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Speaker 1: Get in touch with technology with tex Stuff from dot com.

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Speaker 1: Hey there, welcome to tech Stuff. I'm Jonathan Strickland, and

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Speaker 1: joining me in the studio today is my esteemed colleague

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Speaker 1: Ben Bullen, host of many shows, one of which is

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Speaker 1: Stuff They Do Don't Want You To Know. Yes, thanks

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Speaker 1: for having me on. And of course by now listeners

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Speaker 1: are probably used to us hanging out here on tech

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Speaker 1: stuff and in our various other endeavors. Yeah, yeah, Ben

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Speaker 1: and I are thickest thieves. Ben is one of those

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Speaker 1: most valuable player types in her office who will jump

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Speaker 1: in at a moment's notice to help folks out, even

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Speaker 1: at the expense of his own sanity, which I don't value.

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Speaker 1: So I'm happy to have him here. Thanks man, that

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Speaker 1: might be the nicest thing you've ever said to me.

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Speaker 1: It could be. Ben also had me on his show

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Speaker 1: Stuff They Don't Want You To Know, to talk about

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Speaker 1: today's topic, the Sony Hack, And at the time when

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Speaker 1: we were recording, it was still in December and the

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Speaker 1: story was still unfolding. In fact, you could say that's

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Speaker 1: still unfolding now, although the news has certainly slowed down

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Speaker 1: significantly since the end of December. But we ended up

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Speaker 1: talking about the story as far as we could at

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Speaker 1: that point, and even made some predictions of our own,

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Speaker 1: some some theories of our own. So, uh, in order

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Speaker 1: to return the favor, Ben's joined me for this episode

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Speaker 1: so that we can revisit that topic, talk about the

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Speaker 1: Sony hack, maybe talk a little bit about some of

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Speaker 1: the information that came out after we had already recorded

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Speaker 1: the episode, and uh, just kind of explain what happened

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Speaker 1: and how it's different from some of the other big

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Speaker 1: stories we've heard, Like you know, all the stories about

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Speaker 1: the Sony PlayStation network at the Xbox Live network getting

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Speaker 1: brought down, those were done through direct denial of service

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Speaker 1: attacks or distributed denial of service attacks, I should say,

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Speaker 1: so they were just atributed denial of service attacks, which

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Speaker 1: is really a brute force way of shutting up a server.

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Speaker 1: Completely different in comparison to the original Sony hacks, wherein

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Speaker 1: the various films were downloaded. But before we go any further,

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Speaker 1: I just have to say I really appreciate what you're

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Speaker 1: saying here, Jonathan. I'm blushing. Thank god I grew this

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Speaker 1: beard out so you can see it, and thank god

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Speaker 1: as an audio podcast, but this is not entirely all

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Speaker 1: truism on my part. I come here also as a

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Speaker 1: representative of my co host Matt Frederick. UM, we had

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Speaker 1: such a great time doing this two part episode on

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Speaker 1: Sony for stuff they want, you know, and uh we

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Speaker 1: we actually went back and listened to it because we

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Speaker 1: liked some of the jokes that the three of us

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Speaker 1: were doing. But we really wanted another crack at this

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Speaker 1: just because other information is emerged. UM, and listeners out there,

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Speaker 1: if you do check out Jonathan's earlier appearance, UM, spoiler alert,

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Speaker 1: some of those predictions that you and I made are

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Speaker 1: not that far off. Yeah yeah, And in fact that

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Speaker 1: again we don't We still don't have all the details.

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Speaker 1: We still have some conflicting information out there, stuff that

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Speaker 1: conflicts with the theories we have. It still hasn't changed

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Speaker 1: my theories yet, But I do acknowledge the fact that

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Speaker 1: I the thing that I believe may not be true,

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Speaker 1: and in fact is being said to be untrue by

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Speaker 1: certain entities that go by three letter initialisms, like the FBI.

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Speaker 1: Uh So, let's start at the beginning, A very good

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Speaker 1: place to start. On November that was the day that

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Speaker 1: the Sony hack was revealed, and I say revealed because

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Speaker 1: the extent of this hack, the incredible amount of information

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Speaker 1: that was stolen as part of this hack was so

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Speaker 1: huge as to require months of time toensic research. I mean,

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Speaker 1: you're talking about the initial story we got and was

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Speaker 1: that the the hackers responsible claim to have stolen one

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Speaker 1: terabytes of data. A terabyte of data is a huge amount, right,

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Speaker 1: And if you're thinking of a hacker that's accessing a

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Speaker 1: system remotely, so we're assuming that this person did not

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Speaker 1: dress themselves up as a Sony employee infiltrate the company.

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Speaker 1: If you're talking about remotely accessing this and siphoning off

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Speaker 1: that data. Guys, you know, if you've ever downloaded a

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Speaker 1: big file, you know it takes time. Even if you

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Speaker 1: have a fast internet connection, it could take a while.

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Speaker 1: You know, if you're trying to download let's say a

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Speaker 1: really big computer game that's maybe thirty or forty gigabytes,

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Speaker 1: that takes time. Terabytes are enormous. A hundred terabytes is huge.

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Speaker 1: It would take months to download that much information, and

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Speaker 1: only if the faucet is always on. Yeah, you and

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Speaker 1: also to be able to do it without raising anyone's attention,

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Speaker 1: because would see the activity over the connection. Yeah, you

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Speaker 1: would think at least someone would figure out something in

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Speaker 1: that time. So all of this is to say that

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Speaker 1: it's the While November twenty was when we became aware

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Speaker 1: of it, the actual activity had to have been happening

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Speaker 1: for at least a few months, if not longer. Right,

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Speaker 1: So what what exactly happens? I love this description because

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Speaker 1: it's so cinematic. Yeah, so imagine you are an employee

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Speaker 1: of Sony Pictures Entertainment, because we always say the Sony hack,

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Speaker 1: but we're specifically referring to Sony Pictures, so the movie

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Speaker 1: industry arm of Sony. So you're an employee of Sony

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Speaker 1: Pictures Entertainment. You go into work on November. It's the

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Speaker 1: week of Thanksgiving. You're looking forward to having dinner with

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Speaker 1: your family, having a few days off. You come in,

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Speaker 1: you turn on your computer to get your little work

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Speaker 1: you work done, type of, type of, type of, and

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Speaker 1: then all of a sudden, like it was a nineteen

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Speaker 1: eighties computer thriller, a skull stylized skull all pops up

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Speaker 1: on your screen, and this feels like it. It feels

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Speaker 1: like a stupid movie already, Like you think about those

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Speaker 1: movies like the net. You know, any movie where Hollywood

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Speaker 1: is trying to get across the idea of what hacking

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Speaker 1: is like, and they they visualize it where it's not

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Speaker 1: someone saying at a computer typing in code. No, it's

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Speaker 1: creeping through a dungeon. And then you see a skull

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Speaker 1: and crossbones. That's firewall. That's what this was in real life.

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Speaker 1: The skulls pop up on everyone's screen and it has

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Speaker 1: a phrase that essentially says, this is just the beginning.

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Speaker 1: We've obtained all your internal data, and it went on

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Speaker 1: to warn that if the company did not quote obey

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Speaker 1: the hackers demands end quote, that the internal information would

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Speaker 1: be shared with the world. And this had this included

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Speaker 1: everything from well, they didn't even know what it included yet,

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Speaker 1: so they didn't have any idea of the extent of

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Speaker 1: that personal information that I that that sensitive info. As

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Speaker 1: it turns out, it was incredibly sensitive information. And those

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Speaker 1: demands we're going to get back to because the demands

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Speaker 1: are one of the keys I think to this mystery,

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Speaker 1: which is still sort is okay. So the way the

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Speaker 1: way it works out, the news spreads quickly eleven am

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Speaker 1: same day November, it hits the media right, that's right,

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Speaker 1: and so this is where, uh, different media outlets start

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Speaker 1: to cover the story. Uh, the employees of Sony Pictures

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Speaker 1: have no access to their computers. Also, their email servers

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Speaker 1: are completely down, and even their phone systems because they

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Speaker 1: were using networked phones, which is you know, we we've

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Speaker 1: had network phones in this office in the past, so

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Speaker 1: it's one of those things that if your internet goes down,

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Speaker 1: suddenly you don't have phone service either, and that's kind

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Speaker 1: of creepsy out a little bit. So they literally couldn't

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Speaker 1: do any work. They couldn't access any of their files,

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Speaker 1: any of those important documents, contracts, all that kind of stuff.

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Speaker 1: All of that was inaccessible. And uh, meanwhile, as the

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Speaker 1: story would go on, I'm gonna skip ahead a little bit,

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Speaker 1: but we're gonna go through a timeline, little little detail

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Speaker 1: this stuff as we go through. But eventually the hackers

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Speaker 1: refer to themselves as Guardians of Peace or GOP. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: Also amuses me because to think when we're talking about

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Speaker 1: the GOP and this, since it's not the Grand Old Party,

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Speaker 1: the Guardians of Peace. Um, this is when they claim

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Speaker 1: to have stolen one terabytes of data. Ten terabytes is

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Speaker 1: enough for all the information in the Library of Congress.

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Speaker 1: So they stole ten Libraries of Congress. Yes, they stole

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Speaker 1: the Library of Congress ten times. Now right, Yeah, I

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Speaker 1: used to use UM. I used to use uh conquistadors

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Speaker 1: as an element as a unit of measurement for everything.

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Speaker 1: But now I'm I'm willing to go and switch to

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Speaker 1: Library of Congress at least when it comes to data.

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Speaker 1: So yeah, this and and of course some of that

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Speaker 1: information was in the form of high resolution digital film files.

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Speaker 1: We'll talk more about that. And the second so on

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Speaker 1: top of all that, this is this is another like

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Speaker 1: you know, kick once you're down. You've already been knocked

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Speaker 1: down because you've had your this hack stop your work.

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Speaker 1: You've been told that a lot of your information has

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Speaker 1: been stolen. On top of all that, they also the

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Speaker 1: hackers also installed malware called Wiper And you can probably

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Speaker 1: guess what this does just based on the name. It

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Speaker 1: starts to erase all the data on these various machines.

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Speaker 1: So not only did you have all this information stolen,

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Speaker 1: but now it's truly inaccessible. It's been white from your computers.

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Speaker 1: I'm sure some of it was probably UM. You were

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Speaker 1: probably able to get back at some of it using

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Speaker 1: some I T. Expertise, like deleting a file off your

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Speaker 1: computer doesn't mean it's gone forever. Overwriting it does so

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Speaker 1: unless wiper and it may very well do this. Unless

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Speaker 1: Wiper over was overwriting all the data as it was

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Speaker 1: erasing it, then you could in theory at least get

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Speaker 1: some of that. But at any rate, Uh, there were

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Speaker 1: even that UM reports that Sony account Twitter feeds were

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Speaker 1: being uh compromised, and so the Guardians of Peace were

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Speaker 1: able to tweet out using that. We actually saw something

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Speaker 1: similar to that recently here in the United States with

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Speaker 1: UM the Central Command Twitter feed. Did you see that? Yeah? Yeah, yeah.

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Speaker 1: The The thing is that Twitter is uh, from what

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Speaker 1: I understand, much easier to compromise than something that would

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Speaker 1: be a well protected, uh corporate level system of of

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Speaker 1: this magnitude. But it does tell us something really important, Jonathan,

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Speaker 1: because it tells us that this would have been a

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Speaker 1: multi tiered attack. Even if even if or rather a

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Speaker 1: multifront attacked, sir, even if Twitter was just uh the

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Speaker 1: sprinkle on the cupcake, this still shows us that this

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Speaker 1: was well thought out, It was established in advance, so

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Speaker 1: it doesn't seem to be an impulsive thing at all.

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Speaker 1: Just just going back to how much memory and how

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Speaker 1: much time it would take to steal Yes, yeah, I

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Speaker 1: mean obviously, like you wouldn't be able to do that

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Speaker 1: all on a single day. So novemby was essentially the

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Speaker 1: day that the hackers decided, Okay, now we let them

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Speaker 1: know what we have done. Like, we've already done it.

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Speaker 1: It's it's that parts. So we're we're already scott away,

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Speaker 1: scott free, you know. Now we're just gonna set the

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Speaker 1: the we're gonna make the world burn, and we're gonna

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Speaker 1: walk away in slow motion. But Sony still has no

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Speaker 1: idea what's going on? For like a week? Right? Yeah? Well,

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Speaker 1: I mean again, it happened during Thanksgiving weeks, so this

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Speaker 1: was a time when a lot of people were planning

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Speaker 1: on being on vacation and suddenly, now you've got this

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Speaker 1: amazing crisis to deal with. Uh. And it would take

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Speaker 1: more than a week for for executives to start even

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Speaker 1: getting a hint at how bad this attack was. So

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Speaker 1: on December one, that's when executives became aware that the

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Speaker 1: stolen data included personal information about employees and their depends,

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Speaker 1: such as social security numbers and financial information as well

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Speaker 1: as health information, like one of the leaks of documents

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Speaker 1: gave details to employees who had sought treatment for things

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Speaker 1: like cirrhosis or cancer or there or had dependents who

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Speaker 1: had to seek treatments for such things. And so, I

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Speaker 1: mean that's a huge breach. Now are we talking, uh,

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Speaker 1: in terms of for sent injury numbers? How many employees?

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Speaker 1: About fifty thousand social Security numbers were stolen? Actually around

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Speaker 1: forty seven thousand. I rounded up round, I rounded up

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Speaker 1: for forty seven thousand and fifty. But yeah, more than

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Speaker 1: forty seven thousand social Security numbers were stolen. Now these

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Speaker 1: were both current and former Sony employees, because it was

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Speaker 1: just it was databasis full of information of the various

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Speaker 1: employees who had either worked there in the past or

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Speaker 1: we're currently working. Not to downplay the gravity of this,

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Speaker 1: because it is very dangerous and it's an absolute nutter

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Speaker 1: of violation and privacy. But not only is that not

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Speaker 1: the end of what they stole, but they stole so

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Speaker 1: much that if you're okay, I'd like to infomercial this

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Speaker 1: and maybe chime in with some but wait, there's more. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: in fact, that is well warranted, right, because the first

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Speaker 1: one the one that's probably the easiest for people to

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Speaker 1: latch onto, because it's a simple it's a simple story,

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Speaker 1: the idea of stolen intellectual property, in this case, stolen movies. Right.

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Speaker 1: So the theft included five movies that were scheduled for

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Speaker 1: Sony release, one which had already been released, which was

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Speaker 1: a fury that one had already come out. But then

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Speaker 1: there was also Annie Mr Turner, Still Alice and to

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Speaker 1: Write Love on Her Arms. Those had all been stolen

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Speaker 1: as well. Uh okay, Yeah, So so those are the

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Speaker 1: easy ones for people to latch onto. But then there

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Speaker 1: was all the internal communications, right, this is where you

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Speaker 1: had information about salary, uh for top executives, like the

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Speaker 1: top seventeen executives, not to mention I think six thousand

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Speaker 1: other Sony employees. Their information got leaked as well. Uh.

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Speaker 1: There was also internal documents that uh that were the

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Speaker 1: records of people having complaints about Sony. Yeah, and there

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Speaker 1: were there were some fairly undiplomatic internal communications regarding regarding

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Speaker 1: coworkers or talent, yeah, or the President of the United States.

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Speaker 1: There were Yeah, no, there's we'll we'll touch on that

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Speaker 1: again in a moment. But out of all these you

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Speaker 1: probably heard the most about Adam Sandler. He got he

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Speaker 1: got raked over the coals quite a bit. And the

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Speaker 1: internal communications a lot of in place that they just

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Speaker 1: didn't like the direction that the movie studio was going in,

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Speaker 1: and they wanted to see if you were Adam Sandler comedies,

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Speaker 1: which is I guess okay, because Netflix picked him up

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Speaker 1: so for four films. Yeah, so Sony might be free

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Speaker 1: of him. We're not. And that's not the only stuff

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Speaker 1: that got leaked. Still, no, no, there's still more, right,

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Speaker 1: I mean, there's tons of information that got taken from this. Uh,

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Speaker 1: personal information about talent was leaked. Stuff like passports and visas,

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Speaker 1: like copies of this stuff that people needed to do. Uh,

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Speaker 1: there were so much things that so many things that

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Speaker 1: were stolen as a result of this. And uh, we're

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Speaker 1: gonna go through the rest of the timeline to kind

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Speaker 1: of give you an idea of how this all unfolded

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Speaker 1: and what extent we begin to learn more and more

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Speaker 1: about the damages. Uh. Meanwhile, one other thing to mention

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Speaker 1: is that Sony employees have many of them, have filed

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Speaker 1: lawsuits against the company for not protecting their personal information

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Speaker 1: well enough to prevent this from happen. Name so, there

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Speaker 1: are several class action lawsuits have been leveled against the

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Speaker 1: company as a result of this. Because people's lives have

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Speaker 1: been really impacted. We're not just talking about you know,

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Speaker 1: celebrities here. I mean that their lives have been impacted too.

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Speaker 1: And it's not I personally don't think that that means

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Speaker 1: that celebrities should be expected to deal with more crap

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Speaker 1: than the rest of us. I mean, sometimes that happens

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Speaker 1: because it's just one of those things that goes along

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Speaker 1: with all the fame and everything else. But regular employees,

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Speaker 1: people just normal folks like me and you who go

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Speaker 1: in to do their job every day and it may

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Speaker 1: not be glamorous, but it's it's an important part of

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Speaker 1: the function of the company. They were impacted too, just

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Speaker 1: regular folks, and they will tend not to have the

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Speaker 1: financial wherewithal or the social safety net to help protect

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Speaker 1: themselves in the aftermath of such an event, right right.

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Speaker 1: They don't have the benefit of that safety net like

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Speaker 1: people who might have of a lawyer on retainer or

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Speaker 1: enormous sums of money to lay in when you go

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Speaker 1: to sleep at night. You know, I have a I

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Speaker 1: have a very particular fantasy in my head of what

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Speaker 1: Hollywood celebrities like, how they live. It's mostly Scrooge McDuck oriented. Yeah, yeah,

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Speaker 1: did you see that? This is totally unrelated, But did

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Speaker 1: you did you ever see the study of what what

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Speaker 1: would happen if you tried to swim through a vault

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Speaker 1: full of gold? I imagine that you would not feel

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Speaker 1: very good. Yeah, it will. It will break you in

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Speaker 1: numerous ways. So maybe it's good that you were talking

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Speaker 1: about sleeping on paper money probably better for your back.

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Speaker 1: And speaking of back, you went to Let's see where

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Speaker 1: where should we go next? Let's look at November twenty eight,

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Speaker 1: because we've been talking a lot about this hack. The

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Speaker 1: the initial messages from the hackers didn't identify any particular

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Speaker 1: motivation for the attack. They it was more of almost

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Speaker 1: like an extortion thing, like do what we tell you,

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Speaker 1: or you're gonna get it. You know. It was like

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Speaker 1: and it essentially sounded like pay us off or we

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Speaker 1: will ruin you. Now. They didn't name a specific amount

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Speaker 1: of money at that initial point. They just said do

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Speaker 1: what we say. Yeah, so they The reason why this

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Speaker 1: is important is because a lot of the discussion that

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Speaker 1: has followed has centered around a very specific topic that

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Speaker 1: we're about to touch on. But that all came after

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Speaker 1: the fact, which makes me a little cautious in actually

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Speaker 1: saying that that was the reason for the whole thing,

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Speaker 1: the whole time. So November twenty, this is four days

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Speaker 1: after the initial attack was discovered. That's the first time

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Speaker 1: anyone floats the possibility that the attack was in response

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Speaker 1: to Sony's plans to release the film. The interview, which

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Speaker 1: I have we both seen it at this point. I

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Speaker 1: have not seen it. Did you watch it? I did

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Speaker 1: see it. What did you think? Well, I will I

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Speaker 1: will say that I enjoy uh, Seth Rogan and James

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Speaker 1: Franco a bit more than you, which is which is

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Speaker 1: something we've talked about before. Yeah, and it's not hard

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Speaker 1: to enjoy Seth Rogan and James Franco more than you do.

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Speaker 1: No offense. Right now, I have a very low you

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Speaker 1: own it. You own it, though, and I respect that. Um,

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Speaker 1: you know. I'll be I'll be candid here. It was

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Speaker 1: not my favorite film because I think that while I

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Speaker 1: I enjoy a lot of a lot of what might

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Speaker 1: be termed low brow comedy, I'm not above it. You know,

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Speaker 1: one thing that I noticed sometimes is that it is

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Speaker 1: very convenient to conflate satire and racism, and I think

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Speaker 1: there's uh to me. There were moments in the film

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Speaker 1: that I that I thought were racist, and I and

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Speaker 1: also was talking with my girlfriend about this and said, okay,

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Speaker 1: well check me here, like my am I being two

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Speaker 1: PC and my and my getting my jim socks, I'll

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Speaker 1: punched up over something unnecessarily. And she came in and

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Speaker 1: watched part of it, and she said, no, I think

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Speaker 1: that's pretty very racist. Yeah. No, there is definitely a

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Speaker 1: difference between using satire in order to point out things

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Speaker 1: that you see as being important or unequal or whatever.

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Speaker 1: It's something that you are actually commenting on and bringing

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Speaker 1: attention to and starting a discussion over. And then there's

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Speaker 1: a totally different type where you're just making fun of

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Speaker 1: something or or you know, especially in hurtful ways. Well,

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Speaker 1: here's a here's the question I have for you. I

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Speaker 1: don't want to derailist, but the question would be then, uh,

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Speaker 1: in comparison to let's say the South Park film also

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Speaker 1: a work of satire in any ways, So what makes

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Speaker 1: these two different? You know? Is it because the south

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Speaker 1: Park film is animated. I think part of it is

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Speaker 1: that South Park is really about pointing out the uh,

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Speaker 1: the the absolute ridiculousness of things like racism. I mean,

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Speaker 1: south Park used the movie used Canadians as the the

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Speaker 1: great big enemy, you know, that's what all the people

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Speaker 1: they blame Canada. There's a whole song about it. It's yeah,

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Speaker 1: it's a good song, actually was nominated for an Academy Award.

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Speaker 1: But at any rate, the you know, that was really

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Speaker 1: to kind of poke fun saying like this is literally

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Speaker 1: there's no difference between people like you know, you look

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Speaker 1: at Canadians and Americans, there's no difference there, just as

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Speaker 1: there's no difference with any people of any two nations,

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Speaker 1: and therefore the concept of racism itself is utterly ridiculous.

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Speaker 1: I see what you're saying. There's there's a method to

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Speaker 1: the prat falls, as you would say. But the I

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Speaker 1: don't know if anyone's ever said that before. But the

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Speaker 1: thing about the interview, despite that, I think it was enjoyable.

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Speaker 1: I definitely laughed out loud a couple of times. But

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Speaker 1: I believe it's received much much more, much more international

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Speaker 1: attention than ever would have had it not been associated

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Speaker 1: with this, and also, you know, for people who aren't

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Speaker 1: familiar with it, Uh, the entire film is about people

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Speaker 1: traveling to assassinate Kim Jong un, the current leader of

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Speaker 1: North Korea. Right, The whole idea about a host of

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Speaker 1: a celebrity talk show type program and his producer heading

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Speaker 1: over to North Korea because it turns out Kim jongun

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Speaker 1: is a big fan of the program, and then being

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Speaker 1: told by is the CIA, Yeah, yeah, the CIA to

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Speaker 1: take this opportunity to assassinate Kim Jong un and uh

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Speaker 1: and of course, uh spoiler alert, the leader is killed

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Speaker 1: in the film. Uh. So this was November. Was the

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Speaker 1: first time anyone had even mentioned this as a possibility

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Speaker 1: of a monovader. Yeah, there was. This was not from

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Speaker 1: the attackers at all. This was all just kind of

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Speaker 1: a I wonder if this thing that's coming out later

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Speaker 1: this month had anything to do with our actually next month,

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Speaker 1: because this was still in November. Um so, yeah, we

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Speaker 1: didn't really have any evidence here. And now there was

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Speaker 1: a North Korean website that had referred to the interview

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Speaker 1: as quote an evil act of provocation end quote. So

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Speaker 1: you could say, well, they said that it was an

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Speaker 1: evil act of provocation. We were they were provoked, so

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Speaker 1: maybe this was the act they were provoked into doing.

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Speaker 1: But you know, yeah, I mean, like I said, the

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Speaker 1: the attack itself must have gone on for months, and

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Speaker 1: it was only in those last few months that the

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Speaker 1: interview was even getting the promotion of here's a movie

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Speaker 1: that's coming out soon, and here's what it's all about.

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Speaker 1: So that would have meant that North Korea was just

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Speaker 1: paying attention to this film for longer than the American

401
00:23:53,320 --> 00:23:57,560
Speaker 1: public was, and that that the attack began months in advance,

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Speaker 1: in anticipation for this December release. All that being said,

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Speaker 1: December one, that's when the top seventeen Sony executive salaries

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Speaker 1: were leaked. Uh, the information had already been stolen, but

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00:24:08,920 --> 00:24:12,520
Speaker 1: the information that had then been leaked publicly. A lot

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Speaker 1: of these leaks happened on an app that allows for

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Speaker 1: anonymous text dumps, so you can just put things up

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Speaker 1: on that app and not leave a trace of who

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Speaker 1: you are, and that's how a lot of this information

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Speaker 1: got distributed, also, including that same file where the salaries

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Speaker 1: of more than six thousand Sony employees. One of the

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Speaker 1: big things that came out about this was a disparity

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Speaker 1: in pay depending upon gender and race. And so this

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Speaker 1: also makes me think the nature of the leak. The

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Speaker 1: first stuff that's leaked here, here's a bread crumb for

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Speaker 1: bread crumb later on, the nature of the stuff that

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00:24:51,240 --> 00:24:57,920
Speaker 1: was leaked first was incredibly harmful to Sony the company

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Speaker 1: uh in an industry perspective, but had nothing to do

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Speaker 1: with any sort of like it didn't have anything to

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Speaker 1: do with the interview directly anyway. So that to me

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Speaker 1: suggests that there's a very specific motivation behind the attack.

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Speaker 1: But we'll get into that when we get towards the end.

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Speaker 1: So December three was when the Adam Sandler PDF dump happened.

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Speaker 1: There's a big dump of Adam Sandler information. And I'm

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Speaker 1: using that word in a couple of different ways. It

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Speaker 1: could have been a little bit of editorializing. This is

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Speaker 1: also when the data including a passport information, visa information,

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Speaker 1: other private information about celebrities who had worked on various

429
00:25:43,960 --> 00:25:47,800
Speaker 1: Sonny films, actors, actresses, directors, that kind of thing got leaked.

430
00:25:47,840 --> 00:25:51,000
Speaker 1: So this is where people were getting copies of Angelina

431
00:25:51,080 --> 00:25:56,000
Speaker 1: Jolie's passport, for example. Um they also included confidential information

432
00:25:56,040 --> 00:26:01,119
Speaker 1: about film contracts, and budgets. So again, very industry specific

433
00:26:01,280 --> 00:26:05,560
Speaker 1: stuff and very very damaging because Okay, first off, this

434
00:26:05,760 --> 00:26:09,800
Speaker 1: breeds such dissension amidst the employees, you know, each other's salaries,

435
00:26:09,800 --> 00:26:13,960
Speaker 1: and huge morale issue. Huge and then also the idea

436
00:26:14,080 --> 00:26:18,120
Speaker 1: about finding numbers and film contracts and budgets, that's a

437
00:26:18,160 --> 00:26:21,320
Speaker 1: massive amount of leverage lost on Sony's part. Well, and

438
00:26:21,359 --> 00:26:24,440
Speaker 1: it's you know, these are industry secrets, like if you've

439
00:26:24,480 --> 00:26:29,680
Speaker 1: ever heard stories about how miraculously no movie ever released

440
00:26:29,760 --> 00:26:33,080
Speaker 1: makes money, like you know, if you have, if you

441
00:26:33,119 --> 00:26:36,240
Speaker 1: have the inside look on these budgets, the actual numbers,

442
00:26:36,320 --> 00:26:40,240
Speaker 1: the real thing, then suddenly you know how much actual

443
00:26:40,400 --> 00:26:43,919
Speaker 1: money was being spent producing it versus how much was

444
00:26:43,960 --> 00:26:46,800
Speaker 1: made in revenue. And then you've got some really tough

445
00:26:47,040 --> 00:26:51,240
Speaker 1: tax questions that you need to answer. So again, very

446
00:26:51,320 --> 00:26:54,439
Speaker 1: much a very savvy attack. This is gonna be trouble

447
00:26:54,520 --> 00:26:57,240
Speaker 1: for Sony down the road. Yeah, it's gonna be troull

448
00:26:57,280 --> 00:27:01,359
Speaker 1: for a while. So December four, when the Associated Press

449
00:27:01,400 --> 00:27:05,040
Speaker 1: reports that cybersecurity experts found similarities in the code used

450
00:27:05,080 --> 00:27:10,360
Speaker 1: in the Sony hacks of with another attack that targeted

451
00:27:10,400 --> 00:27:14,040
Speaker 1: South Korean companies in two thou and you remember the

452
00:27:14,119 --> 00:27:17,760
Speaker 1: name of that attack, right, Oh, I do remember reading it.

453
00:27:17,800 --> 00:27:21,199
Speaker 1: What was it? Dark Soul, spelled like the capital of

454
00:27:21,240 --> 00:27:24,920
Speaker 1: South Korea. Oh, that's so brilliant. Nah, I was thinking

455
00:27:24,960 --> 00:27:27,160
Speaker 1: of something else too, so I didn't. I didn't even

456
00:27:27,200 --> 00:27:30,520
Speaker 1: hear of it called dark Soul. That's awesome, but it's

457
00:27:30,520 --> 00:27:35,159
Speaker 1: so again. This was sort of a a uh a

458
00:27:35,280 --> 00:27:38,159
Speaker 1: hint that perhaps North Korea was behind it, because Korea

459
00:27:38,280 --> 00:27:41,360
Speaker 1: was was very much believed to be behind the two

460
00:27:41,359 --> 00:27:45,720
Speaker 1: thousand thirteen attacks against South Korea. Yeah, so uh, but

461
00:27:45,800 --> 00:27:48,560
Speaker 1: no one's come out and said anything yet. December five

462
00:27:48,600 --> 00:27:52,240
Speaker 1: was when messages allegedly from Guardians of Peace threatened Sony

463
00:27:52,320 --> 00:27:55,640
Speaker 1: executives that they don't condemn their own company, but they're

464
00:27:55,640 --> 00:27:58,800
Speaker 1: really poorly constructed. They actually don't read the same way

465
00:27:58,920 --> 00:28:02,720
Speaker 1: as the initial messages did in the attack reveal back

466
00:28:02,720 --> 00:28:06,080
Speaker 1: on Nowyo. So one of the things we need to

467
00:28:06,119 --> 00:28:10,240
Speaker 1: keep in mind is that the various communications to Sony

468
00:28:10,359 --> 00:28:13,040
Speaker 1: and to others may or may not have come from

469
00:28:13,080 --> 00:28:16,240
Speaker 1: the hackers. We don't necessarily know. It's kind of like

470
00:28:16,320 --> 00:28:21,800
Speaker 1: when you hear about anonymous targeting someone, you don't know

471
00:28:22,080 --> 00:28:26,119
Speaker 1: what to what extent The the overall group of Anonymous

472
00:28:26,240 --> 00:28:29,840
Speaker 1: feels that way right, Because Anonymous is made up of

473
00:28:30,600 --> 00:28:34,879
Speaker 1: a huge number of people with different ideologies, different motivations.

474
00:28:35,560 --> 00:28:40,080
Speaker 1: Sometimes a splinter group will end up targeting somebody, whereas

475
00:28:40,120 --> 00:28:42,920
Speaker 1: the rest of the group either doesn't care actively saying hey,

476
00:28:42,960 --> 00:28:45,760
Speaker 1: don't do that. But that's the thing is that it's

477
00:28:45,800 --> 00:28:49,280
Speaker 1: impossible that like you say, I got a message from Anonymous,

478
00:28:49,760 --> 00:28:52,160
Speaker 1: and maybe technically that's true, but you're gonna have people

479
00:28:52,160 --> 00:28:55,120
Speaker 1: in Anonymous saying, hey, whoa dude, I'm totally not that

480
00:28:55,200 --> 00:29:00,320
Speaker 1: was not us. That was not us. That that people

481
00:29:00,520 --> 00:29:05,360
Speaker 1: create factions within Anonymous that are oriented towards a specific

482
00:29:05,920 --> 00:29:08,360
Speaker 1: project that sort, and I think we even mentioned it.

483
00:29:08,360 --> 00:29:10,120
Speaker 1: I think I might have brought it up in our

484
00:29:10,760 --> 00:29:14,160
Speaker 1: Sony Hack episodes for stuff they don't want you to know. Then,

485
00:29:14,160 --> 00:29:16,520
Speaker 1: this reminds me a lot of the Jack the Ripper letters,

486
00:29:16,960 --> 00:29:20,200
Speaker 1: because when Jack the Ripper was active, there were letters

487
00:29:20,200 --> 00:29:24,720
Speaker 1: written to the police, the London police that was the

488
00:29:24,800 --> 00:29:29,200
Speaker 1: were essentially taunting the police, and a lot of ripperologists

489
00:29:29,800 --> 00:29:34,080
Speaker 1: experts in the field believe that many of those, if

490
00:29:34,120 --> 00:29:37,240
Speaker 1: not all of them, are fakes. They weren't written by

491
00:29:37,240 --> 00:29:39,920
Speaker 1: the killer, and it could be that some of the

492
00:29:39,960 --> 00:29:42,800
Speaker 1: messages that are attributed to Guardians the piece we're not

493
00:29:42,840 --> 00:29:46,840
Speaker 1: written at all by anyone remotely involved. We don't know, right,

494
00:29:46,880 --> 00:29:54,480
Speaker 1: because there's no way to verify now. On December seven,

495
00:29:55,040 --> 00:29:58,080
Speaker 1: North Korea officially says they had nothing to do with

496
00:29:58,120 --> 00:30:01,920
Speaker 1: this attack. On December eight, another alleged Guardians of Peace

497
00:30:01,960 --> 00:30:06,480
Speaker 1: message demands that Sony stop immediately showing the movie of Terrorism,

498
00:30:06,520 --> 00:30:14,520
Speaker 1: which can break regional peace and caused the war. Um,

499
00:30:14,680 --> 00:30:18,200
Speaker 1: they don't specifically name the interview, although I guess, you know,

500
00:30:18,400 --> 00:30:20,280
Speaker 1: I don't know what other films. I don't think they

501
00:30:20,280 --> 00:30:24,200
Speaker 1: were talking about Annie, So if they did, it was

502
00:30:24,240 --> 00:30:26,960
Speaker 1: The Hard Knock Life for us. But uh no, I

503
00:30:27,000 --> 00:30:29,720
Speaker 1: think they meant the interview, but that wasn't specifically named.

504
00:30:31,480 --> 00:30:35,560
Speaker 1: And uh these events continue though, because the hackers, now

505
00:30:35,960 --> 00:30:39,960
Speaker 1: after a little bit of silence, are communicating semi regularly

506
00:30:40,720 --> 00:30:44,080
Speaker 1: or at least leaking information there. There's someone is communicating

507
00:30:44,120 --> 00:30:47,400
Speaker 1: semi regularly. Whether it's the actual hackers or not, we

508
00:30:47,480 --> 00:30:51,120
Speaker 1: don't really know. Um. Also, it's kind of interesting that,

509
00:30:51,920 --> 00:30:55,120
Speaker 1: uh that you know, we had that that previous message

510
00:30:55,160 --> 00:30:58,640
Speaker 1: supposedly from the Guardians of Peace saying, you know, condemn

511
00:30:58,640 --> 00:31:02,840
Speaker 1: your own company, which is a very odd request. It's

512
00:31:03,120 --> 00:31:06,520
Speaker 1: that's another breadcrumb force, I think. Yeah, to say, like,

513
00:31:06,800 --> 00:31:09,880
Speaker 1: please sign a paper that says your company stinks. That's

514
00:31:09,960 --> 00:31:12,240
Speaker 1: essentially what they were saying. It just seems seems a

515
00:31:12,280 --> 00:31:15,200
Speaker 1: little odd. It seems a bit childish and personal. Yeah,

516
00:31:15,280 --> 00:31:18,040
Speaker 1: it's a little weird, all right. So December night through eleventh,

517
00:31:18,120 --> 00:31:21,320
Speaker 1: now we get a little bit more activity with more

518
00:31:21,440 --> 00:31:24,600
Speaker 1: leaked material. The hackers release emails that reveal some pretty

519
00:31:24,800 --> 00:31:29,200
Speaker 1: ugly conversations about various actors, directors, and even the President

520
00:31:29,240 --> 00:31:32,360
Speaker 1: of the United States, including some remarks that you could

521
00:31:32,360 --> 00:31:35,840
Speaker 1: at least say are racially insensitive, if not outright racist.

522
00:31:36,240 --> 00:31:40,280
Speaker 1: Uh and Sony executive Scott Ruden actually with an issue

523
00:31:40,280 --> 00:31:44,400
Speaker 1: an apology on the on December eleventh for the messages

524
00:31:44,440 --> 00:31:46,960
Speaker 1: that he claims were written in just with no offense

525
00:31:47,080 --> 00:31:52,000
Speaker 1: intended and um yeah, saying that was just a joke.

526
00:31:52,040 --> 00:31:53,960
Speaker 1: I didn't mean any offense. It really meant like I

527
00:31:54,000 --> 00:31:56,520
Speaker 1: didn't expect any one of that race to ever read

528
00:31:56,560 --> 00:31:59,000
Speaker 1: this email that I wrote. That's what it comes across

529
00:31:59,040 --> 00:32:03,320
Speaker 1: to me. Maybe I'm I'm sorry, I got caught. Yeah,

530
00:32:03,360 --> 00:32:06,040
Speaker 1: I love I love the I'm sorry, I'm sorry if

531
00:32:06,080 --> 00:32:08,800
Speaker 1: I offended you. Not I'm sorry I offended you. Not

532
00:32:08,960 --> 00:32:11,120
Speaker 1: I'm sorry I said that thing, but I'm sorry that

533
00:32:11,200 --> 00:32:15,000
Speaker 1: you felt this way in response to something I said. Well,

534
00:32:15,040 --> 00:32:18,560
Speaker 1: I'm sorry that you're upset. Yeah exactly. I'm like, well,

535
00:32:18,600 --> 00:32:21,280
Speaker 1: you can just keep your apologies then, Mr. Now this

536
00:32:21,360 --> 00:32:23,960
Speaker 1: isn't this is an interesting thing that comes next, because

537
00:32:24,040 --> 00:32:26,120
Speaker 1: this is something I did not know about until you

538
00:32:26,160 --> 00:32:30,320
Speaker 1: told me. Yeah. So, December fifte Aaron Sorkin publishes an

539
00:32:30,320 --> 00:32:33,400
Speaker 1: open editorial column in The New York Times. Now, Sorkin

540
00:32:33,480 --> 00:32:36,400
Speaker 1: had had some of his emails revealed in a process

541
00:32:36,440 --> 00:32:39,120
Speaker 1: of this, some of which ended up having Sorkin being

542
00:32:39,120 --> 00:32:45,200
Speaker 1: a little uh uncharitable towards certain Hollywood personalities. Yeah, like

543
00:32:45,280 --> 00:32:48,200
Speaker 1: saying that certain actors are not a draw and therefore

544
00:32:48,280 --> 00:32:49,960
Speaker 1: there's no reason to ever have them in one of

545
00:32:50,000 --> 00:32:53,480
Speaker 1: his movies. That kind of thing. Anyway, in the open editorial,

546
00:32:53,520 --> 00:32:57,960
Speaker 1: he did not say that, because how would be crazy? Uh. Instead,

547
00:32:58,000 --> 00:33:02,240
Speaker 1: he actually said that journalists were being just as uh

548
00:33:02,440 --> 00:33:07,640
Speaker 1: just as destructive as the hackers were by sharing this

549
00:33:07,880 --> 00:33:12,880
Speaker 1: confidential information, that they were essentially enabling the hackers in

550
00:33:12,880 --> 00:33:16,960
Speaker 1: their attack to cause damage to the company by taking

551
00:33:17,000 --> 00:33:19,360
Speaker 1: that same info. He says, you know, I imagine that

552
00:33:19,400 --> 00:33:23,480
Speaker 1: the hackers are sorting through that mountain of information they stole,

553
00:33:23,560 --> 00:33:26,640
Speaker 1: looking for the most harmful pieces of information. Meanwhile, the

554
00:33:26,680 --> 00:33:29,480
Speaker 1: journalists are next door doing the exact same thing with

555
00:33:29,520 --> 00:33:32,720
Speaker 1: all the stuff that's been leaked. And he drew a differentiation, however,

556
00:33:33,200 --> 00:33:35,440
Speaker 1: between the two. Well, yeah, I mean, he was saying

557
00:33:35,440 --> 00:33:37,120
Speaker 1: that the hackers are at least doing it out of

558
00:33:37,120 --> 00:33:39,600
Speaker 1: the sense of ideology, but the journalists are just doing

559
00:33:39,600 --> 00:33:41,800
Speaker 1: it to make a make a nickel is essentially what

560
00:33:41,840 --> 00:33:44,120
Speaker 1: I said. He actually did say make a nickel? Uh

561
00:33:44,240 --> 00:33:46,280
Speaker 1: no word if he was walking and talking as he

562
00:33:46,320 --> 00:33:49,440
Speaker 1: wrote this. Um, that's the only way I imagined Sorkin.

563
00:33:50,840 --> 00:33:55,400
Speaker 1: But anyway, so it's an interesting point, And honestly, one

564
00:33:55,480 --> 00:33:58,239
Speaker 1: of the things that's really important to me reporting on

565
00:33:58,280 --> 00:34:01,360
Speaker 1: this stuff is that we're reporting on the incidents, but

566
00:34:01,440 --> 00:34:04,440
Speaker 1: we're not sharing any of that information that was linked.

567
00:34:04,240 --> 00:34:07,120
Speaker 1: I haven't sought it out, I haven't downloaded a in it.

568
00:34:07,520 --> 00:34:11,400
Speaker 1: I'm not interested in the contents, uh Like, I'm not

569
00:34:11,440 --> 00:34:16,440
Speaker 1: interested in the specifics. I'm interested in the impact. I

570
00:34:16,440 --> 00:34:22,279
Speaker 1: I agree with you partially, I'm ultimately interested in the

571
00:34:22,480 --> 00:34:27,280
Speaker 1: big mystery and in the final answer, the stuff about

572
00:34:28,320 --> 00:34:33,640
Speaker 1: people's salaries, people's medical records, things like that. As strange

573
00:34:33,640 --> 00:34:36,120
Speaker 1: as it is to say, it comes down to an

574
00:34:36,200 --> 00:34:42,080
Speaker 1: issue of you know, your personal opinion of what is

575
00:34:42,280 --> 00:34:44,040
Speaker 1: what is right and wrong to look at because a

576
00:34:44,040 --> 00:34:46,759
Speaker 1: lot of people nowadays, with the cost of information and

577
00:34:46,760 --> 00:34:49,840
Speaker 1: communication being so low, there are a lot of people

578
00:34:49,920 --> 00:34:54,160
Speaker 1: who will simply hoard information to collect it. You know, um,

579
00:34:54,200 --> 00:34:59,200
Speaker 1: I because I would not really want anybody reading my

580
00:34:59,280 --> 00:35:03,800
Speaker 1: medical It's not that I'm like secretly awarewolf or something secret. No,

581
00:35:03,880 --> 00:35:06,160
Speaker 1: I'm pretty open about it. Where your like candor part

582
00:35:06,239 --> 00:35:09,520
Speaker 1: on your sleeve when you when you're able to wear sleeves,

583
00:35:09,719 --> 00:35:12,200
Speaker 1: when I'm able to wear sleeves indeed. But but the

584
00:35:12,239 --> 00:35:15,160
Speaker 1: point is that, uh, you know, I think both you

585
00:35:15,200 --> 00:35:18,000
Speaker 1: and I kind of go on a golden rule basis

586
00:35:18,040 --> 00:35:21,719
Speaker 1: for this stuff. I'm very much a proponent of compassion

587
00:35:21,760 --> 00:35:25,000
Speaker 1: and understanding as much as possible in general, not just

588
00:35:25,080 --> 00:35:27,600
Speaker 1: in this case. But yeah, I mean, I think it's

589
00:35:27,640 --> 00:35:31,840
Speaker 1: newsworthy that it happened. I think taking that information and

590
00:35:31,880 --> 00:35:36,240
Speaker 1: actually disseminating what was inside it apart from a generalization,

591
00:35:36,320 --> 00:35:40,319
Speaker 1: like you could say it was salary information without going

592
00:35:40,360 --> 00:35:43,680
Speaker 1: into the details of what that salary information was. Right.

593
00:35:43,880 --> 00:35:46,640
Speaker 1: So Sorkin was specifically pointing out the journalists who are

594
00:35:46,640 --> 00:35:49,600
Speaker 1: sharing this information and essentially doing what the hackers wanted

595
00:35:49,640 --> 00:35:52,480
Speaker 1: them to do in the first place, right, essentially making

596
00:35:52,520 --> 00:35:57,239
Speaker 1: the hackers threats work. Yeah. Yeah, it's like now you

597
00:35:57,239 --> 00:36:02,000
Speaker 1: guys are carrying out the second part of that plan essentially. Um.

598
00:36:02,040 --> 00:36:05,360
Speaker 1: So you know, on the other hand, there are some

599
00:36:05,520 --> 00:36:08,239
Speaker 1: very important issues that have been talked about, like the

600
00:36:08,239 --> 00:36:13,759
Speaker 1: pay disparity that clearly should be addressed. Uh. And so

601
00:36:13,920 --> 00:36:17,080
Speaker 1: it's hard to just be completely like hands off on

602
00:36:17,120 --> 00:36:18,879
Speaker 1: this because there are some things that have come out

603
00:36:18,880 --> 00:36:21,080
Speaker 1: of this that, you know, you want to say, like,

604
00:36:21,160 --> 00:36:24,719
Speaker 1: all right, some of you, some of you may be

605
00:36:24,920 --> 00:36:28,040
Speaker 1: terrible people, and some of your policies may be very

606
00:36:28,160 --> 00:36:30,400
Speaker 1: terrible as well, and maybe we need to take a

607
00:36:30,400 --> 00:36:32,520
Speaker 1: look at that. This is not the way I would

608
00:36:32,520 --> 00:36:35,799
Speaker 1: have preferred us to have this conversation. Absolutely, that's a

609
00:36:35,800 --> 00:36:39,120
Speaker 1: really good point. And and uh, it's weird because although

610
00:36:39,400 --> 00:36:44,680
Speaker 1: the Guardians of Peace do not directly respond, I guess

611
00:36:44,760 --> 00:36:49,440
Speaker 1: to media members, we do see that they are clearly

612
00:36:49,680 --> 00:36:53,719
Speaker 1: listening to. As much as I loathe the term Jonathan

613
00:36:53,760 --> 00:36:58,719
Speaker 1: to the narrative. Yes, So December sixteenth, that narrative gets

614
00:36:58,719 --> 00:37:02,320
Speaker 1: pushed forward with another message allegedly from Guardians of Peace

615
00:37:02,760 --> 00:37:06,560
Speaker 1: that specifically mentions the interview. This is the first time

616
00:37:07,040 --> 00:37:10,680
Speaker 1: the interview is mentioned by name December sixteen. November twenty

617
00:37:10,719 --> 00:37:13,840
Speaker 1: four was when the attack was revealed. December sixteenth is

618
00:37:13,880 --> 00:37:16,320
Speaker 1: when the interview is mentioned by name, and the message

619
00:37:16,360 --> 00:37:18,279
Speaker 1: contains threats saying that if the film is allowed to

620
00:37:18,320 --> 00:37:21,280
Speaker 1: run in theaters, there will be a September eleventh style

621
00:37:21,440 --> 00:37:25,359
Speaker 1: terrorist attack as a response specifically against the New York

622
00:37:25,400 --> 00:37:29,320
Speaker 1: theater where it would have premiered, but also uh nationwide

623
00:37:29,960 --> 00:37:33,760
Speaker 1: um incidents if it were to run in local theaters.

624
00:37:34,160 --> 00:37:36,720
Speaker 1: Sony ends up canceling the premiere and pulls the film

625
00:37:36,719 --> 00:37:39,880
Speaker 1: from theaters, but they really pull the film for theaters

626
00:37:39,920 --> 00:37:42,359
Speaker 1: after several theater chains have already said that they will

627
00:37:42,440 --> 00:37:45,000
Speaker 1: not show the movie. Right, and these are the big

628
00:37:45,400 --> 00:37:50,399
Speaker 1: the big names, Yeah, so these are That's exactly right.

629
00:37:50,480 --> 00:37:53,399
Speaker 1: So once I mean, if if the major chains say

630
00:37:53,440 --> 00:37:56,560
Speaker 1: we're not going to show your movie, then canceling it

631
00:37:56,640 --> 00:37:59,359
Speaker 1: kind of makes sense. So we'll come back to that.

632
00:37:59,560 --> 00:38:04,200
Speaker 1: Because Tony story about this removing of the movie and

633
00:38:04,200 --> 00:38:11,759
Speaker 1: then returning the film is not totally coherent. Yeah, that's

634
00:38:11,800 --> 00:38:14,480
Speaker 1: and it's a charitable way to put it. So at

635
00:38:14,520 --> 00:38:18,080
Speaker 1: this time people say, well, you should release it in

636
00:38:18,520 --> 00:38:22,399
Speaker 1: video on demand somehow, right, or independent theaters right, And

637
00:38:22,480 --> 00:38:27,279
Speaker 1: Sony says, nope, dada, We're not releasing it in any form. Now,

638
00:38:27,400 --> 00:38:30,480
Speaker 1: this is an important thing to remember that Sony has

639
00:38:30,480 --> 00:38:32,839
Speaker 1: said they do not want to release the movie in

640
00:38:32,920 --> 00:38:37,080
Speaker 1: any format. And uh so, December seventeenth, the U. S Government,

641
00:38:37,560 --> 00:38:39,960
Speaker 1: in the form mostly of the FBI, state that they

642
00:38:39,960 --> 00:38:43,359
Speaker 1: believe North Korea was centrally involved in the hacking, although

643
00:38:43,360 --> 00:38:45,359
Speaker 1: the FBI has not officially said that at this point,

644
00:38:45,360 --> 00:38:48,640
Speaker 1: it was really a government official saying we believe that

645
00:38:48,719 --> 00:38:52,120
Speaker 1: North Korea was involved. This was not when the FBI

646
00:38:52,239 --> 00:38:56,880
Speaker 1: specifically came out, but on December eighteen, messages again allegedly

647
00:38:56,960 --> 00:38:59,600
Speaker 1: from Guardians of Peace went to Sony executives and said

648
00:38:59,600 --> 00:39:02,640
Speaker 1: that if the film was never released in any format,

649
00:39:03,320 --> 00:39:06,440
Speaker 1: then Guardians of Peace would not release any more damaging

650
00:39:06,480 --> 00:39:09,959
Speaker 1: information stolen in the hack. So presumably they still had

651
00:39:10,040 --> 00:39:13,560
Speaker 1: some that was at least as damaging as the mountain

652
00:39:13,600 --> 00:39:16,400
Speaker 1: of stuff they had already released, but they were holding

653
00:39:16,440 --> 00:39:18,560
Speaker 1: it in check. And if that movie didn't come out

654
00:39:18,560 --> 00:39:21,040
Speaker 1: at all, it would never see the light of day.

655
00:39:21,080 --> 00:39:24,359
Speaker 1: But a second message on the web application paste band,

656
00:39:24,440 --> 00:39:28,279
Speaker 1: that's the one I was talking about. That text, it's

657
00:39:28,280 --> 00:39:31,080
Speaker 1: supposedly also was from Guardians of Peace and had a

658
00:39:31,080 --> 00:39:34,720
Speaker 1: different message in it, saying that Sony had suffered enough

659
00:39:35,000 --> 00:39:37,520
Speaker 1: and the company could release the movie if Kim Jong

660
00:39:37,640 --> 00:39:42,799
Speaker 1: UN's death wasn't quote too happy, And I guess that

661
00:39:42,920 --> 00:39:47,319
Speaker 1: if it wasn't like a big emotionally uplifting moment in

662
00:39:47,360 --> 00:39:50,600
Speaker 1: the film, like you weren't supposed to stand up and

663
00:39:50,719 --> 00:39:53,400
Speaker 1: cheer and go yea when Kim jong un dies, and

664
00:39:53,480 --> 00:39:59,200
Speaker 1: that would be okay. I feel fairly confident and saying

665
00:39:59,239 --> 00:40:02,399
Speaker 1: that this is not the same group, or at least

666
00:40:02,400 --> 00:40:04,920
Speaker 1: it's not a group representing North Korea, because that seems

667
00:40:04,960 --> 00:40:08,839
Speaker 1: completely antithetical to everything else that's been said. It's even

668
00:40:08,880 --> 00:40:12,040
Speaker 1: antithetical to the other message that was released that very day,

669
00:40:12,880 --> 00:40:15,640
Speaker 1: Like one message says, never released the movie and we'll stop,

670
00:40:15,680 --> 00:40:17,640
Speaker 1: and the other message says, go ahead and release the

671
00:40:17,680 --> 00:40:20,320
Speaker 1: movie as long as it's not celebrating the death of

672
00:40:20,400 --> 00:40:23,600
Speaker 1: Kim jongoon, then you you've suffered enough and you've learned

673
00:40:23,600 --> 00:40:27,840
Speaker 1: your Lesson. Clearly, these can't be the same people unless

674
00:40:27,840 --> 00:40:30,279
Speaker 1: they're just message with Sony. In that case that it

675
00:40:30,360 --> 00:40:33,120
Speaker 1: could be the same people, but now they're cruel mischief makers.

676
00:40:33,400 --> 00:40:36,520
Speaker 1: Now there's one other thing though, that's that's a pretty

677
00:40:36,560 --> 00:40:41,160
Speaker 1: big deal that was unearthed during the leaks of the

678
00:40:41,200 --> 00:40:43,440
Speaker 1: Sony hats. Yeah, this is one that has become a

679
00:40:43,480 --> 00:40:46,800
Speaker 1: separate issue all on its own, and it's one that

680
00:40:46,840 --> 00:40:48,960
Speaker 1: I would really need to look into further to to

681
00:40:49,040 --> 00:40:53,280
Speaker 1: do a full rundown on it. But in the future

682
00:40:53,400 --> 00:40:55,719
Speaker 1: I think so. Yeah, I've been trying to give it

683
00:40:55,800 --> 00:40:58,600
Speaker 1: some more space so I can get more information on it.

684
00:40:58,640 --> 00:41:01,400
Speaker 1: But this was where we also saw as part of

685
00:41:01,400 --> 00:41:05,239
Speaker 1: the leaked information that came out that there was this

686
00:41:05,400 --> 00:41:10,240
Speaker 1: um kind of a conspiracy really among movie studios about

687
00:41:10,480 --> 00:41:16,080
Speaker 1: Project Goliath, which everyone is pretty sure means Google and

688
00:41:16,160 --> 00:41:18,840
Speaker 1: Google in the m p a A, the Motion Picture

689
00:41:18,840 --> 00:41:23,040
Speaker 1: Association of America ended up having some um some very

690
00:41:23,120 --> 00:41:27,920
Speaker 1: public spats about the information contained in the leak regarding

691
00:41:28,040 --> 00:41:31,480
Speaker 1: Project Goliath, Google, saying that the m p A was

692
00:41:31,600 --> 00:41:35,480
Speaker 1: essentially trying to reinstate policies that were under the SOAPA

693
00:41:35,719 --> 00:41:40,600
Speaker 1: umbrella but had been defeated because SOAPA was not adopted. Meanwhile,

694
00:41:40,600 --> 00:41:43,520
Speaker 1: the m p a A Is saying Google being talking

695
00:41:43,520 --> 00:41:46,200
Speaker 1: about self as a champion of free speech is a joke.

696
00:41:47,800 --> 00:41:52,400
Speaker 1: It got brutal. Uh yeah, very ugly. It's definitely worth

697
00:41:52,440 --> 00:41:54,719
Speaker 1: looking further into, but we won't. You know, I just

698
00:41:54,760 --> 00:41:56,879
Speaker 1: wanted to mention it because again, it's like, that's not

699
00:41:56,960 --> 00:41:59,480
Speaker 1: that this story wasn't big enough, but other big stories

700
00:41:59,520 --> 00:42:03,000
Speaker 1: came up to like because of it. December nineteenth, that's

701
00:42:03,040 --> 00:42:06,240
Speaker 1: when the FBI announces it has connected the North Korean

702
00:42:06,280 --> 00:42:09,839
Speaker 1: government to the attacks, citing unreleased evidence as well as

703
00:42:09,880 --> 00:42:12,560
Speaker 1: clues such as hacking tools that have been used by

704
00:42:12,600 --> 00:42:15,520
Speaker 1: North Korean hackers in the past. They also cite that

705
00:42:15,560 --> 00:42:19,759
Speaker 1: the attacks seemed to originate from IP addresses within North Korea,

706
00:42:19,840 --> 00:42:22,439
Speaker 1: and later stated that they believed it would have been

707
00:42:22,480 --> 00:42:25,400
Speaker 1: really difficult for anyone else to have used or spoofed

708
00:42:25,480 --> 00:42:29,120
Speaker 1: those particular IP addresses. Is my favorite part coming up. Yeah,

709
00:42:29,120 --> 00:42:31,719
Speaker 1: and then North Korea says it was not involved in

710
00:42:31,719 --> 00:42:34,600
Speaker 1: the hacks, but praises the hackers as sympathizers and that

711
00:42:34,640 --> 00:42:38,200
Speaker 1: the hack was quote a righteous deed unquote. They basically said,

712
00:42:38,360 --> 00:42:41,400
Speaker 1: we didn't do it, but we should have Yeah, I

713
00:42:41,520 --> 00:42:42,960
Speaker 1: like that they say it was a righteous deed, but

714
00:42:42,960 --> 00:42:44,200
Speaker 1: I like to think of him saying it was a

715
00:42:44,440 --> 00:42:48,720
Speaker 1: righteous deed, you know, like kind of Surfer de mutant

716
00:42:48,760 --> 00:42:51,080
Speaker 1: Ninja Turtles version of righteous. I don't know how popular

717
00:42:51,120 --> 00:42:53,200
Speaker 1: Hawaiian shirts are there, but that would have been good,

718
00:42:53,480 --> 00:42:56,040
Speaker 1: good costume. If they're really popular, then I've got my

719
00:42:56,160 --> 00:42:59,120
Speaker 1: wardrobe should I ever visit North Korea, I've got a

720
00:42:59,160 --> 00:43:03,080
Speaker 1: ton of those. President Obama also on December nineteenth, spoke

721
00:43:03,120 --> 00:43:05,400
Speaker 1: out about the hack and said he felt that Sony

722
00:43:05,440 --> 00:43:08,280
Speaker 1: made a mistake pulling the movie from theaters, and also

723
00:43:08,320 --> 00:43:11,640
Speaker 1: said that the US would respond proportionately to the attack.

724
00:43:12,160 --> 00:43:15,120
Speaker 1: What that specifically meant, no one was really sure at

725
00:43:15,120 --> 00:43:17,560
Speaker 1: the time. Yeah, I've even gotta I forgot to put

726
00:43:17,600 --> 00:43:19,000
Speaker 1: the note in, but I'll mention it when we get

727
00:43:19,000 --> 00:43:22,400
Speaker 1: a little further in about the something that happened in

728
00:43:22,400 --> 00:43:26,160
Speaker 1: North Korea that some wonder perhaps was the proportionate attack.

729
00:43:26,239 --> 00:43:30,600
Speaker 1: We don't write the response now that that same day,

730
00:43:30,760 --> 00:43:34,000
Speaker 1: Sony came out and this is where the this is

731
00:43:34,040 --> 00:43:39,759
Speaker 1: where their message evolves. Yeah, evolves is good. Changes makes

732
00:43:39,760 --> 00:43:46,240
Speaker 1: a degree turn. So this is the CEO Michael Lynton

733
00:43:46,280 --> 00:43:48,520
Speaker 1: came out and said that the decision to cancel the

734
00:43:48,560 --> 00:43:51,879
Speaker 1: film was merely in response to theater's refusing to show it,

735
00:43:52,280 --> 00:43:54,759
Speaker 1: and not a sign that the company was bowing to

736
00:43:54,960 --> 00:43:58,600
Speaker 1: terrorist threats. If that's the case, I don't know why

737
00:43:58,719 --> 00:44:01,759
Speaker 1: they refused to release it in any format. If they

738
00:44:01,760 --> 00:44:05,359
Speaker 1: said we're never releasing this movie. Ever, how could that

739
00:44:05,400 --> 00:44:09,120
Speaker 1: be only because the theaters refused to show it, Because

740
00:44:09,120 --> 00:44:11,759
Speaker 1: you would assume that the company wouldn't want to just

741
00:44:11,880 --> 00:44:17,000
Speaker 1: eat the expenses of producing and marketing a film. Gigantic

742
00:44:17,080 --> 00:44:21,480
Speaker 1: expenses not many millions of dollars, So if you want

743
00:44:21,480 --> 00:44:24,400
Speaker 1: to recapture at least some of that, you could release

744
00:44:24,440 --> 00:44:27,560
Speaker 1: it online. I mean, if you're truly not scared of

745
00:44:27,640 --> 00:44:32,759
Speaker 1: the threats, then why not why not release it online?

746
00:44:32,920 --> 00:44:36,960
Speaker 1: Or allow independent theaters that say, look, we'll still show it.

747
00:44:37,520 --> 00:44:39,400
Speaker 1: Why not allow them to do it? And that was

748
00:44:39,560 --> 00:44:41,960
Speaker 1: that was the thing is that this response to me

749
00:44:42,080 --> 00:44:46,160
Speaker 1: did not ring true because the actions that Sony had

750
00:44:46,160 --> 00:44:49,120
Speaker 1: taken just a couple of days earlier, U spoke very

751
00:44:49,200 --> 00:44:51,839
Speaker 1: differently than what they were saying. However, of course, they

752
00:44:51,840 --> 00:44:53,560
Speaker 1: want to save face. They want to say, hey, we

753
00:44:53,560 --> 00:44:56,279
Speaker 1: weren't scared. It's just that there was no place to

754
00:44:56,320 --> 00:44:59,080
Speaker 1: show it, so that's why we pulled it, which is

755
00:44:59,239 --> 00:45:05,520
Speaker 1: patently else because there were several in the city of

756
00:45:05,560 --> 00:45:09,000
Speaker 1: Atlanta that was ready to show it. Uh. There are

757
00:45:09,040 --> 00:45:13,280
Speaker 1: two theaters in general that are specific, rather too specific

758
00:45:13,320 --> 00:45:16,279
Speaker 1: theaters that said they wanted to show the film. One

759
00:45:16,360 --> 00:45:19,399
Speaker 1: is in Atlanta called the Plaza, which is just down

760
00:45:19,480 --> 00:45:22,040
Speaker 1: the street from where I live. Independent theater, yeah, a

761
00:45:22,040 --> 00:45:25,560
Speaker 1: little tiny independent theater. Uh, and they said we'll show it.

762
00:45:25,640 --> 00:45:28,640
Speaker 1: And then there was the other one in Texas, Alamo Drafthouse.

763
00:45:28,840 --> 00:45:33,520
Speaker 1: Yeah yeah, yeah, which are which are too um unforeseen

764
00:45:33,719 --> 00:45:37,240
Speaker 1: champions there. We we do know though. This is another

765
00:45:37,280 --> 00:45:40,720
Speaker 1: thing that's really interesting to me because all this stuff

766
00:45:40,760 --> 00:45:43,920
Speaker 1: takes place after you and I and Matt did the

767
00:45:43,960 --> 00:45:47,839
Speaker 1: earlier show. So what happens on December twenty That's when

768
00:45:47,840 --> 00:45:50,759
Speaker 1: North Korea offers to take part in a joint investigation

769
00:45:50,800 --> 00:45:54,400
Speaker 1: of the hack and the U. S Government declines. So

770
00:45:54,520 --> 00:45:57,200
Speaker 1: North Korea says, hey, we weren't responsible, but we will

771
00:45:57,239 --> 00:45:59,920
Speaker 1: totally help you try and track down who was responsible

772
00:46:00,280 --> 00:46:02,920
Speaker 1: for this thing that we approve of but totally didn't do.

773
00:46:03,480 --> 00:46:07,600
Speaker 1: And the United States said, Uh, here's what's interesting to

774
00:46:07,640 --> 00:46:10,080
Speaker 1: mean though, if North Korea is telling the truth, right,

775
00:46:10,120 --> 00:46:13,759
Speaker 1: and if they were in no way involved in that hack, right,

776
00:46:14,239 --> 00:46:19,239
Speaker 1: this this uh, these bits of code that somehow could

777
00:46:19,280 --> 00:46:23,760
Speaker 1: have come from them. I'm wondering if maybe maybe their

778
00:46:23,880 --> 00:46:29,279
Speaker 1: willingness to investigate was seen as uh disingenuous. Maybe they

779
00:46:29,320 --> 00:46:33,680
Speaker 1: were looking to find out how their how their work

780
00:46:33,760 --> 00:46:36,520
Speaker 1: got out there, how he got found, or maybe they were.

781
00:46:37,080 --> 00:46:39,839
Speaker 1: It could also possibly be that North Korea is saying, hey,

782
00:46:39,880 --> 00:46:43,520
Speaker 1: you know, we didn't um, we didn't allow for this

783
00:46:43,600 --> 00:46:46,319
Speaker 1: to happen. We didn't, we didn't designate someone to go

784
00:46:46,360 --> 00:46:48,960
Speaker 1: and do this on our behalf. We would like to

785
00:46:49,000 --> 00:46:54,160
Speaker 1: track down the person responsible for reasons of our own right, Yeah, exactly.

786
00:46:54,440 --> 00:46:58,440
Speaker 1: Or it could be that they totally did it, and

787
00:46:58,480 --> 00:47:00,160
Speaker 1: that's one thing that we should point out, Like I

788
00:47:00,800 --> 00:47:05,279
Speaker 1: have pretty strong skepticism about this, but they totally could

789
00:47:05,280 --> 00:47:07,840
Speaker 1: have done it. Right now, it's just not enough information.

790
00:47:07,880 --> 00:47:10,560
Speaker 1: We'll get to we'll get to the biggest, the biggest

791
00:47:10,600 --> 00:47:13,680
Speaker 1: problem in the information gap here pretty soon, I think.

792
00:47:13,760 --> 00:47:16,319
Speaker 1: But then on that same day, December twentie that's when

793
00:47:16,360 --> 00:47:19,120
Speaker 1: North Korea also warned that there would be serious consequences

794
00:47:19,120 --> 00:47:22,440
Speaker 1: should the United States attack North Korea if this retaliation

795
00:47:22,440 --> 00:47:25,640
Speaker 1: were to happen, right, whatever that would be. Yeah, So

796
00:47:25,840 --> 00:47:29,719
Speaker 1: essentially like whatever proportionate response you're thinking of, better not

797
00:47:29,800 --> 00:47:33,560
Speaker 1: be against us, because boy haality, we will we And

798
00:47:33,560 --> 00:47:37,280
Speaker 1: and they were very like, very militant, not big surprise,

799
00:47:37,320 --> 00:47:40,439
Speaker 1: I mean North Korea, very angry. North Korea has got

800
00:47:40,440 --> 00:47:44,760
Speaker 1: a long history of of you know, beating the drama

801
00:47:44,760 --> 00:47:49,320
Speaker 1: and saying that they will take severe action without backing

802
00:47:49,320 --> 00:47:52,160
Speaker 1: it up. That you would ever want them to back

803
00:47:52,200 --> 00:47:55,080
Speaker 1: it up. But the United States and North Korea remember

804
00:47:55,120 --> 00:47:58,879
Speaker 1: still technically in a ceasefire with the war that never ended. Yes,

805
00:47:59,000 --> 00:48:01,319
Speaker 1: North Korea has never acknowledge the end of the war.

806
00:48:01,480 --> 00:48:05,840
Speaker 1: So December twenty three, Sony would authorize three theaters to

807
00:48:05,880 --> 00:48:09,080
Speaker 1: show the interview on Christmas Day, and they also released

808
00:48:09,200 --> 00:48:13,200
Speaker 1: the film to streaming options late on the Christmas Eve.

809
00:48:13,640 --> 00:48:17,120
Speaker 1: And there were no further attacks. Despite that fact that

810
00:48:17,200 --> 00:48:19,279
Speaker 1: you know, you had those messages earlier saying that if

811
00:48:19,320 --> 00:48:22,520
Speaker 1: you ever show this, we will attack more, there weren't

812
00:48:22,520 --> 00:48:27,879
Speaker 1: any There were no real life violent consequences. December seven,

813
00:48:28,000 --> 00:48:31,160
Speaker 1: North Korea condemns the release of the film, and they're

814
00:48:31,200 --> 00:48:37,279
Speaker 1: real jerks about it. They used a racially insensitive term

815
00:48:37,360 --> 00:48:42,040
Speaker 1: to describe our president, which was pretty ugly and I

816
00:48:42,200 --> 00:48:44,560
Speaker 1: got a lot of people up in arms. But I

817
00:48:44,600 --> 00:48:47,120
Speaker 1: mean the most important thing is obviously that there wasn't

818
00:48:47,160 --> 00:48:50,600
Speaker 1: any kind of physical retaliation for the release of the movie.

819
00:48:50,920 --> 00:48:56,040
Speaker 1: It was just a really nasty worded message from people

820
00:48:56,120 --> 00:49:00,200
Speaker 1: who were upset about it. Well and the film itself.

821
00:49:00,000 --> 00:49:02,920
Speaker 1: Of course, given we talked about this a little bit,

822
00:49:02,960 --> 00:49:08,560
Speaker 1: but given the political environment and ideology of the Democratic

823
00:49:08,600 --> 00:49:12,000
Speaker 1: People's Republic of Career North Korea, this is this is

824
00:49:12,040 --> 00:49:17,040
Speaker 1: a profoundly offensive thing. It's it's similar to a film

825
00:49:17,120 --> 00:49:22,920
Speaker 1: that came out featuring Mohammed from you know, from the

826
00:49:23,000 --> 00:49:27,600
Speaker 1: Muslim faith, uh, which depicting Mohammed is already supposed to

827
00:49:27,600 --> 00:49:32,399
Speaker 1: be a profound defense, and then having him killed. It's

828
00:49:32,480 --> 00:49:35,640
Speaker 1: similar to that because of the deification of the leadership

829
00:49:35,640 --> 00:49:38,640
Speaker 1: of North Korea. Sure, yeah, it's it's it's a very

830
00:49:38,719 --> 00:49:41,719
Speaker 1: much a kind of divine right sort of thing. Yeah,

831
00:49:41,719 --> 00:49:45,320
Speaker 1: that's a good phrase, and so a nastily worded statement,

832
00:49:45,680 --> 00:49:49,480
Speaker 1: uh with with added racism, I guess, just to make

833
00:49:49,520 --> 00:49:53,920
Speaker 1: it really pop, is uh the least you could expect.

834
00:49:54,000 --> 00:49:59,279
Speaker 1: Ye Uh. Sony also has threatened media companies that are

835
00:49:59,320 --> 00:50:01,960
Speaker 1: covering the hack with legal action saying they will sue

836
00:50:02,520 --> 00:50:07,160
Speaker 1: companies that specifically companies that are sharing the leaked information.

837
00:50:07,280 --> 00:50:10,480
Speaker 1: I mean, reporting on something is one thing. Obviously, Sony

838
00:50:10,600 --> 00:50:13,200
Speaker 1: suing a company for reporting on the story would be

839
00:50:14,600 --> 00:50:17,160
Speaker 1: pretty difficult to win. I mean, you know, no one

840
00:50:17,239 --> 00:50:21,560
Speaker 1: wants to get sued. It's an expensive endeavor. But you know,

841
00:50:21,600 --> 00:50:24,000
Speaker 1: most most media outlets are going to say, like, well,

842
00:50:24,040 --> 00:50:26,319
Speaker 1: we're just covering the news. This is news, and that's

843
00:50:26,360 --> 00:50:30,640
Speaker 1: what we do. A government, you can't claim that this

844
00:50:30,760 --> 00:50:34,000
Speaker 1: is a national security issue. Yeah. Now if if in

845
00:50:34,080 --> 00:50:38,120
Speaker 1: fact they were releasing private like corporate secrets that kind

846
00:50:38,160 --> 00:50:40,920
Speaker 1: of thing, then you get into sort of a murky ground.

847
00:50:41,360 --> 00:50:44,520
Speaker 1: And I can see why Sony definitely wanted to to

848
00:50:44,640 --> 00:50:48,440
Speaker 1: try and cut down on people sharing this information and

849
00:50:48,480 --> 00:50:52,280
Speaker 1: disseminating it further, which is another reason why I report

850
00:50:52,400 --> 00:50:56,919
Speaker 1: about the story but not go into it. Uh, there's

851
00:50:56,960 --> 00:51:00,359
Speaker 1: not always altruistic. Now, there's one other thing you that

852
00:51:00,400 --> 00:51:03,280
Speaker 1: you were going to mention as well about this, which

853
00:51:03,520 --> 00:51:07,359
Speaker 1: is something funny happened in North Korea's internet. Yeah, their

854
00:51:07,400 --> 00:51:11,920
Speaker 1: internet um had a real slow down and eventually just

855
00:51:11,960 --> 00:51:17,160
Speaker 1: a complete halt of operations in late December, and there

856
00:51:17,200 --> 00:51:18,960
Speaker 1: was some question about whether or not that was in

857
00:51:19,000 --> 00:51:22,040
Speaker 1: fact the proportionate response that the United States was going

858
00:51:22,080 --> 00:51:26,880
Speaker 1: to take against whomever perpetrated the hack um and we

859
00:51:26,920 --> 00:51:29,160
Speaker 1: don't know. We don't know if it was. In fact.

860
00:51:29,200 --> 00:51:34,880
Speaker 1: There's so few nodes in North Korea, and it's all

861
00:51:35,360 --> 00:51:37,759
Speaker 1: stuff that the government and military can have access to,

862
00:51:37,880 --> 00:51:41,240
Speaker 1: but no one else outside of those organizations has access

863
00:51:41,239 --> 00:51:45,839
Speaker 1: to the Internet. So but those those nodes that all

864
00:51:45,880 --> 00:51:49,359
Speaker 1: the connections were essentially shut down, like the Internet went

865
00:51:49,440 --> 00:51:52,360
Speaker 1: dark in North Korea. It led some people to wonder

866
00:51:52,440 --> 00:51:54,719
Speaker 1: if perhaps there was an attack, if it was a

867
00:51:54,760 --> 00:51:58,560
Speaker 1: state sponsored attack like the United States proportionate response, if

868
00:51:58,600 --> 00:52:01,279
Speaker 1: that was it, or if it was just as an

869
00:52:01,320 --> 00:52:06,040
Speaker 1: example of infrastructure breaking down, which could have been the case.

870
00:52:06,080 --> 00:52:08,080
Speaker 1: It could have been that it was as simple as

871
00:52:08,120 --> 00:52:11,080
Speaker 1: someone needed to go and reboot a machine in order

872
00:52:11,080 --> 00:52:14,520
Speaker 1: for it to reconnect to the Internet at large. So uh,

873
00:52:14,560 --> 00:52:16,880
Speaker 1: there just wasn't any answer to that. Of course, you know,

874
00:52:16,960 --> 00:52:20,240
Speaker 1: you had a lot of speculation around it, but since

875
00:52:20,280 --> 00:52:23,200
Speaker 1: there's not enough information, I don't want to speculate right

876
00:52:23,320 --> 00:52:26,600
Speaker 1: the We're just saying that the issue of antiquated or

877
00:52:26,640 --> 00:52:30,879
Speaker 1: malfunctioning equipment is at least as likely a culprit as

878
00:52:31,360 --> 00:52:34,880
Speaker 1: a state sponsored attack, if not more likely in my opinion.

879
00:52:34,960 --> 00:52:38,279
Speaker 1: But so happy New Year, Sony. You made it to

880
00:52:39,760 --> 00:52:44,880
Speaker 1: uh the and that's January second. There's a funny thing, Jonathan,

881
00:52:44,920 --> 00:52:46,640
Speaker 1: you and I have talked about this off air before,

882
00:52:46,840 --> 00:52:51,480
Speaker 1: but there's this funny way that stories drop. Uh, some

883
00:52:51,560 --> 00:52:55,360
Speaker 1: big stories drop on Friday afternoon. Listeners will recall that

884
00:52:55,440 --> 00:52:59,000
Speaker 1: January two was a Friday. There's a great subreddit about

885
00:52:59,480 --> 00:53:02,520
Speaker 1: important news that drops on Friday. Yeah. The hope that

886
00:53:03,280 --> 00:53:05,839
Speaker 1: there are a lot of companies that will released like

887
00:53:06,120 --> 00:53:08,719
Speaker 1: unpleasant news on a Friday, hoping that it just gets

888
00:53:08,760 --> 00:53:11,520
Speaker 1: buried and then by the time everyone's ready to talk

889
00:53:11,520 --> 00:53:13,560
Speaker 1: about it again on Monday, it's old news, so no

890
00:53:13,600 --> 00:53:17,520
Speaker 1: one talks about it, right, Yeah, exactly, And so this is, uh,

891
00:53:17,560 --> 00:53:21,880
Speaker 1: this is a pretty big Friday to drop some disappearing

892
00:53:21,960 --> 00:53:25,760
Speaker 1: news because it's the day after New Year's Day. Everyone's hungover,

893
00:53:26,040 --> 00:53:28,200
Speaker 1: no one can no one can remember what their name is,

894
00:53:28,360 --> 00:53:31,279
Speaker 1: let alone read a press release right right, And like,

895
00:53:31,400 --> 00:53:34,279
Speaker 1: you don't drink, and you're probably just hungover from having

896
00:53:34,320 --> 00:53:36,959
Speaker 1: to deal with all the people drinking. It's mostly made

897
00:53:36,960 --> 00:53:39,960
Speaker 1: dealing with the immense frustration of all my drunk friends

898
00:53:39,960 --> 00:53:43,040
Speaker 1: who are who are texting me as they're like, dude,

899
00:53:43,040 --> 00:53:45,000
Speaker 1: did I call you last night? And if I did,

900
00:53:45,200 --> 00:53:48,879
Speaker 1: don't remember the things I said? Check the message. Yes

901
00:53:48,960 --> 00:53:51,000
Speaker 1: you know your your co host Matt Frederick has done

902
00:53:51,000 --> 00:53:54,840
Speaker 1: that to me. At one thirty in the morning, I

903
00:53:54,880 --> 00:53:57,000
Speaker 1: got a call from him. That was a few years

904
00:53:57,040 --> 00:53:59,000
Speaker 1: ago though that was not this year. That was in

905
00:53:59,040 --> 00:54:02,240
Speaker 1: his checkered past. So here's what happens. On January second.

906
00:54:02,239 --> 00:54:05,239
Speaker 1: The White House announces a new round of sanctions on

907
00:54:05,320 --> 00:54:08,720
Speaker 1: North Korea, and they do this via executive order. Uh.

908
00:54:08,800 --> 00:54:13,200
Speaker 1: We've got a quotation here, uh, which we should say

909
00:54:13,239 --> 00:54:17,120
Speaker 1: also that as the US is releasing these new sanctions

910
00:54:17,400 --> 00:54:24,040
Speaker 1: of people are already raising um skeptical concern about this

911
00:54:24,239 --> 00:54:28,600
Speaker 1: North Korea allegation. And they're saying, you know, the FBI

912
00:54:28,800 --> 00:54:31,479
Speaker 1: or the CIA or the rest of the alphabet soup

913
00:54:31,560 --> 00:54:35,720
Speaker 1: seems convinced that North Korea was involved. And they're saying

914
00:54:36,520 --> 00:54:40,480
Speaker 1: that due to information we have, we know it was

915
00:54:40,560 --> 00:54:45,839
Speaker 1: North Korea. And people are saying, but how and why

916
00:54:46,080 --> 00:54:48,279
Speaker 1: what is this information that you have that is such

917
00:54:48,280 --> 00:54:53,000
Speaker 1: a convincing smoking gun, right, And uh, they that's why

918
00:54:53,200 --> 00:54:58,919
Speaker 1: we've got the exact quotation of why they are sanctioning this, Uh,

919
00:54:58,960 --> 00:55:00,960
Speaker 1: if if you could probably do a better voice to

920
00:55:01,400 --> 00:55:07,040
Speaker 1: the response. So, it's a response to ongoing provocative, destabilizing,

921
00:55:07,080 --> 00:55:11,000
Speaker 1: and repressive actions and policies. Particularly it's destructive and coercive

922
00:55:11,000 --> 00:55:15,960
Speaker 1: cyber attacks on Sony Pictures Entertainment. So specifically, not not

923
00:55:16,080 --> 00:55:22,520
Speaker 1: just specifically cyber crime, but specifically Sony Pictures Entertainment. They're saying,

924
00:55:22,840 --> 00:55:25,120
Speaker 1: not only do we think he did it, this is

925
00:55:25,160 --> 00:55:29,040
Speaker 1: our official response to that. Yeah. So in this case,

926
00:55:29,080 --> 00:55:32,440
Speaker 1: I mean, it's essentially saying, like cases closed, guys, this

927
00:55:32,520 --> 00:55:36,279
Speaker 1: is they did it. And uh, we're gonna kind of

928
00:55:36,320 --> 00:55:40,279
Speaker 1: segue into sort of the skepticism about this, including my

929
00:55:40,320 --> 00:55:43,920
Speaker 1: own personal skepticism, but I want to preface it with saying,

930
00:55:44,160 --> 00:55:46,279
Speaker 1: and we said this on on the stuff they don't

931
00:55:46,280 --> 00:55:48,719
Speaker 1: want you to know episode as well, that this is

932
00:55:48,760 --> 00:55:51,640
Speaker 1: based upon the information that we have available to us.

933
00:55:51,680 --> 00:55:54,919
Speaker 1: And it could be that the US government hasn't its

934
00:55:54,920 --> 00:55:59,759
Speaker 1: possession information that is damning evidence that proves that North

935
00:56:00,040 --> 00:56:03,799
Speaker 1: Rhea's government was in fact behind the attacks. Uh, And

936
00:56:03,880 --> 00:56:06,239
Speaker 1: it's just that we don't have access to that information,

937
00:56:06,239 --> 00:56:11,000
Speaker 1: and therefore that's why things look a little hokey to us. Uh.

938
00:56:11,120 --> 00:56:14,120
Speaker 1: That being said, things look a little hokey to us.

939
00:56:15,000 --> 00:56:17,359
Speaker 1: How so what what are some of the points that

940
00:56:17,400 --> 00:56:22,400
Speaker 1: make this not an iron clad theory? All right? So, first,

941
00:56:22,480 --> 00:56:25,719
Speaker 1: it's odd to have a state sponsored attack where you

942
00:56:25,760 --> 00:56:29,360
Speaker 1: have a hacker group claiming responsibility and giving itself a

943
00:56:29,400 --> 00:56:33,160
Speaker 1: cool name. Yes. So so having a group come out

944
00:56:33,160 --> 00:56:35,160
Speaker 1: and say, hey, we're guardians of peace. Were the ones

945
00:56:35,160 --> 00:56:37,000
Speaker 1: who did this, this is the reason we did it,

946
00:56:37,160 --> 00:56:39,560
Speaker 1: here's how you can stop it from happening, is a

947
00:56:39,560 --> 00:56:42,200
Speaker 1: lot different from a state sponsored attack. A state sponsored

948
00:56:42,239 --> 00:56:45,160
Speaker 1: attack usually one thing is they don't want to leave

949
00:56:45,200 --> 00:56:47,759
Speaker 1: any trace of who it was that did it. You know,

950
00:56:47,840 --> 00:56:51,399
Speaker 1: this is if you remember the episodes we've done about

951
00:56:51,440 --> 00:56:54,080
Speaker 1: stuck s net, then you know this is the case.

952
00:56:54,120 --> 00:56:56,840
Speaker 1: Like you want, you want to have the effect without

953
00:56:56,960 --> 00:57:02,600
Speaker 1: having it be autographed, you know, love North Korea. Next,

954
00:57:02,640 --> 00:57:05,600
Speaker 1: the amount of data stolen was huge, so we mentioned

955
00:57:05,640 --> 00:57:08,400
Speaker 1: this earlier. It takes a really long time to siphon

956
00:57:08,440 --> 00:57:12,279
Speaker 1: off a hundred terabytes of data, particularly if you're not

957
00:57:12,480 --> 00:57:17,400
Speaker 1: on site. So that is an enormous undertaking. It's not impossible,

958
00:57:17,560 --> 00:57:22,200
Speaker 1: it is something that could happen, but it would take months. Well,

959
00:57:22,240 --> 00:57:24,120
Speaker 1: it would suggest to me that if in fact this

960
00:57:24,200 --> 00:57:29,120
Speaker 1: is North Korea that's behind it, that they targeted Sony

961
00:57:29,280 --> 00:57:35,479
Speaker 1: essentially sometime mid two thousand and fourteen for a movie

962
00:57:35,520 --> 00:57:37,480
Speaker 1: that wasn't going to come out for six months at

963
00:57:37,520 --> 00:57:40,840
Speaker 1: the latest, because that's how long it's going to take

964
00:57:40,840 --> 00:57:43,439
Speaker 1: to steal that much information. Also, that they were able

965
00:57:43,480 --> 00:57:46,200
Speaker 1: to identify the information that would be most harmful to

966
00:57:46,240 --> 00:57:50,960
Speaker 1: the company, target it, take it, and not ever be noticed.

967
00:57:50,960 --> 00:57:53,200
Speaker 1: Now granted, when they're taking it, they're making copies. It's

968
00:57:53,240 --> 00:57:56,360
Speaker 1: not like stealing from a store where suddenly there's there's

969
00:57:56,360 --> 00:57:59,640
Speaker 1: an empty space where a TV used to be, right,

970
00:57:59,760 --> 00:58:02,840
Speaker 1: So it's a little different from physical theft, but still

971
00:58:03,000 --> 00:58:05,080
Speaker 1: you could end up being caught, you know, you could

972
00:58:05,080 --> 00:58:09,080
Speaker 1: at lead people could see unusual traffic in the Internet servers,

973
00:58:09,120 --> 00:58:14,280
Speaker 1: that kind of thing. Um, so it's unusual. Also the

974
00:58:14,320 --> 00:58:17,560
Speaker 1: fact that the information that was released to harm the

975
00:58:17,600 --> 00:58:23,120
Speaker 1: company was incredibly savvy, like this speaks of someone who

976
00:58:23,120 --> 00:58:28,240
Speaker 1: has a real understanding of what is going to make

977
00:58:28,280 --> 00:58:33,760
Speaker 1: a company, specifically a media company vulnerable. Matter right, how

978
00:58:33,800 --> 00:58:37,560
Speaker 1: do I strike at the morale of the employees, how

979
00:58:37,600 --> 00:58:41,400
Speaker 1: do I strike at the relationship between the production company

980
00:58:41,440 --> 00:58:44,720
Speaker 1: and the other big players in the industry, how do

981
00:58:44,760 --> 00:58:48,240
Speaker 1: I strike at the American public's perception of that company.

982
00:58:48,320 --> 00:58:52,320
Speaker 1: This is incredibly savvy stuff. Not to say that there

983
00:58:52,360 --> 00:58:55,040
Speaker 1: are there aren't people in North Korea who are aware

984
00:58:55,080 --> 00:58:58,040
Speaker 1: of this. They very well maybe, but it seems to

985
00:58:58,040 --> 00:59:02,880
Speaker 1: me like it's a real in cider's insight to what

986
00:59:03,080 --> 00:59:06,400
Speaker 1: is important within the film industry in general and Sony

987
00:59:06,440 --> 00:59:12,080
Speaker 1: in particular. That's a nice turn of phrase. Yeah, it

988
00:59:12,160 --> 00:59:15,480
Speaker 1: was a little clunky myself, but okay. Also, the threats

989
00:59:15,520 --> 00:59:18,000
Speaker 1: to obey the hackers had nothing to do with the

990
00:59:18,120 --> 00:59:21,600
Speaker 1: interview for a really long time, like, so essentially they

991
00:59:21,600 --> 00:59:24,520
Speaker 1: were saying, obey us, do what we say, but they

992
00:59:24,520 --> 00:59:28,439
Speaker 1: weren't saying They weren't giving instructions, Like, they didn't give

993
00:59:28,560 --> 00:59:31,720
Speaker 1: Sony the chance to pull the interview. It was only

994
00:59:31,920 --> 00:59:36,040
Speaker 1: after leaking the information that the demand was even made.

995
00:59:36,520 --> 00:59:39,680
Speaker 1: So it's really odd that if the interview was in

996
00:59:39,720 --> 00:59:43,040
Speaker 1: fact the reason for the attack, and if the goal

997
00:59:43,120 --> 00:59:45,680
Speaker 1: of the attack was to have the interview pulled from

998
00:59:45,720 --> 00:59:49,520
Speaker 1: film from theaters, why not actually give the company a

999
00:59:49,640 --> 00:59:53,440
Speaker 1: chance to do that rather than just slash and burn

1000
00:59:53,880 --> 00:59:56,840
Speaker 1: because the film was released anyway, yeah to me. That's

1001
00:59:56,840 --> 00:59:59,480
Speaker 1: that's one of the most important parts. Let alone the

1002
00:59:59,520 --> 01:00:06,200
Speaker 1: fact that UH states don't typically attack other states for

1003
01:00:06,720 --> 01:00:10,920
Speaker 1: media like private films, you know, private sector films. UH.

1004
01:00:11,560 --> 01:00:15,000
Speaker 1: We've already talked about. You know something that ties into

1005
01:00:15,080 --> 01:00:18,480
Speaker 1: that earlier point you just made, which is, UH, how

1006
01:00:18,520 --> 01:00:21,040
Speaker 1: to attribute who said what? Yeah? How do you How

1007
01:00:21,080 --> 01:00:23,880
Speaker 1: can you be sure that a message supposedly from the

1008
01:00:23,880 --> 01:00:26,440
Speaker 1: hackers was actually from the hackers? And you can't know.

1009
01:00:27,160 --> 01:00:29,880
Speaker 1: I mean, you know, you might as well sit there

1010
01:00:29,920 --> 01:00:33,400
Speaker 1: and go to four chan and try and say this

1011
01:00:33,440 --> 01:00:36,360
Speaker 1: particular message was from this particular person. It's all supposed

1012
01:00:36,360 --> 01:00:40,480
Speaker 1: to be anonymously protected, so you don't know. Also, security

1013
01:00:40,480 --> 01:00:45,200
Speaker 1: firm Norse identified six former Sony employees who had the

1014
01:00:45,240 --> 01:00:49,000
Speaker 1: skills necessary to pull off something like this and had

1015
01:00:49,040 --> 01:00:53,080
Speaker 1: participated in chat room discussions revealing their negative feelings towards

1016
01:00:53,120 --> 01:00:57,520
Speaker 1: the company, which wasn't anything incriminating, but they were clearly disgruntled.

1017
01:00:57,520 --> 01:01:00,400
Speaker 1: They were former employees, they were part of a layoff

1018
01:01:00,440 --> 01:01:03,640
Speaker 1: that happened in two thousand fourteen. UM and the FBI

1019
01:01:03,720 --> 01:01:08,880
Speaker 1: rejected this information, which is interesting because one other thing

1020
01:01:08,960 --> 01:01:12,760
Speaker 1: that I believe it was NORSE found when North submitted

1021
01:01:12,760 --> 01:01:16,320
Speaker 1: their stuff to the FBI. They they are big proponents

1022
01:01:16,360 --> 01:01:20,040
Speaker 1: of this insider job argument because within the code they

1023
01:01:20,120 --> 01:01:23,320
Speaker 1: found the credentials that you would need to access some

1024
01:01:23,440 --> 01:01:28,919
Speaker 1: of these uh some of these compartmentalized basis of information, right. Yeah,

1025
01:01:29,120 --> 01:01:33,760
Speaker 1: it seemed to a lot of cybersecurity experts that whomever

1026
01:01:34,080 --> 01:01:38,480
Speaker 1: pulled off this attack had access to passwords and other

1027
01:01:38,600 --> 01:01:43,280
Speaker 1: verification UH criteria that would allow them access to these

1028
01:01:43,680 --> 01:01:48,320
Speaker 1: very sensitive areas of information that would be challenging for

1029
01:01:48,400 --> 01:01:52,160
Speaker 1: an outsider to identify and use. But if you're if

1030
01:01:52,160 --> 01:01:54,640
Speaker 1: you were familiar with the system already, then you would

1031
01:01:54,640 --> 01:01:57,680
Speaker 1: know what you needed before you did your attack. So

1032
01:01:58,360 --> 01:01:59,920
Speaker 1: it's it's one of those things where you're like, yeah,

1033
01:02:00,040 --> 01:02:03,120
Speaker 1: it's not impossible for someone outside the group to have

1034
01:02:03,160 --> 01:02:06,760
Speaker 1: figured this out, but it's far more likely that there

1035
01:02:06,840 --> 01:02:11,400
Speaker 1: was at least some insider assistance because you know, they

1036
01:02:11,440 --> 01:02:15,400
Speaker 1: were able to target specific pieces of information. And perhaps

1037
01:02:15,480 --> 01:02:18,640
Speaker 1: it's unwitting insider assistance too. It could be, you know,

1038
01:02:18,720 --> 01:02:20,920
Speaker 1: it could just very well be a case of social

1039
01:02:20,920 --> 01:02:26,720
Speaker 1: engineering where UH, an outside hacker gets unwitting participation and

1040
01:02:26,960 --> 01:02:29,680
Speaker 1: the people who handed over the information or the the

1041
01:02:29,760 --> 01:02:32,520
Speaker 1: access the keys to the Kingdom weren't aware of what

1042
01:02:32,520 --> 01:02:35,400
Speaker 1: they were doing at the time, that's possible. Um, I

1043
01:02:35,480 --> 01:02:41,040
Speaker 1: still think that the insider hypothesis is the most compelling

1044
01:02:41,200 --> 01:02:45,280
Speaker 1: based upon what was stolen, how it was leaked, and

1045
01:02:45,560 --> 01:02:48,800
Speaker 1: the effect it had. But and also the fact that

1046
01:02:48,880 --> 01:02:51,720
Speaker 1: the demand for the film thing didn't come until after

1047
01:02:52,200 --> 01:02:56,440
Speaker 1: the leaks had happened. But again that's that's just based

1048
01:02:56,480 --> 01:02:58,480
Speaker 1: on the information have available to me. So what do

1049
01:02:58,520 --> 01:03:02,120
Speaker 1: you think then about one of the early things presented

1050
01:03:02,160 --> 01:03:07,080
Speaker 1: as smoking gun evidence the idea that uh, certain pieces

1051
01:03:07,120 --> 01:03:10,680
Speaker 1: of code that have been used in the attacks were

1052
01:03:10,720 --> 01:03:13,600
Speaker 1: present in these most recent attacks. Well, Ben, as you

1053
01:03:13,600 --> 01:03:17,280
Speaker 1: and I know, on the internet, um, all code is

1054
01:03:18,360 --> 01:03:22,440
Speaker 1: incredibly proprietary and can't be spread around or tweaked or

1055
01:03:22,560 --> 01:03:26,640
Speaker 1: changed or altered or added to or taken away from.

1056
01:03:26,760 --> 01:03:29,919
Speaker 1: I mean, if only we lived in a world where

1057
01:03:29,920 --> 01:03:33,640
Speaker 1: you could take existing programs, change them and make them

1058
01:03:33,640 --> 01:03:37,880
Speaker 1: do things for your on your own behalf, then we

1059
01:03:37,920 --> 01:03:40,880
Speaker 1: would live in a world where you can't attribute a

1060
01:03:41,040 --> 01:03:43,640
Speaker 1: source for a particular attack simply because of the code

1061
01:03:43,680 --> 01:03:45,480
Speaker 1: that was Oh wait, that is the world we live in.

1062
01:03:47,240 --> 01:03:49,680
Speaker 1: So yeah, here's the problem is that just because the

1063
01:03:49,720 --> 01:03:54,080
Speaker 1: code was found in attacks from a previous instance doesn't

1064
01:03:54,120 --> 01:03:58,560
Speaker 1: mean that that code only belongs to one group. A

1065
01:03:58,600 --> 01:04:01,880
Speaker 1: lot of these tools get to be through various channels

1066
01:04:01,920 --> 01:04:05,800
Speaker 1: online hackers. When they create a really powerful tool, sometimes

1067
01:04:05,880 --> 01:04:08,200
Speaker 1: they love to share it. Not all the time. Some

1068
01:04:08,320 --> 01:04:10,760
Speaker 1: of them are very jealous with what they create and

1069
01:04:10,800 --> 01:04:14,400
Speaker 1: they keep it for themselves. But some will go and say, hey,

1070
01:04:14,520 --> 01:04:17,640
Speaker 1: I made this tool, it's perfect for cracking passwords. Have

1071
01:04:17,840 --> 01:04:21,280
Speaker 1: at it. And then the people who downloaded and use it,

1072
01:04:21,360 --> 01:04:23,600
Speaker 1: we often call them script kiddies. They aren't the ones

1073
01:04:23,640 --> 01:04:26,040
Speaker 1: who developed the code. They're just making use of code

1074
01:04:26,040 --> 01:04:30,480
Speaker 1: that was built to do a specific thing. So I

1075
01:04:30,560 --> 01:04:36,640
Speaker 1: hesitate to attribute an attack to us specific group simply

1076
01:04:36,640 --> 01:04:40,200
Speaker 1: because the code that was included. Yeah, I agree with

1077
01:04:40,240 --> 01:04:44,760
Speaker 1: you there, because it's strange too. It's strange to think

1078
01:04:44,840 --> 01:04:50,640
Speaker 1: that someone could own a process, and especially when there's

1079
01:04:50,680 --> 01:04:55,959
Speaker 1: so much sharing in the toolbox. And uh, if this

1080
01:04:56,080 --> 01:05:01,840
Speaker 1: code was recognized right then, that already inherently tells us

1081
01:05:02,160 --> 01:05:04,520
Speaker 1: that other people have seen it, which also means they

1082
01:05:04,560 --> 01:05:07,880
Speaker 1: could replicate it. It would be I think it's a

1083
01:05:07,880 --> 01:05:13,240
Speaker 1: little bit movie thriller right now to say, uh that

1084
01:05:13,360 --> 01:05:16,360
Speaker 1: someone purposely put it in his red herring but wouldn't

1085
01:05:16,400 --> 01:05:19,000
Speaker 1: that be cool? No, I just think it's also movie

1086
01:05:19,080 --> 01:05:22,280
Speaker 1: thriller to say I recognize this code if it could

1087
01:05:22,320 --> 01:05:27,080
Speaker 1: only come from one place, and that's totally a movie. Yeah,

1088
01:05:27,160 --> 01:05:30,200
Speaker 1: And and you're right about that. And one thing that

1089
01:05:30,520 --> 01:05:33,600
Speaker 1: we should also list that I think is important to

1090
01:05:33,760 --> 01:05:38,040
Speaker 1: note here is that I've seen several journalists UM reciting

1091
01:05:38,120 --> 01:05:42,360
Speaker 1: these u S statements of North Korean involvement as fact,

1092
01:05:42,880 --> 01:05:46,840
Speaker 1: and it is true. The problem with this is something

1093
01:05:46,840 --> 01:05:49,200
Speaker 1: that you and I have have touched upon already in

1094
01:05:49,200 --> 01:05:52,160
Speaker 1: the show, which is that we know that the United

1095
01:05:52,200 --> 01:05:56,240
Speaker 1: States and some of its cooperative countries have this vast

1096
01:05:56,320 --> 01:06:00,600
Speaker 1: array of sophisticated and in many plate cases classify UH

1097
01:06:00,640 --> 01:06:04,720
Speaker 1: collection methods, right sure, And this means that it is

1098
01:06:04,800 --> 01:06:07,760
Speaker 1: fair to assume that the United States has access to

1099
01:06:07,880 --> 01:06:12,760
Speaker 1: information that civilians and journalists may not be able to analyze.

1100
01:06:12,520 --> 01:06:16,200
Speaker 1: Right So so yeah, that leads you to the conclusion

1101
01:06:16,280 --> 01:06:19,880
Speaker 1: that again, there could be a smoking gun sure that

1102
01:06:19,960 --> 01:06:24,160
Speaker 1: I am completely unaware of that says no, it was

1103
01:06:24,200 --> 01:06:27,680
Speaker 1: North Korea. It was not some insider. Uh, it was not.

1104
01:06:28,040 --> 01:06:32,760
Speaker 1: It wasn't a disgruntled employee. This was a very effective attack,

1105
01:06:33,120 --> 01:06:35,640
Speaker 1: which if that is here's the thing. If that's the

1106
01:06:35,720 --> 01:06:39,440
Speaker 1: real answer, if that really is the real answer, that's terrifying,

1107
01:06:40,200 --> 01:06:42,040
Speaker 1: because not only does it mean that you have a

1108
01:06:42,080 --> 01:06:46,600
Speaker 1: country that has created an incredibly effective, invasive attack into

1109
01:06:46,640 --> 01:06:51,320
Speaker 1: a major corporation, but they understand the culture and the

1110
01:06:51,400 --> 01:06:55,760
Speaker 1: impact that corporation has and how to best attack it. It

1111
01:06:55,120 --> 01:07:00,040
Speaker 1: It just doesn't make sense though to do so. I

1112
01:07:00,080 --> 01:07:04,560
Speaker 1: would be surprised to do something of that magnitude for

1113
01:07:04,600 --> 01:07:09,080
Speaker 1: a work of fiction that honestly, honestly, and I say

1114
01:07:09,120 --> 01:07:12,200
Speaker 1: this as as a fan of Seth Rogan, it's not

1115
01:07:12,400 --> 01:07:14,320
Speaker 1: it's not going to be his Oscar winning film. I

1116
01:07:14,640 --> 01:07:19,200
Speaker 1: had said that. Um when Sony first pulled the film,

1117
01:07:19,280 --> 01:07:22,720
Speaker 1: I said, listen, I don't plan to see the interview,

1118
01:07:23,600 --> 01:07:26,040
Speaker 1: but I want that to be my option that I

1119
01:07:26,160 --> 01:07:28,240
Speaker 1: don't see the interview, right, you want it to be

1120
01:07:28,280 --> 01:07:30,720
Speaker 1: your choice. I don't don't want the choice made for

1121
01:07:30,800 --> 01:07:33,480
Speaker 1: me that I don't see the interview. And see, that's

1122
01:07:33,480 --> 01:07:35,280
Speaker 1: the thing is that they released it, and again we

1123
01:07:35,320 --> 01:07:37,800
Speaker 1: didn't see more attacks, at least not yet. I mean,

1124
01:07:37,920 --> 01:07:39,800
Speaker 1: it could be by the time this podcast goes out

1125
01:07:39,840 --> 01:07:42,480
Speaker 1: that in fact, more has developed the story, which we

1126
01:07:42,520 --> 01:07:44,920
Speaker 1: do have to be conscious of but going back to

1127
01:07:44,920 --> 01:07:47,840
Speaker 1: that point of the missing information, this also means that

1128
01:07:47,880 --> 01:07:51,560
Speaker 1: without access to it, there's no way for someone to

1129
01:07:51,640 --> 01:07:58,120
Speaker 1: independently verify the accuracy of the statements on the part

1130
01:07:58,120 --> 01:08:01,040
Speaker 1: of Uncle Sam, and it's been it's being used as

1131
01:08:01,480 --> 01:08:05,120
Speaker 1: the proof, and the fact that their further sanctions really

1132
01:08:05,160 --> 01:08:08,240
Speaker 1: does show I think it indicates that there is some

1133
01:08:08,280 --> 01:08:11,120
Speaker 1: sort of belief. Yeah. Yeah, I I am at least

1134
01:08:11,160 --> 01:08:14,760
Speaker 1: hopeful that they are sincere in the statement that they

1135
01:08:14,800 --> 01:08:18,080
Speaker 1: fully believe North Korea to be behind it, because otherwise

1136
01:08:18,120 --> 01:08:22,559
Speaker 1: we're talking about a very bizarre clancy like thriller, where

1137
01:08:23,200 --> 01:08:27,920
Speaker 1: the US government is taking advantage of an insane hacking

1138
01:08:27,920 --> 01:08:31,559
Speaker 1: attack on a media company as an excuse to step

1139
01:08:31,640 --> 01:08:37,400
Speaker 1: up sanctions against a hostile foreign power, which is such

1140
01:08:37,439 --> 01:08:40,760
Speaker 1: a weird thing to even say. But what I love

1141
01:08:40,800 --> 01:08:45,840
Speaker 1: about the plan is that it's so straightforward. Right, step

1142
01:08:45,880 --> 01:08:49,920
Speaker 1: three profit. Yeah. So, so where does this leave us, Well,

1143
01:08:49,920 --> 01:08:51,840
Speaker 1: it pretty much leaves us in the same place we

1144
01:08:51,840 --> 01:08:55,360
Speaker 1: were at the beginning. We don't really know you, and

1145
01:08:55,400 --> 01:08:59,439
Speaker 1: I certainly don't know who. Yeah, and it may very

1146
01:08:59,439 --> 01:09:02,320
Speaker 1: well be we said that in fact it is North Korea,

1147
01:09:03,280 --> 01:09:07,920
Speaker 1: and it's just that that's such it's it stretches my

1148
01:09:08,040 --> 01:09:10,639
Speaker 1: belief so much. That's why I really have trouble with it.

1149
01:09:10,840 --> 01:09:13,800
Speaker 1: But it could very well be true. I'm curious what

1150
01:09:13,880 --> 01:09:16,439
Speaker 1: our listeners think. Guys, if you have any suggestions, If

1151
01:09:16,479 --> 01:09:18,960
Speaker 1: you if you have an opinion on this, or you

1152
01:09:19,000 --> 01:09:21,080
Speaker 1: have a suggestion for a future episode, you should write

1153
01:09:21,120 --> 01:09:24,000
Speaker 1: in the addresses tech Stuff at how stuff works dot

1154
01:09:24,080 --> 01:09:27,280
Speaker 1: com or drop us a line on Facebook or Twitter.

1155
01:09:27,400 --> 01:09:30,120
Speaker 1: They handle it's tech stuff hs W ben Where can

1156
01:09:30,160 --> 01:09:34,240
Speaker 1: they find you? Ah? Yes, well you can find Jonathan

1157
01:09:34,280 --> 01:09:37,519
Speaker 1: and I hanging out on several shows where I'm brain

1158
01:09:37,600 --> 01:09:40,080
Speaker 1: Stuff together on YouTube and What the Stuff. We've got

1159
01:09:40,080 --> 01:09:43,360
Speaker 1: an upcoming episode of brain Stuff. Where were we both

1160
01:09:43,360 --> 01:09:46,160
Speaker 1: appear in the same episode? Oh, we do. Only one

1161
01:09:46,160 --> 01:09:49,400
Speaker 1: of us talks and that's why. Yeah, you know on

1162
01:09:49,400 --> 01:09:51,880
Speaker 1: on that is What the Stuff. I believe it's uh,

1163
01:09:51,960 --> 01:09:56,719
Speaker 1: it is What the Stuff technology spoilers. My bad, it's

1164
01:09:57,160 --> 01:09:59,920
Speaker 1: it's that. That was a strange shoot. I hope listen

1165
01:10:00,080 --> 01:10:02,160
Speaker 1: is enjoy. You can find my co host Matt and

1166
01:10:02,200 --> 01:10:05,479
Speaker 1: I on stuff they don't want you to know. You

1167
01:10:05,520 --> 01:10:09,880
Speaker 1: can find uh a former guest host or recurring guest

1168
01:10:09,880 --> 01:10:13,680
Speaker 1: host of tech Stuff, Scott Benjamin, who works works with

1169
01:10:13,720 --> 01:10:17,280
Speaker 1: me on car stuff next to me. Yeah, yeah, he does.

1170
01:10:17,800 --> 01:10:20,120
Speaker 1: You guys have some of the most interesting conversations in

1171
01:10:20,120 --> 01:10:22,599
Speaker 1: the office. Yeah, you know Scott. I was peg Scott

1172
01:10:22,640 --> 01:10:24,640
Speaker 1: as the super quiet guy in the office, but he

1173
01:10:24,720 --> 01:10:29,880
Speaker 1: really does enjoy a fun, bizarre, thoughtful conversation. He's a

1174
01:10:29,880 --> 01:10:32,280
Speaker 1: big true crime fan too, by the way. That's good

1175
01:10:32,320 --> 01:10:35,479
Speaker 1: to know. It's good to know. It's more more risks

1176
01:10:35,560 --> 01:10:38,479
Speaker 1: for the mill my friend. Uh. And if somebody, if

1177
01:10:38,520 --> 01:10:42,679
Speaker 1: somebody wants to learn more about let's see the future

1178
01:10:42,720 --> 01:10:45,000
Speaker 1: of technology and they haven't heard of your other show,

1179
01:10:45,040 --> 01:10:47,559
Speaker 1: where would they go, Well, they would go to fw

1180
01:10:47,680 --> 01:10:51,559
Speaker 1: thinking dot com for Forward Thinking. That's where Lauren Vogelbaum,

1181
01:10:51,680 --> 01:10:55,400
Speaker 1: Joe McCormick and I will end up talking at nauseum

1182
01:10:55,439 --> 01:10:58,200
Speaker 1: about all sorts of things from the future. Uh. It's

1183
01:10:58,200 --> 01:11:01,320
Speaker 1: also the video series Forward Thinking. I the soul host

1184
01:11:01,479 --> 01:11:06,400
Speaker 1: of that show and sometimes the writer. Uh. But you

1185
01:11:06,439 --> 01:11:08,040
Speaker 1: should definitely check that out. If you haven't listened to

1186
01:11:08,120 --> 01:11:10,960
Speaker 1: that podcast, you've got to check out the episodes that

1187
01:11:11,080 --> 01:11:13,719
Speaker 1: just went live so you can find them. In the

1188
01:11:13,720 --> 01:11:17,080
Speaker 1: most recent ones, we did Back to Back to the

1189
01:11:17,120 --> 01:11:21,040
Speaker 1: Future to part one, and then we did Back to

1190
01:11:21,160 --> 01:11:24,160
Speaker 1: Back to the Future, to part two, where we looked

1191
01:11:24,160 --> 01:11:27,439
Speaker 1: at the technology that Marty McFly encounters when he travels

1192
01:11:27,479 --> 01:11:30,200
Speaker 1: to two thousand fifteen and see how it measures up

1193
01:11:30,200 --> 01:11:33,240
Speaker 1: to the actual two thousand fifteen technology of today. Yeah,

1194
01:11:33,240 --> 01:11:34,960
Speaker 1: I wonder if they're ever going to come out with

1195
01:11:34,960 --> 01:11:37,680
Speaker 1: that Pepsi can Pepsi bottle. I can tell you that

1196
01:11:37,720 --> 01:11:40,599
Speaker 1: the power laces are going to happen this year. Finally,

1197
01:11:40,800 --> 01:11:44,000
Speaker 1: Nike's gonna bring us power laces sometime in twent to

1198
01:11:44,120 --> 01:11:46,880
Speaker 1: hear more check out that show. Yeah, and thanks so

1199
01:11:46,960 --> 01:11:49,719
Speaker 1: much for having me back on, Jonathan. I look forward

1200
01:11:49,720 --> 01:11:53,320
Speaker 1: to seeing how this situation develops, and I do hope

1201
01:11:53,360 --> 01:11:55,320
Speaker 1: we get an answer. Yeah, me too. I mean, this

1202
01:11:55,479 --> 01:11:58,000
Speaker 1: could be one of the great mysteries where you know,

1203
01:11:58,040 --> 01:12:00,920
Speaker 1: we have an official word, but there may always be

1204
01:12:01,040 --> 01:12:04,320
Speaker 1: lingering down. I'm not normally a conspiracy theory guy. It's

1205
01:12:04,360 --> 01:12:05,840
Speaker 1: just sometimes there are things like, you know, you like,

1206
01:12:06,000 --> 01:12:08,800
Speaker 1: this just doesn't smell right, and it could very well

1207
01:12:08,840 --> 01:12:12,960
Speaker 1: be that just a stinky, stinky mess. So anyway, thanks

1208
01:12:12,960 --> 01:12:15,280
Speaker 1: again guys for listening, and we will talk to you

1209
01:12:15,320 --> 01:12:21,760
Speaker 1: again really soon for more on this and thousands of

1210
01:12:21,760 --> 01:12:33,720
Speaker 1: other topics. Does it have toff works dot com,