1 00:00:15,356 --> 00:00:22,036 Speaker 1: Pushkin from Pushkin Industries. This is Deep Background, the show 2 00:00:22,036 --> 00:00:24,956 Speaker 1: where we explore the stories behind the stories in the news. 3 00:00:25,436 --> 00:00:29,516 Speaker 1: I'm Noah Feldman. Today's episode is a little different than usual. 4 00:00:29,916 --> 00:00:33,876 Speaker 1: It's a conversation between me and one of my podcasting gods, 5 00:00:34,116 --> 00:00:37,556 Speaker 1: Malcolm Gladwell. Malcolm is the host of Revisionist History, which 6 00:00:37,596 --> 00:00:39,796 Speaker 1: is produced by the same company that produces this show. 7 00:00:40,756 --> 00:00:43,996 Speaker 1: About a year ago, Malcolm reported a story for Revisionist 8 00:00:44,036 --> 00:00:48,036 Speaker 1: History about a constitutional law professor named Michael Stokes Paulsen 9 00:00:48,436 --> 00:00:51,636 Speaker 1: who has this totally crazy theory the Texas has the 10 00:00:51,716 --> 00:00:54,956 Speaker 1: right to break into five states if it wants all 11 00:00:55,036 --> 00:00:58,156 Speaker 1: because the authors of the United States Constitution used a 12 00:00:58,236 --> 00:01:01,476 Speaker 1: semicolon in a certain way. Here's a clip from that 13 00:01:01,516 --> 00:01:04,796 Speaker 1: episode of Malcolm talking to Michael Paulson. I want to 14 00:01:04,796 --> 00:01:06,396 Speaker 1: find the full thing. By the way you can find 15 00:01:06,396 --> 00:01:09,756 Speaker 1: it in the Revisionist History feed. It's called Divide and Conquer. 16 00:01:10,316 --> 00:01:14,836 Speaker 1: Imagine a governor of Texas reads your law review article 17 00:01:14,916 --> 00:01:17,396 Speaker 1: and said, well, that's a funny enough premise as it is, 18 00:01:18,436 --> 00:01:21,756 Speaker 1: and says, okay, I want to I want to trigger it. Okay, 19 00:01:21,876 --> 00:01:24,756 Speaker 1: so walk me through how triggering might work in the 20 00:01:24,796 --> 00:01:29,516 Speaker 1: real world. Well imagining a real world where people take 21 00:01:29,756 --> 00:01:32,516 Speaker 1: law review articles seriously. It's a it's a good it's 22 00:01:32,516 --> 00:01:36,836 Speaker 1: a better real world. It's a better real world. All 23 00:01:36,876 --> 00:01:39,476 Speaker 1: we know is that Congress has granted its consent for 24 00:01:39,556 --> 00:01:42,556 Speaker 1: the sovereign state of Texas to do what it needs 25 00:01:42,556 --> 00:01:45,236 Speaker 1: to do. But the significant fact here is that given 26 00:01:45,236 --> 00:01:49,956 Speaker 1: that Congress has already granted its permission, the all that 27 00:01:49,996 --> 00:01:52,156 Speaker 1: has to happen is for Texas to get its act together. 28 00:01:52,436 --> 00:01:55,756 Speaker 1: It's up to Texas. So far, Texas has not done 29 00:01:55,796 --> 00:01:59,516 Speaker 1: anything with Michael Paulson's theory, but it still seems to 30 00:01:59,516 --> 00:02:02,476 Speaker 1: have had an impact. About a month ago, an article 31 00:02:02,516 --> 00:02:05,436 Speaker 1: appeared in the Harvard Law Review. It's called a note 32 00:02:05,476 --> 00:02:09,396 Speaker 1: because that's what short student writing is called, and one 33 00:02:09,436 --> 00:02:12,356 Speaker 1: hundred percent confirmed this because everything in the Harvard Larvue 34 00:02:12,396 --> 00:02:15,876 Speaker 1: is anonymous. But it seems pretty clear to me that 35 00:02:15,916 --> 00:02:20,716 Speaker 1: this note was inspired by Malcolm Gladwell's story about Michael Paulson. 36 00:02:21,356 --> 00:02:24,356 Speaker 1: The note is called pack the Union, a Proposal to 37 00:02:24,396 --> 00:02:27,876 Speaker 1: admit new States for the purpose of ensuring equal representation, 38 00:02:28,436 --> 00:02:31,196 Speaker 1: and in it, the author argues that since Washington, DC 39 00:02:31,436 --> 00:02:34,756 Speaker 1: is not a state and is therefore overseen by Congress, 40 00:02:35,596 --> 00:02:39,436 Speaker 1: Congress has the authority to pass legislation that would break 41 00:02:39,556 --> 00:02:43,996 Speaker 1: Washington DC into one hundred and twenty seven states. Yes, 42 00:02:44,036 --> 00:02:47,316 Speaker 1: you heard me right, break Washington DC into one hundred 43 00:02:47,316 --> 00:02:51,556 Speaker 1: and twenty seven states. Malcolm seem pretty into this idea. 44 00:02:51,916 --> 00:02:53,996 Speaker 1: So we had a conversation in which I tried my 45 00:02:54,116 --> 00:02:58,596 Speaker 1: best to suggest that practically speaking, it doesn't make any 46 00:02:58,596 --> 00:03:03,196 Speaker 1: sense as a non constitutional scholar. Walk me through how 47 00:03:03,276 --> 00:03:07,476 Speaker 1: this new ideas outlined in the Harvard Larvue works. Well, 48 00:03:07,516 --> 00:03:09,836 Speaker 1: the magic of the idea goes back to your comma 49 00:03:09,916 --> 00:03:13,716 Speaker 1: conversation and your whole analysis in that episode of the 50 00:03:13,796 --> 00:03:18,236 Speaker 1: question of whether states have to consent to being broken 51 00:03:18,316 --> 00:03:22,116 Speaker 1: up into lots of new states. So the person who 52 00:03:22,156 --> 00:03:24,756 Speaker 1: came up with this idea are so far anonymous author 53 00:03:24,796 --> 00:03:28,236 Speaker 1: thought about it and said, well, it's true that under 54 00:03:28,276 --> 00:03:31,756 Speaker 1: the constitutional reading, the most rigorous one states would have 55 00:03:31,836 --> 00:03:34,636 Speaker 1: to agree to be broken up. But the District of 56 00:03:34,676 --> 00:03:37,396 Speaker 1: Columbia is not a state. It's not one of the 57 00:03:37,436 --> 00:03:42,316 Speaker 1: fifty states. It's just a district controlled by Congress. Therefore, 58 00:03:42,396 --> 00:03:45,556 Speaker 1: it should be up to Congress under the Constitution to 59 00:03:45,596 --> 00:03:48,556 Speaker 1: decide if it wants to turn some parts of District 60 00:03:48,556 --> 00:03:51,156 Speaker 1: of Columbia into a state. Now, you might say, but wait, 61 00:03:51,236 --> 00:03:54,116 Speaker 1: the Constitution mentions DC and says that it can't be 62 00:03:54,156 --> 00:03:57,276 Speaker 1: a state, and so the person says, no problem. Preserve 63 00:03:57,316 --> 00:03:59,796 Speaker 1: a few blocks around the White House and the Capitol, 64 00:04:00,356 --> 00:04:03,716 Speaker 1: call those the District of Columbia, treat that as not 65 00:04:03,796 --> 00:04:06,316 Speaker 1: a state, and then take the rest of the district 66 00:04:06,596 --> 00:04:09,076 Speaker 1: and break it up into one hundred and twenty seven 67 00:04:09,236 --> 00:04:13,516 Speaker 1: than states, which is how many it would take to 68 00:04:13,556 --> 00:04:17,556 Speaker 1: assure on this view the constitutionality of future changes. The 69 00:04:17,596 --> 00:04:20,156 Speaker 1: idea is to actually get a situation where those voters 70 00:04:20,156 --> 00:04:23,236 Speaker 1: could control essentially two thirds of the Senate for all 71 00:04:23,356 --> 00:04:26,716 Speaker 1: major future determinations and decisions. And the whole claim of 72 00:04:26,756 --> 00:04:29,196 Speaker 1: the article is you could pull this off within the 73 00:04:29,236 --> 00:04:32,036 Speaker 1: text of the Constitution. You'd need Congress to do it, 74 00:04:32,076 --> 00:04:34,876 Speaker 1: but a majority on they in this theory, a majority 75 00:04:34,916 --> 00:04:37,236 Speaker 1: of Congress with a signature by the President could in 76 00:04:37,316 --> 00:04:40,396 Speaker 1: fact do it. So you would have you create all 77 00:04:40,396 --> 00:04:42,636 Speaker 1: these new states. Each of these states gets two senators. 78 00:04:43,076 --> 00:04:48,396 Speaker 1: The Senate becomes a body with two hundredodd senators, and 79 00:04:48,596 --> 00:04:51,636 Speaker 1: most of them are are residents of the former District 80 00:04:51,636 --> 00:04:56,036 Speaker 1: of Columbia. Presumably the area is hand picked for their democraticness. 81 00:04:56,236 --> 00:04:58,836 Speaker 1: You wouldn't have to do much handpicking in Washington, DC, 82 00:04:59,076 --> 00:05:02,076 Speaker 1: even at that micro level. Not that many Republicans in 83 00:05:02,076 --> 00:05:05,076 Speaker 1: the district yet. But this obviously is open to the 84 00:05:05,116 --> 00:05:09,596 Speaker 1: criticism that the other idea avoids, which this is a 85 00:05:09,756 --> 00:05:15,076 Speaker 1: massive violation of democratic norms, right, exactly, exactly, you know, 86 00:05:15,116 --> 00:05:16,996 Speaker 1: I think you're completely right. And that's why this article, 87 00:05:17,316 --> 00:05:21,236 Speaker 1: you know, shifts from creative to humorous to a too 88 00:05:21,236 --> 00:05:26,436 Speaker 1: absurd because it would it would violate the core idea 89 00:05:26,596 --> 00:05:29,276 Speaker 1: of you know, of the way the framers imagine the Constitution. 90 00:05:29,356 --> 00:05:32,036 Speaker 1: Now there's pushback. I mean, again, to put words in 91 00:05:32,076 --> 00:05:34,436 Speaker 1: the mouth of the anonymous author, we could say, well, 92 00:05:34,476 --> 00:05:38,796 Speaker 1: the Senate itself is a gross violation of democratic norms. 93 00:05:39,396 --> 00:05:42,316 Speaker 1: And that's actually true. You know, Madison thought that Madison 94 00:05:42,596 --> 00:05:45,956 Speaker 1: hated the idea that each state would get two senators, 95 00:05:46,356 --> 00:05:48,516 Speaker 1: the big states like his state, Virginia, where the little 96 00:05:48,516 --> 00:05:51,636 Speaker 1: mini states like Delaware and Rhode Island. He detested the 97 00:05:51,756 --> 00:05:54,956 Speaker 1: very idea of it, and he lost in the Constitutional Convention, 98 00:05:54,996 --> 00:05:57,876 Speaker 1: you know, famously he said no, you know, we're not 99 00:05:57,876 --> 00:05:59,676 Speaker 1: going to do it that way, and the small states 100 00:05:59,676 --> 00:06:02,396 Speaker 1: staged a walk out and they shut down the convention, 101 00:06:02,396 --> 00:06:04,516 Speaker 1: and they basically said, we're not coming back unless you agree, 102 00:06:04,836 --> 00:06:06,636 Speaker 1: and he had no choice, and he actually walked away 103 00:06:06,676 --> 00:06:10,116 Speaker 1: from the convention feeling that his greatest failure there was 104 00:06:10,596 --> 00:06:15,356 Speaker 1: the failure to get a democratic, small, d democratically structured Senate. 105 00:06:15,396 --> 00:06:18,436 Speaker 1: He thought this was a violation of basic principles. You 106 00:06:18,516 --> 00:06:21,156 Speaker 1: can't say one man, one vote, because they didn't treat 107 00:06:21,396 --> 00:06:24,316 Speaker 1: African Americans as full citizens or citizens at all, and 108 00:06:24,316 --> 00:06:25,996 Speaker 1: they had a three fifth compromise, and they didn't let 109 00:06:26,036 --> 00:06:28,756 Speaker 1: women vote. But he thought that among white men there 110 00:06:28,756 --> 00:06:31,836 Speaker 1: should at least be proportionality, and this obviously meant there wasn't. 111 00:06:32,356 --> 00:06:35,476 Speaker 1: But what if someone did a more modest version of 112 00:06:35,516 --> 00:06:40,316 Speaker 1: this and just said it will, let's create a state 113 00:06:40,476 --> 00:06:44,396 Speaker 1: out of one state out of DC using this exact 114 00:06:44,436 --> 00:06:48,756 Speaker 1: same methodology, will conserve the crucial areas, call it DC, 115 00:06:49,276 --> 00:06:51,676 Speaker 1: and we'll take all of you know, the balance of 116 00:06:52,596 --> 00:06:56,516 Speaker 1: the city and create a new state of Columbia. Does 117 00:06:56,556 --> 00:06:59,796 Speaker 1: that make this idea plausible, Well, it does make it plausible. 118 00:06:59,876 --> 00:07:02,676 Speaker 1: It just runs into the political problem that has always 119 00:07:02,676 --> 00:07:04,916 Speaker 1: accompanied the idea of the introduction of new states, where 120 00:07:04,916 --> 00:07:07,716 Speaker 1: it's pretty easy to guess what political party their senators 121 00:07:07,716 --> 00:07:10,196 Speaker 1: and congressmen will be from and the centers are the 122 00:07:10,196 --> 00:07:11,956 Speaker 1: ones that matter, because DC is small enough that it 123 00:07:11,996 --> 00:07:15,276 Speaker 1: wouldn't have that many representatives. And that is just how 124 00:07:15,276 --> 00:07:17,316 Speaker 1: do you get the other party to agree. And that's 125 00:07:17,356 --> 00:07:19,396 Speaker 1: why so many states of the Union have been introduced 126 00:07:19,436 --> 00:07:22,676 Speaker 1: in pairs. You know, this was obviously true before the 127 00:07:22,756 --> 00:07:25,196 Speaker 1: Civil War. In fact, the big problem before the Civil 128 00:07:25,196 --> 00:07:27,396 Speaker 1: War was that if you didn't admit states in pairs 129 00:07:27,436 --> 00:07:29,476 Speaker 1: slave and free slave and free slave and free, they 130 00:07:29,516 --> 00:07:31,316 Speaker 1: were going to throw off the balance in the Senate. 131 00:07:31,396 --> 00:07:33,356 Speaker 1: And people were worried that would lead to a civil war, 132 00:07:33,476 --> 00:07:36,556 Speaker 1: and it kind of did, and then afterwards people said, Okay, 133 00:07:36,596 --> 00:07:38,356 Speaker 1: let's be really cautious about this. Even though no one 134 00:07:38,356 --> 00:07:40,636 Speaker 1: thinks we're on the brink of civil war. The other 135 00:07:40,636 --> 00:07:42,996 Speaker 1: party never wants to allow it in and usually uses 136 00:07:42,996 --> 00:07:44,756 Speaker 1: what he can to block it. But sure the people 137 00:07:44,796 --> 00:07:46,476 Speaker 1: who call for statehood in DC, and there are lots 138 00:07:46,476 --> 00:07:48,516 Speaker 1: of people like that are thinking in those terms. Puerto 139 00:07:48,596 --> 00:07:50,316 Speaker 1: Rico is another really good example. A lot of Puerto 140 00:07:50,396 --> 00:07:53,436 Speaker 1: Ricans want Puerto Rico to become a state, but they 141 00:07:53,476 --> 00:07:55,116 Speaker 1: just need to get the politics of it right. Either. 142 00:07:55,116 --> 00:07:56,396 Speaker 1: They need to make it look like it'll be half 143 00:07:56,436 --> 00:07:59,316 Speaker 1: democratic and half republican, or alternatively, they need to if 144 00:07:59,316 --> 00:08:01,476 Speaker 1: it's going to be mostly democratic, they need to get 145 00:08:01,516 --> 00:08:03,836 Speaker 1: a republican state to come in at the same time. 146 00:08:04,116 --> 00:08:07,476 Speaker 1: Following all along, these two ideas in combination might work. 147 00:08:07,516 --> 00:08:10,796 Speaker 1: What if the trade was in the short term, creating 148 00:08:10,876 --> 00:08:15,196 Speaker 1: new states out of the existing Texas sounds like it's 149 00:08:15,196 --> 00:08:17,756 Speaker 1: a pro republican idea. I mean, the augument about Texas 150 00:08:17,996 --> 00:08:22,116 Speaker 1: is in the long term, Texas is drifting democratic. But 151 00:08:22,156 --> 00:08:25,196 Speaker 1: in the short term would if a deal was created 152 00:08:25,196 --> 00:08:27,476 Speaker 1: which said we will if you let us create a 153 00:08:28,076 --> 00:08:31,636 Speaker 1: side state out of DC, will let you add another 154 00:08:31,796 --> 00:08:34,676 Speaker 1: state to Texas. I think in principle you could get this. 155 00:08:34,756 --> 00:08:37,596 Speaker 1: But here's the circularity. I think you know, the minute 156 00:08:37,596 --> 00:08:40,156 Speaker 1: that you're having a democratic state added and then a 157 00:08:40,196 --> 00:08:44,596 Speaker 1: republican state added, effectively, nobody is winning, right, So the 158 00:08:44,676 --> 00:08:47,076 Speaker 1: deal would then become pointless. I mean, I think this 159 00:08:47,156 --> 00:08:51,676 Speaker 1: goes to my second not pointless, because you're increasing the 160 00:08:52,356 --> 00:08:55,796 Speaker 1: democratic structure of the Senate by you're solving two problems. 161 00:08:55,916 --> 00:08:59,796 Speaker 1: When is you're making Senate more representative by breaking out Texas, 162 00:08:59,836 --> 00:09:03,796 Speaker 1: and two you are long last giving some formal representation 163 00:09:03,836 --> 00:09:06,356 Speaker 1: to the citizens of DC's that strikes me as being 164 00:09:06,676 --> 00:09:10,876 Speaker 1: that initial step strikes me as being very easy to justify. 165 00:09:11,436 --> 00:09:13,276 Speaker 1: Well that I agree with. I mean, I think you 166 00:09:13,276 --> 00:09:15,836 Speaker 1: wouldn't be solving the unrepresentative in this problem, because you'd 167 00:09:15,876 --> 00:09:18,636 Speaker 1: still have New York and California and lots and lots 168 00:09:18,636 --> 00:09:20,796 Speaker 1: of other states, and you still have this huge disparity. 169 00:09:20,996 --> 00:09:22,436 Speaker 1: But I agree you'd be moving it slowly in the 170 00:09:22,556 --> 00:09:24,356 Speaker 1: right direction. I think the question is, you know, it 171 00:09:24,396 --> 00:09:27,196 Speaker 1: takes so much power, so much force to overcome the 172 00:09:27,276 --> 00:09:30,076 Speaker 1: inertia of something like the arrangement of the States, that 173 00:09:30,276 --> 00:09:33,556 Speaker 1: probably you're only going to see it happening if both 174 00:09:33,596 --> 00:09:35,356 Speaker 1: parties think they're going to benefit from it in the 175 00:09:35,356 --> 00:09:38,276 Speaker 1: long run, And since everybody involved is pretty sophisticated, it's 176 00:09:38,276 --> 00:09:40,396 Speaker 1: hard to get them to think that the other side 177 00:09:40,436 --> 00:09:43,116 Speaker 1: is going to con them. You know, I always think 178 00:09:43,116 --> 00:09:45,156 Speaker 1: of this as similar the problem in Israel, where they 179 00:09:45,156 --> 00:09:47,516 Speaker 1: don't have a constitution at all, and every so often 180 00:09:47,596 --> 00:09:49,196 Speaker 1: I get a call saying, will you join this commission. 181 00:09:49,236 --> 00:09:50,996 Speaker 1: We're gonna have a Blue ribon commission. We're gonna talk 182 00:09:50,996 --> 00:09:53,196 Speaker 1: about creating a constitution for Israel. And I always say 183 00:09:53,236 --> 00:09:55,356 Speaker 1: the same thing. The right wing doesn't want to do 184 00:09:55,396 --> 00:09:58,276 Speaker 1: it because they think that it will impose individual rights 185 00:09:58,316 --> 00:10:01,476 Speaker 1: that they won't like. The left doesn't really necessarily want 186 00:10:01,476 --> 00:10:02,756 Speaker 1: to do it because they think the right wing will 187 00:10:02,796 --> 00:10:04,476 Speaker 1: use it to push a more right wing vision of 188 00:10:04,476 --> 00:10:06,516 Speaker 1: what the country should be like. So the only way 189 00:10:06,516 --> 00:10:08,556 Speaker 1: it can happen is if each side is convinced that 190 00:10:08,596 --> 00:10:11,436 Speaker 1: the other side is making a mistake. If each side 191 00:10:11,436 --> 00:10:14,316 Speaker 1: thinks the other side or suckers, then the deal will happen. 192 00:10:14,796 --> 00:10:16,636 Speaker 1: And so I, you know, I worry a little bit 193 00:10:16,676 --> 00:10:19,316 Speaker 1: about that in this political context. And that actually brings 194 00:10:19,316 --> 00:10:21,836 Speaker 1: me to this. Why do you think it's so fascinating 195 00:10:21,916 --> 00:10:29,236 Speaker 1: for everybody to imagine magical technical fixes to deep structural 196 00:10:29,276 --> 00:10:32,396 Speaker 1: problems in something like the Constitution? Well, I just to think, Aha, 197 00:10:32,596 --> 00:10:34,796 Speaker 1: we figured it out. One professor figured it out. It's 198 00:10:34,836 --> 00:10:38,556 Speaker 1: in his notes there. It is, we can fix this problem. Well, 199 00:10:38,596 --> 00:10:44,116 Speaker 1: I would actually state this somewhat differently, which is the reason, 200 00:10:44,156 --> 00:10:49,276 Speaker 1: as an object of such fascination among Americans, is there's 201 00:10:49,316 --> 00:10:53,116 Speaker 1: something weird about the American political system as opposed to 202 00:10:53,156 --> 00:10:57,876 Speaker 1: other democracies, which is in other democracies. This is my 203 00:10:57,956 --> 00:11:00,316 Speaker 1: impression as a Canadian, for example, and as someone who 204 00:11:00,396 --> 00:11:02,476 Speaker 1: knows a lot about the English system as well, that 205 00:11:03,196 --> 00:11:07,236 Speaker 1: there's way more flexibility in those systems. So you want 206 00:11:07,276 --> 00:11:09,436 Speaker 1: to dump your prime minister, you dump your prime minister. 207 00:11:09,876 --> 00:11:12,676 Speaker 1: If Canada decided I didn't want tudo tomorrow both of 208 00:11:12,756 --> 00:11:15,636 Speaker 1: no confidence, he's gone call an election. You want an election, 209 00:11:15,676 --> 00:11:18,076 Speaker 1: We're gon an election next week. You know, you call election. 210 00:11:18,156 --> 00:11:20,716 Speaker 1: It happens within whatever it is, a month or whatever. 211 00:11:21,356 --> 00:11:25,156 Speaker 1: It's consistent with the notion of democracy in many Western 212 00:11:25,196 --> 00:11:29,196 Speaker 1: countries is the idea that you can start over, you 213 00:11:29,276 --> 00:11:34,116 Speaker 1: can rewrite the rules. Canada, in my lifetime gave itself 214 00:11:34,156 --> 00:11:37,796 Speaker 1: a constitution and did all kinds of you know, only 215 00:11:37,796 --> 00:11:40,756 Speaker 1: in America is this notion, Like you literally have people 216 00:11:40,796 --> 00:11:44,476 Speaker 1: in Supreme Court who are wedded to the interpretations of 217 00:11:44,516 --> 00:11:47,756 Speaker 1: the constitution network in place in the middle of the 218 00:11:47,836 --> 00:11:52,916 Speaker 1: eighteenth century. I mean, it's bananas. So no wonder, yeah, yeah, well, 219 00:11:52,956 --> 00:11:55,516 Speaker 1: no wonder where Americas are in love with these ideas 220 00:11:55,516 --> 00:12:00,996 Speaker 1: of technical fixes because we are alone among sophisticated democracies 221 00:12:01,036 --> 00:12:07,516 Speaker 1: in having this weird resistance to any kind of innovation, 222 00:12:07,556 --> 00:12:10,316 Speaker 1: even at the fringches. Does that make sense? It does? 223 00:12:10,356 --> 00:12:12,516 Speaker 1: I mostly agree with that. I mean, on your first point. 224 00:12:12,676 --> 00:12:15,556 Speaker 1: It's true that any presidential system, not just the American 225 00:12:15,636 --> 00:12:18,156 Speaker 1: but any presidential system doesn't have the vote of no 226 00:12:18,236 --> 00:12:21,996 Speaker 1: confidence remove the person function. So that's parliamentary democracies do 227 00:12:22,076 --> 00:12:24,876 Speaker 1: have that, but lots of other constitutional democracies that our 228 00:12:24,916 --> 00:12:27,036 Speaker 1: presidential systems don't. You can't get rid of the president 229 00:12:27,076 --> 00:12:29,116 Speaker 1: of France quite that easily, can get rid of the 230 00:12:29,156 --> 00:12:31,356 Speaker 1: president of Brazil that easily. That's why they actually have 231 00:12:31,396 --> 00:12:34,836 Speaker 1: impeached the president of Brazil recently. That feature is not 232 00:12:34,996 --> 00:12:37,156 Speaker 1: as unique to the United States. But I think you're 233 00:12:37,236 --> 00:12:39,676 Speaker 1: right that the idea that we would still use a 234 00:12:39,756 --> 00:12:43,396 Speaker 1: constitution that's, you know, two hundred and thirty years old, 235 00:12:43,516 --> 00:12:46,116 Speaker 1: and that also have totally failed once. I mean most 236 00:12:46,156 --> 00:12:48,716 Speaker 1: countries after your constitution fails. Our Civil War was a 237 00:12:48,756 --> 00:12:50,996 Speaker 1: failure of our constitution. I mean, that's what it is 238 00:12:50,996 --> 00:12:52,956 Speaker 1: for a constitution to fail. But after it failed, we 239 00:12:52,956 --> 00:12:55,356 Speaker 1: didn't admit that it failed. We just said, well, we're 240 00:12:55,396 --> 00:12:58,076 Speaker 1: going to add these amendments that provide for the end 241 00:12:58,076 --> 00:13:00,836 Speaker 1: of slavery and equal protection and due process of the law, 242 00:13:00,876 --> 00:13:02,996 Speaker 1: and allow African Americans to vote, and we're not going 243 00:13:03,076 --> 00:13:06,236 Speaker 1: to change anything else, which is totally Absurdain and that 244 00:13:06,356 --> 00:13:08,076 Speaker 1: also led to the situation right now, and I think 245 00:13:08,076 --> 00:13:10,156 Speaker 1: where you say that's bananas, you're right. Nobody else does 246 00:13:10,196 --> 00:13:12,396 Speaker 1: it our way, and I guess that leads to this 247 00:13:12,476 --> 00:13:16,556 Speaker 1: idea that maybe, just maybe there's some tricky technical way 248 00:13:16,636 --> 00:13:18,916 Speaker 1: to repair our problems. And that's where you know, the 249 00:13:18,916 --> 00:13:20,796 Speaker 1: concerts lawyer in me wants to say, well, that would 250 00:13:20,836 --> 00:13:23,156 Speaker 1: be great, but that's up to the politicians and they 251 00:13:23,156 --> 00:13:25,436 Speaker 1: have to have the will to do it, And if 252 00:13:25,436 --> 00:13:27,276 Speaker 1: they really had the will to do it, they wouldn't 253 00:13:27,316 --> 00:13:29,836 Speaker 1: need something tricky. We could actually have a constitutional convention 254 00:13:29,956 --> 00:13:32,116 Speaker 1: or we could start again or something like that. Yeah, 255 00:13:32,356 --> 00:13:36,076 Speaker 1: let me ask you something else, a related line of questioning, 256 00:13:37,116 --> 00:13:41,716 Speaker 1: and it's this, So, if the academics of America had 257 00:13:41,756 --> 00:13:45,156 Speaker 1: any money, which they don't, or we're organized, which they aren't, 258 00:13:45,396 --> 00:13:48,396 Speaker 1: and they wanted to put together an award for person 259 00:13:48,716 --> 00:13:51,196 Speaker 1: in the country, maybe a person in the world, who's 260 00:13:51,236 --> 00:13:54,716 Speaker 1: done the most for them, the most to popularize their ideas, 261 00:13:54,796 --> 00:13:58,436 Speaker 1: make them seem relevant. You would be the first recipient 262 00:13:58,476 --> 00:14:00,116 Speaker 1: of that award. In fact that you're probably name it 263 00:14:00,156 --> 00:14:02,596 Speaker 1: for you because again and again in your career you 264 00:14:02,756 --> 00:14:08,276 Speaker 1: found fascinating, quirky opinions by scholars, and you've put them 265 00:14:08,476 --> 00:14:11,396 Speaker 1: into public debate, and then people argue about them, and 266 00:14:11,436 --> 00:14:13,756 Speaker 1: then if you change your mind, you quote the scholars 267 00:14:13,756 --> 00:14:17,436 Speaker 1: from the other side. You're scrupulously fair. Yet, and here's 268 00:14:17,476 --> 00:14:20,716 Speaker 1: the Yet, when it comes to the institutions that a 269 00:14:20,796 --> 00:14:25,036 Speaker 1: lot of these professors teaching, the ones that pay their salaries, 270 00:14:25,676 --> 00:14:29,596 Speaker 1: like Fancy Ivy League universities, you seem to really hate 271 00:14:29,636 --> 00:14:33,596 Speaker 1: the universities. You criticize them. You talked about their unfairness, 272 00:14:33,636 --> 00:14:36,036 Speaker 1: their injustice. To tell me about that, first of all, 273 00:14:36,036 --> 00:14:38,116 Speaker 1: am I getting you right? Yes, you're getting me correct. 274 00:14:38,156 --> 00:14:40,396 Speaker 1: I don't hate all of them, I hate the elite ones. 275 00:14:41,156 --> 00:14:45,196 Speaker 1: So yes to my allegiances are very clear. My allegiances are. 276 00:14:45,756 --> 00:14:50,236 Speaker 1: I am a faculty brat myself, and so identify very 277 00:14:50,236 --> 00:14:55,276 Speaker 1: strongly with faculty and identify with the students. But I 278 00:14:55,356 --> 00:15:00,596 Speaker 1: remember come from Canada, where the goals of the educations 279 00:15:00,796 --> 00:15:05,596 Speaker 1: were very clear. Access to higher education was in Canada 280 00:15:05,716 --> 00:15:09,396 Speaker 1: is what the entire system is supposed to be oriented around. Sound, 281 00:15:10,316 --> 00:15:12,996 Speaker 1: And you're willing to make all kinds of sacrifices in 282 00:15:13,076 --> 00:15:18,276 Speaker 1: order to maximize the affordability and access to right. So 283 00:15:18,316 --> 00:15:21,396 Speaker 1: there's two things I'm interested in systems that serve the 284 00:15:21,836 --> 00:15:25,236 Speaker 1: faculty and systems that serve students in form of access. 285 00:15:25,396 --> 00:15:30,276 Speaker 1: To my mind, the American higher ed system has betrayed 286 00:15:30,316 --> 00:15:36,236 Speaker 1: both those things. I think academics are grossly undervalued and underpaid, 287 00:15:36,356 --> 00:15:39,836 Speaker 1: which is weird because the cost of a university education 288 00:15:39,876 --> 00:15:44,636 Speaker 1: has skyrocketed, which is one of those strange puzzles. Whatever 289 00:15:44,676 --> 00:15:47,156 Speaker 1: I hear, like, what's someone teaching like eight classes at 290 00:15:47,196 --> 00:15:50,276 Speaker 1: a state university? What they're making I'm appalled. This is 291 00:15:50,316 --> 00:15:53,916 Speaker 1: one of the central functions of a civilized society is 292 00:15:53,916 --> 00:15:58,436 Speaker 1: the education of its intellectual class. And you know, we're 293 00:15:58,436 --> 00:16:03,156 Speaker 1: paying these people embarrassing wages A but B. And at 294 00:16:03,196 --> 00:16:06,636 Speaker 1: the same time, we're escalating the cost of education to 295 00:16:06,636 --> 00:16:09,076 Speaker 1: the point where people are spending their first ten years 296 00:16:09,316 --> 00:16:12,996 Speaker 1: is post college or more paying off their loans. That's 297 00:16:13,036 --> 00:16:15,916 Speaker 1: also crazy, and I think, what's it? You know, there 298 00:16:15,916 --> 00:16:17,756 Speaker 1: are many things to blame of this, but one of 299 00:16:17,756 --> 00:16:21,236 Speaker 1: them is the example. There's a handful of institutions that 300 00:16:21,316 --> 00:16:23,276 Speaker 1: are at the very top of the food chain that 301 00:16:23,316 --> 00:16:27,276 Speaker 1: are setting an extraordinarily bad example, and they are the 302 00:16:27,436 --> 00:16:29,916 Speaker 1: schools of the Ivy League. My favorite whipping hearts at 303 00:16:29,916 --> 00:16:34,196 Speaker 1: the moment is Princeton. You know, Princeton, Princeton and Harvard 304 00:16:34,196 --> 00:16:36,716 Speaker 1: both should be ten times the size. I mean ten 305 00:16:36,716 --> 00:16:38,916 Speaker 1: times maybe too much, but I don't know. When you 306 00:16:39,076 --> 00:16:41,396 Speaker 1: when you realize that the University of Toronto is seventy 307 00:16:41,756 --> 00:16:46,156 Speaker 1: five thousand students, it becomes really, really really hard to 308 00:16:46,276 --> 00:16:50,836 Speaker 1: justify Princeton, which has resources that are probably ten x 309 00:16:51,756 --> 00:16:55,676 Speaker 1: University of Toronto. Why Princeton is a tenth a size 310 00:16:56,076 --> 00:16:59,436 Speaker 1: that's sentent a size. Everything you're saying is true, and 311 00:16:59,476 --> 00:17:01,356 Speaker 1: I but I want to let me just raise a 312 00:17:01,356 --> 00:17:03,436 Speaker 1: couple of possible count arguments and just hear your thoughts 313 00:17:03,476 --> 00:17:05,796 Speaker 1: about them. So first I hear you. You know, some 314 00:17:05,916 --> 00:17:08,676 Speaker 1: of this is you're seeing it from a Canadian perspective, 315 00:17:09,316 --> 00:17:12,116 Speaker 1: and like a good Canadian, you look at the United States. 316 00:17:12,156 --> 00:17:14,156 Speaker 1: We have a crazy constitution and we have a crazy 317 00:17:14,236 --> 00:17:18,156 Speaker 1: higher educational system. That's fair enough, and I think it's true. 318 00:17:18,636 --> 00:17:22,196 Speaker 1: It does raise, first off, the question of whether the 319 00:17:22,836 --> 00:17:25,676 Speaker 1: putting a lot of resources into a handful of institutions 320 00:17:26,276 --> 00:17:29,756 Speaker 1: actually produces better conditions for the faculty there. So you 321 00:17:29,836 --> 00:17:33,916 Speaker 1: mentioned the terrible under payment of professors who teach at 322 00:17:33,916 --> 00:17:35,996 Speaker 1: state universities, and that's absolutely right. But that's not the 323 00:17:36,036 --> 00:17:39,836 Speaker 1: elite institutions. The elite institutions do much better in terms 324 00:17:39,836 --> 00:17:42,276 Speaker 1: of compensation, and especially when you measure it in terms 325 00:17:42,276 --> 00:17:44,396 Speaker 1: of how much teaching they're doing. So if you teach 326 00:17:44,396 --> 00:17:47,836 Speaker 1: at Princeton, you actually have the chance to write and read, 327 00:17:48,036 --> 00:17:50,236 Speaker 1: or if you're in a lab, do lab research, and 328 00:17:50,316 --> 00:17:53,636 Speaker 1: that's where a huge amount of the scholarship is getting produced. 329 00:17:53,636 --> 00:17:55,436 Speaker 1: I don't think anyone could say with a straight face 330 00:17:55,676 --> 00:17:59,236 Speaker 1: the Princeton professors or underresourced or underpaid. To the contrary, 331 00:17:59,396 --> 00:18:02,596 Speaker 1: they're well resourced, they're fairly paid, and they produce a 332 00:18:02,636 --> 00:18:06,116 Speaker 1: ton of interesting ideas because that takes up a lot 333 00:18:06,156 --> 00:18:08,516 Speaker 1: of time. Whereas the same exact people with the same 334 00:18:08,556 --> 00:18:11,916 Speaker 1: degree of training and skill and creativity were put in 335 00:18:11,916 --> 00:18:14,076 Speaker 1: a state institution where they had to teach four courses 336 00:18:14,156 --> 00:18:16,676 Speaker 1: a semester, they would produce less in the way of 337 00:18:16,716 --> 00:18:19,836 Speaker 1: creative and original ideas, a lot less. And I would 338 00:18:19,876 --> 00:18:21,476 Speaker 1: just add, you know, we can talk about Inversity of 339 00:18:21,476 --> 00:18:24,276 Speaker 1: Toronto in a second. That's an incredible institution. But you know, 340 00:18:24,316 --> 00:18:25,996 Speaker 1: I have a one of my best students ever as 341 00:18:26,036 --> 00:18:28,796 Speaker 1: a professor at University of Toronto in the law school, 342 00:18:28,796 --> 00:18:30,476 Speaker 1: and that's a great great law school. It has some 343 00:18:30,516 --> 00:18:34,116 Speaker 1: private funding for it, but her work requirements are substantially 344 00:18:34,156 --> 00:18:37,916 Speaker 1: greater than they would be at a comparably ranked US 345 00:18:38,156 --> 00:18:40,956 Speaker 1: law school. She just does a lot more work because, 346 00:18:40,996 --> 00:18:42,236 Speaker 1: as you said, there are just so many students, and 347 00:18:42,236 --> 00:18:44,516 Speaker 1: the law school as she isn't that huge. Yeah, No, 348 00:18:44,636 --> 00:18:47,556 Speaker 1: I mean, the thing about under payment is a critique 349 00:18:47,596 --> 00:18:51,956 Speaker 1: of the the ninetieth percentile on down. It's obviously not 350 00:18:51,996 --> 00:18:55,396 Speaker 1: a critique. And my critique about the second critique, though, 351 00:18:55,476 --> 00:18:58,036 Speaker 1: is a critique of the top. So one is Ones 352 00:18:58,036 --> 00:19:00,556 Speaker 1: a mass critique and Ones an elite critique, but they're 353 00:19:00,596 --> 00:19:03,076 Speaker 1: linked in a sense that one of the one of 354 00:19:03,076 --> 00:19:06,876 Speaker 1: the things that makes it difficult for universities who are 355 00:19:07,316 --> 00:19:11,996 Speaker 1: not elite to pay their fact properly and to preserve 356 00:19:12,396 --> 00:19:15,076 Speaker 1: access is that they are trapped in an arms race 357 00:19:15,116 --> 00:19:17,956 Speaker 1: as being driven by the leading institutions. The problem is 358 00:19:17,996 --> 00:19:21,116 Speaker 1: that the whole system is in the middle of this 359 00:19:21,156 --> 00:19:25,316 Speaker 1: amenity's arms race, which is all being fueled by the 360 00:19:25,396 --> 00:19:30,156 Speaker 1: actions of you know, fifteen schools top which have access 361 00:19:30,196 --> 00:19:33,716 Speaker 1: to disproportionate resources. If I'm a Hio state, i am 362 00:19:33,916 --> 00:19:39,956 Speaker 1: on some level, i am competing for students with private 363 00:19:39,996 --> 00:19:43,996 Speaker 1: elite colleges, and I have to play that game to attractive, 364 00:19:43,996 --> 00:19:45,556 Speaker 1: I got to have a nicer dining hall. I gotta 365 00:19:45,556 --> 00:19:47,156 Speaker 1: have better food. I got to have And what does 366 00:19:47,156 --> 00:19:49,076 Speaker 1: that leave me? Less money left over to pay my 367 00:19:49,596 --> 00:19:53,756 Speaker 1: faculty properly, and less money left over to subsidize the 368 00:19:53,796 --> 00:19:56,676 Speaker 1: cost of providing an education, and more money going into 369 00:19:56,756 --> 00:20:01,036 Speaker 1: things that have no real educational function. There's something a 370 00:20:01,076 --> 00:20:06,076 Speaker 1: little bit screwy about the incentive structure of higher education. 371 00:20:06,116 --> 00:20:07,916 Speaker 1: So I'm not I mean, I'm not saying anything that 372 00:20:08,116 --> 00:20:11,236 Speaker 1: has not been said a found sometimes before. I I 373 00:20:11,596 --> 00:20:15,476 Speaker 1: am just beginning to lose patience with the fetishization of 374 00:20:16,156 --> 00:20:19,196 Speaker 1: private education in this country, right. I mean, look, the 375 00:20:19,196 --> 00:20:23,116 Speaker 1: amenities arms race is completely insane. It's a product not 376 00:20:23,196 --> 00:20:25,156 Speaker 1: just of competition, although that's a big part of it, 377 00:20:25,196 --> 00:20:30,036 Speaker 1: but also of the commercialization of education, where the universities 378 00:20:30,076 --> 00:20:32,756 Speaker 1: and the colleges think of the students as customers, and 379 00:20:32,836 --> 00:20:35,196 Speaker 1: if they're customers, well, then the customer is always right, 380 00:20:35,236 --> 00:20:37,436 Speaker 1: and you have to cultivate the customer, and you you're 381 00:20:37,436 --> 00:20:42,116 Speaker 1: in the business of providing education services for the customer. Ironically, 382 00:20:42,236 --> 00:20:45,956 Speaker 1: the elite institutions worry less about that than the middle 383 00:20:46,036 --> 00:20:49,836 Speaker 1: level institutions, because at the elite institutions, we know that 384 00:20:49,876 --> 00:20:52,756 Speaker 1: the students will come. And although we try to be 385 00:20:52,836 --> 00:20:54,796 Speaker 1: nice about the amenities, because after all, we have the resources, 386 00:20:54,836 --> 00:20:57,716 Speaker 1: why shouldn't we be we're not really doing amenities in 387 00:20:57,836 --> 00:21:00,196 Speaker 1: order to get students to come here who might go 388 00:21:00,316 --> 00:21:04,356 Speaker 1: somewhere else. What's difficult is if you're a middle ranked institution. 389 00:21:04,396 --> 00:21:06,716 Speaker 1: You know, my brother teaches at Connecticut College, which is 390 00:21:06,716 --> 00:21:09,476 Speaker 1: a fantastic liberal arts college in Connecticut, and they have 391 00:21:09,516 --> 00:21:11,916 Speaker 1: to be very aware that they're competing with other small 392 00:21:11,916 --> 00:21:14,516 Speaker 1: liberal arts colleges for the best students, and that if 393 00:21:14,556 --> 00:21:17,516 Speaker 1: they fall behind, they could fall off the cliff. You know, 394 00:21:17,596 --> 00:21:18,996 Speaker 1: if they go on to the second page of the 395 00:21:19,116 --> 00:21:21,036 Speaker 1: US News and World Report, they've seen it happen to 396 00:21:21,076 --> 00:21:24,116 Speaker 1: other colleges. So they have to compete on every ground 397 00:21:24,156 --> 00:21:26,956 Speaker 1: that eighteen year olds care about. And I don't think 398 00:21:26,996 --> 00:21:29,476 Speaker 1: that amenity's race is actually coming from the very top. 399 00:21:29,676 --> 00:21:32,676 Speaker 1: I think it's coming from other colleges in their same 400 00:21:33,356 --> 00:21:37,476 Speaker 1: you know, in their same range. They're competing with similar colleges. Yeah, yeah, 401 00:21:37,796 --> 00:21:40,676 Speaker 1: you know, there's a if I might bring this conversation, 402 00:21:41,156 --> 00:21:43,956 Speaker 1: try and bring it full circle. The reason why to 403 00:21:43,996 --> 00:21:47,076 Speaker 1: go back to Michael Paulson for a moment. The thing 404 00:21:47,116 --> 00:21:52,156 Speaker 1: that is so beautiful, if I might use that word 405 00:21:52,516 --> 00:21:57,716 Speaker 1: about that article he wrote, was he uses a provocative, 406 00:21:58,516 --> 00:22:04,556 Speaker 1: mischievous idea as a vessel for almost tricking you into 407 00:22:05,156 --> 00:22:11,156 Speaker 1: thinking about some pretty weighty, serious subjects. Right. In other words, 408 00:22:11,676 --> 00:22:14,596 Speaker 1: he's doing what a great teacher is supposed to do. 409 00:22:15,036 --> 00:22:17,396 Speaker 1: I am not someone who would normally ever read something 410 00:22:17,436 --> 00:22:21,156 Speaker 1: about constitutional law. He tricked me in the most beautiful, 411 00:22:21,236 --> 00:22:24,156 Speaker 1: lovely way into like spending a month of my life 412 00:22:24,196 --> 00:22:27,156 Speaker 1: thinking about constitutional law because he had this clever way 413 00:22:27,196 --> 00:22:30,356 Speaker 1: in And to my mind, that thing that he did 414 00:22:30,396 --> 00:22:33,356 Speaker 1: in that article is what a university is supposed to do. 415 00:22:33,836 --> 00:22:37,156 Speaker 1: Is lure you into thinking about things that you would 416 00:22:37,156 --> 00:22:38,716 Speaker 1: never have thought about, and at the end of the 417 00:22:38,796 --> 00:22:42,436 Speaker 1: day leave you with a feeling of not just satisfaction 418 00:22:42,476 --> 00:22:46,236 Speaker 1: but joy, like that the whole experience was fun. And 419 00:22:46,596 --> 00:22:48,436 Speaker 1: when I look at what universities are doing now, I 420 00:22:48,436 --> 00:22:52,316 Speaker 1: feel like they are doing everything but that they're trying 421 00:22:52,316 --> 00:22:54,516 Speaker 1: to convince you that they're here. Are nine reasons to 422 00:22:54,556 --> 00:22:57,556 Speaker 1: go to our university, But the idea that you might 423 00:22:57,716 --> 00:23:02,796 Speaker 1: get some kind of intellectual pleasure out of toying with 424 00:23:02,876 --> 00:23:05,716 Speaker 1: a radical idea seems to be not just way down 425 00:23:05,716 --> 00:23:08,676 Speaker 1: the list, but also when they do in counter radical ideas, 426 00:23:08,756 --> 00:23:11,996 Speaker 1: they run for the tall grass screening. It's not gutting there, 427 00:23:12,236 --> 00:23:15,196 Speaker 1: you know. It's like it's such a kind of weird inversion, 428 00:23:15,596 --> 00:23:18,676 Speaker 1: Like it should be enough. If I'm seventeen and I 429 00:23:18,716 --> 00:23:21,436 Speaker 1: read an article, I should say, oh my god, I 430 00:23:21,476 --> 00:23:23,356 Speaker 1: want to go and be taught a course by that guy. 431 00:23:23,516 --> 00:23:27,236 Speaker 1: That should be the reason I go to college. Right. Yeah, 432 00:23:27,276 --> 00:23:29,476 Speaker 1: in a world where seventeen years where already reading large 433 00:23:29,476 --> 00:23:32,836 Speaker 1: few articles, though we'd have no other problems, that would 434 00:23:32,836 --> 00:23:35,236 Speaker 1: be a magic world where everything would already have been solved. 435 00:23:35,276 --> 00:23:37,316 Speaker 1: Everyone would be a little Malcolm Godwell in the making. 436 00:23:37,356 --> 00:23:39,396 Speaker 1: You know, no, no, but but Noah. Think about this. 437 00:23:39,516 --> 00:23:42,916 Speaker 1: Imagine if I said, if I asked you to teach 438 00:23:42,916 --> 00:23:46,996 Speaker 1: a course in an honors class of a public high 439 00:23:46,996 --> 00:23:49,876 Speaker 1: school and senior honors pass in a public high school 440 00:23:49,876 --> 00:23:52,876 Speaker 1: in the Boston area, and your text was that Michael 441 00:23:53,036 --> 00:23:56,076 Speaker 1: Paulson article. Do you think you could hold their interest 442 00:23:56,156 --> 00:23:59,676 Speaker 1: for a semester totally? For sure? Yeah, for sure. I 443 00:23:59,676 --> 00:24:01,436 Speaker 1: don't know about a whole semester, but you could definitely 444 00:24:01,436 --> 00:24:04,796 Speaker 1: get students engaged and interested, no doubt about it. The students. 445 00:24:04,796 --> 00:24:07,716 Speaker 1: And again that's against the backdrop of having, as you say, 446 00:24:07,756 --> 00:24:09,996 Speaker 1: an honors class at a public high school kids. But 447 00:24:10,036 --> 00:24:12,116 Speaker 1: that's the feeding ground for what we're talking about. Yeah, 448 00:24:12,156 --> 00:24:13,196 Speaker 1: those are the kids who are going to go to 449 00:24:13,236 --> 00:24:15,036 Speaker 1: the schools and we're talking about there's a lot there 450 00:24:15,076 --> 00:24:19,196 Speaker 1: are hundreds and hundreds of thousands of kids and honors 451 00:24:19,196 --> 00:24:22,356 Speaker 1: classes in America who potentially could find that article really 452 00:24:22,356 --> 00:24:27,076 Speaker 1: really fun and hilarious and exciting, you know, And that's 453 00:24:27,076 --> 00:24:29,076 Speaker 1: what I that's just a little piece of it that 454 00:24:29,236 --> 00:24:33,796 Speaker 1: seems to me to be absent. That's a super nice 455 00:24:33,796 --> 00:24:36,476 Speaker 1: way of thinking about it. And I agree that in 456 00:24:36,516 --> 00:24:39,876 Speaker 1: the long run, our objectives should be to get those 457 00:24:39,916 --> 00:24:42,036 Speaker 1: teachers who are teaching those kids and who are for 458 00:24:42,076 --> 00:24:45,156 Speaker 1: the most part, are doing a great job to you know, 459 00:24:45,196 --> 00:24:47,156 Speaker 1: to have the opportunity to teach them stuff like that. 460 00:24:47,556 --> 00:24:49,636 Speaker 1: I think that's a very Malcolm perspective and I think 461 00:24:49,636 --> 00:24:51,716 Speaker 1: it's super helpful. Can I ask you just one one 462 00:24:51,796 --> 00:24:55,116 Speaker 1: last question, and it's this, and it's relevant to also 463 00:24:55,156 --> 00:24:57,156 Speaker 1: to you know, to your finding paulse and you're being 464 00:24:57,196 --> 00:24:59,436 Speaker 1: able to get that interview with him, how do you 465 00:24:59,516 --> 00:25:04,756 Speaker 1: find getting the interviews to work so well in a podcast? 466 00:25:04,796 --> 00:25:07,396 Speaker 1: I mean, you're you're spectacular at it. Here, I am 467 00:25:07,596 --> 00:25:09,356 Speaker 1: trying to have my own podcast, trying to and how 468 00:25:09,356 --> 00:25:12,356 Speaker 1: to do it properly. Well, what's what's the secret sauce? 469 00:25:12,436 --> 00:25:14,236 Speaker 1: I'm not talking now about the secret sauce of coming 470 00:25:14,276 --> 00:25:16,316 Speaker 1: up with their ideas. That's unique, and you know there's 471 00:25:16,316 --> 00:25:18,156 Speaker 1: no way to share that. You're you're Malcolm. But when 472 00:25:18,196 --> 00:25:20,476 Speaker 1: it comes to doing the interviews, maybe there you've got 473 00:25:20,476 --> 00:25:24,516 Speaker 1: some secret sauce you can share. Well. The lovely thing 474 00:25:24,556 --> 00:25:30,196 Speaker 1: about if I'm interviewing you for a newspaper article. Having 475 00:25:30,196 --> 00:25:33,436 Speaker 1: been a newspaper reporter for ten years of my life, 476 00:25:33,756 --> 00:25:36,036 Speaker 1: people would often be nervous to talk to you because 477 00:25:36,076 --> 00:25:42,316 Speaker 1: they're aware of how difficult. Not bias necessarily, though biases 478 00:25:42,476 --> 00:25:45,636 Speaker 1: sometimes a problem, just inherently difficult the task is. So, 479 00:25:45,796 --> 00:25:47,996 Speaker 1: I'm writing an article on Deadline that's going to be 480 00:25:48,076 --> 00:25:51,516 Speaker 1: eight hundred words in which I'm tackling a very difficult topic. 481 00:25:51,596 --> 00:25:54,196 Speaker 1: I'm going to talk to you for twenty minutes when 482 00:25:54,236 --> 00:25:56,156 Speaker 1: the conversation should really be an hour and a half, 483 00:25:56,156 --> 00:25:59,316 Speaker 1: and I'm going to extract two sentences that bear on 484 00:26:00,156 --> 00:26:02,756 Speaker 1: the thing I'm writing about that it is almost certainly 485 00:26:02,796 --> 00:26:06,196 Speaker 1: the case that those two sentences that I extract do 486 00:26:06,556 --> 00:26:11,516 Speaker 1: a far less in adequate job of presenting your true position. 487 00:26:11,876 --> 00:26:16,196 Speaker 1: It's just structurally, institutionally, that form is really hard for 488 00:26:16,236 --> 00:26:19,036 Speaker 1: all parties. It's like fracking. You know, you're extracting something 489 00:26:19,036 --> 00:26:20,516 Speaker 1: and that you don't really care what the costs are, 490 00:26:20,556 --> 00:26:21,556 Speaker 1: and you're going to do it and you're going to 491 00:26:21,676 --> 00:26:25,916 Speaker 1: leave them behind afterwards. Yes, under great pressure. Yes, the 492 00:26:25,916 --> 00:26:29,916 Speaker 1: analogy is beautiful, and that's so that's like, that's the 493 00:26:29,916 --> 00:26:33,196 Speaker 1: world I started in, and I was aware of its shortcomings. 494 00:26:33,396 --> 00:26:36,156 Speaker 1: Then I go to the New Yorker, and now you 495 00:26:36,276 --> 00:26:39,516 Speaker 1: have much more space and much more time, but you 496 00:26:39,556 --> 00:26:42,836 Speaker 1: still have the problem that you are extracting the interview 497 00:26:42,876 --> 00:26:48,916 Speaker 1: from its context. In a podcast interview, both parties are 498 00:26:48,956 --> 00:26:53,156 Speaker 1: aware that it's about as safe an interview space as 499 00:26:53,276 --> 00:26:57,636 Speaker 1: is possible, because now the person gets to say it 500 00:26:57,676 --> 00:27:00,396 Speaker 1: in their own words, and so you all of the 501 00:27:00,516 --> 00:27:05,596 Speaker 1: kind of tone of voice, irony, even things like you know, 502 00:27:05,876 --> 00:27:08,716 Speaker 1: the constant thing in print journalism, if that quote was 503 00:27:08,716 --> 00:27:12,516 Speaker 1: taken out a context, why because you left off the 504 00:27:12,916 --> 00:27:14,716 Speaker 1: you know, the clause at the end of the sentence 505 00:27:14,876 --> 00:27:17,636 Speaker 1: or the sentence that came immediately before, which clarified it 506 00:27:17,876 --> 00:27:21,756 Speaker 1: much harder to do in an audio interview. So what 507 00:27:21,836 --> 00:27:24,996 Speaker 1: happens in an audio interview is that people that you're 508 00:27:24,996 --> 00:27:28,196 Speaker 1: interviewing are aware that they're getting a much more accurate 509 00:27:28,236 --> 00:27:33,596 Speaker 1: representation of their ideas, and as a result, they relax. 510 00:27:34,436 --> 00:27:38,076 Speaker 1: And if you can communicate that fact that, oh, I'm 511 00:27:38,076 --> 00:27:39,796 Speaker 1: just going to let this run, you know, you wanted 512 00:27:39,796 --> 00:27:41,836 Speaker 1: to just tell you what's on your mind. And you know, 513 00:27:42,636 --> 00:27:45,116 Speaker 1: they're funnier because they have more time to be funny, 514 00:27:45,196 --> 00:27:49,836 Speaker 1: and they're not as anxious about being misrepresented, and they'll 515 00:27:49,836 --> 00:27:52,436 Speaker 1: say more interesting things because they have this time and 516 00:27:52,516 --> 00:27:56,956 Speaker 1: space to qualify them appropriately. And you know, so that's 517 00:27:56,996 --> 00:28:00,996 Speaker 1: just a it's just a safe space, a safer space 518 00:28:01,636 --> 00:28:04,276 Speaker 1: for this kind of conversation. And I think that's why 519 00:28:04,316 --> 00:28:08,636 Speaker 1: I like this format so much. Thank you for joining 520 00:28:08,676 --> 00:28:11,076 Speaker 1: the safe space of deep background of Malcolm's the first 521 00:28:11,076 --> 00:28:12,636 Speaker 1: time anyone has ever used the word safe space and 522 00:28:12,676 --> 00:28:14,716 Speaker 1: the same sentence with me. But I'll take it, and 523 00:28:14,756 --> 00:28:18,636 Speaker 1: I'm very happy to hear it. Thanks for coming. Okay, wonderful, 524 00:28:18,876 --> 00:28:28,236 Speaker 1: take care. Thanks Now, the name of the Revisionist History 525 00:28:28,236 --> 00:28:31,276 Speaker 1: episode again that Malcolm and I were discussing is Divide 526 00:28:31,276 --> 00:28:34,716 Speaker 1: and Conquer. It's definitely worth a listen. And now it's 527 00:28:34,716 --> 00:28:37,276 Speaker 1: time for our playback segment, where I choose a moment 528 00:28:37,316 --> 00:28:40,156 Speaker 1: in the news and play it back to try to 529 00:28:40,316 --> 00:28:42,796 Speaker 1: make some sense out of it. That was a soil 530 00:28:42,836 --> 00:28:54,916 Speaker 1: Carday have a clipboard with a card on it and 531 00:28:55,196 --> 00:28:59,076 Speaker 1: number has written down the right side of that clipboard. 532 00:28:59,796 --> 00:29:04,036 Speaker 1: That sound of confusion is from the Iowa caucuses about 533 00:29:04,036 --> 00:29:06,556 Speaker 1: ten days ago, and it was recorded by one of 534 00:29:06,556 --> 00:29:10,996 Speaker 1: our producers, Eloise Linton. What's really crazy, of course, is 535 00:29:11,036 --> 00:29:13,956 Speaker 1: that that was ten days ago and we still don't 536 00:29:13,996 --> 00:29:17,676 Speaker 1: really know who won the Iowa caucuses, and it's looking 537 00:29:17,716 --> 00:29:22,156 Speaker 1: like we never will. With all of the votes counted 538 00:29:22,356 --> 00:29:26,916 Speaker 1: quote unquote counted. Pete Buddha Judge was announced by point 539 00:29:27,036 --> 00:29:30,836 Speaker 1: one percent the victor, and the Bernie Sanders campaign has 540 00:29:30,836 --> 00:29:33,276 Speaker 1: not at all conceded that, and they also point out 541 00:29:33,356 --> 00:29:36,956 Speaker 1: that if you count not ultimate allocation of delicates, but 542 00:29:37,196 --> 00:29:40,396 Speaker 1: rather who walked into the room in the first instance 543 00:29:40,396 --> 00:29:42,156 Speaker 1: and said they were going to vote for someone, that 544 00:29:42,196 --> 00:29:46,036 Speaker 1: Bernie Sanders is actually clearly ahead in that number. All 545 00:29:46,076 --> 00:29:48,036 Speaker 1: this makes me want to turn to a question that 546 00:29:48,036 --> 00:29:50,596 Speaker 1: we're going to have to keep on asking about Iowa 547 00:29:50,636 --> 00:29:55,276 Speaker 1: for a long time, and that question is what went wrong? Now, 548 00:29:55,356 --> 00:29:57,556 Speaker 1: let may be clear, there are many ways that you 549 00:29:57,596 --> 00:29:59,956 Speaker 1: could answer this question, and many of them would start 550 00:29:59,956 --> 00:30:03,236 Speaker 1: with the app that failed and the failure of the 551 00:30:03,276 --> 00:30:07,196 Speaker 1: Democratic Committee of Iowa to produce a process that worked. 552 00:30:07,676 --> 00:30:10,716 Speaker 1: I'm not disputing those things. Instead, I want to focus 553 00:30:10,796 --> 00:30:14,196 Speaker 1: on a specific innovation that the Democratic Party made this 554 00:30:14,316 --> 00:30:18,636 Speaker 1: time and how it may have contributed to what went wrong. Specifically, 555 00:30:18,876 --> 00:30:22,556 Speaker 1: for the first time ever, in the Democratic caucuses. Instead 556 00:30:22,556 --> 00:30:26,876 Speaker 1: of just having each person who's running each caucus report 557 00:30:26,996 --> 00:30:31,476 Speaker 1: one number, namely, what were the final allocation of delegates 558 00:30:31,476 --> 00:30:34,836 Speaker 1: at the end of this night, instead the party asked 559 00:30:34,836 --> 00:30:38,756 Speaker 1: to have three numbers reported, which began with the initial 560 00:30:38,836 --> 00:30:40,916 Speaker 1: process of how people wanted to vote when they came in, 561 00:30:41,236 --> 00:30:44,476 Speaker 1: then moved on to include the process of change, and 562 00:30:44,516 --> 00:30:47,356 Speaker 1: then ended up with a final result at the end. Now, 563 00:30:47,396 --> 00:30:51,396 Speaker 1: in principle, introducing this information was a really good idea. 564 00:30:51,556 --> 00:30:53,676 Speaker 1: In fact, it was pushed forward by the Bernie Sanders 565 00:30:53,676 --> 00:30:57,516 Speaker 1: campaign and the aftermath of the twenty sixteen Iowa caucuses 566 00:30:57,756 --> 00:31:00,516 Speaker 1: because they felt that they had been robbed insofar as 567 00:31:00,556 --> 00:31:02,316 Speaker 1: they had more votes from the people who walked in 568 00:31:02,436 --> 00:31:04,956 Speaker 1: the first place than they did ultimately in the process, 569 00:31:05,076 --> 00:31:09,116 Speaker 1: and that information had not been reported. In principle, it's 570 00:31:09,236 --> 00:31:12,196 Speaker 1: always good that we know more information about an election. 571 00:31:12,516 --> 00:31:16,236 Speaker 1: In theory, we always want to know more data. The 572 00:31:16,316 --> 00:31:19,716 Speaker 1: reality is, however, that when you have a complex and 573 00:31:19,836 --> 00:31:23,356 Speaker 1: ramshackle process that relies on individual humans who are not 574 00:31:23,476 --> 00:31:28,516 Speaker 1: professionals recording information, asking them to submit three data points 575 00:31:28,556 --> 00:31:31,556 Speaker 1: instead of one, open the door to a disaster that 576 00:31:31,756 --> 00:31:36,876 Speaker 1: was in fact highly probable in retrospect. Namely, it created 577 00:31:36,916 --> 00:31:40,516 Speaker 1: the distinct probability that some people would not do the 578 00:31:40,556 --> 00:31:44,316 Speaker 1: math right and would report numbers that were internally inconsistent 579 00:31:44,636 --> 00:31:48,676 Speaker 1: with each other. That's just why we only ask most 580 00:31:48,676 --> 00:31:50,716 Speaker 1: of the time for a single number when it comes 581 00:31:50,756 --> 00:31:53,636 Speaker 1: to counting votes, because the deeper you go into the 582 00:31:53,676 --> 00:31:58,076 Speaker 1: details of data, the more possibility for contradiction and error 583 00:31:58,116 --> 00:32:02,916 Speaker 1: inevitably arises. Remember the two thousand Bush v. Gore controversy. 584 00:32:03,436 --> 00:32:08,916 Speaker 1: When Florida officials began a detailed recount of the entirety 585 00:32:08,916 --> 00:32:13,236 Speaker 1: of what had happened there, they immediately discovered hanging chads, 586 00:32:13,476 --> 00:32:17,076 Speaker 1: dimple chads, divergences in counting it turned out it was 587 00:32:17,116 --> 00:32:20,796 Speaker 1: almost impossible to replicate the same outcome more than once 588 00:32:20,876 --> 00:32:24,796 Speaker 1: on the same body of ballots. That's the way things 589 00:32:24,916 --> 00:32:29,716 Speaker 1: actually are in the reality of elections. There's complexity, there's contradiction, 590 00:32:30,076 --> 00:32:34,396 Speaker 1: and boy is there a lot of human error. Requiring 591 00:32:34,636 --> 00:32:38,316 Speaker 1: the reporting of three pieces of data was almost certain 592 00:32:38,476 --> 00:32:42,076 Speaker 1: to reveal the depth and extremity of that human error. 593 00:32:42,796 --> 00:32:45,556 Speaker 1: Now you might say, well, if that's the way it was, 594 00:32:45,636 --> 00:32:48,276 Speaker 1: then the results were never meaningful, and in that case 595 00:32:48,556 --> 00:32:50,916 Speaker 1: it was good that we got that information. I would 596 00:32:50,956 --> 00:32:53,676 Speaker 1: respond to that by saying that, in fact, the problem 597 00:32:53,756 --> 00:32:56,556 Speaker 1: is that all elections, no matter where you will hold them, 598 00:32:56,556 --> 00:32:59,316 Speaker 1: and no matter how you run them, have a significant 599 00:32:59,356 --> 00:33:03,356 Speaker 1: amount of human error in them. Asking for more data 600 00:33:03,596 --> 00:33:05,956 Speaker 1: is a guarantee that you will reveal that human error. 601 00:33:06,076 --> 00:33:10,116 Speaker 1: And here's the punchline, that will also under the legitimacy 602 00:33:10,196 --> 00:33:14,076 Speaker 1: of elections themselves. We tend to forget that elections because 603 00:33:14,076 --> 00:33:18,236 Speaker 1: they're human are messy. Because humans are messy. We aspire 604 00:33:18,316 --> 00:33:22,276 Speaker 1: to perfection, We aspire to cleanliness. We aspire to yes 605 00:33:22,596 --> 00:33:25,396 Speaker 1: an app that has the capacity to do everything we 606 00:33:25,436 --> 00:33:29,756 Speaker 1: think without trouble or mistakes. The reality proves to be otherwise, 607 00:33:30,156 --> 00:33:35,356 Speaker 1: apps break down. Humans break down, math breaks down, the 608 00:33:35,396 --> 00:33:39,316 Speaker 1: elections break down. That's why the simplest is always the 609 00:33:39,356 --> 00:33:42,396 Speaker 1: best when it comes to the democratic process. By only 610 00:33:42,436 --> 00:33:45,556 Speaker 1: announcing one number, the number of votes of who won 611 00:33:45,996 --> 00:33:48,876 Speaker 1: and the number of votes of who lost, we mask 612 00:33:49,236 --> 00:33:52,556 Speaker 1: the ugliness, and that masking turns out to in fact 613 00:33:52,596 --> 00:33:57,476 Speaker 1: be necessary to producing democratic legitimacy. So you think the 614 00:33:57,596 --> 00:34:00,316 Speaker 1: data is always good. You think information is always good. 615 00:34:00,756 --> 00:34:05,076 Speaker 1: It isn't always good if it reveals the ugly human 616 00:34:05,436 --> 00:34:08,836 Speaker 1: messiness and frailty at the base of our democratic system. 617 00:34:09,276 --> 00:34:12,276 Speaker 1: We're better off with elections that just tell you who 618 00:34:12,396 --> 00:34:15,676 Speaker 1: voted and for whom, and that may mean we're better 619 00:34:15,716 --> 00:34:21,116 Speaker 1: off having elections and not having caucuses at all. Deep 620 00:34:21,156 --> 00:34:24,396 Speaker 1: Background is brought to you by Pushkin Industries. Our producer 621 00:34:24,476 --> 00:34:27,636 Speaker 1: is Lydia Gene Coott, with studio recording by Joseph Fridman 622 00:34:27,756 --> 00:34:31,956 Speaker 1: and mastering by Jason Gambrell and Jason Roskowski. Our showrunner 623 00:34:31,996 --> 00:34:35,796 Speaker 1: is Sophie mckibbon. Our theme music is composed by Luis Gara. 624 00:34:36,076 --> 00:34:39,716 Speaker 1: Special thanks to the Pushkin Brass Malcolm Gladwell, Jacob Weisberg 625 00:34:39,756 --> 00:34:43,076 Speaker 1: and Mia Lobel. I'm Noah Feldman. You can follow me 626 00:34:43,156 --> 00:34:47,276 Speaker 1: on Twitter at Noah R. Feldman. This is deep background