1 00:00:13,800 --> 00:00:17,400 Speaker 1: Hello, and welcome to What Goes Up, a weekly markets podcast. 2 00:00:17,520 --> 00:00:19,680 Speaker 1: My name is Mike Reagan. I'm a senior editor at 3 00:00:19,680 --> 00:00:24,079 Speaker 1: Bloomberg and I'm Moldana across asset reporter with Bloomberg. Add 4 00:00:24,120 --> 00:00:26,720 Speaker 1: this week on the show. Well, we hate to sound 5 00:00:26,760 --> 00:00:29,400 Speaker 1: like a broken record around here, but when it comes 6 00:00:29,400 --> 00:00:34,400 Speaker 1: to financial markets, it's all about inflation again. Both the 7 00:00:34,440 --> 00:00:36,920 Speaker 1: stock and bond markets got off to a roaring starts 8 00:00:36,960 --> 00:00:40,599 Speaker 1: of the year following a disastrous twenty twenty two. I've 9 00:00:40,640 --> 00:00:43,600 Speaker 1: made hopes that last year's surge and consumer prices had 10 00:00:43,720 --> 00:00:47,560 Speaker 1: finally been tamed, but that strong start has mostly been 11 00:00:47,600 --> 00:00:50,920 Speaker 1: reversed following some higher than expected inflation readings both in 12 00:00:50,960 --> 00:00:53,880 Speaker 1: the US and Europe. So where do we stand now? 13 00:00:54,120 --> 00:00:56,880 Speaker 1: Are these recent reports just potholes on the road to 14 00:00:56,920 --> 00:01:00,360 Speaker 1: the normalization of inflation or is something else going went on? 15 00:01:00,920 --> 00:01:03,080 Speaker 1: And what does it all mean for the path of 16 00:01:03,200 --> 00:01:06,480 Speaker 1: interest rates. We'll get into it with a very influential 17 00:01:06,520 --> 00:01:09,560 Speaker 1: economist who's best known for being Vice Chair of the 18 00:01:09,600 --> 00:01:12,760 Speaker 1: Federal Reserve and a member of President Bill Clinton's Council 19 00:01:13,000 --> 00:01:16,680 Speaker 1: of Economic Advisors in the nineteen nineties. He's got a 20 00:01:16,720 --> 00:01:19,440 Speaker 1: new book out and it's all about the history of 21 00:01:19,560 --> 00:01:24,400 Speaker 1: monetary and fiscal policy in the US. But first, vil Donna, 22 00:01:24,440 --> 00:01:27,200 Speaker 1: I have to say I'm excited about this guest for 23 00:01:27,240 --> 00:01:29,520 Speaker 1: two reasons. One, I think he's the perfect guest to 24 00:01:30,400 --> 00:01:34,360 Speaker 1: sort of talk about all the issues affecting markets these days. 25 00:01:35,120 --> 00:01:37,640 Speaker 1: But also, do you remember how excited I got a 26 00:01:37,680 --> 00:01:41,680 Speaker 1: few weeks ago? Unreasonable, I will admit, unreasonably excited when 27 00:01:41,720 --> 00:01:45,120 Speaker 1: I got to ride the Dinky. Yes, I remember? You 28 00:01:45,200 --> 00:01:49,040 Speaker 1: remember what the dire happy it's Is it a train 29 00:01:49,160 --> 00:01:52,680 Speaker 1: or a bus? It's a train. It's it's the shortest 30 00:01:52,800 --> 00:01:55,440 Speaker 1: I believe, maybe our guests can correct me. It's the 31 00:01:55,560 --> 00:02:00,360 Speaker 1: shortest train line commuter train line in the US. It's 32 00:02:00,360 --> 00:02:02,400 Speaker 1: like two and a half miles. It goes from Princeton 33 00:02:02,480 --> 00:02:07,200 Speaker 1: Junction to Princeton to Princeton University or Princeton Town the 34 00:02:07,240 --> 00:02:09,919 Speaker 1: town Okay, well, yes, yes to both. Yeah, it lands 35 00:02:10,000 --> 00:02:13,040 Speaker 1: right on campus. You were not as excited when I 36 00:02:13,040 --> 00:02:15,320 Speaker 1: got to ride that as No, because how long of 37 00:02:15,400 --> 00:02:17,880 Speaker 1: a ride? Is that? A minute? Like it's like I 38 00:02:17,919 --> 00:02:20,119 Speaker 1: think it's like five minutes. Okay, So you can't even 39 00:02:20,160 --> 00:02:23,400 Speaker 1: sit down, you can't even have a snack. You can 40 00:02:23,639 --> 00:02:25,799 Speaker 1: you have to snack quickly. You have to snack quickly. 41 00:02:26,120 --> 00:02:29,680 Speaker 1: That's what makes it exciting, is the superlative of the 42 00:02:29,720 --> 00:02:34,040 Speaker 1: shortest ever train line. I've never I've never been on it. 43 00:02:34,080 --> 00:02:35,799 Speaker 1: Maybe you and I can make a trip out there. 44 00:02:36,040 --> 00:02:38,280 Speaker 1: We should, We should. I think our guests has been 45 00:02:38,320 --> 00:02:40,920 Speaker 1: on it, including our guests. I bet he's written it. 46 00:02:41,200 --> 00:02:45,320 Speaker 1: I have many times. Okay, well, before you tell us more, 47 00:02:46,560 --> 00:02:50,040 Speaker 1: it's the person speaking is Alan Blinder. He's a professor 48 00:02:50,040 --> 00:02:53,000 Speaker 1: of economics at Princeton and he's a former FED vice chair. 49 00:02:53,040 --> 00:02:55,640 Speaker 1: Thanks so much for joining us on the podcast. Oh, sure, 50 00:02:55,639 --> 00:02:59,919 Speaker 1: you're welcome. How has the dinky been riding it? Well? 51 00:03:00,040 --> 00:03:01,840 Speaker 1: Have it it lately? I mean that's the way to 52 00:03:01,880 --> 00:03:05,040 Speaker 1: get to New York. I used to go to New 53 00:03:05,120 --> 00:03:08,799 Speaker 1: York quite a lot. Two things happened. The obvious one 54 00:03:08,880 --> 00:03:12,400 Speaker 1: is the pandemic, and I don't go there very much anymore. 55 00:03:12,400 --> 00:03:16,240 Speaker 1: The non obvious one is we had some grandchildren, little 56 00:03:16,240 --> 00:03:19,840 Speaker 1: ones in Washington, so my wife and I now go 57 00:03:19,960 --> 00:03:23,200 Speaker 1: south more often than we own North. Oh, let's get 58 00:03:23,240 --> 00:03:26,639 Speaker 1: into sort of the current state of the markets. And 59 00:03:26,880 --> 00:03:29,280 Speaker 1: by the way, congratulations on your book. I'm about halfway 60 00:03:29,320 --> 00:03:32,000 Speaker 1: through it. It It really fascinating and I think just a 61 00:03:32,160 --> 00:03:36,080 Speaker 1: really important read for anyone who wants to get an 62 00:03:36,080 --> 00:03:39,760 Speaker 1: overview of sort of how we got where we are 63 00:03:39,800 --> 00:03:43,600 Speaker 1: and sort of the the dynamic between monetary and fiscal 64 00:03:43,640 --> 00:03:47,920 Speaker 1: policy and sometimes frictions. I guess you could say, but 65 00:03:48,080 --> 00:03:51,880 Speaker 1: I'm curious how you're thinking right now about inflation. Yoyo'd 66 00:03:52,120 --> 00:03:55,760 Speaker 1: op ed in the Wallstreet Journal earlier this year in 67 00:03:55,800 --> 00:04:00,040 Speaker 1: which you were very optimistic that perhaps we've seen the 68 00:04:00,120 --> 00:04:02,320 Speaker 1: worst of inflation. You look at sort of the first 69 00:04:02,360 --> 00:04:05,160 Speaker 1: half of the year twenty twenty two versus the second half. 70 00:04:05,640 --> 00:04:08,800 Speaker 1: It was super hot, double digit inflation in the first half, 71 00:04:08,800 --> 00:04:12,080 Speaker 1: and then back closer to the Fed's target in the 72 00:04:12,120 --> 00:04:15,000 Speaker 1: second half. You know, if you look at it month 73 00:04:15,000 --> 00:04:17,520 Speaker 1: over month on an annualized basis, I think it was 74 00:04:17,600 --> 00:04:21,200 Speaker 1: three months annualized basis. Correct me if I'm wrong. But 75 00:04:21,279 --> 00:04:24,800 Speaker 1: we have seen sort of renewed concern about inflation. The 76 00:04:25,400 --> 00:04:29,680 Speaker 1: January numbers were a little hotter, both pc and CPI. 77 00:04:30,200 --> 00:04:35,000 Speaker 1: This week, the market's reacting pretty strongly to France, Spain, 78 00:04:35,200 --> 00:04:40,240 Speaker 1: and Germany reputing hotter than expected inflation. How are you 79 00:04:40,279 --> 00:04:42,719 Speaker 1: thinking about it now? Is it still is there still 80 00:04:42,720 --> 00:04:46,000 Speaker 1: reason to be optimistic that we're trending in the right direction. 81 00:04:46,120 --> 00:04:48,800 Speaker 1: You know, is this just sort of a pothole on 82 00:04:48,839 --> 00:04:51,320 Speaker 1: that road to normalization or is there any reason to 83 00:04:51,360 --> 00:04:54,360 Speaker 1: be more concerned. I think it's more of a pothole 84 00:04:54,400 --> 00:04:58,240 Speaker 1: with one big exception. And this is my beef with 85 00:04:58,279 --> 00:05:01,520 Speaker 1: the Bureau of Labor Statistics that I usually love, it's 86 00:05:01,640 --> 00:05:04,839 Speaker 1: one of the great statistical agencies in the world. But 87 00:05:04,960 --> 00:05:07,479 Speaker 1: what they did after I wrote that Wall Street Journal 88 00:05:07,520 --> 00:05:11,280 Speaker 1: piece that you correctly referred to, this is going to 89 00:05:11,360 --> 00:05:16,839 Speaker 1: send very wonkish change the seasonal adjustment factors. So it's 90 00:05:16,880 --> 00:05:19,400 Speaker 1: no longer true. If you look at the year when 91 00:05:19,400 --> 00:05:23,360 Speaker 1: I wrote that piece, it was true that roughly speaking, 92 00:05:23,400 --> 00:05:28,919 Speaker 1: inflation in twenty twenty two was about eleven percent annual 93 00:05:29,040 --> 00:05:31,680 Speaker 1: rate in the first half and about a two percent 94 00:05:31,800 --> 00:05:34,479 Speaker 1: annual rate in the second half. Of Wow, that's quite 95 00:05:34,480 --> 00:05:38,560 Speaker 1: a difference. It's nothing like that now because of changing 96 00:05:38,560 --> 00:05:43,159 Speaker 1: the seasonals, which you know, struck me as dirty pool 97 00:05:43,760 --> 00:05:47,200 Speaker 1: for a prognosticator. I was looking at what turned out 98 00:05:47,200 --> 00:05:53,280 Speaker 1: to be wrong data. That said, the qualitative story that 99 00:05:53,400 --> 00:05:56,039 Speaker 1: old lower inflation in the second half than in the 100 00:05:56,120 --> 00:06:01,640 Speaker 1: first half remains true. That did not disappear from the data. 101 00:06:01,720 --> 00:06:06,440 Speaker 1: It's also mostly universal. I won't say every country, but 102 00:06:06,480 --> 00:06:09,800 Speaker 1: it's certainly true in Europe and in most other countries. 103 00:06:10,200 --> 00:06:13,880 Speaker 1: But in terms of magnitude, nothing like what it was 104 00:06:14,000 --> 00:06:16,919 Speaker 1: before they change the data. And that's the sense in 105 00:06:16,960 --> 00:06:19,400 Speaker 1: which I view it as a kind of a pothole, 106 00:06:20,200 --> 00:06:23,600 Speaker 1: but a pothole now on a road that's not as 107 00:06:23,680 --> 00:06:28,920 Speaker 1: deeply declining as we used to think, but declining. That's important. 108 00:06:29,160 --> 00:06:31,440 Speaker 1: So can you tell us more about this because this 109 00:06:31,480 --> 00:06:35,839 Speaker 1: piece it did come out a couple of weeks ago 110 00:06:36,279 --> 00:06:38,880 Speaker 1: before we got the minutes from the last FED meeting. 111 00:06:38,920 --> 00:06:41,800 Speaker 1: But you said the FED now has a good chance 112 00:06:41,880 --> 00:06:46,400 Speaker 1: at a soft economic landing. Yeah, because of this data revision, 113 00:06:46,440 --> 00:06:50,160 Speaker 1: I'm revising that we whole revise things where we get 114 00:06:50,240 --> 00:06:54,240 Speaker 1: new data. I'm revising that to be a little less optimistic. 115 00:06:54,640 --> 00:06:56,400 Speaker 1: I think they still have a chance, but it's a 116 00:06:56,440 --> 00:06:59,640 Speaker 1: tougher chance than it was, you know, just to repeat 117 00:07:00,120 --> 00:07:03,640 Speaker 1: with the old data. By late in twenty twenty two, 118 00:07:04,080 --> 00:07:06,360 Speaker 1: we are pretty close to the target where the FED 119 00:07:06,440 --> 00:07:09,200 Speaker 1: wanted to be, but with the new data, we're not 120 00:07:09,279 --> 00:07:13,160 Speaker 1: quite as close. And among other things, that means we 121 00:07:13,200 --> 00:07:16,800 Speaker 1: have to fed as likely to raise interest rates more. Okay, 122 00:07:16,800 --> 00:07:18,800 Speaker 1: I have a bunch of follow up questions about this, 123 00:07:18,920 --> 00:07:21,960 Speaker 1: because there's a bunch of debates going on, you know, 124 00:07:22,360 --> 00:07:25,800 Speaker 1: especially when I'm hearing people on bloom or TV or 125 00:07:26,000 --> 00:07:29,160 Speaker 1: people I talked to on a daily basis, A lot 126 00:07:29,200 --> 00:07:31,679 Speaker 1: of them are saying that a six percent Fed funds 127 00:07:31,760 --> 00:07:34,640 Speaker 1: rate is a real possibility. To what extent you would 128 00:07:34,640 --> 00:07:38,560 Speaker 1: agree with that, No, I'd bet against that. It's not 129 00:07:38,920 --> 00:07:42,400 Speaker 1: beyond the realm of the possible. You're reminding me a 130 00:07:42,440 --> 00:07:45,200 Speaker 1: bit when I was on the FED in ancient times 131 00:07:45,640 --> 00:07:49,040 Speaker 1: in the nineteen nineties. You're too young to remember this. 132 00:07:50,720 --> 00:07:54,600 Speaker 1: When we were tightening in ninety four ninety five, market 133 00:07:54,720 --> 00:07:59,200 Speaker 1: sentiments at one point, not just for a day, for 134 00:07:59,280 --> 00:08:02,160 Speaker 1: a while was that we were going to go up 135 00:08:02,160 --> 00:08:05,280 Speaker 1: to eight percent on the federal funds rate. I remember 136 00:08:05,280 --> 00:08:08,280 Speaker 1: sitting there in my office in Washington saying, are those 137 00:08:08,320 --> 00:08:12,360 Speaker 1: people crazy? We're not going to go anywhere near eight percent. 138 00:08:12,440 --> 00:08:14,880 Speaker 1: But in those days you weren't allowed to say anything. 139 00:08:15,520 --> 00:08:17,880 Speaker 1: Those are the days when the FED was mum and 140 00:08:17,960 --> 00:08:22,640 Speaker 1: if the markets flew off in some wild direction, Alan Greenspan, 141 00:08:22,720 --> 00:08:26,200 Speaker 1: who was the chairman, wouldn't do anything to bring them back. Eventually, 142 00:08:26,320 --> 00:08:30,240 Speaker 1: events brought them back, and in fact, we topped out 143 00:08:30,280 --> 00:08:35,000 Speaker 1: coincidentally at six percent, not eight percent, so I'd be 144 00:08:35,080 --> 00:08:37,559 Speaker 1: surprised if we get to six. I want to get 145 00:08:37,600 --> 00:08:40,320 Speaker 1: into that idea of the Fed staying mom and sort 146 00:08:40,320 --> 00:08:44,000 Speaker 1: of compare and contrast that with today. But first, before 147 00:08:44,040 --> 00:08:47,839 Speaker 1: we do that, I think two things have shifted in 148 00:08:48,160 --> 00:08:51,000 Speaker 1: the sort of the market's view of where the Fed's 149 00:08:51,080 --> 00:08:53,880 Speaker 1: rate is going to go. One is exactly how high 150 00:08:54,200 --> 00:08:56,400 Speaker 1: it's going to go, and we can debate five and 151 00:08:56,400 --> 00:08:58,720 Speaker 1: a quarter, five and a half or six. But I 152 00:08:58,760 --> 00:09:02,120 Speaker 1: think what's we're alarming to investors these days is the 153 00:09:02,120 --> 00:09:05,480 Speaker 1: notion that it's going to stay there for a while. Um. 154 00:09:05,880 --> 00:09:07,719 Speaker 1: You know, we we came into this year. If you 155 00:09:07,760 --> 00:09:09,880 Speaker 1: look at the dot plot, uh you know, which is 156 00:09:09,920 --> 00:09:13,960 Speaker 1: the feds uh individual members projections of where they see 157 00:09:14,000 --> 00:09:17,600 Speaker 1: the FED funds rate or even market pricing in the 158 00:09:17,640 --> 00:09:22,319 Speaker 1: SOFA or Fed funds futures markets that you know, it 159 00:09:22,400 --> 00:09:25,640 Speaker 1: seemed to be at an unanimous consensus almost that that 160 00:09:26,040 --> 00:09:29,960 Speaker 1: rate would peak maybe this spring early summer, and then 161 00:09:30,120 --> 00:09:32,960 Speaker 1: immediately come down, that the Fed would pivot and start 162 00:09:33,040 --> 00:09:36,200 Speaker 1: cutting rates. That seems to be you know, that dot 163 00:09:36,240 --> 00:09:39,320 Speaker 1: plot hasn't been updated yet, but I'm assuming what it 164 00:09:39,480 --> 00:09:41,839 Speaker 1: is that that that pivot's not no longer going to 165 00:09:41,880 --> 00:09:44,840 Speaker 1: be there, and in the pricing of the you know, 166 00:09:44,960 --> 00:09:49,120 Speaker 1: SOFA and FED funds futures market, it's no longer there either. 167 00:09:49,720 --> 00:09:53,760 Speaker 1: Is that the correct interpretation and view of the rest 168 00:09:53,760 --> 00:09:55,520 Speaker 1: of the year, do you think? I think so? I 169 00:09:55,559 --> 00:09:58,319 Speaker 1: think the markets were getting were, frankly a little bit 170 00:09:58,320 --> 00:10:03,320 Speaker 1: wacky when they had, as you correctly characterize, view that 171 00:10:03,360 --> 00:10:05,000 Speaker 1: the FED was going to go up to a peak 172 00:10:05,000 --> 00:10:08,360 Speaker 1: and then write down that's not what usually happens with 173 00:10:08,600 --> 00:10:13,800 Speaker 1: monetary policy. The much more likely scenario always was it 174 00:10:13,840 --> 00:10:17,080 Speaker 1: was going to go up to some peak, and one 175 00:10:17,120 --> 00:10:19,720 Speaker 1: could debate, and people did debate where that peak would be, 176 00:10:20,120 --> 00:10:23,240 Speaker 1: and then hang around there for a while see what happens. 177 00:10:23,520 --> 00:10:25,520 Speaker 1: The same thing is true when the FED is going down. 178 00:10:26,320 --> 00:10:28,840 Speaker 1: It goes down for a while, it flattens out, usually 179 00:10:29,480 --> 00:10:33,200 Speaker 1: to wait and watch, wait and watch what, among other things, 180 00:10:33,200 --> 00:10:36,240 Speaker 1: the effects of the policy it's already promulgated, and then 181 00:10:36,400 --> 00:10:41,559 Speaker 1: keep moving if necessary, or reverse if that seems appropriate. 182 00:10:41,640 --> 00:10:45,200 Speaker 1: So I never thought that was a likely scenario, and 183 00:10:45,200 --> 00:10:47,600 Speaker 1: I'm glad to see the markets don't believe it anymore. 184 00:10:48,480 --> 00:10:51,240 Speaker 1: And what about the debate that the FED will have 185 00:10:51,320 --> 00:10:54,720 Speaker 1: to rethink it's two percent target. And we've had guests 186 00:10:54,760 --> 00:10:58,960 Speaker 1: on this podcast as well arguing that maybe they should 187 00:10:58,960 --> 00:11:03,360 Speaker 1: be rethinking that two percent just isn't very realistic. So 188 00:11:03,480 --> 00:11:05,920 Speaker 1: let me assure you of one thing, and then I 189 00:11:05,960 --> 00:11:11,200 Speaker 1: elaborate slightly. There is no debate inside the FIT. None. Zero. 190 00:11:11,800 --> 00:11:15,080 Speaker 1: It is not going to happen. Bet your whole portfolio 191 00:11:15,160 --> 00:11:17,960 Speaker 1: on it, all right, if the FIT is not changing 192 00:11:17,960 --> 00:11:23,200 Speaker 1: its target. Now, a broader question, which is interesting to 193 00:11:23,320 --> 00:11:26,400 Speaker 1: economists and historians we're talking about a book on economic 194 00:11:26,440 --> 00:11:29,680 Speaker 1: history here, is whether it should have set a higher 195 00:11:30,360 --> 00:11:34,000 Speaker 1: number when it did latch onto a target not two. 196 00:11:34,960 --> 00:11:37,440 Speaker 1: I think that's quite debatable, and I think I'd be 197 00:11:37,520 --> 00:11:40,160 Speaker 1: on the side of yes, it should have gone higher. 198 00:11:41,080 --> 00:11:45,640 Speaker 1: So why do I say both? Because and the reason 199 00:11:45,800 --> 00:11:48,360 Speaker 1: it's the same answer to the reason. Why is there 200 00:11:48,400 --> 00:11:51,200 Speaker 1: no debate at the FIT? Because it would look like caving, 201 00:11:51,320 --> 00:11:54,360 Speaker 1: giving in, surrendering. We can't do it, So we're going 202 00:11:54,400 --> 00:11:58,600 Speaker 1: to make our target easier. And immediately people would start saying, oh, 203 00:11:58,640 --> 00:12:00,160 Speaker 1: you went up to three, how do I know you 204 00:12:00,200 --> 00:12:02,439 Speaker 1: don't go up to four? And those are the kinds 205 00:12:02,440 --> 00:12:06,480 Speaker 1: of reasons why the FED will never ever. Ever, well, 206 00:12:07,000 --> 00:12:09,840 Speaker 1: ever is much too long. Let's say for the next 207 00:12:09,880 --> 00:12:12,800 Speaker 1: thirty five years that it is not going to think 208 00:12:12,800 --> 00:12:17,440 Speaker 1: about changing the target. What would have been, in your view, 209 00:12:17,440 --> 00:12:20,760 Speaker 1: a better target than two. I thought three would be 210 00:12:20,760 --> 00:12:23,360 Speaker 1: better than two. And the main reason is what we 211 00:12:23,360 --> 00:12:29,920 Speaker 1: were experiencing before the pandemic with zero quote zero interest rates, 212 00:12:30,440 --> 00:12:33,120 Speaker 1: that if it was three rather than two, the FED 213 00:12:33,160 --> 00:12:37,640 Speaker 1: would have had more room as the economy crater to 214 00:12:37,880 --> 00:12:42,360 Speaker 1: push the economy out of the crater with lower interest rates, 215 00:12:42,040 --> 00:12:45,320 Speaker 1: as if it had started with interest rates one hundred 216 00:12:45,320 --> 00:12:47,960 Speaker 1: basis points higher than it did, or would add one 217 00:12:48,000 --> 00:12:52,040 Speaker 1: hundred basis points more easy before it had to resort 218 00:12:52,120 --> 00:13:02,760 Speaker 1: to the so called unconventional policies. Well, and I think 219 00:13:02,840 --> 00:13:06,400 Speaker 1: maybe an important distinction to draw is the idea of 220 00:13:06,480 --> 00:13:09,559 Speaker 1: while the FED may not change that two percent target, 221 00:13:09,720 --> 00:13:13,160 Speaker 1: I assume that that doesn't necessarily mean that they won't 222 00:13:13,400 --> 00:13:16,800 Speaker 1: pause or pivot before it gets to two. Right, Absolutely, 223 00:13:17,280 --> 00:13:20,120 Speaker 1: I think they'll pause, not pivot, That's what we're talking about. Before. 224 00:13:20,200 --> 00:13:25,440 Speaker 1: They'll pause once inflation gets low enough and is falling, 225 00:13:26,600 --> 00:13:29,400 Speaker 1: so the two percent, so to speak, is in sight, 226 00:13:30,040 --> 00:13:32,760 Speaker 1: then they'll pause to see, all right, is it going 227 00:13:32,800 --> 00:13:34,760 Speaker 1: to two? Is it not going to two? How's the 228 00:13:34,840 --> 00:13:41,000 Speaker 1: economy look? And so what about other areas within the economy? 229 00:13:41,280 --> 00:13:43,360 Speaker 1: Actually hear this question a lot, and I asked this 230 00:13:43,440 --> 00:13:45,360 Speaker 1: question a lot when I'm talking to people. Look where 231 00:13:45,400 --> 00:13:50,560 Speaker 1: actually are we seeing any weakness? Or I'm thinking about 232 00:13:50,559 --> 00:13:52,880 Speaker 1: the housing market. I get a ton of notes in 233 00:13:53,080 --> 00:13:56,559 Speaker 1: my inbox on a daily basis that says, the housing 234 00:13:56,600 --> 00:13:59,640 Speaker 1: market now is also showing some signs of pricking up 235 00:13:59,640 --> 00:14:04,200 Speaker 1: and of a turnaround, and the consumer remains strong, etcetera. 236 00:14:04,440 --> 00:14:07,840 Speaker 1: Where might you point to even show any weakness right now? 237 00:14:08,000 --> 00:14:10,840 Speaker 1: I point to the housing market, and I'm getting the 238 00:14:10,920 --> 00:14:13,760 Speaker 1: same email says you're getting or some of them. And 239 00:14:13,840 --> 00:14:16,280 Speaker 1: if you look at the graphs that accompany with them, 240 00:14:16,360 --> 00:14:18,840 Speaker 1: it looks like it's gone down, down, down a usual 241 00:14:18,880 --> 00:14:22,440 Speaker 1: way and then a tiny little uptick. Let me see 242 00:14:22,440 --> 00:14:25,080 Speaker 1: that uptick grow over a month, and then I'll start 243 00:14:25,080 --> 00:14:28,040 Speaker 1: getting worried. And the reason I say that is that 244 00:14:28,240 --> 00:14:33,040 Speaker 1: classically for decades, if you ask people on the fed 245 00:14:33,680 --> 00:14:36,960 Speaker 1: away from microphones, so it's stop being recorded by Bloomberg, 246 00:14:37,920 --> 00:14:40,800 Speaker 1: where do you think you can do your damage or 247 00:14:40,920 --> 00:14:44,880 Speaker 1: help for that matter, If it's the other direction on 248 00:14:44,960 --> 00:14:49,680 Speaker 1: the economy, they'll say, housing, Housing is by far the 249 00:14:49,720 --> 00:14:54,880 Speaker 1: most sensitive to interest rates, and to me, despite these 250 00:14:54,920 --> 00:15:00,400 Speaker 1: little blips of optimism, very lately housing as well down, 251 00:15:00,440 --> 00:15:03,840 Speaker 1: and that's what you'd expect. The second place, by the way, 252 00:15:03,920 --> 00:15:07,000 Speaker 1: is more puzzling, and I can't figure it out, which 253 00:15:07,080 --> 00:15:12,440 Speaker 1: is automobile purchases. They generally respond to interest rates a lot. 254 00:15:13,040 --> 00:15:14,760 Speaker 1: And the reason I can't figure it out of the 255 00:15:14,800 --> 00:15:17,480 Speaker 1: reasons maybe there are people that are more expert in 256 00:15:17,520 --> 00:15:20,920 Speaker 1: the auto market than I is. As you remember, we 257 00:15:21,040 --> 00:15:24,680 Speaker 1: had all these shortages the manufacturers couldn't make enough cars 258 00:15:24,680 --> 00:15:27,000 Speaker 1: because they couldn't get enough chips and so on and 259 00:15:27,040 --> 00:15:32,360 Speaker 1: so forth, and there have been some unusual fluctuations, so 260 00:15:32,400 --> 00:15:37,640 Speaker 1: you wouldn't want to attribute those down drafts to interest rates, 261 00:15:38,480 --> 00:15:41,800 Speaker 1: and that sort of confused the whole picture. So I 262 00:15:41,800 --> 00:15:44,160 Speaker 1: don't know what to make of automobiles if and I 263 00:15:44,240 --> 00:15:46,280 Speaker 1: just haven't studied it enough. Maybe if I had, i'd 264 00:15:46,280 --> 00:15:49,640 Speaker 1: have a clearer pictures. But those are the two places, 265 00:15:50,320 --> 00:15:54,160 Speaker 1: and the third, which is also down, is business investment. 266 00:15:54,720 --> 00:15:58,600 Speaker 1: The worst of this past recession caused by the pandemic 267 00:15:59,200 --> 00:16:04,440 Speaker 1: was in concert sumer services. Anybody who was expecting the 268 00:16:04,480 --> 00:16:11,280 Speaker 1: FEDS tightening to affect spending on consumer services was not 269 00:16:11,360 --> 00:16:15,520 Speaker 1: paying attention to history. It doesn't have any effect zero. 270 00:16:16,600 --> 00:16:20,680 Speaker 1: Now that's a big hunk of the economy. But even 271 00:16:20,720 --> 00:16:23,400 Speaker 1: in the good old days when nobody questioned whether the 272 00:16:23,480 --> 00:16:27,000 Speaker 1: FED could push the economy around, like the Volker days 273 00:16:27,080 --> 00:16:30,400 Speaker 1: or the Greenspan days, nobody on nobody at the FED. 274 00:16:30,400 --> 00:16:32,800 Speaker 1: I don't want to speak about the whole earth. No 275 00:16:32,800 --> 00:16:37,480 Speaker 1: nobody at the FED ever thought they were able to 276 00:16:37,520 --> 00:16:41,560 Speaker 1: either push up or push down consumer spending on services. 277 00:16:42,600 --> 00:16:46,320 Speaker 1: You know, Professor, It's it's interesting how one hundred percent 278 00:16:46,360 --> 00:16:50,400 Speaker 1: of the discussion around fighting inflation these days relates to 279 00:16:51,000 --> 00:16:53,680 Speaker 1: monetary policy and what the FED can or can't do. 280 00:16:54,320 --> 00:16:56,400 Speaker 1: A part of your book that I found really fascinating 281 00:16:56,480 --> 00:17:00,040 Speaker 1: is you get into the sixties during the present and 282 00:17:00,160 --> 00:17:05,400 Speaker 1: see of JFK and LBJ and how the the Keynesian 283 00:17:05,440 --> 00:17:09,560 Speaker 1: economists had really come into power and you know, and 284 00:17:09,680 --> 00:17:13,600 Speaker 1: influence under both of those administrations, and you know, the 285 00:17:13,640 --> 00:17:17,960 Speaker 1: notion of you know, using fiscal spending to boost demand, 286 00:17:18,520 --> 00:17:21,879 Speaker 1: don't let worries about the deficit really handcuff you in 287 00:17:21,920 --> 00:17:25,359 Speaker 1: that sense, And you talk about how Keynesians sort of 288 00:17:25,359 --> 00:17:29,399 Speaker 1: got a bad rap back then because inflation accelerated pretty 289 00:17:29,440 --> 00:17:33,000 Speaker 1: pretty fast during the Vietnam War because of all the 290 00:17:33,040 --> 00:17:39,720 Speaker 1: defense outleads and Keynesians were actually advising on fiscal restraint 291 00:17:39,960 --> 00:17:44,439 Speaker 1: to to to to bring down inflation. And as you 292 00:17:44,520 --> 00:17:46,359 Speaker 1: point out, I think you know, and this to me 293 00:17:46,440 --> 00:17:50,159 Speaker 1: is kind of relates to today's world two with modern 294 00:17:50,640 --> 00:17:54,719 Speaker 1: monetary theory, in that it's very easy for a politician 295 00:17:54,960 --> 00:17:57,720 Speaker 1: to go out there and promise lower taxes, more spending, 296 00:17:57,760 --> 00:18:03,320 Speaker 1: that sort of thing. It's pretty much political suicide to 297 00:18:03,320 --> 00:18:07,720 Speaker 1: to suggest some kind of fiscal constraint and higher taxes, 298 00:18:07,800 --> 00:18:12,520 Speaker 1: less spending in order to help reduce inflation. Is it 299 00:18:12,600 --> 00:18:16,440 Speaker 1: just a lost cause to ever think that fiscal policy 300 00:18:17,080 --> 00:18:20,200 Speaker 1: could or will ever be used in the fight against inflation? 301 00:18:20,320 --> 00:18:24,600 Speaker 1: Is it just too politically impossible to even consider anymore. Yes, 302 00:18:24,720 --> 00:18:28,199 Speaker 1: in a word, I wish it weren't true, but I 303 00:18:28,240 --> 00:18:31,040 Speaker 1: think it is true. One of the things I discovered 304 00:18:31,119 --> 00:18:35,240 Speaker 1: in reminded myself, i should say, in researching and writing 305 00:18:35,280 --> 00:18:38,720 Speaker 1: this book is and this is to your point, the 306 00:18:38,840 --> 00:18:44,960 Speaker 1: last time fiscal policy was used deliberately by the government 307 00:18:45,440 --> 00:18:47,760 Speaker 1: to take some steam out of the economy to fight 308 00:18:47,800 --> 00:18:52,719 Speaker 1: inflation was nineteen sixty eight nineteen sixty eight. That's a 309 00:18:52,760 --> 00:18:56,240 Speaker 1: long time. There had been other episode since sixty eight 310 00:18:56,680 --> 00:19:01,440 Speaker 1: in which fiscal policy turned contractionary, but that was always 311 00:19:01,600 --> 00:19:05,720 Speaker 1: motivated by concerns about the deficit, not about concerns about 312 00:19:05,720 --> 00:19:09,159 Speaker 1: the economy. I was in the Clinton administration and that 313 00:19:09,240 --> 00:19:12,760 Speaker 1: was an example. Right, we promulgated and barely got through 314 00:19:12,800 --> 00:19:16,240 Speaker 1: Congress by the skin of our teeth, or more accurately, 315 00:19:16,280 --> 00:19:19,879 Speaker 1: by Al Gore breaking a tie vote in the Senate, 316 00:19:20,640 --> 00:19:26,560 Speaker 1: a contractionary fiscal policy to reduce the deficit. It was 317 00:19:26,640 --> 00:19:29,840 Speaker 1: not to bring down inflation. The inflation was three percent. 318 00:19:30,560 --> 00:19:32,840 Speaker 1: Most of us thought, oh, three percent, We were just 319 00:19:32,840 --> 00:19:36,399 Speaker 1: talking about three percent inflation. Believe me, Bill Clinton was 320 00:19:36,440 --> 00:19:39,879 Speaker 1: not concerned that the inflationary was three percent and that 321 00:19:39,960 --> 00:19:44,239 Speaker 1: was terrible. He was concerned about the budget deficit. So 322 00:19:44,520 --> 00:19:49,120 Speaker 1: there have been some episodes like that, but none since 323 00:19:49,359 --> 00:19:54,639 Speaker 1: These Keynesian economists who were referring to finally convinced Johnson 324 00:19:54,920 --> 00:19:59,040 Speaker 1: that we needed to raise taxes because of the Vietnam inflation, 325 00:19:59,320 --> 00:20:03,120 Speaker 1: and then john after a year and a half of cajoling, 326 00:20:03,560 --> 00:20:07,240 Speaker 1: finally convinced Congress to do it. It was a really 327 00:20:07,280 --> 00:20:14,080 Speaker 1: hard fight. Since then, there's been no fiscal contraction for 328 00:20:14,480 --> 00:20:21,080 Speaker 1: demand management reasons. I love taking all the different scenarios 329 00:20:21,160 --> 00:20:24,399 Speaker 1: and historical time periods that you talk about in the 330 00:20:24,400 --> 00:20:28,160 Speaker 1: book and then comparing them to maybe developments that we've 331 00:20:28,160 --> 00:20:30,439 Speaker 1: seen over the last ten years or so. And you 332 00:20:30,560 --> 00:20:33,399 Speaker 1: said recessions at the end of the fifties and the 333 00:20:34,160 --> 00:20:36,560 Speaker 1: two recessions at the end of the fifties and at 334 00:20:36,560 --> 00:20:39,679 Speaker 1: the start of the sixties, they didn't see Congress or 335 00:20:39,720 --> 00:20:42,600 Speaker 1: the White House coming in to help mitigate things. And 336 00:20:43,119 --> 00:20:45,960 Speaker 1: obviously that is very different from what we saw during 337 00:20:46,000 --> 00:20:48,200 Speaker 1: the COVID pandemics. So maybe you could talk a bit 338 00:20:48,200 --> 00:20:52,639 Speaker 1: about that and how things have changed. Yeah, those episodes 339 00:20:52,680 --> 00:20:56,320 Speaker 1: that you talked about were in the United States, though 340 00:20:56,359 --> 00:21:00,600 Speaker 1: not in Europe in the pre Kansian era. Came Zianism 341 00:21:00,640 --> 00:21:07,840 Speaker 1: was considered back then a strange foreign doctrine. Probably some 342 00:21:07,880 --> 00:21:11,280 Speaker 1: people were calling it communist. I was once called a 343 00:21:11,400 --> 00:21:14,040 Speaker 1: Malice Keynesian. I haven't figured out what that is yet, 344 00:21:15,640 --> 00:21:22,080 Speaker 1: But in those days in the Eisenhower administration, the Keynesian 345 00:21:22,200 --> 00:21:26,240 Speaker 1: ideas had just not caught on in the American political world. 346 00:21:26,520 --> 00:21:30,240 Speaker 1: They had in the academic world absolutely. I mean I 347 00:21:30,400 --> 00:21:34,200 Speaker 1: was a young student back in the sixties and we 348 00:21:34,200 --> 00:21:37,000 Speaker 1: were taught that kind of stuff, but an academia, no, 349 00:21:37,720 --> 00:21:42,240 Speaker 1: and that was one of the things that was revolutionary, 350 00:21:42,520 --> 00:21:46,280 Speaker 1: though it took a long time. In Kennedy's call for 351 00:21:46,359 --> 00:21:50,520 Speaker 1: a tax cut, which he first made in nineteen sixty two, 352 00:21:51,520 --> 00:21:54,720 Speaker 1: let's note the dates. It finally passed in nineteen sixty 353 00:21:54,840 --> 00:22:00,880 Speaker 1: four and only after he was tragically assassinated. We can't 354 00:22:00,960 --> 00:22:05,040 Speaker 1: run history again, but my best guess is it never 355 00:22:05,080 --> 00:22:09,080 Speaker 1: would have passed where Kennedy not assassinated, if he was 356 00:22:09,080 --> 00:22:12,000 Speaker 1: still alive and trying to push it through Congress. There 357 00:22:12,080 --> 00:22:17,560 Speaker 1: was tremendous resistance to Kenzie and ideas, largely because they 358 00:22:17,600 --> 00:22:20,760 Speaker 1: were going to raise the deficit in that if it's 359 00:22:20,840 --> 00:22:23,719 Speaker 1: Kenzie and in that direction. A few minutes ago we 360 00:22:23,720 --> 00:22:25,960 Speaker 1: were talking about Kenzie and in the other direction, trying 361 00:22:26,000 --> 00:22:29,719 Speaker 1: to throttle back demand. But if it's Keynesianism in the 362 00:22:29,760 --> 00:22:34,480 Speaker 1: expansionary direction, it's going to raise the deficit, something Ronald 363 00:22:34,560 --> 00:22:38,480 Speaker 1: Reagan should have known in nineteen eighty one. Maybe he did, 364 00:22:38,560 --> 00:22:43,240 Speaker 1: but that's another story. But the point is that these 365 00:22:43,320 --> 00:22:47,440 Speaker 1: ideas were foreign and considered kind of revolutionary back then. 366 00:22:48,400 --> 00:22:52,040 Speaker 1: Not anymore, but back then, yeah, Well, I wonder. You know, 367 00:22:52,960 --> 00:22:56,000 Speaker 1: I still feel like the debate hasn't been settled on 368 00:22:56,480 --> 00:22:59,920 Speaker 1: exactly how we got where we are today with inflation, 369 00:23:00,200 --> 00:23:02,320 Speaker 1: and maybe it can't be settled. But you know, your 370 00:23:02,320 --> 00:23:06,720 Speaker 1: book really points out the various drivers of inflation throughout history. 371 00:23:06,760 --> 00:23:10,320 Speaker 1: You know, it was UH in the sixties, first JFK's 372 00:23:10,400 --> 00:23:14,040 Speaker 1: tax cuts and then the big spending on the Vietnam War. 373 00:23:14,560 --> 00:23:16,760 Speaker 1: Then later in the seventies it was the you know, 374 00:23:16,800 --> 00:23:19,360 Speaker 1: the oil price shock obviously played played a big role. 375 00:23:20,240 --> 00:23:22,520 Speaker 1: I feel like these days we've gotten hit with it 376 00:23:22,560 --> 00:23:24,879 Speaker 1: all at once. You know, we had the Trump tax cuts, 377 00:23:25,080 --> 00:23:30,440 Speaker 1: the covid UH spending, the were in Ukraine, and the 378 00:23:30,480 --> 00:23:33,680 Speaker 1: oil price shock, not to mention all the supply chain 379 00:23:34,000 --> 00:23:36,800 Speaker 1: disruptions during the pandemic. So how in your head, how 380 00:23:36,840 --> 00:23:40,400 Speaker 1: do you sort of assign the blame for the inflation 381 00:23:40,480 --> 00:23:46,000 Speaker 1: inflation problem between you know, fiscal policy, monetary policy that 382 00:23:46,119 --> 00:23:49,480 Speaker 1: arguably stayed too loose for too long, the oil shock, 383 00:23:49,600 --> 00:23:51,479 Speaker 1: on and on. How do you sort of assign the 384 00:23:51,520 --> 00:23:54,280 Speaker 1: influence of each on on where we are now? Your 385 00:23:54,320 --> 00:24:00,840 Speaker 1: list is exactly right. Assigning a portioning the blame is 386 00:24:00,960 --> 00:24:07,520 Speaker 1: harder and controversial, But my list would put the supply 387 00:24:07,720 --> 00:24:12,840 Speaker 1: disruptions in the recovery from COVID on the top of 388 00:24:12,880 --> 00:24:16,280 Speaker 1: the list. They were pervasive all over the place. It 389 00:24:16,359 --> 00:24:20,560 Speaker 1: wasn't like just one thing. And then would put the 390 00:24:20,600 --> 00:24:26,080 Speaker 1: supply shocks which were not one hundred percent but very 391 00:24:26,200 --> 00:24:32,240 Speaker 1: much exacerbated by the war in Ukraine. And then the 392 00:24:32,280 --> 00:24:37,640 Speaker 1: excessive stimulus of the economy. Now that's the one that's 393 00:24:37,680 --> 00:24:42,000 Speaker 1: most controversial. People that want to blame Joe Biden or 394 00:24:42,119 --> 00:24:46,840 Speaker 1: Donald Trump before him latch onto the tremendous fiscal stimulus. 395 00:24:46,880 --> 00:24:50,520 Speaker 1: And it was of tremendous fiscal stimulus, and that's the 396 00:24:50,600 --> 00:24:52,920 Speaker 1: kind of thing that you expect to be at least 397 00:24:52,960 --> 00:24:59,600 Speaker 1: somewhat inflationary. But my view is that the forces clobbering 398 00:24:59,680 --> 00:25:05,280 Speaker 1: the economy over the head, we're so powerful that giving 399 00:25:05,400 --> 00:25:10,480 Speaker 1: some upward impetus to the economy, a substantial upward impetus, 400 00:25:10,600 --> 00:25:12,679 Speaker 1: was necessary if we aren't going to go into a 401 00:25:12,760 --> 00:25:16,320 Speaker 1: deep hole. And then finally we come to the FED. 402 00:25:17,440 --> 00:25:20,120 Speaker 1: Part of the blame that is related is the FED 403 00:25:20,240 --> 00:25:24,760 Speaker 1: started tightening too late. There's unanimity on that. Jerome Powell 404 00:25:24,880 --> 00:25:29,439 Speaker 1: himself has said that numerous times we goofed that wasn't 405 00:25:29,520 --> 00:25:31,280 Speaker 1: that's not the way to talk. After of the Chairman 406 00:25:31,320 --> 00:25:34,000 Speaker 1: of the FED, but he said, we goofed and we 407 00:25:34,000 --> 00:25:38,840 Speaker 1: should have raised interest rates earlier than we should and 408 00:25:38,960 --> 00:25:43,040 Speaker 1: that's right. But if you try to put magnitudes to 409 00:25:43,200 --> 00:25:47,119 Speaker 1: that through models that we used to estimate the effects 410 00:25:47,160 --> 00:25:55,760 Speaker 1: of monetary policy, remembering also that the mistake was maybe 411 00:25:55,840 --> 00:26:00,199 Speaker 1: a delay being three to six months too late, not 412 00:26:00,320 --> 00:26:04,199 Speaker 1: two years too late, it's hard to come for me 413 00:26:04,280 --> 00:26:07,640 Speaker 1: to come up with big numbers on that. So, yes, 414 00:26:07,960 --> 00:26:11,840 Speaker 1: the mistake of the FED did contribute to inflation, but 415 00:26:11,920 --> 00:26:14,720 Speaker 1: I don't I put it closer to the bottom of 416 00:26:14,720 --> 00:26:32,880 Speaker 1: the list than to the top of the list. One 417 00:26:32,920 --> 00:26:37,960 Speaker 1: other very interesting anecdote you talk about is the downturn 418 00:26:38,040 --> 00:26:40,440 Speaker 1: in the first quarter of nineteen eighty and you said 419 00:26:40,480 --> 00:26:45,520 Speaker 1: consumers voluntarily stepped stopped spending, They sort of stepped into 420 00:26:45,560 --> 00:26:50,280 Speaker 1: do their part to help out, which is I don't know. 421 00:26:50,320 --> 00:26:55,080 Speaker 1: I just find that so so fascinating because the Prince, 422 00:26:55,240 --> 00:26:58,639 Speaker 1: the data princes that we've gotten in recent weeks have 423 00:26:58,800 --> 00:27:03,840 Speaker 1: shown really strong retail spending numbers, etc. Etc. So maybe 424 00:27:03,840 --> 00:27:06,080 Speaker 1: you can tell us more about that. It was the 425 00:27:06,119 --> 00:27:10,680 Speaker 1: second quarter of nineteen eighty at Jimmy Carter was president, 426 00:27:10,760 --> 00:27:13,520 Speaker 1: and inflation, of course, was the problem of the day, 427 00:27:14,000 --> 00:27:17,439 Speaker 1: the economic problem of the day. In a speech, he 428 00:27:17,560 --> 00:27:20,639 Speaker 1: urged people to put away their credit cards and not 429 00:27:20,880 --> 00:27:25,280 Speaker 1: use them and spend less. He also pushed Paul Volker, 430 00:27:25,359 --> 00:27:29,639 Speaker 1: who wasn't too happy about it, to invoke credit controls 431 00:27:29,640 --> 00:27:33,520 Speaker 1: on banks, something we don't normally do, and Volca was 432 00:27:33,640 --> 00:27:40,359 Speaker 1: very unhappy about doing it, but felt that Carter was 433 00:27:40,480 --> 00:27:42,840 Speaker 1: giving him him in the fence such a free reign 434 00:27:42,960 --> 00:27:48,560 Speaker 1: to do nasty things that were against Carter's political interest, 435 00:27:48,640 --> 00:27:51,120 Speaker 1: that he ought at least go along and do that. 436 00:27:51,240 --> 00:27:56,040 Speaker 1: But coming to what you asked, an astonishing number of 437 00:27:56,160 --> 00:27:59,920 Speaker 1: people tore up their credit cards and wrote to the 438 00:28:00,119 --> 00:28:03,439 Speaker 1: White House, here's my torn up credit card. I'm not 439 00:28:03,600 --> 00:28:06,879 Speaker 1: using it anymore to try to help the fight against inflation. 440 00:28:07,480 --> 00:28:09,840 Speaker 1: I don't remember what I thought at the time, but 441 00:28:09,960 --> 00:28:12,760 Speaker 1: I'm sure I was astonished. To take you back a 442 00:28:12,800 --> 00:28:17,320 Speaker 1: little bit further, it was only about six years earlier 443 00:28:18,000 --> 00:28:24,280 Speaker 1: that Jerry Ford as president, tried something similar. They were 444 00:28:24,320 --> 00:28:29,920 Speaker 1: issuing wind buttons with inflation. Now, wi n I still 445 00:28:29,920 --> 00:28:33,639 Speaker 1: have mine as an historical souvenir. It was a joke. 446 00:28:34,680 --> 00:28:39,400 Speaker 1: Nobody did anything, so I certainly didn't think Carter's urging 447 00:28:39,440 --> 00:28:42,480 Speaker 1: people to tear up their credit cards wasn't going to 448 00:28:42,560 --> 00:28:47,200 Speaker 1: do anything. But boy was I wrong, and consumer spending 449 00:28:47,320 --> 00:28:51,680 Speaker 1: just fell off a cliffs. It almost it sort of 450 00:28:51,720 --> 00:28:54,400 Speaker 1: looked like what happened at the beginning of the pandemic 451 00:28:55,480 --> 00:28:58,520 Speaker 1: that was a bigger cliff, but a smaller version of 452 00:28:58,560 --> 00:29:02,640 Speaker 1: that happened in the second quarter of nineteen eighty. It 453 00:29:02,720 --> 00:29:08,080 Speaker 1: was so severe the contraction that both Vulcar and Carter 454 00:29:08,280 --> 00:29:13,280 Speaker 1: got scared, like this economy sliding down hill really rapidly, 455 00:29:13,720 --> 00:29:17,120 Speaker 1: and Volca eased up on monetary policy and Carter reversed 456 00:29:17,400 --> 00:29:21,920 Speaker 1: field and took away the controls. But while it lasted, 457 00:29:21,960 --> 00:29:24,840 Speaker 1: it was a whopper. I just can't imagine people ripping 458 00:29:24,880 --> 00:29:28,760 Speaker 1: up their credit cards today. Well neither could I. Then. Yeah, 459 00:29:28,840 --> 00:29:32,280 Speaker 1: if you asked me if Joe Biden did the same today, 460 00:29:32,520 --> 00:29:37,120 Speaker 1: would people listen? My guess is no. But I I 461 00:29:37,240 --> 00:29:42,120 Speaker 1: remember having the same guests in the Jimmy Carter case. Well, 462 00:29:42,160 --> 00:29:45,120 Speaker 1: it gets to the notion of communication, at least you 463 00:29:45,160 --> 00:29:48,720 Speaker 1: know from the White House, can be influential. I remember 464 00:29:48,720 --> 00:29:51,760 Speaker 1: reading that, Yeah, Carter, people would actually mail their ripped 465 00:29:51,800 --> 00:29:54,680 Speaker 1: up cards to the to the White House. I mentioned 466 00:29:54,720 --> 00:29:56,959 Speaker 1: at some point maybe you wanted to tape them back 467 00:29:57,000 --> 00:30:03,000 Speaker 1: together and send them back turn asunder. But um, but uh, professor, 468 00:30:03,000 --> 00:30:05,800 Speaker 1: I wanted to get to that notion of FED communications. 469 00:30:05,840 --> 00:30:08,760 Speaker 1: You know you said earlier how in the Greenspan era, 470 00:30:09,760 --> 00:30:14,240 Speaker 1: Alan Greenspan wouldn't necessarily come out and push back against 471 00:30:14,280 --> 00:30:20,040 Speaker 1: the market's interpretation of FED policy. Obviously, in this era, 472 00:30:20,280 --> 00:30:23,920 Speaker 1: Chair Pal has been very vocal about more communication is better. 473 00:30:24,440 --> 00:30:27,160 Speaker 1: But I feel like it's a it's a difficult needle 474 00:30:27,200 --> 00:30:31,200 Speaker 1: to thread because say, you know, you're the FED chair 475 00:30:32,120 --> 00:30:35,920 Speaker 1: and you do believe that inflation is under control and 476 00:30:36,040 --> 00:30:38,800 Speaker 1: that it'll continue to normalize and maybe by the end 477 00:30:38,840 --> 00:30:41,520 Speaker 1: of the year we'll be back at two percent. That's 478 00:30:41,560 --> 00:30:46,680 Speaker 1: a dangerous opinion to communicate to the market because investors 479 00:30:46,720 --> 00:30:50,320 Speaker 1: hear it, the markets go wild, stocks go up, yields 480 00:30:50,320 --> 00:30:52,640 Speaker 1: come down, and you run the risk of loosening the 481 00:30:52,760 --> 00:30:56,400 Speaker 1: financial conditions enough to to sort of defeat your own purposes. So, 482 00:30:57,480 --> 00:31:01,560 Speaker 1: you know, I hate to use the word subter future misleading, 483 00:31:01,600 --> 00:31:05,440 Speaker 1: but it's it possible that fedeficials kind of come across 484 00:31:05,440 --> 00:31:08,240 Speaker 1: a little more hawkish than maybe they are in their hearts. 485 00:31:08,280 --> 00:31:10,360 Speaker 1: In order to avoid that type of thing. Yeah, I 486 00:31:10,400 --> 00:31:13,240 Speaker 1: think so. I think so. And what I was going 487 00:31:13,320 --> 00:31:18,360 Speaker 1: to say, what they definitely do is stay away from 488 00:31:18,480 --> 00:31:25,680 Speaker 1: interesting or colorful adjectives and adverbs. Be boring. It boring, Lee, 489 00:31:26,560 --> 00:31:28,200 Speaker 1: you know, just the opposite of what you want to 490 00:31:28,200 --> 00:31:32,760 Speaker 1: do in the media show. That's why everything's modest and moderate. 491 00:31:32,880 --> 00:31:36,880 Speaker 1: And yeah, I mean they use boring pros and in 492 00:31:36,960 --> 00:31:40,560 Speaker 1: the statements, in the formal statements, as you know, you say, 493 00:31:41,080 --> 00:31:43,360 Speaker 1: tend to see the same words over and over and 494 00:31:43,400 --> 00:31:46,680 Speaker 1: over again. You know, if you think that's designed to 495 00:31:46,680 --> 00:31:49,680 Speaker 1: put you to sleep, it is. They don't want you 496 00:31:49,720 --> 00:31:52,800 Speaker 1: getting hyper excited because they know. And this is the 497 00:31:52,840 --> 00:31:57,960 Speaker 1: other point, it's inherent in the financial world they live 498 00:31:58,000 --> 00:32:01,960 Speaker 1: in that markets will over act. This is not a 499 00:32:02,000 --> 00:32:05,360 Speaker 1: surprise to the Fed. This is not somebody it wasn't expecting. 500 00:32:06,040 --> 00:32:09,680 Speaker 1: It's always expecting markets to overreact, and they just about 501 00:32:09,720 --> 00:32:13,040 Speaker 1: always do the nice thing. So that's the bad thing 502 00:32:13,040 --> 00:32:15,920 Speaker 1: about markets. The nice thing about markets is they tend 503 00:32:15,960 --> 00:32:19,880 Speaker 1: to self correct when they see, oh, the Fed's not 504 00:32:19,920 --> 00:32:27,000 Speaker 1: going to cut interest rates next month, they reprice securities 505 00:32:27,600 --> 00:32:31,800 Speaker 1: so they do correct. And to come back to the 506 00:32:31,800 --> 00:32:36,800 Speaker 1: way you introduced this question, the FED nowadays, not in 507 00:32:36,840 --> 00:32:40,640 Speaker 1: the old days, but nowadays helps them with that by 508 00:32:40,680 --> 00:32:45,080 Speaker 1: basically saying, politely, you guys got it wrong, and here's 509 00:32:45,080 --> 00:32:47,440 Speaker 1: the way you should be thinking about what we're thinking. 510 00:32:48,800 --> 00:32:50,920 Speaker 1: That was what I was alluding to. Alan Greensman just 511 00:32:51,000 --> 00:32:55,040 Speaker 1: refused to do that in the nineties. He wouldn't, but 512 00:32:55,160 --> 00:32:57,880 Speaker 1: Ben Bernanke started doing it, Janet Yellen did it, and 513 00:32:58,000 --> 00:33:00,840 Speaker 1: Jay Powell does it. You also said in the book 514 00:33:01,040 --> 00:33:05,880 Speaker 1: that you once asked Volker how monetary policy crushes inflation 515 00:33:05,960 --> 00:33:10,400 Speaker 1: and he said by causing bankruptcies. Yeah, you're a close reader. 516 00:33:10,520 --> 00:33:14,800 Speaker 1: I gasped when I read that. She's in three different 517 00:33:14,800 --> 00:33:18,160 Speaker 1: book clubs. Professor, She's you're a close reader. And yes, 518 00:33:18,200 --> 00:33:21,720 Speaker 1: I was shocked by that. I mean, yeah, very surprised 519 00:33:21,720 --> 00:33:24,440 Speaker 1: by that too. This was a conversation we had pulled 520 00:33:24,480 --> 00:33:30,320 Speaker 1: vocal between FED jobs. Spent the year or two years 521 00:33:30,360 --> 00:33:33,360 Speaker 1: as a visiting professor at Princeton, and I had a 522 00:33:33,480 --> 00:33:39,240 Speaker 1: number of discussions with him, and I was engaged, as 523 00:33:39,280 --> 00:33:42,640 Speaker 1: a lot of macroeconomists were engaged in different theories of 524 00:33:42,680 --> 00:33:47,360 Speaker 1: how monetary policy works. So one day at lunch, I figured, well, 525 00:33:47,360 --> 00:33:49,880 Speaker 1: I have the former chairman of the FED right here. 526 00:33:50,560 --> 00:33:52,120 Speaker 1: Let me ask him how he thought it worked that. 527 00:33:52,200 --> 00:33:54,400 Speaker 1: That's what he gave me as an answer, not that 528 00:33:54,480 --> 00:33:58,880 Speaker 1: he relished it, but he thought that's how it actually worked. So, professor, 529 00:33:58,960 --> 00:34:01,960 Speaker 1: let's kind of get you were state of mind right 530 00:34:01,960 --> 00:34:04,480 Speaker 1: now for how the rest of the year turns out. 531 00:34:05,080 --> 00:34:09,440 Speaker 1: Is it basically a plateau in rates and still that 532 00:34:09,560 --> 00:34:12,200 Speaker 1: chance of a soft landing amid that? Is that a 533 00:34:12,280 --> 00:34:14,520 Speaker 1: fair characterization? I don't. I don't think we're at the 534 00:34:14,560 --> 00:34:17,680 Speaker 1: plateau yet. Yeah, I think the FED is going to 535 00:34:17,760 --> 00:34:20,920 Speaker 1: go up a bit more and then probably plateau and 536 00:34:21,000 --> 00:34:26,280 Speaker 1: watch what happens. Soft landings are tough, and the heart 537 00:34:27,239 --> 00:34:29,440 Speaker 1: the higher the FED goes, the tougher it is to 538 00:34:29,520 --> 00:34:34,279 Speaker 1: land softly. And so the odds are moving in the 539 00:34:34,320 --> 00:34:38,440 Speaker 1: wrong direction right now. But I you know, if I 540 00:34:38,520 --> 00:34:41,880 Speaker 1: was betting on this, depending of course, on the definition 541 00:34:41,920 --> 00:34:44,560 Speaker 1: of the bed of what's a soft landing, I guess 542 00:34:44,560 --> 00:34:49,120 Speaker 1: I would handicap it as just a hair below fifty 543 00:34:49,200 --> 00:34:53,920 Speaker 1: percent chance. And an important part of that, Mike, by 544 00:34:53,960 --> 00:34:58,520 Speaker 1: the way, is that unlike some previous feds in history, 545 00:34:59,440 --> 00:35:02,959 Speaker 1: including the one I served on in the nineties, this 546 00:35:03,200 --> 00:35:07,560 Speaker 1: FOMC wants to achieve a soft landing if it can. 547 00:35:09,480 --> 00:35:12,799 Speaker 1: Many of them have said that, either directly or indirectly, 548 00:35:13,160 --> 00:35:16,680 Speaker 1: and that includes Chairman Powell. If you had asked Paul 549 00:35:16,760 --> 00:35:20,800 Speaker 1: Volker in nineteen eighty one, are you shooting it for 550 00:35:20,840 --> 00:35:24,000 Speaker 1: a soft landing, he'd a laugh, He said, with this 551 00:35:24,080 --> 00:35:26,440 Speaker 1: kind of a problem, there's no way we land softly. 552 00:35:27,040 --> 00:35:29,359 Speaker 1: This is going to be a crash landing. But and 553 00:35:29,440 --> 00:35:31,640 Speaker 1: what's interesting in your book you point out, you know, 554 00:35:31,680 --> 00:35:35,279 Speaker 1: I think many people believe that it's a pipe dream 555 00:35:35,320 --> 00:35:37,279 Speaker 1: to engineer a soft landing. But as you put on 556 00:35:37,320 --> 00:35:40,160 Speaker 1: the book, it's it's happened. It has happened several times 557 00:35:40,200 --> 00:35:43,640 Speaker 1: in history. Yes, yeah, it depends on your definition, but 558 00:35:43,640 --> 00:35:47,480 Speaker 1: but yes, it has happened several times in history. Yeah, well, 559 00:35:47,680 --> 00:35:52,200 Speaker 1: fingers crossed, it happens again. With that said, professor, we 560 00:35:52,239 --> 00:35:53,920 Speaker 1: can't let you go just yet, because we have a 561 00:35:53,920 --> 00:35:58,160 Speaker 1: tradition on this podcast where we all like to observe 562 00:35:58,280 --> 00:36:01,759 Speaker 1: the craziest things we've seen in markets and economics and 563 00:36:02,360 --> 00:36:05,319 Speaker 1: whatever's in your wheelhouse in the last week or so. 564 00:36:05,920 --> 00:36:08,480 Speaker 1: Then why don't you start, what's the craziest thing you've 565 00:36:08,480 --> 00:36:12,160 Speaker 1: seen in the past week. I think this technically was 566 00:36:12,960 --> 00:36:16,239 Speaker 1: from at the It came out at the end of 567 00:36:16,280 --> 00:36:18,640 Speaker 1: the prior week, but I'm gonna go with it because 568 00:36:18,640 --> 00:36:24,319 Speaker 1: it's striking. Okay, Blackstones CEO Steve Schwartzman, did you see this. 569 00:36:26,560 --> 00:36:29,279 Speaker 1: I'd have to hear the rest. Okay, No, he's been 570 00:36:29,320 --> 00:36:32,560 Speaker 1: in the news quite a bit. This is big. He 571 00:36:32,719 --> 00:36:37,239 Speaker 1: took home a record one point two seven billion dollars 572 00:36:37,800 --> 00:36:43,000 Speaker 1: in twenty twenty two. One point two seven Be like, boy, 573 00:36:43,480 --> 00:36:45,400 Speaker 1: not bad work if you can get it, Professor, what 574 00:36:45,440 --> 00:36:53,680 Speaker 1: do you think that's more than Princeton pays me? You know, 575 00:36:53,719 --> 00:36:56,160 Speaker 1: I don't want to talk down to your audience, but 576 00:36:56,320 --> 00:36:59,680 Speaker 1: some of the rewards in the financial sector seemed way 577 00:36:59,719 --> 00:37:03,799 Speaker 1: out of line with their contributions to society. That's a 578 00:37:03,880 --> 00:37:06,640 Speaker 1: good thing. It's a good thing. C Schwartzman isn't listening 579 00:37:06,640 --> 00:37:11,560 Speaker 1: to this podcast. Even if he is, I don't think 580 00:37:11,560 --> 00:37:14,279 Speaker 1: there's much debate on that. That's that's pretty good, all right. 581 00:37:14,440 --> 00:37:18,000 Speaker 1: I'll give you mine. Uh Maiden's courtesy of the Twitter 582 00:37:18,080 --> 00:37:24,719 Speaker 1: user Zoran law Vanny. It's on the Hustle dot Co website. Dona, 583 00:37:24,800 --> 00:37:27,200 Speaker 1: what was your favorite toy as a child. I had 584 00:37:27,320 --> 00:37:31,600 Speaker 1: this Barbie that I really wanted and my mom got 585 00:37:31,640 --> 00:37:33,800 Speaker 1: it for me for my birthday, and if you press 586 00:37:33,920 --> 00:37:38,120 Speaker 1: this button on like her abdomen, she sang a song 587 00:37:39,000 --> 00:37:41,400 Speaker 1: and I and I wanted it for forever. And the 588 00:37:42,080 --> 00:37:45,840 Speaker 1: day I got it, my sister took the doll. She 589 00:37:45,960 --> 00:37:49,000 Speaker 1: was so mad jealous, I guess, and ran it over 590 00:37:49,040 --> 00:37:52,120 Speaker 1: with her tricycle like fifty times. Like she basically flattened 591 00:37:52,120 --> 00:37:56,320 Speaker 1: the Barbie pancake. Oh my goodness, that is that's a 592 00:37:57,080 --> 00:37:59,600 Speaker 1: traumatic memory to be brigg it up for you. My 593 00:37:59,600 --> 00:38:02,600 Speaker 1: sister listens to the podcast, so I have to call 594 00:38:02,640 --> 00:38:07,160 Speaker 1: her for being evil. Well, Biden's related because my favorite 595 00:38:07,160 --> 00:38:10,040 Speaker 1: toy was hot wheels, you know, the little toy cars, 596 00:38:10,400 --> 00:38:14,640 Speaker 1: And apparently Mattel had such a hit with Barbie that 597 00:38:14,640 --> 00:38:16,320 Speaker 1: they came out. They're like, well now we got to 598 00:38:16,360 --> 00:38:18,360 Speaker 1: sell something to the boys, so they came out with 599 00:38:18,400 --> 00:38:22,239 Speaker 1: hot wheels. So the story on the Hustle dot com 600 00:38:22,480 --> 00:38:26,840 Speaker 1: website talks about this guy, Bruce Pascal, who's got a 601 00:38:26,920 --> 00:38:31,680 Speaker 1: one point five million dollar collection of hot wheels. Pretty 602 00:38:31,680 --> 00:38:35,040 Speaker 1: extensive collection. But in order to turn this into our 603 00:38:35,120 --> 00:38:39,360 Speaker 1: game show, the prices precise. I want you to guess 604 00:38:40,400 --> 00:38:43,799 Speaker 1: the most expensive, most highly valued hot wheels. It hasn't 605 00:38:43,800 --> 00:38:47,399 Speaker 1: sold in a while. But what the collector's estimate is 606 00:38:47,719 --> 00:38:51,600 Speaker 1: the most highly valued hot whale in his collection, And 607 00:38:51,640 --> 00:38:54,880 Speaker 1: I'll give you a little details on here. It was 608 00:38:54,920 --> 00:38:59,959 Speaker 1: a prototype for the nineteen sixty nine rearloading beach Bomb, 609 00:39:00,360 --> 00:39:02,000 Speaker 1: which was basically kind of looks like one of those 610 00:39:02,000 --> 00:39:05,200 Speaker 1: old Volkswagen vans has a surfboard coming out the back. 611 00:39:05,920 --> 00:39:08,520 Speaker 1: There are only forty some of them made, but this 612 00:39:08,600 --> 00:39:12,800 Speaker 1: was the actual prototype. Um So, so what's your bid? 613 00:39:12,880 --> 00:39:16,000 Speaker 1: What's your bid on that for this one car? One 614 00:39:16,280 --> 00:39:22,520 Speaker 1: nineteen sixty nine rear loading beach Bomb surfer Van hot wheels? Okay, 615 00:39:22,760 --> 00:39:25,160 Speaker 1: then I'll go with two hundred thousand dollars. Two hundred 616 00:39:25,200 --> 00:39:30,400 Speaker 1: thousand dollars, very quick, quick and uh confident answer on 617 00:39:30,480 --> 00:39:32,960 Speaker 1: your part, professor, What do you think if you're if 618 00:39:32,960 --> 00:39:35,480 Speaker 1: you're on the prices right, what are you been for 619 00:39:35,560 --> 00:39:39,560 Speaker 1: the world's most expensive hot wheel? Definitely less than hundred 620 00:39:39,560 --> 00:39:42,840 Speaker 1: thousand dollars. I'll tell you what you just both taught me. 621 00:39:44,040 --> 00:39:48,759 Speaker 1: My six year old grandson as a burgeoning collection of 622 00:39:49,280 --> 00:39:52,040 Speaker 1: hot wheels, I'm gonna make sure he doesn't do with 623 00:39:52,080 --> 00:39:54,560 Speaker 1: it what I did with my collection of baseball cards 624 00:39:55,080 --> 00:39:57,279 Speaker 1: when I was six. What'd you do with that, I 625 00:39:57,400 --> 00:39:59,319 Speaker 1: just let it go to rotten. We put him in 626 00:39:59,360 --> 00:40:02,640 Speaker 1: a bicycles spokes, took them outside in the rain, and 627 00:40:03,680 --> 00:40:06,839 Speaker 1: you know, yeah, I probably had a Mickey mantle from 628 00:40:06,960 --> 00:40:11,640 Speaker 1: nineteen fifty something, but I don't have it anymore. It 629 00:40:11,800 --> 00:40:14,200 Speaker 1: was putting up though, I'm gonna go lower. One hundred thousand, 630 00:40:14,280 --> 00:40:17,160 Speaker 1: hundred thousand. Well, you guys split the difference perfectly. It 631 00:40:17,239 --> 00:40:20,920 Speaker 1: was one hundred and fifty thousand dollars. Is the value? 632 00:40:21,160 --> 00:40:24,560 Speaker 1: So I think prices precise roles. We have to give 633 00:40:24,600 --> 00:40:28,200 Speaker 1: it to a professor bondary here you think another item 634 00:40:28,239 --> 00:40:31,520 Speaker 1: for your resume. There, professor, you win. The prices precise. 635 00:40:32,680 --> 00:40:36,400 Speaker 1: I'm not buying, not really betting on that hot wheel. 636 00:40:37,520 --> 00:40:40,760 Speaker 1: How about you Alt? Have you seen anything crazy recently? Sure? 637 00:40:42,320 --> 00:40:47,680 Speaker 1: To me, almost everything about cryptocurrency is crazy. So you 638 00:40:47,719 --> 00:40:52,319 Speaker 1: can start with Sam and it doesn't stop with that 639 00:40:52,480 --> 00:40:55,480 Speaker 1: company was once valued in the market at twenty five 640 00:40:55,520 --> 00:40:59,319 Speaker 1: billion dollars. I'll put that up as crazy. Yeah, what 641 00:40:59,440 --> 00:41:03,760 Speaker 1: do you think it? Is? It the loose monetary policy 642 00:41:03,800 --> 00:41:07,120 Speaker 1: that a lot of people blame. As an economics professor 643 00:41:07,120 --> 00:41:10,920 Speaker 1: in historin with your credentials things like that, how do 644 00:41:10,920 --> 00:41:15,040 Speaker 1: you explain the booming crypto. There have been fads and 645 00:41:15,200 --> 00:41:19,880 Speaker 1: crazes like that throughout history. I when I talk about 646 00:41:19,880 --> 00:41:22,960 Speaker 1: the stock market in economics one on one, I tell 647 00:41:23,080 --> 00:41:27,520 Speaker 1: my students that the first bubble in the stock market 648 00:41:27,600 --> 00:41:31,240 Speaker 1: happened with the very first company. It was the south 649 00:41:31,280 --> 00:41:35,640 Speaker 1: Sea Bubble in England, the first listing company basically, and 650 00:41:35,719 --> 00:41:39,080 Speaker 1: already they having a bubble, so people have gone crazy. 651 00:41:39,080 --> 00:41:42,400 Speaker 1: And then there was the tulip of craze, and yeah, 652 00:41:42,440 --> 00:41:45,640 Speaker 1: the tech stock craze, and you know, you go on 653 00:41:45,680 --> 00:41:49,920 Speaker 1: and on and on. It just happens in speculative markets. Oh, 654 00:41:50,160 --> 00:41:54,920 Speaker 1: just inevitable sort of human nature to people who get 655 00:41:55,000 --> 00:42:02,040 Speaker 1: hyper excited about the new new thing, and and they 656 00:42:02,160 --> 00:42:06,600 Speaker 1: wind up paying outrageous prices. Yeah. Yeah, you only know 657 00:42:06,640 --> 00:42:11,800 Speaker 1: they're outrageous later, right right, right, Well, great perspective, Professor 658 00:42:11,800 --> 00:42:15,480 Speaker 1: Alan Binder, Princeton University. We really appreciate your time and 659 00:42:15,520 --> 00:42:17,839 Speaker 1: your your insights. I think you really helped a lot 660 00:42:17,840 --> 00:42:21,200 Speaker 1: of us think about the current state of affairs, especially 661 00:42:21,200 --> 00:42:24,799 Speaker 1: from that that really important historical perspective that you bring 662 00:42:24,840 --> 00:42:27,760 Speaker 1: with your new book. It's called A Monetary and Fiscal 663 00:42:27,840 --> 00:42:31,200 Speaker 1: History of the United States nineteen sixty one to twenty 664 00:42:31,280 --> 00:42:33,439 Speaker 1: twenty one. Thank you so much for your time. Nice 665 00:42:33,440 --> 00:42:44,680 Speaker 1: to be with you. Thank you, Professor What Goes Up. 666 00:42:44,760 --> 00:42:47,719 Speaker 1: We'll be back next week. Until then, you can find 667 00:42:47,800 --> 00:42:51,440 Speaker 1: us on the Bloomberg Terminal website and app, or wherever 668 00:42:51,640 --> 00:42:54,160 Speaker 1: you get your podcast. We'd love it if you took 669 00:42:54,200 --> 00:42:56,239 Speaker 1: the time to rate and review the show so more 670 00:42:56,280 --> 00:42:59,360 Speaker 1: listeners can find us. And you can find us on Twitter, 671 00:43:00,200 --> 00:43:04,800 Speaker 1: follow me at Veldona Hirich. Mike Reagan is at Reaganonymous. 672 00:43:05,440 --> 00:43:09,719 Speaker 1: You can also follow Bloomer Podcasts at podcasts. What Goes 673 00:43:09,840 --> 00:43:12,400 Speaker 1: Up is produced by Stacy Wong and our head of 674 00:43:12,440 --> 00:43:15,759 Speaker 1: Podcasts is Sage Baldman. Thanks for listening and we'll see 675 00:43:15,760 --> 00:43:16,359 Speaker 1: you next week.