1 00:00:15,396 --> 00:00:24,116 Speaker 1: Pushkin from Pushkin Industries. This is Deep Background, the show 2 00:00:24,156 --> 00:00:27,436 Speaker 1: where we explore the stories behind the stories in the news. 3 00:00:27,956 --> 00:00:32,636 Speaker 1: I'm Noah Feldman. Today on Deep Background, we continue our 4 00:00:32,796 --> 00:00:37,476 Speaker 1: special mini series looking at global power, the institutions of power, 5 00:00:37,796 --> 00:00:40,436 Speaker 1: the people who deploy it, and what it means for 6 00:00:40,476 --> 00:00:43,636 Speaker 1: the United States in the world. To discuss these issues, 7 00:00:43,676 --> 00:00:47,636 Speaker 1: I can hardly think of a person more extraordinary than 8 00:00:47,676 --> 00:00:50,596 Speaker 1: for Read Zakaria. For Reid is known as one of 9 00:00:50,596 --> 00:00:53,476 Speaker 1: the leading foreign policy intellectuals, not only in the United 10 00:00:53,516 --> 00:00:56,796 Speaker 1: States but in the world. Not only that, he explains 11 00:00:56,836 --> 00:00:59,836 Speaker 1: foreign policy to the world as the host of CNN's 12 00:00:59,916 --> 00:01:03,276 Speaker 1: for Reid Zakaria GPS and the author of a regular 13 00:01:03,316 --> 00:01:07,076 Speaker 1: column for The Washington Post. Before that, he was a 14 00:01:07,116 --> 00:01:11,236 Speaker 1: Calmness for Newsweek, the editor of Newsweek International, and editor 15 00:01:11,276 --> 00:01:15,116 Speaker 1: at large of Time, and the editor of Foreign Affairs. 16 00:01:15,916 --> 00:01:20,236 Speaker 1: He's written several important and influential books on foreign policy 17 00:01:20,316 --> 00:01:23,676 Speaker 1: and the US, and today he's agreed to talk about 18 00:01:23,716 --> 00:01:27,476 Speaker 1: the major challenges that face US foreign policy in the 19 00:01:27,516 --> 00:01:31,636 Speaker 1: time of the Biden administration, how the US government can 20 00:01:31,716 --> 00:01:35,636 Speaker 1: and should think about its relationship with China, whether the 21 00:01:35,716 --> 00:01:39,396 Speaker 1: world is becoming a bipolar place with the US and 22 00:01:39,476 --> 00:01:43,676 Speaker 1: China on either side, and how power has been transformed 23 00:01:44,116 --> 00:01:48,276 Speaker 1: over the last several decades. He's also agreed to look 24 00:01:48,276 --> 00:01:50,676 Speaker 1: a little bit into the crystal ball of prediction and 25 00:01:50,756 --> 00:01:53,836 Speaker 1: try to figure out how the post COVID era is 26 00:01:53,916 --> 00:01:57,916 Speaker 1: going to affect foreign policy today. We will go deep 27 00:01:57,956 --> 00:02:00,956 Speaker 1: and go behind the thinking that led to the arguments 28 00:02:01,156 --> 00:02:08,916 Speaker 1: in that book. Farid, thank you so much for joining me. Farid. 29 00:02:09,196 --> 00:02:11,876 Speaker 1: Want to start by asking you to do a job 30 00:02:11,916 --> 00:02:13,876 Speaker 1: that you've been asked to do many times over the year, 31 00:02:13,956 --> 00:02:18,956 Speaker 1: which is to imagine yourself as the foreign policies are 32 00:02:19,196 --> 00:02:21,956 Speaker 1: of the United States. And in the old days we 33 00:02:21,956 --> 00:02:24,556 Speaker 1: would have said Secretary of State or National security advisor, 34 00:02:24,596 --> 00:02:27,236 Speaker 1: but today it's not entirely clear where the true power lies. 35 00:02:28,036 --> 00:02:31,036 Speaker 1: And to think about what are the major foreign policy 36 00:02:31,116 --> 00:02:33,636 Speaker 1: challenges that are facing the US right now that are 37 00:02:33,636 --> 00:02:36,876 Speaker 1: facing the Biden administration, and then we'll work our way 38 00:02:36,956 --> 00:02:41,396 Speaker 1: through that to the question of how American power is 39 00:02:41,796 --> 00:02:47,036 Speaker 1: faring at this particular juncture. So let me start by 40 00:02:47,316 --> 00:02:50,316 Speaker 1: asking it to you in the most open ended way possible. 41 00:02:50,396 --> 00:02:54,916 Speaker 1: What strike you as the largest issues? Oh? Thanks, no, 42 00:02:55,156 --> 00:02:57,476 Speaker 1: it's a huge pleasure to beyond with you. I'm a 43 00:02:57,476 --> 00:03:00,876 Speaker 1: fan of the podcast. I think that one way to 44 00:03:01,036 --> 00:03:03,076 Speaker 1: think about this is to say, what is the sort 45 00:03:03,076 --> 00:03:08,076 Speaker 1: of central challenge that the United States faces beyond everything else? 46 00:03:08,196 --> 00:03:10,996 Speaker 1: It was the organized principle, and I would argue it is. 47 00:03:11,836 --> 00:03:15,236 Speaker 1: The United States has created over the last seventy years 48 00:03:15,596 --> 00:03:19,396 Speaker 1: a rather remarkable international system, a system quite different from 49 00:03:19,396 --> 00:03:23,156 Speaker 1: one that existed previously at any point in history, that 50 00:03:23,356 --> 00:03:30,796 Speaker 1: is marked by a greater degree of international order, norms, rules, 51 00:03:31,356 --> 00:03:35,156 Speaker 1: even liberal values. It's not perfect by any stretch. There's 52 00:03:35,276 --> 00:03:38,236 Speaker 1: lots of violations. The US violates at a lot of times. 53 00:03:38,236 --> 00:03:41,316 Speaker 1: But if you just think in big historical terms, the 54 00:03:41,356 --> 00:03:44,676 Speaker 1: big shift that's taken place since nineteen forty five is 55 00:03:44,716 --> 00:03:48,476 Speaker 1: this one. And you know, for example, the annexation of 56 00:03:48,756 --> 00:03:52,436 Speaker 1: territory by using force is something that used to happen 57 00:03:52,556 --> 00:03:57,116 Speaker 1: routinely for hundreds and hundreds of years before that. It 58 00:03:57,196 --> 00:04:01,756 Speaker 1: barely ever happens anymore. The Russian occupation and invasion of 59 00:04:01,756 --> 00:04:05,956 Speaker 1: Crimea is a rare example to the contrary. So if 60 00:04:05,996 --> 00:04:08,396 Speaker 1: you say to yourself, sometimes people call this a kind 61 00:04:08,436 --> 00:04:12,716 Speaker 1: of liberal national order, rules based international order, that is 62 00:04:12,756 --> 00:04:15,876 Speaker 1: the central achievement of American foreign policy. It is the 63 00:04:15,956 --> 00:04:18,636 Speaker 1: defining feature of the world we live in right a 64 00:04:18,716 --> 00:04:21,596 Speaker 1: world in which France and Germany went to war three 65 00:04:21,636 --> 00:04:25,556 Speaker 1: times between eighteen fifty and nineteen fifty. It's now unthinkable 66 00:04:25,596 --> 00:04:28,196 Speaker 1: that France and Germany would go to war. So if 67 00:04:28,236 --> 00:04:31,476 Speaker 1: that is the central achievement of American foreign policy, I 68 00:04:31,476 --> 00:04:36,436 Speaker 1: would say it is also uniquely threatened these days. It 69 00:04:36,516 --> 00:04:38,876 Speaker 1: had a good run during the Cold War, it was 70 00:04:38,996 --> 00:04:43,116 Speaker 1: kind of a half system, then flourished after the fall 71 00:04:43,116 --> 00:04:46,996 Speaker 1: of the Soviet Union, and now is really threatened. And 72 00:04:47,036 --> 00:04:49,396 Speaker 1: it's threatened by a number of things. And I would 73 00:04:49,436 --> 00:04:51,956 Speaker 1: say the central challenge for the United States is how 74 00:04:51,996 --> 00:04:56,876 Speaker 1: do you stabilize, shore up this liberal world order and 75 00:04:57,076 --> 00:05:01,276 Speaker 1: help to make it endure into the twenty first century. 76 00:05:01,996 --> 00:05:05,436 Speaker 1: That's beautifully stated, and it leads us immediately to one 77 00:05:05,476 --> 00:05:09,276 Speaker 1: of the most visible challenges to this order, and that's China. 78 00:05:10,036 --> 00:05:12,076 Speaker 1: In part of the time that you describe the Cold 79 00:05:12,076 --> 00:05:15,556 Speaker 1: War time, the US was in a bipolar world where 80 00:05:15,636 --> 00:05:17,756 Speaker 1: the US powers on one side and the Soviet power 81 00:05:17,836 --> 00:05:20,596 Speaker 1: largely on the other. Then in the Postcold War period, 82 00:05:20,836 --> 00:05:24,276 Speaker 1: some people talked about the world being unipolar, dominated by 83 00:05:24,276 --> 00:05:28,076 Speaker 1: the United States. Now, the rise of China makes bipolarity 84 00:05:28,316 --> 00:05:31,796 Speaker 1: extremely probable, And in your fantastic book Ten Lessons for 85 00:05:31,836 --> 00:05:34,916 Speaker 1: a Post Pandemic World, you have a whole section talking 86 00:05:34,916 --> 00:05:39,756 Speaker 1: about bipolarity and how while war is not inevitable between 87 00:05:39,796 --> 00:05:44,156 Speaker 1: the United States and China, some bipolarity is how should 88 00:05:44,156 --> 00:05:46,716 Speaker 1: the US be thinking about China when it comes to 89 00:05:47,556 --> 00:05:52,356 Speaker 1: incorporation into this international system of norms and orders, Because 90 00:05:52,396 --> 00:05:55,796 Speaker 1: just to deepen the question, for about a decade and 91 00:05:55,796 --> 00:05:58,316 Speaker 1: a half, foreign policy experts said, well, what the US 92 00:05:58,356 --> 00:06:00,436 Speaker 1: should do is just give China the incentives to enter 93 00:06:00,476 --> 00:06:03,916 Speaker 1: into this order, and then it will play alongside the 94 00:06:03,996 --> 00:06:06,836 Speaker 1: United States and it will actually strengthen the order. And 95 00:06:06,916 --> 00:06:09,396 Speaker 1: sometimes in some areas China appear to be doing at 96 00:06:09,436 --> 00:06:12,796 Speaker 1: the World Trade Organization being a prominent example. But now 97 00:06:12,836 --> 00:06:15,356 Speaker 1: it looks as though China is going to behave a 98 00:06:15,396 --> 00:06:17,996 Speaker 1: little bit more like the US does. Embrace the order 99 00:06:17,996 --> 00:06:21,276 Speaker 1: when it's useful and then step outside the order when 100 00:06:21,316 --> 00:06:25,796 Speaker 1: that is useful. Yeah, you make a very important point 101 00:06:25,796 --> 00:06:28,316 Speaker 1: that I think we often forget that the US often 102 00:06:28,436 --> 00:06:30,916 Speaker 1: violates this order. I mean, if you look at, for example, 103 00:06:30,996 --> 00:06:33,196 Speaker 1: even on something like trade, where the US has been 104 00:06:33,236 --> 00:06:36,756 Speaker 1: the great promoter of free trade over the years over 105 00:06:36,796 --> 00:06:40,276 Speaker 1: the decades, we violate free trade principles all the time. 106 00:06:40,516 --> 00:06:42,996 Speaker 1: By the way, all the tariffs against China and the 107 00:06:43,036 --> 00:06:46,236 Speaker 1: tariffs against Europe are essentially a violation of the spirit 108 00:06:46,236 --> 00:06:49,956 Speaker 1: of free trade. Many of them invoke entirely bogus national 109 00:06:49,996 --> 00:06:54,636 Speaker 1: security arguments. We face a national security threat from Germany 110 00:06:54,676 --> 00:06:57,356 Speaker 1: and Canada and therefore have tariffs on there on their 111 00:06:57,396 --> 00:07:00,556 Speaker 1: steel and aluminum product. But let me get to your 112 00:07:00,636 --> 00:07:03,716 Speaker 1: central point, which is which is of course the most 113 00:07:03,756 --> 00:07:06,596 Speaker 1: important one. So what I try to explain in the 114 00:07:06,596 --> 00:07:08,756 Speaker 1: book is that most people are going to think, wait, 115 00:07:08,836 --> 00:07:11,356 Speaker 1: we're not really in a bipolar world. The US is 116 00:07:11,796 --> 00:07:15,956 Speaker 1: by far the most powerful country, which is true. But really, 117 00:07:15,956 --> 00:07:20,396 Speaker 1: when you think about systems of international relations, the defining 118 00:07:20,556 --> 00:07:23,436 Speaker 1: feature of polarity, of you know, whether you're in a 119 00:07:23,516 --> 00:07:28,116 Speaker 1: multipolar or unipolar or bipolar system is mostly are the 120 00:07:28,236 --> 00:07:30,636 Speaker 1: two powers in a bipolar system kind of in a 121 00:07:30,756 --> 00:07:33,356 Speaker 1: league of their own. This is what Hans Morganhou came 122 00:07:33,436 --> 00:07:37,596 Speaker 1: up with in the late forties. Were accurately figured out 123 00:07:38,036 --> 00:07:40,676 Speaker 1: that we were entering a bipolar world, even though the 124 00:07:40,716 --> 00:07:43,476 Speaker 1: Soviet Union, by the way, was at that point probably 125 00:07:43,476 --> 00:07:46,796 Speaker 1: one third as large as the United States in terms 126 00:07:46,836 --> 00:07:49,756 Speaker 1: of its global economic impact. The US was roughly forty 127 00:07:49,756 --> 00:07:52,956 Speaker 1: percent of the world economy. The Soviets were maybe ten 128 00:07:53,036 --> 00:07:56,236 Speaker 1: or twelve percent of the world economy. So if you 129 00:07:56,316 --> 00:07:59,636 Speaker 1: look at it in those terms, morganhouse point was, Yeah, 130 00:07:59,676 --> 00:08:02,436 Speaker 1: the Soviet Union might be only twelve percent, but it's 131 00:08:02,556 --> 00:08:04,996 Speaker 1: way more than anybody else, you know. In other words, 132 00:08:05,036 --> 00:08:08,196 Speaker 1: as the US, there's a Soviet Union, and then Britain, 133 00:08:08,236 --> 00:08:11,636 Speaker 1: which had collapsed, was down to something like three and 134 00:08:11,716 --> 00:08:15,916 Speaker 1: a half percent of world GDP. This time around, it's 135 00:08:16,036 --> 00:08:19,076 Speaker 1: clear the US is number one, but China is number 136 00:08:19,156 --> 00:08:22,636 Speaker 1: two and larger than numbers three, four, and five and 137 00:08:22,756 --> 00:08:25,556 Speaker 1: six put together, larger than the next four countries put 138 00:08:25,556 --> 00:08:29,956 Speaker 1: together in economic terms and in defense spending. So clearly 139 00:08:29,996 --> 00:08:33,596 Speaker 1: these two countries have a kind of weight and heft 140 00:08:33,636 --> 00:08:38,516 Speaker 1: and reach beyond almost anything. And China, unlike the Soviet Union, 141 00:08:39,116 --> 00:08:42,476 Speaker 1: really is an advanced economy in many senses. Obviously not 142 00:08:42,556 --> 00:08:45,076 Speaker 1: on its averages. But give you an example. There are 143 00:08:45,156 --> 00:08:49,156 Speaker 1: five hundred of supercomputers in the world. The five hundred 144 00:08:49,156 --> 00:08:53,156 Speaker 1: fastest computers in the world can be distributed thusly two 145 00:08:53,716 --> 00:08:56,036 Speaker 1: about two hundred and twenty five are in China, about 146 00:08:56,076 --> 00:08:58,596 Speaker 1: one hundred and twenty five are in the US, and 147 00:08:58,636 --> 00:09:02,796 Speaker 1: then the rest are Europe, Taiwan and South Korea, Singapore, 148 00:09:02,836 --> 00:09:06,356 Speaker 1: places like that. So you see that in some very 149 00:09:06,396 --> 00:09:09,076 Speaker 1: cutting edge areas, China is actually ahead of the United 150 00:09:09,316 --> 00:09:12,876 Speaker 1: States overall. No question, the US is number one by far, 151 00:09:13,476 --> 00:09:16,956 Speaker 1: but China is a legitimate number two. So that's why 152 00:09:16,996 --> 00:09:20,396 Speaker 1: I say bipolarity is inevitable. There is inevitably going to 153 00:09:20,436 --> 00:09:24,356 Speaker 1: be a sense of rivalry competition between these two countries. 154 00:09:24,356 --> 00:09:27,036 Speaker 1: There is a structural reality where each is going to 155 00:09:27,116 --> 00:09:30,836 Speaker 1: think that its loss comes at the others gain and 156 00:09:30,996 --> 00:09:35,196 Speaker 1: vice versa. But I don't think it's like the Cold War. 157 00:09:35,356 --> 00:09:39,076 Speaker 1: For reasons you alluded to, the Soviet Union was an 158 00:09:39,116 --> 00:09:44,436 Speaker 1: ideological and economic political challenge to not just the United States, 159 00:09:44,516 --> 00:09:48,036 Speaker 1: but to the entire world order the United States had constructed. 160 00:09:48,676 --> 00:09:51,676 Speaker 1: China is not quite that kind of player. It has 161 00:09:51,836 --> 00:09:55,636 Speaker 1: readily embraced large parts of that order, not just the 162 00:09:55,716 --> 00:09:59,596 Speaker 1: trading regime, but the knowledge regime, if you will, I 163 00:09:59,596 --> 00:10:02,236 Speaker 1: mean the China sense. It's students to the United States. 164 00:10:02,276 --> 00:10:05,916 Speaker 1: It abides by patent laws. You know, there's all kinds 165 00:10:05,916 --> 00:10:09,916 Speaker 1: of areas where it is trying to mirror many of 166 00:10:09,956 --> 00:10:13,636 Speaker 1: the rules regulations and norms that have been put in place. 167 00:10:14,196 --> 00:10:16,556 Speaker 1: Then there are many areas where it violates, and Pattern 168 00:10:16,676 --> 00:10:19,676 Speaker 1: is actually a good example where they violate and follow 169 00:10:19,716 --> 00:10:23,876 Speaker 1: at the same time, similarly with trade. But if you 170 00:10:23,916 --> 00:10:27,436 Speaker 1: think of the Soviets who actively argued that their goal 171 00:10:27,676 --> 00:10:31,876 Speaker 1: was a communist world revolution and that funded parties around 172 00:10:31,876 --> 00:10:35,156 Speaker 1: the world to do that, funded insurgent movements around the 173 00:10:35,156 --> 00:10:38,196 Speaker 1: world to do that. Mouse China did that, it was 174 00:10:38,236 --> 00:10:41,596 Speaker 1: funding at least a dozen insurgencies around the world. The 175 00:10:42,396 --> 00:10:47,516 Speaker 1: Chinese Communist Party today is strikingly about not kind of 176 00:10:47,596 --> 00:10:51,876 Speaker 1: world revolution and insurrections and things like that, but making 177 00:10:51,956 --> 00:10:56,916 Speaker 1: China great. In doing that, they are violating a lot 178 00:10:57,236 --> 00:11:01,156 Speaker 1: of the rules, norms, and values of a liberal international order. 179 00:11:01,596 --> 00:11:04,356 Speaker 1: So the challenge with China is, I don't think that 180 00:11:04,556 --> 00:11:08,276 Speaker 1: you face the same kind of Soviet like Cold War threat, 181 00:11:08,396 --> 00:11:11,236 Speaker 1: but you face a country that is determined to rise 182 00:11:11,956 --> 00:11:16,716 Speaker 1: and to really cheat in order to rise. And again, 183 00:11:16,756 --> 00:11:18,596 Speaker 1: to be clear, it doesn't cheat all the time, but 184 00:11:19,036 --> 00:11:23,276 Speaker 1: when it cheats, it is violating that that road. I 185 00:11:23,276 --> 00:11:27,236 Speaker 1: would argue, that's why you have to have strong measures 186 00:11:27,236 --> 00:11:30,956 Speaker 1: of deterrence where you really push back, but then also 187 00:11:31,596 --> 00:11:34,596 Speaker 1: strong measures of integration, where you say to the Chinese, 188 00:11:34,596 --> 00:11:37,676 Speaker 1: if you are playing by the rules, we will allow you, 189 00:11:37,756 --> 00:11:40,156 Speaker 1: for example, to have a larger say in the World 190 00:11:40,156 --> 00:11:43,676 Speaker 1: Bank or the IMF. Those examples are interesting because basically 191 00:11:43,716 --> 00:11:46,876 Speaker 1: what happened over the last ten years is the Chinese 192 00:11:46,956 --> 00:11:49,836 Speaker 1: tried to do that to say, we'd like to integrate. 193 00:11:49,876 --> 00:11:52,076 Speaker 1: We'd like to be you know, we'd like to be 194 00:11:52,116 --> 00:11:54,676 Speaker 1: more involved, we'd like to pay more of the bills, 195 00:11:54,676 --> 00:11:57,156 Speaker 1: we'd like to bear more of the burdens on peacekeeping, 196 00:11:57,196 --> 00:12:01,196 Speaker 1: on UN operations, but we'd like more of a say, 197 00:12:01,276 --> 00:12:03,596 Speaker 1: and with something like the World Bank or you know, 198 00:12:03,916 --> 00:12:07,876 Speaker 1: or the Asian Development Bank. The US largely said no, 199 00:12:07,996 --> 00:12:10,476 Speaker 1: you can't have more, and so the Chinese went off 200 00:12:10,516 --> 00:12:13,556 Speaker 1: and said, okay, fine, we'll start our own bank, the 201 00:12:13,596 --> 00:12:17,876 Speaker 1: Asian Infrastructure Bank. And you know, that's the tension were 202 00:12:18,516 --> 00:12:20,676 Speaker 1: One of the ways I think about this is to say, 203 00:12:21,556 --> 00:12:24,076 Speaker 1: we all seem to in the in the United States, 204 00:12:24,196 --> 00:12:29,036 Speaker 1: be sure we understand when China is overstepping its boundaries, 205 00:12:29,316 --> 00:12:33,396 Speaker 1: it is exerting too much power and influence South China 206 00:12:33,516 --> 00:12:37,836 Speaker 1: Sea or bullying Australia. But we haven't figured out what 207 00:12:37,916 --> 00:12:41,916 Speaker 1: would be an okay level of power and influence for 208 00:12:41,956 --> 00:12:44,996 Speaker 1: the second richest country in the world to have. It's 209 00:12:45,036 --> 00:12:48,356 Speaker 1: not going to be what China's role in influence was 210 00:12:48,356 --> 00:12:51,196 Speaker 1: when it was one percent of GDP, which was only 211 00:12:51,316 --> 00:12:54,596 Speaker 1: twenty years ago. It's now fifteen percent of GDP. So 212 00:12:54,636 --> 00:12:58,276 Speaker 1: that's a fifteen full rise in China's raw economic power. 213 00:12:58,956 --> 00:13:02,236 Speaker 1: Surely there's going to be some increase in its influence, 214 00:13:02,516 --> 00:13:05,716 Speaker 1: and we haven't figured out how do we allow for that. 215 00:13:05,716 --> 00:13:07,716 Speaker 1: That's what I mean, that kind of force of integration, 216 00:13:08,276 --> 00:13:10,916 Speaker 1: which will then give much more force it seems to 217 00:13:10,956 --> 00:13:15,236 Speaker 1: me incredibility to the pushback, to the deterrence to say no, 218 00:13:15,396 --> 00:13:18,356 Speaker 1: these are red lines when you're crossing them. But for 219 00:13:18,436 --> 00:13:20,276 Speaker 1: there to be red lines, it seems to me they 220 00:13:20,396 --> 00:13:24,116 Speaker 1: also have to be green lines. I love the paradigm 221 00:13:24,116 --> 00:13:27,556 Speaker 1: that you're offering of deterrence and integration, and I think 222 00:13:27,716 --> 00:13:30,956 Speaker 1: you couldn't be more correct that if your only stance 223 00:13:31,236 --> 00:13:35,956 Speaker 1: is deterrence, then there's no positive incentive for integration. But 224 00:13:35,996 --> 00:13:38,316 Speaker 1: I want to ask in practice what that means for 225 00:13:39,076 --> 00:13:42,676 Speaker 1: good old fashioned hard power, you know, geopolitical power over 226 00:13:42,756 --> 00:13:46,996 Speaker 1: other countries, because you know there have been voices, quiet 227 00:13:47,076 --> 00:13:49,396 Speaker 1: voices for a long time, but louder in recent years, 228 00:13:49,476 --> 00:13:51,636 Speaker 1: saying that when it comes to that kind of power, 229 00:13:51,716 --> 00:13:55,156 Speaker 1: the US should squarely be in a model of containment 230 00:13:55,276 --> 00:14:00,196 Speaker 1: towards China. That basically, every extra move that China gets 231 00:14:00,276 --> 00:14:05,156 Speaker 1: more powerful in militarily comes at the expense of the US, 232 00:14:05,356 --> 00:14:08,476 Speaker 1: because the US has been the dominant global superpower and 233 00:14:08,556 --> 00:14:12,636 Speaker 1: China is rising. And often that view went alongside people saying, 234 00:14:13,076 --> 00:14:16,236 Speaker 1: but when it comes to economic activity, that's where we 235 00:14:16,316 --> 00:14:21,116 Speaker 1: can provide positive incentives sometimes because the positive incentives and 236 00:14:21,156 --> 00:14:23,676 Speaker 1: economics are not thought to be zero sum. So if 237 00:14:23,756 --> 00:14:26,556 Speaker 1: China gets rich, that doesn't mean that the US gets poorer. 238 00:14:27,036 --> 00:14:29,676 Speaker 1: To an economist, at least, it's possible for everybody to 239 00:14:29,716 --> 00:14:32,156 Speaker 1: get rich in a positive some way. But when it 240 00:14:32,196 --> 00:14:36,436 Speaker 1: comes to geopolitical power, it's closer to a zero sum. 241 00:14:36,516 --> 00:14:38,396 Speaker 1: It may not be exactly a zero sum, but it's 242 00:14:38,396 --> 00:14:41,316 Speaker 1: closer to a zero sum. And so one of the 243 00:14:41,356 --> 00:14:45,676 Speaker 1: schools of thought had been hard line on anything military, 244 00:14:46,636 --> 00:14:50,156 Speaker 1: but give them green lines and encourage their participation and 245 00:14:50,236 --> 00:14:56,036 Speaker 1: integrate them on anything broadly speaking economic. Does that seem 246 00:14:56,076 --> 00:14:58,076 Speaker 1: to you like a plausible way of looking at it, 247 00:14:58,156 --> 00:15:00,876 Speaker 1: or does that miss the point of how China's rise 248 00:15:00,996 --> 00:15:05,436 Speaker 1: is actually operated, which is mostly through the economic vector. No. 249 00:15:05,596 --> 00:15:08,156 Speaker 1: I think that misses the point for a different reason, Noah, 250 00:15:08,196 --> 00:15:11,276 Speaker 1: which is that if you set yourself up to say 251 00:15:11,356 --> 00:15:17,596 Speaker 1: that the geopolitical space is entirely zero sum, the problem 252 00:15:17,636 --> 00:15:21,836 Speaker 1: becomes you condemned the United States to be essentially a 253 00:15:21,956 --> 00:15:25,636 Speaker 1: world empire. Because what you're saying is if there are 254 00:15:25,996 --> 00:15:28,876 Speaker 1: any gains not just for China, but for any other 255 00:15:28,916 --> 00:15:33,156 Speaker 1: country anywhere in the world, that is de facto a 256 00:15:33,276 --> 00:15:36,756 Speaker 1: loss of American power and influence. But does the United 257 00:15:36,796 --> 00:15:42,116 Speaker 1: States want to be the dominant geopolitical player in every 258 00:15:42,276 --> 00:15:45,716 Speaker 1: local conflict everywhere in the world. I mean, we're seeing 259 00:15:46,116 --> 00:15:50,076 Speaker 1: the United States fatigue from having done that for forty years, 260 00:15:50,156 --> 00:15:52,756 Speaker 1: I don't know, seventy sixty years in the Middle East, right, 261 00:15:53,156 --> 00:15:55,876 Speaker 1: we're seeing a certain sense in which even in places 262 00:15:55,956 --> 00:15:59,356 Speaker 1: like Latin America, the United States is taking a much 263 00:15:59,476 --> 00:16:02,996 Speaker 1: less forward leaning position. If you think about you know, 264 00:16:03,556 --> 00:16:06,596 Speaker 1: John Kennedy is a Latin American policy which was basically 265 00:16:06,876 --> 00:16:08,996 Speaker 1: the United States was going to fund the foreign a 266 00:16:09,276 --> 00:16:13,196 Speaker 1: in development throughout Latin America. We're not quite in that mode. 267 00:16:13,876 --> 00:16:15,636 Speaker 1: Do we want to be in that mode? And if 268 00:16:15,636 --> 00:16:17,436 Speaker 1: we don't want to be in the mode. It gets 269 00:16:17,436 --> 00:16:21,036 Speaker 1: back to this sort of central architecture we've been talking about. 270 00:16:21,636 --> 00:16:25,436 Speaker 1: Is there a way to conceive of a world order 271 00:16:25,556 --> 00:16:30,396 Speaker 1: in which the United States is not maintaining the geopolitical 272 00:16:30,436 --> 00:16:33,916 Speaker 1: balance in every local area so as to keep the 273 00:16:33,956 --> 00:16:38,316 Speaker 1: world in some kind of equipoise, or are we willing 274 00:16:38,356 --> 00:16:43,876 Speaker 1: to accept a certain amount of messiness regional balances things 275 00:16:43,876 --> 00:16:45,836 Speaker 1: like that. Look what's happened as the United States has 276 00:16:45,836 --> 00:16:48,516 Speaker 1: withdrawn from the Middle East. Basically you have a power 277 00:16:48,596 --> 00:16:52,276 Speaker 1: struggle going on between the Saudiast, the Iranians, the Turks, 278 00:16:52,396 --> 00:16:55,716 Speaker 1: the Israelis. But you know, it hasn't led the United 279 00:16:55,756 --> 00:16:58,676 Speaker 1: States to say, oh my god, this is unacceptable. We 280 00:16:58,716 --> 00:17:01,156 Speaker 1: need to be dominating. It's in fact, I think for 281 00:17:01,276 --> 00:17:05,476 Speaker 1: many Americans, even American strategies, there's a sense of relief. 282 00:17:05,556 --> 00:17:07,876 Speaker 1: You know, we were never even clear what we were doing, 283 00:17:07,876 --> 00:17:10,156 Speaker 1: and we weren't clear what our interests world We were 284 00:17:10,316 --> 00:17:14,636 Speaker 1: making huge expenditures and commitments without being sure we were 285 00:17:14,636 --> 00:17:17,516 Speaker 1: getting much in return for it. So I think that's 286 00:17:17,636 --> 00:17:21,676 Speaker 1: in some ways the central problem there is the reality 287 00:17:21,756 --> 00:17:26,556 Speaker 1: that economics is more win win than security. But you know, 288 00:17:26,956 --> 00:17:32,356 Speaker 1: one thing that Franklin Roosevelt who is my hero, understood 289 00:17:32,356 --> 00:17:36,236 Speaker 1: about the you know, creating a world order, which Woodrow 290 00:17:36,316 --> 00:17:40,836 Speaker 1: Wilson didn't. He admired Wilson greatly. Roosevelt did, but he 291 00:17:40,916 --> 00:17:44,676 Speaker 1: understood you have to marry kind of power and idealism. 292 00:17:44,756 --> 00:17:47,156 Speaker 1: You have to give the great powers a reason to 293 00:17:47,276 --> 00:17:51,396 Speaker 1: be engaged in the international system. And so there has 294 00:17:51,436 --> 00:17:54,356 Speaker 1: to be something in it for the other big powers 295 00:17:54,396 --> 00:17:56,636 Speaker 1: in the world. They have to I hate to put 296 00:17:56,636 --> 00:17:58,876 Speaker 1: it this way, but you know, they have to have 297 00:17:59,076 --> 00:18:04,836 Speaker 1: some degree of influence. It's not spheres of control, really, 298 00:18:04,836 --> 00:18:08,156 Speaker 1: But if you're saying nobody gets to have real power 299 00:18:08,196 --> 00:18:11,996 Speaker 1: and influence other than the United States, then you know, 300 00:18:12,036 --> 00:18:15,476 Speaker 1: it's very difficult to imagine a world order that that 301 00:18:16,236 --> 00:18:19,876 Speaker 1: runs on any other principle than US as world hegemon. 302 00:18:21,316 --> 00:18:23,916 Speaker 1: Here is where the rubber, I think, really meets the road. 303 00:18:25,436 --> 00:18:28,716 Speaker 1: You're absolutely right that the public sentiment in the United States, 304 00:18:28,996 --> 00:18:31,356 Speaker 1: if you ask people in polls, is not that the 305 00:18:31,436 --> 00:18:35,236 Speaker 1: United States should be an empire that dominates decision making 306 00:18:35,236 --> 00:18:38,636 Speaker 1: everywhere in the world. And Donald Trump's foreign policy, if 307 00:18:38,636 --> 00:18:41,476 Speaker 1: you can call it a foreign policy, followed that call 308 00:18:41,516 --> 00:18:45,956 Speaker 1: it intuition, public intuition, and you know, Trump regularly responded 309 00:18:45,996 --> 00:18:48,436 Speaker 1: to problems in various regions by saying, I don't care, 310 00:18:48,716 --> 00:18:52,356 Speaker 1: not my problem. We're going to back away from this situation. 311 00:18:53,236 --> 00:18:56,556 Speaker 1: The Biden administration comes in full of young, smart people 312 00:18:57,116 --> 00:18:59,916 Speaker 1: who don't see the world that way at all. Many 313 00:18:59,956 --> 00:19:04,276 Speaker 1: of them are products of Hillary Clinton's time in the 314 00:19:04,316 --> 00:19:08,596 Speaker 1: State Department, which in turn reflected to some degree Bill 315 00:19:08,636 --> 00:19:12,556 Speaker 1: clinton foreign policy vision in which people talked about the 316 00:19:12,676 --> 00:19:15,916 Speaker 1: United States is the indispensable Nation, which is a kind 317 00:19:15,956 --> 00:19:19,556 Speaker 1: of egomaniacal formulation in a certain way, but which does 318 00:19:19,676 --> 00:19:23,716 Speaker 1: capture this post Cold War idea that the United States 319 00:19:23,956 --> 00:19:28,236 Speaker 1: would intervene wherever it was possible to do so to 320 00:19:28,396 --> 00:19:32,516 Speaker 1: try to maintain something like the international order. Now. I 321 00:19:32,516 --> 00:19:34,916 Speaker 1: don't think anyone disputes at this point that we overplayed 322 00:19:34,916 --> 00:19:38,596 Speaker 1: our hand very badly with the wars in Afghanistan any rock, 323 00:19:39,196 --> 00:19:41,036 Speaker 1: and with respect in the Middle East, I think you're 324 00:19:41,116 --> 00:19:43,596 Speaker 1: right that there's a tendency to say, let's not get 325 00:19:43,636 --> 00:19:47,596 Speaker 1: involved in that anymore. And yet when the Israelis and 326 00:19:47,596 --> 00:19:50,556 Speaker 1: the Palestinians find themselves leaving aside the rights and the 327 00:19:50,556 --> 00:19:53,676 Speaker 1: wrongs and who started it's killing each other, it's the 328 00:19:53,756 --> 00:19:56,956 Speaker 1: United States that gets the call still. And that's partly 329 00:19:56,956 --> 00:19:59,036 Speaker 1: because Israel as a US ally, but it's also partly 330 00:19:59,036 --> 00:20:02,116 Speaker 1: because there's no other actor who can plausibly go in 331 00:20:02,556 --> 00:20:05,356 Speaker 1: and sit the sides down and say, Okay, there's going 332 00:20:05,396 --> 00:20:09,956 Speaker 1: to be a ceasefire now. And I'm wondering whether, as 333 00:20:09,956 --> 00:20:13,076 Speaker 1: you look at the Biden administration's approach, they should just 334 00:20:13,156 --> 00:20:15,436 Speaker 1: be saying something more trumpy. They should just be saying, no, 335 00:20:15,636 --> 00:20:17,996 Speaker 1: we're not going to do that anymore. It sounded a 336 00:20:17,996 --> 00:20:19,836 Speaker 1: bit like you were saying that that the US should 337 00:20:19,836 --> 00:20:23,036 Speaker 1: sort of say to regional powers, you know, step up, 338 00:20:23,076 --> 00:20:25,956 Speaker 1: you take some responsibility here. You want it anyway, so 339 00:20:25,996 --> 00:20:27,956 Speaker 1: we'll just sort of give it to you. And I 340 00:20:27,996 --> 00:20:30,196 Speaker 1: wonder if that's I mean, I don't have the sense 341 00:20:30,516 --> 00:20:33,676 Speaker 1: that a lot of Biden's foreign policy advisors think that way, 342 00:20:33,996 --> 00:20:36,756 Speaker 1: but perhaps they should think that way. You know, you're 343 00:20:36,836 --> 00:20:39,956 Speaker 1: right about Trump. But what I think you are neglecting 344 00:20:39,956 --> 00:20:44,356 Speaker 1: to say is Obama in many ways had very similar 345 00:20:44,396 --> 00:20:48,476 Speaker 1: instincts on this limited issue as Trump did, particularly in 346 00:20:48,516 --> 00:20:52,916 Speaker 1: the Middle East. The central drama of Barack Obama's presidency 347 00:20:52,916 --> 00:20:57,116 Speaker 1: in the Middle East was his refusal to intervene in Syria, 348 00:20:57,196 --> 00:21:00,876 Speaker 1: despite frankly a majority of his aids wanting him to 349 00:21:00,916 --> 00:21:03,716 Speaker 1: do so. I happened to think Obama was dead right 350 00:21:03,916 --> 00:21:07,676 Speaker 1: that if you had had a major US intervention in Syria, 351 00:21:07,756 --> 00:21:10,196 Speaker 1: it is very difficult for me to see how it 352 00:21:10,196 --> 00:21:13,596 Speaker 1: would either not Either it would be completely feckless and 353 00:21:13,636 --> 00:21:17,156 Speaker 1: you would be just prolonging a civil war and actually 354 00:21:17,276 --> 00:21:22,076 Speaker 1: increasing the casualties without doing having much impact, or you'd 355 00:21:22,116 --> 00:21:23,796 Speaker 1: go in a big way and it would be a 356 00:21:23,876 --> 00:21:25,836 Speaker 1: rock all over again. I mean, you had basically an 357 00:21:25,876 --> 00:21:30,756 Speaker 1: almost identical situation, a minority government that was being pushed, 358 00:21:31,436 --> 00:21:33,036 Speaker 1: you know, with lots of islam Is there, and the 359 00:21:33,116 --> 00:21:35,476 Speaker 1: US was being told get rid of the minority government 360 00:21:35,836 --> 00:21:38,196 Speaker 1: in this case, an Ola Whide government, in the Iraqi case, 361 00:21:38,436 --> 00:21:41,636 Speaker 1: a Sydney government, and we would have seen a much 362 00:21:41,676 --> 00:21:44,476 Speaker 1: bigger civil war and we would own it. And Obama 363 00:21:44,596 --> 00:21:48,836 Speaker 1: is I think, very conscious of that danger, and you know, 364 00:21:48,956 --> 00:21:51,636 Speaker 1: had this kind of hippocratic view, which is let's first 365 00:21:51,676 --> 00:21:54,716 Speaker 1: not do any harm. But I think you're right many 366 00:21:54,756 --> 00:21:57,556 Speaker 1: of his advisers are more in the Hillary Clinton mode, 367 00:21:57,876 --> 00:22:01,756 Speaker 1: which is more of a kind of reflexive American imperial mode. 368 00:22:02,556 --> 00:22:04,636 Speaker 1: What I would say to you is, look not so 369 00:22:04,716 --> 00:22:06,996 Speaker 1: much at the Arab Israeli issue where the US has 370 00:22:07,156 --> 00:22:11,396 Speaker 1: unique equities causes, you say, of the very close relationship 371 00:22:11,436 --> 00:22:14,556 Speaker 1: with Israel, but also of the sense on the Palestinian 372 00:22:14,596 --> 00:22:17,516 Speaker 1: side send me of a certain generation of Palestinians that 373 00:22:17,596 --> 00:22:20,636 Speaker 1: the USA is trying to broker something and is actually 374 00:22:20,636 --> 00:22:24,076 Speaker 1: trying in its own way to create a two state solution. 375 00:22:24,956 --> 00:22:26,756 Speaker 1: Look at the rest of the Middle East. I don't 376 00:22:26,756 --> 00:22:29,636 Speaker 1: think Biden is getting much involved as far as I 377 00:22:29,676 --> 00:22:31,876 Speaker 1: can tell. I mean Syria. They you know, as I say, 378 00:22:31,956 --> 00:22:34,996 Speaker 1: many of those Biden advisors criticized Obama for staying out 379 00:22:34,996 --> 00:22:38,396 Speaker 1: of Syria. They're staying out of Syria. So I think 380 00:22:38,436 --> 00:22:42,116 Speaker 1: everywhere you're seeing more of an approach that tries to 381 00:22:42,156 --> 00:22:45,956 Speaker 1: recognize that the US does not have to be dominating 382 00:22:45,996 --> 00:22:49,396 Speaker 1: and shaping every one of these balances. It's not just 383 00:22:49,476 --> 00:22:53,716 Speaker 1: the American people. I think it's the reality that you know, 384 00:22:53,756 --> 00:22:56,156 Speaker 1: I wrote a book about the post American world, and 385 00:22:56,156 --> 00:22:58,876 Speaker 1: the central point was that these other countries have become 386 00:22:58,956 --> 00:23:02,436 Speaker 1: quite strong and powerful. You know, you can't push them around. 387 00:23:02,796 --> 00:23:05,676 Speaker 1: To my mind, Turkey is in some ways the best 388 00:23:05,716 --> 00:23:09,236 Speaker 1: example of that. Twenty five years ago, Turkey was a 389 00:23:09,236 --> 00:23:12,476 Speaker 1: basket case economy run by generals, and every time the 390 00:23:12,556 --> 00:23:14,996 Speaker 1: United States would tell the Turks to jump, they would 391 00:23:15,076 --> 00:23:19,716 Speaker 1: ask how high. Today, Turkeys, I think the GDP's has 392 00:23:19,756 --> 00:23:23,756 Speaker 1: gone up fivefold since then. It is a mature political system. 393 00:23:23,916 --> 00:23:27,836 Speaker 1: It is a democracy of sorts and imperfect democracy. Its 394 00:23:27,996 --> 00:23:31,956 Speaker 1: leader is quite popular. He has a very different attitude, right, 395 00:23:31,956 --> 00:23:34,156 Speaker 1: And I don't think it's just out one. I think 396 00:23:34,196 --> 00:23:37,636 Speaker 1: any Turkish leader at this point that who was democratically elected, 397 00:23:37,996 --> 00:23:41,316 Speaker 1: who had the weight of the Turkish economy behind him, 398 00:23:41,596 --> 00:23:44,036 Speaker 1: is going to be much less willing to simply act 399 00:23:44,076 --> 00:23:48,956 Speaker 1: as America's stalwart. Ally. Turkey has very complicated interests in 400 00:23:48,996 --> 00:23:52,596 Speaker 1: that area, and so it pursues them correctly or incorrectly. 401 00:23:52,916 --> 00:23:55,436 Speaker 1: And I think that's you know, that to me feels 402 00:23:55,516 --> 00:23:58,356 Speaker 1: like the new world we're in. Look at India, look 403 00:23:58,396 --> 00:24:01,956 Speaker 1: at Brazil, look at Indonesia. These places are not going 404 00:24:01,996 --> 00:24:04,316 Speaker 1: to be pushed around in quite the same way. So 405 00:24:04,876 --> 00:24:08,916 Speaker 1: the US has I think, real power, and that is 406 00:24:08,956 --> 00:24:12,116 Speaker 1: a gender setting power, and it has real power when 407 00:24:12,156 --> 00:24:14,916 Speaker 1: it wants to. What I would like to see is 408 00:24:14,956 --> 00:24:17,996 Speaker 1: in America that played more of that agenda setting role 409 00:24:18,436 --> 00:24:22,636 Speaker 1: which it uniquely has, and I think that's for all 410 00:24:22,756 --> 00:24:25,676 Speaker 1: kinds of reasons, a combination of hard and soft power, 411 00:24:25,796 --> 00:24:29,836 Speaker 1: but only the US that can push forward some big 412 00:24:29,876 --> 00:24:33,236 Speaker 1: idea on the international stage, whether it's climate change, whether 413 00:24:33,316 --> 00:24:36,076 Speaker 1: it's even something like this global tax regime. The janet 414 00:24:36,116 --> 00:24:39,756 Speaker 1: Yellen has just managed to do. It is striking that 415 00:24:39,796 --> 00:24:42,516 Speaker 1: the US has this power. It should be using it 416 00:24:42,556 --> 00:24:46,196 Speaker 1: to do stuff like that, to shore up the international system, 417 00:24:46,276 --> 00:24:49,876 Speaker 1: to make it work, make everybody feel like their equities 418 00:24:49,916 --> 00:24:54,196 Speaker 1: are being taken into account, and not to go off 419 00:24:54,236 --> 00:24:57,596 Speaker 1: in one more military intervention hero there, which often tears 420 00:24:57,636 --> 00:25:01,756 Speaker 1: at this fabric rather than builds it. One of the 421 00:25:01,796 --> 00:25:05,556 Speaker 1: fascinating sections of your Ten Lessons book was about the 422 00:25:05,636 --> 00:25:09,436 Speaker 1: question of decline, and you quoted the late grade political 423 00:25:09,436 --> 00:25:13,516 Speaker 1: scientists Samuel Huntington, always controversial but also always saying something 424 00:25:13,516 --> 00:25:16,476 Speaker 1: that made everybody think on the idea of there being 425 00:25:16,796 --> 00:25:20,396 Speaker 1: moments of declinism in US history, and his moments when 426 00:25:20,436 --> 00:25:22,796 Speaker 1: he was writing were mostly moments of the late sixties 427 00:25:23,156 --> 00:25:26,076 Speaker 1: through the middle seventies. And you note that we might 428 00:25:26,116 --> 00:25:29,676 Speaker 1: be in another moment of declinism. Huntington, as you point out, 429 00:25:30,156 --> 00:25:32,396 Speaker 1: use this phrase to say, we're not really declining. People 430 00:25:32,436 --> 00:25:35,836 Speaker 1: just think we're declining. You're more measured in the book, 431 00:25:36,316 --> 00:25:38,196 Speaker 1: and you say, look, this might be a moment of 432 00:25:38,316 --> 00:25:41,716 Speaker 1: declinism where without actual decline, or it may actually be 433 00:25:41,756 --> 00:25:45,036 Speaker 1: a moment of decline. I'm wondering how that plays into 434 00:25:45,036 --> 00:25:48,156 Speaker 1: the picture that you were describing, because the one difference 435 00:25:48,196 --> 00:25:51,316 Speaker 1: between now and those other times is that there really 436 00:25:51,396 --> 00:25:55,076 Speaker 1: is another power, namely China, that is in a position 437 00:25:55,196 --> 00:25:58,676 Speaker 1: to share a substantial part of the power that the 438 00:25:58,756 --> 00:26:02,316 Speaker 1: US has had now. That existed during the Soviet period, 439 00:26:02,356 --> 00:26:05,236 Speaker 1: of course, but over time it dwindled, and one of 440 00:26:05,236 --> 00:26:07,476 Speaker 1: the reasons the US didn't decline is that the Soviet 441 00:26:07,556 --> 00:26:12,276 Speaker 1: Union declined faster and then disappeared. This time around, China 442 00:26:12,356 --> 00:26:13,956 Speaker 1: is not in a moment of the client's in a 443 00:26:13,956 --> 00:26:16,836 Speaker 1: moment of rise. And so I'm wondering if you think 444 00:26:16,876 --> 00:26:21,596 Speaker 1: that relative to China, we are inevitably somewhat declining, and 445 00:26:21,636 --> 00:26:24,796 Speaker 1: that that's a reason to push this kind of legacy 446 00:26:24,796 --> 00:26:28,316 Speaker 1: issue that you're describing, the international order, which after all, 447 00:26:28,476 --> 00:26:30,716 Speaker 1: was created in part because it was good for the US, 448 00:26:31,676 --> 00:26:34,756 Speaker 1: and which now maybe is still good for the US 449 00:26:34,796 --> 00:26:38,956 Speaker 1: as well. Yeah, I mean, it's a fascinating question. So 450 00:26:39,156 --> 00:26:41,716 Speaker 1: where I find myself coming out is when you look 451 00:26:41,756 --> 00:26:45,636 Speaker 1: at America, you cannot help but notice it. It's a 452 00:26:45,796 --> 00:26:49,116 Speaker 1: very complicated country, and the answer to a question is 453 00:26:49,156 --> 00:26:52,476 Speaker 1: going to be necessarily complicated. There are areas where the 454 00:26:52,556 --> 00:26:56,516 Speaker 1: United States is incredibly inventive and dominates the world like 455 00:26:57,156 --> 00:27:00,316 Speaker 1: frankly no other country of our hats think about big tech. 456 00:27:00,836 --> 00:27:03,116 Speaker 1: If you went back to the nineteen seventies and said 457 00:27:03,156 --> 00:27:05,716 Speaker 1: what country dominates the world of technology? It would have 458 00:27:05,716 --> 00:27:08,556 Speaker 1: been a complicated question because the Germans, you know, still 459 00:27:08,556 --> 00:27:12,036 Speaker 1: we're doing very well. The Dutch in areas like the 460 00:27:12,196 --> 00:27:15,836 Speaker 1: Phillips and consumer electronics, we're doing very well today. The 461 00:27:15,916 --> 00:27:19,516 Speaker 1: big technology companies in the world or all American or Chinese, 462 00:27:19,556 --> 00:27:22,636 Speaker 1: but the American ones, I think I still have a lead, 463 00:27:23,396 --> 00:27:27,756 Speaker 1: and that reality is, you know, one that does not 464 00:27:28,036 --> 00:27:32,036 Speaker 1: seem likely to go away anytime soon. On the other hand, 465 00:27:32,556 --> 00:27:36,116 Speaker 1: in terms of you know, the quality of life for 466 00:27:36,196 --> 00:27:41,196 Speaker 1: average Americans, median wages, social mobility, all kinds of metrics 467 00:27:41,236 --> 00:27:44,996 Speaker 1: like child mortality, the United States does wigh worse than 468 00:27:45,076 --> 00:27:49,676 Speaker 1: most European countries, certainly worse than all Northern European countries, 469 00:27:49,916 --> 00:27:53,436 Speaker 1: and increasingly worse than places like Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea. 470 00:27:53,836 --> 00:27:57,476 Speaker 1: So you know, how to conjure up in America that 471 00:27:58,476 --> 00:28:02,676 Speaker 1: conveys that full picture difficult. But that's why I rest 472 00:28:02,796 --> 00:28:05,916 Speaker 1: my argument here or less on where America is in 473 00:28:06,036 --> 00:28:08,876 Speaker 1: terms of how well it's doing, more in terms of 474 00:28:09,156 --> 00:28:11,356 Speaker 1: how the rest of the world is doing. I think 475 00:28:11,396 --> 00:28:14,156 Speaker 1: it's fair to say that whatever you may think of 476 00:28:14,356 --> 00:28:19,476 Speaker 1: how America is doing, Singapore is doing ten times better 477 00:28:19,516 --> 00:28:21,916 Speaker 1: than it was twenty five years ago. In South Korea 478 00:28:22,076 --> 00:28:26,996 Speaker 1: and Indonesia, and India and Chile are all leaps and 479 00:28:27,036 --> 00:28:29,676 Speaker 1: bounds further ahead than they were. And of course the 480 00:28:29,836 --> 00:28:32,796 Speaker 1: number one country in that regard is China. As I say, 481 00:28:32,836 --> 00:28:36,036 Speaker 1: one percent of global GDP twenty years ago, fifteen percent 482 00:28:36,116 --> 00:28:40,436 Speaker 1: now almost inevitably rising to twenty percent in the next 483 00:28:40,476 --> 00:28:42,636 Speaker 1: five to seven years. I would say, you know, seven 484 00:28:42,716 --> 00:28:46,156 Speaker 1: years would be a reasonable number, and in that sense, 485 00:28:47,396 --> 00:28:52,076 Speaker 1: in relative terms, it would be astonishing of the United 486 00:28:52,116 --> 00:28:55,076 Speaker 1: States did not decline a little, not a lot. I mean, 487 00:28:55,116 --> 00:28:58,996 Speaker 1: the truth is, the USS stayed roughly constant for the 488 00:28:59,076 --> 00:29:02,436 Speaker 1: last twenty or thirty years. It's been sort of between 489 00:29:02,516 --> 00:29:06,156 Speaker 1: twenty and twenty five percent of world economy. The Chinese 490 00:29:06,636 --> 00:29:10,196 Speaker 1: have gone up, largely at Europe's expense. The country that 491 00:29:10,276 --> 00:29:14,236 Speaker 1: has the countries that have declined in those terms, but 492 00:29:14,356 --> 00:29:16,316 Speaker 1: the US has also declined a bit. I mean, it 493 00:29:16,356 --> 00:29:19,236 Speaker 1: was closer to twenty five, it's now closer to twenty. 494 00:29:19,276 --> 00:29:22,356 Speaker 1: It's likely I think they'll go down to eighteen something 495 00:29:22,396 --> 00:29:25,916 Speaker 1: like that. So I do think that there is a 496 00:29:25,996 --> 00:29:29,996 Speaker 1: reality here, and the larger reality is also one of 497 00:29:30,316 --> 00:29:35,236 Speaker 1: political confidence, of cultural pride, of a sense you know. 498 00:29:35,276 --> 00:29:37,676 Speaker 1: One of the things that I've always been struck by 499 00:29:37,756 --> 00:29:40,476 Speaker 1: is the degree to which American culture, which used to 500 00:29:40,556 --> 00:29:44,476 Speaker 1: dominate the world completely, just does not anymore. When you 501 00:29:44,556 --> 00:29:46,436 Speaker 1: go to mean, if you go to China, there is 502 00:29:46,516 --> 00:29:49,676 Speaker 1: essentially unknown. I mean, there are five American rock singers, 503 00:29:49,836 --> 00:29:52,756 Speaker 1: rock stars who are known, and then everything else is Chinese. 504 00:29:52,756 --> 00:29:55,396 Speaker 1: But even those, you know, Britney Spears or Beyonce or 505 00:29:55,716 --> 00:29:58,436 Speaker 1: Jay Z, whoever you have, these are like number forty 506 00:29:58,596 --> 00:30:03,356 Speaker 1: in China. But that's increasingly true everywhere. South Korean television 507 00:30:03,396 --> 00:30:08,156 Speaker 1: shows dominate East Asia much more than American television shows too, 508 00:30:08,476 --> 00:30:12,636 Speaker 1: So that maybe one kind of soft indication of what 509 00:30:12,676 --> 00:30:15,436 Speaker 1: I'm describing. But I really do think that it's this 510 00:30:15,716 --> 00:30:19,116 Speaker 1: rise of the rest that is the dominating force here, 511 00:30:19,236 --> 00:30:21,996 Speaker 1: not so much the decline of America. But to put 512 00:30:22,036 --> 00:30:25,236 Speaker 1: it in terms that you were asking, quite rightly, it 513 00:30:25,276 --> 00:30:28,916 Speaker 1: does mean a certain kind of relative decline. Even if 514 00:30:28,956 --> 00:30:33,876 Speaker 1: the raw numbers show a small decline, there's a similar 515 00:30:33,956 --> 00:30:37,756 Speaker 1: moment in many of these countries. I think we'll be 516 00:30:37,836 --> 00:30:50,516 Speaker 1: right back, Freed. I want to ask you a question 517 00:30:50,596 --> 00:30:53,836 Speaker 1: that I hear frequently from what I would call the 518 00:30:53,956 --> 00:31:00,756 Speaker 1: critical left that looks at international order, looks at liberal 519 00:31:00,756 --> 00:31:06,356 Speaker 1: internationalism and says that when it works, it just benefits 520 00:31:06,396 --> 00:31:14,356 Speaker 1: global elites, that it facilitates trade and facilitates great accumulations 521 00:31:14,396 --> 00:31:17,436 Speaker 1: of wealth. And yes, if you push people, they will say, yes, 522 00:31:17,476 --> 00:31:19,556 Speaker 1: it's very nice that so many Chinese people came out 523 00:31:19,596 --> 00:31:22,436 Speaker 1: of poverty. But they say that happened at the expense 524 00:31:22,476 --> 00:31:26,076 Speaker 1: of the loss of middle class jobs in the United States. 525 00:31:26,996 --> 00:31:29,556 Speaker 1: And so one of the lines of criticism of the 526 00:31:29,596 --> 00:31:32,276 Speaker 1: liberal international order is that it hasn't actually serve the 527 00:31:32,316 --> 00:31:35,756 Speaker 1: interests of ordinary Americans, of middle class and working class Americans, 528 00:31:36,596 --> 00:31:41,236 Speaker 1: and that therefore, in that approach, continued adherence to it 529 00:31:41,276 --> 00:31:43,716 Speaker 1: with ideas that you and I tend to like, like 530 00:31:44,196 --> 00:31:48,516 Speaker 1: free trade countries participating in an international order for intellectual 531 00:31:48,556 --> 00:31:52,476 Speaker 1: property and so forth, is actually not in the long 532 00:31:52,556 --> 00:31:56,516 Speaker 1: term interests of ordinary Americans that we need something different, 533 00:31:56,676 --> 00:32:00,876 Speaker 1: perhaps a little bit more populist, less globalist, less focused 534 00:32:00,916 --> 00:32:03,476 Speaker 1: on the idea of trade, and a little bit less 535 00:32:03,476 --> 00:32:06,356 Speaker 1: worried about the fact that we can, through this model, 536 00:32:06,716 --> 00:32:08,596 Speaker 1: enable poor people in other places in the world to 537 00:32:08,636 --> 00:32:13,276 Speaker 1: get richer, more concerned about taking care of ourselves. So, first, 538 00:32:13,316 --> 00:32:16,276 Speaker 1: I think it is worth noting the irony of a 539 00:32:16,396 --> 00:32:19,756 Speaker 1: movement of people who central claim is that they are 540 00:32:20,356 --> 00:32:26,156 Speaker 1: most concerned about human poverty, essentially being against a process 541 00:32:26,196 --> 00:32:30,556 Speaker 1: that has taken the poorest of the poor, the you know, 542 00:32:30,596 --> 00:32:34,076 Speaker 1: the people living on one dollar a day and move 543 00:32:34,196 --> 00:32:36,316 Speaker 1: them up. You know, it's easy to regard this as 544 00:32:36,316 --> 00:32:38,716 Speaker 1: an abstraction. I grew up in India. When you went 545 00:32:38,756 --> 00:32:42,476 Speaker 1: into my father was a politician. Much of his constituency 546 00:32:42,596 --> 00:32:46,196 Speaker 1: was rural. When you go into rural India even today, 547 00:32:46,276 --> 00:32:49,556 Speaker 1: but twenty five years ago, I mean, there are people 548 00:32:49,596 --> 00:32:55,316 Speaker 1: living there in medieval poverty. And so the idea that 549 00:32:55,396 --> 00:32:57,596 Speaker 1: this is something to be scoffed at or to be 550 00:32:57,676 --> 00:33:01,156 Speaker 1: taken lightly, you know, this is extraordinary. Five hundred million 551 00:33:01,196 --> 00:33:05,396 Speaker 1: people moved from that kind of poverty into a more 552 00:33:05,436 --> 00:33:07,996 Speaker 1: decent circumstance. You know, three four dollars a day. But 553 00:33:08,116 --> 00:33:10,276 Speaker 1: I will say, the right wing populist seven don't have 554 00:33:10,276 --> 00:33:13,116 Speaker 1: that worry about hypocrisy. I agree that part has to 555 00:33:13,156 --> 00:33:14,876 Speaker 1: deal with that, but if you're a Trump supporter, you 556 00:33:14,916 --> 00:33:17,476 Speaker 1: can skip over that part, right, you don't care. But 557 00:33:17,476 --> 00:33:19,716 Speaker 1: but I think it's weird that Bernie Sanders, you know, 558 00:33:19,756 --> 00:33:23,476 Speaker 1: the man of Workers of the World Unite, doesn't seem 559 00:33:23,516 --> 00:33:27,276 Speaker 1: to notice this extraordinary benefit that trade and globalization has 560 00:33:27,316 --> 00:33:31,716 Speaker 1: produced for hundreds and hundreds of millions of incredibly poor 561 00:33:31,716 --> 00:33:34,636 Speaker 1: people all over the world. It is true, I will 562 00:33:34,716 --> 00:33:38,316 Speaker 1: I will not pretend that there is no connection between 563 00:33:38,356 --> 00:33:43,356 Speaker 1: globalization and what has happened to middle class wages in 564 00:33:43,836 --> 00:33:46,636 Speaker 1: the Western world and in the United States in particular. 565 00:33:47,276 --> 00:33:49,356 Speaker 1: It is not the whole story, as you well know, 566 00:33:49,836 --> 00:33:52,596 Speaker 1: a large part of it when economists do the math. 567 00:33:52,716 --> 00:33:57,356 Speaker 1: A large part of that story is manufacturing has become automated. 568 00:33:57,756 --> 00:34:00,956 Speaker 1: If you look at America's manufacturing output, it has gone 569 00:34:01,036 --> 00:34:02,956 Speaker 1: up and up and up over the last twenty years. 570 00:34:03,076 --> 00:34:06,076 Speaker 1: It's just with fewer and fewer and fewer workers. So 571 00:34:06,076 --> 00:34:08,516 Speaker 1: when people keep saying we're going to bring back manufacturing 572 00:34:08,556 --> 00:34:10,876 Speaker 1: to the United says you can bring it back all 573 00:34:10,876 --> 00:34:13,956 Speaker 1: you want. What you're bringing back is highly automated plans 574 00:34:13,956 --> 00:34:16,796 Speaker 1: where very few workers work, and where the people who 575 00:34:16,836 --> 00:34:20,796 Speaker 1: work are essentially advanced software engineers, you know, kind of 576 00:34:20,876 --> 00:34:25,236 Speaker 1: running the plan. So there is that problem, but globalization 577 00:34:25,316 --> 00:34:27,716 Speaker 1: plays some part in it, there's no question, and China 578 00:34:27,756 --> 00:34:31,436 Speaker 1: plays a large part in that story. I have always 579 00:34:31,556 --> 00:34:34,636 Speaker 1: felt about this the way I do about domestic economics. 580 00:34:34,636 --> 00:34:37,476 Speaker 1: And again, I grew up in India socialist economy, and 581 00:34:37,476 --> 00:34:43,316 Speaker 1: so maybe I'm colored by that experience of watching a dysfunctional, decaying, stagnant, 582 00:34:43,316 --> 00:34:47,756 Speaker 1: corrupt system. There's no question that the market provides much 583 00:34:47,836 --> 00:34:52,796 Speaker 1: greater efficiency, much greater vitality, allows for innovation, allows for 584 00:34:52,956 --> 00:34:56,956 Speaker 1: the generation of growth. There's also no question that markets 585 00:34:56,996 --> 00:34:59,716 Speaker 1: need to be regulated and some of their profits need 586 00:34:59,796 --> 00:35:03,756 Speaker 1: to be taken and redistributed to provide greater opportunities for people. 587 00:35:04,116 --> 00:35:06,796 Speaker 1: I think the biggest mistake we've made with regard to 588 00:35:06,836 --> 00:35:11,116 Speaker 1: trade over the last fifty years is we keep saying that, oh, yes, 589 00:35:11,156 --> 00:35:13,276 Speaker 1: you know, whether we know there are winners and losers 590 00:35:13,356 --> 00:35:15,716 Speaker 1: in trade, and we need to make sure that we 591 00:35:15,876 --> 00:35:19,196 Speaker 1: help the losers adjust, and then we never do it. 592 00:35:19,556 --> 00:35:22,636 Speaker 1: There's never any money spent it seems to me this 593 00:35:22,716 --> 00:35:26,396 Speaker 1: is obviously the right answer, which is you keep the 594 00:35:26,476 --> 00:35:30,636 Speaker 1: motor that generates the dynamism and the wealth and the innovation, 595 00:35:31,156 --> 00:35:35,796 Speaker 1: but you use the proceeds, the rewards to really try 596 00:35:35,796 --> 00:35:40,556 Speaker 1: to bolster economic opportunity to really help people move up. 597 00:35:40,996 --> 00:35:45,156 Speaker 1: Places like Denmark Sweden do this very well, even Germany, 598 00:35:45,396 --> 00:35:47,636 Speaker 1: which is why they have not had as much of 599 00:35:47,676 --> 00:35:51,196 Speaker 1: a decline of their manufacturing sectors or as much of 600 00:35:51,236 --> 00:35:53,596 Speaker 1: a decline of their jobs. So it seems to me 601 00:35:53,956 --> 00:35:58,076 Speaker 1: the answer is not to go in a Trumpian populist direction, 602 00:35:58,516 --> 00:36:02,836 Speaker 1: but in a more social democratic European direction. Social democracy 603 00:36:02,916 --> 00:36:06,316 Speaker 1: properly understood Northern Europe is very free market. In fact, 604 00:36:06,356 --> 00:36:10,396 Speaker 1: in the Heritage Foundations Index of Economic free Denmark and 605 00:36:10,476 --> 00:36:13,396 Speaker 1: Sweden rank higher than the United States because they're more 606 00:36:13,436 --> 00:36:16,716 Speaker 1: free trade that they actually don't have that much regulation, 607 00:36:17,076 --> 00:36:20,356 Speaker 1: but they take that money and they spend it on 608 00:36:20,516 --> 00:36:25,076 Speaker 1: the poor, onequality economic opportunity. That seems to me the 609 00:36:25,156 --> 00:36:31,156 Speaker 1: answer when a country is economically powerful that does have 610 00:36:31,236 --> 00:36:35,636 Speaker 1: a tendency, not universally, but to create more economic opportunity 611 00:36:35,636 --> 00:36:38,236 Speaker 1: and therefore more opportunity for well being for ordinary citizens, 612 00:36:38,436 --> 00:36:41,636 Speaker 1: especially if they do the kind of Nordic redistribution that 613 00:36:41,676 --> 00:36:47,076 Speaker 1: you're describing. What about geopolitical power? Is there any real 614 00:36:47,116 --> 00:36:50,196 Speaker 1: reason to believe in this day and age that a 615 00:36:50,196 --> 00:36:55,716 Speaker 1: country's capacity to exert its will globally necessarily serves the 616 00:36:55,796 --> 00:36:58,996 Speaker 1: interests of ordinary citizens. You know. Trump seemed to think 617 00:36:59,036 --> 00:37:02,596 Speaker 1: that it just didn't matter to ordinary Americans if the 618 00:37:02,676 --> 00:37:06,116 Speaker 1: United States could exert its will globally, because it wouldn't 619 00:37:06,116 --> 00:37:08,516 Speaker 1: translate into jobs, and it wouldn't translate into anything that 620 00:37:08,516 --> 00:37:11,236 Speaker 1: would affect their pocketbook, and wouldn't translate into their daily 621 00:37:11,796 --> 00:37:16,996 Speaker 1: well being. And in contrast, a lot of liberal internationalists, 622 00:37:17,036 --> 00:37:20,956 Speaker 1: myself included, tend to assume that there are benefits to 623 00:37:21,076 --> 00:37:25,996 Speaker 1: all Americans knowing that, let's say, our values can be 624 00:37:26,036 --> 00:37:29,756 Speaker 1: expressed globally, that international institutions that we help design to 625 00:37:29,796 --> 00:37:33,476 Speaker 1: serve our own interests are out there and are functioning 626 00:37:33,516 --> 00:37:35,836 Speaker 1: in the world. But I'm not sure that we've necessarily 627 00:37:35,836 --> 00:37:39,036 Speaker 1: done a very good job of translating that into concrete 628 00:37:39,156 --> 00:37:42,876 Speaker 1: terms for ordinary people. Yeah, the Trump argument is sort of, 629 00:37:43,156 --> 00:37:46,436 Speaker 1: I don't see cash coming into my pocket by doing this, 630 00:37:46,556 --> 00:37:49,436 Speaker 1: so obviously the whole thing is a scam, and therefore 631 00:37:49,476 --> 00:37:52,476 Speaker 1: what we should just do is you know, Drum would 632 00:37:52,476 --> 00:37:55,476 Speaker 1: literally say this, even no matter how illogical it was, 633 00:37:55,636 --> 00:37:59,076 Speaker 1: we should just charge the Chinese for this, or charge 634 00:37:59,156 --> 00:38:03,196 Speaker 1: the Saudist to defend them, or you know, things like that. 635 00:38:03,956 --> 00:38:06,836 Speaker 1: The truth is, I think is a much stronger case 636 00:38:06,956 --> 00:38:11,276 Speaker 1: to be made that the kind of world that the 637 00:38:11,356 --> 00:38:15,556 Speaker 1: United States has created is profoundly in the interests of 638 00:38:15,556 --> 00:38:19,676 Speaker 1: an ordinary American. First of all, it produces peace, It 639 00:38:19,716 --> 00:38:25,076 Speaker 1: produces stability, It produces more general prosperity, a more general 640 00:38:25,116 --> 00:38:28,596 Speaker 1: adherence to rules and norms, all of which is great 641 00:38:28,636 --> 00:38:31,636 Speaker 1: if you are a rich, powerful country that you know 642 00:38:31,676 --> 00:38:35,196 Speaker 1: already has lots of things that you don't want war, 643 00:38:35,316 --> 00:38:38,676 Speaker 1: you don't want revolution, you don't want massive chaos all 644 00:38:38,676 --> 00:38:41,396 Speaker 1: over the world. And as you say, there is a 645 00:38:41,436 --> 00:38:47,676 Speaker 1: certain benefit that we get from having regular open trade 646 00:38:47,756 --> 00:38:51,476 Speaker 1: by having you know, democratic societies around the world observe 647 00:38:51,556 --> 00:38:54,876 Speaker 1: the rule of law, observe human rights. Because we're the 648 00:38:54,916 --> 00:38:57,596 Speaker 1: ones who are most more likely than not to interact, 649 00:38:57,636 --> 00:39:00,876 Speaker 1: to travel, to trade. I think that the sort of 650 00:39:00,956 --> 00:39:04,716 Speaker 1: central challenge we face that's more substantive, and this goes 651 00:39:04,756 --> 00:39:08,916 Speaker 1: back to, you know, where we started is can we 652 00:39:09,236 --> 00:39:15,076 Speaker 1: build a liberal international order in which we also adhere 653 00:39:15,116 --> 00:39:18,196 Speaker 1: to the rules more. You know, there's a certain tension 654 00:39:18,276 --> 00:39:21,556 Speaker 1: here where we tend to think we're the guys organizing 655 00:39:21,596 --> 00:39:25,036 Speaker 1: the whole system, so we can we can be expected 656 00:39:25,076 --> 00:39:29,316 Speaker 1: to live by these rules. So when we criticize China 657 00:39:29,556 --> 00:39:33,676 Speaker 1: for excessive involvement in the South China Sea in violation 658 00:39:33,756 --> 00:39:36,716 Speaker 1: of the Law of the Seas Treaty, nobody points out 659 00:39:36,836 --> 00:39:40,636 Speaker 1: the US is not itself a signatory to the Law 660 00:39:40,676 --> 00:39:43,956 Speaker 1: of the CIA's treaty. When we talk about war crimes again, 661 00:39:44,036 --> 00:39:46,796 Speaker 1: you know, and we accuse dictators of war crimes, what 662 00:39:46,916 --> 00:39:48,796 Speaker 1: we are implying is that they're going to be taken 663 00:39:48,836 --> 00:39:51,396 Speaker 1: to the International Criminal Court in the Hague, and we 664 00:39:51,396 --> 00:39:54,036 Speaker 1: don't point out we are not a signatory to the 665 00:39:54,076 --> 00:39:57,396 Speaker 1: International Criminal Court. You know, when we talk about these 666 00:39:57,396 --> 00:40:00,676 Speaker 1: tariffs or these unfair trade practices, the Chinese have a 667 00:40:02,316 --> 00:40:05,596 Speaker 1: couple of good accounts have tallied up the number of 668 00:40:05,636 --> 00:40:09,836 Speaker 1: protectionist measures enacted by any country. The US is off 669 00:40:09,836 --> 00:40:13,196 Speaker 1: the charts. We're number one by far. So it seems 670 00:40:13,236 --> 00:40:17,956 Speaker 1: to me our challenges can we find a way to 671 00:40:18,036 --> 00:40:23,156 Speaker 1: also adhere to these rules and norms more, because that 672 00:40:23,356 --> 00:40:25,876 Speaker 1: is going to be a more compelling argument as to 673 00:40:25,916 --> 00:40:28,316 Speaker 1: why the Chinese need to do it as well. You 674 00:40:28,396 --> 00:40:31,476 Speaker 1: put it very correctly. You know, the start of the show, 675 00:40:31,516 --> 00:40:34,036 Speaker 1: you said, the Chinese really are not trying to be 676 00:40:34,076 --> 00:40:37,116 Speaker 1: the Soviet Union in nineteen sixty. What they're trying to 677 00:40:37,116 --> 00:40:40,596 Speaker 1: be is the United States in nineteen ninety five or 678 00:40:40,596 --> 00:40:44,076 Speaker 1: two thousand and five, and say, we're big enough now that, yeah, 679 00:40:44,196 --> 00:40:48,236 Speaker 1: mostly will follow the rules. But whenever we feel like 680 00:40:48,276 --> 00:40:50,196 Speaker 1: we don't want to follow the rules, we're big enough 681 00:40:50,196 --> 00:40:52,996 Speaker 1: that we don't need to. And Exhibit A is the 682 00:40:53,036 --> 00:40:56,436 Speaker 1: United States of America. I want to close for Reid 683 00:40:56,716 --> 00:41:01,236 Speaker 1: with a challenge that is enormous to everybody and also 684 00:41:01,316 --> 00:41:04,396 Speaker 1: important to everybody, and that can't be solved without very 685 00:41:04,396 --> 00:41:08,076 Speaker 1: sophisticated deployment of global power. And that's a climate. Pretty 686 00:41:08,156 --> 00:41:09,836 Speaker 1: much every country in the world now is prepared to 687 00:41:09,876 --> 00:41:12,556 Speaker 1: say that we need to reduce emissions in order to 688 00:41:12,596 --> 00:41:17,836 Speaker 1: maintain the global temperature, but the collective action problem remains 689 00:41:18,276 --> 00:41:23,316 Speaker 1: just so difficult to overcome. How do you think about 690 00:41:23,356 --> 00:41:25,796 Speaker 1: the right approach to that? How should the Biden administration 691 00:41:25,876 --> 00:41:28,716 Speaker 1: be thinking about what it can realistically do, because this 692 00:41:28,756 --> 00:41:30,636 Speaker 1: is one of those cases where the ideals are shared. 693 00:41:31,116 --> 00:41:34,036 Speaker 1: The problem is in the practical realities of getting people 694 00:41:34,076 --> 00:41:38,556 Speaker 1: to overcome their own impulses to develop their economies. So 695 00:41:38,596 --> 00:41:41,516 Speaker 1: it's the perfect example of why I think we should 696 00:41:41,516 --> 00:41:43,716 Speaker 1: not go down a path of a cold war with China, 697 00:41:43,876 --> 00:41:47,196 Speaker 1: because you know, you would have the two most powerful 698 00:41:47,236 --> 00:41:50,596 Speaker 1: economies in the world that would be engaged in a 699 00:41:50,796 --> 00:41:55,076 Speaker 1: ceaseless competition. And the central danger, the central cost, it 700 00:41:55,116 --> 00:41:57,756 Speaker 1: seems to me, is that we will not be able 701 00:41:57,916 --> 00:42:01,676 Speaker 1: to cooperate on issues where we need to cooperate. And 702 00:42:01,796 --> 00:42:04,156 Speaker 1: the number one there's climate. You know, if you really 703 00:42:04,196 --> 00:42:07,756 Speaker 1: do believe the climate is the existential challenge that we 704 00:42:07,796 --> 00:42:10,476 Speaker 1: need to face up to, you can't do it without 705 00:42:10,476 --> 00:42:14,076 Speaker 1: the United States and China in some measure of cooperation. 706 00:42:14,756 --> 00:42:18,116 Speaker 1: This is a problem that actually heart power is very 707 00:42:18,156 --> 00:42:21,796 Speaker 1: poorly designed to solve because the United States is not 708 00:42:21,876 --> 00:42:24,516 Speaker 1: going to be able to force countries to do things 709 00:42:24,516 --> 00:42:27,556 Speaker 1: that are not in its self interest. Right. If you 710 00:42:27,596 --> 00:42:30,116 Speaker 1: look at a country like India that is essentially building 711 00:42:30,116 --> 00:42:33,636 Speaker 1: a coal five power plant almost every couple of weeks, still, 712 00:42:34,516 --> 00:42:37,716 Speaker 1: what is going to make India stop doing that is 713 00:42:38,116 --> 00:42:42,436 Speaker 1: two things. One, there has to be some economic logic 714 00:42:42,916 --> 00:42:46,876 Speaker 1: that makes sense for India, some kind of financing structure 715 00:42:47,316 --> 00:42:51,316 Speaker 1: which allows it to buy slightly more expensive energy. And 716 00:42:51,396 --> 00:42:55,116 Speaker 1: the second is a regime of global norms and values 717 00:42:55,396 --> 00:42:59,076 Speaker 1: and rules which say this is really not okay, and 718 00:42:59,156 --> 00:43:01,676 Speaker 1: you would pay a certain price, even if it's an 719 00:43:01,676 --> 00:43:04,196 Speaker 1: intelligible price, even if it's a kind of normative price. 720 00:43:04,516 --> 00:43:07,196 Speaker 1: So you'd need those two things to happen, And for 721 00:43:07,636 --> 00:43:10,196 Speaker 1: both of those things to happen, you need the United 722 00:43:10,236 --> 00:43:13,876 Speaker 1: States and China on the same side to generate those norms, 723 00:43:13,956 --> 00:43:16,796 Speaker 1: to generate the financing, because otherwise what's going to happen 724 00:43:17,116 --> 00:43:21,036 Speaker 1: is the Chinese will provide financing for dirty energy, which 725 00:43:21,116 --> 00:43:23,356 Speaker 1: is what a lot of the Belton Road initiative is, 726 00:43:23,596 --> 00:43:27,396 Speaker 1: we will provide financing for clean energy. Again, this will 727 00:43:27,396 --> 00:43:30,316 Speaker 1: all get caught up in the more of competition. So 728 00:43:31,156 --> 00:43:34,596 Speaker 1: it feels to me like there's no way to do 729 00:43:34,636 --> 00:43:38,836 Speaker 1: this without some substantial degree of cooperation between the United 730 00:43:38,876 --> 00:43:41,596 Speaker 1: States and China. Europe is already on board. So when 731 00:43:41,596 --> 00:43:43,716 Speaker 1: you add that all up, you're talking about sixty five 732 00:43:44,116 --> 00:43:48,516 Speaker 1: seventy percent of the world economy. But it seems to 733 00:43:48,516 --> 00:43:50,596 Speaker 1: me that there's a larger issue, which is, you know, 734 00:43:50,796 --> 00:43:53,676 Speaker 1: is there a way for us to find these kind 735 00:43:53,716 --> 00:43:57,956 Speaker 1: of areas of common opportunity and to say to ourselves, look, 736 00:43:57,956 --> 00:44:01,516 Speaker 1: there is a reality of common humanity. Are there ways 737 00:44:01,556 --> 00:44:04,196 Speaker 1: we can try to solve these common you know, these 738 00:44:04,196 --> 00:44:08,596 Speaker 1: common challenges. It has always been America's historical legacy that 739 00:44:08,716 --> 00:44:11,236 Speaker 1: we have been able to do this. Maybe it's because 740 00:44:11,236 --> 00:44:14,036 Speaker 1: I'm an immigrant. I do think one of the distinctive 741 00:44:14,076 --> 00:44:16,916 Speaker 1: features about America is we think about our national interests 742 00:44:17,036 --> 00:44:19,916 Speaker 1: like every other country in the world, but we also 743 00:44:20,076 --> 00:44:24,596 Speaker 1: think about broader global interests, and we try to expense 744 00:44:24,676 --> 00:44:27,676 Speaker 1: some power and some resources in doing that. So if 745 00:44:27,716 --> 00:44:31,476 Speaker 1: you're going to say that's important, then it's you know, 746 00:44:31,516 --> 00:44:34,396 Speaker 1: it's crucial that we not end up with a foreign 747 00:44:34,436 --> 00:44:38,476 Speaker 1: policy that is solely defined around a kind of nationalist 748 00:44:38,516 --> 00:44:42,196 Speaker 1: competition against another country, no matter what country, because that 749 00:44:42,876 --> 00:44:45,876 Speaker 1: has never been the American way. The American way has 750 00:44:45,876 --> 00:44:48,716 Speaker 1: been to try to create a better world, not simply 751 00:44:48,756 --> 00:44:52,196 Speaker 1: to keep one country down, no matter how problematic that 752 00:44:52,276 --> 00:44:56,396 Speaker 1: country is. Freed I want to thank you for your very, 753 00:44:56,516 --> 00:45:00,236 Speaker 1: very coach intend sophisticated analysis that's tremendously valuable to all 754 00:45:00,236 --> 00:45:01,916 Speaker 1: of us who try to think about these issues. Thank 755 00:45:01,956 --> 00:45:04,476 Speaker 1: you so much. Now, this is a huge pleasure. Thank 756 00:45:04,516 --> 00:45:15,716 Speaker 1: you Listening to Farid's fascinating analysis really brought home the 757 00:45:15,836 --> 00:45:19,116 Speaker 1: depth to which a foreign policy thinker like Farid has 758 00:45:19,116 --> 00:45:22,556 Speaker 1: to go in order to produce the analysis and the 759 00:45:22,636 --> 00:45:26,836 Speaker 1: suggestions that go into much of his public commentary. Behind 760 00:45:26,996 --> 00:45:32,916 Speaker 1: Fred's analysis lies a complex worldview that sees a combination 761 00:45:33,196 --> 00:45:38,076 Speaker 1: of foreign policy realism and foreign policy idealism as components 762 00:45:38,116 --> 00:45:42,356 Speaker 1: of how the United States approaches power and politics. In 763 00:45:42,356 --> 00:45:45,636 Speaker 1: an important sense, Farid is a globalist. He cares a 764 00:45:45,676 --> 00:45:48,596 Speaker 1: lot about how people all over the world are conducting 765 00:45:48,636 --> 00:45:52,836 Speaker 1: their lives and are trying to improve them. He credits 766 00:45:52,916 --> 00:45:56,996 Speaker 1: China with extraordinary efforts to raise people out of poverty, 767 00:45:57,396 --> 00:45:59,996 Speaker 1: even as he is concerned about the lack of freedoms 768 00:46:00,156 --> 00:46:03,356 Speaker 1: that China extends to its own citizens and the ways 769 00:46:03,436 --> 00:46:07,036 Speaker 1: in which It's built and road initiative limit and constrain 770 00:46:07,396 --> 00:46:11,916 Speaker 1: the freedom of countries with which it interacts. Freed does 771 00:46:11,996 --> 00:46:15,236 Speaker 1: believe that we are headed for a greater degree of 772 00:46:15,396 --> 00:46:19,036 Speaker 1: bipolar struggle between the US and China than we have 773 00:46:19,156 --> 00:46:24,316 Speaker 1: seen until now. Yet simultaneously he argues that while struggle 774 00:46:24,396 --> 00:46:28,476 Speaker 1: between the two may be inevitable, genuine conflict may be 775 00:46:28,636 --> 00:46:32,916 Speaker 1: controlled and constrained. He sees the United States as playing 776 00:46:32,956 --> 00:46:37,396 Speaker 1: a central role in the continuing international legal order, and 777 00:46:37,676 --> 00:46:40,356 Speaker 1: he hopes that the United States can, at the level 778 00:46:40,396 --> 00:46:44,956 Speaker 1: of its grandest strategy, still seek to constrain and limit 779 00:46:45,076 --> 00:46:48,556 Speaker 1: China and bring it into that order, requiring it to 780 00:46:48,596 --> 00:46:51,636 Speaker 1: the extent possible to follow the rules of the game 781 00:46:51,996 --> 00:46:57,036 Speaker 1: in order to be a constructive partner for the United States. Overall, 782 00:46:57,196 --> 00:47:02,636 Speaker 1: Freed's analysis remains optimistic about the capacities and possibilities of 783 00:47:02,636 --> 00:47:05,276 Speaker 1: the United States to continue to lead in a range 784 00:47:05,276 --> 00:47:08,196 Speaker 1: of different ways, even as it acknowledges the rise of 785 00:47:08,316 --> 00:47:12,956 Speaker 1: China and seeks to recognize a shifting set of global 786 00:47:12,996 --> 00:47:17,516 Speaker 1: power actors that go beyond just the handful of traditional 787 00:47:17,556 --> 00:47:21,516 Speaker 1: ones in the United States and in Western Europe. The 788 00:47:21,596 --> 00:47:24,436 Speaker 1: picture that emerged from our conversation is of a world 789 00:47:24,476 --> 00:47:28,916 Speaker 1: getting more complex by the minute, a world in which 790 00:47:29,156 --> 00:47:31,756 Speaker 1: no country can think that it has all of the 791 00:47:31,756 --> 00:47:35,036 Speaker 1: answers to the core problems of the future, and in which, 792 00:47:35,156 --> 00:47:39,236 Speaker 1: above all, on issues like climate, the world must work 793 00:47:39,316 --> 00:47:43,636 Speaker 1: together or all countries are going to reap the whirlwind. 794 00:47:44,876 --> 00:47:48,316 Speaker 1: I'm grateful that Farid agreed to go deep into his worldview, 795 00:47:48,676 --> 00:47:51,676 Speaker 1: and I learned a tremendous amount from listening to him. 796 00:47:52,276 --> 00:47:54,116 Speaker 1: Until the next time I speak to all of you, 797 00:47:54,796 --> 00:47:58,276 Speaker 1: be well, think deep thoughts, and have a little fun. 798 00:47:59,916 --> 00:48:02,996 Speaker 1: Deep Background is brought to you by Pushkin Industries. Our 799 00:48:02,996 --> 00:48:06,636 Speaker 1: producer is Mola Board, our engineer is Ben Talliday, and 800 00:48:06,676 --> 00:48:11,596 Speaker 1: our showrunner is Sophie Crane mckibbon. Editorial support from noahm Osband. 801 00:48:12,116 --> 00:48:15,516 Speaker 1: Theme music by Luis Gera at Pushkin. Thanks to Mia Lobell, 802 00:48:15,716 --> 00:48:20,516 Speaker 1: Julia Barton, Lydia Jeancott, Heather Fain, Carlie Migliori, Maggie Taylor, 803 00:48:20,636 --> 00:48:24,196 Speaker 1: Eric Sandler, and Jacob Weissberg. You can find me on 804 00:48:24,236 --> 00:48:27,036 Speaker 1: Twitter at Noah R. Feldman. I also write a column 805 00:48:27,036 --> 00:48:29,716 Speaker 1: for Bloomberg Opinion, which you can find at Bloomberg dot 806 00:48:29,756 --> 00:48:34,036 Speaker 1: com slash Feldman. To discover Bloomberg's original slate of podcasts, 807 00:48:34,276 --> 00:48:37,516 Speaker 1: go to Bloomberg dot com slash Podcasts, and if you 808 00:48:37,596 --> 00:48:40,236 Speaker 1: liked what you heard today, please write a review or 809 00:48:40,316 --> 00:48:43,276 Speaker 1: tell a friend This is Deep Background.