1 00:00:15,076 --> 00:00:24,476 Speaker 1: Pushkin, this is solvable. I'm Jacob Weisberg. So you can 2 00:00:24,476 --> 00:00:28,876 Speaker 1: talk about fake news and propaganda and astroturfing, but all 3 00:00:28,916 --> 00:00:31,636 Speaker 1: of those things hacked the greater process. The conversation around 4 00:00:31,636 --> 00:00:36,556 Speaker 1: the election. Election meddling undermines what sits at the foundation 5 00:00:36,636 --> 00:00:41,156 Speaker 1: of American democracy, confidence in our voting system. Whether hacking 6 00:00:41,196 --> 00:00:43,676 Speaker 1: takes the form of masking the original source of a 7 00:00:43,716 --> 00:00:46,396 Speaker 1: campaign message to make it seem like it comes from 8 00:00:46,436 --> 00:00:52,236 Speaker 1: the grassroots, so called astarturfing, or disseminating intentionally false information, 9 00:00:52,556 --> 00:00:55,796 Speaker 1: it all leads Americans to question the legitimacy of the 10 00:00:55,836 --> 00:01:01,116 Speaker 1: democratic process. In twenty sixteen, we discovered Russian backhackers were 11 00:01:01,116 --> 00:01:06,676 Speaker 1: responsible for disinformation campaigns. In response, Congress directed three hundred 12 00:01:06,676 --> 00:01:09,956 Speaker 1: and eighty million dollars to the fifty states to boost 13 00:01:09,996 --> 00:01:14,316 Speaker 1: election security. But did it really help? Is it useful 14 00:01:14,356 --> 00:01:17,356 Speaker 1: to compare electoral outcomes to poll results? You're not going 15 00:01:17,396 --> 00:01:20,156 Speaker 1: to believe it, right, I mean, the problem of voting, 16 00:01:20,276 --> 00:01:23,676 Speaker 1: as opposed to any other computer security mechanism is that 17 00:01:23,796 --> 00:01:27,836 Speaker 1: after the fact, it's partisan. Is there a problem with 18 00:01:27,876 --> 00:01:31,396 Speaker 1: the expectation we have than that the winner of election 19 00:01:31,876 --> 00:01:35,836 Speaker 1: ought to be declared immediately? So yes, a slower process 20 00:01:36,316 --> 00:01:41,236 Speaker 1: would enable us to do more checking before announcing anything. 21 00:01:41,836 --> 00:01:45,316 Speaker 1: The American people don't like that. I mean, even going 22 00:01:45,356 --> 00:01:49,756 Speaker 1: to sleep before knowing is bad. With increasingly long election seasons, 23 00:01:49,836 --> 00:01:53,236 Speaker 1: I'd sleep better on election night hearing than my candidate one, 24 00:01:53,676 --> 00:01:56,756 Speaker 1: But wouldn't we all sleep better knowing that whatever the result, 25 00:01:56,916 --> 00:02:00,116 Speaker 1: it was guaranteed to be accurate. The tech is real, 26 00:02:00,396 --> 00:02:03,116 Speaker 1: but the tech is solvable. None of what you've described 27 00:02:03,996 --> 00:02:08,996 Speaker 1: is exotic or untried. Why has it been so difficult 28 00:02:08,996 --> 00:02:12,196 Speaker 1: to convince other states to put in place some of 29 00:02:12,236 --> 00:02:18,076 Speaker 1: these already available voting techniques Because the problems are not technical. 30 00:02:18,476 --> 00:02:27,556 Speaker 1: The problems are political Elections security is mostly solvable. Brush 31 00:02:27,556 --> 00:02:32,756 Speaker 1: Schneier is an internationally renowned security technologist. He teaches cybersecurity 32 00:02:32,756 --> 00:02:36,156 Speaker 1: at the Harvard Kennedy School. My co host Malcolm Gladwell 33 00:02:36,396 --> 00:02:38,956 Speaker 1: talked with Schneier about the threats that loom over the 34 00:02:39,036 --> 00:02:43,516 Speaker 1: vote this fall. When we talk about elections being hacked, 35 00:02:44,436 --> 00:02:47,116 Speaker 1: what does that mean? I'm assuming that there are fifty 36 00:02:47,116 --> 00:02:50,676 Speaker 1: different things that fall under that category. So we'll talk 37 00:02:50,716 --> 00:02:55,356 Speaker 1: about hacking the voting process, and that's a process by 38 00:02:55,396 --> 00:02:57,996 Speaker 1: which you cast your vote. We also talk about hacking 39 00:02:57,996 --> 00:03:02,436 Speaker 1: the broader electoral process. So when the Russians hacked the 40 00:03:02,476 --> 00:03:05,396 Speaker 1: Democratic National Committee and posted a dump a lot of 41 00:03:05,436 --> 00:03:08,836 Speaker 1: information online, they weren't hacking the vote. They were hacking 42 00:03:09,196 --> 00:03:12,276 Speaker 1: the overall election process. So you can talk about fake 43 00:03:12,356 --> 00:03:16,596 Speaker 1: news and propaganda and astroturfing and all of those things 44 00:03:16,636 --> 00:03:19,996 Speaker 1: hack the greater process, the conversation around the election. And 45 00:03:20,036 --> 00:03:24,396 Speaker 1: that's one very separate branch. The other branch is hacking 46 00:03:24,396 --> 00:03:27,436 Speaker 1: the vote itself, or the process by which you and 47 00:03:27,476 --> 00:03:31,556 Speaker 1: I go to vote. And there you have four places 48 00:03:32,036 --> 00:03:35,236 Speaker 1: where you can affect things, sort of affect the outcome. 49 00:03:36,036 --> 00:03:40,276 Speaker 1: The first is the registration process, and we've read about 50 00:03:40,356 --> 00:03:43,316 Speaker 1: and seen different hacks on the voting rolls so that 51 00:03:43,396 --> 00:03:45,716 Speaker 1: when you go to vote, you can't at that point 52 00:03:45,756 --> 00:03:48,996 Speaker 1: this particular kind of hacking. Is it really about taking 53 00:03:48,996 --> 00:03:52,156 Speaker 1: people off the rolls. It's a couple of things. In 54 00:03:52,236 --> 00:03:56,356 Speaker 1: California some years ago, people had their party affiliation change 55 00:03:56,916 --> 00:04:00,436 Speaker 1: from Republican to Democrat. You can change the address of somebody, 56 00:04:00,716 --> 00:04:02,756 Speaker 1: so they go to vote and they were told to 57 00:04:02,796 --> 00:04:05,476 Speaker 1: go to a different poll. And some of these are easy. 58 00:04:05,916 --> 00:04:11,156 Speaker 1: Many states have online systems to change your registration that 59 00:04:11,316 --> 00:04:15,276 Speaker 1: aren't well authenticated. Others is to pull people off the 60 00:04:15,316 --> 00:04:19,436 Speaker 1: voting roles. Others are to erase the voting roles. What 61 00:04:19,476 --> 00:04:21,356 Speaker 1: happens if we get to election day in a certain 62 00:04:21,396 --> 00:04:24,316 Speaker 1: state and the voting roles don't work and we don't 63 00:04:24,356 --> 00:04:27,076 Speaker 1: know why. So a lot of things against the voting roles. 64 00:04:28,116 --> 00:04:30,716 Speaker 1: The second is the thing we talk about all the time, 65 00:04:30,716 --> 00:04:34,956 Speaker 1: which is the vote itself. Is your vote recorded accurately. 66 00:04:36,196 --> 00:04:39,276 Speaker 1: The third is the tabulation process. May no matter how 67 00:04:39,356 --> 00:04:43,316 Speaker 1: you vote, there's this sort of automated, sort of manual 68 00:04:43,356 --> 00:04:47,236 Speaker 1: process by which the numbers out of each machine get 69 00:04:47,276 --> 00:04:52,276 Speaker 1: increasingly aggregated, the numbers in the building, the numbers and 70 00:04:52,356 --> 00:04:56,276 Speaker 1: the precinct, the numbers in the town, the city, the state, 71 00:04:56,356 --> 00:04:59,236 Speaker 1: you know, all the way up to the national if 72 00:04:59,276 --> 00:05:02,596 Speaker 1: that matters. And then the last, which I think people 73 00:05:02,596 --> 00:05:05,876 Speaker 1: don't think about a lot, is the reporting process. And 74 00:05:05,956 --> 00:05:08,956 Speaker 1: we have seen and this was something that we think 75 00:05:09,196 --> 00:05:16,916 Speaker 1: is thwarted in eighteen erroneous reporting where the numbers are right. 76 00:05:17,196 --> 00:05:21,556 Speaker 1: But the press release says the opposite of those four 77 00:05:21,636 --> 00:05:24,596 Speaker 1: things that you've identified, Can we rank them in order 78 00:05:24,596 --> 00:05:28,036 Speaker 1: of seriousness? Which is the one that worries you the most? 79 00:05:28,676 --> 00:05:31,836 Speaker 1: I would not rank them. I think ranking is dangerous. 80 00:05:31,836 --> 00:05:36,436 Speaker 1: I think they're all risky. Yeah, if I'm a chaos agent, 81 00:05:37,756 --> 00:05:42,316 Speaker 1: how did what's the level of difficulty involved in spreading 82 00:05:42,396 --> 00:05:45,236 Speaker 1: chaos in the American electoral system. It will depend on 83 00:05:45,276 --> 00:05:48,756 Speaker 1: the technology. So we can talk about voting machines and 84 00:05:48,916 --> 00:05:52,276 Speaker 1: some are more secure than others. And I vote in Minnesota. 85 00:05:52,476 --> 00:05:54,756 Speaker 1: We use optical scan voting. I have a piece of paper, 86 00:05:54,796 --> 00:05:58,556 Speaker 1: I fill in ovals and then that is tallied using computer. 87 00:05:58,836 --> 00:06:02,756 Speaker 1: That is the gold standard. It is a voter verifiable 88 00:06:02,956 --> 00:06:07,436 Speaker 1: paper audit trail now is real hard to mess with that, 89 00:06:08,036 --> 00:06:10,556 Speaker 1: and you can mess with the tabulating, but there's a 90 00:06:10,596 --> 00:06:13,996 Speaker 1: paper backup. You can do a recount. Some states vote 91 00:06:14,036 --> 00:06:17,716 Speaker 1: on touch screen machines. We've had times those machines have 92 00:06:17,756 --> 00:06:20,076 Speaker 1: opened up and that it's been zero to zero, zero 93 00:06:20,076 --> 00:06:22,476 Speaker 1: to zero. What does that mean? Right? No votes to 94 00:06:22,596 --> 00:06:27,636 Speaker 1: no votes? Something went wrong today. Those machines are a 95 00:06:27,676 --> 00:06:30,996 Speaker 1: lot worse than you want them to be. The companies 96 00:06:31,076 --> 00:06:34,636 Speaker 1: keep them very secret, but there have been audits. At 97 00:06:34,676 --> 00:06:37,036 Speaker 1: Defcon hacker conference, I think a couple of years ago, 98 00:06:37,076 --> 00:06:39,076 Speaker 1: we had a bunch of machines and a voting village 99 00:06:39,316 --> 00:06:42,556 Speaker 1: and they were all hacked. Companies say they're all flying, 100 00:06:42,596 --> 00:06:46,396 Speaker 1: they're often online. There's a lot of ways to go 101 00:06:46,436 --> 00:06:49,596 Speaker 1: after those those machines. So this isn't like hacking into 102 00:06:49,596 --> 00:06:53,716 Speaker 1: the NSA. This is like, this is some This is 103 00:06:53,756 --> 00:06:55,636 Speaker 1: a lot more garden variety kind of hacking that we're 104 00:06:55,676 --> 00:06:57,716 Speaker 1: talking about. It's a lot more garden variety. Give me 105 00:06:57,756 --> 00:07:00,996 Speaker 1: a description of the most vulnerable system. What would be 106 00:07:01,076 --> 00:07:04,396 Speaker 1: the one? Touch screens, touch screen voting. Anybody voting on 107 00:07:04,436 --> 00:07:08,116 Speaker 1: touch screen voting is taking a chance. Now that's in 108 00:07:08,116 --> 00:07:12,596 Speaker 1: the US country like Estonia, they have internet voting that 109 00:07:12,716 --> 00:07:17,276 Speaker 1: is even more dangerous than going to a machine. Yeah, 110 00:07:17,316 --> 00:07:21,596 Speaker 1: I can't design a secure internet voting system. I can't 111 00:07:21,636 --> 00:07:25,356 Speaker 1: design a secure electronic voting machine. I can't do it. 112 00:07:25,356 --> 00:07:27,596 Speaker 1: It can't be done. We shouldn't do it. And you'll 113 00:07:27,596 --> 00:07:30,796 Speaker 1: come back to me and say, we're banking over the internet. 114 00:07:31,196 --> 00:07:34,196 Speaker 1: We're doing all these other things over the Internet. Why 115 00:07:34,236 --> 00:07:36,956 Speaker 1: in the world is this different? Why is it different? 116 00:07:36,996 --> 00:07:41,396 Speaker 1: The short answer is that voting requires anonymity. That when 117 00:07:41,436 --> 00:07:43,196 Speaker 1: you think about everything else to do in the Internet, 118 00:07:43,796 --> 00:07:46,076 Speaker 1: your name is attached as an account attached. If there's 119 00:07:46,116 --> 00:07:48,356 Speaker 1: a problem, you can roll it back, you can figure 120 00:07:48,356 --> 00:07:50,596 Speaker 1: it out. MAF you came back to me and said, 121 00:07:51,076 --> 00:07:53,196 Speaker 1: we're going to dump the secret ballots. Right, all votes 122 00:07:53,236 --> 00:07:55,596 Speaker 1: are now public, right, you know, and we could decide 123 00:07:55,636 --> 00:08:00,316 Speaker 1: that's a reasonable way to vote. The Switzerland voted that 124 00:08:00,356 --> 00:08:03,796 Speaker 1: way for many years, the Romans voted that way for 125 00:08:03,836 --> 00:08:07,876 Speaker 1: a lot of their elections. Then it's a different story. 126 00:08:07,876 --> 00:08:10,356 Speaker 1: And actually I could do voting easily. I can vote 127 00:08:10,396 --> 00:08:12,436 Speaker 1: by app, we can vote by Facebook. All that will 128 00:08:12,476 --> 00:08:16,156 Speaker 1: work because at the end of the day you can 129 00:08:16,196 --> 00:08:19,316 Speaker 1: go look online at the tally of votes, make sure 130 00:08:19,356 --> 00:08:22,036 Speaker 1: your name is in the right column, and you know 131 00:08:22,076 --> 00:08:25,516 Speaker 1: the votes accurate. I'm not sure to understand the fact 132 00:08:25,556 --> 00:08:28,116 Speaker 1: that voting has to be we have to have a 133 00:08:28,156 --> 00:08:33,036 Speaker 1: secret ballot makes the task of digital voting. You're saying 134 00:08:33,356 --> 00:08:37,196 Speaker 1: very very difficult. Why exactly, I'm not following that. Why 135 00:08:37,196 --> 00:08:41,316 Speaker 1: can't I have an authentication system to get into the 136 00:08:41,396 --> 00:08:46,516 Speaker 1: voting booth, But then you anonymize me once I'm inside 137 00:08:46,596 --> 00:08:50,076 Speaker 1: the booth and the electronic booth and record my vote. 138 00:08:50,396 --> 00:08:52,636 Speaker 1: So that works great. They are systems that do that. 139 00:08:53,356 --> 00:08:56,836 Speaker 1: And now the question is do we trust the computer security? Right? 140 00:08:57,116 --> 00:09:00,116 Speaker 1: Are the computers that are doing this somehow magically better 141 00:09:00,156 --> 00:09:03,236 Speaker 1: than other computers and they're not, so there'll be lots 142 00:09:03,236 --> 00:09:05,556 Speaker 1: of ways to hack into that, just like there are 143 00:09:05,596 --> 00:09:07,916 Speaker 1: lots of ways to hack into corporate networks and banking 144 00:09:07,956 --> 00:09:11,276 Speaker 1: networks and all those comut to security stories we find. Now, 145 00:09:11,276 --> 00:09:15,276 Speaker 1: if someone hacks into your bank and changes bank balances, 146 00:09:15,876 --> 00:09:17,716 Speaker 1: you will know that, you will see that, you will 147 00:09:17,756 --> 00:09:19,316 Speaker 1: go to the bank, the bank will figure it out. 148 00:09:19,636 --> 00:09:23,516 Speaker 1: The difference is that in the election case, you might 149 00:09:23,556 --> 00:09:25,756 Speaker 1: not know it would happen, and there's no way to 150 00:09:25,876 --> 00:09:29,796 Speaker 1: recover because there is that anonymity, because there's that break 151 00:09:29,876 --> 00:09:34,276 Speaker 1: between the registration right getting into the system, as you mentioned, 152 00:09:34,756 --> 00:09:38,996 Speaker 1: and the voting your votes anonymized. I can't have an 153 00:09:39,036 --> 00:09:43,636 Speaker 1: audit system, and I can't post on a public website 154 00:09:43,916 --> 00:09:46,796 Speaker 1: everybody who voted for candidate A ever and voted for 155 00:09:46,836 --> 00:09:51,196 Speaker 1: candidate B. Now that's a check. You do that, and 156 00:09:51,276 --> 00:09:53,116 Speaker 1: we will all though those of us who care enough 157 00:09:53,116 --> 00:09:55,756 Speaker 1: of us will will look at the lists, make sure 158 00:09:55,756 --> 00:09:59,476 Speaker 1: we're there, and we have very high confidence that no 159 00:09:59,476 --> 00:10:03,356 Speaker 1: one's been moved without their consent. You can't do that 160 00:10:03,436 --> 00:10:05,596 Speaker 1: with an anonymous ballot. So what if I just said 161 00:10:05,636 --> 00:10:08,676 Speaker 1: to you, Okay, if the risk of hacking is as 162 00:10:08,756 --> 00:10:10,796 Speaker 1: large as you say, it is, why don't we do 163 00:10:10,836 --> 00:10:13,316 Speaker 1: away with the secret ballot? We could. Now that's a 164 00:10:13,396 --> 00:10:15,836 Speaker 1: voting question, that's not I mean I'm a computer security person. 165 00:10:15,876 --> 00:10:19,156 Speaker 1: That feels like a political science question. I mean, let's 166 00:10:19,196 --> 00:10:21,996 Speaker 1: have experts talk about that. We can talk about some 167 00:10:22,076 --> 00:10:23,796 Speaker 1: of the some of the risks. The risks are going 168 00:10:23,836 --> 00:10:28,716 Speaker 1: to be coercion. So if I am in, I'm gonna 169 00:10:28,716 --> 00:10:31,796 Speaker 1: make this up an abusive relationship with you. You can 170 00:10:31,796 --> 00:10:33,156 Speaker 1: tell me how to vote, and you can make sure 171 00:10:33,196 --> 00:10:35,676 Speaker 1: I vote the way you want me to. You could 172 00:10:35,676 --> 00:10:38,636 Speaker 1: buy my vote and make sure I deliver. Yeah. Now, 173 00:10:38,676 --> 00:10:42,316 Speaker 1: we're in a world where many of us are transparent 174 00:10:42,636 --> 00:10:46,356 Speaker 1: about our votes, but there is political value in the 175 00:10:46,396 --> 00:10:49,596 Speaker 1: secret ballot, and that is probably a discussion we should 176 00:10:49,596 --> 00:10:52,476 Speaker 1: have as a society today. So setting that aside for 177 00:10:52,516 --> 00:10:55,116 Speaker 1: a vote, that's one that's one branch we could follow. 178 00:10:55,356 --> 00:10:57,476 Speaker 1: And so you're saying, if we decided to do with 179 00:10:57,476 --> 00:10:59,756 Speaker 1: the secret ballot, it makes the job of people like 180 00:10:59,836 --> 00:11:03,196 Speaker 1: you a lot easier. Actually, it makes it trivial. I mean, 181 00:11:03,756 --> 00:11:07,156 Speaker 1: it's suddenly it's solved. You download an app, you vote 182 00:11:07,556 --> 00:11:13,036 Speaker 1: anyway you want, webs kiosk on Facebook, nobody cares. Yeah, 183 00:11:13,716 --> 00:11:17,236 Speaker 1: how do we know when there's fraud, So is it 184 00:11:17,396 --> 00:11:19,836 Speaker 1: entirely possible that a lot of the fraud that goes 185 00:11:19,876 --> 00:11:22,596 Speaker 1: on because you're talking about systems like say with a 186 00:11:22,636 --> 00:11:27,036 Speaker 1: touchscreen system, it's quite possible. You would never something could 187 00:11:27,036 --> 00:11:29,676 Speaker 1: be hacking. You'd never know, right, And that's true in 188 00:11:29,836 --> 00:11:32,916 Speaker 1: pretty much all hacking is your email hacked? Who's reading 189 00:11:32,916 --> 00:11:36,596 Speaker 1: your email? You don't know? Yeah, and you know. I 190 00:11:36,636 --> 00:11:41,396 Speaker 1: mean it's a famous hack against Apple Photo Archive where 191 00:11:41,476 --> 00:11:45,116 Speaker 1: photographs of celebrities were stolen and then published. Were they 192 00:11:45,116 --> 00:11:49,276 Speaker 1: not published, we would never know. Examples of networks, equifacts 193 00:11:49,436 --> 00:11:52,316 Speaker 1: they were hacked. They figured it out like five six 194 00:11:52,396 --> 00:11:56,956 Speaker 1: months later by accident. Lots of hacking in our world 195 00:11:57,316 --> 00:12:00,396 Speaker 1: goes unnoticed, and the more skilled you are, the more 196 00:12:00,516 --> 00:12:03,836 Speaker 1: you can cover your tracks. You talk about government hacking, 197 00:12:03,876 --> 00:12:08,716 Speaker 1: I bet a lot of it goes unnoticed forever. Criminal 198 00:12:08,756 --> 00:12:11,116 Speaker 1: hacking tends to be noticed because the crime is going 199 00:12:11,156 --> 00:12:14,556 Speaker 1: to be financial and eventually you'll see you lost money 200 00:12:14,596 --> 00:12:17,836 Speaker 1: and you'll try to figure out how. But hacking for information, 201 00:12:19,316 --> 00:12:21,436 Speaker 1: I think there's a lot more that goes on at 202 00:12:21,476 --> 00:12:25,916 Speaker 1: the state, the state level than we know about because 203 00:12:25,916 --> 00:12:28,236 Speaker 1: it is largely done in secret. So you're talking about 204 00:12:28,236 --> 00:12:30,716 Speaker 1: some of these systems, say, with the test screen system, 205 00:12:30,796 --> 00:12:36,316 Speaker 1: it's very difficult, too impossible to figure out whether hacking 206 00:12:36,356 --> 00:12:39,756 Speaker 1: has taken place. But are there proxies we can use? 207 00:12:39,796 --> 00:12:42,956 Speaker 1: I mean, is it useful to compare electoral outcomes to 208 00:12:43,076 --> 00:12:46,556 Speaker 1: poll results? And is there other ways to flag at 209 00:12:46,636 --> 00:12:50,796 Speaker 1: least suspicious outcomes? There is, but you're not going to 210 00:12:50,836 --> 00:12:53,476 Speaker 1: believe it, right. I mean, the problem of a voting 211 00:12:53,636 --> 00:12:56,996 Speaker 1: as opposed to any other computer security mechanism is that 212 00:12:57,156 --> 00:13:01,876 Speaker 1: after the fact it's partisan. You know, we can do 213 00:13:02,036 --> 00:13:04,916 Speaker 1: polling and compare polling with the actual vote and stuff 214 00:13:04,956 --> 00:13:07,796 Speaker 1: that didn't matter, like what color eminem we want to choose, 215 00:13:08,156 --> 00:13:10,476 Speaker 1: and we can use that say oh yeah, look there's 216 00:13:10,476 --> 00:13:14,636 Speaker 1: been the balance stuffing the purple eminem people organized on 217 00:13:15,196 --> 00:13:18,956 Speaker 1: four chan and they have stuffed the vote. But if 218 00:13:18,956 --> 00:13:21,516 Speaker 1: you do that with an actual election and you're on 219 00:13:21,516 --> 00:13:24,236 Speaker 1: the losing side, how do you feel when someone says 220 00:13:24,716 --> 00:13:27,676 Speaker 1: the actual vote was different than the polls, You're going 221 00:13:27,716 --> 00:13:29,956 Speaker 1: to say, no, what do you mean? The actual vote 222 00:13:29,996 --> 00:13:33,916 Speaker 1: is what counts the polls, don't people lied on the polls. 223 00:13:33,916 --> 00:13:38,156 Speaker 1: Silent majority will have all these reasons, So scientifically we 224 00:13:38,236 --> 00:13:41,916 Speaker 1: might be able to use that as evidence, but politically 225 00:13:42,716 --> 00:13:48,076 Speaker 1: that will never fly as anything because it is so partisan. 226 00:13:48,836 --> 00:13:51,516 Speaker 1: Is there a problem with the expectation we have that then, 227 00:13:51,596 --> 00:13:55,276 Speaker 1: that the winner of election ought to be declared immediately? 228 00:13:55,356 --> 00:14:00,076 Speaker 1: Should we start by abandoning that that notion? So? Yes, 229 00:14:00,196 --> 00:14:04,796 Speaker 1: a slower process would enable us to do more checking 230 00:14:05,676 --> 00:14:10,996 Speaker 1: before announcing anything. The American people don't like that, you 231 00:14:10,996 --> 00:14:13,876 Speaker 1: know nobody, I mean, even going to sleep before knowing 232 00:14:14,956 --> 00:14:19,076 Speaker 1: is bad in our system. If we could abandon the 233 00:14:19,116 --> 00:14:24,036 Speaker 1: immediate knowing, the exit polls, the guessing, all of that. 234 00:14:25,156 --> 00:14:28,756 Speaker 1: As an election security person, as election to reliability person, 235 00:14:28,996 --> 00:14:31,276 Speaker 1: I would like that change. So it's all right, place 236 00:14:31,356 --> 00:14:32,996 Speaker 1: you can have that. How long do you need for 237 00:14:33,036 --> 00:14:35,996 Speaker 1: close elections? You want a little more time because you 238 00:14:36,036 --> 00:14:39,676 Speaker 1: want to make sure everything's accurate in a normal election. 239 00:14:40,356 --> 00:14:43,436 Speaker 1: My guess is only a few days. Because what I 240 00:14:43,556 --> 00:14:48,236 Speaker 1: want to do is do automatic audits on all elections. 241 00:14:48,476 --> 00:14:51,836 Speaker 1: There are systems of audits we can do where the 242 00:14:51,956 --> 00:14:55,836 Speaker 1: level of audit depends on how close the election is. 243 00:14:56,196 --> 00:14:58,716 Speaker 1: If the election is ninety percent to one, you have 244 00:14:58,756 --> 00:15:01,556 Speaker 1: to audit one ballot, or you know, ten percent of 245 00:15:01,556 --> 00:15:03,956 Speaker 1: the ballots. If it's fifty one to forty nine, you 246 00:15:03,956 --> 00:15:06,796 Speaker 1: have to audit and to make this up twenty percent 247 00:15:06,836 --> 00:15:09,116 Speaker 1: of the ballots. The numbers are actually actually a lot 248 00:15:09,116 --> 00:15:13,116 Speaker 1: lower than that, So you know, two thousand Florida, we 249 00:15:13,196 --> 00:15:16,516 Speaker 1: actually wanted a lot of time, and politically we couldn't 250 00:15:16,516 --> 00:15:20,356 Speaker 1: get it because that was a badly designed ballot. So 251 00:15:20,476 --> 00:15:24,476 Speaker 1: it was a slow, manual recount that was triggered. I 252 00:15:24,516 --> 00:15:27,956 Speaker 1: think one of the I think the Gore team to 253 00:15:28,476 --> 00:15:31,516 Speaker 1: ask for the recount according to law, so I want 254 00:15:31,556 --> 00:15:34,556 Speaker 1: automatic recounts that don't have to be asked for. That 255 00:15:34,596 --> 00:15:36,996 Speaker 1: we just do as a matter of course because we 256 00:15:37,036 --> 00:15:40,396 Speaker 1: don't know where there's going to be problems. So it's 257 00:15:40,436 --> 00:15:43,556 Speaker 1: really right now, it's going to depend on COVID. So 258 00:15:43,596 --> 00:15:45,396 Speaker 1: we're going to have an election that will be a 259 00:15:45,396 --> 00:15:47,676 Speaker 1: lot of mail in votes at the last minute, and 260 00:15:47,756 --> 00:15:49,836 Speaker 1: some of the states say they have to be postmarked 261 00:15:50,036 --> 00:15:53,036 Speaker 1: on election day, so which means what they delivered three 262 00:15:53,116 --> 00:15:56,836 Speaker 1: days later and they are counted slowly after that. I 263 00:15:57,036 --> 00:16:00,916 Speaker 1: worry that they will be preliminary results on election night 264 00:16:01,356 --> 00:16:04,476 Speaker 1: and that the demographics of the mail the late mail 265 00:16:04,556 --> 00:16:07,556 Speaker 1: in voters will be different. I don't even know how 266 00:16:07,596 --> 00:16:10,596 Speaker 1: in what way, but you know, it's plausible that there'll 267 00:16:10,596 --> 00:16:13,196 Speaker 1: be some demographic that waits at the last minute, and 268 00:16:13,236 --> 00:16:17,636 Speaker 1: then you'll have the person who's was declared the presumptive 269 00:16:17,636 --> 00:16:21,676 Speaker 1: winner on election night. Say I was robbed when two 270 00:16:21,676 --> 00:16:25,476 Speaker 1: weeks later all of these mail in ballots swing the 271 00:16:25,476 --> 00:16:27,756 Speaker 1: election the other way. And I don't even know which 272 00:16:27,756 --> 00:16:30,076 Speaker 1: party is going to benefit. Right that it's not even 273 00:16:30,076 --> 00:16:34,036 Speaker 1: obvious to me. Let's do Bruce's optimal system tell me 274 00:16:34,276 --> 00:16:37,636 Speaker 1: what election, what the electoral process should look like in 275 00:16:37,676 --> 00:16:41,076 Speaker 1: the United States. So this is so, I think we 276 00:16:41,156 --> 00:16:45,036 Speaker 1: have a problem in that we require separate registration. I 277 00:16:45,076 --> 00:16:49,276 Speaker 1: think registration should come with citizenship when you turn eighteen, 278 00:16:49,756 --> 00:16:51,996 Speaker 1: and a lot of other countries do that. We have 279 00:16:52,036 --> 00:16:55,276 Speaker 1: a separate registration process that has largely been a voter 280 00:16:55,356 --> 00:16:58,796 Speaker 1: suppression process, and we should do away with it. So 281 00:16:58,876 --> 00:17:02,076 Speaker 1: you're saying, at the age of eighteen, everyone automatically has 282 00:17:02,076 --> 00:17:04,956 Speaker 1: the right to vote, and that's true, but they should 283 00:17:04,956 --> 00:17:08,036 Speaker 1: all they should automatically be registered, they should have ability 284 00:17:08,116 --> 00:17:12,636 Speaker 1: to vote. Yeah, how does automatic registration work in practical terms? 285 00:17:12,716 --> 00:17:15,076 Speaker 1: I mean, I don't know. You automatically get a source 286 00:17:15,076 --> 00:17:18,596 Speaker 1: security number when you're born, so maybe something's flipped when 287 00:17:18,636 --> 00:17:20,876 Speaker 1: you turn eighteen. I mean I don't know how these 288 00:17:20,876 --> 00:17:25,796 Speaker 1: processes work. Yeah, but I think removing that separate step 289 00:17:26,196 --> 00:17:30,436 Speaker 1: will make elections better and fairer and will increase participation. 290 00:17:30,596 --> 00:17:33,516 Speaker 1: Yeah yeah, I'd like there to be. What the US 291 00:17:33,596 --> 00:17:37,236 Speaker 1: doesn't have is an independent voting commission. A lot of 292 00:17:37,276 --> 00:17:41,716 Speaker 1: countries have a bureaucracy that's in charge of voting. Candidate 293 00:17:41,796 --> 00:17:44,476 Speaker 1: does the UK does. We have a bureaucracy in charge 294 00:17:44,476 --> 00:17:47,836 Speaker 1: of the census, a similar breaucracy in charge of voting, 295 00:17:48,116 --> 00:17:52,116 Speaker 1: in charge of accuracy, not partisan this, I think we'll 296 00:17:52,116 --> 00:17:55,276 Speaker 1: go a long way to making this more more secure. 297 00:17:56,076 --> 00:17:59,196 Speaker 1: So we should do that, and that group will be 298 00:17:59,236 --> 00:18:03,596 Speaker 1: in charge of making sure these voting lists are accurate, 299 00:18:03,796 --> 00:18:07,316 Speaker 1: are current, are sent to the precincts where they need 300 00:18:07,356 --> 00:18:10,276 Speaker 1: to be sent. If they are problems, they can there's 301 00:18:10,316 --> 00:18:13,316 Speaker 1: a helpline to figure it out. As much of this 302 00:18:13,356 --> 00:18:16,276 Speaker 1: should be done with paperbackup as possible, because we all 303 00:18:16,276 --> 00:18:19,556 Speaker 1: worried about computer hacking, the voting itself needs to be 304 00:18:19,596 --> 00:18:22,556 Speaker 1: done on secure machines. I mentioned Minnesota optical scan of 305 00:18:22,596 --> 00:18:26,356 Speaker 1: voting that is the gold standard right now and all cases, 306 00:18:26,396 --> 00:18:30,876 Speaker 1: in all elections, we do an audit. The size of 307 00:18:30,916 --> 00:18:33,796 Speaker 1: it depends on the margin of victory. None of what 308 00:18:33,916 --> 00:18:40,996 Speaker 1: you've described is exotic or untried or a lot of 309 00:18:40,996 --> 00:18:44,276 Speaker 1: times when we do these solvable podcasts, we're talking about 310 00:18:44,276 --> 00:18:48,156 Speaker 1: a solution that's off on the horizon somewhere. These solusions 311 00:18:48,156 --> 00:18:50,916 Speaker 1: are not off on the horizon. There some chunk of 312 00:18:50,956 --> 00:18:53,116 Speaker 1: it is in the state of Minnesota. Why has it 313 00:18:53,156 --> 00:18:57,316 Speaker 1: been so difficult to convince other states to put in 314 00:18:57,356 --> 00:19:02,596 Speaker 1: place some of these already available voting techniques because the 315 00:19:02,756 --> 00:19:06,956 Speaker 1: problems are not technical. The problems are political. If you 316 00:19:07,076 --> 00:19:12,316 Speaker 1: believe that your side benefit fits from ignoring the problem, 317 00:19:12,876 --> 00:19:15,316 Speaker 1: why would you spend money on the problem. I mean, 318 00:19:15,436 --> 00:19:19,396 Speaker 1: voting machines are for profit enterprises in this country. There's 319 00:19:19,836 --> 00:19:24,716 Speaker 1: government lobbying on spying and selling voting machines. It's not 320 00:19:24,876 --> 00:19:30,196 Speaker 1: likely again getting back to a government bureaucracy in charge 321 00:19:30,196 --> 00:19:32,836 Speaker 1: of accuracy, we don't have that. So if you are 322 00:19:32,876 --> 00:19:35,556 Speaker 1: a company that makes touching voting machines, you're going to 323 00:19:35,676 --> 00:19:39,476 Speaker 1: shove out all this kind of noise on how great 324 00:19:39,556 --> 00:19:42,436 Speaker 1: your machines are, and the election officials don't know better, 325 00:19:42,476 --> 00:19:45,276 Speaker 1: and they're going to buy them. After two thousand, we 326 00:19:45,356 --> 00:19:48,956 Speaker 1: had to help America Vote Act, where Congress apportioned a 327 00:19:48,996 --> 00:19:52,076 Speaker 1: lot of money to give to the states to improve 328 00:19:52,116 --> 00:19:55,676 Speaker 1: their voting machines. A lot of those went to computerized 329 00:19:55,756 --> 00:20:00,236 Speaker 1: voting machines that have been dumped since then because of 330 00:20:00,436 --> 00:20:04,196 Speaker 1: security problems. So this is a very political issue. My 331 00:20:04,476 --> 00:20:07,956 Speaker 1: problems are in technological that's it's not core science, Yeah, 332 00:20:08,276 --> 00:20:11,276 Speaker 1: it's policy and politics. Do you think there might also 333 00:20:11,316 --> 00:20:15,036 Speaker 1: be a kind of implicit bias that among some people 334 00:20:15,076 --> 00:20:20,276 Speaker 1: that as we move towards more digital digitalization of the system, 335 00:20:20,556 --> 00:20:22,836 Speaker 1: we're making it safer. In other words, are people assuming 336 00:20:22,836 --> 00:20:26,116 Speaker 1: that the application of additional technology here is what will 337 00:20:26,156 --> 00:20:28,916 Speaker 1: improve things and not you're actually you're you're arguing for 338 00:20:29,156 --> 00:20:31,836 Speaker 1: a return to a much more traditional way of voting. 339 00:20:32,276 --> 00:20:34,796 Speaker 1: And this is how we started the podcast, Right, what's 340 00:20:34,916 --> 00:20:38,676 Speaker 1: different about the risks of voting? So, yes, right, there's 341 00:20:38,676 --> 00:20:40,916 Speaker 1: a belief that, you know, we're putting computers on this, 342 00:20:41,316 --> 00:20:44,516 Speaker 1: Computers are good computers going to make this better, safer, faster, 343 00:20:45,036 --> 00:20:47,556 Speaker 1: do all of these things, and it turns out security 344 00:20:48,276 --> 00:20:51,676 Speaker 1: is uh, you know, ends up being something that's that's 345 00:20:51,716 --> 00:20:55,356 Speaker 1: flowing in the other direction, and that that makes this harder. 346 00:20:55,956 --> 00:20:58,996 Speaker 1: What can listeners to this podcast, what can ordinary citizens 347 00:20:59,036 --> 00:21:03,796 Speaker 1: and voters do to to help advance the case of 348 00:21:04,636 --> 00:21:10,756 Speaker 1: most secure elections. So there are organizations that are advocating 349 00:21:10,876 --> 00:21:16,556 Speaker 1: for accurate voting, Verified Voting, dot Org, the National Electoral 350 00:21:16,556 --> 00:21:19,956 Speaker 1: Defense Coalition, There's a group called True the Vote, the 351 00:21:19,956 --> 00:21:22,596 Speaker 1: Brennan Center for Justice. So those are some of the 352 00:21:22,676 --> 00:21:26,716 Speaker 1: organizations I support and think we all should. But if 353 00:21:26,756 --> 00:21:31,196 Speaker 1: this is not a political issue, this will not change fundamentally. 354 00:21:31,516 --> 00:21:34,636 Speaker 1: That is the problem. The tech is real, but the 355 00:21:34,676 --> 00:21:38,036 Speaker 1: tech is solvable. We need the political will to solve it. 356 00:21:38,396 --> 00:21:41,916 Speaker 1: We need the money to solve it. Bruce, thank you 357 00:21:41,956 --> 00:21:45,436 Speaker 1: so much. This has been fascinating. Thank you again. Hey, 358 00:21:45,436 --> 00:21:49,356 Speaker 1: thanks for having me. This is fun. That was Malcolm 359 00:21:49,396 --> 00:21:53,916 Speaker 1: Gladwell speaking with security technologist Brush Nier. Remember to check 360 00:21:53,916 --> 00:21:56,196 Speaker 1: out our show notes for links to the suggestions our 361 00:21:56,276 --> 00:21:59,836 Speaker 1: guest mate for ways that you can get involved. Solvable 362 00:21:59,916 --> 00:22:02,596 Speaker 1: is brought to you by Pushkin Industries. Our show is 363 00:22:02,596 --> 00:22:07,876 Speaker 1: produced by Camille Baptista, Senior producer Jocelyn Frank. Catherine Girardou 364 00:22:07,956 --> 00:22:11,476 Speaker 1: is our managing producer. Our executive producer is Mia Lobell. 365 00:22:12,116 --> 00:22:15,996 Speaker 1: Special thanks to Heather Faine, Eric Sandler, Carl Migliori and 366 00:22:16,076 --> 00:22:18,436 Speaker 1: Kadija Holland. I'm Jacob Weisberg.