01:04:47,000
Speaker 1: of this have been deployed in mice with apparently very

1128
01:04:47,040 --> 01:04:50,840
Speaker 1: few side effects, and so in the short term this

1129
01:04:50,920 --> 01:04:54,840
Speaker 1: might prove a useful treatment for various neurological disorders, you know,

1130
01:04:54,960 --> 01:05:00,600
Speaker 1: age associated neurodegenerative diseases like Alzheimer's and other neurological disorders.

1131
01:05:00,640 --> 01:05:04,040
Speaker 1: But Musk is not shy about the sci fi stuff.

1132
01:05:04,080 --> 01:05:08,240
Speaker 1: He's He's into his other motive, which is that ultimately

1133
01:05:08,280 --> 01:05:13,040
Speaker 1: he's interested in cognitive upgrades. He wants cognitive augmentation of

1134
01:05:13,080 --> 01:05:15,920
Speaker 1: the human brain. And one of the main reasons he's

1135
01:05:15,960 --> 01:05:18,280
Speaker 1: given publicly is that Musk is one of these people

1136
01:05:18,600 --> 01:05:23,520
Speaker 1: who's concerned about existential risk from artificial intelligence. So we've

1137
01:05:23,560 --> 01:05:26,320
Speaker 1: talked about this a little bit on the podcast before.

1138
01:05:26,360 --> 01:05:28,439
Speaker 1: We I think we talked about it in our Transhumanist

1139
01:05:28,520 --> 01:05:31,760
Speaker 1: Rapture War episodes, but maybe we should do a whole

1140
01:05:31,960 --> 01:05:34,880
Speaker 1: episode or episode series on this sometimes, because I do

1141
01:05:34,960 --> 01:05:38,680
Speaker 1: think the question of the risks posed by artificial intelligence

1142
01:05:38,720 --> 01:05:42,040
Speaker 1: is interesting, and one of the reasons it's interesting is

1143
01:05:42,080 --> 01:05:44,880
Speaker 1: that it's one of these questions where really smart people

1144
01:05:44,960 --> 01:05:47,240
Speaker 1: who really know what they're talking about, are totally on

1145
01:05:47,320 --> 01:05:50,080
Speaker 1: both sides of the issue. You hear people saying we

1146
01:05:50,120 --> 01:05:53,680
Speaker 1: need to be worrying about existential risk from AI right now,

1147
01:05:54,120 --> 01:05:56,840
Speaker 1: and other smart people are saying these people are lunatics.

1148
01:05:56,920 --> 01:06:00,560
Speaker 1: You this is not a concern. And not sure which

1149
01:06:00,600 --> 01:06:04,360
Speaker 1: side of the the issue I fall on. Yeah, it

1150
01:06:04,440 --> 01:06:07,880
Speaker 1: kind of depends on whose argument I'm reading. I kind

1151
01:06:07,880 --> 01:06:10,919
Speaker 1: of fall in line with with whoever whatever the last

1152
01:06:11,000 --> 01:06:14,120
Speaker 1: rational argument happen on the matter. Yeah, I guess I'm there.

1153
01:06:14,160 --> 01:06:17,360
Speaker 1: I I consider myself highly persuadable on this topic still,

1154
01:06:18,080 --> 01:06:20,600
Speaker 1: but anyway, Musk is one of these people who says, look,

1155
01:06:20,760 --> 01:06:24,960
Speaker 1: creating superhuman artificial intelligence is a genuine risk to us.

1156
01:06:25,240 --> 01:06:28,480
Speaker 1: We at the very least risk becoming irrelevant, if not

1157
01:06:28,800 --> 01:06:32,160
Speaker 1: risk being destroyed. And so he thinks that in order

1158
01:06:32,160 --> 01:06:35,000
Speaker 1: to avoid becoming irrelevant or worse in the face of

1159
01:06:35,040 --> 01:06:38,080
Speaker 1: superhuman AI, we've got to be willing to upgrade our

1160
01:06:38,120 --> 01:06:40,360
Speaker 1: brains to keep up with the machines. In other words,

1161
01:06:40,680 --> 01:06:42,640
Speaker 1: the only way to make sure that you don't fall

1162
01:06:42,800 --> 01:06:45,760
Speaker 1: victim to machine intelligence is to merge with it to

1163
01:06:45,840 --> 01:06:49,640
Speaker 1: become Yeah, and in his view, neural lace might be

1164
01:06:49,680 --> 01:06:51,640
Speaker 1: one way to get us there, giving us the power

1165
01:06:51,680 --> 01:06:55,000
Speaker 1: to augment our bio brains with your neurotechnology to become

1166
01:06:55,120 --> 01:06:59,640
Speaker 1: superhuman mind hybrids. So if the if the the AI

1167
01:06:59,720 --> 01:07:03,480
Speaker 1: got is essentially a cat's cradle design, we want to

1168
01:07:03,520 --> 01:07:05,560
Speaker 1: make sure we're the fingers. We want to make sure

1169
01:07:05,600 --> 01:07:11,760
Speaker 1: we're uh, you know, an important aspect of its spiritual body. Yeah,

1170
01:07:11,800 --> 01:07:13,720
Speaker 1: even if we're not, it's and I mean, we also

1171
01:07:13,760 --> 01:07:16,920
Speaker 1: don't want to be just some irrelevant obstacle to whatever

1172
01:07:17,000 --> 01:07:19,880
Speaker 1: its goals. Are we want to be thoroughly integrated with

1173
01:07:19,960 --> 01:07:23,200
Speaker 1: it and its motives. Yeah, which kind of comes back

1174
01:07:23,200 --> 01:07:25,400
Speaker 1: to n in Banks. That's that that's kind of how

1175
01:07:25,440 --> 01:07:28,920
Speaker 1: he he weaves the humans and the humanoids of the

1176
01:07:28,960 --> 01:07:32,720
Speaker 1: culture into everything, Like they're the minds, the ai s

1177
01:07:32,800 --> 01:07:35,240
Speaker 1: that that ultimately rule everything and are making all the

1178
01:07:35,280 --> 01:07:39,440
Speaker 1: hard decisions. They see the value and having human operatives,

1179
01:07:39,880 --> 01:07:43,640
Speaker 1: and they also have this is kind of like like

1180
01:07:43,840 --> 01:07:47,000
Speaker 1: hard hard part of their programming, Like I guess they're

1181
01:07:47,120 --> 01:07:51,280
Speaker 1: sort of corporate culture, is that there's something important about

1182
01:07:51,960 --> 01:07:54,960
Speaker 1: human life. Yeah. Now, if you're still one of those

1183
01:07:54,960 --> 01:07:57,560
Speaker 1: people out there saying, Okay, I'm just never going to

1184
01:07:57,680 --> 01:08:00,760
Speaker 1: get any kind of neurological implants that By the way,

1185
01:08:00,800 --> 01:08:04,920
Speaker 1: I'm not advising people never get neurological implants. I'm more

1186
01:08:05,000 --> 01:08:07,800
Speaker 1: saying that the people designing these things really need to

1187
01:08:07,800 --> 01:08:11,400
Speaker 1: be thinking super hard about security from day one. I

1188
01:08:11,400 --> 01:08:13,840
Speaker 1: guess we're way past day one, but from day whatever.

1189
01:08:13,880 --> 01:08:17,680
Speaker 1: This is right now, But you don't just have to

1190
01:08:17,720 --> 01:08:21,599
Speaker 1: worry about the future of neurological influence from technology if

1191
01:08:21,680 --> 01:08:24,720
Speaker 1: you get an implant. There are other ways to influence

1192
01:08:24,760 --> 01:08:28,000
Speaker 1: the brain with technology. Yeah, yeah, I mean I mentioned

1193
01:08:28,000 --> 01:08:30,640
Speaker 1: this a little bit earlier. But I think another potential

1194
01:08:31,040 --> 01:08:34,840
Speaker 1: exploit exploitation would be, uh, you know, if you had

1195
01:08:34,920 --> 01:08:39,160
Speaker 1: some manner of external fine tuned electromagnetic cranial stimulation device,

1196
01:08:39,439 --> 01:08:42,120
Speaker 1: perhaps when the aids of the treatment of a psychological condition,

1197
01:08:42,240 --> 01:08:47,120
Speaker 1: or perhaps even works recreationally. Imagine malware or hacking scheme

1198
01:08:47,200 --> 01:08:50,960
Speaker 1: that turns such brain functioning management on its ear. You know,

1199
01:08:51,000 --> 01:08:53,240
Speaker 1: how fast would you be able to rip the thing off?

1200
01:08:53,320 --> 01:08:56,400
Speaker 1: And oh, I can't use it uh in anymore? You know,

1201
01:08:56,800 --> 01:08:58,000
Speaker 1: I'm gonna have to go a day. I'm gonna have

1202
01:08:58,000 --> 01:08:59,200
Speaker 1: to bring this thing into the shop. How am I

1203
01:08:59,200 --> 01:09:02,559
Speaker 1: going to get across down without my uh my, my

1204
01:09:02,640 --> 01:09:05,639
Speaker 1: god helmet to get me there? Now, these external devices

1205
01:09:05,680 --> 01:09:08,400
Speaker 1: I think are a little less plausible on this account

1206
01:09:08,439 --> 01:09:11,720
Speaker 1: than implanted devices are because they're less precise. Right, So

1207
01:09:11,800 --> 01:09:17,160
Speaker 1: you've got transcranial electrical stimulation, also transcranial magnetic stimulation, these

1208
01:09:17,160 --> 01:09:19,840
Speaker 1: things that you know, yeah, play electromagnetic force to the

1209
01:09:19,840 --> 01:09:23,320
Speaker 1: outside of the head. Uh. When I've seen experiments with

1210
01:09:23,360 --> 01:09:26,840
Speaker 1: these types of things so far, the results they're able

1211
01:09:26,880 --> 01:09:31,519
Speaker 1: to induce in the brain are very very blunt and broad,

1212
01:09:31,640 --> 01:09:33,720
Speaker 1: if you know what I mean. They're not nearly the

1213
01:09:33,800 --> 01:09:37,639
Speaker 1: kinds of minute targeted results that you would get by

1214
01:09:37,680 --> 01:09:42,080
Speaker 1: implanting electrical devices inside the skull or inside the brain. Still,

1215
01:09:42,120 --> 01:09:46,360
Speaker 1: if it keeps me from from auditing my body theting's appropriately,

1216
01:09:46,439 --> 01:09:52,000
Speaker 1: then it's gonna ruin my week. Yeah. So so on

1217
01:09:52,000 --> 01:09:55,080
Speaker 1: one hand, I do think this is a real concern.

1218
01:09:55,160 --> 01:09:57,360
Speaker 1: And I should also mention that one of the other

1219
01:09:57,640 --> 01:10:01,120
Speaker 1: papers we looked at was a paper by Saldi Costa,

1220
01:10:01,200 --> 01:10:05,080
Speaker 1: Dale R. Stevens, and Jeremy A. Hansen in UH from

1221
01:10:05,080 --> 01:10:09,000
Speaker 1: the International Conference on Human Aspects of Information Security, Privacy

1222
01:10:09,000 --> 01:10:12,240
Speaker 1: and Trust from and essentially what they look at is

1223
01:10:12,280 --> 01:10:16,839
Speaker 1: trying to create a broad architecture for an intrusion prevention

1224
01:10:16,920 --> 01:10:20,320
Speaker 1: system for brain computer interfaces. That's kind of a hard

1225
01:10:20,320 --> 01:10:22,680
Speaker 1: thing to design at this point, because you know, you

1226
01:10:22,720 --> 01:10:25,200
Speaker 1: don't know exactly what all these systems are gonna look like.

1227
01:10:25,640 --> 01:10:27,800
Speaker 1: But the basic system they come up with is that,

1228
01:10:27,840 --> 01:10:30,880
Speaker 1: you know, you'd you'd have a two tiered security system

1229
01:10:30,920 --> 01:10:35,479
Speaker 1: where any UH in Internet or external input coming into

1230
01:10:35,479 --> 01:10:38,000
Speaker 1: the brain has to go through what's known as an

1231
01:10:38,000 --> 01:10:41,719
Speaker 1: intrusion prevention system, which is just a system that tries

1232
01:10:41,800 --> 01:10:44,879
Speaker 1: to screen traffic passing into a network or a machine,

1233
01:10:45,280 --> 01:10:47,920
Speaker 1: and if traffic looks suspicious, it says, sorry, you can't

1234
01:10:47,960 --> 01:10:50,400
Speaker 1: go in, And then you'd have to pair that with

1235
01:10:50,479 --> 01:10:53,240
Speaker 1: And I love this sort of the brain equivalent of

1236
01:10:53,280 --> 01:10:57,760
Speaker 1: an anti virus program. Anti virus program looks at what

1237
01:10:57,920 --> 01:11:00,559
Speaker 1: code is executing on this computer right now, what what

1238
01:11:00,680 --> 01:11:04,920
Speaker 1: executive functions are happening, and if it sees suspicious activity,

1239
01:11:05,360 --> 01:11:08,320
Speaker 1: it shuts it down. The brain version would have to

1240
01:11:08,520 --> 01:11:11,400
Speaker 1: use some kind of signal processing to look at what's

1241
01:11:11,400 --> 01:11:13,600
Speaker 1: happening in the brain, or in the or in the

1242
01:11:13,600 --> 01:11:16,720
Speaker 1: neural device and say, does any of this looks suspicious,

1243
01:11:16,760 --> 01:11:19,840
Speaker 1: like something the brain wouldn't normally be doing, and if so,

1244
01:11:20,040 --> 01:11:22,639
Speaker 1: you might have to disconnect the neural device or shut

1245
01:11:22,680 --> 01:11:25,000
Speaker 1: it down. Yeah, and this is an area where I

1246
01:11:25,040 --> 01:11:27,000
Speaker 1: can just imagine this kind of instead of going just

1247
01:11:27,280 --> 01:11:30,800
Speaker 1: full fledged face forward into a thought police scenario, we're

1248
01:11:30,840 --> 01:11:34,080
Speaker 1: kind of backing into one, because you end up with

1249
01:11:34,080 --> 01:11:38,760
Speaker 1: a situation where potentially where you have we're human cognition.

1250
01:11:38,920 --> 01:11:42,759
Speaker 1: Is this byproduct of organic and machine right become increasingly

1251
01:11:42,800 --> 01:11:46,120
Speaker 1: cyborg it's it becomes and then therefore any kind of

1252
01:11:46,360 --> 01:11:49,439
Speaker 1: intrusive thoughts or even criminal thoughts, it becomes kind of

1253
01:11:49,479 --> 01:11:53,200
Speaker 1: like bad behavior in a dog, right, not a wild dog,

1254
01:11:53,240 --> 01:11:57,400
Speaker 1: but a pet animal because whatever, what always happens, Like

1255
01:11:57,400 --> 01:12:00,240
Speaker 1: people are saying, oh, well is this because the is this?

1256
01:12:00,280 --> 01:12:02,439
Speaker 1: The owner's thought is that the dog's fault. And it

1257
01:12:02,520 --> 01:12:05,120
Speaker 1: is there any way to really distinguish between all of

1258
01:12:05,160 --> 01:12:08,240
Speaker 1: these things because the condition of the dog is so

1259
01:12:08,280 --> 01:12:13,559
Speaker 1: manipulated and so changed by its relationship with humans. Yeah,

1260
01:12:13,600 --> 01:12:15,240
Speaker 1: that's a very good point. I mean, I can see

1261
01:12:15,280 --> 01:12:19,720
Speaker 1: a scenario where in the future people might have say,

1262
01:12:19,720 --> 01:12:22,760
Speaker 1: you've got a deep brain stimulator in your head, or

1263
01:12:22,800 --> 01:12:25,240
Speaker 1: you've just got neural lace or something like that, some

1264
01:12:25,360 --> 01:12:30,439
Speaker 1: kind of neuroperipheral technology that changes the way your brain works,

1265
01:12:30,520 --> 01:12:33,960
Speaker 1: and then you do something that you say that didn't

1266
01:12:34,000 --> 01:12:37,680
Speaker 1: seem like me. Did the neuroprosthetic make me do it.

1267
01:12:37,760 --> 01:12:40,960
Speaker 1: Let's say I went and robbed a bank. Could I

1268
01:12:41,040 --> 01:12:44,120
Speaker 1: sue the company that made my neuroprosthetics and say this

1269
01:12:44,200 --> 01:12:46,360
Speaker 1: is totally out of character for me. I don't know

1270
01:12:46,400 --> 01:12:48,400
Speaker 1: why I did that. I never would have robbed a

1271
01:12:48,400 --> 01:12:51,680
Speaker 1: bank normally, And I think what happened is that my

1272
01:12:51,800 --> 01:12:56,600
Speaker 1: neuroprosthetic malfunctioned and it artificially pumped up my aggressiveness and

1273
01:12:56,680 --> 01:13:00,000
Speaker 1: lowered my inhibitions and did all this stuff that temporary

1274
01:13:00,000 --> 01:13:02,640
Speaker 1: really turned me into a bank robber, and that's not

1275
01:13:02,760 --> 01:13:06,200
Speaker 1: my biological brain's fault. Or it could be that you

1276
01:13:06,200 --> 01:13:09,280
Speaker 1: went to the wrong website, you clicked on something you

1277
01:13:09,280 --> 01:13:13,200
Speaker 1: you shouldn't have, and that somehow that managed to like

1278
01:13:13,280 --> 01:13:15,960
Speaker 1: follow up the chain to your brain itself and alter

1279
01:13:16,080 --> 01:13:19,640
Speaker 1: your behavior. Oh, I didn't even think about that with neuroprosthetics.

1280
01:13:19,640 --> 01:13:22,160
Speaker 1: So it could be something you click on on the Internet,

1281
01:13:22,280 --> 01:13:25,519
Speaker 1: or some search you do on Amazon can now not

1282
01:13:25,640 --> 01:13:28,559
Speaker 1: only follow you around it showing you ads at different websites,

1283
01:13:28,640 --> 01:13:30,840
Speaker 1: but it can follow you into your brain. Or maybe

1284
01:13:30,840 --> 01:13:33,600
Speaker 1: they didn't even hack you, say they hacked an advertisement

1285
01:13:33,640 --> 01:13:37,080
Speaker 1: that you passed, and that advertisement communicates with devices that

1286
01:13:37,160 --> 01:13:40,519
Speaker 1: you have that you know, so that it can you

1287
01:13:40,560 --> 01:13:42,280
Speaker 1: can figure out what your behavior is and you know,

1288
01:13:42,439 --> 01:13:45,479
Speaker 1: feed you the right advertisements, maybe in your dreams or something.

1289
01:13:46,360 --> 01:13:50,280
Speaker 1: Yeah uh yeah. So the main thing, my main point

1290
01:13:50,320 --> 01:13:54,360
Speaker 1: in this episode is that I think that we cannot

1291
01:13:54,439 --> 01:14:00,360
Speaker 1: depend on the consumers opting out as a way to

1292
01:14:00,439 --> 01:14:05,040
Speaker 1: avoid these risks because of this this irresistible availability thing.

1293
01:14:05,120 --> 01:14:08,320
Speaker 1: As these things become more available, become more widespread, and

1294
01:14:08,400 --> 01:14:11,439
Speaker 1: become more useful. People are just not going to be

1295
01:14:11,520 --> 01:14:15,920
Speaker 1: able to resist the urge to use them. And uh

1296
01:14:15,920 --> 01:14:18,599
Speaker 1: and in some cases there you know, if you suffer

1297
01:14:18,720 --> 01:14:21,080
Speaker 1: like an injury or a disability or something, there's no

1298
01:14:21,160 --> 01:14:23,639
Speaker 1: reason you you you should want to resist them, right,

1299
01:14:23,680 --> 01:14:27,320
Speaker 1: They will give you lost functionality back. I mean, unless

1300
01:14:27,439 --> 01:14:31,120
Speaker 1: there's an end to the advancement technology or say there's

1301
01:14:31,160 --> 01:14:34,640
Speaker 1: a buttle arian jahad and and people as as you

1302
01:14:34,640 --> 01:14:38,000
Speaker 1: know in mass decide no, we we you know, we're

1303
01:14:38,040 --> 01:14:40,160
Speaker 1: not going to cross this point. We're gonna put in

1304
01:14:40,200 --> 01:14:44,280
Speaker 1: place laws that keep us from augmenting ourselves and becoming

1305
01:14:44,760 --> 01:14:48,080
Speaker 1: and thinking like machines. Yeah. So I'm saying you can't

1306
01:14:48,120 --> 01:14:52,160
Speaker 1: depend on the individual consumer or patient to opt out.

1307
01:14:52,360 --> 01:14:54,760
Speaker 1: That that is not something that should be part of

1308
01:14:54,800 --> 01:14:58,160
Speaker 1: the thinking on this. It should be that security concerns

1309
01:14:58,600 --> 01:15:03,160
Speaker 1: are absolutely take can into consideration from day whatever this

1310
01:15:03,280 --> 01:15:06,519
Speaker 1: is now, because it's never from day one, it's always

1311
01:15:06,520 --> 01:15:10,400
Speaker 1: going to be like day you gotta you gotta be

1312
01:15:10,479 --> 01:15:13,200
Speaker 1: ahead of those brain hackers. Yeah, all right, so there

1313
01:15:13,200 --> 01:15:16,240
Speaker 1: you have it. Hopefully we gave everyone some you know ace,

1314
01:15:16,400 --> 01:15:19,759
Speaker 1: you know, definitely some some room for a little paranoia

1315
01:15:19,800 --> 01:15:22,439
Speaker 1: and a little sci fi wondering, for sure, but also

1316
01:15:22,520 --> 01:15:28,000
Speaker 1: just some some some real facts about technology and security

1317
01:15:28,400 --> 01:15:31,840
Speaker 1: and how the how the the footfalls tend to go

1318
01:15:32,280 --> 01:15:35,759
Speaker 1: in this trek, and one hopes those footfalls are chosen

1319
01:15:35,800 --> 01:15:39,120
Speaker 1: by one's own free will. Yes indeed so hey. If

1320
01:15:39,120 --> 01:15:41,760
Speaker 1: you want to uh learn more about this topic, head

1321
01:15:41,760 --> 01:15:43,360
Speaker 1: on over to stuff to Blow your Mind dot com.

1322
01:15:43,560 --> 01:15:46,599
Speaker 1: That's where we'll find all of our podcast episodes, blog posts,

1323
01:15:46,800 --> 01:15:48,760
Speaker 1: links out to our various social media accounts such as

1324
01:15:48,800 --> 01:15:51,960
Speaker 1: face but Twitter, Tumbler, Instagram. We're on all those things,

1325
01:15:52,040 --> 01:15:54,680
Speaker 1: and the landing page for this episode will include some

1326
01:15:54,720 --> 01:15:56,559
Speaker 1: links out to the some of the sources we talked

1327
01:15:56,600 --> 01:15:58,920
Speaker 1: about here today. And if you want to get in

1328
01:15:58,920 --> 01:16:01,000
Speaker 1: touch with us directly to of us feedback on this

1329
01:16:01,040 --> 01:16:02,920
Speaker 1: episode or any other, or to let us know if

1330
01:16:03,000 --> 01:16:07,760
Speaker 1: you think you would accept a voluntarily opt in neuro enhancement,

1331
01:16:08,200 --> 01:16:10,719
Speaker 1: or if you want to suggest topics for the future

1332
01:16:10,840 --> 01:16:13,080
Speaker 1: or anything like that, you can always email us at

1333
01:16:13,080 --> 01:16:26,960
Speaker 1: blow the Mind at how stuff works dot com for

1334
01:16:27,120 --> 01:16:29,439
Speaker 1: more on this and thousands of other topics. Is it

1335
01:16:29,520 --> 01:16:38,960
Speaker 1: how stuff works dot com, lovel bl