1 00:00:04,840 --> 00:00:08,520 Speaker 1: My guest today is Ben and Ben Tealablue, Senior director 2 00:00:08,560 --> 00:00:12,440 Speaker 1: for the Foundation for Defensive Democracies Iran program, where he 3 00:00:12,480 --> 00:00:16,720 Speaker 1: oversees the depth of FDD's work on Iran in addition 4 00:00:16,760 --> 00:00:21,119 Speaker 1: to serving as senior Fellow specializing in Iranian security and 5 00:00:21,280 --> 00:00:24,119 Speaker 1: political issues. I should say that I am a huge 6 00:00:24,239 --> 00:00:29,400 Speaker 1: fan of the Foundation for Defensive Democracies. They do remarkably 7 00:00:29,440 --> 00:00:34,199 Speaker 1: sophisticated and effective work. He's joining me today to discuss 8 00:00:34,240 --> 00:00:39,159 Speaker 1: the evolving conflict with the US Israel versus Iran and 9 00:00:39,240 --> 00:00:57,760 Speaker 1: what we can expect in the coming days and weeks. Benham, 10 00:00:57,840 --> 00:01:00,840 Speaker 1: welcome and thank you for joining me again. No News World. 11 00:01:01,560 --> 00:01:03,600 Speaker 2: It's always a pleasure to be with you, sir. And 12 00:01:03,640 --> 00:01:05,560 Speaker 2: then honor and thanks for the kind words you said 13 00:01:05,560 --> 00:01:07,759 Speaker 2: about FUD. If you love what you do, you never 14 00:01:07,760 --> 00:01:08,840 Speaker 2: work a day in your life. 15 00:01:09,120 --> 00:01:12,080 Speaker 1: Yeah, that's exactly right. Other people think it's your hobby 16 00:01:12,120 --> 00:01:14,160 Speaker 1: and luckily you paid for it. You are one of 17 00:01:14,200 --> 00:01:17,360 Speaker 1: the leading experts and you watched this every day. Were 18 00:01:17,400 --> 00:01:21,240 Speaker 1: you surprised when the US and Israel launch strikes in 19 00:01:21,319 --> 00:01:22,280 Speaker 1: a ram? 20 00:01:22,720 --> 00:01:26,720 Speaker 2: It really did feel given the drum beat politically and militarily. 21 00:01:26,760 --> 00:01:29,640 Speaker 2: In twenty twenty six, as well as the multiple red 22 00:01:29,640 --> 00:01:32,600 Speaker 2: lines President Trump had drawn on the backdrop of the 23 00:01:32,640 --> 00:01:36,080 Speaker 2: repressed protests in January of this year that military action 24 00:01:36,319 --> 00:01:39,880 Speaker 2: was a matter of when and not if. And regardless 25 00:01:39,880 --> 00:01:42,440 Speaker 2: of our analysis here in the West, it seems like 26 00:01:42,480 --> 00:01:45,600 Speaker 2: the hubris of Iran Supreme Leader and other officials in 27 00:01:45,600 --> 00:01:48,600 Speaker 2: the Islamic Republic seemed to have missed that it was 28 00:01:48,640 --> 00:01:50,240 Speaker 2: going to be a matter of when, not if. And 29 00:01:50,280 --> 00:01:53,120 Speaker 2: they held an above ground meeting in a compound in 30 00:01:53,160 --> 00:01:56,240 Speaker 2: broad daylight. And that's exactly how the war began, with 31 00:01:56,320 --> 00:01:59,160 Speaker 2: the decapitation of the Supreme Leader and commander in chief. 32 00:02:00,200 --> 00:02:04,040 Speaker 1: Is an exaggerator in the media, or was it in 33 00:02:04,080 --> 00:02:09,280 Speaker 1: fact sort of amazing that apparently Massad Israeli intelligence people, 34 00:02:09,800 --> 00:02:13,400 Speaker 1: we're able to track this entire thing, and then the 35 00:02:13,440 --> 00:02:16,799 Speaker 1: American military, with the President's approval, we're able to move 36 00:02:16,840 --> 00:02:20,200 Speaker 1: in like ten hours. Streissman is almost like a movie. 37 00:02:20,720 --> 00:02:23,519 Speaker 2: It does. In fact, they say art imitates life, life 38 00:02:23,600 --> 00:02:26,280 Speaker 2: imitates art. I don't know which way it is these days, 39 00:02:26,360 --> 00:02:29,919 Speaker 2: because throughout the backdrop of this war and the protests, 40 00:02:30,280 --> 00:02:34,280 Speaker 2: new seasons episodes of Tehran on Apple TV had also 41 00:02:34,320 --> 00:02:36,520 Speaker 2: been dropping on a weekly basis. And people didn't know 42 00:02:36,560 --> 00:02:39,400 Speaker 2: what to watch. What was more nail biting reality or 43 00:02:39,440 --> 00:02:42,680 Speaker 2: the fiction on television. But clearly something is in inspiration 44 00:02:43,200 --> 00:02:45,799 Speaker 2: here for something else, whether it's a spy novel, a movie, 45 00:02:45,840 --> 00:02:49,120 Speaker 2: or a TV series, Because certainly the dribs and drabs 46 00:02:49,120 --> 00:02:51,640 Speaker 2: of reporting coming out about the spycraft, both from the 47 00:02:51,639 --> 00:02:53,600 Speaker 2: agency as well as from the Mosad, by the way 48 00:02:53,880 --> 00:02:56,680 Speaker 2: that a lot up to this operation, are exceptionally impressive, 49 00:02:57,000 --> 00:03:01,960 Speaker 2: both in terms of risk tolerance, professionalism and operational capacity. 50 00:03:02,080 --> 00:03:07,600 Speaker 1: We saw the Israelis run an astonishing operation against Hezbollah, 51 00:03:08,360 --> 00:03:11,480 Speaker 1: and then we saw them methodically go after the leaders 52 00:03:11,480 --> 00:03:14,680 Speaker 1: of Hamas. But it seems to me in these movement 53 00:03:14,760 --> 00:03:18,280 Speaker 1: kind of systems sometimes all you're doing is clearing way 54 00:03:18,320 --> 00:03:22,680 Speaker 1: for a more aggressive, younger leadership. To what extent do 55 00:03:22,720 --> 00:03:26,640 Speaker 1: you think the leadership in Iran is crippled or is 56 00:03:26,680 --> 00:03:29,200 Speaker 1: simply transferring to a new generation. 57 00:03:30,440 --> 00:03:33,560 Speaker 2: Well, some of this shifts are not necessarily generational as 58 00:03:33,680 --> 00:03:36,200 Speaker 2: much as they are institutional and political. I think you're 59 00:03:36,280 --> 00:03:39,440 Speaker 2: right to be skeptical of systems like the Islamar Republic, 60 00:03:39,440 --> 00:03:44,400 Speaker 2: where unfortunately the Islamism and the authoritarianism has been institutionalized 61 00:03:44,680 --> 00:03:48,080 Speaker 2: against the backdrop of a national security deep state. In fact, 62 00:03:48,080 --> 00:03:50,640 Speaker 2: that's what made Ali Jamine, as an eighty six year 63 00:03:50,640 --> 00:03:53,520 Speaker 2: old autocrat, still effective, even though he may not have 64 00:03:53,560 --> 00:03:56,560 Speaker 2: been managing the day to day operations of the regime 65 00:03:56,720 --> 00:03:59,440 Speaker 2: internally and externally. And so right now, if I have 66 00:03:59,520 --> 00:04:02,400 Speaker 2: to say, there are a constellation of institutions, probably two 67 00:04:02,480 --> 00:04:05,560 Speaker 2: that come to mind, others we can discuss which are 68 00:04:05,600 --> 00:04:08,040 Speaker 2: really running the show right now. So, regardless of who 69 00:04:08,040 --> 00:04:11,120 Speaker 2: becomes quote unquote the next Supreme leader, if the Islamic 70 00:04:11,120 --> 00:04:14,520 Speaker 2: Republic survives this thing, and if the US and Israeli 71 00:04:14,560 --> 00:04:18,360 Speaker 2: confrontation will be limited to just defanging the regime of missiles, 72 00:04:18,720 --> 00:04:21,200 Speaker 2: and then that which would remain would be, in my view, 73 00:04:21,279 --> 00:04:27,000 Speaker 2: a hardened, coursened, unpopular riddle national security deep state, and 74 00:04:27,120 --> 00:04:30,000 Speaker 2: it would be led by the Supreme National Security Council 75 00:04:30,040 --> 00:04:33,120 Speaker 2: as the most important decision making body in the country 76 00:04:33,480 --> 00:04:36,880 Speaker 2: and the military, in particular the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 77 00:04:36,960 --> 00:04:39,239 Speaker 2: as the most important security force in that country. 78 00:04:39,720 --> 00:04:45,599 Speaker 1: To what extent does the Revolutionary Guard compete with the 79 00:04:45,640 --> 00:04:48,719 Speaker 1: regular military and to what extent do they have a 80 00:04:48,760 --> 00:04:50,920 Speaker 1: stable kind of relationship. 81 00:04:51,880 --> 00:04:55,760 Speaker 2: Well, despite the command lines on paper where both the ARTEESH, 82 00:04:55,839 --> 00:04:59,039 Speaker 2: which is the national military, and the IERGC, which is 83 00:04:59,080 --> 00:05:03,440 Speaker 2: the newer revolution institution, that ideological military that is passd 84 00:05:03,440 --> 00:05:06,799 Speaker 2: with defending the revolution rather than the state. On paper, 85 00:05:06,839 --> 00:05:09,720 Speaker 2: they're supposed to feed upwards into this Iranian version of 86 00:05:09,760 --> 00:05:13,360 Speaker 2: the Joint Staff called the Armed Forces General Staff, which 87 00:05:13,440 --> 00:05:16,200 Speaker 2: during wartime is rotated out to be led by this 88 00:05:16,240 --> 00:05:20,599 Speaker 2: other entity called the Hatamlambia Central Headquarters. Now all of 89 00:05:20,600 --> 00:05:22,440 Speaker 2: that is just a fancy way to stay on paper 90 00:05:22,440 --> 00:05:25,279 Speaker 2: that the regime says that they don't compete, but in reality, 91 00:05:25,320 --> 00:05:29,200 Speaker 2: not only is there a competition, but the competition is over. Unfortunately, 92 00:05:29,240 --> 00:05:32,240 Speaker 2: the national security state in Iran has preference the revolutionary 93 00:05:32,279 --> 00:05:36,320 Speaker 2: military over the regular military, whether that's resources, whether that's funding, 94 00:05:36,360 --> 00:05:40,640 Speaker 2: whether that's core capabilities, that's treatment and care for its veterans, 95 00:05:41,040 --> 00:05:43,120 Speaker 2: all of that, which is precisely why there is such 96 00:05:43,120 --> 00:05:46,640 Speaker 2: a chasm between the ARTECHE and the IRGC. And despite 97 00:05:46,960 --> 00:05:49,760 Speaker 2: attempts by the Iranian government of the past four decades 98 00:05:50,120 --> 00:05:55,120 Speaker 2: to ideologically indoctrinate multiple generations of new rtech members, it 99 00:05:55,279 --> 00:05:59,720 Speaker 2: still believed that this is a more traditional professional military organization. 100 00:05:59,520 --> 00:06:04,800 Speaker 1: Is likelihood as the Revolutionary Guard has weakened that the 101 00:06:04,800 --> 00:06:10,159 Speaker 1: military may decide that its future is separate, and that 102 00:06:10,160 --> 00:06:12,960 Speaker 1: there comes a point in time were they prepared to 103 00:06:12,960 --> 00:06:13,640 Speaker 1: seize power. 104 00:06:14,640 --> 00:06:17,400 Speaker 2: Well, this needed to be, in my view, a persistent 105 00:06:17,520 --> 00:06:21,520 Speaker 2: part of America's intelligence war against the Islamic Republic. It 106 00:06:21,520 --> 00:06:23,640 Speaker 2: would be too late to start now, but better late 107 00:06:23,680 --> 00:06:25,960 Speaker 2: than ever. But one would have hoped that this would 108 00:06:25,960 --> 00:06:28,960 Speaker 2: have been a decades long effort how to press upon 109 00:06:29,040 --> 00:06:32,200 Speaker 2: the fissures between these competing services so that the right 110 00:06:32,240 --> 00:06:36,640 Speaker 2: time that pulling apart would be framed as patriotic duty 111 00:06:36,960 --> 00:06:39,160 Speaker 2: and the arteche could do essentially what they did in 112 00:06:39,240 --> 00:06:42,320 Speaker 2: nineteen seventy nine, which was at that point they declared neutrality, 113 00:06:42,360 --> 00:06:45,359 Speaker 2: and unfortunately that's when all many declared victory impounced. But 114 00:06:45,440 --> 00:06:48,000 Speaker 2: here they could not only declare neutrality but flip and 115 00:06:48,080 --> 00:06:50,560 Speaker 2: empower the street against the state. There is a real 116 00:06:50,640 --> 00:06:53,680 Speaker 2: argument to play to running patriotism and to running nationals 117 00:06:53,680 --> 00:06:56,000 Speaker 2: and to get that. I think at this moment in time, 118 00:06:56,040 --> 00:06:58,400 Speaker 2: they're worried about their faith, they're worried about their future. 119 00:06:58,760 --> 00:07:00,760 Speaker 2: That is right now, far off off. But one would 120 00:07:00,760 --> 00:07:02,800 Speaker 2: hope that this would have been a core line of 121 00:07:02,800 --> 00:07:06,160 Speaker 2: effort for a foreign intelligence service to try to facilitate. 122 00:07:06,680 --> 00:07:08,760 Speaker 1: Did you agree that we have to replace the regime? 123 00:07:09,840 --> 00:07:13,160 Speaker 2: I certainly think the only strategy that provides President Trump 124 00:07:13,360 --> 00:07:16,600 Speaker 2: with the endgame that he said is a win would 125 00:07:16,600 --> 00:07:19,160 Speaker 2: be replacing the regime. That's really the only art of 126 00:07:19,200 --> 00:07:21,120 Speaker 2: the deal here to be had. If I could borrow 127 00:07:21,200 --> 00:07:24,200 Speaker 2: or appropriate a phrase, anything that leaves this regime in 128 00:07:24,280 --> 00:07:26,400 Speaker 2: power will only give it the time and space to 129 00:07:26,480 --> 00:07:29,440 Speaker 2: rebuild an exact revenge. And I do worry here about 130 00:07:29,480 --> 00:07:32,720 Speaker 2: the President's legacy because he can absolutely get a military 131 00:07:32,760 --> 00:07:35,760 Speaker 2: win in short order. The challenges how can he nest 132 00:07:35,840 --> 00:07:38,880 Speaker 2: that into a political win, both for American national security 133 00:07:38,920 --> 00:07:42,200 Speaker 2: but also politically for his own legacy, because it's highly likely, 134 00:07:42,240 --> 00:07:44,360 Speaker 2: given the fault lines of the Democratic Party and the 135 00:07:44,400 --> 00:07:46,920 Speaker 2: Republican Party, they may not have what it takes to 136 00:07:46,920 --> 00:07:48,240 Speaker 2: go out the Islamic Republic. 137 00:07:48,280 --> 00:07:53,200 Speaker 1: Again, well, when you look at it, the Islamic Republic 138 00:07:53,240 --> 00:07:56,960 Speaker 1: will have learned lessons that it will apply to deepen 139 00:07:57,680 --> 00:08:00,760 Speaker 1: its capacity to survive. If we don't want to put 140 00:08:00,760 --> 00:08:04,320 Speaker 1: in American forces, which I think the President would find 141 00:08:04,800 --> 00:08:07,720 Speaker 1: very difficult to do, we have to find some way 142 00:08:08,360 --> 00:08:14,080 Speaker 1: of helping the Iranian people themselves mobilize and raising the 143 00:08:14,080 --> 00:08:18,440 Speaker 1: cost of survival for the Revolutionary Guard. What's your take 144 00:08:18,480 --> 00:08:18,920 Speaker 1: on all that? 145 00:08:19,920 --> 00:08:22,800 Speaker 2: In general, we haven't had the best success with training 146 00:08:22,840 --> 00:08:26,920 Speaker 2: equipped missions ranging from Iraq, Afghanistan to Syria. But I 147 00:08:27,000 --> 00:08:29,280 Speaker 2: understand the logic of what you're saying, because the logic 148 00:08:29,360 --> 00:08:31,080 Speaker 2: is the only thing that stops a bad guy with 149 00:08:31,120 --> 00:08:33,400 Speaker 2: a gun is a good guy with a gun. And 150 00:08:33,440 --> 00:08:35,800 Speaker 2: I think that's why before we have to get to 151 00:08:35,840 --> 00:08:38,360 Speaker 2: this sort of scenario where Iranians who are untrained and 152 00:08:38,480 --> 00:08:41,079 Speaker 2: armed are all of a sudden armed in some fashion, 153 00:08:41,120 --> 00:08:43,120 Speaker 2: Before we have to get to that scenario, I think 154 00:08:43,160 --> 00:08:45,840 Speaker 2: it's imperative that we have to do everything possible to 155 00:08:46,080 --> 00:08:50,440 Speaker 2: fracture the cohesion of the regime's security forces, to instill 156 00:08:50,520 --> 00:08:53,480 Speaker 2: that fear factor, to be gutting the high to mid 157 00:08:53,600 --> 00:08:56,679 Speaker 2: level command and control so that low level as every 158 00:08:56,720 --> 00:09:01,240 Speaker 2: incentive for opportunism, self preservation and survival and defects or 159 00:09:01,280 --> 00:09:03,040 Speaker 2: doesn't show up to work or on a day to 160 00:09:03,120 --> 00:09:05,080 Speaker 2: day basis where they do show up to work, do 161 00:09:05,200 --> 00:09:07,480 Speaker 2: this thing that millennials and gen z do, which is 162 00:09:07,480 --> 00:09:10,760 Speaker 2: called to quote unquote quiet quitting and basically not perform 163 00:09:10,840 --> 00:09:13,080 Speaker 2: any of their functions but still show up and be 164 00:09:13,160 --> 00:09:16,480 Speaker 2: a drained by collecting paychecks. In that sense, there are 165 00:09:16,520 --> 00:09:19,800 Speaker 2: some signs of cautious optimism in Iran right now. Just 166 00:09:19,800 --> 00:09:22,679 Speaker 2: this morning, the Economist ran a story talking about how 167 00:09:22,720 --> 00:09:26,440 Speaker 2: police officers, these Lomarch Revolutionary Guard Corps and other security 168 00:09:26,440 --> 00:09:29,040 Speaker 2: forces are not showing up to work. And just today 169 00:09:29,040 --> 00:09:33,160 Speaker 2: on Persian language social media, we're seeing tents like physical 170 00:09:33,240 --> 00:09:36,720 Speaker 2: camping tents that have been set up across Iran housing 171 00:09:37,160 --> 00:09:40,280 Speaker 2: some of these more thuggish security forces, like the Bestiege, 172 00:09:40,600 --> 00:09:43,600 Speaker 2: because they can't go into their own buildings or barracks 173 00:09:43,679 --> 00:09:46,440 Speaker 2: or compounds because those were bombed by the Israelies, that 174 00:09:46,520 --> 00:09:49,000 Speaker 2: they're kind of hanging out in these tents, and then 175 00:09:49,000 --> 00:09:52,199 Speaker 2: the evenings they're going and harassing people and trying to 176 00:09:52,280 --> 00:09:55,200 Speaker 2: keep regime moral high will these rallies just bomb some 177 00:09:55,240 --> 00:09:57,560 Speaker 2: of those tents, and that is stuff that I can 178 00:09:57,600 --> 00:10:00,840 Speaker 2: actually stiffened the spine of protesters, get them to go 179 00:10:00,920 --> 00:10:03,840 Speaker 2: to the next level in terms of street behavior, but 180 00:10:03,960 --> 00:10:06,480 Speaker 2: also cause those defections of some of those guys with 181 00:10:06,559 --> 00:10:10,000 Speaker 2: the guns, so the professionals with the arms can go 182 00:10:10,080 --> 00:10:11,800 Speaker 2: towards the side of the street. And again here I 183 00:10:11,800 --> 00:10:14,440 Speaker 2: would say one of the biggest things US intelligence and 184 00:10:14,480 --> 00:10:17,040 Speaker 2: other foreign intelligence services need to do is to try 185 00:10:17,080 --> 00:10:20,120 Speaker 2: to find a way to play on the patriotism that 186 00:10:20,200 --> 00:10:23,320 Speaker 2: may exist at a more local level of Iran's arteese 187 00:10:23,440 --> 00:10:26,760 Speaker 2: of the national military. That would be really the ideal scenario. 188 00:10:26,880 --> 00:10:30,280 Speaker 2: I think anything particularly on the margins that could be 189 00:10:30,559 --> 00:10:33,000 Speaker 2: a train and equip mission for an ethnic minority that 190 00:10:33,040 --> 00:10:35,520 Speaker 2: could lead to an ethnic insurgency, and that would not 191 00:10:35,559 --> 00:10:38,120 Speaker 2: provide the president with the political win that I think 192 00:10:38,120 --> 00:10:40,560 Speaker 2: he knows he wants and knows he needs here and 193 00:10:40,679 --> 00:10:43,280 Speaker 2: worse could leave the region worse off and then finally 194 00:10:43,400 --> 00:10:46,559 Speaker 2: even worse than that. In my view, I think if 195 00:10:46,600 --> 00:10:48,960 Speaker 2: the goal would be to use military power and future 196 00:10:49,000 --> 00:10:52,680 Speaker 2: to drive street pressure and street protests, large swaths of 197 00:10:52,720 --> 00:10:55,880 Speaker 2: a not so silent great majority of Iranians might sit 198 00:10:55,960 --> 00:10:58,800 Speaker 2: it out because they might fear civil war. So I 199 00:10:58,800 --> 00:11:03,160 Speaker 2: think it's an incredibly complex and kaleidoscopic picture. But philosophically, 200 00:11:03,160 --> 00:11:05,199 Speaker 2: you're right that the only thing that stops a bad 201 00:11:05,240 --> 00:11:06,880 Speaker 2: guy with the gun is a good guy with the gun. 202 00:11:07,120 --> 00:11:11,040 Speaker 1: Well, at the same time, isn't around something like forty 203 00:11:11,080 --> 00:11:12,439 Speaker 1: six percent non Persian. 204 00:11:13,640 --> 00:11:16,640 Speaker 2: It's fifty one to sixty four percent Persian, depending on 205 00:11:16,679 --> 00:11:18,679 Speaker 2: how you count but I want to, with a men's respect, 206 00:11:19,120 --> 00:11:21,959 Speaker 2: caution you on some of the ethno linguistic component here, 207 00:11:22,000 --> 00:11:25,760 Speaker 2: because I think Balkanization doesn't serve us or is really 208 00:11:25,840 --> 00:11:27,600 Speaker 2: interest I think it's time we have a partner in 209 00:11:27,640 --> 00:11:29,880 Speaker 2: this part of the world. There's a way to actually 210 00:11:29,920 --> 00:11:32,240 Speaker 2: benefit from the great masses of the Runnians, which are, 211 00:11:32,520 --> 00:11:36,040 Speaker 2: regardless of ethno linguistic background, among the most pro American 212 00:11:36,080 --> 00:11:38,560 Speaker 2: and most pro Israeli in the heartland of the Muslim 213 00:11:38,559 --> 00:11:40,080 Speaker 2: Middle East. I don't know if we can say that 214 00:11:40,120 --> 00:11:42,560 Speaker 2: for many of these other states, which with a men's 215 00:11:42,600 --> 00:11:45,079 Speaker 2: respect to them, are post Ottoman and post World War 216 00:11:45,120 --> 00:11:47,880 Speaker 2: One creations in this part of the world. And it 217 00:11:47,920 --> 00:11:49,839 Speaker 2: would behoove America to have a partner in this part 218 00:11:49,840 --> 00:11:52,520 Speaker 2: of the world too. That is different. And so for 219 00:11:52,559 --> 00:11:55,520 Speaker 2: all those reasons, and of course for internal reasons, which 220 00:11:55,559 --> 00:11:59,600 Speaker 2: are those perishiaries where the majority language is one non 221 00:11:59,600 --> 00:12:03,280 Speaker 2: Persian language, there is great internal migration and there is 222 00:12:03,320 --> 00:12:06,840 Speaker 2: great inter marriage, such that even Iran's Supreme Leader or 223 00:12:06,880 --> 00:12:10,800 Speaker 2: recently deceased Supreme leader is half ASII. And in places 224 00:12:10,840 --> 00:12:13,520 Speaker 2: like one of Iran's tw Ozerbaijan provinces, like the city 225 00:12:13,520 --> 00:12:16,680 Speaker 2: of Urumia, for example, where the population is split half 226 00:12:16,679 --> 00:12:19,880 Speaker 2: and half, half Curred half Azeri. The Islano Republic has 227 00:12:19,920 --> 00:12:23,520 Speaker 2: played imperial games with these two populations, and they really 228 00:12:23,520 --> 00:12:26,920 Speaker 2: do have pitched street battles with one another, fight for 229 00:12:26,960 --> 00:12:30,200 Speaker 2: parliamentary seats with one another, fight for governorships with one another. 230 00:12:30,640 --> 00:12:33,640 Speaker 2: So it's not as clean and parsimonious as the center 231 00:12:33,760 --> 00:12:36,000 Speaker 2: versus the periphery, or the periphery versus center. 232 00:12:53,240 --> 00:12:56,920 Speaker 1: From your perspective, you really think our goal has to 233 00:12:56,960 --> 00:13:04,880 Speaker 1: be a coherent fighter ran under a sort of post 234 00:13:04,960 --> 00:13:10,600 Speaker 1: dictatorship system that's susceptible to the vast majority of Iranians. 235 00:13:11,200 --> 00:13:15,000 Speaker 2: Yes, and I think if that gets done right, then 236 00:13:15,080 --> 00:13:18,120 Speaker 2: the theory of citizenship can be unlocked. You know, it's 237 00:13:18,120 --> 00:13:20,920 Speaker 2: irrelevant to me who lives and works abroad. I can't 238 00:13:20,960 --> 00:13:23,360 Speaker 2: dictate the future of the country. But if you do 239 00:13:23,480 --> 00:13:28,360 Speaker 2: have something that offers Iranians a sense of citizenship beyond ethno, 240 00:13:28,520 --> 00:13:31,480 Speaker 2: linguistic or sectarian background, that could be one of the 241 00:13:31,559 --> 00:13:35,199 Speaker 2: keys to stabilize the region. We got this wrong unfortunately 242 00:13:35,240 --> 00:13:37,959 Speaker 2: in places like Iraq. Now we're seeing that in places 243 00:13:37,960 --> 00:13:40,800 Speaker 2: like Syria really atomize based on those fault lines. I 244 00:13:40,840 --> 00:13:43,440 Speaker 2: think it would be a mistake to replicate pressing on 245 00:13:43,520 --> 00:13:44,440 Speaker 2: those fault lines. 246 00:13:44,880 --> 00:13:48,880 Speaker 1: How close do you think the Revolutionary Guard system is 247 00:13:48,920 --> 00:13:51,240 Speaker 1: to cracking given the fact that, as you were pointing 248 00:13:51,240 --> 00:13:54,240 Speaker 1: out with the tents, the ability of the United States 249 00:13:54,280 --> 00:13:58,160 Speaker 1: and Israel to track things from space and elsewhere and 250 00:13:58,280 --> 00:14:01,360 Speaker 1: have a very granular sense of what's going on and 251 00:14:01,400 --> 00:14:04,319 Speaker 1: how to target in a pretty granular way is really 252 00:14:04,440 --> 00:14:08,000 Speaker 1: very different than the previous war. I mean both because 253 00:14:08,000 --> 00:14:11,240 Speaker 1: they now have, for all practical purposes, total air control 254 00:14:11,559 --> 00:14:14,640 Speaker 1: so they can patrol all day long at minimum risk, 255 00:14:15,240 --> 00:14:20,760 Speaker 1: and because they have such exquisite information systems to track down, 256 00:14:20,880 --> 00:14:24,520 Speaker 1: you know, relatively small numbers of people and either go 257 00:14:24,560 --> 00:14:28,240 Speaker 1: after their car or their house, or their tent or 258 00:14:28,280 --> 00:14:31,400 Speaker 1: their office. How close do you think we are to 259 00:14:31,560 --> 00:14:36,800 Speaker 1: that beginning to break them around? Of the Revolutionary Guard? 260 00:14:37,760 --> 00:14:41,200 Speaker 2: You know, this is a multi generational institution with different 261 00:14:41,280 --> 00:14:45,040 Speaker 2: identities about itself. As glad as I am to see 262 00:14:45,080 --> 00:14:49,040 Speaker 2: those examples that I offered at the moment, those remain anecdotal, 263 00:14:49,360 --> 00:14:51,200 Speaker 2: and I think the one thing that can move them 264 00:14:51,200 --> 00:14:54,240 Speaker 2: from anecdotal to empiricals that we can see and feel 265 00:14:54,240 --> 00:14:57,000 Speaker 2: it quote unquote a bit more is sustained air power 266 00:14:57,320 --> 00:15:00,760 Speaker 2: and a shift in the campaign, a shift the campaign 267 00:15:00,840 --> 00:15:04,440 Speaker 2: away from defanging, which I don't mean it should be 268 00:15:04,560 --> 00:15:08,080 Speaker 2: stopped prematurely, but it should be successfully completed and then 269 00:15:08,160 --> 00:15:10,680 Speaker 2: move to a different sort of operation. You know, B 270 00:15:10,880 --> 00:15:13,520 Speaker 2: two s and F thirty fives are not necessary to 271 00:15:13,600 --> 00:15:17,560 Speaker 2: target best each tense, but suicide one way attack drones 272 00:15:17,800 --> 00:15:21,640 Speaker 2: or low flying a tens or Tamahawk cruise missiles or 273 00:15:21,680 --> 00:15:25,680 Speaker 2: standoff weapons could be more useful in targeting this apparatus 274 00:15:25,720 --> 00:15:29,480 Speaker 2: of repression. In fostering that fear factor and having the 275 00:15:29,480 --> 00:15:31,920 Speaker 2: pressure be felt from the units below that want to 276 00:15:31,960 --> 00:15:36,000 Speaker 2: survive and the foreign military pressure from the top, as 277 00:15:36,040 --> 00:15:39,760 Speaker 2: well as potential renewed street pressure. This is I think doable, 278 00:15:39,920 --> 00:15:42,520 Speaker 2: but it is doable only if you accept that it 279 00:15:42,560 --> 00:15:46,120 Speaker 2: is costlier and riskier than just taking the military when 280 00:15:46,120 --> 00:15:48,200 Speaker 2: and stepping aside. But you are one hundred and ten 281 00:15:48,240 --> 00:15:51,040 Speaker 2: percent right to point out that we have more intelligence 282 00:15:51,120 --> 00:15:55,080 Speaker 2: and more technological capabilities to be more granular about the 283 00:15:55,160 --> 00:15:58,080 Speaker 2: kind of targeting than ever before at this time, let 284 00:15:58,120 --> 00:16:01,360 Speaker 2: alone the fact that these lonarch republics is basically a 285 00:16:01,480 --> 00:16:03,440 Speaker 2: zombie at this point in time, and even when it 286 00:16:03,480 --> 00:16:06,040 Speaker 2: wasn't a zombie, as these really showed. It was as 287 00:16:06,280 --> 00:16:09,000 Speaker 2: penetrated as Swiss cheese, with all these holes and cracks 288 00:16:09,000 --> 00:16:09,840 Speaker 2: and crevices. 289 00:16:10,200 --> 00:16:15,640 Speaker 1: It's very striking to me that both in Venezuela and 290 00:16:15,680 --> 00:16:20,200 Speaker 1: in Iran, the Chinese and Russian systems just didn't work. 291 00:16:20,880 --> 00:16:23,000 Speaker 1: There's no evidence that they were ever able to target 292 00:16:23,040 --> 00:16:26,040 Speaker 1: a single aircraft and that has to be very sobering. 293 00:16:26,040 --> 00:16:30,240 Speaker 1: And Beijing, as they contemplate, but they think the correlation 294 00:16:30,320 --> 00:16:34,600 Speaker 1: of forces is but we have achieved a remarkable level 295 00:16:34,640 --> 00:16:37,720 Speaker 1: of air superiority where the only casualties actually were a 296 00:16:37,720 --> 00:16:41,800 Speaker 1: friendly fire incident in Kuwait wasn't from the Iranians. And 297 00:16:41,920 --> 00:16:44,040 Speaker 1: I think in that sorts that the imbalance of power 298 00:16:44,080 --> 00:16:44,800 Speaker 1: is astonishing. 299 00:16:45,680 --> 00:16:48,160 Speaker 2: And just on China, I'm glad you mentioned this. I'm 300 00:16:48,160 --> 00:16:51,240 Speaker 2: sure you remember the first time the Trump administration bombed 301 00:16:51,600 --> 00:16:55,160 Speaker 2: the Assad regime in serious chemical weapons depots. It was 302 00:16:55,280 --> 00:16:58,800 Speaker 2: during a dinner with President Trump and she in the 303 00:16:58,880 --> 00:17:01,120 Speaker 2: United States. And in less than a month there will 304 00:17:01,160 --> 00:17:03,640 Speaker 2: be another Trump. She summits, and I think he would 305 00:17:03,680 --> 00:17:06,720 Speaker 2: behoove the Trump administration just to take pictures of I 306 00:17:06,760 --> 00:17:08,560 Speaker 2: don't know if it was Chinese Sam's or any other 307 00:17:09,000 --> 00:17:11,359 Speaker 2: Chinese peck. But if there was any Chinese peck that 308 00:17:11,400 --> 00:17:13,760 Speaker 2: the US or is real defeated, just to take the 309 00:17:13,800 --> 00:17:16,719 Speaker 2: battle damage assessment and share that with the Chinese, just 310 00:17:16,720 --> 00:17:19,080 Speaker 2: so that they know that it got her bid future 311 00:17:19,080 --> 00:17:22,920 Speaker 2: with Taiwan invasion situation, Uncle Sam has superiority. 312 00:17:23,320 --> 00:17:26,240 Speaker 1: It's been a surprise to me, how clear, how decisive 313 00:17:26,320 --> 00:17:29,720 Speaker 1: it's man. I thought we probably had superiority, been nothing 314 00:17:29,760 --> 00:17:30,879 Speaker 1: on this particular skill. 315 00:17:31,240 --> 00:17:34,479 Speaker 2: Some may say this is crass because President Trump turned 316 00:17:34,520 --> 00:17:37,280 Speaker 2: to she while they were having dessert and said that 317 00:17:37,320 --> 00:17:40,119 Speaker 2: he was bombing Syria at the moment, or when President 318 00:17:40,160 --> 00:17:42,760 Speaker 2: Trump met Pudin in Alaska, he had the B twos 319 00:17:42,800 --> 00:17:46,399 Speaker 2: that had just bombed Iran's nuclear facilities fly overhead. But 320 00:17:46,480 --> 00:17:50,440 Speaker 2: if he comes with this imagery, I think stylistically and substantively, 321 00:17:50,520 --> 00:17:53,879 Speaker 2: no one can induce that chilling or deterrent effect like 322 00:17:53,960 --> 00:17:58,360 Speaker 2: the President, who is perhaps more comfortable with raw power 323 00:17:58,400 --> 00:17:59,720 Speaker 2: than his predecessors. 324 00:18:00,400 --> 00:18:02,320 Speaker 1: I think that's right, And I think dealing with somebody 325 00:18:02,400 --> 00:18:06,280 Speaker 1: like Gi that's actually an advantage. Did he can't bluff you? 326 00:18:07,000 --> 00:18:10,000 Speaker 1: For the first time since World War Two, an American 327 00:18:10,040 --> 00:18:14,520 Speaker 1: submarine sank warship that apparently was a real shock to 328 00:18:14,560 --> 00:18:18,320 Speaker 1: the Iranians. But I've been just watching their reaction to 329 00:18:18,400 --> 00:18:21,960 Speaker 1: things they've said. They must have not thought that we 330 00:18:22,000 --> 00:18:23,119 Speaker 1: would be that aggressive. 331 00:18:24,520 --> 00:18:27,840 Speaker 2: Yeah, I think certainly the decisiveness that the US has 332 00:18:27,960 --> 00:18:31,800 Speaker 2: been engaging in this operation has caught the Islamic Republic 333 00:18:31,840 --> 00:18:34,800 Speaker 2: off guard. Yes, they saw the US come in and 334 00:18:34,840 --> 00:18:37,399 Speaker 2: bomb nuclear facilities late, I have to say, in the 335 00:18:37,400 --> 00:18:40,720 Speaker 2: twelve day war and leave. But the decisiveness of American 336 00:18:40,760 --> 00:18:43,560 Speaker 2: power is really being felt. They just felt the tip 337 00:18:43,600 --> 00:18:46,600 Speaker 2: of the spear for a few hours during Midnight Hammer. 338 00:18:46,680 --> 00:18:50,280 Speaker 2: This is about five six days now and ongoing, and 339 00:18:50,320 --> 00:18:54,080 Speaker 2: that is a fundamentally different quote unquote feel on the ground. 340 00:18:55,320 --> 00:18:59,640 Speaker 1: Well, I remember when they damage an American frigate during 341 00:18:59,640 --> 00:19:03,840 Speaker 1: REGA be unleashed, and I think in a two day 342 00:19:03,840 --> 00:19:05,879 Speaker 1: period we sank cants the Iranian navy. 343 00:19:07,119 --> 00:19:08,600 Speaker 2: Oh yes, Frank Mantis. 344 00:19:08,880 --> 00:19:11,320 Speaker 1: One of the key points of seems to me, is 345 00:19:11,359 --> 00:19:14,639 Speaker 1: going to be whether or not we can protect ships 346 00:19:14,680 --> 00:19:17,520 Speaker 1: going through the streets of Humus. And I'd be curious 347 00:19:17,520 --> 00:19:20,400 Speaker 1: what you're general thinking is because some people have suggested 348 00:19:20,440 --> 00:19:24,800 Speaker 1: that they have dug in systems along the streets that 349 00:19:24,880 --> 00:19:27,440 Speaker 1: would be very very hard to get at and that 350 00:19:27,520 --> 00:19:31,600 Speaker 1: would be capable of causing damage to oil tankers as 351 00:19:31,640 --> 00:19:33,640 Speaker 1: they try to go through there. Do you have any 352 00:19:33,680 --> 00:19:37,119 Speaker 1: sense of whether they can keep the straight closed or 353 00:19:37,160 --> 00:19:38,879 Speaker 1: whether we can force it open. 354 00:19:39,920 --> 00:19:41,879 Speaker 2: I certainly think we can force it open. It's just 355 00:19:41,880 --> 00:19:44,640 Speaker 2: a matter of how they choose to quote unquote close it. 356 00:19:44,640 --> 00:19:47,000 Speaker 2: It's never as you know, as manatic as flipping on 357 00:19:47,119 --> 00:19:49,480 Speaker 2: and off a light switch. It could be a sustained 358 00:19:49,480 --> 00:19:52,200 Speaker 2: mining operation, in which case we have to do countermining 359 00:19:52,240 --> 00:19:54,800 Speaker 2: and mind sweeping, which takes time, and we have to 360 00:19:54,840 --> 00:19:57,040 Speaker 2: have our forces that are doing that be protected from 361 00:19:57,040 --> 00:19:59,680 Speaker 2: their fire, which is almost certainly likely going to come 362 00:19:59,720 --> 00:20:02,280 Speaker 2: because it'll be closer to their territory. So there's a 363 00:20:02,320 --> 00:20:05,160 Speaker 2: whole host of military contingencies that would come our way 364 00:20:05,440 --> 00:20:07,560 Speaker 2: based on the nature of the way. The Iranians choose 365 00:20:07,560 --> 00:20:10,919 Speaker 2: to either harassed ships that go through or incrementally close 366 00:20:11,320 --> 00:20:13,879 Speaker 2: or quote unquote fully closed. The Runians have given a 367 00:20:13,920 --> 00:20:17,080 Speaker 2: political statement that it's fully closed. President Trump has responded 368 00:20:17,119 --> 00:20:19,480 Speaker 2: with a political statement that he will help with the 369 00:20:19,560 --> 00:20:23,239 Speaker 2: insurance for commercial vessels traveling where it has been a 370 00:20:23,320 --> 00:20:26,360 Speaker 2: drop down but not a troll. Cessation of any kind 371 00:20:26,400 --> 00:20:29,120 Speaker 2: of maritime traffic but I think it's important to note 372 00:20:29,160 --> 00:20:31,280 Speaker 2: that we could be moving in that direction belong with 373 00:20:31,320 --> 00:20:33,879 Speaker 2: the conflict goes on, And I would just say with 374 00:20:33,920 --> 00:20:37,760 Speaker 2: respect to the notion of dug in positions, the Islamic 375 00:20:37,760 --> 00:20:41,080 Speaker 2: Republic does have quite a bit of coastal defenses anti 376 00:20:41,080 --> 00:20:43,800 Speaker 2: ship cruise missiles, almost every single variant of which, by 377 00:20:43,840 --> 00:20:46,399 Speaker 2: the way, is a licensed or an unlicensed copy of 378 00:20:46,440 --> 00:20:49,640 Speaker 2: a Chinese anti ship cruise missile, as well as some 379 00:20:49,760 --> 00:20:52,720 Speaker 2: shorter range rockets which it has buried, as well as 380 00:20:52,760 --> 00:20:55,960 Speaker 2: having a couple of missile bases and depots across Ron's 381 00:20:55,960 --> 00:20:59,480 Speaker 2: southern coast. Those same chains of bases that American and 382 00:20:59,520 --> 00:21:02,359 Speaker 2: Israel are time targeting in the west, in the center, 383 00:21:02,440 --> 00:21:05,280 Speaker 2: and in the east also exist kind of parallel with 384 00:21:05,359 --> 00:21:08,480 Speaker 2: the Persian Gulf coastline in the south, So it's imperative 385 00:21:08,520 --> 00:21:10,960 Speaker 2: that those be taken out if the goal is to 386 00:21:10,960 --> 00:21:13,359 Speaker 2: get rid of the regime's A to A D capabilities 387 00:21:13,600 --> 00:21:14,840 Speaker 2: and coastal defenses. 388 00:21:15,320 --> 00:21:19,960 Speaker 1: The last real strategic tool they have is to try 389 00:21:20,000 --> 00:21:24,080 Speaker 1: to raise the cost of oil sufficiently high that the 390 00:21:24,119 --> 00:21:26,879 Speaker 1: pain level forces people to ask if it's really worthwhile. 391 00:21:27,560 --> 00:21:29,840 Speaker 1: Then that takes time. It's not obvious to me that 392 00:21:29,880 --> 00:21:30,760 Speaker 1: they can pull it off. 393 00:21:31,480 --> 00:21:34,480 Speaker 2: Bless you, It's still very much a TBD in my view, 394 00:21:34,960 --> 00:21:38,280 Speaker 2: how much risk tolerance the regime is going to show 395 00:21:38,600 --> 00:21:41,320 Speaker 2: towards energy installations in this part of the world and 396 00:21:41,440 --> 00:21:44,120 Speaker 2: energy transit in this part of the world precisely because 397 00:21:44,160 --> 00:21:46,399 Speaker 2: they know that they are to a certain degree exposed. 398 00:21:46,720 --> 00:21:48,920 Speaker 2: Not only would they not be able to have their 399 00:21:48,960 --> 00:21:52,080 Speaker 2: ships traverse the Persian Golf and straight of the hormones 400 00:21:52,160 --> 00:21:55,119 Speaker 2: and be able to skirt sanctions to sell oil, and 401 00:21:55,240 --> 00:21:58,480 Speaker 2: unlike some other countries, they don't necessarily have overland pipeline 402 00:21:58,480 --> 00:22:01,119 Speaker 2: options that are sufficient to keep the country afloat. But 403 00:22:01,240 --> 00:22:03,800 Speaker 2: b they have an island in the Persian Gulf, Higherk Island, 404 00:22:04,080 --> 00:22:06,960 Speaker 2: where even though ninety percent of irania oild goes to China, 405 00:22:07,240 --> 00:22:11,040 Speaker 2: about eighty plus percent of all crude exports go through 406 00:22:11,119 --> 00:22:14,200 Speaker 2: Higherk Island, and it really is an Achilles heel. And yes, 407 00:22:14,240 --> 00:22:17,400 Speaker 2: that would send energy markets probably spiraling. And I could 408 00:22:17,440 --> 00:22:20,320 Speaker 2: see America saving that for a potential end of day scenario, 409 00:22:20,760 --> 00:22:24,480 Speaker 2: but that could be triggered by more sustained Iranian harassment 410 00:22:24,920 --> 00:22:28,639 Speaker 2: and kinetic activity against shipping or against US vessels in 411 00:22:28,680 --> 00:22:31,040 Speaker 2: the narritime domain. And I'm glad we're talking about this 412 00:22:31,160 --> 00:22:34,200 Speaker 2: because in the cycles of violence we saw in the 413 00:22:34,240 --> 00:22:37,880 Speaker 2: Middle East post October seven, the Persian dolphin straighter Hormu's 414 00:22:37,920 --> 00:22:41,560 Speaker 2: maritime threat was exported via the Iranians to the Huthis 415 00:22:41,560 --> 00:22:44,200 Speaker 2: and Yemen, to the Babo Mandeb and Gulf of Eight 416 00:22:44,280 --> 00:22:46,840 Speaker 2: and at Red Sea. But those were always capabilities the 417 00:22:46,880 --> 00:22:49,399 Speaker 2: regime had perfected for the home front first. 418 00:23:05,440 --> 00:23:09,240 Speaker 1: In that setting. As you just pointed out, how much 419 00:23:09,240 --> 00:23:12,680 Speaker 1: of this is a huge threat to China economically because 420 00:23:12,720 --> 00:23:15,359 Speaker 1: of their reliance on Iranian oil. 421 00:23:16,480 --> 00:23:19,600 Speaker 2: Reliance on Iranian oil as well as reliance on Saudi 422 00:23:19,960 --> 00:23:22,639 Speaker 2: China is very interesting because it buys the same commodity 423 00:23:22,760 --> 00:23:26,080 Speaker 2: from two very different types of actors both sides of 424 00:23:26,080 --> 00:23:28,520 Speaker 2: the Persian Gulf, the pro American an anti American, the 425 00:23:28,560 --> 00:23:31,480 Speaker 2: status quo and the anti Status school actor. So real 426 00:23:31,520 --> 00:23:35,280 Speaker 2: threats to maritime shipping would put a considerable crunch on 427 00:23:35,520 --> 00:23:39,320 Speaker 2: Iran's biggest importer, be it elicit or illicit of crude oil, 428 00:23:39,440 --> 00:23:41,840 Speaker 2: and since twenty twelve twenty eleven, that has been China. 429 00:23:42,400 --> 00:23:46,520 Speaker 2: And while the Saudis do have capacity or overland via pipeline, 430 00:23:46,520 --> 00:23:49,520 Speaker 2: it's not the same volume, but they do have that capacity. 431 00:23:49,520 --> 00:23:53,120 Speaker 2: The Iranians don't, so the Chinese would certainly be upset 432 00:23:53,160 --> 00:23:55,399 Speaker 2: by that. And then it raises the question of you know, 433 00:23:55,440 --> 00:23:57,760 Speaker 2: how much of this is something that the Islamic Republic 434 00:23:57,800 --> 00:23:59,760 Speaker 2: did to spite its own face? 435 00:24:00,480 --> 00:24:03,840 Speaker 1: In that es sense, you have to wonder how thoughtful 436 00:24:04,640 --> 00:24:08,200 Speaker 1: their current planning processes and to what ex censor is 437 00:24:08,240 --> 00:24:10,720 Speaker 1: going to be fumbling around? What's your sense of the 438 00:24:10,840 --> 00:24:13,840 Speaker 1: son who apparently is going to replace the Ayatollah. 439 00:24:14,800 --> 00:24:19,560 Speaker 2: So the Hamine's second son, Mushtaba Kamene is popularly rumored 440 00:24:19,600 --> 00:24:21,720 Speaker 2: to be his successor. There's a couple of outlets that 441 00:24:21,800 --> 00:24:24,480 Speaker 2: say he's been kind of quote unquote crowned or nominated 442 00:24:24,560 --> 00:24:27,439 Speaker 2: or selected already. I'm still waiting for some more public 443 00:24:27,480 --> 00:24:30,320 Speaker 2: evidence before i go all in on that theory. Even 444 00:24:30,440 --> 00:24:33,080 Speaker 2: when Kamene was alive, it was highly likely in my view, 445 00:24:33,320 --> 00:24:35,359 Speaker 2: that it would have been Mushtaba. And so many have 446 00:24:35,480 --> 00:24:39,119 Speaker 2: said that the Islamic Republic cannot have dynastic succession that 447 00:24:39,200 --> 00:24:41,920 Speaker 2: looks too much like monarchy, at which I've always said, 448 00:24:41,960 --> 00:24:45,000 Speaker 2: do you know how authority works in Shiaied Islam? It 449 00:24:45,080 --> 00:24:48,200 Speaker 2: is entirely patrilineal succession. It's the descendants of the prophet 450 00:24:48,280 --> 00:24:51,679 Speaker 2: Muhammad via his cousin and son in law Ali with 451 00:24:51,760 --> 00:24:54,440 Speaker 2: his daughter Fatima, all through the twelve the moms, and 452 00:24:54,520 --> 00:24:57,640 Speaker 2: any cleric who wears a black turban is also signaling 453 00:24:57,640 --> 00:24:59,639 Speaker 2: that he is a descendant of the prophet Mahmed. So 454 00:25:00,560 --> 00:25:04,119 Speaker 2: this stuff is patrilineal and in some ways dynastics. So 455 00:25:04,160 --> 00:25:07,320 Speaker 2: that didn't ever prevent me from thinking about such a scenario. 456 00:25:07,720 --> 00:25:10,760 Speaker 2: But whoever is at the top today or tomorrow or 457 00:25:10,840 --> 00:25:12,960 Speaker 2: at any point in twenty twenty six, they will be 458 00:25:13,040 --> 00:25:16,320 Speaker 2: leading a rump state that probably would be coarsening if 459 00:25:16,320 --> 00:25:18,560 Speaker 2: it's left or permitted to stay in power at all. 460 00:25:19,000 --> 00:25:22,119 Speaker 2: And there, I would say, actually the secretary of Iran 461 00:25:22,200 --> 00:25:25,960 Speaker 2: Supreme National Security Council, that's the most important national security 462 00:25:25,960 --> 00:25:29,000 Speaker 2: council decision making body that probably is the go between 463 00:25:29,080 --> 00:25:32,920 Speaker 2: between the political and military organs of the state. That 464 00:25:33,119 --> 00:25:36,520 Speaker 2: individual Ali Larra Johnny probably would still, in my view, 465 00:25:36,640 --> 00:25:40,160 Speaker 2: overshadow and out flank any new or nascent supreme leader, 466 00:25:40,280 --> 00:25:43,639 Speaker 2: even if it is a member of Commenda's family. And 467 00:25:43,760 --> 00:25:46,480 Speaker 2: in this instance, I think we have to be a 468 00:25:46,480 --> 00:25:50,080 Speaker 2: bit better about unpacking those two institutions, the Supreme National 469 00:25:50,080 --> 00:25:53,520 Speaker 2: Security Council and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and really 470 00:25:53,560 --> 00:25:56,679 Speaker 2: pressuring them and shaping their decisions for the purpose of 471 00:25:56,680 --> 00:25:59,240 Speaker 2: the US national interest. Here, if we're going to be 472 00:25:59,240 --> 00:26:02,240 Speaker 2: able to affect any meaningful change in Iran, and by 473 00:26:02,280 --> 00:26:05,400 Speaker 2: meaningful change, I mean we win, they lose, because otherwise 474 00:26:05,440 --> 00:26:08,360 Speaker 2: these would be the two most important institutions buttressing any 475 00:26:08,400 --> 00:26:09,119 Speaker 2: Supreme leader. 476 00:26:09,480 --> 00:26:12,639 Speaker 1: Then that's setting. Do you think we continue to go 477 00:26:12,720 --> 00:26:17,159 Speaker 1: after each designated leader if we can find them, and 478 00:26:17,320 --> 00:26:19,720 Speaker 1: just continue to decapitate the system. 479 00:26:20,119 --> 00:26:22,440 Speaker 2: If I had the guess, I think that's already Israel's 480 00:26:22,440 --> 00:26:25,960 Speaker 2: modus operenda here, to make those job tenures as short 481 00:26:25,960 --> 00:26:28,080 Speaker 2: as possible, and perhaps not even just for the Supreme 482 00:26:28,160 --> 00:26:31,520 Speaker 2: Leader but for some of the military or national security 483 00:26:31,880 --> 00:26:34,280 Speaker 2: elite as well. I think we're on that path dependent 484 00:26:34,320 --> 00:26:36,200 Speaker 2: course already. It seems to be that way. 485 00:26:36,760 --> 00:26:40,760 Speaker 1: My impression earlier was that you have a considerable respect 486 00:26:40,840 --> 00:26:45,960 Speaker 1: for the depth of institutional integrity that the Revolutionary Guards 487 00:26:46,000 --> 00:26:50,040 Speaker 1: build up over this half century, and that in fact 488 00:26:50,560 --> 00:26:52,960 Speaker 1: they're going to be reasonably robust, partly because they have 489 00:26:52,960 --> 00:26:56,040 Speaker 1: no alternative. If they lose, they will really lose. 490 00:26:56,520 --> 00:26:59,840 Speaker 2: And it's in that scenario that breath will not cut it. 491 00:27:00,320 --> 00:27:02,960 Speaker 2: Depth will cut it. So if they will be military 492 00:27:02,960 --> 00:27:07,160 Speaker 2: force applied to certain institutions, it won't be sufficient to deracinate. 493 00:27:07,480 --> 00:27:10,800 Speaker 2: You have to deracinate and drill down and drill down 494 00:27:10,880 --> 00:27:14,439 Speaker 2: so that the entire institution, in terms of political orders 495 00:27:14,440 --> 00:27:18,080 Speaker 2: and directives can't communicate a work its way to the top. 496 00:27:18,119 --> 00:27:21,440 Speaker 2: And given that the Islamak Republic post Iran Iroq War, 497 00:27:21,800 --> 00:27:24,159 Speaker 2: which was the longest war of the twentieth century and 498 00:27:24,320 --> 00:27:26,560 Speaker 2: was the war that shaped the worldview and the thinking 499 00:27:26,600 --> 00:27:29,760 Speaker 2: and the security doctrine of the is Lomach revolutionary yardcore 500 00:27:30,160 --> 00:27:32,480 Speaker 2: and birth, the regime's interest in these weapons that it 501 00:27:32,520 --> 00:27:36,400 Speaker 2: has today like missiles and drones and asymmetric maritime stuff. 502 00:27:36,880 --> 00:27:41,040 Speaker 2: Ultimately it will be about drilling down against those institutions 503 00:27:41,280 --> 00:27:43,879 Speaker 2: so that the fear factor on the bottom levels the 504 00:27:44,000 --> 00:27:48,199 Speaker 2: conscripts rises up. And because this regime has engaged in 505 00:27:48,240 --> 00:27:51,000 Speaker 2: coup proofing, the people who have been at mid level 506 00:27:51,000 --> 00:27:54,879 Speaker 2: and above in terms of officers and commanders, probably aren't 507 00:27:54,960 --> 00:27:58,120 Speaker 2: the savviest or most competence, but they are more likely 508 00:27:58,160 --> 00:28:02,679 Speaker 2: on balance is either opportunityistic or ideological. And that's the 509 00:28:02,680 --> 00:28:05,280 Speaker 2: position that Uncle Sam can get these forces to either 510 00:28:05,359 --> 00:28:08,000 Speaker 2: make a mistake, and that's each one of these can 511 00:28:08,040 --> 00:28:10,120 Speaker 2: be kind of put in the corner for a fight 512 00:28:10,240 --> 00:28:12,480 Speaker 2: or flights. But I think in that short to medium 513 00:28:12,600 --> 00:28:15,160 Speaker 2: term we will see lots of fights before we see 514 00:28:15,200 --> 00:28:16,080 Speaker 2: significant flight. 515 00:28:16,359 --> 00:28:20,720 Speaker 1: As this evolves, I hope you will come back and 516 00:28:20,840 --> 00:28:23,679 Speaker 1: let us continue to pick your brain because you clearly 517 00:28:24,160 --> 00:28:27,159 Speaker 1: follow this at a level of depth far beyond anything 518 00:28:27,200 --> 00:28:31,480 Speaker 1: I do. I really deeply respect your work and cliffs 519 00:28:31,520 --> 00:28:35,719 Speaker 1: work and everybody who's at the Foundation for Defensive Options. 520 00:28:35,880 --> 00:28:39,040 Speaker 1: I would urge our listeners you can go to FDD 521 00:28:39,520 --> 00:28:43,600 Speaker 1: dot org and see the amazing range of things that 522 00:28:43,680 --> 00:28:46,240 Speaker 1: they do. But Benham, thank you for this kind of 523 00:28:46,280 --> 00:28:46,760 Speaker 1: a briefing. 524 00:28:47,520 --> 00:28:49,160 Speaker 2: Thank you. It's a pleasure and honor to be with 525 00:28:49,200 --> 00:28:51,000 Speaker 2: you again, and absolutely we will keep in touch. 526 00:28:54,480 --> 00:28:58,320 Speaker 1: Thank you to my guest, Benham, Ben Tellaboo. Newt's World 527 00:28:58,400 --> 00:29:02,240 Speaker 1: is produced by Giving Sweet Sixteed and iHeartMedia. Our executive 528 00:29:02,240 --> 00:29:06,480 Speaker 1: producer is Guarnsey Sloan. Our researcher is Rachel Peterson. The 529 00:29:06,600 --> 00:29:10,520 Speaker 1: artwork for the show was created by Steve Penley. Special 530 00:29:10,560 --> 00:29:13,080 Speaker 1: thanks to the team at Gingish three sixty. If you've 531 00:29:13,080 --> 00:29:15,880 Speaker 1: been enjoying Newtsworld. I hope you'll go to Apple Podcast 532 00:29:16,280 --> 00:29:18,800 Speaker 1: and both rate us with five stars and give us 533 00:29:18,800 --> 00:29:21,600 Speaker 1: a review so others can learn what it's all about. 534 00:29:21,920 --> 00:29:24,800 Speaker 1: Join me on substack at gingrish three sixty dot net. 535 00:29:25,200 --> 00:29:27,680 Speaker 1: I'm Nick Gingrich. This is Newtsworld.