WEBVTT - The Big Man Can't Shoot 0:00:15.356 --> 0:00:21.876 Bushkin. The greatest game of basketball anyone has ever played 0:00:22.556 --> 0:00:26.276 was in Hershey, Pennsylvania, March second, nineteen. 0:00:25.996 --> 0:00:29.276 Sixty two, and everybody's thinking out on his work. 0:00:29.316 --> 0:00:31.356 God, I got he's got sixty nine gone at here's 0:00:31.396 --> 0:00:31.756 the past. 0:00:32.356 --> 0:00:33.396 He's got another. 0:00:34.716 --> 0:00:38.476 Cold, rainy night. Just over four thousand people in the stands. 0:00:38.996 --> 0:00:40.996 Philadelphia Warriors versus. 0:00:40.676 --> 0:00:44.556 The New York Knicks have a good shot. They're taking it, 0:00:44.596 --> 0:00:46.316 but mostly they're setting up the big man. 0:00:47.396 --> 0:00:49.916 The star of the Warriors was a man named Wilt Chamberlain. 0:00:50.196 --> 0:00:53.036 No doubt you've heard of him, seven foot one, two 0:00:53.116 --> 0:00:57.116 hundred and seventy five pounds. For sheer physical presence, there 0:00:57.156 --> 0:01:01.036 has probably never been anyone like Willed. There are lots 0:01:01.076 --> 0:01:03.836 of seven footers who play basketball who are basically on 0:01:03.876 --> 0:01:07.196 the court purely because they're seven feet tall. They're clumsy 0:01:07.236 --> 0:01:11.276 and ungainly. Chamberlain, it was not like that. He was 0:01:11.316 --> 0:01:13.396 as big as an oak tree and as graceful as 0:01:13.396 --> 0:01:17.356 a ballet dancer. That season nineteen sixty one to nineteen 0:01:17.396 --> 0:01:20.676 sixty two, he ended up averaging more than fifty points 0:01:20.716 --> 0:01:29.396 a game. That record will never be broken. So March second, 0:01:29.916 --> 0:01:32.676 Wilt was hungover. He'd been out all night with a 0:01:32.676 --> 0:01:35.956 woman he picked up at a bar. That's classic Will too. 0:01:36.316 --> 0:01:38.956 He would later claim to have slept with twenty thousand 0:01:39.076 --> 0:01:41.636 women in his life. And when he said that, lots 0:01:41.636 --> 0:01:43.276 of people did the math and said there was no 0:01:43.356 --> 0:01:45.356 way that was possible, given the fact that they were 0:01:45.356 --> 0:01:47.556 only twenty four hours in a day and will only 0:01:47.556 --> 0:01:49.956 live to the age of sixty three. But even the 0:01:49.956 --> 0:01:53.396 skeptics were like, well, maybe it's ten thousand or eight thousand. 0:01:53.676 --> 0:01:56.636 It was an argument over whether it was an unbelievably 0:01:56.716 --> 0:01:59.836 high number or merely an incredibly high number. 0:02:06.756 --> 0:02:08.836 The big Man over the Warriors and the big man 0:02:08.836 --> 0:02:10.556 in the he has ninety two points. 0:02:11.196 --> 0:02:13.676 Jaron, make sure my. 0:02:13.716 --> 0:02:17.836 Name is Malcolm Gladwell. You're listening to Revisionist History, where 0:02:17.836 --> 0:02:21.276 every week we re examine the forgotten and the misunderstood. 0:02:27.556 --> 0:02:31.436 This week's episode is about Wilt Chamberlain's most famous game. 0:02:32.596 --> 0:02:39.436 Work's got the ball, he's gone up, he shoots, So. 0:02:39.436 --> 0:02:42.996 Back to the game in question. Chamberlain makes his first 0:02:43.036 --> 0:02:45.316 five shots and has twenty three points at the end 0:02:45.356 --> 0:02:49.036 of the first quarter. At halftime, he has forty one points. 0:02:49.756 --> 0:02:52.956 No one's thinking history just yet. But then by the 0:02:53.076 --> 0:02:55.676 end of the third quarter, he has sixty nine points, 0:02:55.956 --> 0:03:00.196 and he keeps going and going and going. He shoots 0:03:00.196 --> 0:03:02.276 put it out the reason Luck and Bill. 0:03:02.476 --> 0:03:03.916 K so Rockwick in the chamber. 0:03:09.636 --> 0:03:13.636 A hundred points, the most anyone has ever scored in 0:03:13.676 --> 0:03:17.356 a professional basketball game. And here's the most incredible thing 0:03:17.396 --> 0:03:24.116 about it. He shot brilliantly from the foul liney or 0:03:24.156 --> 0:03:27.876 thirty two Ye. That's Rick Berry speaking. He was a 0:03:27.916 --> 0:03:32.276 contemporary of Chamberlain's, also a Hall of Famer, an absolutely 0:03:32.356 --> 0:03:35.636 unstoppable scorer. I met him at his condo in South 0:03:35.636 --> 0:03:37.716 Carolina where he lives part of the year, so we 0:03:37.756 --> 0:03:40.596 can follow his son, Canyon, who plays basketball for the 0:03:40.596 --> 0:03:44.796 College of Charleston. Barry is seventy two, six foot eight 0:03:44.876 --> 0:03:47.956 inches tall, barrel chest, legs that looked like he had 0:03:47.956 --> 0:03:51.196 special extensions put on them, and that thing that great 0:03:51.236 --> 0:03:53.876 athletes have and never seem to lose, which is that 0:03:53.916 --> 0:03:56.556 they kind of glide across the floor like they have 0:03:56.596 --> 0:04:00.436 wheels on. A big part of this episode is about Barry, 0:04:00.796 --> 0:04:03.476 but other people too, because although this sounds like it's 0:04:03.516 --> 0:04:06.356 going to be a show about basketball, the truth is 0:04:06.636 --> 0:04:09.516 it's not. It's a show about good Eyedea. He is 0:04:09.916 --> 0:04:13.876 and why they have such difficulties spreading. But for the moment, 0:04:14.676 --> 0:04:20.676 back to Wilt Chamberlain. Chamberlain next, He's made twenty eight 0:04:20.756 --> 0:04:23.436 out of his thirty two shots from the free throw line, 0:04:23.916 --> 0:04:27.996 eighty seven point five percent. The reason that's incredible is 0:04:28.036 --> 0:04:30.796 that when Chamberlain came into the NBA, he was a 0:04:30.876 --> 0:04:34.916 horrendous free throw shooter. Though worst. Here was a man 0:04:35.036 --> 0:04:38.916 who could excel at virtually every physical feat under the sun, 0:04:39.196 --> 0:04:42.676 who could score at will with two and sometimes three 0:04:42.716 --> 0:04:46.236 defenders draped all over his body, but put him all 0:04:46.276 --> 0:04:49.676 alone fifteen feet from the basket, and he was hopeless. 0:04:50.436 --> 0:04:53.676 He was shooting forty percent from the free throw line. 0:04:53.996 --> 0:04:59.996 That's terrible. But this season Chamberlain changes tactics. He starts 0:05:00.076 --> 0:05:03.836 to shoot his foul shots underhanded. He doesn't release the 0:05:03.876 --> 0:05:06.796 ball up by his forehead. He holds the ball between 0:05:06.836 --> 0:05:10.036 his knees and flicks it towards the basket from a 0:05:10.036 --> 0:05:13.556 slight crouch, and all of a sudden, he's a pretty 0:05:13.556 --> 0:05:16.356 good free throw shooter. He gets up to more than 0:05:16.396 --> 0:05:20.916 sixty percent, and that special night in Hershey, Pennsylvania, he's 0:05:20.916 --> 0:05:22.236 an incredible free. 0:05:21.996 --> 0:05:24.316 Throw shooter on the line. 0:05:24.396 --> 0:05:27.516 Pal shot up in the area is eighty four. He 0:05:27.596 --> 0:05:31.476 makes twenty eight free throws, the most anyone has ever 0:05:31.556 --> 0:05:35.916 made in NBA history. What Rick Barry will tell you 0:05:36.156 --> 0:05:38.876 is that shooting underhanded is simply a better way to 0:05:38.916 --> 0:05:41.996 make foul shots. And he knows that because he was 0:05:42.036 --> 0:05:44.636 one of the greatest foul shooters of all time, maybe 0:05:44.716 --> 0:05:45.356 the greatest. 0:05:45.596 --> 0:05:48.436 I missed ten in one season and nine in another 0:05:49.276 --> 0:05:50.036 and the whole season. 0:05:50.596 --> 0:05:53.636 To put that in perspective, Lebron James, the greatest player 0:05:53.676 --> 0:05:57.116 of the current basketball generation, typically misses about one hundred 0:05:57.156 --> 0:06:00.356 and fifty free throws a season. Rick Barry would miss 0:06:00.476 --> 0:06:01.076 nine or ten. 0:06:01.476 --> 0:06:03.516 I think I shot ninety three five or something in 0:06:03.596 --> 0:06:05.236 ninety four to seven, something like that. 0:06:05.316 --> 0:06:07.756 And Rick Berry only shot underhanded. 0:06:07.916 --> 0:06:11.876 From a physics standpoint, it's a much better way to shoot. 0:06:12.236 --> 0:06:14.516 Less things that can go wrong, Less things that you 0:06:14.596 --> 0:06:16.796 have to worry about repeating properly in order for it 0:06:16.836 --> 0:06:18.996 to be successful. But the other thing is is that 0:06:19.036 --> 0:06:22.796 who walks around like this hand This is not a 0:06:22.876 --> 0:06:26.036 natural position when I shoot underhanded free throws. Where are 0:06:26.076 --> 0:06:29.876 my arms hanging straight down the way they are normally? 0:06:30.836 --> 0:06:33.836 And so I'm totally completely relaxed. It's not in the 0:06:33.876 --> 0:06:35.956 situation where I have to worry about my muscles getting 0:06:35.956 --> 0:06:38.796 tense or tight. And then the shot itself, it's a 0:06:39.236 --> 0:06:42.036 softer shot. So many of my shots, even if they're 0:06:42.036 --> 0:06:43.956 a little off, they hit so nice and soft, and 0:06:43.956 --> 0:06:47.676 they'll still fall in the much softer touch, and so 0:06:47.716 --> 0:06:50.396 you have a little bit more margin for error. Some 0:06:50.436 --> 0:06:52.916 of those shots that are a little bit offline have 0:06:52.996 --> 0:06:55.476 a much better opportunity of going into the basket than 0:06:55.476 --> 0:06:56.396 when you shoot overhand. 0:06:57.036 --> 0:07:00.596 So Wilt Chamberlain switches to a better shooting technique. It 0:07:00.676 --> 0:07:04.676 pays off. In the greatest basketball game ever played. He's 0:07:04.716 --> 0:07:07.796 playing the way that Rick Berry proved basketball players ought 0:07:07.796 --> 0:07:14.996 to play. Then something incredible happens. Well, Chamberlain stops shooting underhanded, 0:07:15.516 --> 0:07:18.436 and he goes back to being a terrible foul shooter. 0:07:27.396 --> 0:07:30.236 Let's think about what he did for a moment. Chamberlain 0:07:30.316 --> 0:07:34.356 had a problem, he tested out a possible solution, the 0:07:34.396 --> 0:07:37.436 solution worked, and all of a sudden, he's fixed his 0:07:37.476 --> 0:07:41.116 biggest weakness as a player. This is not a trivial matter. 0:07:41.436 --> 0:07:44.076 If you're a basketball player and you can't hit your 0:07:44.116 --> 0:07:48.076 free throws, you're an incredible liability to your team, particularly 0:07:48.156 --> 0:07:51.076 at the end of close games. The other side simply 0:07:51.116 --> 0:07:53.596 fouls you every time you touch the ball because they 0:07:53.636 --> 0:07:55.516 know you'll miss your free throw and they'll get the 0:07:55.556 --> 0:07:58.676 ball back. If you can't hit your foul shots, it 0:07:58.756 --> 0:08:01.596 means you can't be used in a tight game. You 0:08:01.676 --> 0:08:04.916 know what Chamberlain's coach said to him, if you were 0:08:04.916 --> 0:08:09.396 a ninety percent shooter, we might never lose. You got 0:08:09.436 --> 0:08:10.156 to know him quite well. 0:08:10.196 --> 0:08:10.796 I got to know him. 0:08:10.796 --> 0:08:10.996 You don't. 0:08:11.516 --> 0:08:14.716 I just joked with him. You said your technique was terrible. 0:08:14.756 --> 0:08:16.556 I mean, but I mean had you stuck with it, 0:08:17.356 --> 0:08:18.876 I mean, there's no tell him what he would have done. 0:08:18.916 --> 0:08:20.436 I mean, the numbers he would have put up would 0:08:20.436 --> 0:08:22.996 have been insane because the only way they defended him 0:08:22.996 --> 0:08:23.556 was the fallom. 0:08:24.116 --> 0:08:28.156 Chamberlain had every incentive in the world to keep shooting 0:08:28.276 --> 0:08:33.036 free throws underhanded, and he didn't. I think we understand 0:08:33.076 --> 0:08:35.356 cases where people don't do what they ought to do 0:08:35.396 --> 0:08:39.316 because of ignorance. This is not that this is doing 0:08:39.356 --> 0:08:42.676 something dumb, even though you are fully aware that you're 0:08:42.716 --> 0:08:46.556 doing something dumb. By the way, there have been countless 0:08:46.556 --> 0:08:51.356 players like Chamberlain, players who could have been transcendent, devastating 0:08:51.716 --> 0:08:54.436 if only they had been open to taking foul shots 0:08:54.476 --> 0:08:58.916 a different way. Take Shaquille O'Neal up there with Will Chamberlain. 0:08:58.996 --> 0:09:01.436 Is one of the greatest NBA centers of all time, 0:09:01.876 --> 0:09:06.316 but an absolutely horrendous free throw shooter. Barry tried to 0:09:06.356 --> 0:09:07.236 reason with him once. 0:09:07.836 --> 0:09:09.676 Oh, you actually talked to shit. I tried to get 0:09:09.716 --> 0:09:12.316 Shack to change, and I try to get him done. 0:09:12.356 --> 0:09:15.396 He said, forget, I'd rather shoot zero than shoot underhanded. 0:09:15.476 --> 0:09:16.996 And I'm just fascinated by that. 0:09:17.116 --> 0:09:18.076 I don't understand it. 0:09:18.636 --> 0:09:18.836 Yeah. 0:09:18.916 --> 0:09:20.956 No, The difference is if Shaq was an eighty percent 0:09:20.996 --> 0:09:24.156 free throw shooter, he becomes the go to guy on 0:09:24.316 --> 0:09:28.236 the court as opposed to go to the bench guy. 0:09:28.716 --> 0:09:30.516 You change the dynamic of the game. 0:09:31.236 --> 0:09:35.036 No one shoots underhanded. Not even Barry's teammates followed his lead, 0:09:35.556 --> 0:09:37.676 people who saw him shoot that way every day and 0:09:37.756 --> 0:09:38.876 never miss one. 0:09:38.916 --> 0:09:39.156 Guy. 0:09:39.676 --> 0:09:42.716 Only George Johnson, my teammate with the Warriors, he was 0:09:42.756 --> 0:09:44.756 I think he was like forty eight fifty percent something 0:09:44.796 --> 0:09:46.436 like that, and I worked with him for one season. 0:09:46.436 --> 0:09:47.836 I didn't get to stay with him. He didn't get 0:09:47.836 --> 0:09:50.196 the technique down as much as I'd like it, But 0:09:50.236 --> 0:09:52.236 I think eventually, a season or two later, I think 0:09:52.276 --> 0:09:54.636 George actually shot eighty percent. I can actually look it 0:09:54.716 --> 0:09:56.236 up and be interesting to see what he did. I'll 0:09:56.236 --> 0:10:02.436 get George Johnson's stats here everything George Johnson's stats. Okay, 0:10:03.876 --> 0:10:09.996 stats for George Johnson NBA are George. 0:10:09.796 --> 0:10:12.796 Johnson's stats from the twenty fifteen NFL season. 0:10:13.196 --> 0:10:17.436 NFL wrong guy, wrong season, I mean, but anyway, we'll 0:10:17.436 --> 0:10:19.116 look it up. It's interesting, I think. 0:10:19.196 --> 0:10:21.516 But what about your on your high school team? 0:10:21.556 --> 0:10:22.556 Did anyone follow Oh? 0:10:22.596 --> 0:10:25.676 No, nobody. I've only had one guy ever come to me. 0:10:25.716 --> 0:10:27.396 An NBA guy came to me. I'm will tell you 0:10:27.476 --> 0:10:29.396 his name, but he came to me. He asked me 0:10:29.436 --> 0:10:31.156 to work with him. I did it. I worked with him. 0:10:31.196 --> 0:10:33.476 I had him shooting really well, and he never had 0:10:33.556 --> 0:10:36.076 the nerve to go back and do it. You want 0:10:36.076 --> 0:10:38.836 to talk his name, it's not it's fair to him. 0:10:39.356 --> 0:10:41.996 I don't want to say his name. It's not fair 0:10:41.996 --> 0:10:45.316 to him, like it's some kind of dark, shameful secret. 0:10:46.156 --> 0:10:49.476 College basketball is no different. Out of the thousands of 0:10:49.556 --> 0:10:54.196 college basketball players today, there are just two who shoot underhanded. 0:10:54.836 --> 0:10:57.636 One is a Nigerian American who plays for Louisville called 0:10:57.676 --> 0:11:01.876 Chinanu Anuaku. The other is Kenyon Barry, who plays for 0:11:01.916 --> 0:11:04.716 the College of Charleston, and who, in case he missed 0:11:04.716 --> 0:11:08.316 this earlier, happens to be Rick Barry's son. In other words, 0:11:08.556 --> 0:11:11.236 there are only two conditions under which people will try 0:11:11.236 --> 0:11:14.236 the underhanded free throw, one if their family is from 0:11:14.276 --> 0:11:19.956 another continent, and two if they're an offspring of Rick Berry. 0:11:20.716 --> 0:11:22.876 Anyway, do you want to just quickly describe where we 0:11:22.916 --> 0:11:23.636 are and what we're doing. 0:11:23.796 --> 0:11:26.996 That's my producer, Jacob Smith. He hung out with some 0:11:27.036 --> 0:11:30.836 players on the Columbia University women's basketball team and tried 0:11:30.876 --> 0:11:34.556 to get them to shoot underhanded. Our theory was, maybe 0:11:34.556 --> 0:11:37.636 this is just a dumb man's thing. Maybe women are 0:11:37.636 --> 0:11:39.116 more rational when they're on the court. 0:11:39.436 --> 0:11:42.956 So we are in Columbia's basketball gym and we are 0:11:42.996 --> 0:11:49.116 going to compare overhand shooting to underhand shooting. Hey, here 0:11:49.116 --> 0:11:49.436 he goes. 0:11:49.796 --> 0:11:52.956 That's er Talkov, a junior in the team. She missed 0:11:52.996 --> 0:11:53.636 her first try. 0:11:54.036 --> 0:11:55.156 I feel like you could bend in the kne a 0:11:55.156 --> 0:11:56.036 little more on that that. 0:11:58.836 --> 0:12:01.516 Then she makes the next two shots, her first two 0:12:01.676 --> 0:12:05.396 ever shooting underhanded. But Jacob couldn't get any of the 0:12:05.396 --> 0:12:08.996 Columbia players interested in switching over. Here's Sarah Mead, senior 0:12:09.156 --> 0:12:09.636 point guard. 0:12:09.956 --> 0:12:11.996 Ever since we were young, we were taught to shoot 0:12:12.036 --> 0:12:15.116 it overhand, and you know, as kids, you kind of 0:12:15.236 --> 0:12:18.196 play around with the idea of a granny shot or underhand. 0:12:18.236 --> 0:12:20.956 But yeah, I'm not sure we've ever taken it seriously. 0:12:21.756 --> 0:12:24.756 She calls it a granny shot, a shot used by 0:12:24.796 --> 0:12:27.156 one of the greatest players ever to play the game. 0:12:27.796 --> 0:12:31.556 Women are as bad as men. We like to think 0:12:31.596 --> 0:12:34.836 that good ideas will spread because they're good, because their 0:12:34.876 --> 0:12:38.756 advantages are obvious. But that's not true. So why don't 0:12:38.756 --> 0:12:41.836 they Or to put it another way, what is it 0:12:41.836 --> 0:12:44.276 about Rick Berry that allowed him to shoot this way? 0:12:44.436 --> 0:12:46.716 And what is it about Wilt Chamberlain and all the 0:12:46.756 --> 0:12:53.436 others that stands in their way? Let me try out 0:12:53.436 --> 0:12:57.156 a theory on you. It's from a sociologist named Mark Granovetter. 0:12:57.716 --> 0:13:00.796 Granavetter is one of the greatest social theorists of his generation. 0:13:01.196 --> 0:13:04.076 If you're an academic groupie like I am, Granavetter is 0:13:04.116 --> 0:13:07.716 like James Dean. So Granoveter came up with something called 0:13:07.756 --> 0:13:11.716 the threshold model of collective behavior. He was trying to 0:13:11.756 --> 0:13:14.756 answer the question of why people do things out of character. 0:13:15.316 --> 0:13:18.516 Use riots as his big example, why do otherwise law 0:13:18.516 --> 0:13:24.916 abiding citizens suddenly throw rocks through windows? Before Granavetter came along, 0:13:25.196 --> 0:13:28.916 sociologists tried to explain that kind of puzzling behavior in 0:13:29.036 --> 0:13:33.156 terms of beliefs. So the thinking went, you and I 0:13:33.196 --> 0:13:35.556 have a set of beliefs, but when you throw the 0:13:35.636 --> 0:13:39.076 rock through the window, something powerful must have happened in 0:13:39.116 --> 0:13:43.196 the moment to change your beliefs. Something about the crowd 0:13:43.756 --> 0:13:49.996 transforms the way you think. Here's Granavetter explaining that idea. 0:13:50.276 --> 0:13:53.156 There was a lot of intellectual tradition that said that 0:13:53.196 --> 0:13:56.916 when people got into a crowd, their independent judgment went 0:13:56.956 --> 0:13:59.356 out the window, and that they somehow became creatures of 0:13:59.396 --> 0:14:02.956 the crowd, and that there was some kind of I 0:14:02.956 --> 0:14:06.156 don't know, miasma of irrationality would settle over people and 0:14:06.196 --> 0:14:07.916 they would act in ways that they would never act 0:14:07.956 --> 0:14:10.236 if they were by themselves or they weren't influenced by 0:14:10.316 --> 0:14:11.756 the mob mentality. 0:14:12.236 --> 0:14:15.116 But Granna Better doesn't buy it. He doesn't think that 0:14:15.236 --> 0:14:17.676 being part of the mob casts some kind of spell 0:14:17.756 --> 0:14:21.156 that makes everyone irrational. To his mind, it's much more 0:14:21.196 --> 0:14:22.596 subtle and complicated. 0:14:22.676 --> 0:14:22.956 Than that. 0:14:23.236 --> 0:14:26.156 People are pretty much who they are, But if the 0:14:26.196 --> 0:14:31.156 situation develops in a certain way, then there's a domino effect. 0:14:31.436 --> 0:14:33.556 Some people are activated and that activates other people in 0:14:33.556 --> 0:14:35.876 that activates other people, and it all happens so fast. 0:14:36.196 --> 0:14:39.756 Granaveetter says that the issue isn't about people having beliefs 0:14:39.756 --> 0:14:43.196 about what's right and then suddenly losing those beliefs because 0:14:43.236 --> 0:14:49.596 they're in a mob. The issue is about thresholds. Now, 0:14:49.596 --> 0:14:53.316 what does Granaveetter mean by that word threshold? A belief 0:14:53.596 --> 0:14:56.556 is an internal thing. It's a position we've taken in 0:14:56.596 --> 0:15:00.356 our head or in our heart. But unlike beliefs, thresholds 0:15:00.356 --> 0:15:04.676 are external. They're about pure pressure. Your threshold is the 0:15:04.796 --> 0:15:07.676 number of people who have to do something before you 0:15:07.796 --> 0:15:11.876 join in. Granavedterer makes two crucial arguments. The first is 0:15:11.876 --> 0:15:15.556 that thresholds and beliefs sometimes overlap, but a lot of 0:15:15.556 --> 0:15:19.036 the time they don't. When your teenage son is driving 0:15:19.036 --> 0:15:21.196 one hundred miles an hour at midnight with three of 0:15:21.236 --> 0:15:24.476 his friends, it's not because he believes that driving one 0:15:24.556 --> 0:15:27.436 hundred miles an hour is a good idea. In that moment, 0:15:27.676 --> 0:15:32.636 his beliefs are irrelevant. His behavior is guided by his threshold. 0:15:33.036 --> 0:15:35.796 An eighteen year old may be drunk at midnight in 0:15:35.876 --> 0:15:39.116 a car with three of his friends. That person has 0:15:39.156 --> 0:15:41.916 a really low threshold. It doesn't take a lot of 0:15:42.076 --> 0:15:47.196 encouragement to get him to do something stupid. Granavetter's second 0:15:47.196 --> 0:15:52.596 point is just as important. Everyone's threshold is different. There 0:15:52.636 --> 0:15:55.356 are plenty of radicals and troublemakers who might need only 0:15:55.476 --> 0:15:59.836 slight encouragement to throw that rock. Their threshold is really low. 0:16:00.396 --> 0:16:03.756 But think about your grandmother. She might well need her sister, 0:16:04.076 --> 0:16:07.916 her grandchildren, her neighbors, or friends from church, all of 0:16:07.956 --> 0:16:09.716 them to be throwing rocks before or she would even 0:16:09.796 --> 0:16:13.796 dream of joining in. She's got a high threshold. The 0:16:13.876 --> 0:16:16.036 riot has to be going on for a very long 0:16:16.076 --> 0:16:18.996 time and has to involve a whole lot of people 0:16:19.036 --> 0:16:23.436 before Grandma will join in. Granavetter's argument goes on in 0:16:23.556 --> 0:16:26.276 much more detail, all of it fascinating, and I encourage you, 0:16:26.316 --> 0:16:28.756 if you're interested, to look it up online and read 0:16:28.756 --> 0:16:32.316 it because it's beautifully clear. But for the moment, I 0:16:32.516 --> 0:16:35.236 just want to focus on the one big implication of 0:16:35.276 --> 0:16:40.716 Grandavetter's argument. What people believe isn't going to help you much. 0:16:40.916 --> 0:16:43.796 If you want to understand why they try or don't 0:16:43.836 --> 0:16:48.476 try difficult or problematic or strange things. You have to 0:16:48.636 --> 0:16:53.356 understand the social context in which they're operating. Your grandmother's 0:16:53.436 --> 0:16:56.476 belief is that rioting is wrong, but there are times 0:16:56.516 --> 0:17:01.676 when even grandmothers might throw rocks through windows. Granavetter's theory 0:17:01.716 --> 0:17:03.996 explained a lot of things that have been puzzling to me. 0:17:04.556 --> 0:17:07.636 So here's a good example. It's from an interview I 0:17:07.636 --> 0:17:09.876 did at the ninety second Street Wall in New York 0:17:10.196 --> 0:17:13.156 with the economist Richard Thaylor, who's one of the leading 0:17:13.236 --> 0:17:16.676 lights in what's called behavioral economics. He had a book 0:17:16.716 --> 0:17:19.756 coming out called Misbehaving, and I really liked it, and 0:17:19.796 --> 0:17:21.076 we thought it would be fun if we did an 0:17:21.076 --> 0:17:25.636 event together. You and I have met before. The first 0:17:25.676 --> 0:17:29.236 time we met was at a hotel bar in Rochester, Yes, 0:17:29.516 --> 0:17:32.356 the only time I've ever Faylor is the kind of 0:17:32.356 --> 0:17:35.916 guy who's interested in everything, including sports, and there was 0:17:35.956 --> 0:17:38.796 a point in our conversation when he started to talk 0:17:38.836 --> 0:17:42.236 about the fact that the owners of professional football teams 0:17:42.516 --> 0:17:46.556 do things on occasion that are really stupid and inexplicable. 0:17:47.716 --> 0:17:51.036 Take the professional football draft. For those of you who 0:17:51.076 --> 0:17:54.436 are not football fans. Let me explain. Every year, all 0:17:54.516 --> 0:17:57.716 the draft eligible college football players are thrown into a 0:17:57.756 --> 0:18:01.916 big pool, and the thirty two professional football teams pick 0:18:01.996 --> 0:18:05.196 the players they want one by one. The first player 0:18:05.236 --> 0:18:06.916 taken as the one that people think will be the 0:18:06.916 --> 0:18:10.156 best professional player. That person gets it's the biggest salary. 0:18:10.516 --> 0:18:13.076 The second player taken is the one predicted to be 0:18:13.116 --> 0:18:16.636 the second best professional player, and so on. And after 0:18:16.716 --> 0:18:19.836 every team has picked one player each, they all start 0:18:19.876 --> 0:18:23.596 again and do another round. Because the players selected in 0:18:23.676 --> 0:18:26.756 the first round are considered the most valuable, all the 0:18:26.756 --> 0:18:30.276 teams fight over them. They pay enormous sums of money 0:18:30.276 --> 0:18:33.796 and construct elaborate deals to try and acquire those high 0:18:33.836 --> 0:18:34.596 draft picks. 0:18:34.996 --> 0:18:39.036 The interesting thing about that is there's a market for picks, 0:18:39.876 --> 0:18:44.636 so you can trade the first pick for say, half 0:18:44.676 --> 0:18:49.356 a dozen second round picks. That's what the market says. Now, 0:18:49.716 --> 0:18:54.756 that implies that the first pick is five times more 0:18:54.916 --> 0:18:58.316 valuable than an early pick in the second round. 0:18:58.516 --> 0:19:01.316 Filer in a colleague named Kade Massey decide to analyze 0:19:01.316 --> 0:19:04.916 this assumption. Was it really true that a first round 0:19:04.916 --> 0:19:07.436 pick was worth half a dozen second round. 0:19:07.276 --> 0:19:11.556 Picks if you compute the surplus a player provides to 0:19:11.596 --> 0:19:18.196 his team, meaning how good his performance is minus how 0:19:18.276 --> 0:19:21.236 much you have to pay him. What we found is 0:19:21.436 --> 0:19:25.716 these second round picks are actually more valuable than that 0:19:25.836 --> 0:19:28.476 first pick, but you could get five of those for 0:19:28.556 --> 0:19:31.956 that pick. It's the biggest anomaly I've ever found. 0:19:33.316 --> 0:19:35.956 The implication of Taylor in Massey's work is that teams 0:19:35.996 --> 0:19:39.596 should trade away their first round picks. They should stockpile 0:19:39.636 --> 0:19:42.276 players in the second and third rounds who can be 0:19:42.316 --> 0:19:45.916 paid a lot less and are nearly as good. This 0:19:46.076 --> 0:19:49.476 is how you build a winning football team. So what 0:19:49.596 --> 0:19:53.036 was the reaction of NFL teams to Taylor's idea. Well, 0:19:53.276 --> 0:19:55.756 not long after he and Kate Massey did their research, 0:19:56.036 --> 0:19:58.076 they got a call from the Washington Redskins. 0:19:58.276 --> 0:20:03.076 It was early in Dan Snyder's tenure as owner, and 0:20:03.556 --> 0:20:06.876 I met him and he said, oh, we don't want 0:20:06.916 --> 0:20:09.556 to know about this, and he introduced me. I'm going 0:20:09.596 --> 0:20:12.556 to send my people to see you, and they flew 0:20:12.596 --> 0:20:14.836 out to Chicago. I met with Gad and me and 0:20:14.876 --> 0:20:18.236 we told them what our findings were. And we basically 0:20:18.236 --> 0:20:25.756 have two pieces of advice, trade down and lend picks 0:20:25.796 --> 0:20:27.236 this year for picks next year. 0:20:27.996 --> 0:20:30.996 With that last sentence, Taylor is referring to the second 0:20:30.996 --> 0:20:34.916 thing he and Massy discovered. Owners sometimes trade a pick 0:20:34.996 --> 0:20:38.196 in this year's draft for a pick in some future draft. 0:20:38.676 --> 0:20:40.636 They use a rule of thumb to figure out how 0:20:40.676 --> 0:20:42.716 to value the difference between a player you can use 0:20:42.756 --> 0:20:44.916 this year versus a draft pick you can't use until 0:20:44.956 --> 0:20:48.076 some future year. And Taylor and Massy discover that the 0:20:48.156 --> 0:20:52.396 rule of thumb makes no sense. It's completely irrational. It 0:20:52.516 --> 0:20:58.316 massively overvalues current picks and undervalues future picks. Like a 0:20:58.316 --> 0:21:01.196 good economist, Taylor talks about the value of that rule 0:21:01.236 --> 0:21:04.516 of thumb as an interest rate. It's like borrowing money. 0:21:04.796 --> 0:21:07.596 If you compute the real interest rate, it's one hundred 0:21:07.636 --> 0:21:09.116 and thirty seven percent per year. 0:21:09.596 --> 0:21:12.716 In other words, for the privilege of having a player now, 0:21:12.836 --> 0:21:16.036 as opposed to waiting a year, the owners pay a 0:21:16.236 --> 0:21:19.716 huge premium. They borrow money at one hundred and thirty 0:21:19.756 --> 0:21:20.796 seven percent interest. 0:21:21.036 --> 0:21:23.876 These guys did not get to be billionaires borrowing at 0:21:23.876 --> 0:21:26.476 one hundred and thirty seven percent per year, But that's 0:21:26.516 --> 0:21:29.596 the rule of thumb they use. So anyway, we taught 0:21:29.996 --> 0:21:34.156 his guys Stans guys what to do, and then we 0:21:34.236 --> 0:21:37.876 watched the draft eagerly that year, and they traded up 0:21:38.356 --> 0:21:42.716 and borrowed a picked this year for one next year. 0:21:42.756 --> 0:21:43.916 So okay. 0:21:44.236 --> 0:21:47.756 In other words, the Redskins did the exact opposite of 0:21:47.796 --> 0:21:50.916 what they should have done if they were rational, and 0:21:50.956 --> 0:21:53.476 they weren't the only ones. Dyla and Massi have consulted 0:21:53.556 --> 0:21:57.076 for three NFL franchises now and no one has ever 0:21:57.076 --> 0:22:00.836 followed their advice. It gets worse. There's a very respected 0:22:00.876 --> 0:22:04.876 economist named David Romer who famously proved that football teams 0:22:04.916 --> 0:22:07.796 would win more games if they didn't punt, if they 0:22:07.836 --> 0:22:10.316 simply use all four dens to try and gain ten 0:22:10.396 --> 0:22:13.316 yards as opposed to giving the ball away to their opponents. 0:22:14.196 --> 0:22:18.756 So since Romer published his work, are NFL teams less 0:22:18.836 --> 0:22:21.996 likely to punt on fourth down? You guessed it? 0:22:22.716 --> 0:22:26.116 No to tell you how big this is if you 0:22:26.236 --> 0:22:30.476 did this right, But we think you would win one 0:22:30.516 --> 0:22:36.636