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Speaker 1: Zone Media.

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Speaker 2: Hey everybody, Robert Evans here and I wanted to let

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Speaker 2: you know this is a compilation episode. So every episode

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Speaker 2: of the week that just happened is here in one

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Speaker 2: convenient and with somewhat less ads package for you to

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Speaker 2: listen to in a long stretch if you want. If

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Speaker 2: you've been listening to the episodes every day this week,

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Speaker 2: there's going to be nothing new here for you, but

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Speaker 2: you can make your own decisions.

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Speaker 3: Get ready for anarchy in Atlanta.

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Speaker 4: You got to or you won't be arend anarchists start work.

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Speaker 4: They struck again this week.

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Speaker 5: Cops are approaching now.

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Speaker 6: Obviously got a flashbawn.

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Speaker 7: This is it could happen here. I'm Garrison Davis. For

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Speaker 7: the past three years, a wide range of people in Atlanta,

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Speaker 7: Georgia have been working to prevent the construction of a

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Speaker 7: now one hundred and ten million million dollar militarized police

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Speaker 7: training facility in the South River Forest in southeast Atlanta.

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Speaker 7: I've continuously covered the evolving struggle on it Could Happen

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Speaker 7: Here for the past few years.

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Speaker 6: Now.

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Speaker 7: In this episode, I will attempt to summarize some of

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Speaker 7: the actions from the past six months and the wave

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Speaker 7: of recent repression targeted against the movement. I will also

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Speaker 7: offer some analysis and critique on behalf of anonymous Force

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Speaker 7: defenders who spoke with me in dedicated conversations. After the

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Speaker 7: last week of action in summer of twenty twenty three,

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Speaker 7: it was clear the movement needed a new way of

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Speaker 7: people to engage in the struggle against Cop City. Beyond

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Speaker 7: the referendum and the occasional nighttime sabotage. Forest encampments were

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Speaker 7: essentially impossible, and the weeks of action seemed to expunge

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Speaker 7: their usefulness. A small group of people began organizing what

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Speaker 7: would become known as block cop City. The idea was

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Speaker 7: that on Monday, November thirteenth, a mass mobilization would descend

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Speaker 7: upon the Cop City construction site in an act of

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Speaker 7: non violent protest, and perhaps planted tree saplings where the

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Speaker 7: forest once stood. This marks the first time that the

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Speaker 7: framing of quote unquote strategic nonviolence and nonviolent direct action

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Speaker 7: were embraced for a mass action like this, hoping that

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Speaker 7: it may attract NGOs and activist groups to co sign

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Speaker 7: onto the action. Historically, throughout this struggle, such quote unquote

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Speaker 7: non violent framing was at least avoided if not explicitly

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Speaker 7: rejected as a limiting restriction toward achieving measurable victories against

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Speaker 7: the Atlanta Police Foundation and cop City contractors. Throughout the

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Speaker 7: end of summer and the start of fall, a speaking

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Speaker 7: tour for block cup City traveled to over eighty cities

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Speaker 7: around the country to promote the action and recruit people

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Speaker 7: to travel to Atlanta come November. Block cup City started

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Speaker 7: as a very vertical, top down plan. The central conceit

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Speaker 7: was decided upon by a small number of individuals, many

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Speaker 7: of whom were not from Atlanta, and the finer details

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Speaker 7: would be worked out in a series of public meetings

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Speaker 7: in the days before the action. Whether or not local

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Speaker 7: force defenders liked or disliked the proposal, block op City

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Speaker 7: acted as a gravity well, sucking nearly all of the energy, time,

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Speaker 7: and attention into its orbit for the entirety of a

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Speaker 7: fall in Atlanta. Throughout the nationwide block coop City speaking

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Speaker 7: to her a small subset of attendees voiced objections and

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Speaker 7: disagreements with the proposed to strategy and its use of

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Speaker 7: time and resources. Those opposed to block up City thought

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Speaker 7: the idea of a large public march to the work

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Speaker 7: site was going to put people in unnecessary harm without

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Speaker 7: doing much to achieve a measurable blow against cop city.

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Speaker 7: I'm going to quote from a report back that was

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Speaker 7: published online shortly after the action.

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Speaker 6: Quote.

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Speaker 7: Something that tends to happen in autonomous action is that

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Speaker 7: there ends up being an inner circle at the core,

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Speaker 7: which can limit the scope of who is able to

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Speaker 7: meaningfully contribute to the direction of action because it creates

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Speaker 7: a hierarchy at spokes council. It felt like this at

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Speaker 7: times because it was primarily a small group of speakers

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Speaker 7: who were directing the entire block Copcity movement. This led

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Speaker 7: to dismissal of certain concerns which were brought up by

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Speaker 7: affinity groups. In the planning stages. Organizers pushed back on

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Speaker 7: the notion that getting arrested was a part of the plan,

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Speaker 7: but on the day before the November thirteenth action, a

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Speaker 7: block op City organizer told press and media in a

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Speaker 7: private meeting to have your cameras ready because there will

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Speaker 7: be arrests at noon, demonstrating some form of intent to

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Speaker 7: use people's safety and freedom as a way to generate

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Speaker 7: online buzz with the hope of inspiring people to once

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Speaker 7: again take action in the forest. The possibility of arrest

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Speaker 7: was obviously mentioned at the Spokes Council meetings, but was

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Speaker 7: framed as far from a certainty, with rallying cries insisting

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Speaker 7: that the march will be able to all leave together.

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Speaker 7: During the two days of Spokes Council meetings, the route

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Speaker 7: and formation of the march to the construction site was

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Speaker 7: decided upon, and quote unquote direct action trainings took place

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Speaker 7: to prepare people for the march on Monday morning, the

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Speaker 7: march was to be split into three distinct clusters, a frontline, middle,

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Speaker 7: and rear. Before the march, there was limited communication between clusters,

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Speaker 7: making it difficult to have informed expectations of how a

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Speaker 7: confrontation with police will happen. Part of the quote unquote

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Speaker 7: strategic non violence stipulation meant that throwne objects and projectiles

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Speaker 7: were explicitly disallowed. On the morning of the march, words

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Speaker 7: started to spread around that what was left of the

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Speaker 7: frontline cluster decided that only bullets will make the frontline

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Speaker 7: fall back and they would withstand all other forms of

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Speaker 7: police violence, mostly les, lethal rounds, tear gas, batons, etc. Now,

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Speaker 7: this whole thing about live rounds was not widely communicate

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Speaker 7: to people who just showed up for the action. On

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Speaker 7: Monday morning, during the spokes councils, it was learned that

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Speaker 7: a vast majority of attendees had never before been to

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Speaker 7: Atlanta or the Forest, and a great many of whom

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Speaker 7: had never attended a protest or engaged in a clash

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Speaker 7: with police before. Some local force defenders took issue with

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Speaker 7: the perceived strategy of primarily recruiting young people from across

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Speaker 7: the country with little to no experience going up against police.

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Speaker 7: Come Monday morning, the number of people gathered to march

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Speaker 7: on cop City was far fewer than what was initially hoped.

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Speaker 7: It's impossible to say for sure whether the limiting of

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Speaker 7: acceptable tactics and the non violent framing hurt or helped

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Speaker 7: the final number of attendees. Regardless, the four hundred or

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Speaker 7: so brave people that departed Gresham Park was not the

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Speaker 7: mass action initially envisioned by organizers.

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Speaker 8: Got about three.

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Speaker 5: Dozen riot cops and SWAT teams stationed here. Walking off

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Speaker 5: the road heading to the west, got police shields. We

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Speaker 5: have air of fifteen's, we have tactical response vehicles ATV,

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Speaker 5: A lot of cops behind us, a lot of cops

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Speaker 5: in front of us. We are completely sandwiched in by

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Speaker 5: the police.

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Speaker 7: Right now, the front liners approached the police riot line

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Speaker 7: at the big intersection near the entrance to Entrenchment Creek Park.

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Speaker 7: Two large banners formed a V shaped wedge and the

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Speaker 7: crowd advanced into the police line.

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Speaker 5: People are pushing through. Cops are putting up to fight.

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Speaker 5: People are continuing to move forward. The march is pushing

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Speaker 5: the cops back.

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Speaker 7: Under the pressure from a few hundred people. The police

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Speaker 7: line was pushed back by one or two dozen feet

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Speaker 7: front liners. We stood police batons and leslie communitions. Steady

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Speaker 7: progress was being made. That was until tear gas got deployed.

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Speaker 7: Cops are continuing to loop back.

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Speaker 6: Flash bang.

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Speaker 7: We got gap csgas was first launched into the middle

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Speaker 7: of the crowd. Police paused to put on their own

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Speaker 7: gas masks, but instead of using this moment to advance further,

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Speaker 7: the bulk of the crowd held their position, with large

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Speaker 7: sections of the middle cluster subsequently entering into the tree

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Speaker 7: line of Entrenchment Creek Park. As continuing volleys of tear

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Speaker 7: gas were fired by police. This caused the front line

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Speaker 7: to retreat back, effectively ending the offensive portion of the action.

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Speaker 7: As the group that entered into the forest was later

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Speaker 7: escorted out by police, rejoined the march and eventually returned

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Speaker 7: to Gresham Park. Everyone knew that it was a near

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Speaker 7: certainty that police would confront a mobile crowd, and out

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Speaker 7: maneuvering police all the way to the construction site would

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Speaker 7: be highly unlikely. The only way a mass of people

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Speaker 7: would be able to get to the work site is

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Speaker 7: if police allowed it. Still, there's much to learn from

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Speaker 7: block cop City and even just the brief skirmish with police,

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Speaker 7: So forgive me for engaging in some tactical analysis based

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Speaker 7: on the good portion of my life spent in riot

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Speaker 7: jousts and input from others with more on the ground experience.

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Speaker 7: We first have to think about what will cause a

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Speaker 7: mass of people to break up, scatter, and retreat, both

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Speaker 7: on the protester side and on the police side. The

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Speaker 7: front lines are meant to act semi fluid. Typically, projectile

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Speaker 7: launchers are behind the front line and are designed to

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Speaker 7: scatter the opposing front line and middle sections of the

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Speaker 7: enemy side to disrupt an offensive formation so that it

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Speaker 7: loses its capacity for for momentum, or to stagger a

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Speaker 7: defensive line enough to force retreat, as was the case

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Speaker 7: on November thirteenth. When a layered defensive police line is

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Speaker 7: backed up with vehicles like a bear cat, the on

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Speaker 7: foot line will most likely not retreat back behind their vehicles. Frustratingly,

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Speaker 7: these these massive police vehicles occupy a sort of paradoxical

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Speaker 7: role as a ten ton roadblock that would force a

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Speaker 7: center advancing line to break apart in order to pass,

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Speaker 7: putting the advancing line in a less strategic position, even

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Speaker 7: though if the vehicle was threatened by being overrun, police

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Speaker 7: would probably attempt to pull the vehicle back, signifying retreat.

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Speaker 7: So how has this paradox been solved before? Well with

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Speaker 7: ranged attacks like bottles, fireworks and what the State of

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Speaker 7: Ukraine was teaching its civilians to make in the early

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Speaker 7: days of the Russian invasion. This is why projectiles are

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Speaker 7: of such a strategic importance. One cannot break through a

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Speaker 7: police line without employing violence. Utilizing projectiles is necessary to

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Speaker 7: force rear police vehicles to retreat, along with the CoP's

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Speaker 7: own projectile launchers placed behind their riot line, which are

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Speaker 7: used to break up the opposing front line. And police

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Speaker 7: have no such tactical non violence scruples against using projectiles.

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Speaker 7: Some Atlanta anarchists have also noted that the resources put

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Speaker 7: towards acquiring a great number of plants that ended up

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Speaker 7: just being abandoned could also have been used to acquire

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Speaker 7: gas masks for the middle cluster, reinforced shields, and ancillary

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Speaker 7: materials put towards prioritizing the crowd's efficacy and safety against

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Speaker 7: the use of crowd controlled munitions. Thankfully, there were no

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Speaker 7: arrests made in direct connection to the march, but I

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Speaker 7: don't believe this can be accredited to any comprehensive organizing.

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Speaker 7: When the day prior media was told that arrests would

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Speaker 7: be taking place by lunchtime, for whatever reason, the police

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Speaker 7: let a kettled crowd of people go free. We can

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Speaker 7: only speculate on why. Between the logistical hassles, the stretching

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Speaker 7: of prosecutor resources, and the bomb squad that was actively

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Speaker 7: sweeping the area of entrenchment Creek Park and checking all

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Speaker 7: of the bags and backpacks that were dropped in the

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Speaker 7: area where the splinter of the march was escorted out

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Speaker 7: by police with force. Defenders in Atlanta who've spent years

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Speaker 7: now engaging in militant struggle against police. They offered a

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Speaker 7: more fundamental critique of this action. If the choice to

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Speaker 7: employ a strategy of nonviolence is in response to grossly

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Speaker 7: inflated charges and repression the movement is facing, as some

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Speaker 7: block ops to the organizers have stated, that means that

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Speaker 7: you're allowing the state to determine your rules of engagement.

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Speaker 7: The entire idea of announcing your plan to walk onto

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Speaker 7: one of the most policed areas in the country did,

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Speaker 7: in fact prevent people with more on the ground experience

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Speaker 7: from participating on the day of the action. Risk requires reward.

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Speaker 7: A small core of organizers were so steadfast in one

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Speaker 7: particular version of how this event would take shape, branding

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Speaker 7: people with disagreements as all overly online disaffected nihilists no

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Speaker 7: longer involved in the struggle in Atlanta. Not only were

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Speaker 7: online critiques discarded, but opportunities for in person conversation as

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Speaker 7: an input from people with more on the ground experience

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Speaker 7: in Atlanta were also turned down. And I think it

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Speaker 7: is important to state hats off to the many young

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Speaker 7: people that traveled from around the country to participate in

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Speaker 7: this action. One can hope that block cop City broadly

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Speaker 7: and going up against this line of armed riot police

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Speaker 7: was a useful learning experience for whatever happens next in

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Speaker 7: these people's lives as we approach the twenty twenty four

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Speaker 7: election and who knows what is to come. The night

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Speaker 7: after Block cop City, six vehicles owned by the company

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Speaker 7: Earned Concrete were set on fire in Gwinnett County, Georgia.

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Speaker 7: Earlier that fall, Ernst Concrete trucks were seen working on

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Speaker 7: the cop City construction site. After the arson, Ernst Concrete

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Speaker 7: released a statement saying that they were not going to

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Speaker 7: work on the cop City project. In an Atlanta Police

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Speaker 7: Department press conference from December twenty twenty three, Chief Darren

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Speaker 7: Sheerbaum discussed a wave of recent arsons Googa.

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Speaker 3: The most recent one happened in Gwinnette County this past November.

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Speaker 3: This was Ernst Concrete when a number of construction equipment

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Speaker 3: was set on fire. Then we go to three arsons

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Speaker 3: that happened right here in Atlanta mcdonna Boulevard where a contractor,

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Speaker 3: a Brent Scarborough, was targeted three different times in the

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Speaker 3: month of October of this year, July of this year,

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Speaker 3: as well as April this year. We see that the

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Speaker 3: same group takes credit each and every time on their

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Speaker 3: source of giving information out and so it's likely to

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Speaker 3: be that same group, very small in number, moving from

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Speaker 3: state to state is likely the profile of these individuals.

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Speaker 4: It's very very small.

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Speaker 3: It is a handful of individuals that are having a

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Speaker 3: much larger impact on the safety of this city than

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Speaker 3: they should have.

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Speaker 7: Atlanta Fire Chief Roderick Smith and John King, the Georgia

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Speaker 7: Insurance and Fire Safety Commissioner, both talked about how these

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Speaker 7: arsons negatively affect the contractors working to build cop city.

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Speaker 6: As we talk.

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Speaker 9: About impacts caused by arson, it affects our businesses, those

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Speaker 9: that are participating in helping out building Atlanta Public Safety

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Speaker 9: Training Center. We suffer from additional cost due to arson

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Speaker 9: that these companies face and individuals face.

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Speaker 10: This affects every one of our citizens in the area

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Speaker 10: because all these losses. Yes, there's an insurance company that

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Speaker 10: will probably cover some of the costs, but those losses

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Speaker 10: will be passed on to customers, so we all will

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Speaker 10: take the losses.

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Speaker 7: On January seventeenth, APD put out another press conference to

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Speaker 7: discuss even though the police are already doing such a

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Speaker 7: great job out stopping crime when it's fourteen degrees and

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Speaker 7: homicides continue to decline. Even still, a new state of

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Speaker 7: the art police training facility is vital to maintain safety

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Speaker 7: in the city of Atlanta.

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Speaker 3: We've asked you to come together again today because there

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Speaker 3: is an effort underway by very smart individuals anarchists that

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Speaker 3: want to impact the safety of Atlanta, Georgia. Just yesterday,

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Speaker 3: a piece of equipment aligned with one of the construction

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Speaker 3: companies that is building the public safety training center for

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Speaker 3: every lantin was set on fire. Next door in a

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Speaker 3: neighboring state of South Carolina, we had a construction company

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Speaker 3: that had a loose connection to the project here in

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Speaker 3: Atlanta that was targeted by an individual that used one

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Speaker 3: of the tools of violence sphere and intimidation that has

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Speaker 3: been used mainly by this group, which is arson, set

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Speaker 3: equipment on fire, going after concrete trucks, and so soon

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Speaker 3: the individuals that have been in the dark of night

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Speaker 3: impacting every one of our neighborhoods will be held responsible

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Speaker 3: as we bring these individuals to justice.

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Speaker 7: Police in South Carolina were able to identify a suspect

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Speaker 7: and ended up arresting and charging them with arson. The

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Speaker 7: fire chief elaborated on the theoretical risks of arson such

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Speaker 7: as injury to human life and the ugly sight of

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Speaker 7: burnt rubble left over in neighborhoods, as well as reiterating

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Speaker 7: how it affects the cop City project.

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Speaker 6: What are the effects of arson financial?

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Speaker 9: As we've heard earlier, the impact that the equipment being

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Speaker 9: burned plays of role with the company's working delays in

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Speaker 9: the project.

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Speaker 6: Due to this.

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Speaker 7: Less than a week later, the city had another press

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Speaker 7: conference in front of burnt husks of equipment outside a

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Speaker 7: construction site run by a cop City contractor.

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Speaker 3: If you look over my shoulder, you will see the

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Speaker 3: equipment that was burned.

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Speaker 4: It belongs to a private contractor.

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Speaker 9: There were total four pieces of heavy construction equipment that

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Speaker 9: were damaged this morning.

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Speaker 7: Chief Scheerbomb quickly linked the attack to stop cop City

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Speaker 7: due to a post online about the attack accompanied by

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Speaker 7: the hashtag stop cop City.

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Speaker 4: The hashtag is present.

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Speaker 7: Scherbomb also gave an updated account on the number of

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Speaker 7: arsen attacks which have targeted construction equipment.

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Speaker 3: I believe now we're right at thirty five that have

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Speaker 3: occurred here in the state of Georgia and elsewhere. The

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Speaker 3: vast majority of them are concentrated in North Georgia, but

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Speaker 3: there are others that have occurred elsewhere. We're very fortunate

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Speaker 3: of an arrest in South Carolina. There's clearly at least

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Speaker 3: one other person. This individual or individuals don't care about

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Speaker 3: life and safety. If they firebombed police precincts, their go

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Speaker 3: is to a road, proper public safety infrastructure, and to

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Speaker 3: road the government.

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Speaker 7: Very cool stuff. Indeed, I do believe that thirty four

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Speaker 7: number is a gross undercount, but hey, if they've forgotten

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Speaker 7: a few attacks, really no real harm in that. We have, however,

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Speaker 7: gotten a few recent numbers on the monetary damages caused

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Speaker 7: by stop Coop City activity. In a Georgia State Senate

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Speaker 7: committee meeting near the end of January, Senator Deborah Silcox

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Speaker 7: said that APD Chief Administrative Officer Peter Amman told her

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Speaker 7: earlier that day that the estimated cost of nationwide property

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Speaker 7: damage made in protest of cop City exceeds one hundred

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Speaker 7: million dollars. That beats the ELF numbers.

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Speaker 5: Now.

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Speaker 7: Four days later, the Atlanta Police Department tried to backtrack

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Speaker 7: that number to New York Times reporter Sean Keenan, now

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Speaker 7: saying that it was ten million dollars in property damage

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Speaker 7: a one thousand percent difference, which either way is a

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Speaker 7: massive amount of money. And we do know for sure

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Speaker 7: that the city has spent at least one point three

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Speaker 7: million dollars just in the legal fees related to cop City.

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Speaker 7: We know at least some of that one point three

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00:19:33,600 --> 00:19:38,160
Speaker 7: million dollars was used to combat the Cop City referendum campaign,

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00:19:38,600 --> 00:19:42,080
Speaker 7: an initiative started last summer to collect petition signatures to

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Speaker 7: put cop City on an upcoming ballot. I talked with

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Speaker 7: Sam Barnes of the Atlantic Community Press Collective to get

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Speaker 7: an update on the current state of the referendum.

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Speaker 11: The referendum has more or less been stalled out since

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Speaker 11: last fall. In response to a lawsuit from Decab County

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00:20:01,880 --> 00:20:05,920
Speaker 11: residents who claimed that their First Amendment rights were being

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Speaker 11: infringed upon because they were not allowed to canvas for signatures,

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Speaker 11: A Core issued down an injunction basically allowing the referendum

347
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Speaker 11: campaign to have additional time to collect and then turn

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Speaker 11: in signatures. The city then appealed that injunction. That whole

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Speaker 11: situation is currently before the US Court of Appeals, who

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Speaker 11: heard arguments from the city's lawyers and the vote campaign's

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Speaker 11: lawyers in January and who have not yet issued a

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Speaker 11: ruling on that appeal.

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Speaker 7: The referendum campaign has turned in what they say are

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Speaker 7: one hundred and sixteen thousand signatures, which, if verified, should

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Speaker 7: be more than enough to get the referendum onto the ballot,

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Speaker 7: but the City of Atlanta has said that they cannot

357
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Speaker 7: start counting these signatures until the Court of Appeals issues

358
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Speaker 7: their ruling.

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00:21:04,280 --> 00:21:07,000
Speaker 11: It's not really clear of where in case law, or

360
00:21:07,040 --> 00:21:10,520
Speaker 11: in Georgia code, or wherever they are getting that legal

361
00:21:11,080 --> 00:21:15,840
Speaker 11: precedent from, but it is the line they are sticking to.

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Speaker 11: So long story short, even if the city was to

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00:21:22,160 --> 00:21:25,920
Speaker 11: start counting votes today, and even if there were enough

364
00:21:26,160 --> 00:21:30,000
Speaker 11: to get this referendum on the ballot the next election,

365
00:21:30,320 --> 00:21:33,399
Speaker 11: it could appear on the ballot in is the general

366
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Speaker 11: election in November twenty twenty four, Popcity for APD and

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Speaker 11: the APF's repeated claims is going to open and fall

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Speaker 11: of twenty twenty four. Now, I don't personally have a

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00:21:45,640 --> 00:21:47,800
Speaker 11: lot of faith in that at one point it was

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Speaker 11: going to open in August twenty twenty three, just the

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Speaker 11: simple fact of every construction project runs into delays. But

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Speaker 11: I think it is pretty clear, especially given the clear

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Speaker 11: cutting and the concrete pouring that has already happened on

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Speaker 11: the site that it will make significant progress by by November.

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Speaker 11: It's pretty obvious that the city's strategy here is to

376
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Speaker 11: just delay and delay and delay the referendum until the

377
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Speaker 11: thing gets built, effectively just making the referendum dead in

378
00:22:22,040 --> 00:22:22,400
Speaker 11: the water.

379
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Speaker 7: On February eighth, the Federal Bureau of Investigation connected a

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Speaker 7: series of house rates on three homes in South Atlanta

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Speaker 7: that they suspected of being linked to Stop Coop City activists.

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Speaker 7: Phones and computers were seized, along with Stopcop City related

383
00:22:38,160 --> 00:22:42,399
Speaker 7: zines and posters. Occupants of the house were dragged outside,

384
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Speaker 7: sometimes literally. A few were detained for hours on end,

385
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Speaker 7: with one being driven to a police headquarters for interrogation,

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Speaker 7: but was released later that evening.

387
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Speaker 3: This morning, at six am, investigators of the Alan of

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Speaker 3: Fire Rescue, Georgia Berl of Investigation, Federal Burial of Investigation,

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Speaker 3: Bureau of Alcohol to Back and Firearms, and the Atlanta

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Speaker 3: Police Department, joined by uniformed elements of this department at

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Speaker 3: Georgia State Patrol, executed search warrants signed by judges who'd

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Speaker 3: review the probable cause, allowing us to enter three locations

393
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Speaker 3: to seek evidence connected to acts of vandalism and arson

394
00:23:15,760 --> 00:23:19,119
Speaker 3: that have occurred over the last few months. As investigators

395
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Speaker 3: went to those locations, they were armed with an arrest warrant.

396
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Speaker 7: It's worth noting that the search warrants cited federal statutes

397
00:23:25,560 --> 00:23:30,040
Speaker 7: on the destruction of vehicles and reco While executing one

398
00:23:30,040 --> 00:23:33,280
Speaker 7: of these raids, police located an individual whom an arrest

399
00:23:33,359 --> 00:23:37,680
Speaker 7: warrant was issued for days prior and brought them into custody.

400
00:23:38,320 --> 00:23:41,399
Speaker 7: This arrest, along with the one in South Carolina, also

401
00:23:41,440 --> 00:23:45,480
Speaker 7: marked the very first arrests linked to clandestine and nighttime

402
00:23:45,520 --> 00:23:48,360
Speaker 7: attacks in the three year history of the movement.

403
00:23:49,000 --> 00:23:52,439
Speaker 3: We're processing all of the locations now. The evidence to

404
00:23:52,480 --> 00:23:54,840
Speaker 3: make that arrest had already been in possession of law

405
00:23:54,880 --> 00:23:57,399
Speaker 3: enforcement even before we executed the search warrants this morning,

406
00:23:57,600 --> 00:24:00,720
Speaker 3: So the arrest warrant was signed before today, and the

407
00:24:00,800 --> 00:24:03,480
Speaker 3: arrest work was not connected with the search morsols or

408
00:24:03,520 --> 00:24:05,480
Speaker 3: independent of the arrest would be making once we located

409
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Speaker 3: this gentleman.

410
00:24:06,440 --> 00:24:09,160
Speaker 7: In a city press conference, the mayor opened by saying

411
00:24:09,240 --> 00:24:13,080
Speaker 7: this arrest was quote linked to multiple acts of vandalism

412
00:24:13,080 --> 00:24:17,000
Speaker 7: and arson unquote, yet they were only charged with one

413
00:24:17,040 --> 00:24:20,359
Speaker 7: account of first earrye Arsen, which police linked to the

414
00:24:20,400 --> 00:24:23,800
Speaker 7: burning of eight police motorcycles last July, near the end

415
00:24:23,840 --> 00:24:27,680
Speaker 7: of that summer's week of action. This particular arson is

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00:24:27,800 --> 00:24:31,080
Speaker 7: unique from the many other cop city related arsons in

417
00:24:31,240 --> 00:24:35,119
Speaker 7: a few ways. This was not targeting construction equipment. Instead,

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00:24:35,160 --> 00:24:39,919
Speaker 7: it was directly targeting police infrastructure. An unexploded plastic incendiary

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00:24:40,000 --> 00:24:43,159
Speaker 7: device was left at the scene, and the police training

420
00:24:43,160 --> 00:24:46,800
Speaker 7: building that was singed. The city now claims was occupied

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00:24:46,880 --> 00:24:48,359
Speaker 7: by a police officer.

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Speaker 3: But was often overlooked as inside of that precinct was

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Speaker 3: a protector of the city Atlanta police officers inside.

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Speaker 7: As police have said, they only had enough information to

425
00:24:59,240 --> 00:25:03,040
Speaker 7: make this war arrest linked to this one specific instance

426
00:25:03,119 --> 00:25:06,600
Speaker 7: of arson. Thus, these raids can be seen both as

427
00:25:06,640 --> 00:25:10,200
Speaker 7: an intimidation attempt and a last ditch effort to collect

428
00:25:10,240 --> 00:25:13,200
Speaker 7: additional information necessary to make future arrests.

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Speaker 4: More rest will come. It will come soon and will continue.

430
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Speaker 3: To hold people accountable to Everyone that has been involved

431
00:25:19,560 --> 00:25:22,200
Speaker 3: in these acts are in jail and before a judge.

432
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Speaker 3: The investigation is very active, ma'am. There's a reason we

433
00:25:25,359 --> 00:25:26,959
Speaker 3: serve three search warrants today.

434
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Speaker 6: We do.

435
00:25:28,320 --> 00:25:29,840
Speaker 4: We are looking at a wide range of areas.

436
00:25:29,880 --> 00:25:31,360
Speaker 12: We believe evidence as hell that will.

437
00:25:31,200 --> 00:25:33,920
Speaker 3: Identify who is responsible or the others, and who else

438
00:25:34,000 --> 00:25:35,760
Speaker 3: was responsible besides this gentleman.

439
00:25:36,400 --> 00:25:37,879
Speaker 4: The investigation will play that out.

440
00:25:37,760 --> 00:25:39,680
Speaker 3: But there are others that I anticipate will be resting

441
00:25:39,720 --> 00:25:40,680
Speaker 3: in the end of weeks to come.

442
00:25:41,240 --> 00:25:44,320
Speaker 7: This messaging from Chief Sheerbaum is obviously meant to spread

443
00:25:44,400 --> 00:25:49,000
Speaker 7: panic and paranoia amongst activists, organizers, and the anarchists of Atlanta.

444
00:25:49,840 --> 00:25:52,760
Speaker 7: Those in Atlanta were quick to prove that repression would

445
00:25:52,760 --> 00:25:56,040
Speaker 7: not stifle attacks against copp City. On the night of

446
00:25:56,040 --> 00:25:58,800
Speaker 7: February ninth, a police car was torched outside of the

447
00:25:58,840 --> 00:26:01,880
Speaker 7: home of an APD officer officer in the Lakewood neighborhood

448
00:26:01,920 --> 00:26:05,040
Speaker 7: of Atlanta. The next day, police claimed that they tracked

449
00:26:05,119 --> 00:26:08,760
Speaker 7: the movements of two alleged arsonists via ring, doorbell and

450
00:26:08,840 --> 00:26:11,639
Speaker 7: street cameras to a house in Lakewood and conducted a

451
00:26:11,720 --> 00:26:16,280
Speaker 7: raid that afternoon. Nothing was found and no arrests were made.

452
00:26:16,320 --> 00:26:20,680
Speaker 7: The FBI and the ATF viewed the vehicle arsen outside

453
00:26:20,680 --> 00:26:23,280
Speaker 7: of the home of an Atlanta police officer as a

454
00:26:23,320 --> 00:26:28,000
Speaker 7: significant escalation and made their first on camera speaking appearance

455
00:26:28,080 --> 00:26:32,360
Speaker 7: on Channel two to discuss the possibility of introducing federal charges,

456
00:26:33,560 --> 00:26:37,200
Speaker 7: the house raids threats, doing all these press conferences, it's

457
00:26:37,240 --> 00:26:40,960
Speaker 7: all part of this media frenzy to elicit fear. Earlier

458
00:26:40,960 --> 00:26:44,280
Speaker 7: this year, Chief sheerbamb unveiled plans to put four hundred

459
00:26:44,280 --> 00:26:48,320
Speaker 7: and fifty billboards all across the country offering reward money

460
00:26:48,359 --> 00:26:52,639
Speaker 7: for information, specifically placed in cities they believe anarchists are

461
00:26:52,680 --> 00:26:56,760
Speaker 7: traveling from to set fires in Atlanta. Every single press

462
00:26:56,760 --> 00:26:59,760
Speaker 7: conference the police du they are desperately begging for members

463
00:26:59,760 --> 00:27:02,840
Speaker 7: of the public to snitch, saying the only way this

464
00:27:02,920 --> 00:27:05,920
Speaker 7: case will be solved is if anonymous tipsters come forward

465
00:27:05,960 --> 00:27:10,200
Speaker 7: with information, offering increasingly comical amounts of money if information

466
00:27:10,359 --> 00:27:13,240
Speaker 7: leads to a conviction. Fear is one of the greatest

467
00:27:13,280 --> 00:27:16,480
Speaker 7: tools this state has to bear. But through this sequence

468
00:27:16,480 --> 00:27:20,080
Speaker 7: of events, police and investigators are also kind of showing

469
00:27:20,119 --> 00:27:24,560
Speaker 7: their hand here, demonstrating the current limit of their actionable evidence.

470
00:27:25,200 --> 00:27:28,040
Speaker 7: It has now been well over a month since these raids,

471
00:27:28,359 --> 00:27:39,040
Speaker 7: and as of now, no subsequent arrests have been made.

472
00:27:43,800 --> 00:27:46,760
Speaker 7: The timing of these house raids also seemed intended to

473
00:27:46,760 --> 00:27:49,800
Speaker 7: disrupt an event planned for later that month called the

474
00:27:49,920 --> 00:27:55,240
Speaker 7: Nationwide Summit to Stop Cop City, a convergence located in Tucson, Arizona,

475
00:27:55,720 --> 00:27:59,240
Speaker 7: on Amazonia that was planned for February twenty third to

476
00:27:59,359 --> 00:28:02,439
Speaker 7: the twenty six I was not able to attend, but

477
00:28:02,560 --> 00:28:05,360
Speaker 7: I spoke with Sam from the Atlanta Community Press Collective

478
00:28:05,600 --> 00:28:07,320
Speaker 7: who covered the summit in person.

479
00:28:08,040 --> 00:28:10,679
Speaker 11: It was a four day convergence in twoson Arizona, called

480
00:28:10,720 --> 00:28:16,040
Speaker 11: for by the pretty well entrenched radical organizing scene there

481
00:28:16,040 --> 00:28:18,520
Speaker 11: in Tucson that was just intended to be the kind

482
00:28:18,560 --> 00:28:21,000
Speaker 11: of summits we've seen here in Atlanta that are often

483
00:28:21,040 --> 00:28:24,200
Speaker 11: called weeks of Action that can no longer take place

484
00:28:24,200 --> 00:28:27,679
Speaker 11: here in Atlanta. So it was intended to be just

485
00:28:27,840 --> 00:28:31,679
Speaker 11: a gathering of like minded people to share ideas, build community,

486
00:28:32,600 --> 00:28:36,000
Speaker 11: have fun, frankly, and there also were some direct actions

487
00:28:36,000 --> 00:28:38,760
Speaker 11: that occurred during the week. The hub for the summit

488
00:28:39,320 --> 00:28:42,080
Speaker 11: was a park kind of on what i'd call the

489
00:28:42,360 --> 00:28:45,720
Speaker 11: north end of Tucson called Mansfield Park, and there was

490
00:28:45,760 --> 00:28:50,800
Speaker 11: a small camp space set up and organized by locals.

491
00:28:51,480 --> 00:28:54,080
Speaker 11: The structure of the summit and of the camp space

492
00:28:54,120 --> 00:28:56,920
Speaker 11: in general was again very familiar to anyone who has

493
00:28:56,920 --> 00:29:01,480
Speaker 11: attended any of the Weeks of Action in Atlanta. At meals, breakfast, lunch,

494
00:29:01,480 --> 00:29:05,760
Speaker 11: and dinner. There were camp announcements, a lot of spontaneous

495
00:29:05,760 --> 00:29:08,400
Speaker 11: activities within the camp. A couple movie nights were held.

496
00:29:09,040 --> 00:29:13,640
Speaker 7: Tucson, Arizona on Amazonia, is about one hundred miles from

497
00:29:13,640 --> 00:29:16,880
Speaker 7: the US Mexico border. Sam told me about a panel

498
00:29:16,920 --> 00:29:20,920
Speaker 7: they attended on the intersections between the border, Gaza and Atlanta.

499
00:29:21,720 --> 00:29:24,160
Speaker 7: If you've been paying attention to the cop City struggle,

500
00:29:24,360 --> 00:29:27,640
Speaker 7: you're probably already familiar with these themes. The Atlanta Police

501
00:29:27,640 --> 00:29:31,040
Speaker 7: Department participates in the Georgia International Law Enforcement Exchange the

502
00:29:31,040 --> 00:29:34,400
Speaker 7: GILLY program, where they trained with members of the IDF.

503
00:29:35,120 --> 00:29:41,880
Speaker 11: The talk featured Jewish Americans, Palestinian Americans. A correspondent from

504
00:29:42,000 --> 00:29:44,920
Speaker 11: Indian Collective who was there to cover the summit as well,

505
00:29:45,000 --> 00:29:49,560
Speaker 11: also spoke during that event. And that intersection was I

506
00:29:49,600 --> 00:29:57,080
Speaker 11: think even before Aaron Bushnell self imilated that Sunday was

507
00:29:57,120 --> 00:30:01,480
Speaker 11: probably the most profound theme when I threw the weekend again,

508
00:30:01,600 --> 00:30:05,960
Speaker 11: especially with Tucson's proximity to the border and to native

509
00:30:06,040 --> 00:30:10,200
Speaker 11: lands that are on the border and which are often

510
00:30:10,240 --> 00:30:14,920
Speaker 11: surveilled using wait for it, Israeli military technology. The sort

511
00:30:14,960 --> 00:30:20,240
Speaker 11: of official name of the summit was the Nationwide Summit

512
00:30:20,480 --> 00:30:24,760
Speaker 11: to Stop coop City, which was a sort of winking

513
00:30:24,960 --> 00:30:31,960
Speaker 11: nudge nudge at Nationwide Insurance, which is the main underwriter

514
00:30:32,240 --> 00:30:36,400
Speaker 11: of the insurance policies that ensure what would be cop city.

515
00:30:37,200 --> 00:30:43,720
Speaker 11: Nationwide has a major corporate office in Scottsdale, Arizona, which

516
00:30:43,760 --> 00:30:46,280
Speaker 11: is in between Tucson and Phoenix.

517
00:30:47,000 --> 00:30:49,720
Speaker 7: On the first night of the summit, a small group

518
00:30:49,760 --> 00:30:56,520
Speaker 7: of anonymous vandals attacked three subsidiaries of Nationwide Insurance in Tucson, Arizona, Tusan, Amazonia,

519
00:30:56,920 --> 00:31:01,400
Speaker 7: breaking windows and vandalizing their buildings. Later on in the week,

520
00:31:01,640 --> 00:31:05,000
Speaker 7: there were two more public direct actions that happened during

521
00:31:05,000 --> 00:31:07,880
Speaker 7: the summit. The first was a black block march on

522
00:31:07,920 --> 00:31:11,520
Speaker 7: the night of February twenty fifth in downtown Tucson, Arizona,

523
00:31:11,880 --> 00:31:14,880
Speaker 7: sun Arizonia. As a crowd of a little under one

524
00:31:14,960 --> 00:31:19,520
Speaker 7: hundred people moved through downtown stopcop City. Graffiti filled the plaza,

525
00:31:19,760 --> 00:31:21,520
Speaker 7: and a P and C bank as well as a

526
00:31:21,560 --> 00:31:25,880
Speaker 7: recently closed Wells Fargo branch, had their windows smashed. Wells

527
00:31:25,920 --> 00:31:29,000
Speaker 7: Fargo is affiliated with the Atlanta Police Foundation and PNC

528
00:31:29,160 --> 00:31:31,880
Speaker 7: is a financial backer of the Mountain Valley Pipeline in

529
00:31:31,920 --> 00:31:35,360
Speaker 7: the Appalachians. Police were able to arrest at least three

530
00:31:35,360 --> 00:31:38,640
Speaker 7: people suspected of participating in the march. Oddly, they were

531
00:31:38,720 --> 00:31:42,360
Speaker 7: charged with arson of an occupied building, I believe due

532
00:31:42,400 --> 00:31:45,640
Speaker 7: to fireworks being thrown in or near one of the banks.

533
00:31:46,320 --> 00:31:49,720
Speaker 7: Given the name of the nationwide summit, it was expected

534
00:31:49,720 --> 00:31:53,400
Speaker 7: that there would be a public action targeting nationwide insurance.

535
00:31:54,200 --> 00:31:59,200
Speaker 11: So Monday morning we headed up to Scottsdale, Arizona, again

536
00:31:59,320 --> 00:32:02,000
Speaker 11: just outside of feat Phoenix is about two hours away,

537
00:32:02,960 --> 00:32:08,120
Speaker 11: where we stopped by a sort of sidewalk rally type

538
00:32:08,160 --> 00:32:12,480
Speaker 11: situation that was happening outside of the Nationwide Regional offices,

539
00:32:12,560 --> 00:32:16,480
Speaker 11: which was honestly quite locked down, quite hard to get

540
00:32:16,520 --> 00:32:20,560
Speaker 11: access to it. As we were leaving the sidewalk rally

541
00:32:21,400 --> 00:32:26,200
Speaker 11: and being followed by Scottsdale's finest bicycle riders, I thought

542
00:32:26,200 --> 00:32:29,000
Speaker 11: it was interesting that one of the bicycle cops had

543
00:32:29,120 --> 00:32:34,960
Speaker 11: a life behind Bars personalized painted bicycle bell. It was

544
00:32:35,080 --> 00:32:39,240
Speaker 11: Teal and said a Life behind Bars, And when we

545
00:32:39,280 --> 00:32:41,960
Speaker 11: asked him about it, he just said, I just thought

546
00:32:42,000 --> 00:32:44,480
Speaker 11: it was funny because you know, I'm a cop and

547
00:32:44,840 --> 00:32:46,520
Speaker 11: I'm behind bicycle bars.

548
00:32:47,320 --> 00:32:47,760
Speaker 6: It was.

549
00:32:49,240 --> 00:32:53,360
Speaker 11: Delightful and look forward to further coverage of this exciting

550
00:32:53,480 --> 00:32:57,400
Speaker 11: story in a soon to be released ACPC video feature.

551
00:32:58,240 --> 00:33:03,520
Speaker 11: So after the rally outside of nationwide offices, we got

552
00:33:03,520 --> 00:33:07,520
Speaker 11: a tip that a lockdown style action would be happening

553
00:33:08,360 --> 00:33:13,400
Speaker 11: somewhere in the Scottsdale Phoenix area that afternoon, So maybe

554
00:33:13,400 --> 00:33:17,400
Speaker 11: around four or five o'clock, we traveled to the hills

555
00:33:17,440 --> 00:33:22,640
Speaker 11: of Maricopa County, Arizona, formerly home to America's toughest sheriff,

556
00:33:22,720 --> 00:33:27,360
Speaker 11: Joe Arpaio, into this sort of enclave of gated, dead

557
00:33:27,440 --> 00:33:33,280
Speaker 11: end streets with fabulously expensive homes. One of these homes

558
00:33:33,360 --> 00:33:39,000
Speaker 11: is owned by a nationwide insurance executive. So the activists

559
00:33:39,120 --> 00:33:43,160
Speaker 11: that locked down placed their bodies in front of two

560
00:33:43,360 --> 00:33:50,640
Speaker 11: entrances to this enclave with the intention of disrupting the

561
00:33:50,680 --> 00:33:55,800
Speaker 11: evening of this nationwide executive and their neighbors. There were

562
00:33:55,960 --> 00:33:59,960
Speaker 11: six activists in total that locked down, three at each entry.

563
00:34:00,920 --> 00:34:03,280
Speaker 11: They used a device that has been ascribed to me

564
00:34:03,560 --> 00:34:06,800
Speaker 11: as being called a cupcake, meaning it was a bag

565
00:34:06,840 --> 00:34:10,799
Speaker 11: of concrete placed on the inside of a car tire

566
00:34:11,640 --> 00:34:15,200
Speaker 11: set with some rebar and a kind of pipe sticking

567
00:34:15,239 --> 00:34:17,640
Speaker 11: out of it where I assumed there was some sort

568
00:34:17,680 --> 00:34:20,480
Speaker 11: of like handcuff locking on the inside of the pipe.

569
00:34:20,520 --> 00:34:25,000
Speaker 11: The gates were also locked shut with like bicycle locks.

570
00:34:25,480 --> 00:34:27,960
Speaker 7: People were locked to the entrance of the gated community

571
00:34:28,000 --> 00:34:31,239
Speaker 7: for almost four hours before being arrested. All six were

572
00:34:31,320 --> 00:34:34,200
Speaker 7: ultimately given misdemeanor charges and released within twenty four to

573
00:34:34,200 --> 00:34:37,400
Speaker 7: forty eight hours. Sam also talks to me about how

574
00:34:37,560 --> 00:34:41,080
Speaker 7: these big public gatherings like the summit in Tucson, Arizona,

575
00:34:41,400 --> 00:34:43,920
Speaker 7: so I'm not as Zunia, seem like they just can't

576
00:34:43,960 --> 00:34:46,040
Speaker 7: really happen in Atlanta anymore.

577
00:34:46,600 --> 00:34:46,719
Speaker 4: So.

578
00:34:46,840 --> 00:34:49,040
Speaker 11: In November here in Atlanta, we had the Block Cop

579
00:34:49,040 --> 00:34:54,280
Speaker 11: City Convergence, which was organized to a pretty significant extent

580
00:34:54,800 --> 00:34:59,080
Speaker 11: by folks not from Atlanta. I know one reason I

581
00:34:59,120 --> 00:35:03,080
Speaker 11: heard for that. It's pretty well known that organizers in

582
00:35:03,080 --> 00:35:07,320
Speaker 11: Atlanta are tired, and there was a group of people

583
00:35:08,840 --> 00:35:11,520
Speaker 11: from outside of Atlanta that felt like they could carry

584
00:35:11,520 --> 00:35:15,440
Speaker 11: that lift to organize and action here in Atlanta. The

585
00:35:15,480 --> 00:35:18,800
Speaker 11: summit in Tucson, to my knowledge, is the first major

586
00:35:18,840 --> 00:35:22,560
Speaker 11: convergence that has been organized outside of Atlanta with a

587
00:35:22,680 --> 00:35:26,799
Speaker 11: call for folks to come from the nation over. It

588
00:35:26,920 --> 00:35:31,560
Speaker 11: was a very keen or a very sharp feeling of

589
00:35:32,520 --> 00:35:35,480
Speaker 11: grief that this was not happening in Atlanta, that could

590
00:35:35,520 --> 00:35:39,080
Speaker 11: not happen in Atlanta, both because the forest has had

591
00:35:39,080 --> 00:35:42,520
Speaker 11: a huge chunk of it bulldozed, but also due to

592
00:35:42,680 --> 00:35:48,680
Speaker 11: the police occupation of the forest, that this could not

593
00:35:49,160 --> 00:35:53,200
Speaker 11: happen in Atlanta right now in the Willani Forest, and

594
00:35:53,280 --> 00:35:57,800
Speaker 11: I think, especially given recent events in Atlanta, in anywhere

595
00:35:57,920 --> 00:35:59,200
Speaker 11: in Atlanta in Georgia.

596
00:35:59,239 --> 00:36:04,200
Speaker 7: Frankly, even if due to continuating circumstances, events like this

597
00:36:04,320 --> 00:36:07,080
Speaker 7: may not be able to happen in Georgia. Sam told

598
00:36:07,080 --> 00:36:09,680
Speaker 7: me that once the summit kicked off and things got going,

599
00:36:10,160 --> 00:36:13,600
Speaker 7: it became clear that, of course, convergences can and probably

600
00:36:13,640 --> 00:36:17,400
Speaker 7: will continue to happen anywhere and everywhere. For a long time,

601
00:36:17,560 --> 00:36:22,160
Speaker 7: a slogan of this struggle has been cop City is everywhere.

602
00:36:22,600 --> 00:36:29,560
Speaker 11: Even if there weren't similar cop city like facilities planned

603
00:36:30,480 --> 00:36:33,959
Speaker 11: or already being built all over the country. I believe

604
00:36:34,000 --> 00:36:37,960
Speaker 11: the latest count was sixty nine or seventy. I can't

605
00:36:38,080 --> 00:36:41,040
Speaker 11: quite remember who did that research, but even if it

606
00:36:41,080 --> 00:36:45,359
Speaker 11: wasn't for that, again to go back to like the

607
00:36:45,400 --> 00:36:51,240
Speaker 11: sharp through line of Gaza, the border, indigenous lands, Gilly

608
00:36:52,320 --> 00:36:59,000
Speaker 11: historial genocide, this struggle is the same everywhere. The police

609
00:36:59,040 --> 00:37:01,560
Speaker 11: are the same everywhere. As I was recently discussed on

610
00:37:01,560 --> 00:37:02,239
Speaker 11: this podcast.

611
00:37:03,160 --> 00:37:06,120
Speaker 7: As this episode draws to a close, I'd like to

612
00:37:06,320 --> 00:37:09,080
Speaker 7: air out some thoughts I've had ruminating around my head

613
00:37:09,120 --> 00:37:14,040
Speaker 7: for a while about inter conflict as desperation. These comments

614
00:37:14,080 --> 00:37:17,520
Speaker 7: are not about any specific city or situation. This simply

615
00:37:17,560 --> 00:37:21,480
Speaker 7: reflects a pattern I've observed in various struggles caught in

616
00:37:21,520 --> 00:37:24,920
Speaker 7: a down spiral, particularly during the fallout of the twenty

617
00:37:24,960 --> 00:37:30,160
Speaker 7: twenty protests nationwide. Historically, I think Atlanta has actually proven

618
00:37:30,200 --> 00:37:32,759
Speaker 7: to be pretty resilient against this sort of thing, but

619
00:37:33,040 --> 00:37:35,920
Speaker 7: as the stakes are quite high, I would hate to

620
00:37:35,960 --> 00:37:38,839
Speaker 7: see something similar happen, as the cop city struggle here

621
00:37:38,840 --> 00:37:41,760
Speaker 7: in Atlanta seems to be entering its latter stages.

622
00:37:42,760 --> 00:37:43,600
Speaker 6: First, I'd like.

623
00:37:43,560 --> 00:37:47,200
Speaker 7: To say it's always a worrying ticking clock once people

624
00:37:47,239 --> 00:37:50,799
Speaker 7: start getting treated as disposable or as political props to

625
00:37:50,840 --> 00:37:54,799
Speaker 7: be sacrificed in the service of spectacle. But primarily I've

626
00:37:54,800 --> 00:37:58,399
Speaker 7: been thinking about at a certain point far enough within

627
00:37:58,440 --> 00:38:01,200
Speaker 7: a struggle, it becomes easy to fight each other than

628
00:38:01,239 --> 00:38:04,360
Speaker 7: it is to fight police. Which is not to say

629
00:38:04,400 --> 00:38:08,080
Speaker 7: all conflict is bad. Conflict can often be good. Tension

630
00:38:08,160 --> 00:38:11,279
Speaker 7: can result in a new innovative action that otherwise might

631
00:38:11,320 --> 00:38:15,960
Speaker 7: not materialize. But when said, actionable conflict starts to materialize

632
00:38:16,000 --> 00:38:18,680
Speaker 7: more frequently against each other rather than against the state.

633
00:38:19,360 --> 00:38:23,920
Speaker 7: That signals impending doom. Being able to consistently put your

634
00:38:23,920 --> 00:38:26,360
Speaker 7: beliefs into practice with a like minded group of people,

635
00:38:26,520 --> 00:38:29,640
Speaker 7: to directly engage against systems of oppression like the police

636
00:38:29,719 --> 00:38:32,640
Speaker 7: or the state, especially in your own city, is a

637
00:38:32,680 --> 00:38:37,319
Speaker 7: life affirming process, almost intoxicating. It's very easy to become

638
00:38:37,320 --> 00:38:41,960
Speaker 7: addicted to high intensity conflict. Unfortunately, the state is a

639
00:38:42,000 --> 00:38:45,680
Speaker 7: resilient bastard. Even if you can land a few sizeable blows.

640
00:38:46,239 --> 00:38:49,120
Speaker 7: Over time, this state can gather a lot of resources

641
00:38:49,120 --> 00:38:52,040
Speaker 7: to push back, and it take a few days, weeks, months,

642
00:38:52,160 --> 00:38:55,680
Speaker 7: or even years. Only in our minds may the glorious

643
00:38:55,800 --> 00:38:59,160
Speaker 7: first spark of uprising last forever, the burning of the

644
00:38:59,200 --> 00:39:02,040
Speaker 7: Third Precinct, or the first year or so of defend

645
00:39:02,040 --> 00:39:06,400
Speaker 7: the Atlanta Forest. But nostalgia is a trap, and eventually

646
00:39:06,440 --> 00:39:10,040
Speaker 7: the empire does in fact strike back. But as it

647
00:39:10,080 --> 00:39:13,360
Speaker 7: becomes harder, more dangerous, more frightening to engage against the state,

648
00:39:14,280 --> 00:39:17,640
Speaker 7: the desire for that rush of conflict stays. It lingers.

649
00:39:18,120 --> 00:39:20,680
Speaker 7: So what is one to do? The walls are closing in,

650
00:39:20,760 --> 00:39:23,279
Speaker 7: but you have this need to fight, so you take

651
00:39:23,320 --> 00:39:26,640
Speaker 7: out your anxiety, PTSD and frustration on those around you.

652
00:39:27,480 --> 00:39:30,040
Speaker 7: It is much more scary to fight the police. This,

653
00:39:30,160 --> 00:39:33,200
Speaker 7: by comparison, is easy while still feeding that conflict you

654
00:39:33,239 --> 00:39:36,560
Speaker 7: will drive we must keep on fighting, and since it's

655
00:39:36,960 --> 00:39:39,920
Speaker 7: harder and more scary to continually fight the cops or

656
00:39:39,960 --> 00:39:42,839
Speaker 7: the state, we instead are looking for ways to fight

657
00:39:42,880 --> 00:39:45,880
Speaker 7: each other, to find scapegoats to purge, often in service

658
00:39:45,880 --> 00:39:49,520
Speaker 7: of some unrelated personal grievance or in group self preservation

659
00:39:50,200 --> 00:39:54,480
Speaker 7: constant attack, constant strength, constant purity. These conflicts can take

660
00:39:54,560 --> 00:39:57,480
Speaker 7: form as blame as to why desired outcome is not

661
00:39:57,520 --> 00:40:02,239
Speaker 7: being achieved, intensified a stratifica of in group out group dynamics,

662
00:40:02,280 --> 00:40:04,800
Speaker 7: as in these are the bad people in the movement,

663
00:40:05,000 --> 00:40:08,360
Speaker 7: whereas we are the enlightened definity group with the only

664
00:40:08,400 --> 00:40:13,759
Speaker 7: successful strategy or conspiratorial co intel pro like actions such

665
00:40:13,840 --> 00:40:17,480
Speaker 7: as cop jacketing, snitch jacketing, and more general bad jacketing

666
00:40:17,480 --> 00:40:22,000
Speaker 7: against people who you have simple organizational disagreements with. This

667
00:40:22,080 --> 00:40:25,960
Speaker 7: can also manifest as a deep unwillingness to hear preemptive

668
00:40:26,040 --> 00:40:29,480
Speaker 7: critical commentary and the assumption that all criticism comes from

669
00:40:29,560 --> 00:40:32,920
Speaker 7: place of bad faith, A recent article in a popular

670
00:40:32,920 --> 00:40:37,640
Speaker 7: anarchist publication roped in genuine critique and disagreement as somehow

671
00:40:37,680 --> 00:40:41,200
Speaker 7: being in alignment with the state's motivations against the movement.

672
00:40:41,520 --> 00:40:44,680
Speaker 7: And this is not just a form of cop jacketing, saying

673
00:40:44,719 --> 00:40:47,640
Speaker 7: that if you disagree with a particular strategy, that means

674
00:40:47,680 --> 00:40:50,440
Speaker 7: you are in alignment with police because they also dislike

675
00:40:50,440 --> 00:40:54,200
Speaker 7: a particular strategy. But the police dislike the strategy for

676
00:40:54,239 --> 00:40:57,600
Speaker 7: a completely different reason, because they dislike any form of resistance.

677
00:40:58,680 --> 00:41:01,319
Speaker 7: Claiming that critique from an anarchists and criticism from the

678
00:41:01,320 --> 00:41:05,320
Speaker 7: state come from the same fundamental place is simply laughable.

679
00:41:06,200 --> 00:41:09,360
Speaker 7: It is in moments such as this, when repression is increasing,

680
00:41:09,920 --> 00:41:14,120
Speaker 7: that justified frustration and fear leading to paranoia can be

681
00:41:14,200 --> 00:41:17,920
Speaker 7: turned into a weapon by the state. At these moments,

682
00:41:17,920 --> 00:41:20,720
Speaker 7: people must be the most vigilant against their own fear,

683
00:41:20,840 --> 00:41:24,160
Speaker 7: resulting in retreat from battle against the state and turning

684
00:41:24,239 --> 00:41:28,839
Speaker 7: to intra conflict as a desperate form of alternative struggle. Solidarity,

685
00:41:28,920 --> 00:41:33,520
Speaker 7: love and care are paramount, including harsh love, including well

686
00:41:33,560 --> 00:41:38,799
Speaker 7: meaning critical commentary, debate, and constructive conversation. Well that's enough

687
00:41:38,800 --> 00:41:41,799
Speaker 7: of that. Finally, I'd like to give an update on

688
00:41:41,920 --> 00:41:46,480
Speaker 7: the Copcity construction timeline. The past few months, city officials

689
00:41:46,560 --> 00:41:48,960
Speaker 7: and the Atlanta Police Foundation have made a series of

690
00:41:48,960 --> 00:41:53,200
Speaker 7: statements claiming construction is very much on schedule and quickly

691
00:41:53,239 --> 00:41:54,320
Speaker 7: approaching completion.

692
00:41:54,840 --> 00:41:57,680
Speaker 3: I want to say this, the construction of those training

693
00:41:57,719 --> 00:41:58,720
Speaker 3: centers on schedule.

694
00:41:59,160 --> 00:42:01,440
Speaker 4: We will be moving in summer. It will be operational

695
00:42:01,560 --> 00:42:02,399
Speaker 4: this time next year.

696
00:42:02,960 --> 00:42:07,680
Speaker 9: The new facility is almost seventy percent complete with construction.

697
00:42:08,360 --> 00:42:11,600
Speaker 7: Many have pointed out that this is a ridiculously high number,

698
00:42:11,719 --> 00:42:14,880
Speaker 7: considering that a video published by the police just a

699
00:42:14,880 --> 00:42:18,920
Speaker 7: few days ago showed an unfinished foundation and a single

700
00:42:19,000 --> 00:42:23,120
Speaker 7: paved road. Now Sam from the Atlantic Community Press Collective

701
00:42:23,239 --> 00:42:26,600
Speaker 7: helped explain what this number might be referring to.

702
00:42:27,400 --> 00:42:31,080
Speaker 11: There are no walls built, to say the least. I

703
00:42:31,160 --> 00:42:35,759
Speaker 11: personally believe that to be a very charitable reading of

704
00:42:36,480 --> 00:42:39,120
Speaker 11: a document with a construction timeline. We've seen as a

705
00:42:39,120 --> 00:42:42,520
Speaker 11: result of our open records requests that sort of break

706
00:42:42,840 --> 00:42:46,440
Speaker 11: the what a lay person such as myself would call

707
00:42:46,440 --> 00:42:52,480
Speaker 11: it the construction process up into things like permitting, pre construction, development, construction.

708
00:42:53,200 --> 00:42:56,799
Speaker 11: On that timeline, they were about seventy percent done with

709
00:42:56,920 --> 00:43:01,600
Speaker 11: the development, and they were also about seventy percent done

710
00:43:01,680 --> 00:43:06,040
Speaker 11: with the whole process ranging from permitting to cutting the

711
00:43:06,040 --> 00:43:09,720
Speaker 11: red ribbon. What again, as a layperson, I would also

712
00:43:09,800 --> 00:43:14,360
Speaker 11: call the construction process, meaning the whole you know, roof walls, doors,

713
00:43:14,480 --> 00:43:18,880
Speaker 11: thing on that particular document was zero percent complete or like,

714
00:43:19,480 --> 00:43:22,040
Speaker 11: I shouldn't say zero percent because they have like concrete

715
00:43:22,080 --> 00:43:24,120
Speaker 11: paths and stuff. I don't remember exactly what the date

716
00:43:24,160 --> 00:43:27,000
Speaker 11: on this document was, but it was zero to a

717
00:43:27,120 --> 00:43:29,040
Speaker 11: very small percentage of complete.

718
00:43:29,280 --> 00:43:30,440
Speaker 6: So yes on the.

719
00:43:30,239 --> 00:43:34,520
Speaker 11: Grand construction timeline of filing the first document to again

720
00:43:34,800 --> 00:43:39,000
Speaker 11: literal walls. Yeah, sure they're seventy percent complete by any

721
00:43:39,040 --> 00:43:42,880
Speaker 11: measure of construction to the average season. No, they are

722
00:43:42,920 --> 00:43:44,800
Speaker 11: not seventy percent complete.

723
00:43:46,120 --> 00:43:48,520
Speaker 7: Before I close this episode out, I do want to

724
00:43:48,600 --> 00:43:51,520
Speaker 7: let listeners know about ways to support Jack, the person

725
00:43:51,560 --> 00:43:55,080
Speaker 7: rested in the house raid last month. In the show notes,

726
00:43:55,120 --> 00:43:57,120
Speaker 7: I will link to a fundraiser that goes towards his

727
00:43:57,200 --> 00:44:00,359
Speaker 7: legal fees, jail commissary, and phone calls. You can also

728
00:44:00,360 --> 00:44:03,520
Speaker 7: go to the website free Jack dot Co. That's free

729
00:44:03,719 --> 00:44:07,960
Speaker 7: Jack dot Co for information on how to mail letters

730
00:44:07,960 --> 00:44:10,640
Speaker 7: and books to Jack while he is currently being held

731
00:44:10,680 --> 00:44:14,680
Speaker 7: in jail without bond. Trials and court cases related to

732
00:44:14,760 --> 00:44:18,640
Speaker 7: the Georgia copcity recoindictment have all been delayed till at

733
00:44:18,719 --> 00:44:22,680
Speaker 7: least this summer. Follow the Atlantic Community Press Collective for

734
00:44:22,840 --> 00:44:26,359
Speaker 7: updates on that as they happen. See you on the

735
00:44:26,400 --> 00:44:27,239
Speaker 7: other side.

736
00:44:27,760 --> 00:44:29,040
Speaker 6: Do you think he's glaed to stay?

737
00:44:29,880 --> 00:44:33,319
Speaker 3: You know, obviously he's not here and we're seeking him,

738
00:44:33,320 --> 00:44:34,600
Speaker 3: and so we would ask him to come in and

739
00:44:34,680 --> 00:44:35,560
Speaker 3: answer our questions.

740
00:44:48,960 --> 00:44:51,680
Speaker 13: Welcome, sick it up and here, I'm Andrew Siege from

741
00:44:51,760 --> 00:44:55,799
Speaker 13: the Channel andresm and say you will be shedding light

742
00:44:55,960 --> 00:44:59,920
Speaker 13: on a recently popular discussion on the problem with mod

743
00:45:00,200 --> 00:45:04,920
Speaker 13: cities and more specifically the growing absence of third places.

744
00:45:06,040 --> 00:45:09,840
Speaker 13: Now love them or hate them, cities are here to stay.

745
00:45:10,360 --> 00:45:12,319
Speaker 13: And if you spend any time on urban plan and

746
00:45:12,360 --> 00:45:15,560
Speaker 13: YouTube or really just looked around, you know they have

747
00:45:15,600 --> 00:45:20,440
Speaker 13: some issues. Traffic congestion is a big one, a notorious

748
00:45:20,520 --> 00:45:25,160
Speaker 13: nemesis of modern cities, stemming from increased population, poor urban planning,

749
00:45:25,200 --> 00:45:28,600
Speaker 13: and excessive vehicle usage, creating a big waste of time

750
00:45:28,640 --> 00:45:32,360
Speaker 13: and straining or well being. There also issues of physical

751
00:45:32,400 --> 00:45:36,800
Speaker 13: and mental health among city inhabitants. The environmental impact of

752
00:45:36,880 --> 00:45:38,640
Speaker 13: urban areas can be quite terrible.

753
00:45:39,160 --> 00:45:40,759
Speaker 12: Housing issues seem to.

754
00:45:40,800 --> 00:45:45,640
Speaker 14: Be globally hellish, but still people flock to cities because

755
00:45:45,680 --> 00:45:48,800
Speaker 14: that's where the opportunities are. Hence the growth of slums

756
00:45:48,840 --> 00:45:52,600
Speaker 14: and the overall straining infrastructure like utilities and transportation, and

757
00:45:52,680 --> 00:45:55,880
Speaker 14: the functionality of cities, many of which are currently well

758
00:45:55,920 --> 00:46:00,319
Speaker 14: above their capacity. Of course, many of these issues just

759
00:46:00,400 --> 00:46:03,360
Speaker 14: don't touch the wealthy in the same way. Within the

760
00:46:03,360 --> 00:46:08,600
Speaker 14: city's gleaming skyscrapers lie stock disparities and income access to

761
00:46:08,640 --> 00:46:13,879
Speaker 14: resources and opportunities. I for another issue, more relevantile discussionaire.

762
00:46:14,239 --> 00:46:18,040
Speaker 14: In the midst of a crowd, even dwellers often grapple

763
00:46:18,120 --> 00:46:22,359
Speaker 14: with feelings of loneliness and disconnection. The paradox are being

764
00:46:22,400 --> 00:46:28,640
Speaker 14: surrounded by people yet feeling totally alone. In a seminar work,

765
00:46:28,760 --> 00:46:31,680
Speaker 14: The Great Good Place, published in nineteen eighty nine, American

766
00:46:31,719 --> 00:46:35,520
Speaker 14: sociologist Ray Olenberg presents a captivator notion for a balance

767
00:46:35,560 --> 00:46:40,080
Speaker 14: and fulfilling life, a harmony among the three spheres, the home,

768
00:46:40,160 --> 00:46:43,799
Speaker 14: of the workplace, and the realm of third places. These

769
00:46:43,840 --> 00:46:48,120
Speaker 14: third places encompass inclusive social settings, crucial for community bonding

770
00:46:48,360 --> 00:46:52,919
Speaker 14: and faster and meaningful interactions. Now, as for what qualifies

771
00:46:53,000 --> 00:46:55,759
Speaker 14: a third place, common examples come to mind.

772
00:46:56,160 --> 00:46:58,280
Speaker 12: Cafes, pubs, stoops parks.

773
00:46:58,360 --> 00:47:02,680
Speaker 14: However, not every cafe, pubs, tupa park captures the essence

774
00:47:02,719 --> 00:47:04,080
Speaker 14: of a true third.

775
00:47:03,800 --> 00:47:06,040
Speaker 12: Place as Oldenburg described it.

776
00:47:07,040 --> 00:47:09,880
Speaker 14: Historically, their places have been a powerful force in shaping

777
00:47:09,920 --> 00:47:13,680
Speaker 14: the course of revolutions and cultural movements. During the American Revolution,

778
00:47:13,880 --> 00:47:18,200
Speaker 14: the tavern was a vital health of political discourse. In

779
00:47:18,200 --> 00:47:21,160
Speaker 14: the French Revolution, the cafe was a crucial meeting place

780
00:47:21,160 --> 00:47:25,080
Speaker 14: for the revolutionary, intelligentia and common people. During the Enlightenment,

781
00:47:25,280 --> 00:47:28,759
Speaker 14: coffeehouses in London assumed a central rule in fostering the

782
00:47:28,800 --> 00:47:33,279
Speaker 14: intellectual and cultural transformation of society, and during the Harlem Renaissance,

783
00:47:33,520 --> 00:47:36,880
Speaker 14: third places could be found in theaters, churches, jazz cafes

784
00:47:36,880 --> 00:47:41,080
Speaker 14: and more sivin as vital he runs for African American musicians, writers,

785
00:47:41,120 --> 00:47:44,719
Speaker 14: intellectuals the source to develop and celebrate their cultural identity.

786
00:47:45,280 --> 00:47:50,000
Speaker 14: Oldenburg outlines eight key characteristics that define the allure of

787
00:47:50,040 --> 00:47:54,680
Speaker 14: these communal spaces. He takes a rather strict approach, and

788
00:47:54,840 --> 00:47:59,200
Speaker 14: this is key, emphasizing that his description excludes the maturity

789
00:47:59,360 --> 00:48:03,760
Speaker 14: of venue even if they exhibit some of these defining traits.

790
00:48:04,920 --> 00:48:08,000
Speaker 14: And I suppose you can argue with that, but I

791
00:48:08,000 --> 00:48:10,640
Speaker 14: think that's equippal I've had with the discussions about third

792
00:48:10,680 --> 00:48:14,000
Speaker 14: places because people seem to be more infatuated with the

793
00:48:14,239 --> 00:48:18,680
Speaker 14: vague idea of them and not so much interested in

794
00:48:18,760 --> 00:48:22,000
Speaker 14: what the two has actually been coined to describe. See

795
00:48:22,040 --> 00:48:25,000
Speaker 14: end up with people label in all sorts of spaces, clubs,

796
00:48:25,000 --> 00:48:27,719
Speaker 14: and organizations third places.

797
00:48:27,520 --> 00:48:30,440
Speaker 12: Even if they don't fit the criteria. At this point,

798
00:48:30,560 --> 00:48:31,319
Speaker 12: the Internet has.

799
00:48:31,239 --> 00:48:34,480
Speaker 14: Seemingly lost the plot on third places and taken a

800
00:48:34,560 --> 00:48:37,600
Speaker 14: life on its own independent of what Oldenburg intended.

801
00:48:38,239 --> 00:48:39,799
Speaker 12: But he's dead.

802
00:48:40,560 --> 00:48:43,080
Speaker 14: His book is still around, but I don't think a

803
00:48:43,120 --> 00:48:45,719
Speaker 14: lot of people have read it. But I did in

804
00:48:45,840 --> 00:48:48,000
Speaker 14: preparation for this, and so we'll tell into some of

805
00:48:48,000 --> 00:48:49,120
Speaker 14: those characteristics now.

806
00:48:51,160 --> 00:48:54,320
Speaker 12: For one, a third place lies on neutral ground.

807
00:48:54,960 --> 00:48:56,800
Speaker 14: No one has expected to play host for the others,

808
00:48:56,840 --> 00:48:59,239
Speaker 14: no one is obligated to be there, and people are

809
00:48:59,280 --> 00:49:01,760
Speaker 14: comfortable and free to come and go as they please.

810
00:49:03,000 --> 00:49:06,640
Speaker 14: Third places are spaces where people can jest, be where

811
00:49:06,640 --> 00:49:09,920
Speaker 14: you can where opportunities can exist for fraternization in a

812
00:49:10,000 --> 00:49:12,760
Speaker 14: safe public setting that car be found in the privacy

813
00:49:12,760 --> 00:49:15,560
Speaker 14: of the home or the professional boundary.

814
00:49:15,040 --> 00:49:15,799
Speaker 12: Of the workplace.

815
00:49:16,360 --> 00:49:19,520
Speaker 14: A space where a variety of relationships can blossom, including

816
00:49:19,560 --> 00:49:23,840
Speaker 14: the ones that don't go any deeper than friendly public encounters. Secondly,

817
00:49:23,840 --> 00:49:26,560
Speaker 14: the third place is a level in place. It requires

818
00:49:26,560 --> 00:49:29,440
Speaker 14: no formal criteria for membership. In place, there's no emphasis

819
00:49:29,520 --> 00:49:32,439
Speaker 14: on one's social status, and provides the possibility for people

820
00:49:32,440 --> 00:49:35,799
Speaker 14: of a variety of backgrounds and experiences to associate on

821
00:49:35,840 --> 00:49:40,240
Speaker 14: the merit of their personality alone. Within third places, people

822
00:49:40,239 --> 00:49:43,240
Speaker 14: can find friendships with those who are under ordinary circumstances

823
00:49:43,440 --> 00:49:47,200
Speaker 14: that might never cross paths. The third characteristic of the

824
00:49:47,239 --> 00:49:49,560
Speaker 14: third place is that it's a place in which conversation

825
00:49:49,760 --> 00:49:51,239
Speaker 14: is meant to be the main activity.

826
00:49:52,000 --> 00:49:54,440
Speaker 12: It doesn't have to be the only activity. For example,

827
00:49:54,520 --> 00:49:55,920
Speaker 12: card games or pool.

828
00:49:55,760 --> 00:49:59,120
Speaker 14: Or dominoes make for an excellent social lubricant, but the

829
00:49:59,160 --> 00:50:05,560
Speaker 14: space should become enough to facilitate pleasurable, lighthearted, and entertaining conversation. Now,

830
00:50:05,600 --> 00:50:07,920
Speaker 14: it's not difficult to create a space that can facilitate

831
00:50:07,960 --> 00:50:11,080
Speaker 14: good conversation, but it's also easy to ruin the flow

832
00:50:11,120 --> 00:50:16,480
Speaker 14: of good conversation. Music, personal screens, ecosistical people. They can

833
00:50:16,520 --> 00:50:18,680
Speaker 14: all be quite ruinous to the social energy that a

834
00:50:18,719 --> 00:50:20,240
Speaker 14: good third place tries to foster.

835
00:50:20,960 --> 00:50:24,640
Speaker 12: Fourthly, third places need to be open and readily accessible.

836
00:50:25,239 --> 00:50:27,120
Speaker 14: That means being accessible in the sense of being in

837
00:50:27,120 --> 00:50:30,720
Speaker 14: a convenient location and open whenever the demons is holiness

838
00:50:30,800 --> 00:50:33,719
Speaker 14: or bortant strike, or when the depressures and frustrations of

839
00:50:33,719 --> 00:50:35,680
Speaker 14: the day call for relaxation a.

840
00:50:35,680 --> 00:50:37,080
Speaker 12: Mid good company.

841
00:50:37,239 --> 00:50:39,399
Speaker 14: In other words, third places are available when people need

842
00:50:39,440 --> 00:50:39,840
Speaker 14: them to be.

843
00:50:40,800 --> 00:50:41,000
Speaker 12: Now.

844
00:50:41,120 --> 00:50:44,640
Speaker 14: The form of accessibility that Wodenburg describes is not the

845
00:50:44,680 --> 00:50:48,000
Speaker 14: form of accessibility that disability just as advocates fight for,

846
00:50:48,640 --> 00:50:50,839
Speaker 14: And that is one of the quibbles that I have

847
00:50:51,000 --> 00:50:54,080
Speaker 14: with Wrotenberg's conception of third places that I'll get into

848
00:50:54,160 --> 00:50:59,080
Speaker 14: later next. Third places are given their appeal by their regulars,

849
00:50:59,440 --> 00:51:01,920
Speaker 14: who helps the mood of the space and provide a

850
00:51:01,920 --> 00:51:06,520
Speaker 14: welcoming environment for newcomers. Every regular was once a newcomer,

851
00:51:06,760 --> 00:51:09,239
Speaker 14: and the acceptance of newcomers is the central to the

852
00:51:09,280 --> 00:51:11,279
Speaker 14: sustained vitality of.

853
00:51:11,239 --> 00:51:15,320
Speaker 12: The third place. Sixth, third places keep a low profile.

854
00:51:15,360 --> 00:51:19,480
Speaker 14: They're not exclusive, extravagant, potentious to overly fancy. They're not

855
00:51:19,560 --> 00:51:22,960
Speaker 14: usually openly advertised, and they send to be older places

856
00:51:23,080 --> 00:51:26,279
Speaker 14: with a sort of a modest or even CD atmosphere.

857
00:51:27,520 --> 00:51:32,840
Speaker 14: They're certainly not tourist traps. Seventh, and we're almost done.

858
00:51:33,080 --> 00:51:36,560
Speaker 14: Third places have a playful mood. People go to third

859
00:51:36,560 --> 00:51:40,520
Speaker 14: places for the banter and the laughter, not tension and hostility,

860
00:51:40,920 --> 00:51:42,919
Speaker 14: so that's what the space is set up to encourage.

861
00:51:43,480 --> 00:51:45,799
Speaker 12: And lastly, number eight, third places.

862
00:51:45,440 --> 00:51:48,200
Speaker 14: Are meant to be home away from home, offering a

863
00:51:48,239 --> 00:51:51,920
Speaker 14: sense of intimacy, regeneration, and community that puts people at

864
00:51:51,960 --> 00:51:56,000
Speaker 14: ease in a warm and friendly atmosphere. So to summarize,

865
00:51:56,239 --> 00:52:00,880
Speaker 14: third places exist on neutral ground, function as equalizers social status.

866
00:52:01,239 --> 00:52:04,640
Speaker 14: Provide an environment where conversations or the center keep a

867
00:52:04,680 --> 00:52:08,439
Speaker 14: low profile, are open and accommodating, have an essence shape

868
00:52:08,440 --> 00:52:10,960
Speaker 14: by their regulars, characterized by playfulness and a sense of

869
00:52:11,000 --> 00:52:15,320
Speaker 14: home away from home. Third places, with their unique characteristics,

870
00:52:15,520 --> 00:52:18,759
Speaker 14: present an array of advantages. There are only a hands

871
00:52:18,800 --> 00:52:22,160
Speaker 14: in individual social and conversational skills, but also foster a

872
00:52:22,200 --> 00:52:26,280
Speaker 14: sense of genuine connection and belonging within the community. Third

873
00:52:26,280 --> 00:52:28,839
Speaker 14: places are arrested from the monot ney daily life under

874
00:52:28,840 --> 00:52:32,160
Speaker 14: the weight of modern capitalism. They inject much needed novelty

875
00:52:32,200 --> 00:52:34,880
Speaker 14: into our routines, often a diverse and free flow in

876
00:52:34,960 --> 00:52:38,120
Speaker 14: atmosphere that stands apart from the rigidity of our daily

877
00:52:38,280 --> 00:52:42,120
Speaker 14: crid There are bond for emotional wellbeing a spiritual tonic,

878
00:52:42,320 --> 00:52:45,640
Speaker 14: and the loss to tap into our creative and expressive selves.

879
00:52:46,800 --> 00:52:49,040
Speaker 12: Crucially, third places offer.

880
00:52:48,800 --> 00:52:52,720
Speaker 14: With Oldenberg coined as friends by the set, they provide

881
00:52:52,760 --> 00:52:57,480
Speaker 14: convenience paces for social gatherings, offering routine and reliable interactions

882
00:52:57,680 --> 00:53:01,160
Speaker 14: with a diverse array of individuals, both casually and intimately,

883
00:53:01,560 --> 00:53:06,319
Speaker 14: without the hassle of scheduling meetups. Unfortunately, third places kind

884
00:53:06,320 --> 00:53:10,279
Speaker 14: of fell off in many areas, obviously not everywhere, but

885
00:53:10,480 --> 00:53:14,160
Speaker 14: especially in places where American style urban sprawl and suburbia

886
00:53:14,200 --> 00:53:18,320
Speaker 14: has proliferated. I've been describing the characteristics and benefits and

887
00:53:18,440 --> 00:53:21,560
Speaker 14: historical potency of these spaces, but I've only gotten small

888
00:53:21,640 --> 00:53:23,960
Speaker 14: tastes of some of these myself and for a lot

889
00:53:23,960 --> 00:53:28,080
Speaker 14: of people, I think, particularly of my generation. Besides, perhaps

890
00:53:28,160 --> 00:53:33,240
Speaker 14: the approximate experience of a college common room, third places

891
00:53:33,320 --> 00:53:38,840
Speaker 14: are a distant cultural memory, not a lived experience. So

892
00:53:38,920 --> 00:53:42,960
Speaker 14: Oldenberg basically asks what's up with that? And according to him,

893
00:53:42,960 --> 00:53:47,080
Speaker 14: the blame for this mansion act falls squarely on the suburbs.

894
00:53:47,880 --> 00:53:52,680
Speaker 14: These sprawl and enclays prioritized private abodes over public spaces,

895
00:53:53,080 --> 00:53:56,919
Speaker 14: pfatuating and isolating narrative that confines the good life within

896
00:53:56,960 --> 00:54:03,040
Speaker 14: individual homes and yards. Wind designs often imposed by distant developers,

897
00:54:03,600 --> 00:54:08,200
Speaker 14: stifle community connections. Few opportunities exist within them for organic

898
00:54:08,239 --> 00:54:14,680
Speaker 14: social interaction beyond your immediate neighbors. The car centrical layout

899
00:54:14,760 --> 00:54:18,320
Speaker 14: further thoughts the revival of third places, as the reliance

900
00:54:18,360 --> 00:54:22,320
Speaker 14: and cars diminishes chance encounters and informal gathering spots along

901
00:54:22,400 --> 00:54:26,960
Speaker 14: daily routes, fostering a culture of detachment among neighbors. But

902
00:54:27,000 --> 00:54:31,040
Speaker 14: it's not just the suburbs suffering this issue. Urban environments

903
00:54:31,040 --> 00:54:34,880
Speaker 14: too have succumbed to efficiency and profit sacrifice in space

904
00:54:35,000 --> 00:54:39,800
Speaker 14: vir genuine human connection. Standardized franchise chains dominate eras in

905
00:54:39,840 --> 00:54:44,040
Speaker 14: the character and charm that encourage communal interaction, replacing.

906
00:54:43,480 --> 00:54:45,239
Speaker 12: It sterile environments.

907
00:54:46,160 --> 00:54:50,560
Speaker 14: And technology hasn't exactly aided third places either, as the

908
00:54:50,560 --> 00:54:52,879
Speaker 14: alert of the Internet has been a substitute for real

909
00:54:52,920 --> 00:54:57,000
Speaker 14: life interaction that tends to keep people indoors. Sure, you

910
00:54:57,040 --> 00:55:00,239
Speaker 14: can see the Internet as the frontier for new third places,

911
00:55:00,480 --> 00:55:03,239
Speaker 14: and in some ways they are, but not quite in

912
00:55:03,280 --> 00:55:03,839
Speaker 14: the same way.

913
00:55:04,840 --> 00:55:06,960
Speaker 12: And of course I mean less qual its out even

914
00:55:07,000 --> 00:55:08,160
Speaker 12: though wordenburg doesn't.

915
00:55:08,800 --> 00:55:12,960
Speaker 14: Capitalism plays a significant role in the decline of third places.

916
00:55:13,640 --> 00:55:17,600
Speaker 14: Work life imbalances leaves scant time for social engagements to

917
00:55:17,719 --> 00:55:23,360
Speaker 14: relentless commercialization, privatization of public spaces, gentrification, close intraditional hubs,

918
00:55:23,480 --> 00:55:27,960
Speaker 14: and profit driven urban designs all contribute to this decline.

919
00:55:28,080 --> 00:55:31,360
Speaker 14: The disappearance of third places isn't an accident of history,

920
00:55:31,760 --> 00:55:36,239
Speaker 14: but a consequence of our modern societal choices and systemic pressures.

921
00:55:49,600 --> 00:55:52,640
Speaker 14: So all those ideas have been catched on a lot lately,

922
00:55:52,719 --> 00:55:56,520
Speaker 14: especially with younger generations. Like I said, it's this distant

923
00:55:56,600 --> 00:56:00,920
Speaker 14: yet learned cultural memory for obvious reasons, though things kind

924
00:56:00,960 --> 00:56:04,040
Speaker 14: of suck right now, and a lot of people are

925
00:56:04,080 --> 00:56:07,320
Speaker 14: taken a half understood grasp of the concept and running

926
00:56:07,360 --> 00:56:09,680
Speaker 14: wild with it, Like for example, I Aliso see some

927
00:56:09,760 --> 00:56:12,799
Speaker 14: people like just Blankets applying the Internet as the new

928
00:56:12,840 --> 00:56:13,440
Speaker 14: third place.

929
00:56:14,040 --> 00:56:15,520
Speaker 12: And while there are corners.

930
00:56:15,120 --> 00:56:18,759
Speaker 14: Of the Internet that do approximate that experience, and I

931
00:56:18,840 --> 00:56:22,680
Speaker 14: recognize the potential virtual spaces such as Discord to embody

932
00:56:22,680 --> 00:56:26,600
Speaker 14: the characteristics of third places, I fully believe that virtual

933
00:56:26,680 --> 00:56:30,920
Speaker 14: third places lack the tangible elements inherent in traditional spaces

934
00:56:30,920 --> 00:56:34,840
Speaker 14: that are essential for fostering deep emotional connections and empathy

935
00:56:35,080 --> 00:56:39,920
Speaker 14: that are fighter for healthy community life. These social media platforms,

936
00:56:39,960 --> 00:56:44,440
Speaker 14: particularly sites like Twitter, often lack the authenticity and nuanced

937
00:56:44,440 --> 00:56:48,480
Speaker 14: communication president and face to face interactions. That's by design,

938
00:56:48,520 --> 00:56:52,000
Speaker 14: of course. Twitter thrives on conflict. That's why I'm not

939
00:56:52,040 --> 00:56:55,360
Speaker 14: there anymore. But it's all too easy on sites like

940
00:56:55,400 --> 00:56:59,680
Speaker 14: those demit interpret intentions or to use anonymity for negative

941
00:56:59,719 --> 00:57:04,600
Speaker 14: inter actions like cyber bullion, trolling, or online harassment. In

942
00:57:04,640 --> 00:57:08,880
Speaker 14: real life, trolls get kicked out, bulliers in some cases

943
00:57:08,920 --> 00:57:12,680
Speaker 14: are dealt with people who are harassing people also tend

944
00:57:12,680 --> 00:57:16,000
Speaker 14: to get kicked out, But online all those things often

945
00:57:16,120 --> 00:57:22,240
Speaker 14: run rampant. Moreover, the permanents of online interactions can hinder

946
00:57:22,280 --> 00:57:27,440
Speaker 14: the relaxed vulnerability often experience in traditional spaces, as everything

947
00:57:27,640 --> 00:57:30,480
Speaker 14: is recorded, which makes trust easier to breach.

948
00:57:33,880 --> 00:57:35,840
Speaker 12: But despiteer critique of how.

949
00:57:35,760 --> 00:57:38,240
Speaker 14: Some people have been run in with the term third places,

950
00:57:38,360 --> 00:57:41,440
Speaker 14: I think the actual book and its concepts do deserve

951
00:57:41,720 --> 00:57:47,479
Speaker 14: further scrutiny and in my view, radicalization. Wollmenburg's idea of

952
00:57:47,520 --> 00:57:49,520
Speaker 14: the whole in the workplace in the third place is a.

953
00:57:49,560 --> 00:57:50,760
Speaker 12: Sort of a pecan order.

954
00:57:51,120 --> 00:57:55,120
Speaker 14: It also really sidelines domestic labor as like not really

955
00:57:55,200 --> 00:57:58,960
Speaker 14: work as if it's separate from the workplace, and I

956
00:57:58,960 --> 00:58:02,040
Speaker 14: also don't like the idea of work being prioritized over

957
00:58:02,240 --> 00:58:03,920
Speaker 14: like essential social interaction.

958
00:58:05,280 --> 00:58:08,600
Speaker 7: I think there's also the interesting aspect now that for

959
00:58:08,680 --> 00:58:11,600
Speaker 7: a lot of people like myself included, working home are

960
00:58:11,600 --> 00:58:16,200
Speaker 7: now the same spot and there is Ever since the pandemic,

961
00:58:16,280 --> 00:58:18,920
Speaker 7: there's been a large searge of people working from home,

962
00:58:19,160 --> 00:58:22,080
Speaker 7: which kind of complicates this dynamic.

963
00:58:23,120 --> 00:58:30,600
Speaker 14: Yeah, yeah, pre industrialization, I think especially that idea also

964
00:58:30,640 --> 00:58:32,760
Speaker 14: coincide it you know, the first and the second place

965
00:58:32,760 --> 00:58:35,720
Speaker 14: to home. In the workplace, we're also a bit blurred.

966
00:58:36,360 --> 00:58:38,600
Speaker 14: And now I think we're witnessing a similar blurred today,

967
00:58:38,680 --> 00:58:42,760
Speaker 14: you know, post industrialization, and as a consequence of the pandemic,

968
00:58:43,320 --> 00:58:46,080
Speaker 14: with remote work really catching on and blurring those lines

969
00:58:46,120 --> 00:58:51,440
Speaker 14: for sure. I think another major oversighting Oldenbook's work is

970
00:58:51,480 --> 00:58:55,960
Speaker 14: the gender bias within historical and contemporary three Places. You know,

971
00:58:56,040 --> 00:59:00,680
Speaker 14: these spaces have been predominantly male dominated or gender segregated.

972
00:59:01,960 --> 00:59:05,040
Speaker 14: I think it's nostalgia for three Places, which you kind

973
00:59:05,040 --> 00:59:08,400
Speaker 14: of pick up on in the book, neglects the historical

974
00:59:08,440 --> 00:59:12,320
Speaker 14: limitations who women face and accessing these spaces. So I

975
00:59:12,320 --> 00:59:15,200
Speaker 14: think if three Places words make a resurgence, we would

976
00:59:15,200 --> 00:59:19,160
Speaker 14: definitely need to address these systemic barriers, like the double

977
00:59:19,200 --> 00:59:21,880
Speaker 14: shift that many women juggle to ensure.

978
00:59:21,600 --> 00:59:24,040
Speaker 12: Their inclusion in future three places.

979
00:59:25,000 --> 00:59:29,560
Speaker 14: I think another critique I would have is on ownership control.

980
00:59:30,160 --> 00:59:34,160
Speaker 14: You know, third spaces are touted as neutral, but when

981
00:59:34,160 --> 00:59:37,640
Speaker 14: they're operating under the whims of private owners or state authorities,

982
00:59:38,520 --> 00:59:41,800
Speaker 14: they very easily succumb to those profit drift at motives.

983
00:59:43,320 --> 00:59:45,040
Speaker 12: I don't think a community.

984
00:59:44,560 --> 00:59:46,400
Speaker 14: Space, a space that is to be sent that is

985
00:59:46,440 --> 00:59:50,840
Speaker 14: central to a community, should be so concentrated in the hands.

986
00:59:50,480 --> 00:59:54,000
Speaker 12: Of private developers or private owners.

987
00:59:54,920 --> 00:59:58,600
Speaker 14: I think those spaces are the types that should be

988
00:59:58,680 --> 01:00:05,040
Speaker 14: collectively stewarded. There's also the cost barrier of third places.

989
01:00:05,080 --> 01:00:08,080
Speaker 14: You know, due to financial constraints I have already's able to,

990
01:00:08,720 --> 01:00:10,640
Speaker 14: you know, spend the time there and spend the kind

991
01:00:10,640 --> 01:00:13,240
Speaker 14: of money there that those spaces kind of require for

992
01:00:13,280 --> 01:00:15,880
Speaker 14: you to stay there for extended periods of time, they

993
01:00:15,960 --> 01:00:17,560
Speaker 14: kindot have to buy something in all.

994
01:00:17,480 --> 01:00:18,320
Speaker 12: Of those places.

995
01:00:19,280 --> 01:00:21,840
Speaker 14: A lot of good places are alcohol oriented, which is

996
01:00:21,840 --> 01:00:25,600
Speaker 14: not exactly inclusive for people who are not interested in

997
01:00:25,600 --> 01:00:30,600
Speaker 14: alcohol consumption or recovering from addiction. But of course, speaking

998
01:00:30,760 --> 01:00:36,160
Speaker 14: of inclusivity, Willenberg's idea of accessibility, like I said before,

999
01:00:36,320 --> 01:00:38,840
Speaker 14: doesn't really come from a place of disability justice.

1000
01:00:39,120 --> 01:00:40,320
Speaker 12: But that has to change.

1001
01:00:40,320 --> 01:00:44,280
Speaker 14: You know, we in a broader grasp of accessibility, which

1002
01:00:44,280 --> 01:00:47,080
Speaker 14: is why, despite my critiques, I do acknowledge the merits

1003
01:00:47,080 --> 01:00:51,440
Speaker 14: of what are often tombed as virtual third places. They

1004
01:00:51,440 --> 01:00:55,560
Speaker 14: save us more accessible alternatives for the immunal compromise or

1005
01:00:55,560 --> 01:01:00,720
Speaker 14: disabled individuals. These spaces break down geographical barriers, uniting people

1006
01:01:00,760 --> 01:01:05,680
Speaker 14: from diverse backgrounds, locations, fostering connections, base since shared interests, passions,

1007
01:01:05,680 --> 01:01:09,320
Speaker 14: and identities with all the constraints of physical distance. And

1008
01:01:09,440 --> 01:01:13,640
Speaker 14: unlike physical third places, vircial third places are offered around

1009
01:01:13,840 --> 01:01:18,560
Speaker 14: the clock, case into users diverse lifestyles and rhythms, offering

1010
01:01:18,600 --> 01:01:22,880
Speaker 14: a flexibility that is really rarely found in real life settings.

1011
01:01:24,720 --> 01:01:29,600
Speaker 14: At the same time, though in Olenberg's defense, he does

1012
01:01:29,680 --> 01:01:33,040
Speaker 14: point out that third places will not resonate with everyone.

1013
01:01:33,200 --> 01:01:35,200
Speaker 14: There is this popular notion that third places have to

1014
01:01:35,240 --> 01:01:39,840
Speaker 14: be for everybody, and then I see people criticize them, saying, oh, well,

1015
01:01:40,080 --> 01:01:41,400
Speaker 14: I prefer to just stay at home.

1016
01:01:41,480 --> 01:01:42,600
Speaker 12: I don't really like the places.

1017
01:01:42,640 --> 01:01:45,600
Speaker 14: I don't like social interaction or whatever, or I don't

1018
01:01:45,640 --> 01:01:47,040
Speaker 14: like that form of social interaction.

1019
01:01:47,480 --> 01:01:48,200
Speaker 12: And that's cool.

1020
01:01:48,240 --> 01:01:52,040
Speaker 14: You know third places shouldn't be the sole remedy or

1021
01:01:53,160 --> 01:01:57,040
Speaker 14: the main remedy for social ills. Preferences will, of course vary,

1022
01:01:57,120 --> 01:02:01,160
Speaker 14: and not everyone finds cafes or bars appealing. Fine, but

1023
01:02:01,240 --> 01:02:04,120
Speaker 14: I still think we can radicalize their places a bit further,

1024
01:02:04,440 --> 01:02:06,439
Speaker 14: not just in the sense of diversifying it, but also

1025
01:02:06,480 --> 01:02:12,000
Speaker 14: in the sense of bringing it under popular power. I

1026
01:02:12,080 --> 01:02:14,840
Speaker 14: see radical toy places in my version on content to

1027
01:02:14,920 --> 01:02:19,560
Speaker 14: merely existing on neutral ground dictated by capital or stage initiatives.

1028
01:02:19,960 --> 01:02:23,320
Speaker 14: Know the envision has collective grounds, common grounds where in

1029
01:02:23,320 --> 01:02:26,080
Speaker 14: the vidual is not only frequent but co own. These

1030
01:02:26,120 --> 01:02:30,360
Speaker 14: spaces invest in time, energy, and resources to ensure their survival.

1031
01:02:30,960 --> 01:02:35,160
Speaker 14: Imagine spaces that transcend the typical lightheartedness associated with third places.

1032
01:02:35,880 --> 01:02:39,840
Speaker 14: They wield the power to spark social revolutions, serving as

1033
01:02:39,920 --> 01:02:45,040
Speaker 14: zones for decompression, rallying spots for union activities, and nurturing

1034
01:02:45,080 --> 01:02:49,640
Speaker 14: grounds for mutual aid, a nucleus of community driven change.

1035
01:02:51,920 --> 01:02:54,240
Speaker 14: But what says these radical spaces apart is not just

1036
01:02:54,320 --> 01:02:58,480
Speaker 14: the accessibility in location operating ours, but also a culture

1037
01:02:58,560 --> 01:03:02,800
Speaker 14: of inclusivity that goes beyond nostalgia for traditionally male dominated

1038
01:03:02,800 --> 01:03:05,920
Speaker 14: three places. You know, it's about welcoming or broader spectrum

1039
01:03:05,920 --> 01:03:09,480
Speaker 14: of perspectives againsties and abilities. Imagine this not just a

1040
01:03:09,560 --> 01:03:13,160
Speaker 14: space away from home, but integrated with the neighborhoods and

1041
01:03:13,240 --> 01:03:15,600
Speaker 14: mixed use buildings, fostering.

1042
01:03:15,160 --> 01:03:16,360
Speaker 12: Community into creation.

1043
01:03:17,440 --> 01:03:20,640
Speaker 14: As for how we bring these radical three places to life,

1044
01:03:21,240 --> 01:03:24,360
Speaker 14: the Road Flora in Hamburg, Germany, and I think provides

1045
01:03:24,400 --> 01:03:28,840
Speaker 14: some great inspiration. Formerly a theater, it was transformed into

1046
01:03:28,840 --> 01:03:32,840
Speaker 14: a political and cultural hub by activists in nineteen eighty nine.

1047
01:03:33,400 --> 01:03:36,520
Speaker 14: Today it stands as a symbol of resistance against against

1048
01:03:36,520 --> 01:03:40,960
Speaker 14: social injustice and a space pulsating with artistic expression and

1049
01:03:41,160 --> 01:03:46,520
Speaker 14: vibrant dialogue. They achieved that place through squatting and squattin

1050
01:03:46,680 --> 01:03:50,200
Speaker 14: is risky yet revolutionary, but it isn't the only path

1051
01:03:50,280 --> 01:03:54,520
Speaker 14: for secure in such spaces. I think we can mobilize communities,

1052
01:03:54,560 --> 01:03:58,160
Speaker 14: empowering them to actively participate in shape in public spaces

1053
01:03:58,400 --> 01:04:01,320
Speaker 14: instead of waiting for decisions from a I really like

1054
01:04:01,400 --> 01:04:04,160
Speaker 14: the idea of camera.

1055
01:04:03,920 --> 01:04:08,720
Speaker 12: Where the team comes from. But it's gorilla urban planning.

1056
01:04:09,320 --> 01:04:12,200
Speaker 14: You know, painting lines on the on the pavement for

1057
01:04:12,280 --> 01:04:17,520
Speaker 14: back paths, you know, reclaiming the sidewalk, claiming spaces in

1058
01:04:17,560 --> 01:04:21,200
Speaker 14: your neighborhood, taking control and not asking for permission to

1059
01:04:21,240 --> 01:04:24,200
Speaker 14: shape the park or the space that you share as

1060
01:04:24,200 --> 01:04:27,960
Speaker 14: you see fit. It's really about, you know, co creating

1061
01:04:28,040 --> 01:04:32,520
Speaker 14: our environment. It's not merely accepting what's imposed upon us.

1062
01:04:34,240 --> 01:04:40,000
Speaker 14: Reformist strategies in instances like these can have their merits.

1063
01:04:40,040 --> 01:04:45,600
Speaker 14: They don't exactly advance revolution, but you know, advocating for

1064
01:04:45,640 --> 01:04:49,480
Speaker 14: walkable neighborhood to improve probably transportation doesn't you know, it

1065
01:04:49,480 --> 01:04:53,360
Speaker 14: doesn't hurt. But the crocs remains, you know, these actions,

1066
01:04:53,360 --> 01:04:56,600
Speaker 14: these pushing this, this effort to push for reform. You know,

1067
01:04:57,240 --> 01:05:02,600
Speaker 14: it can solely accomplish potential some change, but the crux remains,

1068
01:05:02,640 --> 01:05:06,000
Speaker 14: you know, empowering people to manage their own lives and spaces,

1069
01:05:06,280 --> 01:05:12,640
Speaker 14: not relinquishing that power to uncare and autocrats. The decline

1070
01:05:12,640 --> 01:05:17,000
Speaker 14: of their places might not be catastrophic, but until we

1071
01:05:17,040 --> 01:05:21,080
Speaker 14: recognize and harness our power to shape physical environments, our

1072
01:05:21,240 --> 01:05:24,040
Speaker 14: urban social life will continue to lack of vibrancy.

1073
01:05:25,280 --> 01:05:28,000
Speaker 12: I think we have to acknowledge our profound.

1074
01:05:27,600 --> 01:05:31,800
Speaker 14: Influence and our surroundings and seize our agency to actively

1075
01:05:31,880 --> 01:05:33,280
Speaker 14: craft our spaces.

1076
01:05:34,160 --> 01:05:38,120
Speaker 12: All power to all the people. This is Andrew, This

1077
01:05:38,240 --> 01:05:38,440
Speaker 12: is a.

1078
01:05:40,520 --> 01:05:58,880
Speaker 2: Peace welcome back to It could happen here, the podcast

1079
01:05:58,960 --> 01:06:02,040
Speaker 2: that's happening here in your ear. And one of the

1080
01:06:02,080 --> 01:06:06,520
Speaker 2: things that we love talking about here is a critical

1081
01:06:06,680 --> 01:06:12,600
Speaker 2: ingredient towards creeping authoritarianism, towards growing corporate control and surveillance

1082
01:06:12,640 --> 01:06:15,480
Speaker 2: over all of our lives, which is of course technology

1083
01:06:15,560 --> 01:06:19,160
Speaker 2: that makes it even easier to monitor you than it

1084
01:06:19,240 --> 01:06:22,120
Speaker 2: already is. We're not talking primarily about like the government

1085
01:06:22,880 --> 01:06:25,320
Speaker 2: monitoring you, because they can, you know, do stuff like

1086
01:06:25,480 --> 01:06:28,439
Speaker 2: just pull your phone data from a you know which

1087
01:06:28,480 --> 01:06:31,120
Speaker 2: cell towers is pinged. We're talking about the kind of

1088
01:06:31,120 --> 01:06:35,200
Speaker 2: stuff that allows basically whoever can get an app on

1089
01:06:35,240 --> 01:06:39,480
Speaker 2: your phone to track and stalk you. And Yeah, I'm

1090
01:06:39,480 --> 01:06:42,680
Speaker 2: going to first introduce Mia Wong. Mia, welcome to the

1091
01:06:42,720 --> 01:06:47,080
Speaker 2: show that you also host. Yes, I'm here. So what

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01:06:47,160 --> 01:06:48,919
Speaker 2: are we what are we talking about today? And who

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01:06:48,920 --> 01:06:50,080
Speaker 2: are we talking with?

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01:06:51,320 --> 01:06:53,840
Speaker 6: Yeah? So we are talking about stalker war, which is

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01:06:53,840 --> 01:06:56,760
Speaker 6: the sort of broad name for the category of software

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01:06:56,760 --> 01:06:59,560
Speaker 6: that Robber's been talking about. And we are talking about

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01:06:59,640 --> 01:07:04,960
Speaker 6: someone who hacked one well, a stoker wear stalker. Yeah,

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01:07:06,200 --> 01:07:09,680
Speaker 6: one of the stockerware companies, my Aris and Crime, the

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01:07:09,680 --> 01:07:13,280
Speaker 6: Fame Hacker, the No fly List. Yeah. Returning guests always

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01:07:13,280 --> 01:07:14,120
Speaker 6: happy to have you on.

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01:07:15,120 --> 01:07:20,000
Speaker 15: Yeah, I always happy to be on. Yeah.

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01:07:20,040 --> 01:07:24,280
Speaker 6: So I think I think, I don't know, I think

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01:07:24,280 --> 01:07:28,080
Speaker 6: there's a real tendency among and I see this among

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01:07:28,160 --> 01:07:31,040
Speaker 6: leftists a lot for kind of good reasons and kind

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01:07:31,040 --> 01:07:36,280
Speaker 6: of not good reasons to really only focus on state

1106
01:07:36,440 --> 01:07:40,840
Speaker 6: and like large corporate actors in terms of surveillance. And

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01:07:41,280 --> 01:07:42,160
Speaker 6: that's a mistake.

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01:07:42,920 --> 01:07:43,800
Speaker 15: Yeah, totally.

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01:07:45,280 --> 01:07:47,560
Speaker 6: Yeah, And so I guess I guess the place where

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01:07:47,560 --> 01:07:49,440
Speaker 6: I want to start before we get into the specific

1111
01:07:49,520 --> 01:07:52,840
Speaker 6: company that you do do is it still called owned?

1112
01:07:53,800 --> 01:07:54,240
Speaker 5: I kin't.

1113
01:07:54,600 --> 01:07:58,080
Speaker 15: It's fine to call it owned or pond or whatever.

1114
01:07:58,760 --> 01:08:01,080
Speaker 15: I still do that. Sometimes people get confused.

1115
01:08:01,520 --> 01:08:04,120
Speaker 6: But yeah, yeah, But before we get into that, I

1116
01:08:04,120 --> 01:08:06,000
Speaker 6: want to I want to ask you a bit because

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01:08:06,000 --> 01:08:09,080
Speaker 6: you've done a lot of sort of I guess you

1118
01:08:09,080 --> 01:08:13,000
Speaker 6: could call it research, both actual research wise and then

1119
01:08:13,240 --> 01:08:16,920
Speaker 6: in terms of poking around their servers.

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01:08:16,880 --> 01:08:20,240
Speaker 15: Research and journalism and whatever you want to call it.

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01:08:20,360 --> 01:08:24,720
Speaker 6: Yeah, act Yeah, So I wanted to just start off

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01:08:24,720 --> 01:08:26,680
Speaker 6: by asking if you can give sort of like a

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01:08:26,720 --> 01:08:29,120
Speaker 6: brief summary of what stalker waar is.

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01:08:30,680 --> 01:08:30,880
Speaker 5: Yeah.

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01:08:30,960 --> 01:08:34,680
Speaker 15: So, so stalkerware like as a category, encompasses like a

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01:08:34,760 --> 01:08:37,240
Speaker 15: number of different types of apps. Most of them, like

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01:08:37,320 --> 01:08:41,080
Speaker 15: on the service, advertise themselves as like parental control software,

1128
01:08:41,280 --> 01:08:44,800
Speaker 15: which is already bad enough. Just to be clear that

1129
01:08:44,800 --> 01:08:47,719
Speaker 15: there's like advertised for like spying on your children's phone,

1130
01:08:47,800 --> 01:08:51,280
Speaker 15: like seeing their location in real time, seeing their messages

1131
01:08:51,479 --> 01:08:55,160
Speaker 15: that they receive, any photo they take. Ostensibly this is

1132
01:08:55,160 --> 01:08:58,280
Speaker 15: to like prevent bullying and help with them when they

1133
01:08:58,320 --> 01:09:00,920
Speaker 15: get depressed because they don't try you and talk to

1134
01:09:00,960 --> 01:09:04,599
Speaker 15: you for whatever reason, but obviously a lot of these

1135
01:09:04,640 --> 01:09:08,000
Speaker 15: are then furthermore, because that's like that, sure, that's a

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01:09:08,200 --> 01:09:11,320
Speaker 15: like target audience, that's a demographic you can advertise too.

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01:09:11,320 --> 01:09:15,479
Speaker 15: But then there's this even bigger potential target demographic of

1138
01:09:15,960 --> 01:09:19,280
Speaker 15: people who are insecure in their relationship, mostly men, not

1139
01:09:19,400 --> 01:09:22,080
Speaker 15: only men, but who are then solved this idea that

1140
01:09:22,120 --> 01:09:25,439
Speaker 15: they can use software like this for stalking their partner,

1141
01:09:25,520 --> 01:09:28,000
Speaker 15: for finding out if they are cheating on you, things

1142
01:09:28,120 --> 01:09:30,639
Speaker 15: like that, which is obviously an even bigger problem, which

1143
01:09:30,720 --> 01:09:33,479
Speaker 15: once again not to discount the problems that's spying on

1144
01:09:33,520 --> 01:09:36,439
Speaker 15: your children is already like bad enough, but yeah, lead

1145
01:09:36,520 --> 01:09:39,759
Speaker 15: this leads to this whole big industry of these apps

1146
01:09:39,800 --> 01:09:44,519
Speaker 15: being used by partners against each other, like also just

1147
01:09:44,560 --> 01:09:48,200
Speaker 15: by people like against anyone in the in their surroundings

1148
01:09:48,200 --> 01:09:51,479
Speaker 15: that they suspect might be doing something shady, might be

1149
01:09:51,680 --> 01:09:55,439
Speaker 15: like talking behind their backs. It often kind of turns

1150
01:09:55,439 --> 01:09:58,599
Speaker 15: into like it obviously turns into this obsessive thing, especially

1151
01:09:58,600 --> 01:10:01,120
Speaker 15: if you solve this idea that they this app can

1152
01:10:01,160 --> 01:10:04,880
Speaker 15: magically solve like interpersonal issues, like with anything that sells you,

1153
01:10:04,960 --> 01:10:07,679
Speaker 15: this magic idea of being able to solve any problem.

1154
01:10:07,960 --> 01:10:10,400
Speaker 15: That these people start kind of spying on everyone in

1155
01:10:10,479 --> 01:10:14,679
Speaker 15: their like circles to some of them, like not everyone,

1156
01:10:14,720 --> 01:10:16,600
Speaker 15: most like a lot of people on the spying like

1157
01:10:16,600 --> 01:10:19,280
Speaker 15: their partner or like their child or whatever. But it

1158
01:10:19,360 --> 01:10:22,560
Speaker 15: often like spirals out of control into this like controlling

1159
01:10:22,640 --> 01:10:25,320
Speaker 15: everyone in their surroundings, knowing what everyone is up to

1160
01:10:25,360 --> 01:10:28,120
Speaker 15: where they are, and spending like hundreds of dollars a

1161
01:10:28,160 --> 01:10:31,479
Speaker 15: month on doing so. And yeah, that's pretty fucked up

1162
01:10:31,520 --> 01:10:32,320
Speaker 15: if you ask me.

1163
01:10:32,760 --> 01:10:34,040
Speaker 6: Yeah, yeah.

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01:10:34,120 --> 01:10:36,400
Speaker 2: One of the things that's interesting too. It's also in

1165
01:10:36,439 --> 01:10:38,840
Speaker 2: a lot of cases illegal. This is going to vary,

1166
01:10:38,960 --> 01:10:40,800
Speaker 2: you know, from country to country, in state to state,

1167
01:10:40,880 --> 01:10:43,320
Speaker 2: but in the US there are states like California, which

1168
01:10:43,360 --> 01:10:46,040
Speaker 2: gets pointed out in the very good tech Crunch investigation

1169
01:10:46,280 --> 01:10:49,760
Speaker 2: on truth Spy, where there are really strict laws that

1170
01:10:49,840 --> 01:10:51,720
Speaker 2: journalists like you have to abide bias to when you

1171
01:10:51,800 --> 01:10:55,200
Speaker 2: can record someone that these apps absolutely break.

1172
01:10:55,760 --> 01:10:58,200
Speaker 15: Yes, it's specifically a thing that doesn't. Most of these

1173
01:10:58,200 --> 01:11:00,439
Speaker 15: app will have like a disclaimer at thebot that is

1174
01:11:00,520 --> 01:11:03,599
Speaker 15: like this might be illegal and your jurisdiction and please

1175
01:11:03,640 --> 01:11:06,439
Speaker 15: ask for consent before doing this, and then they have

1176
01:11:06,520 --> 01:11:08,799
Speaker 15: lots of tutorials on how to install this in someone's

1177
01:11:08,840 --> 01:11:12,360
Speaker 15: device without their consent. Yeah, but it's like always like

1178
01:11:12,439 --> 01:11:15,120
Speaker 15: a we do not take any like we it's not

1179
01:11:15,280 --> 01:11:18,000
Speaker 15: our fault if you break the law basically, which obviously,

1180
01:11:18,040 --> 01:11:20,760
Speaker 15: like it's so far not a lot of this has

1181
01:11:20,800 --> 01:11:23,160
Speaker 15: been challenged in court, but I don't think this would

1182
01:11:23,200 --> 01:11:26,400
Speaker 15: hold up too long. I'm not a y, but I

1183
01:11:26,439 --> 01:11:28,760
Speaker 15: don't think just saying we make a product to do

1184
01:11:28,840 --> 01:11:30,800
Speaker 15: crimes with if you do crimes with it, it's not

1185
01:11:30,880 --> 01:11:32,800
Speaker 15: I mean, it works for the gun industry.

1186
01:11:32,880 --> 01:11:34,639
Speaker 6: So yeah.

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01:11:35,040 --> 01:11:38,120
Speaker 2: The difference is that, like with the gun industry, it's

1188
01:11:38,120 --> 01:11:40,360
Speaker 2: a product where there is a legal and an illegal,

1189
01:11:40,840 --> 01:11:42,479
Speaker 2: like clear way to do it.

1190
01:11:42,840 --> 01:11:45,080
Speaker 15: The thing with stocker were as well is that like

1191
01:11:45,120 --> 01:11:47,240
Speaker 15: a lot of them will also explicitly say the only

1192
01:11:47,360 --> 01:11:50,040
Speaker 15: real use of this we allow you to to use

1193
01:11:50,080 --> 01:11:53,479
Speaker 15: it for is to surveil your child, which unfortunately is

1194
01:11:53,600 --> 01:11:57,360
Speaker 15: legal in most jurisdictions because children are property of their parents.

1195
01:11:57,840 --> 01:12:00,200
Speaker 15: Yeah quotes because I do not agree with that, but.

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01:12:01,320 --> 01:12:03,680
Speaker 2: Yeah, it's one of those things where people using it,

1197
01:12:03,760 --> 01:12:06,559
Speaker 2: like someone installing an app on their axes or their

1198
01:12:07,240 --> 01:12:11,840
Speaker 2: partner's phone or whatever without consent, could very easily would

1199
01:12:11,920 --> 01:12:14,840
Speaker 2: lose any court case, whether or not the company would

1200
01:12:14,840 --> 01:12:17,080
Speaker 2: get in trouble. I think it's going to rely a

1201
01:12:17,080 --> 01:12:19,720
Speaker 2: lot on the stuff the videos they're posting about, like

1202
01:12:19,720 --> 01:12:22,000
Speaker 2: how to put how to get these apps on people's

1203
01:12:22,080 --> 01:12:24,040
Speaker 2: phones without them knowing, but like they do have that

1204
01:12:24,160 --> 01:12:26,920
Speaker 2: out with like no, it's just for surveilling children, which is.

1205
01:12:26,880 --> 01:12:29,680
Speaker 15: Great for anyone else you need consent or whatever. But

1206
01:12:29,720 --> 01:12:31,679
Speaker 15: I think it is important, yeah, to point this out

1207
01:12:31,760 --> 01:12:34,479
Speaker 15: very early for anyone who's listening to this because they

1208
01:12:34,520 --> 01:12:37,320
Speaker 15: think they might have stock Aware on their phones, or

1209
01:12:37,320 --> 01:12:39,840
Speaker 15: because they know they have Stockaware on their phones. You

1210
01:12:39,880 --> 01:12:43,240
Speaker 15: can use this in a domestic abuse case, well immediately,

1211
01:12:43,240 --> 01:12:47,200
Speaker 15: this is explicit proof that abuse is happening, no matter

1212
01:12:47,280 --> 01:12:50,360
Speaker 15: anything else, because like that's the thing generally with domestic

1213
01:12:50,360 --> 01:12:54,680
Speaker 15: abuse cases. It's really hard to prove abuses happening. Stalkerware

1214
01:12:55,160 --> 01:12:58,000
Speaker 15: and any other type of spying device like also physical

1215
01:12:58,080 --> 01:13:01,920
Speaker 15: GPS trackers and stuff that is immediate proof that there

1216
01:13:01,960 --> 01:13:05,360
Speaker 15: is a there's controlling behavior going on, that you are

1217
01:13:05,400 --> 01:13:08,640
Speaker 15: being spied on. This it cannot only be used and

1218
01:13:08,640 --> 01:13:13,439
Speaker 15: there's explicit admissible evidence. This is also usually like makes

1219
01:13:13,479 --> 01:13:16,920
Speaker 15: cases first like not not for you, like it just yeah,

1220
01:13:17,040 --> 01:13:21,439
Speaker 15: it like can potentially add charges and make it more serious,

1221
01:13:21,479 --> 01:13:24,360
Speaker 15: and that it can help making cops give a shit

1222
01:13:24,520 --> 01:13:27,720
Speaker 15: about like abuse, which yeah, I hate that I need

1223
01:13:27,760 --> 01:13:30,200
Speaker 15: to say that, but yeah, it's like it makes it

1224
01:13:30,320 --> 01:13:33,200
Speaker 15: more serious because there's like spyware and whatever.

1225
01:13:33,240 --> 01:13:35,639
Speaker 2: It's easy evidence first off, like you can prove they're

1226
01:13:35,640 --> 01:13:37,559
Speaker 2: spying on you, and second, if you are in one

1227
01:13:37,600 --> 01:13:39,960
Speaker 2: of the states where that violates the law, then you

1228
01:13:40,000 --> 01:13:42,920
Speaker 2: can immediately say this person is breaking the law, like

1229
01:13:43,439 --> 01:13:45,240
Speaker 2: this is we don't have to debate whether or not

1230
01:13:45,360 --> 01:13:46,960
Speaker 2: they've they've crossed the line.

1231
01:13:47,640 --> 01:13:50,360
Speaker 15: Yeah, And even if it doesn't directly break the law

1232
01:13:50,439 --> 01:13:53,280
Speaker 15: to spy on someone on a partner like it, depending

1233
01:13:53,320 --> 01:13:55,240
Speaker 15: on the on the on the region, it can be

1234
01:13:55,360 --> 01:13:57,719
Speaker 15: kind of a hazy like thing, especially if it's a

1235
01:13:57,760 --> 01:14:00,519
Speaker 15: device you might co own. If it's like a state

1236
01:14:00,800 --> 01:14:02,960
Speaker 15: where you were with like code possession or whatever. In

1237
01:14:03,000 --> 01:14:05,240
Speaker 15: the US, I do not know US law very much

1238
01:14:05,280 --> 01:14:07,960
Speaker 15: around this, but yeah, there's like laws like that. But

1239
01:14:08,080 --> 01:14:10,599
Speaker 15: usually still the fact that you're being spied on can

1240
01:14:10,600 --> 01:14:13,599
Speaker 15: be used as proof for other abuse things you might

1241
01:14:13,640 --> 01:14:17,000
Speaker 15: be alleging, because it's like hard proof that something is happening.

1242
01:14:17,200 --> 01:14:21,160
Speaker 15: And also usually these companies will somewhat have to respond

1243
01:14:21,240 --> 01:14:22,920
Speaker 15: to some point US, so they will have to give

1244
01:14:22,920 --> 01:14:25,640
Speaker 15: out like who the account on there is behind like

1245
01:14:26,120 --> 01:14:28,400
Speaker 15: the spying on your phone for some of them, we

1246
01:14:28,400 --> 01:14:30,800
Speaker 15: can also there's also tools that help you find out

1247
01:14:30,840 --> 01:14:33,720
Speaker 15: who is spying on you, or there's like someone with

1248
01:14:33,840 --> 01:14:35,240
Speaker 15: forensic background can help.

1249
01:14:35,800 --> 01:14:39,280
Speaker 2: Yeah, and I think people One thing we should note

1250
01:14:39,320 --> 01:14:42,120
Speaker 2: is that if you're kind of curious, has my device

1251
01:14:42,120 --> 01:14:44,960
Speaker 2: been infected by some of these tools, the one that

1252
01:14:44,960 --> 01:14:48,000
Speaker 2: we've been talking about most truth spy. If you go

1253
01:14:48,160 --> 01:14:49,920
Speaker 2: to that tech Crunch article.

1254
01:14:50,080 --> 01:14:52,320
Speaker 15: Or to my article, it also has a link yet.

1255
01:14:52,280 --> 01:14:54,880
Speaker 2: Or to you to your article on your website. There's

1256
01:14:55,080 --> 01:14:57,080
Speaker 2: a tool you can use where you it'll tell you

1257
01:14:57,120 --> 01:14:59,960
Speaker 2: how to get your IMSI I think I must say,

1258
01:15:00,320 --> 01:15:03,080
Speaker 2: I am ai, yeah, which you just dial a thing

1259
01:15:03,120 --> 01:15:05,400
Speaker 2: on your phone and it gives you that number. It's

1260
01:15:05,439 --> 01:15:09,880
Speaker 2: basically how you identify specific bones and you plug that in.

1261
01:15:10,040 --> 01:15:13,360
Speaker 2: It will let you know if your device has been compromised.

1262
01:15:13,360 --> 01:15:16,400
Speaker 15: Now like December last year up until there is the

1263
01:15:16,479 --> 01:15:19,599
Speaker 15: data and if you yeah, it can pretty much tell

1264
01:15:19,640 --> 01:15:22,320
Speaker 15: you if you've been spined on using this specific tool

1265
01:15:22,400 --> 01:15:24,920
Speaker 15: until then. For other stuff, there's also guides usually on

1266
01:15:25,000 --> 01:15:28,519
Speaker 15: TechCrunch and otherwise also on Stop stockerwear dot ARC, which

1267
01:15:28,560 --> 01:15:31,919
Speaker 15: is the US Coalition against Stalker War, and also just generally,

1268
01:15:32,360 --> 01:15:35,919
Speaker 15: I think a lot of like more local anti stocking,

1269
01:15:35,960 --> 01:15:38,599
Speaker 15: anti abuse orcs are not as informed yet as they

1270
01:15:38,640 --> 01:15:41,479
Speaker 15: should be, but there's still a good point also to

1271
01:15:41,520 --> 01:15:43,360
Speaker 15: reach out to or like.

1272
01:15:43,479 --> 01:15:44,760
Speaker 6: Yeah, yeah.

1273
01:15:45,160 --> 01:15:47,639
Speaker 2: One of my questions about truth Spy that I'm hoping

1274
01:15:47,640 --> 01:15:51,080
Speaker 2: you can answer is I know that you can like

1275
01:15:51,200 --> 01:15:54,880
Speaker 2: text messages get transferred via it, your call records, all

1276
01:15:54,880 --> 01:15:57,080
Speaker 2: that kind of stuff, get and who you were calling.

1277
01:15:57,479 --> 01:16:00,639
Speaker 2: Does that include messages for like encrypted apps like Signal

1278
01:16:00,840 --> 01:16:02,599
Speaker 2: or is that not accessible through this?

1279
01:16:02,760 --> 01:16:05,519
Speaker 15: It depends, like for for some of these, it will

1280
01:16:05,560 --> 01:16:08,519
Speaker 15: like get signal messages, what's the messages and everything generally

1281
01:16:08,560 --> 01:16:13,400
Speaker 15: by reading the notification content, because like from notifications, you know,

1282
01:16:13,560 --> 01:16:17,040
Speaker 15: like what messages are have been like received. Sometimes it

1283
01:16:17,040 --> 01:16:19,120
Speaker 15: will only then have the received messages and not the

1284
01:16:19,120 --> 01:16:21,840
Speaker 15: set messages. Often these also include like a key logger

1285
01:16:22,200 --> 01:16:26,439
Speaker 15: component that maps messages then sent back as well. It

1286
01:16:26,520 --> 01:16:30,200
Speaker 15: depends a lot what these apps collect, but for most

1287
01:16:30,240 --> 01:16:32,800
Speaker 15: of them, also the collection for other texting apps is

1288
01:16:32,880 --> 01:16:35,760
Speaker 15: usually kind of broken. None of these apps are really

1289
01:16:35,880 --> 01:16:39,519
Speaker 15: well maintained. They're mostly just quick cash graps. Yeah, are

1290
01:16:39,560 --> 01:16:42,000
Speaker 15: there to maintain features usually don't really work.

1291
01:16:42,520 --> 01:16:45,759
Speaker 2: And it seems like based on that, one thing people

1292
01:16:45,800 --> 01:16:47,920
Speaker 2: can do outside of checking to see if their device

1293
01:16:47,960 --> 01:16:53,400
Speaker 2: has been compromised, is do stuff like turn off notifications

1294
01:16:53,520 --> 01:16:56,479
Speaker 2: for appsling signal, right, like, and that's that's actually just

1295
01:16:56,479 --> 01:17:00,800
Speaker 2: generally good advice. Notifications are are a promise of the

1296
01:17:00,880 --> 01:17:06,040
Speaker 2: security that signal offers. Don't have them enabled, you know, yeah, or.

1297
01:17:06,000 --> 01:17:08,080
Speaker 15: At the very least disabled them on the lock screen

1298
01:17:08,080 --> 01:17:08,559
Speaker 15: on Android.

1299
01:17:08,640 --> 01:17:09,400
Speaker 6: Yeah, I don't know how.

1300
01:17:09,560 --> 01:17:12,120
Speaker 15: I think that's also possible on iOS, but I think

1301
01:17:12,200 --> 01:17:14,719
Speaker 15: I doesn't show message content on the lock screen anyways.

1302
01:17:14,760 --> 01:17:18,320
Speaker 15: I'm not sure anymore. But yeah, it's just also small

1303
01:17:18,360 --> 01:17:20,679
Speaker 15: things like that. And also like one of the key

1304
01:17:20,840 --> 01:17:24,080
Speaker 15: tells that someone probably tampered with your phone, especially for

1305
01:17:24,160 --> 01:17:27,880
Speaker 15: Android is if Google play Protect is disabled and you

1306
01:17:27,920 --> 01:17:31,519
Speaker 15: do not remember disabling it for something else, it was

1307
01:17:31,560 --> 01:17:34,840
Speaker 15: almost definitely disabled because someone installed something on your phone.

1308
01:17:35,160 --> 01:17:37,840
Speaker 15: Just try re enabling it. Then they will probably tell

1309
01:17:37,880 --> 01:17:39,800
Speaker 15: you something. The thing also to keep in mind if

1310
01:17:39,840 --> 01:17:43,120
Speaker 15: you find stockaware on your phone, please get professional help.

1311
01:17:43,360 --> 01:17:46,919
Speaker 15: Do not just delete it. Do not like necessarily confront

1312
01:17:46,920 --> 01:17:50,120
Speaker 15: whoever you think might be your abuser about it unless

1313
01:17:50,120 --> 01:17:52,599
Speaker 15: you're very sure that that's the situation you can handle,

1314
01:17:53,000 --> 01:17:56,559
Speaker 15: because like, yeah, that is one of those things that

1315
01:17:56,680 --> 01:17:59,200
Speaker 15: like bringing it up or just deleting it can very

1316
01:17:59,280 --> 01:18:04,160
Speaker 15: quickly lead to like, yeah, yeah, complicating the situation a lot.

1317
01:18:04,760 --> 01:18:06,439
Speaker 6: You know what else complicates the situation.

1318
01:18:07,160 --> 01:18:20,960
Speaker 16: These ads and we are back.

1319
01:18:21,960 --> 01:18:25,160
Speaker 2: So when it comes to the actual fight against this stuff,

1320
01:18:25,160 --> 01:18:27,599
Speaker 2: obviously what you're doing is a big part of it.

1321
01:18:27,800 --> 01:18:32,120
Speaker 2: Getting inside these companies and finding out like what they're

1322
01:18:32,200 --> 01:18:35,599
Speaker 2: doing and their capabilities is huge for in terms of

1323
01:18:35,640 --> 01:18:38,320
Speaker 2: like what regular people are people who are interested in

1324
01:18:38,360 --> 01:18:41,640
Speaker 2: becoming activists about this can do. What is the what

1325
01:18:41,760 --> 01:18:44,479
Speaker 2: is the struggle to actually fight this stuff? Look like

1326
01:18:44,479 --> 01:18:46,920
Speaker 2: like how do we how do we put a bullet

1327
01:18:46,920 --> 01:18:48,040
Speaker 2: in this industry's head.

1328
01:18:48,400 --> 01:18:50,360
Speaker 15: I think one of the biggest things, and also like

1329
01:18:50,400 --> 01:18:52,280
Speaker 15: why I do the work I do with like hacking

1330
01:18:52,280 --> 01:18:54,680
Speaker 15: and with encouraging others to like send me data, be

1331
01:18:54,800 --> 01:18:57,760
Speaker 15: that insiders from these companies sending it I do to

1332
01:18:57,760 --> 01:19:01,200
Speaker 15: me or like TechCrunch specifically currently because like me and

1333
01:19:01,240 --> 01:19:03,800
Speaker 15: tech crunch are like the only people really doing like

1334
01:19:04,120 --> 01:19:08,559
Speaker 15: journalism on this like regularly. And the important thing with

1335
01:19:08,600 --> 01:19:11,120
Speaker 15: like journalism and all of this is like awareness. It's

1336
01:19:11,200 --> 01:19:13,479
Speaker 15: very important to create awareness about this. That's also why

1337
01:19:13,520 --> 01:19:15,200
Speaker 15: I do the media work with like being on this

1338
01:19:15,360 --> 01:19:18,639
Speaker 15: podcast and things like that. I think the most important

1339
01:19:18,640 --> 01:19:21,600
Speaker 15: thing is to make people aware, like talk about this

1340
01:19:21,840 --> 01:19:25,639
Speaker 15: in your feminist circles or whatever, things like that especially

1341
01:19:25,640 --> 01:19:28,200
Speaker 15: bring it up just also in like general info things

1342
01:19:28,280 --> 01:19:30,840
Speaker 15: about abuse or how to detect abuse. I think the

1343
01:19:30,960 --> 01:19:34,519
Speaker 15: most important thing to do against stocker whereas demestify it

1344
01:19:34,880 --> 01:19:37,280
Speaker 15: because most people don't even know that this is a thing,

1345
01:19:37,400 --> 01:19:40,640
Speaker 15: that this is, like that there's just commercially available spyware

1346
01:19:41,240 --> 01:19:43,960
Speaker 15: anyone can install on your phone. It's most important to

1347
01:19:43,960 --> 01:19:46,320
Speaker 15: not like give in to some sort of paranoia. As

1348
01:19:46,360 --> 01:19:49,559
Speaker 15: with any of these things, it's just important to like yeah,

1349
01:19:49,680 --> 01:19:53,400
Speaker 15: generate awareness, talk about it, and like spread these articles.

1350
01:19:54,360 --> 01:19:57,559
Speaker 15: Let friends know that this is a potential thing, and

1351
01:19:57,600 --> 01:20:01,200
Speaker 15: then yeah, I The hard thing with this is that,

1352
01:20:01,240 --> 01:20:04,240
Speaker 15: like obviously it should will probably help if there was

1353
01:20:04,240 --> 01:20:07,000
Speaker 15: some sort of legislation against some of this, it's going

1354
01:20:07,040 --> 01:20:10,360
Speaker 15: to be very hard to get any proper legislation that

1355
01:20:10,479 --> 01:20:14,040
Speaker 15: ends this industry because in most Western countries, which are

1356
01:20:14,040 --> 01:20:17,120
Speaker 15: the only countries which unfortunately would have enough power to

1357
01:20:17,280 --> 01:20:20,720
Speaker 15: like actually get these apps shut down, because that's the

1358
01:20:20,760 --> 01:20:23,479
Speaker 15: world we live in. But the problem there is usually

1359
01:20:23,479 --> 01:20:25,760
Speaker 15: that like this notion that children are owned by their

1360
01:20:25,760 --> 01:20:28,519
Speaker 15: parents is too strong to really make a full case

1361
01:20:28,560 --> 01:20:31,519
Speaker 15: against these apps. And at the very best what I can,

1362
01:20:31,920 --> 01:20:35,200
Speaker 15: like the very best time kind of hoping for from

1363
01:20:36,400 --> 01:20:40,639
Speaker 15: from legislators is just a ban on advertising these apps

1364
01:20:40,640 --> 01:20:43,799
Speaker 15: on use against other adults, which would be big already,

1365
01:20:43,880 --> 01:20:46,960
Speaker 15: but that doesn't really solve the issue because there's still

1366
01:20:47,000 --> 01:20:48,920
Speaker 15: going to be enough people who know of their use

1367
01:20:49,000 --> 01:20:51,559
Speaker 15: for use against adults, and there's going to be enough

1368
01:20:51,560 --> 01:20:55,280
Speaker 15: people on like credit threads talking about, hey, well yeah,

1369
01:20:55,400 --> 01:20:57,880
Speaker 15: you oh you're not sure if your government is cheating

1370
01:20:57,880 --> 01:20:59,840
Speaker 15: on you, look you can just use this app, you know.

1371
01:21:00,439 --> 01:21:02,920
Speaker 15: That's also how most of this marketing for this works.

1372
01:21:02,920 --> 01:21:04,920
Speaker 15: It's just yeah, at the end of the day, this

1373
01:21:05,040 --> 01:21:10,000
Speaker 15: is like a patriarchal issue. So yeah, I think that's

1374
01:21:10,040 --> 01:21:12,800
Speaker 15: also why, like I am so focused on like the

1375
01:21:12,880 --> 01:21:15,920
Speaker 15: hacking and the like blowing these companies up and showing

1376
01:21:15,960 --> 01:21:18,280
Speaker 15: like who's behind them. It's because at the end of

1377
01:21:18,320 --> 01:21:20,720
Speaker 15: the day, the most effective thing we have against these

1378
01:21:20,760 --> 01:21:24,080
Speaker 15: companies is like the grassroots movement of making them too

1379
01:21:24,120 --> 01:21:27,080
Speaker 15: scared to run in this business, making it not profitable enough,

1380
01:21:27,320 --> 01:21:29,880
Speaker 15: because as I said, most of this is like quick

1381
01:21:30,000 --> 01:21:34,520
Speaker 15: cash grabs from like web design studios and outsourcing companies.

1382
01:21:35,120 --> 01:21:37,960
Speaker 15: Yeah that a're just making a quick buck from this

1383
01:21:38,000 --> 01:21:40,320
Speaker 15: because otherwise they don't get paid enough. Like that's the

1384
01:21:40,439 --> 01:21:42,600
Speaker 15: sad thing really is how much of this industry is

1385
01:21:42,640 --> 01:21:47,280
Speaker 15: in all of these countries. Western companies outsource their IT too,

1386
01:21:47,880 --> 01:21:50,479
Speaker 15: because there's lots of IT companies there and they are

1387
01:21:50,640 --> 01:21:55,759
Speaker 15: entirely reliant on like Western companies giving them very underpaid tasks.

1388
01:21:56,320 --> 01:21:58,519
Speaker 15: And Yeah, this problem that you now have a bunch

1389
01:21:58,520 --> 01:22:01,400
Speaker 15: of employees and not enough money to always pay them.

1390
01:22:01,600 --> 01:22:03,599
Speaker 15: And what do you do, You like find some weird

1391
01:22:03,680 --> 01:22:07,080
Speaker 15: niche of like a tech product you can quickly build. Yeah,

1392
01:22:07,280 --> 01:22:09,400
Speaker 15: and this is like one of those easy niches it's

1393
01:22:09,439 --> 01:22:13,839
Speaker 15: like always the scummy stuff and like yeah, it's that's

1394
01:22:13,880 --> 01:22:16,000
Speaker 15: also why like so many of these companies are like

1395
01:22:16,000 --> 01:22:18,519
Speaker 15: based out of Vietnam, out of Iran and whatever. It's

1396
01:22:18,560 --> 01:22:21,800
Speaker 15: just companies that already have it hard enough to do

1397
01:22:21,880 --> 01:22:26,280
Speaker 15: business globally, where the IT industry is like falling apart

1398
01:22:26,439 --> 01:22:30,760
Speaker 15: because there's not enough like local customers and anything that's international.

1399
01:22:31,320 --> 01:22:34,840
Speaker 15: You're just the cheap workforce, right, So yeah, it's it's

1400
01:22:34,880 --> 01:22:37,680
Speaker 15: once again also like a class problem. I don't like

1401
01:22:37,800 --> 01:22:40,559
Speaker 15: most people working in this industry know that they're working

1402
01:22:40,600 --> 01:22:42,240
Speaker 15: in a like scummy industry.

1403
01:22:42,600 --> 01:22:45,240
Speaker 6: Yeah of course, but like yeah, you got to get

1404
01:22:45,280 --> 01:22:46,360
Speaker 6: paid and that's.

1405
01:22:46,280 --> 01:22:49,080
Speaker 15: Yeah, And that's like why I think making it more

1406
01:22:49,160 --> 01:22:51,920
Speaker 15: scary to operate in this industry is like, yes, the

1407
01:22:52,080 --> 01:22:54,720
Speaker 15: way to go, because like with just like these like

1408
01:22:54,880 --> 01:22:58,160
Speaker 15: four hacks that have happened against these companies over the

1409
01:22:58,240 --> 01:23:02,160
Speaker 15: last like half a year, so two of them, three

1410
01:23:02,160 --> 01:23:06,160
Speaker 15: of them, three of them have shut down completely. Others

1411
01:23:06,320 --> 01:23:11,160
Speaker 15: seem to be slowly moving towards just building other software primarily. Yeah,

1412
01:23:11,520 --> 01:23:15,640
Speaker 15: it's just like, yeah, it's like with any other like

1413
01:23:15,680 --> 01:23:17,880
Speaker 15: shady industry that the best we can do is just

1414
01:23:17,920 --> 01:23:21,160
Speaker 15: do not make it profitable to run the software because

1415
01:23:22,000 --> 01:23:24,559
Speaker 15: at the very best, anything else we will get it's

1416
01:23:24,640 --> 01:23:26,840
Speaker 15: just pushing them more into the shadows, which is not

1417
01:23:26,880 --> 01:23:28,360
Speaker 15: going to solve the issue at all.

1418
01:23:28,960 --> 01:23:29,920
Speaker 6: Yeah.

1419
01:23:29,360 --> 01:23:33,880
Speaker 2: I think a lot about like strategic thinking, which I

1420
01:23:33,920 --> 01:23:36,000
Speaker 2: do believe is kind of often in part because of

1421
01:23:36,439 --> 01:23:39,439
Speaker 2: how rightfully negative most people on the left think about

1422
01:23:39,439 --> 01:23:43,160
Speaker 2: the military. There's a tendency to ignore some of like

1423
01:23:43,240 --> 01:23:46,880
Speaker 2: the theory around how to actually win a conflict and

1424
01:23:47,000 --> 01:23:50,880
Speaker 2: all of it all strategy really, when you're talking about

1425
01:23:50,880 --> 01:23:55,600
Speaker 2: like defeating an opponent, revolves around denying and taking operational

1426
01:23:55,680 --> 01:23:58,040
Speaker 2: area from them, right Yeah, And that's what you're talking

1427
01:23:58,080 --> 01:23:59,840
Speaker 2: about when you talk about what we need to stop this.

1428
01:24:00,080 --> 01:24:01,639
Speaker 2: You know, one of the first things we can do

1429
01:24:01,720 --> 01:24:03,920
Speaker 2: as part of fighting this is to stop them from

1430
01:24:03,960 --> 01:24:08,040
Speaker 2: being able to advertise certain places. Right It's making sure

1431
01:24:08,080 --> 01:24:10,800
Speaker 2: that they're not able to operate without being seen. It's

1432
01:24:10,800 --> 01:24:15,160
Speaker 2: basically cutting down their area, their space to maneuver, their

1433
01:24:15,200 --> 01:24:18,719
Speaker 2: ability to profit, which cuts down their money, their access

1434
01:24:18,760 --> 01:24:22,000
Speaker 2: to people, their ability to actually like operate.

1435
01:24:22,120 --> 01:24:22,320
Speaker 4: Right.

1436
01:24:22,360 --> 01:24:24,760
Speaker 2: Like, that's what we're looking at in terms of how

1437
01:24:24,760 --> 01:24:26,920
Speaker 2: do you kill this stuff. It's not one single really,

1438
01:24:26,960 --> 01:24:29,599
Speaker 2: I use the comparison of like a bullet, but it's

1439
01:24:29,600 --> 01:24:32,240
Speaker 2: never going to be one bullet. These things are too durable.

1440
01:24:32,240 --> 01:24:33,920
Speaker 2: There's too many countries a delay to do that.

1441
01:24:34,600 --> 01:24:37,600
Speaker 15: Yeah, that's also why I put so much emphasis on

1442
01:24:37,720 --> 01:24:40,439
Speaker 15: doing media work about this and getting more people to

1443
01:24:40,520 --> 01:24:43,840
Speaker 15: talk about this and getting more awareness of this out there,

1444
01:24:44,320 --> 01:24:45,960
Speaker 15: to the point where I'm willing to work with more

1445
01:24:46,000 --> 01:24:49,479
Speaker 15: conservative newspapers on this because everyone needs to know about this.

1446
01:24:49,600 --> 01:24:51,280
Speaker 15: At the end of the day, this is how we

1447
01:24:51,800 --> 01:24:54,840
Speaker 15: stop people from falling victims to this. Most people who

1448
01:24:54,840 --> 01:24:57,720
Speaker 15: are a victim of stocker apps have never heard of

1449
01:24:57,800 --> 01:25:01,040
Speaker 15: stocker apps before, and I think that's like one of

1450
01:25:01,080 --> 01:25:03,240
Speaker 15: the biggest ways to tackle this. And on the other hand,

1451
01:25:03,240 --> 01:25:06,160
Speaker 15: we also have I think another big leverage point with

1452
01:25:06,240 --> 01:25:08,640
Speaker 15: how many of these are getting hacked because none of

1453
01:25:08,680 --> 01:25:11,840
Speaker 15: these apps are very secure. That's another thing is this

1454
01:25:12,160 --> 01:25:15,719
Speaker 15: can also be leveraged against like the abusers in this scenario.

1455
01:25:15,840 --> 01:25:17,880
Speaker 15: I think just pointing out to them that all of

1456
01:25:17,920 --> 01:25:20,519
Speaker 15: these apps get hacked all the time and that this

1457
01:25:20,600 --> 01:25:22,240
Speaker 15: is how they get found out, that that this is

1458
01:25:22,280 --> 01:25:25,759
Speaker 15: how their data of them as abusers ends up landing

1459
01:25:25,800 --> 01:25:28,599
Speaker 15: on the internet. I think it's also like a very

1460
01:25:28,640 --> 01:25:30,559
Speaker 15: important angle at the end of the day. Is just

1461
01:25:30,600 --> 01:25:33,000
Speaker 15: to make it clear, like yeah, no, not even you

1462
01:25:33,080 --> 01:25:37,679
Speaker 15: are like secure from this having consequences for your life,

1463
01:25:37,720 --> 01:25:42,280
Speaker 15: like beyond like direct interpersonal or legal consequences. This can

1464
01:25:42,600 --> 01:25:45,439
Speaker 15: and in the past has resulted in like your email

1465
01:25:45,479 --> 01:25:47,680
Speaker 15: adders being on a list of people who have do

1466
01:25:47,840 --> 01:25:50,840
Speaker 15: abuse to people online. You don't want to be on

1467
01:25:50,880 --> 01:25:53,519
Speaker 15: such a list. I think that's also important just to

1468
01:25:53,680 --> 01:25:56,880
Speaker 15: like point out there isn't one stock of a app

1469
01:25:56,880 --> 01:25:59,040
Speaker 15: that's not eventually going to get hacked. There is a

1470
01:25:59,040 --> 01:26:01,920
Speaker 15: big war against these apps. They're all like there's so

1471
01:26:01,960 --> 01:26:05,080
Speaker 15: many different hacking groups that keep sending me data from

1472
01:26:05,080 --> 01:26:08,479
Speaker 15: these like I'm already working on another article that already

1473
01:26:08,760 --> 01:26:11,880
Speaker 15: once again affects like the data of like I think

1474
01:26:11,960 --> 01:26:15,600
Speaker 15: like eighty thousand more like abusers, and it's just the

1475
01:26:15,640 --> 01:26:17,960
Speaker 15: abuser data this time. But I'm still going to report

1476
01:26:17,960 --> 01:26:20,960
Speaker 15: on it, like it's it's it's this is not going

1477
01:26:21,040 --> 01:26:23,880
Speaker 15: to stop. It's even also not going to stop when

1478
01:26:23,920 --> 01:26:27,840
Speaker 15: I stop reporting on this myself, like I've there's been

1479
01:26:27,880 --> 01:26:30,519
Speaker 15: work before me down on this. I also the first

1480
01:26:30,560 --> 01:26:33,240
Speaker 15: time I got involved in finding stockerber was back in

1481
01:26:33,280 --> 01:26:36,720
Speaker 15: twenty twenty. People have been hacking these apps forever and

1482
01:26:36,800 --> 01:26:39,320
Speaker 15: will keep hacking them. Like just look at the Wikipedia

1483
01:26:39,360 --> 01:26:42,840
Speaker 15: page for stockerver. There's an ever growing list of these

1484
01:26:42,880 --> 01:26:44,920
Speaker 15: apps that have been hacked, and I think at this

1485
01:26:44,960 --> 01:26:48,080
Speaker 15: point that like official count being kept by one of

1486
01:26:48,080 --> 01:26:52,080
Speaker 15: the people at TechCrunch is at like thirteen apps, a

1487
01:26:52,080 --> 01:26:55,800
Speaker 15: few of which have been hacked two or three times. Yeah,

1488
01:26:56,960 --> 01:27:00,000
Speaker 15: these are not These are not secure apps for any.

1489
01:27:00,160 --> 01:27:01,000
Speaker 6: No, no, of course not.

1490
01:27:01,920 --> 01:27:05,160
Speaker 2: Yeah, and they yeah, I mean it makes sense that

1491
01:27:05,280 --> 01:27:09,120
Speaker 2: like an app dedicated to violating people's privacy for money

1492
01:27:09,120 --> 01:27:13,439
Speaker 2: would also basically violate the privacy of the people using it.

1493
01:27:13,600 --> 01:27:16,400
Speaker 15: Yeah, and also they don't care. Like I said, of

1494
01:27:16,400 --> 01:27:19,760
Speaker 15: course it's a cash grap. It's nothing else. There's a

1495
01:27:19,760 --> 01:27:21,880
Speaker 15: few apps that are like a little more than a

1496
01:27:21,880 --> 01:27:24,519
Speaker 15: cash crap, but it's usually just because they're made, Like

1497
01:27:24,560 --> 01:27:27,320
Speaker 15: there's still a cash grap, but they're like more well made,

1498
01:27:27,320 --> 01:27:29,679
Speaker 15: but it's because they're a cash graph from a company

1499
01:27:29,720 --> 01:27:33,599
Speaker 15: that has better developers or more money to do the

1500
01:27:33,640 --> 01:27:36,720
Speaker 15: initial investment. The thing is also like most of these

1501
01:27:36,720 --> 01:27:38,920
Speaker 15: companies don't have a lot of initial investment, And I

1502
01:27:39,000 --> 01:27:41,640
Speaker 15: think the important thing to consider as well, here is

1503
01:27:42,360 --> 01:27:45,080
Speaker 15: one big area of this that I have not yet

1504
01:27:45,120 --> 01:27:48,280
Speaker 15: started tackling, but I do want to look into more. Sometimes.

1505
01:27:48,280 --> 01:27:51,679
Speaker 15: Is a big reason this industry is so big and

1506
01:27:52,439 --> 01:27:55,040
Speaker 15: most of these apps have a lot of users despite

1507
01:27:55,040 --> 01:27:59,200
Speaker 15: there being so many of them, is the affiliate marketing industry.

1508
01:27:59,320 --> 01:28:03,479
Speaker 15: Once again, very beloved friend. Yeah, all of these apps

1509
01:28:03,520 --> 01:28:06,720
Speaker 15: are parts of various affiliate marketing networks, some of them

1510
01:28:06,800 --> 01:28:10,960
Speaker 15: started by Stockerware Company, and some of them just other

1511
01:28:11,240 --> 01:28:14,280
Speaker 15: like things to advertise all the shady things like all

1512
01:28:14,320 --> 01:28:17,120
Speaker 15: those phone number locator apps or whatever, that's also part

1513
01:28:17,160 --> 01:28:20,400
Speaker 15: of those same affiliate marketing networks. And there's lots of

1514
01:28:20,439 --> 01:28:22,880
Speaker 15: money flowing here, and there's lots of money flowing to

1515
01:28:23,120 --> 01:28:26,400
Speaker 15: very big tech YouTube channels, and I might soon have

1516
01:28:26,520 --> 01:28:29,160
Speaker 15: some proof for some of that. But that's how these

1517
01:28:29,200 --> 01:28:32,920
Speaker 15: are advertised. It's everyone who advertises stockerware to you, who

1518
01:28:32,960 --> 01:28:36,080
Speaker 15: has a big platform, is doing that because they're getting money,

1519
01:28:36,880 --> 01:28:38,120
Speaker 15: not for any other reason.

1520
01:28:39,240 --> 01:28:43,679
Speaker 6: We need to do more ads. We will be back shortly,

1521
01:28:55,040 --> 01:28:56,639
Speaker 6: and we are back.

1522
01:28:57,560 --> 01:28:59,880
Speaker 2: Well that's all I had, Miya, what do you got?

1523
01:29:00,600 --> 01:29:03,320
Speaker 6: Yeah, I guess there's there's another thing I wanted to

1524
01:29:03,360 --> 01:29:06,280
Speaker 6: ask a little bit about, which Zach Whitaker, who's been

1525
01:29:06,360 --> 01:29:08,360
Speaker 6: one of the journal the journalists that tech Crunch doing

1526
01:29:08,400 --> 01:29:11,320
Speaker 6: a lot of the research was great. One of the

1527
01:29:11,360 --> 01:29:14,160
Speaker 6: things that he brings up that I think is another

1528
01:29:14,800 --> 01:29:16,599
Speaker 6: I don't know, it's kind of a plane with fire

1529
01:29:17,080 --> 01:29:20,040
Speaker 6: angle on them. But one of the issues that these

1530
01:29:20,040 --> 01:29:25,599
Speaker 6: companies seem to have is payment platforms, because a lot

1531
01:29:25,640 --> 01:29:30,000
Speaker 6: of payment platforms look at this and go wait, hold on, yeah,

1532
01:29:30,040 --> 01:29:31,800
Speaker 6: so that's yeah. We've talked about that a little bit.

1533
01:29:31,840 --> 01:29:34,240
Speaker 15: That's an angle. We've also been a fighting on a lot.

1534
01:29:34,320 --> 01:29:36,360
Speaker 15: Like me and Sick, we work on most of these

1535
01:29:36,400 --> 01:29:39,920
Speaker 15: stories together. Like it's kind of funny. We both got

1536
01:29:39,960 --> 01:29:42,719
Speaker 15: each other into the stockover thing back in twenty twenty.

1537
01:29:42,840 --> 01:29:45,360
Speaker 15: As I mentioned, that was the first time I stumbled

1538
01:29:45,400 --> 01:29:48,120
Speaker 15: into a stock cover app with a security issue. I

1539
01:29:48,280 --> 01:29:51,320
Speaker 15: reached out to some random journalists that tech Crunch about it.

1540
01:29:51,600 --> 01:29:53,680
Speaker 15: And now he is the only one talking about this

1541
01:29:53,880 --> 01:29:56,400
Speaker 15: forever because I reached out to him that one time

1542
01:29:56,880 --> 01:30:00,839
Speaker 15: and he got sucked into this horrible, horrible world of spying.

1543
01:30:01,320 --> 01:30:03,840
Speaker 15: But yeah, like, one of the things we focus on

1544
01:30:03,880 --> 01:30:07,240
Speaker 15: a lot is reporting these companies to their payment providers,

1545
01:30:07,240 --> 01:30:10,439
Speaker 15: to their server hosters, to the point where sometimes like

1546
01:30:10,520 --> 01:30:13,040
Speaker 15: for weeks, SAK will just wait for them to switch

1547
01:30:13,080 --> 01:30:15,120
Speaker 15: to when you provider after we got them taken them

1548
01:30:15,120 --> 01:30:17,880
Speaker 15: from like PayPal, and then from their other PayPal account

1549
01:30:17,880 --> 01:30:20,840
Speaker 15: where they're just using like the checkout experience from one

1550
01:30:20,840 --> 01:30:24,240
Speaker 15: of their completely unrelated software projects which they will later

1551
01:30:24,280 --> 01:30:26,960
Speaker 15: claim is not related at all and there are different

1552
01:30:27,000 --> 01:30:30,240
Speaker 15: companies and whatever. But then like eventually they get taken

1553
01:30:30,240 --> 01:30:32,599
Speaker 15: down from that as well, and usually we can get

1554
01:30:32,600 --> 01:30:35,360
Speaker 15: them taken them from most like Western hosters, like especially

1555
01:30:35,439 --> 01:30:37,760
Speaker 15: US housters, will immediately take them down. You do not

1556
01:30:37,880 --> 01:30:43,760
Speaker 15: want to risk being the company hosting spuywire on US grounds. Yeah, yeah,

1557
01:30:43,840 --> 01:30:47,120
Speaker 15: it's just like same with EU hosters. Like the few

1558
01:30:47,160 --> 01:30:50,360
Speaker 15: companies that we've seen that were on headsnerd, they immediately

1559
01:30:50,400 --> 01:30:54,240
Speaker 15: react because it's like yeah no, like under EUO, you

1560
01:30:54,280 --> 01:30:56,639
Speaker 15: don't want to like risk that. And also just because

1561
01:30:56,680 --> 01:30:58,599
Speaker 15: you don't want to host that, like there's no reason

1562
01:30:58,680 --> 01:31:01,479
Speaker 15: for you to host shit like that. It will have

1563
01:31:01,560 --> 01:31:06,320
Speaker 15: like image consequences, and that's an important thing that is

1564
01:31:06,520 --> 01:31:08,640
Speaker 15: maybe also something you can do as more like a

1565
01:31:08,680 --> 01:31:11,320
Speaker 15: grassroots thing. It's also like if you find one of

1566
01:31:11,360 --> 01:31:13,559
Speaker 15: these apps and if you see, oh they're using like

1567
01:31:13,600 --> 01:31:17,680
Speaker 15: PayPal or whatever, just reach out. I think paper is

1568
01:31:17,720 --> 01:31:20,360
Speaker 15: even harder to reach as like just an average lay person.

1569
01:31:20,680 --> 01:31:23,439
Speaker 15: I don't expect them to reply. They might still take action,

1570
01:31:23,560 --> 01:31:26,639
Speaker 15: you will have to manually check. PayPal doesn't really reply

1571
01:31:26,760 --> 01:31:30,280
Speaker 15: to things ever, But yeah, same as like hosting company,

1572
01:31:30,320 --> 01:31:32,759
Speaker 15: if it's either hosted on like a European or American

1573
01:31:32,800 --> 01:31:35,479
Speaker 15: hosting company, I just just reach out be like, hey,

1574
01:31:35,479 --> 01:31:39,040
Speaker 15: there's someone running spyware on your thing. Also used the

1575
01:31:39,080 --> 01:31:41,280
Speaker 15: word spyware, not stocker, where they will not know what

1576
01:31:41,280 --> 01:31:45,519
Speaker 15: that is, and it is spyware. So yeah, and that

1577
01:31:45,680 --> 01:31:48,880
Speaker 15: can usually get them taken down. And often they don't

1578
01:31:48,920 --> 01:31:51,360
Speaker 15: have proper backups and will have a few months of

1579
01:31:51,439 --> 01:31:54,240
Speaker 15: data missing, and it's like, yeah, that's how you slowly

1580
01:31:54,720 --> 01:31:58,240
Speaker 15: grind them to a halt. Yeah. And also once again

1581
01:31:58,280 --> 01:32:01,160
Speaker 15: like if you have tips about it any of these companies,

1582
01:32:01,200 --> 01:32:04,840
Speaker 15: be it having found the vulnerability just or insider info

1583
01:32:04,920 --> 01:32:07,640
Speaker 15: especially I'm always very happy about the insider info. You

1584
01:32:07,680 --> 01:32:10,080
Speaker 15: can reach out to either me or Sack with We're

1585
01:32:10,160 --> 01:32:13,839
Speaker 15: both very happy to talk about this. Yeah.

1586
01:32:13,920 --> 01:32:17,000
Speaker 6: Yeah, that's something that's been used really effectively by right

1587
01:32:17,080 --> 01:32:20,800
Speaker 6: wingers to target sex workers. There's been a huge thing,

1588
01:32:20,840 --> 01:32:24,599
Speaker 6: there's been a bunch of campaigns to get platform companies

1589
01:32:24,840 --> 01:32:27,200
Speaker 6: and yeah, so it's.

1590
01:32:27,400 --> 01:32:30,200
Speaker 15: It's interesting that for once we can use the very

1591
01:32:30,280 --> 01:32:35,440
Speaker 15: restrictive and conservative rules of payment providers for our good Yeah.

1592
01:32:35,479 --> 01:32:38,080
Speaker 15: But yeah, basically any of the big payment providers will

1593
01:32:38,120 --> 01:32:41,080
Speaker 15: not respect something like this. Some of the small regional

1594
01:32:41,160 --> 01:32:44,040
Speaker 15: odd ones probably won't really give a shit. They have

1595
01:32:44,160 --> 01:32:48,000
Speaker 15: no reason to. It's like revenue for them. But yeah,

1596
01:32:48,400 --> 01:32:51,559
Speaker 15: it's generally worth trying. And I'm always glad like if

1597
01:32:51,560 --> 01:32:54,040
Speaker 15: someone just reaches out to these companies and we don't

1598
01:32:54,080 --> 01:32:57,320
Speaker 15: have to do that ourselves. I think me and second

1599
01:32:57,400 --> 01:33:00,280
Speaker 15: to few other people like actively working in this are

1600
01:33:00,280 --> 01:33:03,479
Speaker 15: doing more than enough work currently. But yeah, just if

1601
01:33:03,520 --> 01:33:05,599
Speaker 15: you find one of these things that don't go digging

1602
01:33:05,640 --> 01:33:08,280
Speaker 15: too deep. It's a depressing world. But if you stumble

1603
01:33:08,400 --> 01:33:12,519
Speaker 15: upon one of these somewhere or whatever, just just report them.

1604
01:33:12,760 --> 01:33:15,559
Speaker 15: It's it's it's gonna disrupt their operations, and if it

1605
01:33:15,600 --> 01:33:19,160
Speaker 15: happens often enough, they might just give up. Yeah, And

1606
01:33:19,240 --> 01:33:21,680
Speaker 15: I mean, like in cases like the truth Spy, they

1607
01:33:21,720 --> 01:33:26,840
Speaker 15: are willing to do extreme amounts of fraud to get

1608
01:33:26,880 --> 01:33:30,439
Speaker 15: to money easily because they like started with like mostly

1609
01:33:30,760 --> 01:33:33,400
Speaker 15: just in like with the market they could get with

1610
01:33:33,479 --> 01:33:36,920
Speaker 15: their Vietnamese payment providers, right, and eventually they realized, well,

1611
01:33:37,000 --> 01:33:39,600
Speaker 15: the US is like this really big market, right, but

1612
01:33:39,800 --> 01:33:42,400
Speaker 15: for really easy like US stuff, we need like a

1613
01:33:42,439 --> 01:33:46,120
Speaker 15: paypoal thing, right, So they might like over twelve fake

1614
01:33:46,160 --> 01:33:50,479
Speaker 15: American identities with fake passports and fake addresses and sign

1615
01:33:50,560 --> 01:33:53,080
Speaker 15: up to PayPal a whole bunch of times and had

1616
01:33:53,160 --> 01:33:57,040
Speaker 15: various employees that the company move money around. Yeah, that's

1617
01:33:57,640 --> 01:34:01,280
Speaker 15: obviously not a thing the US cover will like if

1618
01:34:01,320 --> 01:34:05,559
Speaker 15: you do that. Generally speaking, they moved like millions like that,

1619
01:34:05,840 --> 01:34:10,960
Speaker 15: so yeah, which is pretty crazy like that. The amount

1620
01:34:10,960 --> 01:34:15,040
Speaker 15: of money that's moving in this industry is crazy, like yeah, actually,

1621
01:34:15,080 --> 01:34:17,960
Speaker 15: like most of these app apps will be half broken,

1622
01:34:18,120 --> 01:34:20,759
Speaker 15: which no one ever complains about because like it's shady,

1623
01:34:20,920 --> 01:34:23,320
Speaker 15: like you don't expect like if you go online and

1624
01:34:23,400 --> 01:34:25,640
Speaker 15: you search for something shady like anything like be it

1625
01:34:25,720 --> 01:34:28,320
Speaker 15: piracy or whatever, you don't expect it to be the

1626
01:34:28,360 --> 01:34:31,000
Speaker 15: best experience ever. Like you know, you're getting some weird

1627
01:34:31,040 --> 01:34:33,760
Speaker 15: service and it's probably going to be half broken. But yeah,

1628
01:34:33,840 --> 01:34:36,240
Speaker 15: like most of these talkover apps start at like forty

1629
01:34:36,320 --> 01:34:40,000
Speaker 15: dollars a month and more, and then some days for

1630
01:34:40,080 --> 01:34:42,599
Speaker 15: more features you pay like up to sixty or seventy

1631
01:34:42,680 --> 01:34:45,200
Speaker 15: or so and then all of these have like tens

1632
01:34:45,280 --> 01:34:49,040
Speaker 15: of thousands of users, sometimes hundreds of thousands of users. Yeah,

1633
01:34:49,280 --> 01:34:53,519
Speaker 15: you can do them at yourself. It's crazy. This is

1634
01:34:53,520 --> 01:34:56,160
Speaker 15: a really big industry, which makes it so crazy to

1635
01:34:56,200 --> 01:34:58,360
Speaker 15: me that it's like not a thing that's talked about more,

1636
01:34:58,439 --> 01:35:02,240
Speaker 15: especially like feminine spaces and things like that, because this

1637
01:35:02,320 --> 01:35:05,280
Speaker 15: is such a like big angle of like modern tech

1638
01:35:05,360 --> 01:35:08,720
Speaker 15: enabled abuse that they really think should should be more

1639
01:35:08,720 --> 01:35:11,720
Speaker 15: of a topic, especially on the left, like this is

1640
01:35:11,760 --> 01:35:12,439
Speaker 15: this is bad?

1641
01:35:13,080 --> 01:35:16,439
Speaker 2: Yeah, no, this is like critically bad. I agree entirely,

1642
01:35:16,520 --> 01:35:18,519
Speaker 2: And also like that the whole thing with like all

1643
01:35:18,560 --> 01:35:21,080
Speaker 2: of this data being so easily accept your data can

1644
01:35:21,400 --> 01:35:24,160
Speaker 2: end up getting sold on some dark web forum. You're

1645
01:35:24,600 --> 01:35:27,600
Speaker 2: both asked the abuse around that's the target, right, and

1646
01:35:27,680 --> 01:35:30,519
Speaker 2: the government can find these like I have no like

1647
01:35:30,600 --> 01:35:33,000
Speaker 2: this is this is not me making a statement of

1648
01:35:33,040 --> 01:35:36,560
Speaker 2: that's a thing that's happening, but there's nothing preventing the

1649
01:35:36,680 --> 01:35:40,080
Speaker 2: government from hacking these companies and getting like like I

1650
01:35:40,160 --> 01:35:43,040
Speaker 2: sometimes like when whenever I get these data sets, and

1651
01:35:43,240 --> 01:35:45,759
Speaker 2: it's always hard to work with data sets that include

1652
01:35:45,840 --> 01:35:49,759
Speaker 2: like non consent essentially collected data of people, right, yes,

1653
01:35:49,760 --> 01:35:52,439
Speaker 2: but like I do always like do some due diligence checks,

1654
01:35:52,439 --> 01:35:54,760
Speaker 2: like mostly trying to find if the government is using

1655
01:35:54,760 --> 01:35:58,320
Speaker 2: a specific app. Sometimes yes, there's always like the odd

1656
01:35:58,439 --> 01:36:01,360
Speaker 2: correction facility for ser who has signed up for one

1657
01:36:01,479 --> 01:36:05,759
Speaker 2: or two of these apps or like education people and whatever.

1658
01:36:05,840 --> 01:36:08,160
Speaker 2: But then I also on the search through the text

1659
01:36:08,160 --> 01:36:10,280
Speaker 2: message just for just some code words and the amount

1660
01:36:10,320 --> 01:36:14,320
Speaker 2: of people moving drugs have Stocker were on their phones.

1661
01:36:14,680 --> 01:36:18,840
Speaker 2: It's you know, yeah, and it's it's one of those

1662
01:36:18,880 --> 01:36:22,720
Speaker 2: things where there are laws, like technically if I if

1663
01:36:22,760 --> 01:36:25,320
Speaker 2: my understanding of the laws around this are correct, it

1664
01:36:25,400 --> 01:36:28,680
Speaker 2: is illegal for an organization like the FBI to utilize

1665
01:36:28,720 --> 01:36:29,280
Speaker 2: these apps.

1666
01:36:29,680 --> 01:36:33,439
Speaker 15: But yes, but we have an organized and called the

1667
01:36:33,600 --> 01:36:34,760
Speaker 15: NSA who.

1668
01:36:36,200 --> 01:36:38,880
Speaker 2: And it is it is on paper illegal for them

1669
01:36:38,920 --> 01:36:41,559
Speaker 2: to do this with a third party app. But one

1670
01:36:41,600 --> 01:36:45,400
Speaker 2: thing that often gets done, particularly by the FBI, but

1671
01:36:45,600 --> 01:36:48,280
Speaker 2: you know, not just by them, is it's not illegal

1672
01:36:48,760 --> 01:36:53,280
Speaker 2: for law enforcement agencies to contract with private agencies. And

1673
01:36:53,320 --> 01:36:56,200
Speaker 2: if those agencies you don't you just don't check in

1674
01:36:56,320 --> 01:36:59,160
Speaker 2: on what they're doing. You know, what they're using.

1675
01:36:59,320 --> 01:37:01,800
Speaker 15: But like or like if an inform or like if

1676
01:37:01,840 --> 01:37:04,599
Speaker 15: an informant like sends you the s data, like you're

1677
01:37:04,640 --> 01:37:05,559
Speaker 15: not going to say.

1678
01:37:05,360 --> 01:37:07,000
Speaker 6: No, exactly exactly.

1679
01:37:07,000 --> 01:37:09,320
Speaker 15: And also you don't really need to disclose that because

1680
01:37:09,320 --> 01:37:11,680
Speaker 15: it's information and got froment informant. You do not need

1681
01:37:11,720 --> 01:37:14,840
Speaker 15: to disclose that informant in court ever. So yeah, it's

1682
01:37:16,520 --> 01:37:17,400
Speaker 15: it's it's there.

1683
01:37:17,439 --> 01:37:19,519
Speaker 2: There are there are ways around, you know, the laws

1684
01:37:19,520 --> 01:37:21,960
Speaker 2: that we put up, not that we shouldn't continue to

1685
01:37:22,080 --> 01:37:25,720
Speaker 2: extend those laws, but you shouldn't like just because well

1686
01:37:25,960 --> 01:37:27,920
Speaker 2: they're not allowed to use this doesn't mean they can't

1687
01:37:27,920 --> 01:37:29,160
Speaker 2: get access to the info.

1688
01:37:29,360 --> 01:37:30,000
Speaker 4: Yeah.

1689
01:37:30,160 --> 01:37:32,439
Speaker 15: Yeah, And also there's all this important thing like there's

1690
01:37:32,520 --> 01:37:35,360
Speaker 15: more like also globally, like there's other governments that can

1691
01:37:35,520 --> 01:37:37,320
Speaker 15: just be using this. Like for one of the apps I.

1692
01:37:37,240 --> 01:37:40,400
Speaker 2: Got the government, the Russian government doesn't give a ship.

1693
01:37:40,920 --> 01:37:43,840
Speaker 15: That was also like another thing where I's like for

1694
01:37:43,920 --> 01:37:45,640
Speaker 15: one of the apps I got data for. There was

1695
01:37:45,640 --> 01:37:48,639
Speaker 15: some indication that at some point the Colombian National Police

1696
01:37:48,720 --> 01:37:54,000
Speaker 15: did a bigger evaluation of using UH commercials spyware for

1697
01:37:54,120 --> 01:37:56,640
Speaker 15: their use. Because you're in the country with not that

1698
01:37:56,720 --> 01:37:59,479
Speaker 15: big of a like police budget in comparison, you cannot

1699
01:37:59,479 --> 01:38:02,960
Speaker 15: afford like all the Coolestraeli tools everyone else has. So

1700
01:38:03,040 --> 01:38:05,599
Speaker 15: what do you do? You just look for random apps

1701
01:38:05,640 --> 01:38:06,519
Speaker 15: you can find you.

1702
01:38:06,400 --> 01:38:09,280
Speaker 2: Know, yeah you find the Walmart, the Kirklin.

1703
01:38:09,439 --> 01:38:11,560
Speaker 15: The Wish to the conversion I guess.

1704
01:38:11,680 --> 01:38:15,400
Speaker 6: Yeah, yeah, yeah yeah Ali baba spyware. Right. Yeah.

1705
01:38:16,240 --> 01:38:18,360
Speaker 15: I don't think most of them moved forward with this

1706
01:38:18,479 --> 01:38:21,200
Speaker 15: because these apps fucking suck. Like they're bad, Like that's

1707
01:38:21,320 --> 01:38:23,400
Speaker 15: that's the other thing, Like they don't even really do

1708
01:38:23,479 --> 01:38:26,000
Speaker 15: their jump. Well, they're bad and you don't know who

1709
01:38:26,080 --> 01:38:28,160
Speaker 15: is behind them. You cannot even go up to someone

1710
01:38:28,160 --> 01:38:30,599
Speaker 15: and be like, yo, don't do this. You also kinnot

1711
01:38:30,640 --> 01:38:32,479
Speaker 15: go to the cops and be like this company is

1712
01:38:32,520 --> 01:38:37,200
Speaker 15: scamming me, because yeah, I assume some people have probably

1713
01:38:37,240 --> 01:38:40,360
Speaker 15: done that before, but it does involve admitting to a crime.

1714
01:38:40,520 --> 01:38:45,040
Speaker 15: So yeah, it's like, yeah, these companies just get away

1715
01:38:45,080 --> 01:38:47,559
Speaker 15: with not giving a shit about their product because like.

1716
01:38:47,720 --> 01:38:52,320
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, well I think that's that's all we had.

1717
01:38:52,680 --> 01:38:56,120
Speaker 2: Thank you Maya for both the work you're doing and

1718
01:38:56,200 --> 01:38:58,519
Speaker 2: for talking to us. Yeah, is there anything you wanted

1719
01:38:58,560 --> 01:39:00,559
Speaker 2: to plug before we all out here?

1720
01:39:00,680 --> 01:39:01,559
Speaker 16: Just my just my.

1721
01:39:01,560 --> 01:39:04,160
Speaker 15: Blog, I think where we're like, I do this journalistic

1722
01:39:04,200 --> 01:39:06,519
Speaker 15: work and also more, there's about to be another cool

1723
01:39:06,560 --> 01:39:11,679
Speaker 15: investigative piece out soon, which eventually involves more tracking and whatever,

1724
01:39:12,280 --> 01:39:14,960
Speaker 15: and also involves like Hollywood and more. It's it's it's

1725
01:39:15,080 --> 01:39:18,600
Speaker 15: it's a crazy big story. I promise that will be

1726
01:39:18,600 --> 01:39:21,200
Speaker 15: out like hopefully in a month or so. But yeah,

1727
01:39:21,439 --> 01:39:24,920
Speaker 15: my blog at Maya dot CRIMEU dot gay crime. You

1728
01:39:25,040 --> 01:39:31,360
Speaker 15: as in crime, w yeah, and K as in gay yeah.

1729
01:39:31,800 --> 01:39:32,000
Speaker 4: Yeah.

1730
01:39:32,120 --> 01:39:34,160
Speaker 15: Just check out my blog at the bottom of the blog.

1731
01:39:34,200 --> 01:39:36,559
Speaker 15: There's all my links to my social media for anyone

1732
01:39:36,600 --> 01:39:39,200
Speaker 15: who's like listening to this and has been wondering where

1733
01:39:39,200 --> 01:39:41,080
Speaker 15: I am. I am back on Twitter as well.

1734
01:39:41,479 --> 01:39:45,360
Speaker 2: Yeah for now, for now, that's for for all of

1735
01:39:45,439 --> 01:39:48,719
Speaker 2: us these days. That's always like yeah at this.

1736
01:39:48,680 --> 01:39:51,639
Speaker 15: Point, but yeah, I am back on Twitter. I'm posting

1737
01:39:51,720 --> 01:39:54,720
Speaker 15: there sometimes. Yeah.

1738
01:39:55,479 --> 01:39:58,799
Speaker 2: All right, well, thank you and thank you all for listening.

1739
01:39:58,920 --> 01:40:01,439
Speaker 2: We will be back tomorrow unless this comes out on

1740
01:40:01,479 --> 01:40:04,120
Speaker 2: a Friday, in which case we'll be back at some

1741
01:40:04,280 --> 01:40:05,559
Speaker 2: other point but soon.

1742
01:40:20,280 --> 01:40:23,080
Speaker 6: Welcome Jacob app and here the podcast We're Getting Medication

1743
01:40:23,240 --> 01:40:26,040
Speaker 6: takes like four fucking hours because of a bunch of

1744
01:40:26,160 --> 01:40:30,920
Speaker 6: unbelievable bureaucratic bullshit. I your host Neo Wong, who was

1745
01:40:31,040 --> 01:40:34,240
Speaker 6: asked by by pharmacists today and I quote, have you

1746
01:40:34,360 --> 01:40:37,640
Speaker 6: been pregnant or have there been pregnancies?

1747
01:40:38,520 --> 01:40:43,519
Speaker 8: So I like, have that being pregnancies. Yeah, that was

1748
01:40:43,560 --> 01:40:49,280
Speaker 8: what I was like, what involved shooting of human life?

1749
01:40:49,800 --> 01:40:52,280
Speaker 6: She like she walks up to the thing, right and

1750
01:40:52,320 --> 01:40:55,879
Speaker 6: she she she puts the like she puts the meds

1751
01:40:56,160 --> 01:40:58,519
Speaker 6: like like she's about to ring them up right, and

1752
01:40:58,560 --> 01:41:01,080
Speaker 6: then she stops and then turns washed with other persons

1753
01:41:01,080 --> 01:41:03,800
Speaker 6: start talking to her boss and then comes back and

1754
01:41:03,840 --> 01:41:05,640
Speaker 6: they asked me pregnancy.

1755
01:41:05,720 --> 01:41:07,679
Speaker 16: So I'm like, what it's.

1756
01:41:07,560 --> 01:41:10,160
Speaker 6: Like, I am not passing, I'm just worrying. I'm just

1757
01:41:10,200 --> 01:41:14,840
Speaker 6: wearying like jeans, like a mask. It's like a random coat.

1758
01:41:15,200 --> 01:41:15,640
Speaker 14: It is.

1759
01:41:17,640 --> 01:41:19,840
Speaker 6: So it's been a it's been a time.

1760
01:41:20,280 --> 01:41:22,479
Speaker 8: Yeah, achievement in the world of healthcare where they can

1761
01:41:22,560 --> 01:41:26,040
Speaker 8: simultaneously like ask you for being pregnant and then make

1762
01:41:26,120 --> 01:41:29,639
Speaker 8: you fucking labor unpaid for half a day to obtain

1763
01:41:29,760 --> 01:41:33,320
Speaker 8: your like basic hormone therapy or whatever it is you need.

1764
01:41:33,520 --> 01:41:36,519
Speaker 8: Like my favorite is when the health insurance makes me

1765
01:41:37,040 --> 01:41:39,120
Speaker 8: this just existing podcast about health insurance and how we

1766
01:41:39,160 --> 01:41:39,439
Speaker 8: hate it.

1767
01:41:39,520 --> 01:41:41,120
Speaker 6: Have you enjoying it?

1768
01:41:41,520 --> 01:41:44,080
Speaker 8: When they're like, hey, we need a doctor to confirm

1769
01:41:44,080 --> 01:41:46,000
Speaker 8: you still need the instantly? What the fuck do you

1770
01:41:46,040 --> 01:41:53,439
Speaker 8: think has happened? You would have heard about it. I

1771
01:41:53,760 --> 01:41:56,800
Speaker 8: didn't at home pancreas transplant, didn't bill you guys for it.

1772
01:41:56,880 --> 01:42:01,360
Speaker 6: You're welcome. Yeah. With me is James, who is from

1773
01:42:01,400 --> 01:42:04,400
Speaker 6: a country that is more normal about healthcare but is

1774
01:42:04,400 --> 01:42:08,679
Speaker 6: now Yeah, more normal not the right word, but it's

1775
01:42:08,840 --> 01:42:12,479
Speaker 6: less ship is the correct word, unless you're trends, in

1776
01:42:12,479 --> 01:42:13,720
Speaker 6: which case it's about a toss.

1777
01:42:14,040 --> 01:42:17,360
Speaker 8: I was gonna say, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, country which

1778
01:42:17,360 --> 01:42:19,760
Speaker 8: has a different approach at least at least like has

1779
01:42:19,800 --> 01:42:21,680
Speaker 8: accepted the fact that if we're going to have the

1780
01:42:21,720 --> 01:42:24,320
Speaker 8: state pay for like sending bombs to kill little children

1781
01:42:24,320 --> 01:42:27,160
Speaker 8: in Palestine, it should also pay for my incident, which

1782
01:42:27,200 --> 01:42:29,599
Speaker 8: I think is is a good a good place to start.

1783
01:42:29,960 --> 01:42:37,200
Speaker 6: I guess, yeah, there's an ideal combination there, and no

1784
01:42:37,280 --> 01:42:39,960
Speaker 6: we no one is yet reached. This is this is

1785
01:42:40,000 --> 01:42:44,200
Speaker 6: this is the task of international socialism, et cetera, et cetera. Yeah.

1786
01:42:44,320 --> 01:42:46,720
Speaker 8: I will accept the necessity of the state only when

1787
01:42:46,760 --> 01:42:47,840
Speaker 8: it funds incident.

1788
01:42:47,600 --> 01:42:50,599
Speaker 6: Not moms. Yeah, but we we are here to talk

1789
01:42:50,640 --> 01:42:55,760
Speaker 6: about another incredibly violent state bureaucracy and the people who

1790
01:42:55,880 --> 01:42:59,000
Speaker 6: run it. We're gonna be talking about a series of

1791
01:42:59,640 --> 01:43:06,000
Speaker 6: very bizarre and incredibly authoritarian crackdown so that democratic well governors,

1792
01:43:06,240 --> 01:43:11,200
Speaker 6: city councils. Many many such cases, yeah, have have been

1793
01:43:12,000 --> 01:43:17,040
Speaker 6: have been invoking too nominally crack down on crime, a

1794
01:43:17,080 --> 01:43:21,080
Speaker 6: thing that is down everywhere and has been down everywhere

1795
01:43:21,200 --> 01:43:22,120
Speaker 6: for a long time.

1796
01:43:23,040 --> 01:43:26,959
Speaker 8: Yeah, in many such cases. It's great that the Democrat

1797
01:43:27,200 --> 01:43:29,559
Speaker 8: like local politicians are now doing everything that we were

1798
01:43:29,600 --> 01:43:32,719
Speaker 8: warned that Republican president would do four years ago.

1799
01:43:33,520 --> 01:43:35,160
Speaker 6: Yeah, it's really fun and I mean, this is one

1800
01:43:35,200 --> 01:43:36,680
Speaker 6: of these things. So, so the place we're going to

1801
01:43:36,760 --> 01:43:43,120
Speaker 6: start is New York governor cultural I think cutral. Yeah,

1802
01:43:43,200 --> 01:43:46,160
Speaker 6: I don't know. New York keeps going through politicians faster

1803
01:43:46,240 --> 01:43:48,559
Speaker 6: and I can learn how to pronounce their names. So

1804
01:43:49,080 --> 01:43:51,599
Speaker 6: with what they're gonna have, like Andrew Cuomo, the fourth

1805
01:43:51,880 --> 01:43:54,200
Speaker 6: in power, by the time this episode goes out, there'll

1806
01:43:54,200 --> 01:43:55,840
Speaker 6: be like two there will have been two new Kings

1807
01:43:55,840 --> 01:43:57,559
Speaker 6: of England. The secret sibling.

1808
01:43:58,720 --> 01:44:01,479
Speaker 8: Yeah, yeah, yeah, we're not making a podcast about the

1809
01:44:01,560 --> 01:44:02,120
Speaker 8: royal family.

1810
01:44:02,160 --> 01:44:05,040
Speaker 6: Nonsense, we don't care. No, no, this is this is

1811
01:44:05,080 --> 01:44:06,439
Speaker 6: this is the best that you're getting out of that.

1812
01:44:06,880 --> 01:44:09,960
Speaker 6: But yeah, So Houtral has deployed seven hundred and fifty

1813
01:44:10,040 --> 01:44:14,320
Speaker 6: National guardsmen to stand outside of some subway stations. That's

1814
01:44:14,320 --> 01:44:16,519
Speaker 6: a tongue twister. Try saying that one five times is

1815
01:44:16,560 --> 01:44:20,040
Speaker 6: fast in the mirror, to like do bag checks and

1816
01:44:20,120 --> 01:44:23,120
Speaker 6: generally just sort of stand around and be intimidating.

1817
01:44:23,920 --> 01:44:26,719
Speaker 8: Yeah, it's great. I'm sure it's what those people signed

1818
01:44:26,760 --> 01:44:29,960
Speaker 8: up to do. I'm sure they feel fulfilled, and I'm

1819
01:44:29,960 --> 01:44:32,559
Speaker 8: sure everyone in New York feels safer and happier as

1820
01:44:32,600 --> 01:44:36,160
Speaker 8: a result of random people in camouflage being standing around

1821
01:44:36,160 --> 01:44:36,639
Speaker 8: a subway.

1822
01:44:37,800 --> 01:44:39,519
Speaker 6: Yeah, and we're going to get into this sort of

1823
01:44:39,520 --> 01:44:43,280
Speaker 6: emotional effective aspect of this, because that is ultimately what

1824
01:44:43,320 --> 01:44:47,760
Speaker 6: this is about. But I think, okay, there's a lot

1825
01:44:47,800 --> 01:44:51,479
Speaker 6: of sort of interesting aspects of this. So Okay, there's

1826
01:44:51,479 --> 01:44:53,000
Speaker 6: been a lot of talk about what the sort of

1827
01:44:53,040 --> 01:44:56,559
Speaker 6: precursors to this are, and I'm gonna ask you about

1828
01:44:56,840 --> 01:44:58,519
Speaker 6: because there's a lot of nationally, there's a lot of

1829
01:44:58,600 --> 01:45:02,400
Speaker 6: very weird, absolutely dog shit National Guard deployment instead have happened.

1830
01:45:02,840 --> 01:45:05,880
Speaker 8: Yes, yeah, yes, there are I have uh yeah, yeah,

1831
01:45:05,920 --> 01:45:06,760
Speaker 8: we can get onto that.

1832
01:45:06,960 --> 01:45:09,960
Speaker 6: Yeah, but I think I think the most immediate predecessor

1833
01:45:10,040 --> 01:45:11,880
Speaker 6: to this, that that leaps to mind, this is some

1834
01:45:11,920 --> 01:45:13,280
Speaker 6: thing I talk about on the show all the time

1835
01:45:13,280 --> 01:45:15,479
Speaker 6: because everyone else seems to have completely forgotten it. I

1836
01:45:15,520 --> 01:45:17,640
Speaker 6: refused to let this be memory hold, which is the

1837
01:45:17,680 --> 01:45:20,920
Speaker 6: time that my previous shitty mayor ordered a bunch of

1838
01:45:21,000 --> 01:45:23,200
Speaker 6: in twenty twenty ordered a bunch This is in February

1839
01:45:23,200 --> 01:45:26,400
Speaker 6: twenty twents. This is this is pre uprising. Put just

1840
01:45:26,600 --> 01:45:31,559
Speaker 6: started putting swat teams on subways, okay, and they immediately

1841
01:45:31,640 --> 01:45:33,000
Speaker 6: did the thing that the swat team does, which they

1842
01:45:33,000 --> 01:45:35,200
Speaker 6: started putting swat teams on the fucking red line. The

1843
01:45:35,280 --> 01:45:39,280
Speaker 6: immediately shot a guy for no reason, like I think

1844
01:45:39,360 --> 01:45:42,559
Speaker 6: I I if I'm remembering correctly, the thing that originally

1845
01:45:42,560 --> 01:45:44,960
Speaker 6: they said it was fairrivation, and it wasn't fairrivation. It

1846
01:45:45,080 --> 01:45:47,719
Speaker 6: was the guy walked from one train car to another

1847
01:45:47,800 --> 01:45:51,680
Speaker 6: train car, a thing that like millions of people do

1848
01:45:51,920 --> 01:45:52,479
Speaker 6: every day.

1849
01:45:52,600 --> 01:45:56,599
Speaker 8: Yeah, and capital punishment for faavation is also wrong and bad.

1850
01:45:56,680 --> 01:46:01,639
Speaker 6: Yeah, well look this guy somehow survived himack. But yeah,

1851
01:46:01,680 --> 01:46:03,400
Speaker 6: they also tasted him a bunch of times and then

1852
01:46:03,439 --> 01:46:07,920
Speaker 6: shot him, so right, good, yeah bad, However, thankfully this

1853
01:46:08,040 --> 01:46:11,840
Speaker 6: guy survived. But yeah, but this is something that that happens.

1854
01:46:12,600 --> 01:46:14,759
Speaker 6: This is only that you know, with with the current

1855
01:46:15,040 --> 01:46:19,000
Speaker 6: crop of right wing mayors have been doing and you know,

1856
01:46:19,040 --> 01:46:21,240
Speaker 6: the twenty twenty one and it was such a fiasco

1857
01:46:21,640 --> 01:46:26,120
Speaker 6: that even even like Chicago's machine, while it wasn't really

1858
01:46:26,200 --> 01:46:29,920
Speaker 6: quite thee but like even Chicago's right wing Democrats were like, Okay,

1859
01:46:29,960 --> 01:46:32,479
Speaker 6: we probably shouldn't do this lest the SWAT teams have

1860
01:46:32,520 --> 01:46:35,720
Speaker 6: their like start the killing moment. But you know, so

1861
01:46:35,880 --> 01:46:38,320
Speaker 6: that that's like one sort of predecessor to this, and

1862
01:46:38,360 --> 01:46:39,880
Speaker 6: the second one is I wanted to actually ask you

1863
01:46:39,960 --> 01:46:44,160
Speaker 6: specifically about the Federal National Guard deployments on the border

1864
01:46:44,200 --> 01:46:47,280
Speaker 6: because I think, yes, that's the part of this has

1865
01:46:47,320 --> 01:46:49,839
Speaker 6: just been like disappeared, Yes, exactly.

1866
01:46:49,880 --> 01:46:52,720
Speaker 8: Again, those have been like completely overlooked and kind of

1867
01:46:52,760 --> 01:46:56,400
Speaker 8: memory hold by most apparently, like since since Biden came

1868
01:46:56,439 --> 01:46:59,640
Speaker 8: to power. Like there's there's a Texas state deployment right,

1869
01:46:59,640 --> 01:47:02,160
Speaker 8: which will very familiar with. They get cheated out of

1870
01:47:02,200 --> 01:47:08,400
Speaker 8: their benefits. They tend to die from suicide from bringing

1871
01:47:08,400 --> 01:47:12,599
Speaker 8: their own firearms on deployment or getting drunk and driving around.

1872
01:47:12,960 --> 01:47:15,360
Speaker 8: They've had like higher casualties, so they've had deployment to

1873
01:47:15,400 --> 01:47:19,240
Speaker 8: a rock in the Texas deployment, right. Federal one is different.

1874
01:47:19,320 --> 01:47:23,400
Speaker 8: I see these dudes often, it's nearly always dudes. I did,

1875
01:47:23,680 --> 01:47:25,280
Speaker 8: of course, women could be deployed in that capacity. But

1876
01:47:25,280 --> 01:47:28,280
Speaker 8: I haven't seen them, and they are for the most part,

1877
01:47:28,400 --> 01:47:32,759
Speaker 8: like scared kids with firearms guarding prison camps full of children.

1878
01:47:33,439 --> 01:47:35,280
Speaker 8: Like I had one of these guys go to drawers

1879
01:47:35,320 --> 01:47:37,360
Speaker 8: pistol on me the other day because I was trying

1880
01:47:37,400 --> 01:47:41,240
Speaker 8: to alert him. Yeah, I mean, like I guess, like

1881
01:47:41,280 --> 01:47:43,080
Speaker 8: it's better in that situation that, like it's not my

1882
01:47:43,080 --> 01:47:45,400
Speaker 8: first time having someone draw a pistol on me, and

1883
01:47:45,439 --> 01:47:48,080
Speaker 8: I can tell them to sit down and stop being

1884
01:47:48,120 --> 01:47:52,280
Speaker 8: a dick. But this in this case where someone was

1885
01:47:52,680 --> 01:47:57,599
Speaker 8: experiencing cardiac distress and I'd gone to the nearest person

1886
01:47:57,640 --> 01:47:59,200
Speaker 8: who I can do right, like I can't call an

1887
01:47:59,240 --> 01:48:00,800
Speaker 8: ambulance and having to come in there have to go

1888
01:48:00,840 --> 01:48:03,280
Speaker 8: to either get BP to radio or in this case

1889
01:48:03,600 --> 01:48:06,760
Speaker 8: national guide. But what they're doing is, in addition to

1890
01:48:06,840 --> 01:48:10,679
Speaker 8: like guarding these open air detention sites on and off,

1891
01:48:10,840 --> 01:48:14,240
Speaker 8: is they are conducting kind of surveillance along the border.

1892
01:48:14,320 --> 01:48:17,080
Speaker 8: So often I'll see them with like surveillance arraysed cameras.

1893
01:48:17,960 --> 01:48:20,639
Speaker 8: I assume also like listening to radios and stuff like that.

1894
01:48:21,040 --> 01:48:25,160
Speaker 8: They're not actually like interdicting or arresting vigrants. They're not

1895
01:48:25,160 --> 01:48:27,400
Speaker 8: supposed to be anyway. But what it's supposed to be doing.

1896
01:48:27,479 --> 01:48:30,960
Speaker 8: Is that like kind of having that surveillance capacity and

1897
01:48:31,040 --> 01:48:32,639
Speaker 8: I guess protection when it comes to.

1898
01:48:32,600 --> 01:48:33,920
Speaker 6: The to the o ads.

1899
01:48:34,600 --> 01:48:37,799
Speaker 8: But yeah, they are everywhere, Like I see these people

1900
01:48:38,160 --> 01:48:41,640
Speaker 8: all the time down here in you know, certainly on

1901
01:48:41,760 --> 01:48:45,599
Speaker 8: the eastern San Diego County border, and and they're all

1902
01:48:45,600 --> 01:48:47,760
Speaker 8: in rented vehicles as well, which is weird that they

1903
01:48:47,800 --> 01:48:51,519
Speaker 8: haven't got their humvees or whatever. It must be a

1904
01:48:51,560 --> 01:48:57,000
Speaker 8: significant expense. And obviously border crossings are not decreasing thanks

1905
01:48:57,040 --> 01:48:59,719
Speaker 8: to them being there, right they you know, they mostly

1906
01:48:59,760 --> 01:49:02,479
Speaker 8: like are always out doing a water drop on Sunday

1907
01:49:02,479 --> 01:49:04,360
Speaker 8: and you'll see them creasing around the dirt roads and

1908
01:49:04,360 --> 01:49:08,519
Speaker 8: then obviously people therefore just avoid the road. It doesn't

1909
01:49:08,520 --> 01:49:11,880
Speaker 8: make it doesn't reduce migration like everything else. It just

1910
01:49:11,880 --> 01:49:14,720
Speaker 8: makes it more dangerous. But yeah, they've been here for

1911
01:49:14,760 --> 01:49:15,120
Speaker 8: a while.

1912
01:49:16,040 --> 01:49:18,160
Speaker 6: It's one of these things where you know they're they're

1913
01:49:18,200 --> 01:49:21,320
Speaker 6: doing okay. So like the guys in New York just

1914
01:49:21,600 --> 01:49:24,000
Speaker 6: basically seem to be standing around and doing bag checks,

1915
01:49:24,439 --> 01:49:26,600
Speaker 6: whereas those guys are doing a lot more. But I

1916
01:49:26,920 --> 01:49:29,479
Speaker 6: think there's one of the things that's been happening here,

1917
01:49:29,520 --> 01:49:31,880
Speaker 6: and this has been this is you know, This is

1918
01:49:32,439 --> 01:49:35,600
Speaker 6: not just the focus has been on on the like

1919
01:49:35,640 --> 01:49:38,479
Speaker 6: the Republican Texas deployments, right, but this is something that

1920
01:49:38,560 --> 01:49:41,200
Speaker 6: both the Republicans and the Democrats. This is from what

1921
01:49:41,240 --> 01:49:43,880
Speaker 6: we're seeking to eat. Yes, and the federal government have

1922
01:49:44,080 --> 01:49:47,160
Speaker 6: decided that, you know, the thing that we are going

1923
01:49:47,240 --> 01:49:51,320
Speaker 6: to be doing is what are what are and I

1924
01:49:51,320 --> 01:49:57,559
Speaker 6: mean active militia deployments Like that's insane, like that that

1925
01:49:57,640 --> 01:50:00,840
Speaker 6: is a level of that is a level of authoritarianism,

1926
01:50:01,200 --> 01:50:05,280
Speaker 6: that is you know that that has become effectively normal, right,

1927
01:50:05,360 --> 01:50:07,360
Speaker 6: Like there was there wasn't. I mean, there was kind

1928
01:50:07,400 --> 01:50:10,640
Speaker 6: of an outcry against the subway stuff, but like it

1929
01:50:10,680 --> 01:50:13,439
Speaker 6: hasn't stopped because best I could tell, like they're still

1930
01:50:13,439 --> 01:50:16,120
Speaker 6: out like yeah, like nothing on if it stopped it

1931
01:50:16,680 --> 01:50:19,960
Speaker 6: that we've been you know what, the thing that we've

1932
01:50:19,960 --> 01:50:22,800
Speaker 6: been forced to accept is not even not just you know,

1933
01:50:22,840 --> 01:50:24,400
Speaker 6: because we've already been forced to accept the sort of

1934
01:50:24,400 --> 01:50:26,800
Speaker 6: the militarization of the police, right, but now it's just

1935
01:50:26,840 --> 01:50:29,920
Speaker 6: straight up the total militarization of society to the extent

1936
01:50:29,960 --> 01:50:32,640
Speaker 6: that like, yeah, we just have a bunch of soldiers

1937
01:50:32,680 --> 01:50:36,520
Speaker 6: wandering around doing like random security checks and doing surveillance

1938
01:50:36,560 --> 01:50:38,639
Speaker 6: and like holding people in these open air.

1939
01:50:38,520 --> 01:50:42,800
Speaker 8: Prisons, Yeah, exactly, and like deployed way outside their stay

1940
01:50:42,840 --> 01:50:45,559
Speaker 8: often right, Like I think so many people hear from

1941
01:50:45,600 --> 01:50:49,160
Speaker 8: Missouri or Illinois, like some of them the less kind

1942
01:50:49,200 --> 01:50:52,799
Speaker 8: of insane, are you? You know, the people who mistake

1943
01:50:52,840 --> 01:50:54,400
Speaker 8: me if I guess for a member of the cartel

1944
01:50:54,520 --> 01:50:57,719
Speaker 8: judging by that guy's actions or like some ridiculous somehow

1945
01:50:57,760 --> 01:51:00,240
Speaker 8: a threat to him. You know that we can talk

1946
01:51:00,280 --> 01:51:03,800
Speaker 8: to them and then yeah, it's a very bullshit mission.

1947
01:51:03,840 --> 01:51:06,559
Speaker 8: And I think most of them would agree. Like further east,

1948
01:51:06,560 --> 01:51:08,920
Speaker 8: they're just like standing around by the border wall and

1949
01:51:08,960 --> 01:51:11,840
Speaker 8: the baking sne in the desert, just just yeah, doing

1950
01:51:11,880 --> 01:51:15,600
Speaker 8: security theater, but with as you said, real consequences.

1951
01:51:16,200 --> 01:51:18,000
Speaker 6: Yeah, And it's like the thing that is happening is

1952
01:51:18,000 --> 01:51:20,040
Speaker 6: these people have realized that the National Guard, if you

1953
01:51:20,080 --> 01:51:22,280
Speaker 6: are a senior en of state official, is just your

1954
01:51:22,280 --> 01:51:24,040
Speaker 6: private army. You could do whatever the fuck you want

1955
01:51:24,040 --> 01:51:26,679
Speaker 6: with it. And this is the thing that they're doing

1956
01:51:26,680 --> 01:51:28,559
Speaker 6: with it. And I think you should you know, it's

1957
01:51:28,840 --> 01:51:33,040
Speaker 6: worth looking at what the sort of justification for this is, which.

1958
01:51:32,800 --> 01:51:37,439
Speaker 8: Are probably also I neglected to mention that there are

1959
01:51:37,479 --> 01:51:41,200
Speaker 8: a dozen Republican governments, governors who have deployed their national

1960
01:51:41,240 --> 01:51:44,519
Speaker 8: Guard to the border, right, like not as part of

1961
01:51:44,520 --> 01:51:47,240
Speaker 8: the federal deployment, like to your private army thing. And

1962
01:51:47,280 --> 01:51:51,720
Speaker 8: I believe that North Dakota it's funded by a private individual,

1963
01:51:52,360 --> 01:51:54,519
Speaker 8: Like a private individual is covering the state's costs to

1964
01:51:54,560 --> 01:51:57,439
Speaker 8: deploy them to the border. Like this is nuts, yeah,

1965
01:51:57,680 --> 01:52:01,080
Speaker 8: fully insane, like serving as a fucking PMC.

1966
01:52:02,040 --> 01:52:04,880
Speaker 6: Yeah, but I mean we're seeing, you know, very explicitly,

1967
01:52:04,960 --> 01:52:08,120
Speaker 6: we're seeing this fusion of like personal state and corporate

1968
01:52:08,160 --> 01:52:11,599
Speaker 6: power and that's being used to just deploy a bunch

1969
01:52:11,600 --> 01:52:15,400
Speaker 6: of guys with guns to a bunch of random places.

1970
01:52:15,479 --> 01:52:18,760
Speaker 6: And you know, like it's worth mentioning that, Like crime

1971
01:52:18,840 --> 01:52:22,040
Speaker 6: rates are down, they're down year on year, they're down,

1972
01:52:22,439 --> 01:52:27,120
Speaker 6: like the broadshrend is down. They're down, like like outrageous,

1973
01:52:27,320 --> 01:52:29,040
Speaker 6: Like I think it's not like almost like fifty percent

1974
01:52:29,160 --> 01:52:32,800
Speaker 6: or something from the nineties, right Yeah.

1975
01:52:32,840 --> 01:52:37,160
Speaker 8: And likewise, the ratio of people crossing the border to

1976
01:52:37,200 --> 01:52:40,840
Speaker 8: agents to process and is it's much lower than it

1977
01:52:40,960 --> 01:52:43,360
Speaker 8: was in the nineties. You know, we have more border

1978
01:52:43,360 --> 01:52:46,680
Speaker 8: patrol agents, we have a more militarized board patrol. They

1979
01:52:46,720 --> 01:52:49,479
Speaker 8: have all these assets that were previously seen only like

1980
01:52:49,720 --> 01:52:52,439
Speaker 8: see a black Hawk all the fucking time, so we

1981
01:52:52,520 --> 01:52:54,799
Speaker 8: call it a scrap hawk. It's like it's like several

1982
01:52:55,000 --> 01:52:57,679
Speaker 8: several black Hawks. It's like it's not any particular submodel

1983
01:52:57,720 --> 01:52:58,280
Speaker 8: of black Hawk.

1984
01:52:58,400 --> 01:52:58,800
Speaker 12: It's like.

1985
01:53:00,280 --> 01:53:02,840
Speaker 8: The surviving pieces of several black Corks. But yeah, they

1986
01:53:02,840 --> 01:53:04,599
Speaker 8: have a lot of kit that you would think would

1987
01:53:04,600 --> 01:53:05,320
Speaker 8: be military. Kid.

1988
01:53:06,280 --> 01:53:09,080
Speaker 6: Yeah, and you know, I was. I so when I

1989
01:53:09,120 --> 01:53:12,120
Speaker 6: was reading about this, I was like, Okay, so I'm

1990
01:53:12,120 --> 01:53:14,960
Speaker 6: trying to figure out how many crimes are actually happening

1991
01:53:15,040 --> 01:53:16,960
Speaker 6: on New York subway system. But I'm going to read

1992
01:53:17,000 --> 01:53:21,320
Speaker 6: this paragraph from Reuters because it is. It is outrageous.

1993
01:53:22,200 --> 01:53:26,800
Speaker 6: There were thirty eight robberies and seventy thefts including pickpocketing

1994
01:53:27,320 --> 01:53:31,160
Speaker 6: on the subway system in February, compared to forty robberies

1995
01:53:31,160 --> 01:53:34,000
Speaker 6: and ninety eight thefts in the same month last year.

1996
01:53:34,040 --> 01:53:37,160
Speaker 6: According to police data, there were thirty five assaults, the

1997
01:53:37,200 --> 01:53:40,759
Speaker 6: same number as for February twenty twenty three. About ninety

1998
01:53:41,000 --> 01:53:44,200
Speaker 6: million trips were taken on the subway over the month.

1999
01:53:45,439 --> 01:53:52,599
Speaker 6: Now that is nuts the subway including pickpocketing, right, You're

2000
01:53:52,640 --> 01:53:54,920
Speaker 6: at about one hundred yeah, yeah.

2001
01:53:55,360 --> 01:53:57,480
Speaker 8: Reveal a trivial number of incidents.

2002
01:53:57,880 --> 01:54:01,400
Speaker 6: Ninety million trips. Right, this means that like per trip,

2003
01:54:01,479 --> 01:54:04,479
Speaker 6: your odds of being pickpocketed are almost literally one in

2004
01:54:04,520 --> 01:54:08,439
Speaker 6: a million. This is this is about the same odds

2005
01:54:08,479 --> 01:54:12,120
Speaker 6: you have of being struck by lightning. You are seventeen

2006
01:54:12,200 --> 01:54:14,439
Speaker 6: times more likely to get killed by a bee or

2007
01:54:14,520 --> 01:54:18,280
Speaker 6: a wasp sting than you are in like pickpocket, like

2008
01:54:18,439 --> 01:54:23,200
Speaker 6: pickpock not even robbed, pickpocketed on the subway. Right, So

2009
01:54:23,640 --> 01:54:25,720
Speaker 6: there's I from what I can do, I think there

2010
01:54:25,760 --> 01:54:29,240
Speaker 6: was three killings on the New York subway in February.

2011
01:54:29,360 --> 01:54:31,640
Speaker 8: Yeah, that was a shooting. I think today, Oh yesterday

2012
01:54:31,840 --> 01:54:32,120
Speaker 8: wasn't that?

2013
01:54:32,400 --> 01:54:33,920
Speaker 6: Yeah? Yeah, But this is the thing, So these things

2014
01:54:33,960 --> 01:54:36,840
Speaker 6: is gonna get a lot of attention. Right, But again,

2015
01:54:37,160 --> 01:54:41,040
Speaker 6: thirty million trips, we're talking like maybe three maybe four

2016
01:54:41,080 --> 01:54:44,280
Speaker 6: people getting killed a month, So that's like one in

2017
01:54:44,560 --> 01:54:51,160
Speaker 6: thirty million rides. Yeah, someone gets shot. That is outrageously safe.

2018
01:54:51,800 --> 01:54:56,080
Speaker 6: Like that is bafflingly starlingly safe. But this, this sort

2019
01:54:56,120 --> 01:54:58,560
Speaker 6: of brings us to Wow, Okay, the thing, the thing

2020
01:54:58,560 --> 01:55:00,800
Speaker 6: that this immediately brings us to is ad break. But

2021
01:55:00,920 --> 01:55:02,360
Speaker 6: it will be a second thing.

2022
01:55:03,080 --> 01:55:15,920
Speaker 17: Yeah, great, ipe, it's a good one.

2023
01:55:17,040 --> 01:55:19,320
Speaker 6: All right, we're back for the ads. We're bringing you

2024
01:55:19,880 --> 01:55:23,320
Speaker 6: actually amazingly advertisements part of what part of the whole

2025
01:55:23,360 --> 01:55:26,160
Speaker 6: thing is happening here, because you know, one of the

2026
01:55:26,160 --> 01:55:28,720
Speaker 6: big drivers of what's happening in New York and the

2027
01:55:28,760 --> 01:55:33,160
Speaker 6: reason everyone thinks the subway is unsafe is New York's

2028
01:55:33,200 --> 01:55:36,960
Speaker 6: media market. And very this is a like you know,

2029
01:55:36,960 --> 01:55:39,400
Speaker 6: so like the media market in the US is not good, right,

2030
01:55:40,320 --> 01:55:45,000
Speaker 6: but very specifically, the New York media market is absolutely batshit.

2031
01:55:45,560 --> 01:55:47,360
Speaker 6: They are nuts. And this is one of these things

2032
01:55:47,360 --> 01:55:49,360
Speaker 6: where you know, you may have like a one in

2033
01:55:49,480 --> 01:55:52,520
Speaker 6: thirty million chance of getting killed on a subway, but

2034
01:55:53,080 --> 01:55:58,080
Speaker 6: every single one of those thirty million like incidents, like

2035
01:55:58,120 --> 01:56:00,560
Speaker 6: why all those one thirty million is every single one

2036
01:56:00,600 --> 01:56:02,640
Speaker 6: of those is is like FrontPage news, right, because this

2037
01:56:02,720 --> 01:56:05,200
Speaker 6: is you know this, this is both part of the

2038
01:56:05,440 --> 01:56:08,160
Speaker 6: part of the actual sort of conservative politics of these

2039
01:56:08,200 --> 01:56:10,720
Speaker 6: media organizations. They are you know, New York media market

2040
01:56:10,760 --> 01:56:13,880
Speaker 6: is dominated by a bunch of right wing tabloids and

2041
01:56:13,960 --> 01:56:16,560
Speaker 6: a bunch of newspapers that are normally not right wing

2042
01:56:16,640 --> 01:56:20,360
Speaker 6: but are yeah, and so you know, there's this sort

2043
01:56:20,360 --> 01:56:22,400
Speaker 6: of breathless coverage of every single time one of these

2044
01:56:22,400 --> 01:56:24,200
Speaker 6: attacks happened, And this is one of one of the

2045
01:56:24,200 --> 01:56:26,840
Speaker 6: things that Cutrol very much like literally says about this

2046
01:56:26,880 --> 01:56:29,400
Speaker 6: and what you know, like we're at a point in

2047
01:56:29,440 --> 01:56:32,920
Speaker 6: this sort of crime cycle where enough journalists have been

2048
01:56:32,960 --> 01:56:35,600
Speaker 6: screamed at by people who are like the crime rates

2049
01:56:35,600 --> 01:56:38,440
Speaker 6: are all down, that the journalists have to include in

2050
01:56:38,520 --> 01:56:40,680
Speaker 6: the article a thing that's like the crime rates are down.

2051
01:56:40,960 --> 01:56:43,520
Speaker 6: This took like four years of just screaming at them.

2052
01:56:43,560 --> 01:56:46,000
Speaker 6: Eventually it worked. But you know, like Kucios like asked

2053
01:56:46,000 --> 01:56:48,120
Speaker 6: about this and she goes, yeah, well it's it's it's

2054
01:56:48,120 --> 01:56:50,440
Speaker 6: about people feeling. It's about like the feeling that people

2055
01:56:50,520 --> 01:56:54,680
Speaker 6: have because they don't they don't seem to Yeah, yeah,

2056
01:56:54,800 --> 01:56:56,040
Speaker 6: and you know, and this is one of these things

2057
01:56:56,040 --> 01:56:59,320
Speaker 6: we're like, this is like how insane the New York

2058
01:56:59,360 --> 01:57:01,160
Speaker 6: media market is over this off has had like an

2059
01:57:01,200 --> 01:57:04,560
Speaker 6: actual substance of political impact. This is something that you know,

2060
01:57:04,720 --> 01:57:07,200
Speaker 6: the Democrats embrace of this sort of like especially in

2061
01:57:07,240 --> 01:57:09,600
Speaker 6: New York, this like tough on crime thing has gotten

2062
01:57:09,600 --> 01:57:13,160
Speaker 6: to the point we're literally Eric Adams has to be

2063
01:57:13,200 --> 01:57:16,440
Speaker 6: the guy who's like no, no, no, actually hold on,

2064
01:57:16,560 --> 01:57:19,440
Speaker 6: like it's the New York is safe. Please stop panicking.

2065
01:57:19,680 --> 01:57:22,600
Speaker 6: I got my bi got my police funding already, please stop,

2066
01:57:22,680 --> 01:57:24,680
Speaker 6: like fleeing the city in terror.

2067
01:57:25,040 --> 01:57:27,600
Speaker 8: Yeah, it's amazing. Though, that's similar to what's happening in

2068
01:57:27,640 --> 01:57:31,160
Speaker 8: San Diego, another city Democratic councilor mayor. Right, so we

2069
01:57:31,240 --> 01:57:36,320
Speaker 8: have this Gloria terrible mayor, serial bullshitter. And in Gloria,

2070
01:57:36,560 --> 01:57:37,960
Speaker 8: in the State of the City speech was saying we

2071
01:57:38,000 --> 01:57:40,520
Speaker 8: should be locking up criminals, not laundry detergent.

2072
01:57:40,760 --> 01:57:42,640
Speaker 6: This this was his big line. He was very proud of.

2073
01:57:43,000 --> 01:57:46,880
Speaker 8: I have successfully purchased laundry detergent that was not incarcerated

2074
01:57:47,320 --> 01:57:50,040
Speaker 8: since then. But I think he was talking about target.

2075
01:57:50,120 --> 01:57:52,880
Speaker 8: I guess apparently he's legislating for the interest of target.

2076
01:57:52,920 --> 01:57:56,600
Speaker 8: But you have then his opponent in the MAJORA race,

2077
01:57:56,840 --> 01:58:01,560
Speaker 8: who's a former Marine corp Republican guy, being like, yo,

2078
01:58:01,600 --> 01:58:03,680
Speaker 8: I think we fucked up on our homelessness policy. We're

2079
01:58:03,720 --> 01:58:07,040
Speaker 8: just like criminalizing this is not just the answer. And

2080
01:58:07,760 --> 01:58:09,800
Speaker 8: we've got glory to being like, no, lock them up,

2081
01:58:09,880 --> 01:58:11,560
Speaker 8: you know, like they're trying.

2082
01:58:11,320 --> 01:58:11,880
Speaker 6: To push this.

2083
01:58:12,000 --> 01:58:16,560
Speaker 8: Is this continued, like this California bill that will force

2084
01:58:16,600 --> 01:58:20,240
Speaker 8: incarcerated people with mental illness right against their will.

2085
01:58:21,000 --> 01:58:22,600
Speaker 6: Yeah, yeah, it's up.

2086
01:58:22,800 --> 01:58:26,760
Speaker 8: It's fucking I mean, it's not bizarre because like I

2087
01:58:26,760 --> 01:58:30,840
Speaker 8: think so many Democrats, and like certainly publications here have

2088
01:58:31,000 --> 01:58:35,520
Speaker 8: really leaned into like suburban grievance politics and you know,

2089
01:58:35,640 --> 01:58:37,800
Speaker 8: like fixed the potholes and make it so I don't

2090
01:58:37,800 --> 01:58:41,440
Speaker 8: have to see poor people is their entire ideology. But

2091
01:58:41,680 --> 01:58:47,120
Speaker 8: it's still, I know, it's just kind of I'm struggling

2092
01:58:47,160 --> 01:58:49,360
Speaker 8: for the words here. It makes me really fucking pissed off.

2093
01:58:49,400 --> 01:58:51,200
Speaker 8: The people who showed up to one or two BLM

2094
01:58:51,240 --> 01:58:54,240
Speaker 8: marches are now out there like barking for a second

2095
01:58:54,320 --> 01:58:57,320
Speaker 8: border wall and machine gunning the unhoused.

2096
01:58:58,440 --> 01:59:02,560
Speaker 6: Yeah, and you know, and this is had a especially

2097
01:59:02,600 --> 01:59:05,240
Speaker 6: in New York, this has had an actual this has

2098
01:59:05,280 --> 01:59:08,920
Speaker 6: been having a substantive like electoral impact. One of the

2099
01:59:08,960 --> 01:59:12,400
Speaker 6: stories that kind of got buried in twenty twenty two

2100
01:59:12,680 --> 01:59:14,680
Speaker 6: is that you can actually, if you look at the

2101
01:59:14,720 --> 01:59:18,839
Speaker 6: electoral map in twenty twenty two, you can actually literally

2102
01:59:19,000 --> 01:59:22,520
Speaker 6: see where the New York media market ends, because all

2103
01:59:22,560 --> 01:59:24,720
Speaker 6: of the districts in the New York media market became

2104
01:59:24,760 --> 01:59:28,640
Speaker 6: significantly more conservative. And this is and this is not

2105
01:59:28,680 --> 01:59:31,200
Speaker 6: a joke. This is literally this whole tough on crime

2106
01:59:31,200 --> 01:59:34,000
Speaker 6: shit is literally the thing like and in this New

2107
01:59:34,080 --> 01:59:36,360
Speaker 6: York media market, this, this is what caused the Democrats

2108
01:59:36,440 --> 01:59:40,120
Speaker 6: the House because basically everywhere else in the country there

2109
01:59:40,200 --> 01:59:43,680
Speaker 6: was okay, so like like red districts shifted red. Every

2110
01:59:43,720 --> 01:59:46,120
Speaker 6: single district that was contested, like all of the sort

2111
01:59:46,160 --> 01:59:48,640
Speaker 6: of like purple blah blah blah, like the districts they

2112
01:59:48,680 --> 01:59:50,840
Speaker 6: all went They all shifted to the left because of

2113
01:59:50,880 --> 01:59:53,840
Speaker 6: abortion stuff. But then specifically a bunch of the like

2114
01:59:54,000 --> 01:59:56,480
Speaker 6: what are supposed to be like very safe blue districts

2115
01:59:56,920 --> 01:59:59,080
Speaker 6: went red because they were all because all of them

2116
01:59:59,080 --> 02:00:01,560
Speaker 6: were doing this in a tough on crime stuff. And yeah,

2117
02:00:01,640 --> 02:00:04,520
Speaker 6: those seats, like the seats they lost in New York

2118
02:00:04,600 --> 02:00:07,160
Speaker 6: are the reason the Republicans have control of the House.

2119
02:00:07,840 --> 02:00:10,480
Speaker 6: So like, you know, this isn't working for them electorally,

2120
02:00:11,400 --> 02:00:15,080
Speaker 6: but they're still doing it because it's their ideology. And

2121
02:00:15,280 --> 02:00:19,320
Speaker 6: we're gonna get into a bit more about why about

2122
02:00:19,320 --> 02:00:21,280
Speaker 6: that that part a second, but beffore we do that.

2123
02:00:21,320 --> 02:00:23,600
Speaker 6: I want to talk about I think another one of

2124
02:00:23,640 --> 02:00:25,760
Speaker 6: these things that has gotten kind of lost in the shuffle,

2125
02:00:25,800 --> 02:00:27,480
Speaker 6: which is do you do you you heard about the

2126
02:00:27,680 --> 02:00:29,920
Speaker 6: giant like DC Crime Omnibus bill.

2127
02:00:31,000 --> 02:00:33,640
Speaker 8: I've had about this, yeah, yeah, Like I will say

2128
02:00:33,640 --> 02:00:36,240
Speaker 8: I'm not familiar with it other than like herring that

2129
02:00:36,240 --> 02:00:36,720
Speaker 8: it's bad.

2130
02:00:37,640 --> 02:00:41,640
Speaker 6: Yeah, so okay, So so in DC, the City Council

2131
02:00:41,960 --> 02:00:46,520
Speaker 6: passed this enormous sort of like giant set of like

2132
02:00:46,600 --> 02:00:49,480
Speaker 6: omnibus set of like policies are supposed to be there,

2133
02:00:49,520 --> 02:00:54,960
Speaker 6: like keep DC safe crime omnibus thing. I okay. There's

2134
02:00:54,960 --> 02:00:56,440
Speaker 6: a couple of things to note about this. One is

2135
02:00:56,440 --> 02:00:58,600
Speaker 6: that it's actually not as bad as it was originally

2136
02:00:58,640 --> 02:01:02,080
Speaker 6: going to be because there was so much like uproar,

2137
02:01:02,120 --> 02:01:05,240
Speaker 6: because I mean the original one like had provisions that

2138
02:01:05,400 --> 02:01:08,200
Speaker 6: was like banning masks at protests and ship and it

2139
02:01:08,240 --> 02:01:11,640
Speaker 6: was like it was really bad and it got like nuked.

2140
02:01:12,400 --> 02:01:14,000
Speaker 6: But it's still really bad, and there's a lot of

2141
02:01:14,040 --> 02:01:16,320
Speaker 6: it's a lot of really weird kind of grievance stuff,

2142
02:01:16,360 --> 02:01:20,400
Speaker 6: Like there's this provision specifically that's supposed to be about

2143
02:01:20,440 --> 02:01:26,080
Speaker 6: like like targeting quote quote organized retail theft, which is

2144
02:01:26,080 --> 02:01:27,400
Speaker 6: one of the insane this is.

2145
02:01:27,640 --> 02:01:30,000
Speaker 8: Yeah, this is one of the most like storm in

2146
02:01:30,040 --> 02:01:32,560
Speaker 8: a teacups that has been going for a while now.

2147
02:01:33,160 --> 02:01:35,360
Speaker 6: Yeah. But I mean there there's also kind of like

2148
02:01:35,400 --> 02:01:37,880
Speaker 6: there's sister standard police stuff, which is it they're trying

2149
02:01:37,920 --> 02:01:41,680
Speaker 6: to expand pre trial attention on which they did one

2150
02:01:41,720 --> 02:01:44,840
Speaker 6: of the the absolutely insane ones that have been cleared unconstitutional,

2151
02:01:44,840 --> 02:01:48,040
Speaker 6: but apparently they's just back now is allowing police chiefs

2152
02:01:48,040 --> 02:01:54,520
Speaker 6: to designate certain areas quote drug free zones where yeah.

2153
02:01:55,240 --> 02:01:56,959
Speaker 8: See, I'm I'm so, I'm confused.

2154
02:01:57,800 --> 02:02:00,560
Speaker 6: But basically what it lets it basically, what it lets

2155
02:02:00,560 --> 02:02:04,440
Speaker 6: you do is it lets the cops just harass a

2156
02:02:04,520 --> 02:02:07,920
Speaker 6: bunch of people even more than they already do, like

2157
02:02:08,080 --> 02:02:10,640
Speaker 6: mostly mostly what it does is just when you declare

2158
02:02:10,640 --> 02:02:12,680
Speaker 6: one of these areas, it's where all the black people are,

2159
02:02:12,720 --> 02:02:15,800
Speaker 6: and then the cops just have cops have like an incredible,

2160
02:02:15,800 --> 02:02:19,000
Speaker 6: like incredibly increased ability to just randomly stop people and

2161
02:02:19,040 --> 02:02:19,839
Speaker 6: search them.

2162
02:02:19,760 --> 02:02:22,760
Speaker 8: Right, and yeah, ship stop and frisk law.

2163
02:02:22,960 --> 02:02:26,480
Speaker 6: Yeah, there's there. So there there is a thing that

2164
02:02:26,600 --> 02:02:30,960
Speaker 6: like part of the mask provision stayed in force, which

2165
02:02:31,000 --> 02:02:34,480
Speaker 6: is that they're making it basically it's like like wearing

2166
02:02:34,520 --> 02:02:37,680
Speaker 6: a mask with the intent to commit a crime is

2167
02:02:37,720 --> 02:02:44,560
Speaker 6: a crime, right, the cops like determine, right, your intent,

2168
02:02:44,800 --> 02:02:47,240
Speaker 6: So like, yeah, it's one of those laws.

2169
02:02:47,240 --> 02:02:49,080
Speaker 8: Like they do this a lot with gun laws, right,

2170
02:02:49,080 --> 02:02:51,600
Speaker 8: they passed gun laws. It don't make anything that wasn't

2171
02:02:51,840 --> 02:02:55,280
Speaker 8: already illegal illegal, They just make it so that if

2172
02:02:55,320 --> 02:02:57,600
Speaker 8: they if you if you're if you're caught, you're going

2173
02:02:57,640 --> 02:02:58,440
Speaker 8: to prison for longer.

2174
02:02:58,480 --> 02:03:01,400
Speaker 6: Now, Yeah, that this this actually there are there are

2175
02:03:01,400 --> 02:03:03,960
Speaker 6: provisions like that in this too. There's also a bunch

2176
02:03:04,000 --> 02:03:07,560
Speaker 6: of random like gun provisions. There's all the like more

2177
02:03:07,720 --> 02:03:12,080
Speaker 6: nuts ones, like there's there's one where cops can arrest you.

2178
02:03:12,240 --> 02:03:14,400
Speaker 6: So if if they're trying to cite you for not

2179
02:03:14,520 --> 02:03:17,120
Speaker 6: paying a toll, if they they they claim that you

2180
02:03:17,120 --> 02:03:20,400
Speaker 6: didn't pay a you didn't like pay a transit fare,

2181
02:03:21,720 --> 02:03:23,839
Speaker 6: you have to give them your full name and address

2182
02:03:23,840 --> 02:03:25,360
Speaker 6: and if they don't, and if you don't, they can

2183
02:03:25,480 --> 02:03:29,640
Speaker 6: arrest you, which is nuts.

2184
02:03:30,160 --> 02:03:32,440
Speaker 8: This is like, don't disrespect me on the train in

2185
02:03:32,440 --> 02:03:33,920
Speaker 8: front of everyone, nor, isn't it?

2186
02:03:34,200 --> 02:03:38,200
Speaker 6: That's what that is. There's another one. There's another one,

2187
02:03:38,200 --> 02:03:40,560
Speaker 6: which is like, I I don't. I don't have another

2188
02:03:40,560 --> 02:03:43,440
Speaker 6: way to describe it other than this is the uh,

2189
02:03:43,840 --> 02:03:45,680
Speaker 6: this is the how to get away with murder bill,

2190
02:03:46,320 --> 02:03:48,280
Speaker 6: which is this is so one of the things that

2191
02:03:48,280 --> 02:03:52,880
Speaker 6: they're doing is letting cops review their own helmet footage

2192
02:03:53,400 --> 02:03:58,360
Speaker 6: before police inquiries. Right, ah, this is this is this

2193
02:03:58,400 --> 02:03:59,920
Speaker 6: is to get the narrative straight.

2194
02:04:00,400 --> 02:04:03,080
Speaker 8: Yeah, Bill, do you also get to edit it?

2195
02:04:05,480 --> 02:04:05,840
Speaker 10: I don't.

2196
02:04:06,240 --> 02:04:10,720
Speaker 6: Well, okay, so here's the thing about that quote unquote No,

2197
02:04:10,920 --> 02:04:17,680
Speaker 6: however come these things mysteriously vanish time mysteriously disappears. Yeah,

2198
02:04:17,880 --> 02:04:20,520
Speaker 6: there's also like a whole thing about like there are

2199
02:04:20,560 --> 02:04:23,760
Speaker 6: certain groups of people who the cops can just like

2200
02:04:23,960 --> 02:04:27,400
Speaker 6: force DNA collections from. Wow, which is it's a lot

2201
02:04:27,480 --> 02:04:29,440
Speaker 6: less broad than it used to be. But yeah, it's

2202
02:04:29,440 --> 02:04:31,680
Speaker 6: still a provision in there. But yeah, this is a

2203
02:04:31,760 --> 02:04:35,840
Speaker 6: nightmarish bill that they've been able to pass. And you know,

2204
02:04:36,080 --> 02:04:39,520
Speaker 6: I think it's worth thinking about why this is actually happening,

2205
02:04:39,520 --> 02:04:42,160
Speaker 6: which is that all of this stuff, all of these

2206
02:04:42,200 --> 02:04:44,960
Speaker 6: are sort of long range reaction to twenty twenty, right,

2207
02:04:45,120 --> 02:04:48,360
Speaker 6: this is this, This was the sort of strategy after

2208
02:04:48,400 --> 02:04:52,200
Speaker 6: twenty twenty for rebuilding legitimacy of the police, and you know,

2209
02:04:52,240 --> 02:04:56,920
Speaker 6: and and also now rebuilding sort of rebuilding the I

2210
02:04:56,960 --> 02:05:01,120
Speaker 6: don't know, psychological capacity, I guess to you know, I mean,

2211
02:05:01,200 --> 02:05:04,839
Speaker 6: just deploy a bunch of troops on US soil, right, right, yeah,

2212
02:05:05,240 --> 02:05:09,280
Speaker 6: sort of building up that tolerance. Yeah, and you know,

2213
02:05:09,400 --> 02:05:11,080
Speaker 6: like this is all of this stuff is sort of

2214
02:05:11,080 --> 02:05:15,960
Speaker 6: born on you know, on on on protest crackdowns on

2215
02:05:15,960 --> 02:05:18,120
Speaker 6: one of the things that's also sort of worth noting about.

2216
02:05:18,160 --> 02:05:20,400
Speaker 6: This is all of this stuff. I mean, the DC

2217
02:05:20,520 --> 02:05:22,040
Speaker 6: crime build but in the works for a long time,

2218
02:05:22,080 --> 02:05:24,880
Speaker 6: but the subway stuff is all stuff that happened like

2219
02:05:25,240 --> 02:05:31,120
Speaker 6: pretty quickly after they are ambushnell self Imlaysia. So a

2220
02:05:31,160 --> 02:05:35,800
Speaker 6: big part of this has been the sort of the

2221
02:05:36,160 --> 02:05:40,760
Speaker 6: Democratic ruling class kind of losing their minds after watching

2222
02:05:40,840 --> 02:05:43,400
Speaker 6: how widespread twenty twenty was, watching the extent to which

2223
02:05:43,560 --> 02:05:47,000
Speaker 6: they were forced to like you know, like there are

2224
02:05:47,000 --> 02:05:51,680
Speaker 6: democratic politicians in twenty twenty like talking about like I mean,

2225
02:05:51,720 --> 02:05:54,400
Speaker 6: there are like a lucky people talking about defunding the police.

2226
02:05:54,440 --> 02:05:59,320
Speaker 6: There are like they're all remember the weird like that

2227
02:05:59,360 --> 02:06:02,760
Speaker 6: whole like kneed laying thing in Congress. They all do

2228
02:06:03,400 --> 02:06:04,920
Speaker 6: oh yeah yeah.

2229
02:06:04,720 --> 02:06:06,320
Speaker 8: Have the pitched in the morning you can take with

2230
02:06:06,520 --> 02:06:11,560
Speaker 8: yeah yeah, ooh yeah. That's a powerful incents of ringe.

2231
02:06:12,280 --> 02:06:14,600
Speaker 6: Yeah. But there's a lot of like you know, there's

2232
02:06:14,640 --> 02:06:17,240
Speaker 6: there's this this sort of memory of that has been

2233
02:06:17,280 --> 02:06:20,720
Speaker 6: has been sort of drilled deep into into the Democratic

2234
02:06:20,800 --> 02:06:25,760
Speaker 6: party and so what what what has been happening like

2235
02:06:25,760 --> 02:06:27,200
Speaker 6: like you know and that what's been happening and this

2236
02:06:27,240 --> 02:06:31,000
Speaker 6: has been happening in blue states very explicitly is this

2237
02:06:31,160 --> 02:06:36,280
Speaker 6: is this strategy of hypermilitarization with the explicit like not explicit, sorry,

2238
02:06:36,400 --> 02:06:39,760
Speaker 6: with the implicit but not very well concealed goal of

2239
02:06:39,840 --> 02:06:42,560
Speaker 6: putting everyone back in their place after twenty twenty, and

2240
02:06:42,880 --> 02:06:47,600
Speaker 6: that is extremely grim. I mean, I think, I don't know,

2241
02:06:47,720 --> 02:06:50,880
Speaker 6: I'm I'm glad the DC stuff isn't as bad as

2242
02:06:50,920 --> 02:06:53,120
Speaker 6: it was originally because the original one we're just like

2243
02:06:53,160 --> 02:06:55,680
Speaker 6: straight up a bunch of fascist ship. This is also

2244
02:06:55,760 --> 02:07:00,640
Speaker 6: fascist shit, but like not as unhinged as the original

2245
02:07:00,640 --> 02:07:05,280
Speaker 6: bills were, So you know, it's like like the tide

2246
02:07:05,280 --> 02:07:09,160
Speaker 6: of this stuff isn't inevitable, right, but also very very

2247
02:07:09,200 --> 02:07:13,560
Speaker 6: powerful factions of the Democratic Party have decided that this

2248
02:07:13,640 --> 02:07:16,360
Speaker 6: is the thing that they want to do, and it

2249
02:07:16,440 --> 02:07:19,080
Speaker 6: absolutely sucks, and you know, and and and and this

2250
02:07:19,200 --> 02:07:21,360
Speaker 6: is you know, and this is in a similar way

2251
02:07:21,400 --> 02:07:24,040
Speaker 6: to sort of the stuff on the border being by parties.

2252
02:07:24,040 --> 02:07:25,440
Speaker 6: I mean, at some point I'm going to do an

2253
02:07:25,440 --> 02:07:27,760
Speaker 6: episode about the absolute shit show that's been happening in

2254
02:07:27,840 --> 02:07:32,160
Speaker 6: Chicago where yeah, they're like a a kid got fucking

2255
02:07:32,240 --> 02:07:34,560
Speaker 6: measles in one of these and one of the micro

2256
02:07:34,600 --> 02:07:38,640
Speaker 6: shelters in Pilsen in Chicago, and now the mayor's like

2257
02:07:38,720 --> 02:07:41,480
Speaker 6: evicting a bunch of a bunch of people from the

2258
02:07:41,480 --> 02:07:45,320
Speaker 6: bigrant shelters. Jesus, you know, so like there's a bip

2259
02:07:45,440 --> 02:07:47,200
Speaker 6: I mean, this is the thing Like in Chicago, I

2260
02:07:47,280 --> 02:07:51,280
Speaker 6: mean there's just outside of like you know, we're like

2261
02:07:51,480 --> 02:07:55,760
Speaker 6: outside of just like basically every like Walgreens or just

2262
02:07:55,800 --> 02:07:59,800
Speaker 6: on street corners, there's a bunch of refugee families like

2263
02:08:00,240 --> 02:08:02,120
Speaker 6: just sitting out there in the cold, trying to get

2264
02:08:02,120 --> 02:08:06,000
Speaker 6: some money because there's fucking nothing for them here. And

2265
02:08:06,360 --> 02:08:09,160
Speaker 6: this is a bipartisan you know this, this is a

2266
02:08:09,160 --> 02:08:14,920
Speaker 6: bipartisan political project. Yeah, you know, just sort of sheer

2267
02:08:15,040 --> 02:08:17,640
Speaker 6: terror inflicted on most of the little people in society.

2268
02:08:19,200 --> 02:08:22,320
Speaker 8: Yeah, it's it's really depressing to hear that, just because

2269
02:08:22,360 --> 02:08:25,680
Speaker 8: I know that, like, you know, I see people here

2270
02:08:25,760 --> 02:08:27,440
Speaker 8: and then they get out, and my friends see them,

2271
02:08:27,480 --> 02:08:29,440
Speaker 8: and we turn into the airport and my friends feed

2272
02:08:29,480 --> 02:08:31,200
Speaker 8: them and look after them there, and they get on

2273
02:08:31,240 --> 02:08:32,960
Speaker 8: their planes and we hope for the best for them,

2274
02:08:32,960 --> 02:08:35,000
Speaker 8: you know, and then then yeah, they just go to

2275
02:08:35,040 --> 02:08:37,760
Speaker 8: some other city where some other dog shit democrats who

2276
02:08:37,880 --> 02:08:40,800
Speaker 8: lied four years ago is gonna do everything they can

2277
02:08:40,880 --> 02:08:42,480
Speaker 8: to make life as hard for them as possible.

2278
02:08:43,120 --> 02:08:43,520
Speaker 12: Yeah.

2279
02:08:43,600 --> 02:08:45,120
Speaker 8: The good thing is you have to vote for them

2280
02:08:45,120 --> 02:08:50,320
Speaker 8: while you're voting for Fascismoo horay, how sad?

2281
02:08:51,520 --> 02:08:53,560
Speaker 6: Yeah that that that That's what I got today. We'll

2282
02:08:53,600 --> 02:08:58,640
Speaker 6: be back tomorrow with something. What are we back down?

2283
02:08:58,760 --> 02:09:02,040
Speaker 8: Yeah, it will be a podcast. It's with tomorrow's Friday.

2284
02:09:02,440 --> 02:09:04,960
Speaker 8: Oh yeah, Torow's Gaza day. So it's not getting Anny

2285
02:09:05,000 --> 02:09:08,400
Speaker 8: better for you. Yeah, lucky you, lucky you. Tomorrow we'll

2286
02:09:08,440 --> 02:09:24,640
Speaker 8: be hearing from our friends at park or Gaza.

2287
02:09:25,920 --> 02:09:26,040
Speaker 7: Hi.

2288
02:09:26,120 --> 02:09:29,080
Speaker 8: Everyone, it's me James, just introducing this podcast, and I'm

2289
02:09:29,080 --> 02:09:32,760
Speaker 8: recording this the day after we recorded the episode to

2290
02:09:32,800 --> 02:09:35,960
Speaker 8: today's Thursday, the twenty first of March. I wanted to

2291
02:09:36,040 --> 02:09:38,120
Speaker 8: just update a couple of things and correct a couple

2292
02:09:38,120 --> 02:09:39,839
Speaker 8: of things, so I've just listened through the episodes.

2293
02:09:39,880 --> 02:09:40,800
Speaker 6: I'm going to do that now.

2294
02:09:41,080 --> 02:09:43,919
Speaker 8: Firstly, I think I said Igler a couple of times

2295
02:09:44,000 --> 02:09:47,840
Speaker 8: when I meant Strella. It's the Strella portable surface to

2296
02:09:47,840 --> 02:09:51,400
Speaker 8: where missiles have been refitted with new batteries in the

2297
02:09:51,400 --> 02:09:54,520
Speaker 8: Syrian Civil Wars specifically, and I've included a link to

2298
02:09:54,520 --> 02:09:57,840
Speaker 8: a document about that in the show notes. So apologies

2299
02:09:57,880 --> 02:10:00,560
Speaker 8: for getting those two things confused. They're both I guess

2300
02:10:00,600 --> 02:10:04,120
Speaker 8: former Soviet service to a missile systems. The other things

2301
02:10:04,160 --> 02:10:08,040
Speaker 8: I wanted to mention that a few like throughout this

2302
02:10:08,360 --> 02:10:13,120
Speaker 8: episode we've used manpads, right, that's kind of the colloquial

2303
02:10:13,320 --> 02:10:17,960
Speaker 8: term or the official term really for person boughtable anti

2304
02:10:18,000 --> 02:10:22,280
Speaker 8: aircraft systems. Like obviously doesn't mean that you have to

2305
02:10:22,320 --> 02:10:24,680
Speaker 8: be a man to use one, certainly like the fact

2306
02:10:24,680 --> 02:10:27,720
Speaker 8: that the hPG are using them and that the Kurdish

2307
02:10:27,720 --> 02:10:30,800
Speaker 8: Freedom Movement are using them. Obviously women can use them,

2308
02:10:30,840 --> 02:10:33,160
Speaker 8: non binary folks can use them, to everyone can use them.

2309
02:10:33,240 --> 02:10:36,640
Speaker 8: And finally, I just wanted to mention that there have

2310
02:10:36,720 --> 02:10:40,280
Speaker 8: been some suggestions that the thing that was used to

2311
02:10:40,280 --> 02:10:43,480
Speaker 8: shoot down the Bay Reptars was like loatering munition, which

2312
02:10:43,520 --> 02:10:46,320
Speaker 8: is something that is often called a suicide drone. In

2313
02:10:46,320 --> 02:10:49,600
Speaker 8: this case, it's not a loitering munition that impacts something

2314
02:10:49,640 --> 02:10:51,200
Speaker 8: on the ground, but impacts something on the air. There's

2315
02:10:51,240 --> 02:10:55,600
Speaker 8: an Iranian system that does that, but apparently it's possible

2316
02:10:55,640 --> 02:10:58,240
Speaker 8: to replicate that with a large number of off the

2317
02:10:58,280 --> 02:11:00,400
Speaker 8: shelf or sort of commercially available pieces.

2318
02:11:00,480 --> 02:11:01,960
Speaker 6: So maybe that's what's going on.

2319
02:11:02,680 --> 02:11:04,760
Speaker 8: This episode was a little bit speculative, and we still

2320
02:11:04,800 --> 02:11:07,080
Speaker 8: don't have lots of hard answers, but we hope you'll

2321
02:11:07,160 --> 02:11:10,000
Speaker 8: enjoy it because it represents a change in a relationship

2322
02:11:10,000 --> 02:11:11,880
Speaker 8: between the state and people who are not the state,

2323
02:11:12,000 --> 02:11:13,080
Speaker 8: and that's why it's important.

2324
02:11:13,200 --> 02:11:14,360
Speaker 6: Okay, hope you enjoy.

2325
02:11:15,160 --> 02:11:18,600
Speaker 8: Hello, podcast fans, Welcome back to the podcast. I'm joined

2326
02:11:18,600 --> 02:11:20,280
Speaker 8: today by my friend Mia Himea.

2327
02:11:21,040 --> 02:11:22,520
Speaker 6: Hello, and we.

2328
02:11:22,440 --> 02:11:25,720
Speaker 8: Are talking about, of course, surface to wear missiles, a

2329
02:11:25,760 --> 02:11:28,240
Speaker 8: topic that I'm sure is on the top of mind

2330
02:11:28,280 --> 02:11:30,640
Speaker 8: for all of you as you drive to work this morning.

2331
02:11:30,880 --> 02:11:33,080
Speaker 8: Where are we talking about surface to wear missiles today?

2332
02:11:33,400 --> 02:11:33,720
Speaker 6: Well?

2333
02:11:34,000 --> 02:11:38,320
Speaker 8: Today is It is Wednesday, the twentieth of March, and

2334
02:11:38,360 --> 02:11:40,840
Speaker 8: today I'm sure maybe some of you would have seen

2335
02:11:41,320 --> 02:11:43,120
Speaker 8: most of you probably will not as you go about

2336
02:11:43,120 --> 02:11:47,800
Speaker 8: your daily life that the KSEK. The k CK is

2337
02:11:47,960 --> 02:11:52,360
Speaker 8: the group, the Kurdistan Communities Union, the joint group between

2338
02:11:52,520 --> 02:11:55,440
Speaker 8: the various groups in the different parts of Kurdistan. Right,

2339
02:11:55,480 --> 02:11:59,920
Speaker 8: So you have the PKK, you have the Yea Yepiga

2340
02:12:00,480 --> 02:12:03,240
Speaker 8: in Syria, PI k K and Turkey, right the p

2341
02:12:03,440 --> 02:12:07,240
Speaker 8: JACK in Iran in the k like brings all these

2342
02:12:07,240 --> 02:12:08,000
Speaker 8: groups together.

2343
02:12:08,520 --> 02:12:08,800
Speaker 1: Do they?

2344
02:12:09,080 --> 02:12:11,000
Speaker 6: Is there a name? Do they? Is there like an

2345
02:12:11,000 --> 02:12:12,920
Speaker 6: Iraqi branch? That's the one that I don't know.

2346
02:12:13,040 --> 02:12:18,360
Speaker 8: You have the Yevish, the the Azdi group, right, yeah,

2347
02:12:19,400 --> 02:12:22,480
Speaker 8: I think everyone I will reconsider my statement.

2348
02:12:22,920 --> 02:12:24,840
Speaker 6: The people who I have become aware of.

2349
02:12:26,080 --> 02:12:30,200
Speaker 8: Who are in Iraq, who are who I know about journalistically,

2350
02:12:30,680 --> 02:12:36,600
Speaker 8: are k c K people. Okay, little little bit of

2351
02:12:37,720 --> 02:12:39,760
Speaker 8: smoke and mirrors feed there, but yeah, the people the

2352
02:12:39,800 --> 02:12:42,640
Speaker 8: people who I who I know who are in in

2353
02:12:42,720 --> 02:12:45,040
Speaker 8: the Kurdistan Autonomous Region.

2354
02:12:46,240 --> 02:12:46,960
Speaker 6: Are ksey K.

2355
02:12:47,640 --> 02:12:51,000
Speaker 8: So I think that I think most of the sort

2356
02:12:51,000 --> 02:12:54,200
Speaker 8: of people within the greater like Kurdish Freedom move and

2357
02:12:54,240 --> 02:12:56,000
Speaker 8: the APOACHE people are ksey K.

2358
02:12:56,160 --> 02:12:56,800
Speaker 6: Within Iraq.

2359
02:12:57,280 --> 02:13:01,320
Speaker 8: It is in the Kurdistan Autonomous Region, So like Iraqi

2360
02:13:01,360 --> 02:13:03,840
Speaker 8: in a technical sense, but only only really in a

2361
02:13:03,840 --> 02:13:06,440
Speaker 8: technical sense. Like when you go to the Kurdistan Autonomous Region,

2362
02:13:06,480 --> 02:13:10,000
Speaker 8: you don't even do Iraqi immigration. You do Kurdistan immigration,

2363
02:13:10,440 --> 02:13:12,360
Speaker 8: which is nice because it's a lot easier. I was

2364
02:13:12,400 --> 02:13:17,800
Speaker 8: there in October of twenty twenty three, and since February

2365
02:13:17,840 --> 02:13:21,520
Speaker 8: of twenty twenty three, the KCK have announced they have

2366
02:13:21,600 --> 02:13:26,840
Speaker 8: shut down thirteen Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles, right, which what

2367
02:13:26,960 --> 02:13:30,160
Speaker 8: you and I would call drones. And we're not talking

2368
02:13:30,240 --> 02:13:34,240
Speaker 8: about drones like your friend has a drone and they

2369
02:13:34,400 --> 02:13:37,000
Speaker 8: use it to film you at the beach. Drones we're

2370
02:13:37,040 --> 02:13:41,480
Speaker 8: talking about like Bairaktar drones, which are it's an aircraft, right,

2371
02:13:41,560 --> 02:13:43,480
Speaker 8: Like if you saw one you would be like, oh,

2372
02:13:43,480 --> 02:13:44,280
Speaker 8: there goes a plane.

2373
02:13:45,160 --> 02:13:47,240
Speaker 6: Yeah, it's like it's like the Turkish version of the

2374
02:13:47,280 --> 02:13:50,840
Speaker 6: Predator drones and US users, Yeah, yeah, it's it's yeah,

2375
02:13:50,840 --> 02:13:51,640
Speaker 6: it's a very similar thing.

2376
02:13:51,640 --> 02:13:54,920
Speaker 8: It's a very popular drone system actually, right, they've sold

2377
02:13:55,040 --> 02:13:59,600
Speaker 8: bairaktars to I think dozens of countries, like they're i

2378
02:13:59,600 --> 02:14:04,040
Speaker 8: mean all over yeah, thirty one countries that they've exported

2379
02:14:04,040 --> 02:14:06,600
Speaker 8: the Biachta to, so that they're very widely used. They're

2380
02:14:06,680 --> 02:14:09,280
Speaker 8: kind of the the sort of drone of choice for

2381
02:14:09,280 --> 02:14:11,400
Speaker 8: people who are just like buying on the open market. Right,

2382
02:14:11,680 --> 02:14:14,840
Speaker 8: Karta uses them, Ukraine uses them a lot, but even

2383
02:14:14,880 --> 02:14:19,800
Speaker 8: countries like I'm looking here Bakina Faso has has bairactars.

2384
02:14:20,400 --> 02:14:23,320
Speaker 8: So what's notable about this is they've also shot down

2385
02:14:23,320 --> 02:14:27,320
Speaker 8: a kinchies A kinchiese are like the newer Bairaktar variant

2386
02:14:27,440 --> 02:14:30,520
Speaker 8: that they make a slightly different noise. I've spent some

2387
02:14:30,600 --> 02:14:32,840
Speaker 8: time in places that are being attacked by drones over

2388
02:14:32,880 --> 02:14:36,080
Speaker 8: the last year, and it's it's a highly unpleasant experience.

2389
02:14:36,560 --> 02:14:39,960
Speaker 8: But people who are used to this, which I am,

2390
02:14:40,120 --> 02:14:42,120
Speaker 8: I guess thankfully not, will tell you that they can

2391
02:14:42,120 --> 02:14:44,480
Speaker 8: tell the different about the noise at least these drones

2392
02:14:44,520 --> 02:14:47,000
Speaker 8: to make. But there was a Kinchi for instance. I

2393
02:14:47,000 --> 02:14:50,280
Speaker 8: believe it was in a Kinchi that did some of

2394
02:14:50,320 --> 02:14:53,480
Speaker 8: the attacks that I was unfortunate enough to be nearby

2395
02:14:53,520 --> 02:14:58,200
Speaker 8: when I was in ro in October. So what's notable

2396
02:14:58,200 --> 02:15:01,800
Speaker 8: about this is like the k c K obviously, like

2397
02:15:01,840 --> 02:15:04,960
Speaker 8: they're a non state actor, right, because there was not

2398
02:15:05,000 --> 02:15:08,680
Speaker 8: a Kurdish state. There is a Kurdish nation, one might argue,

2399
02:15:08,720 --> 02:15:14,280
Speaker 8: but it's split between four states Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey,

2400
02:15:14,600 --> 02:15:20,320
Speaker 8: and so them being able to shoot down drones, it's

2401
02:15:20,360 --> 02:15:21,240
Speaker 8: quite remarkable.

2402
02:15:22,760 --> 02:15:25,240
Speaker 6: Yeah, no, one's none of the non state actors really

2403
02:15:25,280 --> 02:15:27,080
Speaker 6: in the last like twenty years have been able to

2404
02:15:27,120 --> 02:15:30,600
Speaker 6: do this. Like everyone talks about how advanced like Isis'

2405
02:15:30,800 --> 02:15:33,360
Speaker 6: capabilities were for a non state actor, and they were,

2406
02:15:33,680 --> 02:15:39,080
Speaker 6: but they couldn't do it, Like it's wild, No, like who.

2407
02:15:38,920 --> 02:15:40,960
Speaker 8: These have shut down some reaper drones?

2408
02:15:42,040 --> 02:15:44,600
Speaker 6: Yeah, but they're but they're a state, Like that's the

2409
02:15:44,640 --> 02:15:47,280
Speaker 6: thing like they'd have huge swaths of the regular you

2410
02:15:47,400 --> 02:15:50,800
Speaker 6: many military are just like yeah.

2411
02:15:50,560 --> 02:15:53,640
Speaker 8: And then they're supplied by other state actors, right, like

2412
02:15:53,760 --> 02:15:57,760
Speaker 8: very clearly as it's a little different. What Yeah, it's

2413
02:15:58,240 --> 02:16:01,160
Speaker 8: this is relatively remarkable, right, they've been able to shoot

2414
02:16:01,200 --> 02:16:03,840
Speaker 8: down like and not just it's not just like, oh

2415
02:16:03,840 --> 02:16:06,120
Speaker 8: we've got Lucky, we got we've got lucky and dropped

2416
02:16:06,120 --> 02:16:09,640
Speaker 8: a single drone. Ice has had, if I remember correctly,

2417
02:16:10,160 --> 02:16:14,200
Speaker 8: isis had some Igler man pads, like the old Russian

2418
02:16:14,720 --> 02:16:16,800
Speaker 8: man pads. The thing with those and we're going to

2419
02:16:16,920 --> 02:16:21,000
Speaker 8: talk about this a little bit later. They they have

2420
02:16:21,160 --> 02:16:23,760
Speaker 8: like a battery and that battery will run out over

2421
02:16:23,720 --> 02:16:26,160
Speaker 8: a certain or they're sold that some of them are

2422
02:16:26,160 --> 02:16:28,440
Speaker 8: just being sold on the black market without batteries. From

2423
02:16:28,440 --> 02:16:31,760
Speaker 8: what I've seen, some folks in that we've seen in

2424
02:16:32,000 --> 02:16:34,120
Speaker 8: the civil war in Syria have worked out how to

2425
02:16:34,840 --> 02:16:38,520
Speaker 8: somehow make that battery work with or make another battery,

2426
02:16:38,600 --> 02:16:41,320
Speaker 8: or make another electronic system for them. They don't have

2427
02:16:41,400 --> 02:16:44,440
Speaker 8: like a lockout, right, they don't have a like we've detected,

2428
02:16:44,640 --> 02:16:47,000
Speaker 8: you know, like your iPhone will sometimes get mad if

2429
02:16:47,040 --> 02:16:50,240
Speaker 8: you're using a third party charger. Yeah, yeah, yeah, right,

2430
02:16:50,280 --> 02:16:53,119
Speaker 8: So Tim Apple has was not involved in the design

2431
02:16:53,280 --> 02:16:57,880
Speaker 8: of the ki Igler most pity, and so he wasn't

2432
02:16:57,920 --> 02:17:02,080
Speaker 8: able to engineer it a third party. But those have

2433
02:17:02,280 --> 02:17:06,960
Speaker 8: been repurposed. But yeah, we did not see the Islamic

2434
02:17:07,000 --> 02:17:09,800
Speaker 8: state of Irak and al Sham dropping US drones. In fact,

2435
02:17:10,879 --> 02:17:13,959
Speaker 8: the reason like the thing that allowed there were two

2436
02:17:14,000 --> 02:17:16,680
Speaker 8: things that allowed the defeat of like the so called

2437
02:17:16,720 --> 02:17:19,920
Speaker 8: Islamic state rate One, the heroism of the people who

2438
02:17:19,959 --> 02:17:23,840
Speaker 8: fought against them, be they like Iraqi Kurdish, a lot

2439
02:17:23,879 --> 02:17:27,280
Speaker 8: of people fought against a fifteen thousand kurt died fighting Isis.

2440
02:17:27,280 --> 02:17:29,680
Speaker 8: But also the fact that the US had complete air

2441
02:17:29,720 --> 02:17:34,400
Speaker 8: dominance and could just fucking obliterate things from the sky

2442
02:17:34,480 --> 02:17:38,560
Speaker 8: whenever it wanted to it did. It did a lot

2443
02:17:38,560 --> 02:17:42,520
Speaker 8: of obliterating things from the sky, right, And so the

2444
02:17:42,600 --> 02:17:45,920
Speaker 8: ability to shoot down drones is something that has been

2445
02:17:46,000 --> 02:17:49,720
Speaker 8: very hard for non state actors. And it's not like

2446
02:17:49,959 --> 02:17:53,520
Speaker 8: it's not like the KCK has a state sponsor, right yeah.

2447
02:17:53,600 --> 02:17:55,800
Speaker 6: Yeah. Also so like like for example, like Hasbla has

2448
02:17:55,840 --> 02:17:58,760
Speaker 6: shot down too, although these weren't actually they shut down

2449
02:17:58,760 --> 02:18:01,959
Speaker 6: to Hermes like is really Hermes Jones. So though those

2450
02:18:01,959 --> 02:18:04,480
Speaker 6: are just those are surveillance things. But the thing is,

2451
02:18:04,480 --> 02:18:08,680
Speaker 6: like Hezbola did this by getting surface there missiles, like

2452
02:18:08,720 --> 02:18:11,760
Speaker 6: getting surface there rockets from Iran. Yeah, so yeah, that's

2453
02:18:11,760 --> 02:18:14,640
Speaker 6: why that's that's like, you know, the way that you

2454
02:18:14,640 --> 02:18:18,320
Speaker 6: can do this is if either like Iran, the US,

2455
02:18:18,600 --> 02:18:22,160
Speaker 6: I guess technically China and or and or Russia like

2456
02:18:22,240 --> 02:18:23,800
Speaker 6: hand you them. But if but if none of those

2457
02:18:24,160 --> 02:18:26,320
Speaker 6: four countries are willing to play ball or I mean,

2458
02:18:26,320 --> 02:18:29,840
Speaker 6: I guess ithically the UK, yes, or like France could

2459
02:18:29,840 --> 02:18:32,600
Speaker 6: send you one. But but like it's it's it's really

2460
02:18:32,720 --> 02:18:34,160
Speaker 6: really like.

2461
02:18:34,120 --> 02:18:34,959
Speaker 1: I don't, I don't.

2462
02:18:35,000 --> 02:18:38,240
Speaker 6: I don't think any non state actor who wasn't being

2463
02:18:38,280 --> 02:18:40,600
Speaker 6: just directly armed by one of those states has pulled

2464
02:18:40,600 --> 02:18:42,160
Speaker 6: it off. No.

2465
02:18:42,920 --> 02:18:46,960
Speaker 8: The other non state actor who I've seen with man

2466
02:18:47,000 --> 02:18:51,120
Speaker 8: pads very recently are the Koren, the current National Liberal

2467
02:18:51,200 --> 02:18:53,440
Speaker 8: k in l A. The k and LA have been

2468
02:18:53,440 --> 02:18:56,800
Speaker 8: putting out these pictures. This is this in memr Yes,

2469
02:18:56,840 --> 02:18:58,959
Speaker 8: this is in Mema. So for folks who haven't listened

2470
02:18:58,959 --> 02:19:01,640
Speaker 8: to our previous memp so to go and listen to them.

2471
02:19:01,760 --> 02:19:03,920
Speaker 8: But yeah, there's some of the work I'm proud of.

2472
02:19:04,320 --> 02:19:07,880
Speaker 8: But these k and LA guys have these photos, have

2473
02:19:07,959 --> 02:19:10,440
Speaker 8: come out that then they're not not post photos, right,

2474
02:19:10,879 --> 02:19:13,960
Speaker 8: they'lvery clearly they wanted these photos to come out, and

2475
02:19:14,120 --> 02:19:17,800
Speaker 8: it shows them with these manpad system. I'm actually not

2476
02:19:17,840 --> 02:19:21,000
Speaker 8: sure if it's a Streller or a Chinese. I think

2477
02:19:21,000 --> 02:19:23,760
Speaker 8: it's called the eight N five the Chinese. It's essentially

2478
02:19:23,760 --> 02:19:27,600
Speaker 8: the same thing, but they have the grip stock for them,

2479
02:19:27,600 --> 02:19:29,320
Speaker 8: but they don't have the coolant ball and the battery

2480
02:19:29,360 --> 02:19:32,080
Speaker 8: at the front, So like that they're what they have

2481
02:19:32,240 --> 02:19:35,800
Speaker 8: is a fancy looking doesn't appear to my eyes to

2482
02:19:35,920 --> 02:19:40,039
Speaker 8: be like fully functional, like in terms of tracking and

2483
02:19:40,040 --> 02:19:45,320
Speaker 8: shooting down an aeroplane, although I have seen footage from

2484
02:19:45,360 --> 02:19:53,560
Speaker 8: friends of Hunter aircraft deploying like flares over a current

2485
02:19:53,640 --> 02:19:58,360
Speaker 8: state and then like turning around and leaving. So perhaps

2486
02:19:58,360 --> 02:20:01,440
Speaker 8: there's something I'm missing here. Like it's entirely possible that

2487
02:20:01,600 --> 02:20:03,520
Speaker 8: when they decided for these photos come out, they they

2488
02:20:03,680 --> 02:20:06,320
Speaker 8: they're in a certain fashion. And like those guys have

2489
02:20:06,440 --> 02:20:09,199
Speaker 8: engineered and tire arms industry of their own using Reddit

2490
02:20:09,240 --> 02:20:13,320
Speaker 8: and Ali Express, Like I, if anybody can make something work,

2491
02:20:13,360 --> 02:20:16,120
Speaker 8: they can make something work. I have great faith in

2492
02:20:16,160 --> 02:20:18,800
Speaker 8: their ingenuity and as I said, like it it's people

2493
02:20:18,800 --> 02:20:21,520
Speaker 8: in Syria have previously made systems like this work.

2494
02:20:21,600 --> 02:20:21,920
Speaker 6: They're not.

2495
02:20:22,280 --> 02:20:24,600
Speaker 8: They don't have that lockout, so it's quite possible that

2496
02:20:24,640 --> 02:20:29,160
Speaker 8: they did. But I've not seen a video of anyone

2497
02:20:29,360 --> 02:20:34,960
Speaker 8: in Mianmar shooting down and any kind of aircraft yet, right,

2498
02:20:35,000 --> 02:20:39,920
Speaker 8: the Russian aircraft they have shot down aircraft Allegedly someone

2499
02:20:39,959 --> 02:20:43,720
Speaker 8: shot one down with with a like a grenade launcher,

2500
02:20:43,720 --> 02:20:44,800
Speaker 8: a single shot grenade.

2501
02:20:44,560 --> 02:20:46,680
Speaker 6: Launcher SOLI video.

2502
02:20:46,920 --> 02:20:49,199
Speaker 8: Yeah, it's one of the most chadly things that anyone's

2503
02:20:49,240 --> 02:20:52,680
Speaker 8: ever done. It's it's some like modern warfare or whatever

2504
02:20:52,720 --> 02:20:58,039
Speaker 8: whatever the computer game is called Battlefield, that's what it's called. Yeah,

2505
02:20:58,120 --> 02:21:02,360
Speaker 8: talking of talking of for Chadley and exciting stuff, then

2506
02:21:02,480 --> 02:21:04,080
Speaker 8: this might be an advert for like being a prison

2507
02:21:04,080 --> 02:21:08,040
Speaker 8: guard or something exciting that we have to introduce. Now, okay,

2508
02:21:08,080 --> 02:21:21,120
Speaker 8: don't be a prison guard. All right, and we're back.

2509
02:21:21,400 --> 02:21:23,840
Speaker 8: I hope you found again from employment elsewhere outside of

2510
02:21:23,879 --> 02:21:27,680
Speaker 8: the cast real system. And we're talking about service to

2511
02:21:27,720 --> 02:21:31,720
Speaker 8: our missiles, particularly these thirteen serpace to our missile of

2512
02:21:31,879 --> 02:21:36,680
Speaker 8: thirteen drones that the casey K have shut down. Right.

2513
02:21:36,879 --> 02:21:39,000
Speaker 8: One thing I thought that was noticeable is that they

2514
02:21:39,000 --> 02:21:42,320
Speaker 8: did say missiles they are people were able to pride

2515
02:21:42,360 --> 02:21:46,680
Speaker 8: the missile system necessary. That so, like there's a theory

2516
02:21:46,760 --> 02:21:51,360
Speaker 8: that I've seen that they were able to crash a

2517
02:21:51,440 --> 02:21:55,440
Speaker 8: drone of their own into a bairactar like a kind

2518
02:21:55,440 --> 02:21:58,320
Speaker 8: of like I guess like a suicide. I don't like

2519
02:21:58,320 --> 02:22:00,520
Speaker 8: the word suicide drone because it's not the drone that's dying,

2520
02:22:00,600 --> 02:22:02,480
Speaker 8: like normally when people talk about suicide drones, So theyre

2521
02:22:02,560 --> 02:22:09,920
Speaker 8: killing people, Yeah, but like a ramming drone. Yeah yeah, yeah,

2522
02:22:10,000 --> 02:22:14,560
Speaker 8: like a like a it's like robot Wars. But they

2523
02:22:14,760 --> 02:22:16,760
Speaker 8: said missile on their press. Really, so you know, if

2524
02:22:16,760 --> 02:22:19,000
Speaker 8: we take that on the if we take that on

2525
02:22:19,040 --> 02:22:21,920
Speaker 8: the face of it, that that suggests that they shut

2526
02:22:21,959 --> 02:22:25,440
Speaker 8: them down. Certainly there this like there is good video

2527
02:22:25,480 --> 02:22:28,400
Speaker 8: evidence of the mirror and I just reviewed the video.

2528
02:22:29,240 --> 02:22:32,920
Speaker 8: Incredible soundtrack. We'll link to it in the We'll link

2529
02:22:32,959 --> 02:22:36,800
Speaker 8: to it in the show notes. In the videos, you

2530
02:22:36,920 --> 02:22:39,120
Speaker 8: very clearly see, oh it's a drone. Oh it's a

2531
02:22:39,200 --> 02:22:43,000
Speaker 8: huge explosion that gravity is now having its effect on

2532
02:22:43,000 --> 02:22:45,360
Speaker 8: this drone, like it is plummeting to earth.

2533
02:22:45,440 --> 02:22:49,800
Speaker 6: Yeah, Like it's it's definitely not a like we've fired

2534
02:22:49,840 --> 02:22:52,119
Speaker 6: a machine gun in the air and it hit it

2535
02:22:52,240 --> 02:22:56,640
Speaker 6: somehow or something like it's right. It got it quite explosive. Yeah, yeah,

2536
02:22:57,280 --> 02:22:59,440
Speaker 6: that's remarkable. Yeah.

2537
02:22:59,560 --> 02:23:01,440
Speaker 8: One of the Yeah, there was a shooting down of

2538
02:23:01,480 --> 02:23:03,760
Speaker 8: an aircraft in the Amba. It wasn't one of them megs.

2539
02:23:03,760 --> 02:23:05,280
Speaker 8: I forgot it might have been. It was a two

2540
02:23:05,280 --> 02:23:07,440
Speaker 8: seater training plan. I can't remember quite what it was,

2541
02:23:07,480 --> 02:23:09,920
Speaker 8: but that was shot down supposedly by small arms fire

2542
02:23:10,400 --> 02:23:13,720
Speaker 8: or maybe like a Generally, the like the air defense

2543
02:23:13,760 --> 02:23:16,520
Speaker 8: of most non state armed groups has been dushcuts, right,

2544
02:23:16,600 --> 02:23:18,960
Speaker 8: like a it's a thing that you've seen in the

2545
02:23:19,000 --> 02:23:23,039
Speaker 8: back of a pickup truck going like bang bang with

2546
02:23:23,080 --> 02:23:27,160
Speaker 8: a big sort of spade grip. It's a classic technical gun.

2547
02:23:28,120 --> 02:23:30,680
Speaker 8: But this isn't that, Like, this is something very different.

2548
02:23:30,680 --> 02:23:33,320
Speaker 8: Something they're they're exploding when these drones get hit there

2549
02:23:33,360 --> 02:23:37,600
Speaker 8: exploding and they've all been in I think, oh yeah.

2550
02:23:37,600 --> 02:23:42,000
Speaker 8: All of them are in areas of the what we

2551
02:23:42,120 --> 02:23:43,840
Speaker 8: call the Curtis Donal Autonomous Reach in a bit of

2552
02:23:43,920 --> 02:23:47,680
Speaker 8: rock right, So some of them are in zap which

2553
02:23:47,720 --> 02:23:51,360
Speaker 8: is near to howk but towards north of there.

2554
02:23:52,000 --> 02:23:54,120
Speaker 6: Some of them in the.

2555
02:23:53,440 --> 02:23:57,040
Speaker 8: Kandel Mountains, which is part of the Zagross Mountain Range.

2556
02:23:57,160 --> 02:24:00,360
Speaker 8: Again it's it's in the north of that Curtis Done

2557
02:24:00,959 --> 02:24:04,360
Speaker 8: Autonomous Region, and I think some of them are in it.

2558
02:24:04,480 --> 02:24:07,320
Speaker 8: I think it's Gadat it's pronounced, but they're not in

2559
02:24:07,480 --> 02:24:09,840
Speaker 8: like I think obviously when a lot of people think

2560
02:24:09,840 --> 02:24:12,879
Speaker 8: about the Kurtis Down freedom movement and think about Rajava,

2561
02:24:13,600 --> 02:24:16,920
Speaker 8: this isn't there. The US did shoot down a bay

2562
02:24:17,000 --> 02:24:20,960
Speaker 8: Raktar or an a Kinchi over Rajava while I was there,

2563
02:24:21,600 --> 02:24:23,240
Speaker 8: but they only shot it down because it flew over

2564
02:24:23,240 --> 02:24:26,360
Speaker 8: their base. They continued to let the bay Raktars bomb

2565
02:24:26,760 --> 02:24:30,080
Speaker 8: civilian infrastructure all over the A and E S.

2566
02:24:30,360 --> 02:24:33,120
Speaker 6: So these these are not there.

2567
02:24:33,160 --> 02:24:36,480
Speaker 8: These are so perhaps whatever they're using very interesting, right,

2568
02:24:36,520 --> 02:24:38,880
Speaker 8: Like it's maybe it's not something they can take there,

2569
02:24:39,760 --> 02:24:42,800
Speaker 8: or maybe it's not you know, like it's not they're

2570
02:24:42,800 --> 02:24:44,520
Speaker 8: not able to get it out of the mountains.

2571
02:24:44,520 --> 02:24:47,760
Speaker 6: It's too much of a risk. No, it's it's interesting,

2572
02:24:49,200 --> 02:24:51,800
Speaker 6: I mean for a number of reasons. Well, yeah, partially

2573
02:24:51,840 --> 02:24:53,800
Speaker 6: that they're not using it in serior. Partially they're also they

2574
02:24:53,800 --> 02:24:56,360
Speaker 6: don't seem to be using them in Turkey either.

2575
02:24:57,160 --> 02:25:02,760
Speaker 8: No, it's interesting when take off, it's not that like subtle, right,

2576
02:25:02,800 --> 02:25:04,880
Speaker 8: it's a big aircraft, so they'll get some warning when

2577
02:25:04,920 --> 02:25:06,640
Speaker 8: they take off and that would allow them, I guess,

2578
02:25:06,720 --> 02:25:08,800
Speaker 8: to prepare their munitions. But yeah, they don't seem to

2579
02:25:08,840 --> 02:25:11,600
Speaker 8: be using it. They seem to be using it in

2580
02:25:11,920 --> 02:25:15,840
Speaker 8: like this this area. Whether they're very strong, right, whether

2581
02:25:15,879 --> 02:25:21,240
Speaker 8: these mountains are extremely fortified. They've been fighting Turkey. There

2582
02:25:21,240 --> 02:25:23,640
Speaker 8: are a lot in recent days and weeks. You can

2583
02:25:23,640 --> 02:25:26,760
Speaker 8: always I mean, obviously you're going to see some somewhat

2584
02:25:26,800 --> 02:25:30,039
Speaker 8: traumatic combat footage, but Garrilla TV always has like updates

2585
02:25:30,040 --> 02:25:32,240
Speaker 8: on these things, so that's the sort of thing that

2586
02:25:32,320 --> 02:25:34,640
Speaker 8: you you know, like to keep up to date with.

2587
02:25:34,760 --> 02:25:37,840
Speaker 8: But yeah, they're not using them there, They're not using them.

2588
02:25:37,879 --> 02:25:41,760
Speaker 8: They're they're very close to Turkey, right, but yeah, not

2589
02:25:41,760 --> 02:25:45,439
Speaker 8: not quite in and Turkey soldiers do occupy some areas

2590
02:25:45,520 --> 02:25:51,080
Speaker 8: inside the Iraqi curtash Down Autonomous Region, so like they

2591
02:25:51,920 --> 02:25:54,720
Speaker 8: it's kind of all and Turkey seems to be kind

2592
02:25:54,760 --> 02:25:58,120
Speaker 8: of trying to ramp up its operations against the Coast

2593
02:25:58,160 --> 02:26:01,360
Speaker 8: Down Freedom movement inside the st An Autonomous Region, but

2594
02:26:01,920 --> 02:26:04,080
Speaker 8: this is a significant impediment to that.

2595
02:26:04,160 --> 02:26:04,240
Speaker 4: Right.

2596
02:26:04,320 --> 02:26:07,440
Speaker 8: It's also very interesting that like we have not heard

2597
02:26:07,440 --> 02:26:09,640
Speaker 8: shit about this from Turkey.

2598
02:26:09,840 --> 02:26:13,120
Speaker 6: No, Yeah, well, and I think I think part of

2599
02:26:13,160 --> 02:26:15,480
Speaker 6: this is, you know, like I think It's something that

2600
02:26:15,480 --> 02:26:18,320
Speaker 6: as an indication of how serious this is, because I mean,

2601
02:26:18,560 --> 02:26:20,560
Speaker 6: this has been you know, the law of the twenty

2602
02:26:20,600 --> 02:26:23,520
Speaker 6: first century is that if you're a state actor, you

2603
02:26:23,600 --> 02:26:27,000
Speaker 6: have unlimited air superiority over any non state group you're bombing,

2604
02:26:27,120 --> 02:26:29,360
Speaker 6: and you can, you know, especially like especially if you're

2605
02:26:29,400 --> 02:26:32,720
Speaker 6: like the US, you can send bombers or drones into

2606
02:26:32,840 --> 02:26:35,600
Speaker 6: like any country you want and you can bomb them. Yeah,

2607
02:26:35,720 --> 02:26:38,560
Speaker 6: And that has been true. And this, this has been

2608
02:26:38,600 --> 02:26:41,400
Speaker 6: the basis of US military power. It's also been the

2609
02:26:41,480 --> 02:26:43,680
Speaker 6: basis of a lot of like, you know, the Turkey

2610
02:26:43,680 --> 02:26:45,800
Speaker 6: obviously doesn't have the same air doctrine as the US does,

2611
02:26:45,840 --> 02:26:47,680
Speaker 6: but like that's been the basis of a lot of

2612
02:26:48,080 --> 02:26:51,600
Speaker 6: Turkish operations that they like, they're the people who have airpower.

2613
02:26:51,600 --> 02:26:54,600
Speaker 6: And because they have airpower, because they have drones, because

2614
02:26:54,600 --> 02:26:56,160
Speaker 6: you can't shoot back at them, they can do whatever

2615
02:26:56,160 --> 02:26:57,280
Speaker 6: the fuck they want.

2616
02:26:57,959 --> 02:27:02,440
Speaker 8: Yeah, Like I've been in the situation where you are

2617
02:27:02,480 --> 02:27:07,640
Speaker 8: completely powerless and very afraid because at some point something

2618
02:27:07,680 --> 02:27:09,080
Speaker 8: could fall out the nights gy and kill you and

2619
02:27:09,080 --> 02:27:11,760
Speaker 8: there's fuck all you can do about it. And yeah,

2620
02:27:11,800 --> 02:27:16,920
Speaker 8: that has been the way of the world, like you say,

2621
02:27:17,080 --> 02:27:20,680
Speaker 8: for this entire century. Right, it's what we've seen only Meanmar,

2622
02:27:21,400 --> 02:27:24,280
Speaker 8: the pro democracy forces againing ground every day. They're doing

2623
02:27:24,280 --> 02:27:27,760
Speaker 8: an incredible job. But like, I've also talked to people

2624
02:27:27,800 --> 02:27:29,840
Speaker 8: whose whole unit has been wiped out and they've hidden

2625
02:27:29,879 --> 02:27:31,959
Speaker 8: under the dead bodies of their friends because there's a

2626
02:27:31,959 --> 02:27:36,080
Speaker 8: plane or a helicopter circling around and it's the one

2627
02:27:36,120 --> 02:27:40,120
Speaker 8: area where they've really struggled to defend themselves. Right, It's

2628
02:27:40,600 --> 02:27:44,240
Speaker 8: I'm writing a book about anarchist at war. Eventually I

2629
02:27:44,240 --> 02:27:47,520
Speaker 8: will publish that book. But this is the thing that

2630
02:27:47,680 --> 02:27:51,520
Speaker 8: defines then, like the state. Even when the state like

2631
02:27:51,600 --> 02:27:55,480
Speaker 8: loses its monopoly on legitimate violence, it still has monopoly

2632
02:27:55,520 --> 02:28:01,080
Speaker 8: on airborne violence. And the question that monopoly, like it

2633
02:28:02,600 --> 02:28:07,800
Speaker 8: is incredibly dangerous for the state's ability to for the state,

2634
02:28:07,879 --> 02:28:10,280
Speaker 8: I guess in general, like for it for its continued

2635
02:28:10,280 --> 02:28:15,680
Speaker 8: ability to crush movements, be they liberatory or be they otherwise.

2636
02:28:15,800 --> 02:28:18,680
Speaker 6: Right, and we can Yeah, I mean, this is something

2637
02:28:18,959 --> 02:28:21,600
Speaker 6: I think is really interesting. Is this is something that's

2638
02:28:21,640 --> 02:28:26,080
Speaker 6: been a fear of I mean everyone from like Western

2639
02:28:26,120 --> 02:28:29,240
Speaker 6: intelligence people through like I mean you can see people

2640
02:28:29,280 --> 02:28:32,640
Speaker 6: in like Hollywood freaking out about this, Like like rebel

2641
02:28:32,640 --> 02:28:34,920
Speaker 6: group gets access to a manpad is like one of

2642
02:28:34,920 --> 02:28:39,440
Speaker 6: the most common like spy show plots. Yeah, and yeah,

2643
02:28:39,440 --> 02:28:41,240
Speaker 6: it's like it's something that you know, you can you

2644
02:28:41,240 --> 02:28:44,040
Speaker 6: can listen to, like the US military talking about this

2645
02:28:43,879 --> 02:28:47,760
Speaker 6: is this is something that they're really concerned about.

2646
02:28:48,320 --> 02:28:51,760
Speaker 8: Yeah, they won't like it's their where. It's where they

2647
02:28:51,840 --> 02:28:55,560
Speaker 8: draw the line with the groups who are quote unquote allies, right,

2648
02:28:55,640 --> 02:28:57,520
Speaker 8: who'll be quote like the US will tell you that

2649
02:28:57,560 --> 02:28:59,720
Speaker 8: the SDF for their allies in the fight against ISIS,

2650
02:28:59,720 --> 02:29:02,440
Speaker 8: but they're willing to let their allies die rather than

2651
02:29:02,440 --> 02:29:03,439
Speaker 8: give them manpads.

2652
02:29:03,560 --> 02:29:04,600
Speaker 6: Right, Like I've seen this.

2653
02:29:05,240 --> 02:29:08,440
Speaker 8: I have. I've seen the funerals, you know, because the

2654
02:29:08,560 --> 02:29:10,640
Speaker 8: and the US. But I've also driven right past the

2655
02:29:10,640 --> 02:29:13,080
Speaker 8: fucking US base and I know that there are plenty

2656
02:29:13,120 --> 02:29:15,879
Speaker 8: of plenty of plenty of anti aircraft systems there because

2657
02:29:15,879 --> 02:29:18,120
Speaker 8: they shot down a Turkish drone while I was there.

2658
02:29:18,120 --> 02:29:19,920
Speaker 8: But they're not willing to give them to even the

2659
02:29:19,920 --> 02:29:22,840
Speaker 8: people who they'll fight side by side with because their

2660
02:29:22,920 --> 02:29:26,840
Speaker 8: fear of having manpads get into what they would maybe

2661
02:29:26,879 --> 02:29:31,640
Speaker 8: term the wrong hands is is. Yeah, it's like the

2662
02:29:31,640 --> 02:29:36,440
Speaker 8: the one area where they have I guess complete domination, right,

2663
02:29:36,440 --> 02:29:40,200
Speaker 8: They've given them to Ukraine, of course, but despite like

2664
02:29:40,280 --> 02:29:43,320
Speaker 8: repeated allegations, there is no evidence that Ukraine has sold

2665
02:29:43,360 --> 02:29:47,280
Speaker 8: surface to wear systems anywhere, and they obviously won't give

2666
02:29:47,280 --> 02:29:51,360
Speaker 8: them to me Anmar, right, So it's yeah, it if

2667
02:29:51,360 --> 02:29:53,400
Speaker 8: this is what it appears to be, then it's a

2668
02:29:53,440 --> 02:29:57,400
Speaker 8: really massive change. Talking of a massive change, you could

2669
02:29:58,120 --> 02:30:00,000
Speaker 8: you know, you can make a massive change to your

2670
02:30:00,040 --> 02:30:08,960
Speaker 8: financial situation by purchasing gold.

2671
02:30:14,120 --> 02:30:18,000
Speaker 6: We're back. Yeah. I think something that's really interesting about

2672
02:30:18,000 --> 02:30:21,040
Speaker 6: the way that the sort of manpad getting to nonstate

2673
02:30:21,120 --> 02:30:24,920
Speaker 6: actors has talked about is that usually the way that

2674
02:30:25,040 --> 02:30:28,920
Speaker 6: it's like usually the US line on it is like

2675
02:30:28,959 --> 02:30:30,760
Speaker 6: we can't like we can't let anyone get these yaus,

2676
02:30:30,800 --> 02:30:33,560
Speaker 6: They're gonna use it to shoot down civilian airliners. Yes, yeah,

2677
02:30:34,160 --> 02:30:37,680
Speaker 6: And now, to be fair, people do accidentally shoot down

2678
02:30:37,879 --> 02:30:41,600
Speaker 6: like militaries accidentally shoot down civilian airliners all the time. Yeah,

2679
02:30:41,760 --> 02:30:44,520
Speaker 6: that's a very common thing. But I think I think

2680
02:30:44,560 --> 02:30:47,720
Speaker 6: that's that's a smoke screed, right because like even like

2681
02:30:48,040 --> 02:30:50,760
Speaker 6: the actual thing that if you're if you're a militant group,

2682
02:30:51,040 --> 02:30:53,240
Speaker 6: usually the thing that you want to be doing if

2683
02:30:53,240 --> 02:30:55,520
Speaker 6: you have one of these weapons is shooting down the

2684
02:30:55,560 --> 02:30:57,920
Speaker 6: things that people who are bombing you. Yeah, And I

2685
02:30:57,959 --> 02:31:01,000
Speaker 6: think there's a really interesting sort of like psychological thing

2686
02:31:01,040 --> 02:31:02,360
Speaker 6: going on here with this. Is this is the sort

2687
02:31:02,360 --> 02:31:04,720
Speaker 6: of propaganda thing that that you know, to get to get,

2688
02:31:04,760 --> 02:31:08,320
Speaker 6: like you random person to be terrified of, like you know,

2689
02:31:08,879 --> 02:31:12,920
Speaker 6: the Kurds having surfaced air missiles. Is they used like

2690
02:31:13,240 --> 02:31:15,120
Speaker 6: they use people's like fear of getting born up on

2691
02:31:15,120 --> 02:31:18,560
Speaker 6: an airplane. It's like no, no, like click it, like

2692
02:31:18,680 --> 02:31:21,760
Speaker 6: you know, evidence suggests that what is actually what actually

2693
02:31:21,760 --> 02:31:23,680
Speaker 6: happens that is that they shoot down drones.

2694
02:31:24,160 --> 02:31:26,920
Speaker 8: Yeah, yes, exactly right, and not like the other thing,

2695
02:31:26,959 --> 02:31:29,560
Speaker 8: which is somewhat remarkable. It's it would be one thing

2696
02:31:29,640 --> 02:31:31,800
Speaker 8: to have got your hands on one or two, but

2697
02:31:31,879 --> 02:31:34,600
Speaker 8: to have been to have shut down in a one year,

2698
02:31:34,840 --> 02:31:37,680
Speaker 8: well just over one year, from February thirteenth, twenty twenty

2699
02:31:37,720 --> 02:31:41,280
Speaker 8: three until Mike's the first twenty twenty four, they have

2700
02:31:41,320 --> 02:31:45,480
Speaker 8: shot down fifteen UAVs like that. That's a that's a

2701
02:31:45,520 --> 02:31:49,120
Speaker 8: decent number of manpads or maybe not man pads. That's

2702
02:31:49,160 --> 02:31:51,120
Speaker 8: the other thing we kind of didn't mention, right, like

2703
02:31:52,240 --> 02:31:54,800
Speaker 8: big reptas can fly very high. We were just sort

2704
02:31:54,800 --> 02:31:56,240
Speaker 8: of checking this out before the show, and I think

2705
02:31:56,280 --> 02:32:00,000
Speaker 8: they can fly around seven thousand meters, which within theory

2706
02:32:00,000 --> 02:32:04,720
Speaker 8: about twenty five thousand feet, Yeah, which is about twice

2707
02:32:04,840 --> 02:32:09,480
Speaker 8: the like the the height previous generation manpads like things

2708
02:32:09,480 --> 02:32:12,640
Speaker 8: like stingers and iglers can can operate at I'm not

2709
02:32:12,640 --> 02:32:16,359
Speaker 8: sure of the the what the for for an igler

2710
02:32:17,720 --> 02:32:20,760
Speaker 8: reach targets and mactum altitude of twenty five hundred meters,

2711
02:32:20,879 --> 02:32:23,840
Speaker 8: So yeah, that's a little under as high as these

2712
02:32:24,160 --> 02:32:27,000
Speaker 8: as these like attack drones can fly. Maybe they have

2713
02:32:27,040 --> 02:32:29,280
Speaker 8: to come lower to like launch their munitions, or maybe

2714
02:32:29,280 --> 02:32:34,240
Speaker 8: they come lower to to search for people and presumably

2715
02:32:34,440 --> 02:32:38,640
Speaker 8: looking for The Kurdistan Freedom Movement has gorillas all over

2716
02:32:38,640 --> 02:32:42,160
Speaker 8: these mountains right here, extremely well camouflaged and extremely adept

2717
02:32:42,240 --> 02:32:45,480
Speaker 8: at avoiding drone attacks because that is what they have

2718
02:32:45,600 --> 02:32:48,880
Speaker 8: been doing for for a long time. So maybe that's how.

2719
02:32:49,160 --> 02:32:52,640
Speaker 8: But also maybe maybe there's something that we're not aware

2720
02:32:52,720 --> 02:32:54,800
Speaker 8: of or some kind of Maybe it's not a man

2721
02:32:54,840 --> 02:32:57,560
Speaker 8: portable system at all. Maybe it's something that is like

2722
02:32:57,640 --> 02:32:59,760
Speaker 8: fixed in place well in that in that.

2723
02:33:00,080 --> 02:33:01,440
Speaker 6: So, I think one of the one of the really

2724
02:33:01,520 --> 02:33:04,280
Speaker 6: interesting questions to you, which is how on earth did

2725
02:33:04,320 --> 02:33:08,640
Speaker 6: they get these? Yeah, like whatever system you're using, you know,

2726
02:33:08,760 --> 02:33:13,240
Speaker 6: normally like the only way, like you know, like hesblah

2727
02:33:13,480 --> 02:33:15,720
Speaker 6: or the Hoho thies get them from Iran, right, but

2728
02:33:15,760 --> 02:33:18,440
Speaker 6: the Ridians are absolutely under no circumstances are they going

2729
02:33:18,440 --> 02:33:22,199
Speaker 6: to I mean maybe if Turkey declared war on Iran,

2730
02:33:22,520 --> 02:33:26,120
Speaker 6: there's like a five percent chance maybe in like their

2731
02:33:26,200 --> 02:33:28,440
Speaker 6: darkest hour, they might try this, Like there's no way.

2732
02:33:28,720 --> 02:33:31,840
Speaker 8: Yeah, like Iraq and Iran have repeatedly attempted to mobilize

2733
02:33:31,840 --> 02:33:34,800
Speaker 8: the Kurds against each other, right, but yeah, I think

2734
02:33:34,879 --> 02:33:37,800
Speaker 8: that they would draw the line at handing over manpads

2735
02:33:37,800 --> 02:33:42,200
Speaker 8: and yeah, and they're definitely not getting them from the US. No,

2736
02:33:42,320 --> 02:33:44,320
Speaker 8: then they're using them in areas where they're with the

2737
02:33:44,400 --> 02:33:49,000
Speaker 8: US and the US like.

2738
02:33:48,200 --> 02:33:49,960
Speaker 6: Like you know, it's it's it's definitely not I don't

2739
02:33:49,959 --> 02:33:52,560
Speaker 6: think it's any other Western country either, Like it doesn't

2740
02:33:52,560 --> 02:33:56,080
Speaker 6: make any sense, Like I mean maybe like based Sweden's

2741
02:33:56,120 --> 02:34:00,040
Speaker 6: smothering pads in or something, but I really doubt it,

2742
02:34:00,120 --> 02:34:03,480
Speaker 6: which leaves it really like up in the air. I mean,

2743
02:34:03,520 --> 02:34:08,800
Speaker 6: like maybe Russia maybe somehow, I don't know. It's it's

2744
02:34:09,040 --> 02:34:11,400
Speaker 6: it's all very weird.

2745
02:34:12,000 --> 02:34:14,840
Speaker 8: Yeah, And I mean like in recent months, the A

2746
02:34:14,920 --> 02:34:17,000
Speaker 8: Side regime, which is backed by Russia has been an

2747
02:34:17,000 --> 02:34:21,360
Speaker 8: open conflict with the SDF, So I think it's it's

2748
02:34:21,520 --> 02:34:26,360
Speaker 8: very unlikely, like the side regime has been fighting with

2749
02:34:26,560 --> 02:34:30,119
Speaker 8: and killing it and dying with Yepaga and in Syria,

2750
02:34:30,640 --> 02:34:34,320
Speaker 8: so it seems very unlikely. Yeah, it's very That's what's

2751
02:34:34,440 --> 02:34:37,600
Speaker 8: very strange, Like the there seems to be a couple

2752
02:34:37,600 --> 02:34:39,800
Speaker 8: of different groups of people, right, like the Kuren have

2753
02:34:39,920 --> 02:34:44,480
Speaker 8: popped up with these previous generations Igla.

2754
02:34:44,400 --> 02:34:45,640
Speaker 6: Kind of manpads.

2755
02:34:45,879 --> 02:34:48,680
Speaker 8: The Kitchen have shot down a lot of planes recently,

2756
02:34:48,959 --> 02:34:51,360
Speaker 8: and it's not entirely clear how so the Kitchen or

2757
02:34:51,400 --> 02:34:55,119
Speaker 8: another ethnic group in Miandmyre somewhat closer ties to the PRC.

2758
02:34:55,720 --> 02:34:59,480
Speaker 8: The United ware State Army have man pads. They are

2759
02:34:59,280 --> 02:35:02,800
Speaker 8: the sort of closest tied to the PRC of the

2760
02:35:02,800 --> 02:35:06,280
Speaker 8: e Rros in Myanma. I'm using a lot of acronyms here.

2761
02:35:07,480 --> 02:35:09,280
Speaker 6: Yeah, this is just the problem we're talking about, Curtis

2762
02:35:09,320 --> 02:35:13,560
Speaker 6: Group's not I'm talking about, yes, ye, like the two

2763
02:35:13,680 --> 02:35:15,960
Speaker 6: great acronym like wars.

2764
02:35:16,160 --> 02:35:20,160
Speaker 8: Don't be overlooking the Spanish Civil War, the alphabet super conflicts. Yeah,

2765
02:35:20,160 --> 02:35:22,039
Speaker 8: this is this is a life I've chosen for myself.

2766
02:35:22,280 --> 02:35:26,920
Speaker 8: So yeah, the ethnic revolutionary organizations in Myanma the closest

2767
02:35:26,959 --> 02:35:31,600
Speaker 8: to China, it's the United War State Army who have

2768
02:35:31,720 --> 02:35:34,320
Speaker 8: been at the fringes of the conflict, but it's certainly

2769
02:35:34,360 --> 02:35:36,520
Speaker 8: not fully committed to fighting against the Hunter in the

2770
02:35:36,560 --> 02:35:40,440
Speaker 8: same way that the Karen, the Kachin, the Arakan Army,

2771
02:35:40,640 --> 02:35:44,640
Speaker 8: the PDF for the other groups that form the resistance

2772
02:35:44,640 --> 02:35:48,800
Speaker 8: in Burma or me m R. But there have definitely

2773
02:35:48,800 --> 02:35:52,760
Speaker 8: been more planes shut down in Themma this year than

2774
02:35:52,840 --> 02:35:55,640
Speaker 8: in the in the in the the last few years,

2775
02:35:55,640 --> 02:35:59,000
Speaker 8: so there's perhaps there's some kind of source in the

2776
02:35:59,040 --> 02:36:03,720
Speaker 8: world for these service to miss. There will come a

2777
02:36:03,800 --> 02:36:07,560
Speaker 8: point in the human future, right when one of these

2778
02:36:08,040 --> 02:36:11,400
Speaker 8: is either reverse engineered or someone just really, if someone

2779
02:36:11,440 --> 02:36:13,080
Speaker 8: had said to you ten years ago that, like several

2780
02:36:13,120 --> 02:36:15,400
Speaker 8: people online, some of whom I've spoken to, some of

2781
02:36:15,440 --> 02:36:17,879
Speaker 8: whom our friend j Camera had spoken to, would be

2782
02:36:18,040 --> 02:36:21,480
Speaker 8: able to construct a gun that you could print from

2783
02:36:21,560 --> 02:36:26,560
Speaker 8: your computer, Like you'd have said, you're barking, right, And

2784
02:36:26,680 --> 02:36:29,280
Speaker 8: at some point in the human future someone will work

2785
02:36:29,320 --> 02:36:31,680
Speaker 8: out how to use things they already have to make

2786
02:36:31,720 --> 02:36:36,160
Speaker 8: something that can shoot down aircraft. But yeah, it's baffling

2787
02:36:36,200 --> 02:36:38,440
Speaker 8: like that. There seems to be no obvious answer as

2788
02:36:38,480 --> 02:36:42,520
Speaker 8: to where what the source of these. The last thing

2789
02:36:42,560 --> 02:36:46,320
Speaker 8: I will say is that there was a yakuzer boss. Yeah, yeah,

2790
02:36:46,520 --> 02:36:51,720
Speaker 8: this guy legend. It's just like it like this man's

2791
02:36:51,760 --> 02:36:55,640
Speaker 8: my Man's done nothing wrong. He was convicted of selling

2792
02:36:55,840 --> 02:36:58,840
Speaker 8: trying to sell manpaed to the Karen and I think

2793
02:36:58,840 --> 02:37:02,039
Speaker 8: to the Kachin I can't remember, definitely one of them

2794
02:37:02,040 --> 02:37:05,280
Speaker 8: with the Kren, and he was trying to do so

2795
02:37:05,800 --> 02:37:07,840
Speaker 8: very funny. He was calling them cake and ice cream,

2796
02:37:08,280 --> 02:37:13,080
Speaker 8: incredibly incredibly good cipher it. It's a hell of a

2797
02:37:13,120 --> 02:37:15,879
Speaker 8: it's a banger of an indictment. Everyone should read it.

2798
02:37:16,000 --> 02:37:16,480
Speaker 6: To Keshi.

2799
02:37:16,560 --> 02:37:19,000
Speaker 8: I forget what his last name was, but he he

2800
02:37:19,080 --> 02:37:23,480
Speaker 8: was trying to sell them man pads and what he

2801
02:37:23,560 --> 02:37:25,959
Speaker 8: was actually doing was being monitored by the DEA. But

2802
02:37:26,600 --> 02:37:29,600
Speaker 8: the man pads that he thought that he had access

2803
02:37:29,640 --> 02:37:33,200
Speaker 8: to were fictional, like it was. It was the It

2804
02:37:33,240 --> 02:37:36,280
Speaker 8: was the FEDS who had conned him into thinking they

2805
02:37:36,360 --> 02:37:39,720
Speaker 8: had man pads. They did have some eighty fours. He

2806
02:37:39,800 --> 02:37:43,440
Speaker 8: met them in the Netherlands, took an incredible selfie with

2807
02:37:43,480 --> 02:37:45,959
Speaker 8: a light anti tank weapon and you can look it up.

2808
02:37:46,040 --> 02:37:48,600
Speaker 8: Leather jacket, like I think he's got Blue Aviators on

2809
02:37:49,240 --> 02:37:53,840
Speaker 8: like my man's been arrested for having incredible drip and

2810
02:37:53,879 --> 02:37:56,720
Speaker 8: it's very sad, But yeah, the man pads he thought

2811
02:37:56,720 --> 02:37:59,120
Speaker 8: he was selling were fictional. But the fact that people

2812
02:37:59,160 --> 02:38:03,400
Speaker 8: were like, yeah, this SMEs reasonable, like that people were like, okay,

2813
02:38:03,480 --> 02:38:05,320
Speaker 8: we're prepared to went to deal with you. They weren't like,

2814
02:38:05,440 --> 02:38:09,280
Speaker 8: what are you on about, suggests that maybe these things

2815
02:38:09,480 --> 02:38:13,400
Speaker 8: are entering the market. People will always say that they

2816
02:38:13,440 --> 02:38:17,640
Speaker 8: came from Afghanistan, like after the US left, But I

2817
02:38:17,640 --> 02:38:19,760
Speaker 8: don't think the Taliban would have any reason to sell them.

2818
02:38:19,760 --> 02:38:23,800
Speaker 8: They're getting bombed by Pakistan right now, Like what Yeah, yeah,

2819
02:38:23,840 --> 02:38:25,840
Speaker 8: it doesn't seem it doesn't make sense to me that

2820
02:38:26,680 --> 02:38:28,199
Speaker 8: they would sell them.

2821
02:38:28,480 --> 02:38:28,640
Speaker 15: Yeah.

2822
02:38:28,680 --> 02:38:30,800
Speaker 6: And one thing I should also mention is like every

2823
02:38:30,879 --> 02:38:33,879
Speaker 6: single time there is a war anywhere in the world,

2824
02:38:34,280 --> 02:38:36,880
Speaker 6: there are a trillion rumors that come out. They're like, oh,

2825
02:38:36,920 --> 02:38:39,680
Speaker 6: there's like this guy is selling like ex weapons or whatever,

2826
02:38:39,720 --> 02:38:42,160
Speaker 6: and it's like ninety nine percent of them are false.

2827
02:38:42,520 --> 02:38:42,760
Speaker 15: Yeah.

2828
02:38:42,840 --> 02:38:46,680
Speaker 6: Yeah, yeah, you hear this all the time and it's

2829
02:38:46,720 --> 02:38:50,320
Speaker 6: never true. Yeah, so that makes it really hard to

2830
02:38:50,360 --> 02:38:52,440
Speaker 6: sort out like where these things are coming from.

2831
02:38:52,480 --> 02:38:56,080
Speaker 8: Yeah, exactly. A friend of the podcast, Victor Boot. Is

2832
02:38:56,400 --> 02:39:01,560
Speaker 8: he's free again, He's back. Maybe maybe he's gotten back.

2833
02:39:02,240 --> 02:39:06,199
Speaker 8: Maybe the god of war is back. Baby. It would

2834
02:39:06,200 --> 02:39:08,480
Speaker 8: be incredible. There would be an incredible narrative arc for

2835
02:39:08,640 --> 02:39:13,080
Speaker 8: Victor Boot. But like as we said in that episode, right,

2836
02:39:13,160 --> 02:39:16,240
Speaker 8: like it's very easy to point to Victor Boot as

2837
02:39:16,280 --> 02:39:18,440
Speaker 8: being this evil guy, but in fact, like we've sort

2838
02:39:18,440 --> 02:39:20,000
Speaker 8: of ship tourn of weapons to people who turned out

2839
02:39:20,000 --> 02:39:23,200
Speaker 8: to be pretty pretty uncivil as the United States, a

2840
02:39:23,240 --> 02:39:25,800
Speaker 8: lot more people working you know, all the other places

2841
02:39:25,800 --> 02:39:27,640
Speaker 8: that have offices in San Diego made a lot more

2842
02:39:27,640 --> 02:39:30,640
Speaker 8: money than he did selling weapons to people. So you know,

2843
02:39:30,800 --> 02:39:33,320
Speaker 8: we ought to be you know, Popcorn and the cult

2844
02:39:33,360 --> 02:39:37,080
Speaker 8: back a bit there, but clearly something is up with

2845
02:39:37,120 --> 02:39:39,960
Speaker 8: surface to our missiles. I hope this makes your Spring

2846
02:39:40,000 --> 02:39:43,760
Speaker 8: Bake flights more exciting, just gives it a little edge

2847
02:39:43,920 --> 02:39:44,280
Speaker 8: as you.

2848
02:39:44,240 --> 02:39:46,279
Speaker 6: Take on't don't fly in Turkey.

2849
02:39:46,640 --> 02:39:51,000
Speaker 8: Yeah, yeah, that's the our tip is to to not

2850
02:39:51,080 --> 02:39:54,680
Speaker 8: fly from not land. I guess in I mean, like

2851
02:39:54,720 --> 02:39:56,560
Speaker 8: we said, the Casey King going to shoot down your

2852
02:39:56,600 --> 02:39:59,760
Speaker 8: civilian plane. That then they're nice people. I'll just say

2853
02:40:00,040 --> 02:40:01,959
Speaker 8: the K C. K and my experience have been very nice,

2854
02:40:02,040 --> 02:40:06,520
Speaker 8: very forthcoming, extremely communicative and responsive to press requests, which

2855
02:40:07,440 --> 02:40:10,200
Speaker 8: like much more so than a lot a lot of

2856
02:40:10,240 --> 02:40:13,240
Speaker 8: other state actors. And I don't think you have any

2857
02:40:13,240 --> 02:40:15,680
Speaker 8: worries about them shooting down your aircraft. But it's an

2858
02:40:15,720 --> 02:40:21,400
Speaker 8: interesting development that like, yeah, will fundamentally challenge the way

2859
02:40:21,640 --> 02:40:25,480
Speaker 8: that states are able to squash non state armed groups

2860
02:40:25,520 --> 02:40:26,400
Speaker 8: going forward.

2861
02:40:26,879 --> 02:40:30,800
Speaker 6: Yeah, and if we if we figure out where they

2862
02:40:30,840 --> 02:40:35,760
Speaker 6: got them from and that becomes public, well you'll you'll

2863
02:40:35,760 --> 02:40:38,160
Speaker 6: see the next episode called we found Out where the

2864
02:40:38,240 --> 02:40:39,160
Speaker 6: mad Pads are from?

2865
02:40:39,720 --> 02:40:43,720
Speaker 8: Yeah, yeah, I think in unlikelihood to no one's drest

2866
02:40:43,800 --> 02:40:46,400
Speaker 8: and to to like announce where these are from. And

2867
02:40:46,480 --> 02:40:49,200
Speaker 8: I don't think you know the ones in in Meanmar.

2868
02:40:49,320 --> 02:40:52,280
Speaker 8: It's not inconceivable that they came either directly or indirectly

2869
02:40:52,280 --> 02:40:55,640
Speaker 8: from China, certainly that that would be the most feasible,

2870
02:40:55,640 --> 02:40:59,920
Speaker 8: but seeing them elsewhere, it's fascinating, Like it's you know,

2871
02:41:00,040 --> 02:41:02,480
Speaker 8: if somebody has like either reverse engineered these are there's

2872
02:41:02,520 --> 02:41:04,840
Speaker 8: large now RHITHM available on the black market, that would

2873
02:41:04,879 --> 02:41:10,280
Speaker 8: be a sea change in the way conflict happens, right, like,

2874
02:41:12,000 --> 02:41:13,640
Speaker 8: you know, it's rare. Right now, it's able to bomb

2875
02:41:13,760 --> 02:41:16,960
Speaker 8: Palestine with complete impunity if non state arm groups had

2876
02:41:17,000 --> 02:41:19,920
Speaker 8: access to manpads there that maybe wouldn't be the case,

2877
02:41:20,840 --> 02:41:23,320
Speaker 8: but yeah, it's a change. It's a change in the

2878
02:41:23,320 --> 02:41:25,840
Speaker 8: way the world goes to war. I think it's always interesting.

2879
02:41:25,879 --> 02:41:30,240
Speaker 8: It's always interesting, like for a podcast that was built

2880
02:41:30,280 --> 02:41:35,240
Speaker 8: on speculative picture about future collapses like this certainly is

2881
02:41:35,280 --> 02:41:37,039
Speaker 8: something that challenges the monopoly of the state.

2882
02:41:37,200 --> 02:41:38,920
Speaker 6: So yeah, it's something to keep an eye on.

2883
02:41:39,480 --> 02:41:43,080
Speaker 8: I will attach in the notes the Guerrilla TV video

2884
02:41:43,120 --> 02:41:46,240
Speaker 8: of the Beiractars being shot down. Please enjoyed the soundtrack.

2885
02:41:46,360 --> 02:41:49,760
Speaker 8: Yeah it's banger, and will also include some links to

2886
02:41:49,800 --> 02:41:53,600
Speaker 8: those videos of the Karen National Liberation Army with their

2887
02:41:53,640 --> 02:41:56,360
Speaker 8: man pads. If you're a man pads understander, you know

2888
02:41:56,600 --> 02:41:59,240
Speaker 8: you know where to find me. It's all over the internet.

2889
02:42:00,040 --> 02:42:00,440
Speaker 6: And yep.

2890
02:42:00,480 --> 02:42:02,600
Speaker 8: With that, I will leave you. Have a great weekend,

2891
02:42:03,720 --> 02:42:04,800
Speaker 8: don't fly your sas news.

2892
02:42:08,120 --> 02:42:11,320
Speaker 2: Hey we'll be back Monday with more episodes every week

2893
02:42:11,360 --> 02:42:13,240
Speaker 2: from now until the heat death of the universe.

2894
02:42:13,840 --> 02:42:14,440
Speaker 6: It could happen.

2895
02:42:14,440 --> 02:42:16,800
Speaker 1: Here is a production of cool Zone Media. For more

2896
02:42:16,800 --> 02:42:20,440
Speaker 1: podcasts from cool Zone Media, visit our website Coolzonemedia dot com,

2897
02:42:20,520 --> 02:42:23,160
Speaker 1: or check us out on the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts,

2898
02:42:23,240 --> 02:42:26,080
Speaker 1: or wherever you listen to podcasts, you can find sources

2899
02:42:26,080 --> 02:42:29,240
Speaker 1: for It could happen here, Updated monthly at coolzonemedia dot

2900
02:42:29,280 --> 02:42:31,480
Speaker 1: com slash sources. Thanks for listening.