WEBVTT - Power and Nations: Fareed Zakaria 0:00:15.396 --> 0:00:24.116 Pushkin from Pushkin Industries. This is Deep Background, the show 0:00:24.156 --> 0:00:27.436 where we explore the stories behind the stories in the news. 0:00:27.956 --> 0:00:32.636 I'm Noah Feldman. Today on Deep Background, we continue our 0:00:32.796 --> 0:00:37.476 special mini series looking at global power, the institutions of power, 0:00:37.796 --> 0:00:40.436 the people who deploy it, and what it means for 0:00:40.476 --> 0:00:43.636 the United States in the world. To discuss these issues, 0:00:43.676 --> 0:00:47.636 I can hardly think of a person more extraordinary than 0:00:47.676 --> 0:00:50.596 for Read Zakaria. For Reid is known as one of 0:00:50.596 --> 0:00:53.476 the leading foreign policy intellectuals, not only in the United 0:00:53.516 --> 0:00:56.796 States but in the world. Not only that, he explains 0:00:56.836 --> 0:00:59.836 foreign policy to the world as the host of CNN's 0:00:59.916 --> 0:01:03.276 for Reid Zakaria GPS and the author of a regular 0:01:03.316 --> 0:01:07.076 column for The Washington Post. Before that, he was a 0:01:07.116 --> 0:01:11.236 Calmness for Newsweek, the editor of Newsweek International, and editor 0:01:11.276 --> 0:01:15.116 at large of Time, and the editor of Foreign Affairs. 0:01:15.916 --> 0:01:20.236 He's written several important and influential books on foreign policy 0:01:20.316 --> 0:01:23.676 and the US, and today he's agreed to talk about 0:01:23.716 --> 0:01:27.476 the major challenges that face US foreign policy in the 0:01:27.516 --> 0:01:31.636 time of the Biden administration, how the US government can 0:01:31.716 --> 0:01:35.636 and should think about its relationship with China, whether the 0:01:35.716 --> 0:01:39.396 world is becoming a bipolar place with the US and 0:01:39.476 --> 0:01:43.676 China on either side, and how power has been transformed 0:01:44.116 --> 0:01:48.276 over the last several decades. He's also agreed to look 0:01:48.276 --> 0:01:50.676 a little bit into the crystal ball of prediction and 0:01:50.756 --> 0:01:53.836 try to figure out how the post COVID era is 0:01:53.916 --> 0:01:57.916 going to affect foreign policy today. We will go deep 0:01:57.956 --> 0:02:00.956 and go behind the thinking that led to the arguments 0:02:01.156 --> 0:02:08.916 in that book. Farid, thank you so much for joining me. Farid. 0:02:09.196 --> 0:02:11.876 Want to start by asking you to do a job 0:02:11.916 --> 0:02:13.876 that you've been asked to do many times over the year, 0:02:13.956 --> 0:02:18.956 which is to imagine yourself as the foreign policies are 0:02:19.196 --> 0:02:21.956 of the United States. And in the old days we 0:02:21.956 --> 0:02:24.556 would have said Secretary of State or National security advisor, 0:02:24.596 --> 0:02:27.236 but today it's not entirely clear where the true power lies. 0:02:28.036 --> 0:02:31.036 And to think about what are the major foreign policy 0:02:31.116 --> 0:02:33.636 challenges that are facing the US right now that are 0:02:33.636 --> 0:02:36.876 facing the Biden administration, and then we'll work our way 0:02:36.956 --> 0:02:41.396 through that to the question of how American power is 0:02:41.796 --> 0:02:47.036 faring at this particular juncture. So let me start by 0:02:47.316 --> 0:02:50.316 asking it to you in the most open ended way possible. 0:02:50.396 --> 0:02:54.916 What strike you as the largest issues? Oh? Thanks, no, 0:02:55.156 --> 0:02:57.476 it's a huge pleasure to beyond with you. I'm a 0:02:57.476 --> 0:03:00.876 fan of the podcast. I think that one way to 0:03:01.036 --> 0:03:03.076 think about this is to say, what is the sort 0:03:03.076 --> 0:03:08.076 of central challenge that the United States faces beyond everything else? 0:03:08.196 --> 0:03:10.996 It was the organized principle, and I would argue it is. 0:03:11.836 --> 0:03:15.236 The United States has created over the last seventy years 0:03:15.596 --> 0:03:19.396 a rather remarkable international system, a system quite different from 0:03:19.396 --> 0:03:23.156 one that existed previously at any point in history, that 0:03:23.356 --> 0:03:30.796 is marked by a greater degree of international order, norms, rules, 0:03:31.356 --> 0:03:35.156 even liberal values. It's not perfect by any stretch. There's 0:03:35.276 --> 0:03:38.236 lots of violations. The US violates at a lot of times. 0:03:38.236 --> 0:03:41.316 But if you just think in big historical terms, the 0:03:41.356 --> 0:03:44.676 big shift that's taken place since nineteen forty five is 0:03:44.716 --> 0:03:48.476 this one. And you know, for example, the annexation of 0:03:48.756 --> 0:03:52.436 territory by using force is something that used to happen 0:03:52.556 --> 0:03:57.116 routinely for hundreds and hundreds of years before that. It 0:03:57.196 --> 0:04:01.756 barely ever happens anymore. The Russian occupation and invasion of 0:04:01.756 --> 0:04:05.956 Crimea is a rare example to the contrary. So if 0:04:05.996 --> 0:04:08.396 you say to yourself, sometimes people call this a kind 0:04:08.436 --> 0:04:12.716 of liberal national order, rules based international order, that is 0:04:12.756 --> 0:04:15.876 the central achievement of American foreign policy. It is the 0:04:15.956 --> 0:04:18.636 defining feature of the world we live in right a 0:04:18.716 --> 0:04:21.596 world in which France and Germany went to war three 0:04:21.636 --> 0:04:25.556 times between eighteen fifty and nineteen fifty. It's now unthinkable 0:04:25.596 --> 0:04:28.196 that France and Germany would go to war. So if 0:04:28.236 --> 0:04:31.476 that is the central achievement of American foreign policy, I 0:04:31.476 --> 0:04:36.436 would say it is also uniquely threatened these days. It 0:04:36.516 --> 0:04:38.876 had a good run during the Cold War, it was 0:04:38.996 --> 0:04:43.116 kind of a half system, then flourished after the fall 0:04:43.116 --> 0:04:46.996 of the Soviet Union, and now is really threatened. And 0:04:47.036 --> 0:04:49.396 it's threatened by a number of things. And I would 0:04:49.436 --> 0:04:51.956 say the central challenge for the United States is how 0:04:51.996 --> 0:04:56.876 do you stabilize, shore up this liberal world order and 0:04:57.076 --> 0:05:01.276 help to make it endure into the twenty first century. 0:05:01.996 --> 0:05:05.436 That's beautifully stated, and it leads us immediately to one 0:05:05.476 --> 0:05:09.276 of the most visible challenges to this order, and that's China. 0:05:10.036 --> 0:05:12.076 In part of the time that you describe the Cold 0:05:12.076 --> 0:05:15.556 War time, the US was in a bipolar world where 0:05:15.636 --> 0:05:17.756 the US powers on one side and the Soviet power 0:05:17.836 --> 0:05:20.596 largely on the other. Then in the Postcold War period, 0:05:20.836 --> 0:05:24.276 some people talked about the world being unipolar, dominated by 0:05:24.276 --> 0:05:28.076 the United States. Now, the rise of China makes bipolarity 0:05:28.316 --> 0:05:31.796 extremely probable, And in your fantastic book Ten Lessons for 0:05:31.836 --> 0:05:34.916 a Post Pandemic World, you have a whole section talking 0:05:34.916 --> 0:05:39.756 about bipolarity and how while war is not inevitable between 0:05:39.796 --> 0:05:44.156 the United States and China, some bipolarity is how should 0:05:44.156 --> 0:05:46.716 the US be thinking about China when it comes to 0:05:47.556 --> 0:05:52.356 incorporation into this international system of norms and orders, Because 0:05:52.396 --> 0:05:55.796 just to deepen the question, for about a decade and 0:05:55.796 --> 0:05:58.316 a half, foreign policy experts said, well, what the US 0:05:58.356 --> 0:06:00.436 should do is just give China the incentives to enter 0:06:00.476 --> 0:06:03.916 into this order, and then it will play alongside the 0:06:03.996 --> 0:06:06.836 United States and it will actually strengthen the order. And 0:06:06.916 --> 0:06:09.396 sometimes in some areas China appear to be doing at 0:06:09.436 --> 0:06:12.796 the World Trade Organization being a prominent example. But now 0:06:12.836 --> 0:06:15.356 it looks as though China is going to behave a 0:06:15.396 --> 0:06:17.996 little bit more like the US does. Embrace the order 0:06:17.996 --> 0:06:21.276 when it's useful and then step outside the order when 0:06:21.316 --> 0:06:25.796 that is useful. Yeah, you make a very important point 0:06:25.796 --> 0:06:28.316 that I think we often forget that the US often 0:06:28.436 --> 0:06:30.916 violates this order. I mean, if you look at, for example, 0:06:30.996 --> 0:06:33.196 even on something like trade, where the US has been 0:06:33.236 --> 0:06:36.756 the great promoter of free trade over the years over 0:06:36.796 --> 0:06:40.276 the decades, we violate free trade principles all the time. 0:06:40.516 --> 0:06:42.996 By the way, all the tariffs against China and the 0:06:43.036 --> 0:06:46.236 tariffs against Europe are essentially a violation of the spirit 0:06:46.236 --> 0:06:49.956 of free trade. Many of them invoke entirely bogus national 0:06:49.996 --> 0:06:54.636 security arguments. We face a national security threat from Germany 0:06:54.676 --> 0:06:57.356 and Canada and therefore have tariffs on there on their 0:06:57.396 --> 0:07:00.556 steel and aluminum product. But let me get to your 0:07:00.636 --> 0:07:03.716 central point, which is which is of course the most 0:07:03.756 --> 0:07:06.596 important one. So what I try to explain in the 0:07:06.596 --> 0:07:08.756 book is that most people are going to think, wait, 0:07:08.836 --> 0:07:11.356 we're not really in a bipolar world. The US is 0:07:11.796 --> 0:07:15.956 by far the most powerful country, which is true. But really, 0:07:15.956 --> 0:07:20.396 when you think about systems of international relations, the defining 0:07:20.556 --> 0:07:23.436 feature of polarity, of you know, whether you're in a 0:07:23.516 --> 0:07:28.116 multipolar or unipolar or bipolar system is mostly are the 0:07:28.236 --> 0:07:30.636 two powers in a bipolar system kind of in a 0:07:30.756 --> 0:07:33.356 league of their own. This is what Hans Morganhou came 0:07:33.436 --> 0:07:37.596 up with in the late forties. Were accurately figured out 0:07:38.036 --> 0:07:40.676 that we were entering a bipolar world, even though the 0:07:40.716 --> 0:07:43.476 Soviet Union, by the way, was at that point probably 0:07:43.476 --> 0:07:46.796 one third as large as the United States in terms 0:07:46.836 --> 0:07:49.756 of its global economic impact. The US was roughly forty 0:07:49.756 --> 0:07:52.956 percent of the world economy. The Soviets were maybe ten 0:07:53.036 --> 0:07:56.236 or twelve percent of the world economy. So if you 0:07:56.316 --> 0:07:59.636 look at it in those terms, morganhouse point was, Yeah, 0:07:59.676 --> 0:08:02.436 the Soviet Union might be only twelve percent, but it's 0:08:02.556 --> 0:08:04.996 way more than anybody else, you know. In other words, 0:08:05.036 --> 0:08:08.196 as the US, there's a Soviet Union, and then Britain, 0:08:08.236 --> 0:08:11.636 which had collapsed, was down to something like three and 0:08:11.716 --> 0:08:15.916 a half percent of world GDP. This time around, it's 0:08:16.036 --> 0:08:19.076 clear the US is number one, but China is number 0:08:19.156 --> 0:08:22.636 two and larger than numbers three, four, and five and 0:08:22.756 --> 0:08:25.556 six put together, larger than the next four countries put 0:08:25.556 --> 0:08:29.956 together in economic terms and in defense spending. So clearly 0:08:29.996 --> 0:08:33.596 these two countries have a kind of weight and heft 0:08:33.636 --> 0:08:38.516 and reach beyond almost anything. And China, unlike the Soviet Union, 0:08:39.116 --> 0:08:42.476 really is an advanced economy in many senses. Obviously not 0:08:42.556 --> 0:08:45.076 on its averages. But give you an example. There are 0:08:45.156 --> 0:08:49.156 five hundred of supercomputers in the world. The five hundred 0:08:49.156 --> 0:08:53.156 fastest computers in the world can be distributed thusly two 0:08:53.716 --> 0:08:56.036 about two hundred and twenty five are in China, about 0:08:56.076 --> 0:08:58.596 one hundred and twenty five are in the US, and 0:08:58.636 --> 0:09:02.796 then the rest are Europe, Taiwan and South Korea, Singapore, 0:09:02.836 --> 0:09:06.356 places like that. So you see that in some very 0:09:06.396 --> 0:09:09.076 cutting edge areas, China is actually ahead of the United 0:09:09.316 --> 0:09:12.876 States overall. No question, the US is number one by far, 0:09:13.476 --> 0:09:16.956 but China is a legitimate number two. So that's why 0:09:16.996 --> 0:09:20.396 I say bipolarity is inevitable. There is inevitably going to 0:09:20.436 --> 0:09:24.356 be a sense of rivalry competition between these two countries. 0:09:24.356 --> 0:09:27.036 There is a structural reality where each is going to 0:09:27.116 --> 0:09:30.836 think that its loss comes at the others gain and 0:09:30.996 --> 0:09:35.196 vice versa. But I don't think it's like the Cold War. 0:09:35.356 --> 0:09:39.076 For reasons you alluded to, the Soviet Union was an 0:09:39.116 --> 0:09:44.436 ideological and economic political challenge to not just the United States, 0:09:44.516 --> 0:09:48.036 but to the entire world order the United States had constructed. 0:09:48.676 --> 0:09:51.676 China is not quite that kind of player. It has 0:09:51.836 --> 0:09:55.636 readily embraced large parts of that order, not just the 0:09:55.716 --> 0:09:59.596 trading regime, but the knowledge regime, if you will, I 0:09:59.596 --> 0:10:02.236 mean the China sense. It's students to the United States. 0:10:02.276 --> 0:10:05.916 It abides by patent laws. You know, there's all kinds 0:10:05.916 --> 0:10:09.916 of areas where it is trying to mirror many of 0:10:09.956 --> 0:10:13.636 the rules regulations and norms that have been put in place. 0:10:14.196 --> 0:10:16.556 Then there are many areas where it violates, and Pattern 0:10:16.676 --> 0:10:19.676 is actually a good example where they violate and follow 0:10:19.716 --> 0:10:23.876 at the same time, similarly with trade. But if you 0:10:23.916 --> 0:10:27.436 think of the Soviets who actively argued that their goal 0:10:27.676 --> 0:10:31.876 was a communist world revolution and that funded parties around 0:10:31.876 --> 0:10:35.156 the world to do that, funded insurgent movements around the 0:10:35.156 --> 0:10:38.196 world to do that. Mouse China did that, it was 0:10:38.236 --> 0:10:41.596 funding at least a dozen insurgencies around the world. The 0:10:42.396 --> 0:10:47.516 Chinese Communist Party today is strikingly about not kind of 0:10:47.596 --> 0:10:51.876 world revolution and insurrections and things like that, but making 0:10:51.956 --> 0:10:56.916 China great. In doing that, they are violating a lot 0:10:57.236 --> 0:11:01.156 of the rules, norms, and values of a liberal international order. 0:11:01.596 --> 0:11:04.356 So the challenge with China is, I don't think that 0:11:04.556 --> 0:11:08.276 you face the same kind of Soviet like Cold War threat, 0:11:08.396 --> 0:11:11.236 but you face a country that is determined to rise 0:11:11.956 --> 0:11:16.716 and to really cheat in order to rise. And again, 0:11:16.756 --> 0:11:18.596 to be clear, it doesn't cheat all the time, but 0:11:19.036 --> 0:11:23.276 when it cheats, it is violating that that road. I 0:11:23.276 --> 0:11:27.236 would argue, that's why you have to have strong measures 0:11:27.236 --> 0:11:30.956 of deterrence where you really push back, but then also 0:11:31.596 --> 0:11:34.596 strong measures of integration, where you say to the Chinese, 0:11:34.596 --> 0:11:37.676 if you are playing by the rules, we will allow you, 0:11:37.756 --> 0:11:40.156 for example, to have a larger say in the World 0:11:40.156 --> 0:11:43.676 Bank or the IMF. Those examples are interesting because basically 0:11:43.716 --> 0:11:46.876 what happened over the last ten years is the Chinese 0:11:46.956 --> 0:11:49.836 tried to do that to say, we'd like to integrate. 0:11:49.876 --> 0:11:52.076 We'd like to be you know, we'd like to be 0:11:52.116 --> 0:11:54.676 more involved, we'd like to pay more of the bills, 0:11:54.676 --> 0:11:57.156 we'd like to bear more of the burdens on peacekeeping, 0:11:57.196 --> 0:12:01.196 on UN operations, but we'd like more of a say, 0:12:01.276 --> 0:12:03.596 and with something like the World Bank or you know, 0:12:03.916 --> 0:12:07.876 or the Asian Development Bank. The US largely said no, 0:12:07.996 --> 0:12:10.476 you can't have more, and so the Chinese went off 0:12:10.516 --> 0:12:13.556 and said, okay, fine, we'll start our own bank, the 0:12:13.596 --> 0:12:17.876 Asian Infrastructure Bank. And you know, that's the tension were 0:12:18.516 --> 0:12:20.676 One of the ways I think about this is to say, 0:12:21.556 --> 0:12:24.076 we all seem to in the in the United States, 0:12:24.196 --> 0:12:29.036 be sure we understand when China is overstepping its boundaries, 0:12:29.316 --> 0:12:33.396 it is exerting too much power and influence South China 0:12:33.516 --> 0:12:37.836 Sea or bullying Australia. But we haven't figured out what 0:12:37.916 --> 0:12:41.916 would be an okay level of power and influence for 0:12:41.956 --> 0:12:44.996 the second richest country in the world to have. It's 0:12:45.036 --> 0:12:48.356 not going to be what China's role in influence was 0:12:48.356 --> 0:12:51.196 when it was one percent of GDP, which was only 0:12:51.316 --> 0:12:54.596 twenty years ago. It's now fifteen percent of GDP. So 0:12:54.636 --> 0:12:58.276 that's a fifteen full rise in China's raw economic power. 0:12:58.956 --> 0:13:02.236 Surely there's going to be some increase in its influence, 0:13:02.516 --> 0:13:05.716 and we haven't figured out how do we allow for that. 0:13:05.716 --> 0:13:07.716 That's what I mean, that kind of force of integration, 0:13:08.276 --> 0:13:10.916 which will then give much more force it seems to 0:13:10.956 --> 0:13:15.236 me incredibility to the pushback, to the deterrence to say no, 0:13:15.396 --> 0:13:18.356 these are red lines when you're crossing them. But for 0:13:18.436 --> 0:13:20.276 there to be red lines, it seems to me they 0:13:20.396 --> 0:13:24.116 also have to be green lines. I love the paradigm 0:13:24.116 --> 0:13:27.556 that you're offering of deterrence and integration, and I think 0:13:27.716 --> 0:13:30.956 you couldn't be more correct that if your only stance 0:13:31.236 --> 0:13:35.956 is deterrence, then there's no positive incentive for integration. But 0:13:35.996 --> 0:13:38.316 I want to ask in practice what that means for 0:13:39.076 --> 0:13:42.676 good old fashioned hard power, you know, geopolitical power over 0:13:42.756 --> 0:13:46.996 other countries, because you know there have been voices, quiet 0:13:47.076 --> 0:13:49.396 voices for a long time, but louder in recent years, 0:13:49.476 --> 0:13:51.636 saying that when it comes to that kind of power, 0:13:51.716 --> 0:13:55.156 the US should squarely be in a model of containment 0:13:55.276 --> 0:14:00.196 towards China. That basically, every extra move that China gets 0:14:00.276 --> 0:14:05.156 more powerful in militarily comes at the expense of the US, 0:14:05.356 --> 0:14:08.476 because the US has been the dominant global superpower and 0:14:08.556 --> 0:14:12.636 China is rising. And often that view went alongside people saying, 0:14:13.076 --> 0:14:16.236 but when it comes to economic activity, that's where we 0:14:16.316 --> 0:14:21.116 can provide positive incentives sometimes because the positive incentives and 0:14:21.156 --> 0:14:23.676 economics are not thought to be zero sum. So if 0:14:23.756 --> 0:14:26.556 China gets rich, that doesn't mean that the US gets poorer. 0:14:27.036 --> 0:14:29.676 To an economist, at least, it's possible for everybody to 0:14:29.716 --> 0:14:32.156 get rich in a positive some way. But when it 0:14:32.196 --> 0:14:36.436 comes to geopolitical power, it's closer to a zero sum. 0:14:36.516 --> 0:14:38.396 It may not be exactly a zero sum, but it's 0:14:38.396 --> 0:14:41.316 closer to a zero sum. And so one of the 0:14:41.356 --> 0:14:45.676 schools of thought had been hard line on anything military, 0:14:46.636 --> 0:14:50.156 but give them green lines and encourage their participation and 0:14:50.236 --> 0:14:56.036 integrate them on anything broadly speaking economic. Does that seem 0:14:56.076 --> 0:14:58.076 to you like a plausible way of looking at it, 0:14:58.156 --> 0:15:00.876 or does that miss the point of how China's rise 0:15:00.996 --> 0:15:05.436 is actually operated, which is mostly through the economic vector. No. 0:15:05.596 --> 0:15:08.156 I think that misses the point for a different reason, Noah, 0:15:08.196 --> 0:15:11.276 which is that if you set yourself up to say 0:15:11.356 --> 0:15:17.596 that the geopolitical space is entirely zero sum, the problem 0:15:17.636 --> 0:15:21.836 becomes you condemned the United States to be essentially a 0:15:21.956 --> 0:15:25.636 world empire. Because what you're saying is if there are 0:15:25.996 --> 0:15:28.876 any gains not just for China, but for any other 0:15:28.916 --> 0:15:33.156 country anywhere in the world, that is de facto a 0:15:33.276 --> 0:15:36.756 loss of American power and influence. But does the United 0:15:36.796 --> 0:15:42.116 States want to be the dominant geopolitical player in every 0:15:42.276 --> 0:15:45.716 local conflict everywhere in the world. I mean, we're seeing 0:15:46.116 --> 0:15:50.076 the United States fatigue from having done that for forty years, 0:15:50.156 --> 0:15:52.756 I don't know, seventy sixty years in the Middle East, right, 0:15:53.156 --> 0:15:55.876 we're seeing a certain sense in which even in places 0:15:55.956 --> 0:15:59.356 like Latin America, the United States is taking a much 0:15:59.476 --> 0:16:02.996 less forward leaning position. If you think about you know, 0:16:03.556 --> 0:16:06.596 John Kennedy is a Latin American policy which was basically 0:16:06.876 --> 0:16:08.996 the United States was going to fund the foreign a 0:16:09.276 --> 0:16:13.196 in development throughout Latin America. We're not quite in that mode. 0:16:13.876 --> 0:16:15.636 Do we want to be in that mode? And if 0:16:15.636 --> 0:16:17.436 we don't want to be in the mode. It gets 0:16:17.436 --> 0:16:21.036 back to this sort of central architecture we've been talking about. 0:16:21.636 --> 0:16:25.436 Is there a way to conceive of a world order 0:16:25.556 --> 0:16:30.396 in which the United States is not maintaining the geopolitical 0:16:30.436 --> 0:16:33.916 balance in every local area so as to keep the 0:16:33.956 --> 0:16:38.316 world in some kind of equipoise, or are we willing 0:16:38.356 --> 0:16:43.876 to accept a certain amount of messiness regional balances things 0:16:43.876 --> 0:16:45.836 like that. Look what's happened as the United States has 0:16:45.836 --> 0:16:48.516 withdrawn from the Middle East. Basically you have a power 0:16:48.596 --> 0:16:52.276 struggle going on between the Saudiast, the Iranians, the Turks, 0:16:52.396 --> 0:16:55.716 the Israelis. But you know, it hasn't led the United 0:16:55.756 --> 0:16:58.676 States to say, oh my god, this is unacceptable. We 0:16:58.716 --> 0:17:01.156 need to be dominating. It's in fact, I think for 0:17:01.276 --> 0:17:05.476 many Americans, even American strategies, there's a sense of relief. 0:17:05.556 --> 0:17:07.876 You know, we were never even clear what we were doing, 0:17:07.876 --> 0:17:10.156 and we weren't clear what our interests world We were 0:17:10.316 --> 0:17:14.636 making huge expenditures and commitments without being sure we were 0:17:14.636 --> 0:17:17.516 getting much in return for it. So I think that's 0:17:17.636 --> 0:17:21.676 in some ways the central problem there is the reality 0:17:21.756 --> 0:17:26.556 that economics is more win win than security. But you know, 0:17:26.956 --> 0:17:32.356 one thing that Franklin Roosevelt who is my hero, understood 0:17:32.356 --> 0:17:36.236 about the you know, creating a world order, which Woodrow 0:17:36.316 --> 0:17:40.836 Wilson didn't. He admired Wilson greatly. Roosevelt did, but he 0:17:40.916 --> 0:17:44.676 understood you have to marry kind of power and idealism. 0:17:44.756 --> 0:17:47.156 You have to give the great powers a reason to 0:17:47.276 --> 0:17:51.396 be engaged in the international system. And so there has 0:17:51.436 --> 0:17:54.356 to be something in it for the other big powers 0:17:54.396 --> 0:17:56.636 in the world. They have to I hate to put 0:17:56.636 --> 0:17:58.876 it this way, but you know, they have to have 0:17:59.076 --> 0:18:04.836 some degree of influence. It's not spheres of control, really, 0:18:04.836 --> 0:18:08.156 But if you're saying nobody gets to have real power 0:18:08.196 --> 0:18:11.996 and influence other than the United States, then you know, 0:18:12.036 --> 0:18:15.476 it's very difficult to imagine a world order that that 0:18:16.236 --> 0:18:19.876 runs on any other principle than US as world hegemon. 0:18:21.316 --> 0:18:23.916 Here is where the rubber, I think, really meets the road. 0:18:25.436 --> 0:18:28.716 You're absolutely right that the public sentiment in the United States, 0:18:28.996 --> 0:18:31.356 if you ask people in polls, is not that the 0:18:31.436 --> 0:18:35.236 United States should be an empire that dominates decision making 0:18:35.236 --> 0:18:38.636 everywhere in the world. And Donald Trump's foreign policy, if 0:18:38.636 --> 0:18:41.476 you can call it a foreign policy, followed that call 0:18:41.516 --> 0:18:45.956 it intuition, public intuition, and you know, Trump regularly responded 0:18:45.996 --> 0:18:48.436 to problems in various regions by saying, I don't care, 0:18:48.716 --> 0:18:52.356 not my problem. We're going to back away from this situation. 0:18:53.236 --> 0:18:56.556 The Biden administration comes in full of young, smart people 0:18:57.116 --> 0:18:59.916 who don't see the world that way at all. Many 0:18:59.956 --> 0:19:04.276 of them are products of Hillary Clinton's time in the 0:19:04.316 --> 0:19:08.596 State Department, which in turn reflected to some degree Bill 0:19:08.636 --> 0:19:12.556 clinton foreign policy vision in which people talked about the 0:19:12.676 --> 0:19:15.916 United States is the indispensable Nation, which is a kind 0:19:15.956 --> 0:19:19.556 of egomaniacal formulation in a certain way, but which does 0:19:19.676 --> 0:19:23.716 capture this post Cold War idea that the United States 0:19:23.956 --> 0:19:28.236 would intervene wherever it was possible to do so to 0:19:28.396 --> 0:19:32.516 try to maintain something like the international order. Now. I 0:19:32.516 --> 0:19:34.916 don't think anyone disputes at this point that we overplayed 0:19:34.916 --> 0:19:38.596 our hand very badly with the wars in Afghanistan any rock, 0:19:39.196 --> 0:19:41.036 and with respect in the Middle East, I think you're 0:19:41.116 --> 0:19:43.596 right that there's a tendency to say, let's not get 0:19:43.636 --> 0:19:47.596 involved in that anymore. And yet when the Israelis and 0:19:47.596 --> 0:19:50.556 the Palestinians find themselves leaving aside the rights and the 0:19:50.556 --> 0:19:53.676 wrongs and who started it's killing each other, it's the 0:19:53.756 --> 0:19:56.956 United States that gets the call still. And that's partly 0:19:56.956 --> 0:19:59.036 because Israel as a US ally, but it's also partly 0:19:59.036 --> 0:20:02.116 because there's no other actor who can plausibly go in 0:20:02.556 --> 0:20:05.356 and sit the sides down and say, Okay, there's going 0:20:05.396 --> 0:20:09.956 to be a ceasefire now. And I'm wondering whether, as 0:20:09.956 --> 0:20:13.076 you look at the Biden administration's approach, they should just 0:20:13.156 --> 0:20:15.436 be saying something more trumpy. They should just be saying, no, 0:20:15.636 --> 0:20:17.996 we're not going to do that anymore. It sounded a 0:20:17.996 --> 0:20:19.836 bit like you were saying that that the US should 0:20:19.836 --> 0:20:23.036 sort of say to regional powers, you know, step up, 0:20:23.076 --> 0:20:25.956 you take some responsibility here. You want it anyway, so 0:20:25.996 --> 0:20:27.956 we'll just sort of give it to you. And I 0:20:27.996 --> 0:20:30.196 wonder if that's I mean, I don't have the sense 0:20:30.516 --> 0:20:33.676 that a lot of Biden's foreign policy advisors think that way, 0:20:33.996 --> 0:20:36.756 but perhaps they should think that way. You know, you're 0:20:36.836 --> 0:20:39.956 right about Trump. But what I think you are neglecting 0:20:39.956 --> 0:20:44.356 to say is Obama in many ways had very similar 0:20:44.396 --> 0:20:48.476 instincts on this limited issue as Trump did, particularly in 0:20:48.516 --> 0:20:52.916 the Middle East. The central drama of Barack Obama's presidency 0:20:52.916 --> 0:20:57.116 in the Middle East was his refusal to intervene in Syria, 0:20:57.196 --> 0:21:00.876 despite frankly a majority of his aids wanting him to 0:21:00.916 --> 0:21:03.716 do so. I happened to think Obama was dead right 0:21:03.916 --> 0:21:07.676 that if you had had a major US intervention in Syria, 0:21:07.756 --> 0:21:10.196 it is very difficult for me to see how it 0:21:10.196 --> 0:21:13.596 would either not Either it would be completely feckless and 0:21:13.636 --> 0:21:17.156 you would be just prolonging a civil war and actually 0:21:17.276 --> 0:21:22.076 increasing the casualties without doing having much impact, or you'd 0:21:22.116 --> 0:21:23.796 go in a big way and it would be a 0:21:23.876 --> 0:21:25.836 rock all over again. I mean, you had basically an 0:21:25.876 --> 0:21:30.756 almost identical situation, a minority government that was being pushed, 0:21:31.436 --> 0:21:33.036 you know, with lots of islam Is there, and the 0:21:33.116 --> 0:21:35.476 US was being told get rid of the minority government 0:21:35.836 --> 0:21:38.196 in this case, an Ola Whide government, in the Iraqi case, 0:21:38.436 --> 0:21:41.636 a Sydney government, and we would have seen a much 0:21:41.676 --> 0:21:44.476 bigger civil war and we would own it. And Obama 0:21:44.596 --> 0:21:48.836 is I think, very conscious of that danger, and you know, 0:21:48.956 --> 0:21:51.636 had this kind of hippocratic view, which is let's first 0:21:51.676 --> 0:21:54.716 not do any harm. But I think you're right many 0:21:54.756 --> 0:21:57.556 of his advisers are more in the Hillary Clinton mode, 0:21:57.876 --> 0:22:01.756 which is more of a kind of reflexive American imperial mode. 0:22:02.556 --> 0:22:04.636 What I would say to you is, look not so 0:22:04.716 --> 0:22:06.996 much at the Arab Israeli issue where the US has 0:22:07.156 --> 0:22:11.396 unique equities causes, you say, of the very close relationship 0:22:11.436 --> 0:22:14.556 with Israel, but also of the sense on the Palestinian 0:22:14.596 --> 0:22:17.516 side send me of a certain generation of Palestinians that 0:22:17.596 --> 0:22:20.636 the USA is trying to broker something and is actually 0:22:20.636 --> 0:22:24.076 trying in its own way to create a two state solution. 0:22:24.956 --> 0:22:26.756 Look at the rest of the Middle East. I don't 0:22:26.756 --> 0:22:29.636 think Biden is getting much involved as far as I 0:22:29.676 --> 0:22:31.876 can tell. I mean Syria. They you know, as I say, 0:22:31.956 --> 0:22:34.996 many of those Biden advisors criticized Obama for staying out 0:22:34.996 --> 0:22:38.396 of Syria. They're staying out of Syria. So I think 0:22:38.436 --> 0:22:42.116 everywhere you're seeing more of an approach that tries to 0:22:42.156 --> 0:22:45.956 recognize that the US does not have to be dominating 0:22:45.996 --> 0:22:49.396 and shaping every one of these balances. It's not just 0:22:49.476 --> 0:22:53.716 the American people. I think it's the reality that you know, 0:22:53.756 --> 0:22:56.156 I wrote a book about the post American world, and 0:22:56.156 --> 0:22:58.876 the central point was that these other countries have become 0:22:58.956 --> 0:23:02.436 quite strong and powerful. You know, you can't push them around. 0:23:02.796 --> 0:23:05.676 To my mind, Turkey is in some ways the best 0:23:05.716 --> 0:23:09.236 example of that. Twenty five years ago, Turkey was a 0:23:09.236 --> 0:23:12.476 basket case economy run by generals, and every time the 0:23:12.556 --> 0:23:14.996 United States would tell the Turks to jump, they would 0:23:15.076 --> 0:23:19.716 ask how high. Today, Turkeys, I think the GDP's has 0:23:19.756 --> 0:23:23.756 gone up fivefold since then. It is a mature political system. 0:23:23.916 --> 0:23:27.836 It is a democracy of sorts and imperfect democracy. Its 0:23:27.996 --> 0:23:31.956 leader is quite popular. He has a very different attitude, right, 0:23:31.956 --> 0:23:34.156 And I don't think it's just out one. I think 0:23:34.196 --> 0:23:37.636 any Turkish leader at this point that who was democratically elected, 0:23:37.996 --> 0:23:41.316 who had the weight of the Turkish economy behind him, 0:23:41.596 --> 0:23:44.036 is going to be much less willing to simply act 0:23:44.076 --> 0:23:48.956 as America's stalwart. Ally. Turkey has very complicated interests in 0:23:48.996 --> 0:23:52.596 that area, and so it pursues them correctly or incorrectly. 0:23:52.916 --> 0:23:55.436