1 00:00:15,076 --> 00:00:25,356 Speaker 1: Pushkin. This is solvable on Jacob Weisberg. Every time you 2 00:00:25,516 --> 00:00:28,036 Speaker 1: browse around online, you have a teeny bit of power 3 00:00:28,076 --> 00:00:30,796 Speaker 1: as a consumer in what you elevate and amplify and 4 00:00:31,076 --> 00:00:36,156 Speaker 1: engage with. Since its beginnings, the Internet was meant to 5 00:00:36,196 --> 00:00:40,796 Speaker 1: be a vehicle for free, uncensored communication. Though the Internet 6 00:00:40,876 --> 00:00:43,556 Speaker 1: is international, the model was in many respects based on 7 00:00:43,596 --> 00:00:47,196 Speaker 1: the First Amendment, which guarantees the right to free expression 8 00:00:47,436 --> 00:00:50,516 Speaker 1: in the United States. But as we've all seen in 9 00:00:50,556 --> 00:00:55,596 Speaker 1: recent years, free speech can also suppress speech. The same 10 00:00:55,716 --> 00:00:59,916 Speaker 1: freedom that promotes creativity and collaboration can become a tool 11 00:00:59,996 --> 00:01:05,356 Speaker 1: to spread lies and propaganda. Misinformation usually refers to facts 12 00:01:05,356 --> 00:01:09,276 Speaker 1: that turn out to be wrong, and disinformation refers to 13 00:01:09,316 --> 00:01:13,636 Speaker 1: wrong facts that are being deliberately peddled for a political end. 14 00:01:13,836 --> 00:01:18,956 Speaker 1: So it's the more kind of sinister version. Disinformation now 15 00:01:18,996 --> 00:01:24,956 Speaker 1: threatens American democracy directly. Malicious foreign actors, including the Russian government, 16 00:01:25,236 --> 00:01:29,876 Speaker 1: are taking active measures to so confusion and cynicism, and 17 00:01:29,956 --> 00:01:35,556 Speaker 1: it's unclear where the responsibility falls for separating facts from falsehoods. 18 00:01:36,716 --> 00:01:38,996 Speaker 1: If you don't want the government to have any power 19 00:01:39,076 --> 00:01:41,836 Speaker 1: over online speech, then you have to recognize that you 20 00:01:41,876 --> 00:01:44,716 Speaker 1: have made mark Zuckerberg and Jack Dorsey at Twitter and 21 00:01:44,756 --> 00:01:49,036 Speaker 1: whoever runs YouTube the czars of speech. So you just 22 00:01:49,116 --> 00:01:52,756 Speaker 1: got to reckon with that. I mean, the First Amendment 23 00:01:52,796 --> 00:01:55,796 Speaker 1: is the closest thing to religion and the households I've 24 00:01:56,196 --> 00:02:00,876 Speaker 1: lived in, and the idea that it's broken or needs 25 00:02:00,916 --> 00:02:06,276 Speaker 1: to be modified or limited in some way is I mean, honestly, 26 00:02:06,316 --> 00:02:08,396 Speaker 1: I can only go back to these religious terms. It 27 00:02:08,436 --> 00:02:12,196 Speaker 1: feels herre icle to me, Yes, I know you and 28 00:02:12,276 --> 00:02:16,236 Speaker 1: lots of people in my Twitter timeline. I deeply think 29 00:02:16,276 --> 00:02:19,956 Speaker 1: it's crucial to every democracy to protect free speech. I 30 00:02:20,036 --> 00:02:22,596 Speaker 1: think what Americans need to reconsider is how we are 31 00:02:22,636 --> 00:02:26,076 Speaker 1: protecting free speech. Emily Basilon is a staff writer with 32 00:02:26,156 --> 00:02:29,196 Speaker 1: The New York Times magazine. In her recent story The 33 00:02:29,316 --> 00:02:32,956 Speaker 1: Problem of Free Speech in an Age of Disinformation, she 34 00:02:33,116 --> 00:02:36,836 Speaker 1: explores the way free speech is being abused. I wanted 35 00:02:36,876 --> 00:02:39,796 Speaker 1: to talk to her about that problem and what we 36 00:02:39,916 --> 00:02:47,756 Speaker 1: might do about it. Disinformation is a solvable problem. We 37 00:02:47,876 --> 00:02:50,676 Speaker 1: have this ideal of free speech, which is that there's 38 00:02:50,716 --> 00:02:54,156 Speaker 1: a marketplace of ideas out there, that more speech is 39 00:02:54,156 --> 00:02:57,436 Speaker 1: always better because the good ideas will win out in 40 00:02:57,476 --> 00:03:00,836 Speaker 1: the end. It's a kind of fundamentally optimistic idea. It 41 00:03:00,876 --> 00:03:04,276 Speaker 1: comes originally from the political philosopher John Stuart Mill and 42 00:03:04,396 --> 00:03:07,316 Speaker 1: his book on Liberty in the nineteenth century, and then 43 00:03:07,356 --> 00:03:09,916 Speaker 1: it kind of comes into Supreme court land in the 44 00:03:09,956 --> 00:03:13,676 Speaker 1: twentieth century. But it often just turns out not to 45 00:03:13,716 --> 00:03:17,396 Speaker 1: be true. There are various eras in history where propaganda 46 00:03:17,436 --> 00:03:21,476 Speaker 1: and false ideas have actually won the day. In politics, 47 00:03:21,996 --> 00:03:24,596 Speaker 1: you can think about the Nazis, you can think about 48 00:03:24,636 --> 00:03:30,716 Speaker 1: times of Soviet Union, communism, other nineteen thirties examples of fascism, 49 00:03:30,756 --> 00:03:34,676 Speaker 1: and more recent governments in places like Brazil and India 50 00:03:34,836 --> 00:03:38,556 Speaker 1: where disinformation has really won out. And so I think 51 00:03:38,596 --> 00:03:41,716 Speaker 1: that we are flirting with that possibility in a scary 52 00:03:41,756 --> 00:03:44,996 Speaker 1: way in the United States right now. The fact is 53 00:03:45,036 --> 00:03:48,596 Speaker 1: the marketplace of ideas was always a pretty shaky concept, 54 00:03:48,716 --> 00:03:52,756 Speaker 1: and so free speech is really important to our democracy, 55 00:03:52,836 --> 00:03:55,996 Speaker 1: but we need, I think, to reconceptualize how we think 56 00:03:55,996 --> 00:03:58,276 Speaker 1: about it and how we protect it in a way 57 00:03:58,316 --> 00:04:02,636 Speaker 1: that really protects the speech that supports the democracy instead 58 00:04:02,676 --> 00:04:05,036 Speaker 1: of threatening it. Just so we Yet our terms clear 59 00:04:05,196 --> 00:04:10,236 Speaker 1: say a little about how disinformation with a D differs 60 00:04:10,316 --> 00:04:13,316 Speaker 1: from misinformation with an M. Yeah, I mean these are 61 00:04:13,436 --> 00:04:16,356 Speaker 1: sort of recent terms that are only I think the 62 00:04:16,396 --> 00:04:19,396 Speaker 1: definitions are becoming clear kind of as we speak. But 63 00:04:19,836 --> 00:04:24,036 Speaker 1: misinformation usually refers to facts that turn out to be wrong, 64 00:04:24,516 --> 00:04:28,676 Speaker 1: and disinformation refers to wrong facts that are being deliberately 65 00:04:28,796 --> 00:04:32,396 Speaker 1: peddled for a political end. So it's the more kind 66 00:04:32,436 --> 00:04:38,476 Speaker 1: of sinister version. Yeah, disinformation, intentional deception, often fueled by 67 00:04:38,636 --> 00:04:42,156 Speaker 1: malicious actors of different kinds, is sort of crowding out 68 00:04:42,316 --> 00:04:45,196 Speaker 1: the good information. I mean, there's a term in economics 69 00:04:45,236 --> 00:04:48,716 Speaker 1: called Gresham's law, where you know, the bad money, the 70 00:04:48,756 --> 00:04:52,236 Speaker 1: money that's fake gold kind of is circulating everywhere and 71 00:04:52,276 --> 00:04:55,676 Speaker 1: the real money disappears from the marketplace. In a way, 72 00:04:55,676 --> 00:04:58,436 Speaker 1: that's something like that happening with information right where there's 73 00:04:58,476 --> 00:05:02,596 Speaker 1: just all of this swirling nonsense depending on where you 74 00:05:02,636 --> 00:05:05,796 Speaker 1: get your information from, and you can't tell what's the 75 00:05:05,876 --> 00:05:09,676 Speaker 1: good information or if there's any good information in that context. Ray. 76 00:05:09,756 --> 00:05:11,796 Speaker 1: So one way to think about this is that it 77 00:05:11,916 --> 00:05:14,836 Speaker 1: used to be hard to speak. We had gatekeepers, We 78 00:05:14,876 --> 00:05:20,356 Speaker 1: had these traditional media companies that had a real hold 79 00:05:20,436 --> 00:05:23,476 Speaker 1: and sort of control over speech. Now it's really easy 80 00:05:23,516 --> 00:05:26,036 Speaker 1: to speak, but it's very hard to be heard. And 81 00:05:26,156 --> 00:05:29,356 Speaker 1: some of what we see in disinformation campaigns is a 82 00:05:29,396 --> 00:05:33,036 Speaker 1: deliberate effort to drown out true speech or to smear 83 00:05:33,116 --> 00:05:38,196 Speaker 1: the reputations of people, especially online, so that they'll effectively 84 00:05:38,236 --> 00:05:40,476 Speaker 1: be silenced. They all leave the space, they won't keep 85 00:05:40,556 --> 00:05:43,196 Speaker 1: trying to talk. And so it's the use of speech 86 00:05:43,236 --> 00:05:46,196 Speaker 1: to suppress speech, and that is very challenging for our 87 00:05:46,236 --> 00:05:48,996 Speaker 1: American First Amendment to deal with. I mean, you had 88 00:05:48,996 --> 00:05:51,796 Speaker 1: I thought a really good example in your piece, which 89 00:05:51,956 --> 00:05:54,516 Speaker 1: was a meme. My eye hadn't come across that the 90 00:05:54,636 --> 00:05:58,916 Speaker 1: Democrats were threatening to secede from the country if they 91 00:05:58,996 --> 00:06:01,836 Speaker 1: lost the election. Just tell that story in brief, because 92 00:06:01,836 --> 00:06:05,276 Speaker 1: it was such a tidy example of sort of you know, 93 00:06:05,356 --> 00:06:08,556 Speaker 1: in the famous like Mark Twain, like a lie that 94 00:06:08,636 --> 00:06:10,836 Speaker 1: got halfway around the world before the truth got its 95 00:06:10,836 --> 00:06:12,636 Speaker 1: boots on him. It's just a piece of nonsense that's 96 00:06:12,636 --> 00:06:16,316 Speaker 1: spread like wildfire. Right. Yeah. So over the summer, a 97 00:06:16,436 --> 00:06:23,396 Speaker 1: group of academics and former administration officials, former campaign staffers, posters, 98 00:06:23,756 --> 00:06:27,596 Speaker 1: they got together take game out the twenty twenty election, 99 00:06:27,996 --> 00:06:30,476 Speaker 1: and they played out various scenarios in which one or 100 00:06:30,516 --> 00:06:33,836 Speaker 1: the other candidate won. It was close, there was litigation, 101 00:06:33,956 --> 00:06:37,916 Speaker 1: there wasn't They're basically testing the system of American democracy 102 00:06:38,436 --> 00:06:42,236 Speaker 1: and Rosa Brooks, who was one of the co organizers 103 00:06:42,276 --> 00:06:44,756 Speaker 1: of this project, wrote an essay in The Washington Post 104 00:06:44,756 --> 00:06:46,476 Speaker 1: in which he mentioned that in one of the several 105 00:06:46,756 --> 00:06:51,876 Speaker 1: hypothetical scenarios, Biden won the popular vote, Belosi Electoral College, 106 00:06:51,956 --> 00:06:57,076 Speaker 1: and fictional team Biden talked about trying to ask California 107 00:06:57,116 --> 00:07:00,196 Speaker 1: and the Pacific Northwest threatened to secede as a way 108 00:07:00,236 --> 00:07:03,396 Speaker 1: of pressuring Republicans to add more seeds to the Senate. 109 00:07:03,676 --> 00:07:07,076 Speaker 1: There's just a sentence about this in Rosa Brooks's essay. 110 00:07:07,956 --> 00:07:11,756 Speaker 1: Out of that sentence comes an article by Michael Anton, 111 00:07:11,876 --> 00:07:15,916 Speaker 1: a former Chump official and a conservative publication, arguing that 112 00:07:15,956 --> 00:07:20,196 Speaker 1: a coup is coming. And from that article comes an 113 00:07:20,196 --> 00:07:24,076 Speaker 1: appearance by another Chump official on Tucker Carlson Show talking 114 00:07:24,116 --> 00:07:28,516 Speaker 1: about this fictional threat of a democratic coup, a very 115 00:07:28,596 --> 00:07:33,156 Speaker 1: popular right wing podcaster named Dan Bongino. He shows up 116 00:07:33,276 --> 00:07:36,036 Speaker 1: making videos about this that are getting millions and millions 117 00:07:36,076 --> 00:07:40,356 Speaker 1: of views on social media. President Trump tweets in praise 118 00:07:40,556 --> 00:07:44,116 Speaker 1: of a publication called Revolver News, a right wing website 119 00:07:44,156 --> 00:07:47,836 Speaker 1: which is also spreading this false story. And what you 120 00:07:47,876 --> 00:07:50,116 Speaker 1: see here all the parts of the right wing media 121 00:07:50,316 --> 00:07:55,516 Speaker 1: ecosystem coming together to really give a big platform to 122 00:07:55,596 --> 00:07:58,436 Speaker 1: this made up idea that the Democrats are planning a coup. 123 00:07:58,876 --> 00:08:04,076 Speaker 1: It's like a malignant game of telephone exactly. It's a 124 00:08:04,076 --> 00:08:07,036 Speaker 1: propaganda feedback loop. Yeah, I mean you use that to 125 00:08:07,516 --> 00:08:13,156 Speaker 1: illustrate your argument that the First Amendment isn't serving democracy 126 00:08:13,196 --> 00:08:17,396 Speaker 1: in America. The First Amendment is being used to advance 127 00:08:17,476 --> 00:08:21,916 Speaker 1: propaganda disinformation, and it is not. It's not doing what 128 00:08:21,956 --> 00:08:25,556 Speaker 1: it's supposed to do, which is get information to voters 129 00:08:25,596 --> 00:08:29,556 Speaker 1: and help them make decisions. It's such a striking thing 130 00:08:29,596 --> 00:08:32,756 Speaker 1: to say, and so obviously true in many respects, but 131 00:08:33,596 --> 00:08:35,556 Speaker 1: I mean, I'll say I still have a hard time 132 00:08:36,396 --> 00:08:40,116 Speaker 1: accepting criticism of the First Amendment. I mean, I'm a journalist, 133 00:08:40,156 --> 00:08:42,676 Speaker 1: you're a journalist. You know I grew up in an 134 00:08:42,676 --> 00:08:45,356 Speaker 1: Afilu family. I mean, the First Amendment is the closest 135 00:08:45,396 --> 00:08:49,276 Speaker 1: thing to religion and the households I've lived in, and 136 00:08:49,396 --> 00:08:54,836 Speaker 1: the idea that it's broken or needs to be modified 137 00:08:55,036 --> 00:08:58,236 Speaker 1: or limited in some way is I mean, honestly, I 138 00:08:58,236 --> 00:09:00,596 Speaker 1: can only go back to these religious terms. It feels 139 00:09:00,636 --> 00:09:03,796 Speaker 1: heretical to me. Yes, I know you and lots of 140 00:09:03,796 --> 00:09:06,716 Speaker 1: people in my Twitter timeline, so I guess I'll say 141 00:09:06,716 --> 00:09:09,036 Speaker 1: two things. I do not mean to be making an 142 00:09:09,236 --> 00:09:13,316 Speaker 1: argument against free speech. Like I deeply think it's crucial 143 00:09:13,356 --> 00:09:16,476 Speaker 1: to every democracy to protect free speech. I think what 144 00:09:16,556 --> 00:09:19,876 Speaker 1: Americans need to reconsider is how we are protecting free speech. 145 00:09:20,196 --> 00:09:23,916 Speaker 1: Our First Amendment has come to put corporate interests, in 146 00:09:23,956 --> 00:09:28,156 Speaker 1: particular corporate spending on elections on par with the shouting 147 00:09:28,156 --> 00:09:32,116 Speaker 1: of protesters. That is not the way other democracies think 148 00:09:32,156 --> 00:09:35,756 Speaker 1: about free speech in Europe and Canada and elsewhere. And 149 00:09:35,956 --> 00:09:41,036 Speaker 1: that sort of libertarian corporatization of free speech and of 150 00:09:41,036 --> 00:09:43,076 Speaker 1: the First Amendment. I think that's what we failed to 151 00:09:43,116 --> 00:09:46,036 Speaker 1: grapple with. But it actually is the kind of underlying 152 00:09:46,076 --> 00:09:51,156 Speaker 1: framework for both why the social media sphere circulates disinformation 153 00:09:51,196 --> 00:09:53,756 Speaker 1: the way that it does, and also why we have 154 00:09:53,796 --> 00:09:57,436 Speaker 1: a broken traditional media system in which we have underinvested 155 00:09:57,476 --> 00:10:00,996 Speaker 1: in trusted public broadcasting. And again that is a big 156 00:10:01,036 --> 00:10:04,476 Speaker 1: contrast between us and some of our pure countries in Europe. Right, 157 00:10:04,756 --> 00:10:08,076 Speaker 1: I mean, someone like we believe the First Amendment isn't 158 00:10:08,116 --> 00:10:12,196 Speaker 1: just important for democratic purpose, it's a human right. That is, 159 00:10:12,236 --> 00:10:14,396 Speaker 1: it's you know, it's something that belongs to people. I 160 00:10:14,436 --> 00:10:17,716 Speaker 1: don't believe it's a human right that belongs to non humans, 161 00:10:17,796 --> 00:10:22,156 Speaker 1: i e. Corporations who maybe persons under a kind of 162 00:10:22,236 --> 00:10:25,356 Speaker 1: legal fiction but aren't don't have human rights per se. 163 00:10:25,796 --> 00:10:28,316 Speaker 1: But doesn't this all just go back to this series 164 00:10:28,356 --> 00:10:31,316 Speaker 1: of Supreme Court decisions? I mean, is the problem with 165 00:10:31,396 --> 00:10:34,036 Speaker 1: the First Amendment or is it simply with the way 166 00:10:34,476 --> 00:10:39,276 Speaker 1: a conservative Supreme Court has used the First Amendment to 167 00:10:39,316 --> 00:10:43,516 Speaker 1: protect commercial interests at the expensive democratic interest. I mean, 168 00:10:43,556 --> 00:10:45,516 Speaker 1: it's the latter. The problem is not the text of 169 00:10:45,516 --> 00:10:48,396 Speaker 1: the First Amendment right which protects our freedom of speech 170 00:10:48,436 --> 00:10:50,796 Speaker 1: and freedom of assembly and the freedom of the press. 171 00:10:51,236 --> 00:10:53,516 Speaker 1: It's a line of Supreme Court cases that start in 172 00:10:53,556 --> 00:10:57,516 Speaker 1: the seventies and take off in the eighties and basically 173 00:10:57,596 --> 00:11:01,596 Speaker 1: culminate in Citizens United, which gave corporation so much more 174 00:11:01,716 --> 00:11:04,956 Speaker 1: ability to contribute to political campaigns. There are some other 175 00:11:04,996 --> 00:11:08,116 Speaker 1: cases that come into play here too, involving labor unions. 176 00:11:08,236 --> 00:11:11,196 Speaker 1: And it's really as Justice Elena Kagan put a kind 177 00:11:11,236 --> 00:11:14,156 Speaker 1: of weaponizing of the First Amendment. And then I think 178 00:11:14,196 --> 00:11:16,556 Speaker 1: the other strand of this that's important and that I 179 00:11:16,676 --> 00:11:18,396 Speaker 1: learned a lot about when I was writing my piece 180 00:11:18,636 --> 00:11:24,036 Speaker 1: is the deregulation of traditional media by the Reagan administration. 181 00:11:24,076 --> 00:11:26,516 Speaker 1: In the eighties. So when you go back to the 182 00:11:26,516 --> 00:11:30,076 Speaker 1: beginning of radio and TV, starting in nineteen twelve, you 183 00:11:30,116 --> 00:11:33,716 Speaker 1: have Congress passing laws that are include the idea of 184 00:11:33,756 --> 00:11:37,076 Speaker 1: a public interest, a public interest obligation by the people 185 00:11:37,076 --> 00:11:41,316 Speaker 1: who are getting our broadband space. Right, Like we the 186 00:11:41,316 --> 00:11:44,676 Speaker 1: American people, own the broadband. We are giving you a 187 00:11:44,676 --> 00:11:47,316 Speaker 1: place on the radio dial or on the TV dial, 188 00:11:47,356 --> 00:11:51,476 Speaker 1: and in return we expect some attention to the public interest. 189 00:11:51,916 --> 00:11:55,596 Speaker 1: That idea lasts until the late eighties, and then it 190 00:11:55,636 --> 00:11:58,476 Speaker 1: really goes away during the Reagan administration, and I think 191 00:11:58,476 --> 00:12:01,196 Speaker 1: that's part of what leads to the rise of Fox 192 00:12:01,276 --> 00:12:04,876 Speaker 1: News and talk radio like Rush Limbaugh. I'm not making 193 00:12:04,916 --> 00:12:09,836 Speaker 1: an argument about conservative media because it's conservative, but I 194 00:12:09,876 --> 00:12:13,236 Speaker 1: am talking about the way in which Fox and commentators 195 00:12:13,236 --> 00:12:17,436 Speaker 1: like Limbaugh really spread disinformation more than the mainstream or 196 00:12:17,436 --> 00:12:19,716 Speaker 1: the liberal media. I mean, there's a lot of evidence 197 00:12:19,756 --> 00:12:23,236 Speaker 1: to back up that thesis, right, But you're arguing that 198 00:12:23,596 --> 00:12:27,116 Speaker 1: Western European democracies that don't have the First Amendment per 199 00:12:27,156 --> 00:12:32,796 Speaker 1: se maybe doing free speech better because their version of 200 00:12:32,876 --> 00:12:37,076 Speaker 1: free speech doesn't prevent them from having reasonable regulation around campaigns. 201 00:12:37,436 --> 00:12:42,676 Speaker 1: They have national broadcasters like the BBC that are generally reliable, 202 00:12:42,716 --> 00:12:46,156 Speaker 1: trusted sources of information, and those are all good things, 203 00:12:46,476 --> 00:12:49,036 Speaker 1: but they also those go in hand in hand with 204 00:12:49,116 --> 00:12:53,316 Speaker 1: limitations that we would be in the United States more 205 00:12:53,356 --> 00:12:57,116 Speaker 1: reluctant to accept, certainly those of us who are journalists. 206 00:12:56,636 --> 00:13:01,956 Speaker 1: There's less protection for truth findings through journalism. It's easier 207 00:13:01,996 --> 00:13:04,916 Speaker 1: to sue people for libel. And of course there are 208 00:13:04,996 --> 00:13:09,556 Speaker 1: tougher restrictions on what people would call hate speech. That is, 209 00:13:09,556 --> 00:13:13,836 Speaker 1: there are things, you know, political things, ideas that express 210 00:13:13,916 --> 00:13:16,396 Speaker 1: animals that you know, can't be said in certain in 211 00:13:16,676 --> 00:13:19,236 Speaker 1: certain places. That's you know, that's it's just a more 212 00:13:19,356 --> 00:13:24,356 Speaker 1: limited conception of what free speech allows. I think that's true, 213 00:13:24,716 --> 00:13:27,276 Speaker 1: especially about hate speech. And I think if you are 214 00:13:27,316 --> 00:13:31,236 Speaker 1: really opposed to banning hate speech, then Europe looks like 215 00:13:31,276 --> 00:13:34,716 Speaker 1: a problem because they do punish people for widely disseminated 216 00:13:34,756 --> 00:13:37,756 Speaker 1: hate speech. In Europe, they have a trifferent tradition. Their 217 00:13:37,876 --> 00:13:41,196 Speaker 1: tradition comes out of the fact that the Nazis rose 218 00:13:41,236 --> 00:13:44,436 Speaker 1: to power because they were elected, and so in Europe 219 00:13:44,476 --> 00:13:49,276 Speaker 1: there is this deep sense that anti democratic ideas can 220 00:13:49,356 --> 00:13:52,276 Speaker 1: be terribly threatening and they're just kind of done with 221 00:13:52,316 --> 00:13:55,356 Speaker 1: them and willing to regulate them and ban them in 222 00:13:55,396 --> 00:13:57,756 Speaker 1: a way that we are not. It's a kind of 223 00:13:58,276 --> 00:14:02,436 Speaker 1: more pessimistic view of the marketplace of ideas than we have. 224 00:14:02,956 --> 00:14:05,796 Speaker 1: I guess the question and you know here we are unsolvable, 225 00:14:05,876 --> 00:14:07,836 Speaker 1: and I want to, you know, focus on now when 226 00:14:07,876 --> 00:14:10,996 Speaker 1: are we solving the problem the conversation we can on 227 00:14:11,196 --> 00:14:18,436 Speaker 1: exactly that. You know, what is the solution in broad strokes, Well, 228 00:14:18,476 --> 00:14:20,676 Speaker 1: I think if you are thinking in a kind of 229 00:14:20,716 --> 00:14:25,516 Speaker 1: blue sky way, you could start with investment in traditional 230 00:14:25,556 --> 00:14:29,716 Speaker 1: media in the United States on par with European countries, 231 00:14:29,996 --> 00:14:33,196 Speaker 1: for example, like the BBC in the United Kingdom or 232 00:14:33,596 --> 00:14:37,156 Speaker 1: RD in Germany. And I think especially important is creating 233 00:14:37,196 --> 00:14:44,316 Speaker 1: outlets or more opportunity for competition that conservative audiences will trust. 234 00:14:44,556 --> 00:14:46,916 Speaker 1: So you know, we have lots of fact checking of 235 00:14:46,996 --> 00:14:49,556 Speaker 1: Fox from outlets like CNN and the New York Times 236 00:14:49,556 --> 00:14:52,276 Speaker 1: where I work, but those are just not trusted outlets 237 00:14:52,276 --> 00:14:55,756 Speaker 1: in a conservative part of a country or conservative audience, 238 00:14:55,796 --> 00:14:59,756 Speaker 1: and so you would want to create more competition, particularly 239 00:14:59,756 --> 00:15:02,236 Speaker 1: in that space. The second thing that we're going to 240 00:15:02,476 --> 00:15:06,836 Speaker 1: watch the Europeans do is figure out how to make 241 00:15:06,956 --> 00:15:11,036 Speaker 1: the big social media platform MS more responsible, how to 242 00:15:11,196 --> 00:15:15,556 Speaker 1: essentially inject a public interest sense of obligation into what 243 00:15:15,596 --> 00:15:17,836 Speaker 1: they do. I think they're just going to do it 244 00:15:17,956 --> 00:15:23,476 Speaker 1: much faster than we are. One advantage in regulation I 245 00:15:23,516 --> 00:15:25,796 Speaker 1: think the Europeans have over the United States is that 246 00:15:26,116 --> 00:15:29,676 Speaker 1: these big social media companies they're American companies, they're not 247 00:15:29,756 --> 00:15:34,276 Speaker 1: European companies. And so in United States Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, 248 00:15:34,516 --> 00:15:36,476 Speaker 1: they show up in Congress and they say, hey, if 249 00:15:36,476 --> 00:15:38,836 Speaker 1: you don't protect us, you're going to empower the Chinese 250 00:15:38,956 --> 00:15:41,396 Speaker 1: TikTok is going to take over the world. The Europeans 251 00:15:41,396 --> 00:15:43,836 Speaker 1: aren't particularly moved by that argument. They don't feel the 252 00:15:43,876 --> 00:15:47,436 Speaker 1: same need to protect American corporations, and I think that 253 00:15:47,596 --> 00:15:49,676 Speaker 1: is why they're going to lead the way in figuring 254 00:15:49,716 --> 00:15:53,476 Speaker 1: out how to have just a healthier social media environment. 255 00:15:53,716 --> 00:15:57,996 Speaker 1: Although these companies have big lobbying operations in Brussels, they're 256 00:15:58,636 --> 00:16:02,236 Speaker 1: working the European legislators the same as they're working the 257 00:16:02,236 --> 00:16:05,756 Speaker 1: ones here. Absolutely, I mean, I yes, I'm glad you 258 00:16:05,836 --> 00:16:07,836 Speaker 1: said that they just don't have the kind of home 259 00:16:07,916 --> 00:16:12,196 Speaker 1: team antis, but they are absolutely spending lots of money 260 00:16:12,356 --> 00:16:15,196 Speaker 1: doing exactly that. And there are a range of things 261 00:16:15,196 --> 00:16:17,916 Speaker 1: to talk about here. I mean, I don't I am 262 00:16:17,956 --> 00:16:22,076 Speaker 1: not in favor of direct government regulation of speech online. Like, 263 00:16:22,116 --> 00:16:24,516 Speaker 1: I don't think we should create a federal Department of 264 00:16:24,556 --> 00:16:28,436 Speaker 1: Content moderation. But what we could do, or what the 265 00:16:28,476 --> 00:16:31,516 Speaker 1: Europeans may well do, is start requiring, first of all, 266 00:16:31,596 --> 00:16:35,516 Speaker 1: much more transparency from these companies. Well, let's dig into 267 00:16:35,516 --> 00:16:38,756 Speaker 1: the social media part of it first, because you know, 268 00:16:38,916 --> 00:16:44,596 Speaker 1: here we have a conundrum. We've given these companies permission 269 00:16:44,676 --> 00:16:47,276 Speaker 1: to not be responsible for what they've published. This is 270 00:16:47,276 --> 00:16:50,476 Speaker 1: the so called Section two thirty that says as long 271 00:16:50,516 --> 00:16:56,436 Speaker 1: as their platforms and not publishers, they're not legally culpable 272 00:16:56,476 --> 00:17:01,556 Speaker 1: and what publishers are. And they've generally taken that to mean, well, 273 00:17:01,836 --> 00:17:03,956 Speaker 1: you know, it's not up to us whether something is true, 274 00:17:04,076 --> 00:17:07,156 Speaker 1: it's not. We don't decide what's good information and what's 275 00:17:07,196 --> 00:17:10,556 Speaker 1: bad information. All we have to do is take things 276 00:17:10,556 --> 00:17:13,436 Speaker 1: down if they vile a copyright or I guess increasingly 277 00:17:13,716 --> 00:17:18,836 Speaker 1: if they are proven false. They may limit the spread 278 00:17:18,876 --> 00:17:22,036 Speaker 1: of them. At the moment, independent researchers can't even tell 279 00:17:22,036 --> 00:17:26,716 Speaker 1: you how prevalent disinformation and hate speech is on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, 280 00:17:26,756 --> 00:17:28,876 Speaker 1: and these are places that are not governed by the 281 00:17:28,876 --> 00:17:32,636 Speaker 1: First Amendment. They already police lots of speech, right, they're 282 00:17:32,676 --> 00:17:35,156 Speaker 1: not the public square. They sort of function that way, 283 00:17:35,156 --> 00:17:38,236 Speaker 1: but legally they have much more freedom to monitor speech 284 00:17:38,276 --> 00:17:41,036 Speaker 1: than the government does. They're not the government, they're companies. 285 00:17:41,316 --> 00:17:43,556 Speaker 1: But we don't even really know what they're doing when 286 00:17:43,596 --> 00:17:46,036 Speaker 1: they say that they're fact checking or putting fact checking 287 00:17:46,116 --> 00:17:50,836 Speaker 1: labels on posts, or reducing the spread of disinformation. We 288 00:17:50,916 --> 00:17:53,636 Speaker 1: have to trust their internal reports about the effects that 289 00:17:53,716 --> 00:17:56,796 Speaker 1: has we don't even know. So that's like one place 290 00:17:56,796 --> 00:17:59,876 Speaker 1: to start solving this problem is just literally to find 291 00:17:59,916 --> 00:18:03,596 Speaker 1: out what's going on inside those companies, and then we 292 00:18:03,636 --> 00:18:06,676 Speaker 1: can talk about other parts of this involving like the 293 00:18:06,716 --> 00:18:10,436 Speaker 1: way that their algorithm functions. Yeah, so a crucial suggestion 294 00:18:10,676 --> 00:18:13,756 Speaker 1: is if we're going to do something about disinformation, the 295 00:18:13,876 --> 00:18:18,756 Speaker 1: places that are the main avenues for disinformation. I eat 296 00:18:18,916 --> 00:18:21,516 Speaker 1: Twitter and Facebook more than any others, but the social 297 00:18:21,516 --> 00:18:25,116 Speaker 1: media platforms YouTube, Jacob, we got to include sorry, your 298 00:18:25,156 --> 00:18:27,756 Speaker 1: YouTube absolutely fem in there because they always we always 299 00:18:27,796 --> 00:18:29,876 Speaker 1: leave them out. They have to get good at dealing 300 00:18:29,916 --> 00:18:32,676 Speaker 1: with disincinformation. They have to get good at spotting it 301 00:18:32,996 --> 00:18:37,076 Speaker 1: and keeping it from spreading. And you know, the question is, 302 00:18:37,116 --> 00:18:39,836 Speaker 1: then do they are they going to do? Are they 303 00:18:39,876 --> 00:18:42,676 Speaker 1: incentive has to do that on their own will regulation 304 00:18:42,796 --> 00:18:46,556 Speaker 1: make them do that? Or are there rules like if 305 00:18:46,596 --> 00:18:49,676 Speaker 1: they adopt standard, setting up some sort of independent governing 306 00:18:49,716 --> 00:18:52,276 Speaker 1: body that will enforce the rules they set in a 307 00:18:52,316 --> 00:18:55,676 Speaker 1: consistent manner. Right. That's another thing that Europeans are talking 308 00:18:55,676 --> 00:18:59,276 Speaker 1: about is whether they should have some kind of government 309 00:18:59,276 --> 00:19:03,236 Speaker 1: agency that they don't even necessarily talking about setting the rules, 310 00:19:03,316 --> 00:19:06,196 Speaker 1: but saying to these platforms, Okay, what are your rules, 311 00:19:06,556 --> 00:19:08,636 Speaker 1: and then how can you show us that you're actually 312 00:19:08,916 --> 00:19:12,436 Speaker 1: in forcing them in a fair and comprehensive way. Like 313 00:19:12,516 --> 00:19:15,756 Speaker 1: that's a role you could imagine the government playing. Yeah, 314 00:19:15,876 --> 00:19:17,996 Speaker 1: what can we do about the other side of this, 315 00:19:18,116 --> 00:19:23,676 Speaker 1: the political side, the unlimited money, the undisclosed sources of 316 00:19:23,756 --> 00:19:29,836 Speaker 1: funding on political ads online. Absent a new Supreme Court 317 00:19:29,876 --> 00:19:34,796 Speaker 1: that revisits citizens United, how can we regulate politics in 318 00:19:34,836 --> 00:19:39,116 Speaker 1: a way that de weaponizes the First Amendment? Well, I mean, 319 00:19:39,316 --> 00:19:41,996 Speaker 1: there is nothing in the Supreme Court jurisprints that would 320 00:19:42,036 --> 00:19:46,996 Speaker 1: prevent Congress from requiring disclosure of funding sources for online ads, 321 00:19:47,076 --> 00:19:49,996 Speaker 1: just as they do for radio and television imprint that 322 00:19:50,116 --> 00:19:53,916 Speaker 1: is still available. Another possibility would be to ban or 323 00:19:53,956 --> 00:19:57,876 Speaker 1: regulate what's called microtargeting, which are these very narrow casted 324 00:19:57,916 --> 00:20:01,796 Speaker 1: ads online in which you can pick exactly who you 325 00:20:01,796 --> 00:20:04,596 Speaker 1: want to reach. You can send a more extremist kind 326 00:20:04,636 --> 00:20:07,196 Speaker 1: of message to one part of the electorate and then 327 00:20:07,756 --> 00:20:11,316 Speaker 1: more moderate ones to other parts. And if you're slicing 328 00:20:11,316 --> 00:20:14,636 Speaker 1: and dicing the electrode into very thin slices and sending 329 00:20:14,636 --> 00:20:17,956 Speaker 1: out lots of messages, the chances that people are going 330 00:20:17,996 --> 00:20:21,996 Speaker 1: to fact check all the messages you're sending are much lower. 331 00:20:22,036 --> 00:20:25,716 Speaker 1: Like people aren't even going to see the messages necessarily, 332 00:20:25,916 --> 00:20:27,876 Speaker 1: they may never surface in a way that they come 333 00:20:27,916 --> 00:20:30,676 Speaker 1: to the attention of the press. And so we've seen 334 00:20:30,796 --> 00:20:33,836 Speaker 1: a lot of domestic groups do this in this cycle. 335 00:20:33,916 --> 00:20:37,356 Speaker 1: This is what the Russians did in twenty sixteen. Microtargeted 336 00:20:37,396 --> 00:20:39,676 Speaker 1: ads are one thing. If you're buying shoes, maybe they're 337 00:20:39,676 --> 00:20:42,116 Speaker 1: a totally different thing. And we shouldn't allow campaigns and 338 00:20:42,236 --> 00:20:45,876 Speaker 1: issue advocacy groups to use them. That's one possibility. Isn't 339 00:20:45,916 --> 00:20:50,836 Speaker 1: another important part of it just the widespread consciousness that 340 00:20:50,876 --> 00:20:55,156 Speaker 1: we are prone to disinformation. I mean that there we 341 00:20:55,556 --> 00:20:57,556 Speaker 1: know more and more about how it works, we have 342 00:20:57,596 --> 00:21:01,236 Speaker 1: some ideas where it's coming from, and isn't that you know? 343 00:21:01,276 --> 00:21:04,476 Speaker 1: And that's that's like wearing masks during the pandemic, you 344 00:21:04,556 --> 00:21:09,116 Speaker 1: just have to take some basic precautions totally. I agree. 345 00:21:09,276 --> 00:21:11,276 Speaker 1: I guess what I worry about is that the people 346 00:21:11,316 --> 00:21:14,116 Speaker 1: who are aware of what you just said are not 347 00:21:14,156 --> 00:21:16,596 Speaker 1: the people who are falling for it. You know, sometimes 348 00:21:16,636 --> 00:21:18,596 Speaker 1: when I'm out reporting and I'm talking to people who 349 00:21:18,636 --> 00:21:21,796 Speaker 1: aren't journalists and don't really know very much about politics, 350 00:21:22,236 --> 00:21:25,396 Speaker 1: I just sense a level of exhaustion and confusion about 351 00:21:25,396 --> 00:21:28,436 Speaker 1: which sources of information to trust. And I think if 352 00:21:28,436 --> 00:21:31,916 Speaker 1: you're in that sphere and you're just really not sure 353 00:21:32,036 --> 00:21:35,596 Speaker 1: who's telling the truth, it's very hard to figure out 354 00:21:35,636 --> 00:21:39,916 Speaker 1: what to do because like your whole sense of trustworthy 355 00:21:39,956 --> 00:21:43,836 Speaker 1: information has been destabilized and kind of scrambled. I mean 356 00:21:44,436 --> 00:21:47,596 Speaker 1: an extreme example of this is Russia under putin, where 357 00:21:47,596 --> 00:21:52,876 Speaker 1: people just don't trust anything and I'm not sure what. Well, 358 00:21:53,716 --> 00:21:55,916 Speaker 1: it's not a good thing to say unsolvable. I think 359 00:21:55,996 --> 00:21:58,796 Speaker 1: that one thing we can do about that is a 360 00:21:58,836 --> 00:22:03,116 Speaker 1: longer term effort to really teach people about how social 361 00:22:03,156 --> 00:22:06,356 Speaker 1: media and media work, and that's important. In the more 362 00:22:06,596 --> 00:22:10,636 Speaker 1: short term, we also need to make sure that when 363 00:22:10,636 --> 00:22:12,756 Speaker 1: we talk about disinformation, we don't do it in a 364 00:22:12,756 --> 00:22:15,476 Speaker 1: way that makes it seem so overwhelming that we just 365 00:22:15,596 --> 00:22:18,636 Speaker 1: like exhaust all the people who are not super plugged 366 00:22:18,636 --> 00:22:22,396 Speaker 1: in and make them feel like politics is just useless 367 00:22:22,436 --> 00:22:25,356 Speaker 1: and not something that they can ever figure out. I 368 00:22:25,436 --> 00:22:30,036 Speaker 1: worry about that. Yeah, it's interesting. On coronavirus, the social 369 00:22:30,076 --> 00:22:33,516 Speaker 1: media companies at the outset took a pretty strong position 370 00:22:33,956 --> 00:22:38,276 Speaker 1: that they were going to take down disinformation because it 371 00:22:38,356 --> 00:22:41,436 Speaker 1: was so dangerous for obvious reasons, and they were pretty 372 00:22:41,436 --> 00:22:44,196 Speaker 1: good about that. On the one hand, it doesn't seem 373 00:22:44,276 --> 00:22:47,076 Speaker 1: to have had that much of an impact in that 374 00:22:47,116 --> 00:22:52,036 Speaker 1: there's still tremendous disinformation spreading and being believed by a 375 00:22:52,116 --> 00:22:55,916 Speaker 1: significant portion of the population. On the other hand, it's 376 00:22:55,916 --> 00:22:59,076 Speaker 1: a pretty good model for how they can get bad 377 00:22:59,116 --> 00:23:03,276 Speaker 1: information out of their systems when they want to. Yeah, 378 00:23:03,356 --> 00:23:07,556 Speaker 1: it's interesting because before coronavirus, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube would 379 00:23:07,556 --> 00:23:11,036 Speaker 1: almost always say like, we can't promote authoritative sources, that's 380 00:23:11,076 --> 00:23:15,116 Speaker 1: not our role. And then the World Health Organization came 381 00:23:15,156 --> 00:23:17,436 Speaker 1: to them in March and said we have an infodemic 382 00:23:17,516 --> 00:23:21,316 Speaker 1: on our hands, meaning like a pandemic of disinformation, and 383 00:23:21,396 --> 00:23:24,516 Speaker 1: the platform said okay, and they started trying to promote 384 00:23:24,516 --> 00:23:28,436 Speaker 1: information From the World Health Organization and the CDC. There 385 00:23:28,476 --> 00:23:32,036 Speaker 1: has still been a lot of misinformation about coronavirus online. 386 00:23:32,516 --> 00:23:34,676 Speaker 1: Trump has contributed to a lot of it. You know, 387 00:23:34,716 --> 00:23:38,116 Speaker 1: when Trump started talking about how you can inject disinfectant, 388 00:23:38,916 --> 00:23:42,116 Speaker 1: his words stayed up online, but also the social media 389 00:23:42,116 --> 00:23:46,036 Speaker 1: companies then left up other claims about bleach is disinfectant. 390 00:23:46,116 --> 00:23:49,276 Speaker 1: So there's some way in which Trump himself, at least 391 00:23:49,276 --> 00:23:52,716 Speaker 1: in the United States, is like a major causal factor, 392 00:23:52,876 --> 00:23:54,796 Speaker 1: and or at least we won't know how much it's 393 00:23:54,796 --> 00:23:59,436 Speaker 1: about him until we've moved into some post Donald Trump world. Emily, 394 00:23:59,476 --> 00:24:03,076 Speaker 1: we usually wrap up by asking what listeners can do 395 00:24:03,276 --> 00:24:05,756 Speaker 1: to help with the problem. I think this is one 396 00:24:05,876 --> 00:24:08,236 Speaker 1: where a lot of people have a lot of opinions, 397 00:24:08,276 --> 00:24:10,236 Speaker 1: But what do you think are the most important things 398 00:24:10,236 --> 00:24:14,316 Speaker 1: that ordinary people can do to fight the spread of disinformation. 399 00:24:15,156 --> 00:24:17,796 Speaker 1: The first thing is you can learn more about these issues, 400 00:24:17,916 --> 00:24:23,676 Speaker 1: especially on social media. The Stanford Internet Observatory Cyber Policy 401 00:24:23,756 --> 00:24:28,556 Speaker 1: Center does really interesting analysis of Twitter takedowns and other 402 00:24:29,036 --> 00:24:34,596 Speaker 1: social media developments, Facebook takedowns, and they also have a 403 00:24:34,596 --> 00:24:38,956 Speaker 1: link to the Election Integrity Partnership, another organization that's trying 404 00:24:39,036 --> 00:24:44,876 Speaker 1: to tackle electoral disinformation. There's a really interesting global activist 405 00:24:44,916 --> 00:24:48,676 Speaker 1: group called a VAZ that does. It's a VAAZ. They 406 00:24:48,716 --> 00:24:53,476 Speaker 1: do reports on misinformation and disinformation, and the Berkman Client 407 00:24:53,596 --> 00:24:57,036 Speaker 1: Center for Internet and Society at Harvard is another great resource. 408 00:24:57,796 --> 00:25:00,636 Speaker 1: And then I think another part of this is don't 409 00:25:00,756 --> 00:25:04,236 Speaker 1: share stories that come across your social media feed until 410 00:25:04,316 --> 00:25:06,596 Speaker 1: you're sure they are true. And I think this is 411 00:25:06,636 --> 00:25:09,756 Speaker 1: something that happens to all of us, like liberals as 412 00:25:09,756 --> 00:25:12,756 Speaker 1: well as conservatives. Friends of mine since I've been working 413 00:25:12,756 --> 00:25:15,516 Speaker 1: on this story have confessed to me various stories that 414 00:25:15,916 --> 00:25:18,276 Speaker 1: they looked true and then they turned out to be 415 00:25:18,316 --> 00:25:21,836 Speaker 1: totally wrong. So just be careful when you see things 416 00:25:21,876 --> 00:25:25,276 Speaker 1: coming across your feed, are they coming from a reliable source, 417 00:25:25,676 --> 00:25:27,996 Speaker 1: what kind of evidence do they look like they really 418 00:25:28,036 --> 00:25:31,236 Speaker 1: have behind them? Because what the companies are doing is 419 00:25:31,236 --> 00:25:33,556 Speaker 1: trying to make money, and they are algorithms right now 420 00:25:33,596 --> 00:25:36,516 Speaker 1: are driving and amplifying a lot of content because it's 421 00:25:36,516 --> 00:25:40,916 Speaker 1: hot and that it provokes emotions like outrage. And so 422 00:25:41,476 --> 00:25:45,676 Speaker 1: part of this is being a consumer of social media 423 00:25:45,916 --> 00:25:50,796 Speaker 1: or media who is trying to push these companies toward 424 00:25:51,276 --> 00:25:54,796 Speaker 1: a less profit driven and more public interest kind of model. 425 00:25:55,036 --> 00:25:57,836 Speaker 1: And how do people let social media companies know that 426 00:25:57,916 --> 00:26:00,516 Speaker 1: they want that? I mean literally, it's like what you 427 00:26:00,556 --> 00:26:04,716 Speaker 1: click on, what you respond to. The algorithms are promoting 428 00:26:04,716 --> 00:26:08,276 Speaker 1: the content that keeps people engaged, because the more data 429 00:26:08,316 --> 00:26:10,596 Speaker 1: about us and he's have, the more they have to 430 00:26:10,636 --> 00:26:14,156 Speaker 1: sell back to advertisers. If we're going to disrupt that 431 00:26:14,276 --> 00:26:17,236 Speaker 1: whole loop, it's going to be because we forced it 432 00:26:17,276 --> 00:26:20,596 Speaker 1: to happen. So if we have a different kind of 433 00:26:20,636 --> 00:26:23,876 Speaker 1: diet ourselves like that affects the algorithm in a healthy way. 434 00:26:24,276 --> 00:26:27,956 Speaker 1: So be careful what you share, lean on social media 435 00:26:28,036 --> 00:26:32,516 Speaker 1: companies to be more responsible and better actors themselves. And 436 00:26:32,556 --> 00:26:35,716 Speaker 1: then how about the political part. I mean, if Congress 437 00:26:35,796 --> 00:26:40,236 Speaker 1: were to do one thing and listeners were to write 438 00:26:40,276 --> 00:26:42,516 Speaker 1: their members of Congress asking for that one thing, what 439 00:26:42,516 --> 00:26:46,556 Speaker 1: would it be, Well, I have to choose one thing. Okay, 440 00:26:46,596 --> 00:26:49,196 Speaker 1: you can have as many. Well, certainly we should start 441 00:26:49,236 --> 00:26:52,236 Speaker 1: by requiring disclosure for online ads, just as they do 442 00:26:52,316 --> 00:26:54,916 Speaker 1: for radio and television and print. I mean, that just 443 00:26:55,076 --> 00:26:57,516 Speaker 1: makes sense, And there's by part as an interest in that. 444 00:26:57,996 --> 00:27:01,796 Speaker 1: I think beyond that, there are real questions that go 445 00:27:01,956 --> 00:27:05,796 Speaker 1: deeper about the Supreme Court line of cases that ends 446 00:27:05,796 --> 00:27:09,556 Speaker 1: and Citizens United, and basically how to get corporation out 447 00:27:09,636 --> 00:27:13,396 Speaker 1: of the dominant or near dominant place they have in 448 00:27:13,436 --> 00:27:17,916 Speaker 1: our political ecosystem, and that's about major political change. It 449 00:27:17,996 --> 00:27:22,556 Speaker 1: really is. It's unfortunately not a kind of medium sized solution. 450 00:27:26,076 --> 00:27:28,396 Speaker 1: Emily Basilon is a staff writer for The New York 451 00:27:28,396 --> 00:27:32,316 Speaker 1: Times magazine and the Truman Capote Fellow for Creative Writing 452 00:27:32,316 --> 00:27:35,556 Speaker 1: and Law at Yale Law School. Don't forget to check 453 00:27:35,556 --> 00:27:38,116 Speaker 1: out our show notes for links to the suggestions our 454 00:27:38,196 --> 00:27:40,836 Speaker 1: guest mate for ways that you can get involved in 455 00:27:40,836 --> 00:27:45,116 Speaker 1: solving these problems too. Next week, Solvable will discuss the 456 00:27:45,156 --> 00:27:48,796 Speaker 1: international rise of populism and how to solve it. I 457 00:27:48,836 --> 00:27:51,916 Speaker 1: hope you'll join us. Solvable is brought to you by 458 00:27:51,956 --> 00:27:56,156 Speaker 1: Pushkin Industries. Our show is produced by Camille Baptista, Senior 459 00:27:56,196 --> 00:28:00,716 Speaker 1: producer Jocelyn Frank. Catherine Girardo is our managing producer, and 460 00:28:00,756 --> 00:28:04,756 Speaker 1: our executive producer is Mia lo Bell. I'm Jacob Weisberg.