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Speaker 1: Let me read you the last text that guy, great

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Speaker 1: opportunity up ahead. A stock is about to go up

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Speaker 1: sixty percent. Would you like a trading signal? Here's another

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Speaker 1: one that I got earlier. Hi, Jennifer, what's the news?

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Speaker 1: That's all it says. I get these all the time.

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Speaker 1: You probably do too, maybe even call you Jennifer. And

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Speaker 1: it seems no matter what I do, these things keep

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Speaker 1: coming in. So scams themselves aren't new, but technology is

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Speaker 1: definitely adding to it.

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Speaker 2: What's changed is that now people are using computers to

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Speaker 2: do the communications, to create the communications, where previously they

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Speaker 2: would have literally had to press buttons on the phone.

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Speaker 2: It opens up the floodgates in terms of the volume

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Speaker 2: of messages that you can create, on the numbers of

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Speaker 2: people that you can hurt around the world.

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Speaker 1: Eric Prescons has been in a telecommunications business for a

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Speaker 1: long time. He's worked at T Mobile, at Sky, at WorldCom,

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Speaker 1: and that's just some of the places. In two thousand

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Speaker 1: and six, you founded a site called Comm's Risk, and

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Speaker 1: he left the Corporate World. Comm's Risk reports on the

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Speaker 1: telecom industry and specifically the crimes that are associated with it,

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Speaker 1: including the influx of scam texts, He says it. Scams

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Speaker 1: via text have risen over the last decade as technology

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Speaker 1: has made them easier to send on mass, and.

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Speaker 2: Then you had the pandemic and criminalists couldn't commit some

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Speaker 2: of the crimes that pretty musly committed before, So that

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Speaker 2: became an accelerant for those changes.

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Speaker 1: If it feels like you're getting more scam text these days,

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Speaker 1: it's not just your imagination. According to consumer reports, scam

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Speaker 1: texts have increased by fifty percent in the last year alone,

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Speaker 1: and they're not just increasing in number, they're getting a

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Speaker 1: lot more convincing.

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Speaker 2: The sophistication of now the criminal patents we're seeing is

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Speaker 2: a lot more elaborate than they were in the past.

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Speaker 2: This is a very rapid evolution we're seeing now where

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Speaker 2: we've gone from machines that make very very simple, repetitive

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Speaker 2: scam communications so now far more subtle patterns that may

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Speaker 2: not be so easy to identify.

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Speaker 1: Talking to Eric was an opportunity to get into the

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Speaker 1: world of text scams, how they're being sent, who's behind them,

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Speaker 1: and if there's anything you can do to stab them.

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Speaker 1: Just as a short answer to that last one, yes,

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Speaker 1: we probably could start scam text but it's a lot

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Speaker 1: more complicated than it sounds.

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Speaker 2: Sometimes our use on the triviality of scam an organized crime.

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Speaker 2: Oh you've got an annoying message. Oh I got a

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Speaker 2: phone call. I didn't like the phone call. We're not

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Speaker 2: seeing the bigger picture of how this is having an

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Speaker 2: impact on people's lives. That's become almost unimaginable.

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Speaker 1: From Kaleidoscope and iHeart podcasts, this is kill switch. I'm

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Speaker 1: Dexter Thomas.

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Speaker 3: I'm sharing. I'm sharing Goodbye.

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Speaker 1: When I say scam text, you probably know exactly what

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Speaker 1: I'm talking about. These are things like fake recruiter messages,

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Speaker 1: fake delivery messages, wrong number texts. Some of these are

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Speaker 1: obviously scams because they come from weird email addresses or

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Speaker 1: use weird characters and place of letters. These are all

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Speaker 1: workarounds that scammers are found to bypass some of the

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Speaker 1: security measures that telephone companies are put in place, but

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Speaker 1: some of the newer methods that scammers are using or

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Speaker 1: getting harder and harder to detect by the telephone networks

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Speaker 1: and by us. One that's getting really popular around the

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Speaker 1: world is called a simbox.

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Speaker 2: Think of them as phones, but with one hundred sim

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Speaker 2: cards or two hundred SIM cards in them, so instead

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Speaker 2: of like a phone making one call or sending out

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Speaker 2: one message at a time, it can do two hundred

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Speaker 2: things at once.

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Speaker 1: There's nothing nefarious about the basic technology behind these symboxes.

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Speaker 1: I mean, think of a phone with a dual SIM feature.

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Speaker 1: If you're in the middle of nowhere and the first

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Speaker 1: phone network dies, you can just switch over to the

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Speaker 1: other network. It's not that easy to do normally, but

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Speaker 1: if you have two simcards, one from your primary network

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Speaker 1: and one for your backup network, it's really easy to do.

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Speaker 1: So just imagine that would say dozens of SIM cards

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Speaker 1: or hundreds, and now you have the basic idea for

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Speaker 1: a symbox. From here, you can combine multiple symboxes to

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Speaker 1: make what people call a SIM fharm and that can

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Speaker 1: send out millions of messages per minute.

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Speaker 2: In New York, three hundred of these things were found

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Speaker 2: by the US Secret Service recently.

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Speaker 1: This was back in September, and we still don't know

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Speaker 1: a whole lot about this operation. What we do know

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Speaker 1: is what the Secret Service has told us, and they

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Speaker 1: reported that they uncovered a massive symbox operation in New York.

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Speaker 1: Three hundred symboxes containing a total of one hundred thousand

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Speaker 1: SIM cards spread across multiple abandoned apartment buildings within a

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Speaker 1: thirty five mile radius.

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Speaker 2: They could as send an AEMS message to every American

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Speaker 2: within twelve minutes. That's the level of capacity we're talking

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Speaker 2: about here.

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Speaker 1: That's not to say that they did that. We actually

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Speaker 1: don't know what these scammers were doing. One of the

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Speaker 1: agents on the investigation said that this operation could have

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Speaker 1: quote disabled cell phone towers and essentially shut down the

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Speaker 1: cell phone network in New York City. So it goes

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Speaker 1: beyond just sending some annoying texts. And again, the Secret

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Speaker 1: Service isn't really telling us what these scammers are doing.

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Speaker 1: But if we look at some other cases, we might

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Speaker 1: find some hits.

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Speaker 2: In Latvia, two hundred of these things were found, and

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Speaker 2: it's almost certainly the case that what happened in New

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Speaker 2: York was the same as what happened in Latvia. What

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Speaker 2: were they used for distributing child pornography extortion? But one

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Speaker 2: of the big things that they were being used for

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Speaker 2: was to receive one SMS message. Why would you want

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Speaker 2: to receive one SMS message? Well, if you're setting up

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Speaker 2: a WhatsApp account. It gets tied to a phone number.

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Speaker 2: So if you're creating all other spam scam accounts on WhatsApp,

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Speaker 2: you need somebody to provide the phone numbers to create

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Speaker 2: the accounts. They're using the SIM maybe only once then

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Speaker 2: throwing it away because they have the phone number. The

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Speaker 2: WhatsApp account gets validated because it received the one time

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Speaker 2: password by SMS to create the account, right, and then

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Speaker 2: it doesn't matter if even the telco blocks that SIM

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Speaker 2: card because the WhatsApp account exists. So you can create

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Speaker 2: hundreds of thousands of online accounts, and in the Latvia

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Speaker 2: they estimated that forty nine million online accounts had been

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Speaker 2: created by that particular criminal outfit.

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Speaker 1: Eric points out that scam messages are coming to us

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Speaker 1: in all different ways, not just through SMS messages, but

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Speaker 1: through WhatsApp, through Signal, and all kinds of different messaging apps.

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Speaker 1: Telecom companies can try to detect suspicious activity and block

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Speaker 1: certain numbers, but scammers are usually a step ahead, and

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Speaker 1: the latest technique bypasses the telephone companies completely. It's called

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Speaker 1: an SMS blaster.

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Speaker 2: That's a device that essentially does the same thing that

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Speaker 2: the radio antenna on a mobile phone network does. When

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Speaker 2: you connect to your mobile phone to the network. The

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Speaker 2: difference is it's not a legitimate part of the network,

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Speaker 2: so that's why they're called sometimes fake based stations, false

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Speaker 2: space stations, rogue based stations. When you're normally walking around

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Speaker 2: the city, walking around a town, or driving around, you're

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Speaker 2: going to be transferred from one base station to another

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Speaker 2: base station on your same provider's network, whichever is the

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Speaker 2: strongest signal. These rogue based stations will have the strongest

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Speaker 2: signal for people in their specific location. It's like being

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Speaker 2: connected to a network, except of course, now the base

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Speaker 2: station is a rogue one. It can fire lots of

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Speaker 2: messages at you, and that's typically how they're used.

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Speaker 1: These SMS blasters can connect to your phone without you noticing,

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Speaker 1: and once it's connected, it can send you messages and

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Speaker 1: because it's directly connected to you, the telecom company has

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Speaker 1: no ability to black it. An SMS blaster can also

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Speaker 1: spoof the cinder ID to look like, say, for example,

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Speaker 1: a legitimate text from your base So what's the stop

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Speaker 1: in SMS blaster from just spamming everyone in the country. Well,

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Speaker 1: they don't have very good range, but that doesn't really

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Speaker 1: matter because they're portable.

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Speaker 2: Just the other day, somebody had been using one of

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Speaker 2: these SMS blasters on the London Underground, the capital's subway system,

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Speaker 2: to fire out lots and lots of scam SMS messages

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Speaker 2: to people as they're standing on the platform or traveling

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Speaker 2: through the trains through the underground. Really in Auckland, for example,

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Speaker 2: there was a student. He was paid four hundred dollars

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Speaker 2: a day to drive around one of these devices sending

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Speaker 2: scam SMS messages to whoever was in range. And then

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Speaker 2: the point of the message is it includes a hyperlink

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Speaker 2: that points towards a phishing website that impersonates something that

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Speaker 2: looks like for legitimate business or government function.

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Speaker 1: The technology behind SMS blasters, again was not developed specifically

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Speaker 1: for scamming. It's just been co opted by the scammers.

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Speaker 1: It's actually similar to the technology behind what's known as stingrays.

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Speaker 1: You might have heard about stingrays recently. Those are the

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Speaker 1: devices that police sometimes use to capture data from people

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Speaker 1: at protests. But instead of taking data off your phone

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Speaker 1: for surveillance, the SMS blasters push data on your phone

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Speaker 1: in the form of very convincing scam texts.

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Speaker 2: We're not talking about a completely new, separate technology that

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Speaker 2: was the only creates for criminals. We're talking about radio

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Speaker 2: technology for communications networks, and it's just being adapted slightly

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Speaker 2: tweaked for a different kind of view.

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Speaker 1: So in a way, these almost sound kind of primitive.

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Speaker 1: I mean, it's really just like brute forcing its way

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Speaker 1: into your phones. But you got to drive up pretty close.

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Speaker 1: What is the range of these things is like a

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Speaker 1: couple of miles or something like that.

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Speaker 2: It varies. Some of them are less, so you could

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Speaker 2: have a handheld device that has only a few hundred yards.

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Speaker 2: The advantage of that, of course, much more discrete, much

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Speaker 2: easier to carry around. There's been cases where people have

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Speaker 2: carried them around in backpacks through show malls, for example.

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Speaker 2: Or you might have a larger device with a larger

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Speaker 2: range than heavier, so you'll have to put it in

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Speaker 2: the back of the car or somewhere like that. In

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Speaker 2: one case in Bangkok, there was said to be a

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Speaker 2: particularly powerful device that had a range of three kilometers

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Speaker 2: and was able to send something in the order of

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Speaker 2: one hundred thousand SMS messages per hour. Wow, but that's

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Speaker 2: not necessarily a good thing. In terms of being a criminal,

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Speaker 2: because you don't want to be caught. And that's why

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Speaker 2: I would argue the London underground example I talked about,

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Speaker 2: that's like almost the perfect example because it's about how

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Speaker 2: many people you have passing by. You don't necessarily need

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Speaker 2: to have.

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Speaker 1: A huge range. So that's in background on how you're

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Speaker 1: getting these texts. It's kind of wild to think that

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Speaker 1: when you get one of these, it could just be

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Speaker 1: some random person with a backpack across the street. So

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Speaker 1: who are these people and what do they actually want?

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Speaker 1: That's where it starts to get heavy, and that's after

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Speaker 1: the break. I want to walk through a sample scam

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Speaker 1: text and if you could tell me what's going on here?

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Speaker 1: What are they trying to do? So I'm just going

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Speaker 1: to read you one here. Hi. I'm Caroline from the

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Speaker 1: We Work Remotely human resources team. We recently saw your

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Speaker 1: excellent background would like to introduce you to a remote,

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Speaker 1: high paying job opportunity. The work is so easy you

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Speaker 1: can do it from home. You'll work about sixty minutes

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Speaker 1: a day and will provide you with free training. Daily

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Speaker 1: pay ranges from three hundred to seven hundred. If you're interested,

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Speaker 1: please contact us via WhatsApp or telegram. What's the endgame here?

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Speaker 2: There's a couple of things going on. The always bear

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Speaker 2: in mind that criminal is just looking for potential victims.

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Speaker 2: Some people are more suggestible, some people are more open

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Speaker 2: to suggestion, and so just the very fact that you

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Speaker 2: respond means that you now a better target for all

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Speaker 2: sorts of scams. So there doesn't have to necessarily be

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Speaker 2: a linear relationship between the content of the message and

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Speaker 2: the scam. But in that case, the linear scam would

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Speaker 2: typically be they've got you on the hook. They're gonna

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Speaker 2: convince you that you're gonna make a lot of money

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Speaker 2: down the line, and maybe you have to pay a

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Speaker 2: fee in order to have your application processed or something

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Speaker 2: like that. So they're going to hook you in for

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Speaker 2: spending some money in order to then get the money

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Speaker 2: that's going to be promised to you later on.

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Speaker 1: And maybe if.

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Speaker 2: You pay once, then they're gonna make you pay a

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Speaker 2: second time, because once you've paid once, you really don't

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Speaker 2: want to have that money wasted by not paying a

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Speaker 2: second fee. So then you can see how a more

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Speaker 2: susceptible person gets dragged along until eventually they've realized they've

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Speaker 2: got to stop, So that would be a very typical

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Speaker 2: way in which that scam would evolve.

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Speaker 1: It's interesting because these scam texts are so diverse, because

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Speaker 1: another one that I think a lot of people seen

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Speaker 1: is just a completely random text out of the blue

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Speaker 1: saying how do you what's going on? Or hey Jennifer,

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Speaker 1: how are you? And I'm not Jennifer, O my right

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Speaker 1: now I can say this isn't Jennifer wrong number.

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Speaker 2: We tend to call them now in the industry, the

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Speaker 2: high dad, the hey mom scam, because it's quite often

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Speaker 2: a term like that, right, so it seems like it's

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Speaker 2: somebody familiar. You associate it in your mind with somebody

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Speaker 2: that you know, and that's the start of the process.

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Speaker 2: But again it's the same sequence there where they're just

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Speaker 2: looking to see who's going to reply. They just want

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Speaker 2: to get you into a conversation. And then maybe you

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Speaker 2: do reply back and you go I'm not your mom,

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Speaker 2: I'm a man, and they go, well, I'm very sorry, right,

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Speaker 2: I have the wrong number. But you see, the point

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Speaker 2: is you've already replied back, You've already engaged with them

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Speaker 2: on some level, and so can they turn the conversation

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Speaker 2: around to selling cryptocurrency or something like that. It's all

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Speaker 2: about that initial engagement. It's also about trying to get

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Speaker 2: you off maybe the channel of communication that was used

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Speaker 2: in the beginning, which could be an SMS message, towards

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Speaker 2: something encrypted, because if it's encrypted, it's much harder for

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Speaker 2: any technology to be used to monitor the behavior, to

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Speaker 2: intervene to protect you. So that's another thing that they're

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Speaker 2: looking do to is just to try and get you

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Speaker 2: somewhere else. So some scams are very simple, They stop

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Speaker 2: very quickly and the goal is very clear very early on.

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Speaker 2: Some is a long game. They just want to hug

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Speaker 2: you in and they will take you as far as

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Speaker 2: they possibly can. They're running a lot of scams, these

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Speaker 2: organized criminals. They'll just find the one that will be

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Speaker 2: the one that you are most susceptible to.

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Speaker 1: So who exactly are these criminals with the time and

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Speaker 1: patience to play out a long game of this scale.

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Speaker 1: The world behind this is a lot bigger than whoever

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Speaker 1: sent you that annoying text.

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Speaker 2: When we talk about some of the cyber crimes that

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Speaker 2: go on in the world today, there's this pattern where

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Speaker 2: we talk about kids, maybe teenagers, maybe early twenties. They're

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Speaker 2: learning from each other on discord. They're going to certain

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Speaker 2: forums and they're showing advice on how to commit crime,

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Speaker 2: and that's definitely a way in which crime gets propagated.

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Speaker 2: But to some extent those people are amateurs. Not everybody's

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Speaker 2: an amateur. So what I think you're seeing is a

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Speaker 2: degree to which the professionals are teaching each other how

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Speaker 2: to commit crime. And also they're franchising crime, so they

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Speaker 2: may provide a criminal service, and the point of the

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Speaker 2: criminal service is that somebody else will come along and

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Speaker 2: use the service to commit a more specific crime on

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Speaker 2: top of it, and that then has a multiplier effect.

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Speaker 2: Not every criminal needs to understand how a phone network works.

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Speaker 2: It's capitalism. But in the criminal world, why try to

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Speaker 2: do everything yourself when you can get very very good

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Speaker 2: at a layer of crime and then sell your services

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Speaker 2: to somebody at a different layer.

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Speaker 1: This is when you know crime is getting sophisticated when

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Speaker 1: people specialize in one area to reduce their liability. So

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Speaker 1: that text about a great crypto deal or even the

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Speaker 1: random high Jennifer text likely has a lot of people

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Speaker 1: working on different layers behind it, and it gets pretty

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Speaker 1: dark pretty quick.

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Speaker 2: In Mi and Mah in Cambodia and in Laos, which

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Speaker 2: are the three countries that have taken a lot of

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Speaker 2: the scam compounds that used to be based in China

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Speaker 2: and have become the new homes for scam compounds. It's

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Speaker 2: estimated that there's about one hundred thousand people working in

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Speaker 2: scam compounds, and there's a lot of tragic stories about

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Speaker 2: people being murdered, tortured, hichacked. It's effectively modern day slavery.

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Speaker 2: We're talking about huge numbers of people being persuaded to

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Speaker 2: move to a foreign country to work in these ones

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Speaker 2: with offers of jobs or well paid jobs, well paid

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Speaker 2: it job. Some people move just because they know they're

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Speaker 2: going to work for a criminal enterprise and they don't

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Speaker 2: care other people Hi chacked. I mean, there was a

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Speaker 2: terrible case that I was reading the other day. Nineteen

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Speaker 2: year old old Chinese boy was sold into slavery by

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Speaker 2: a seventeen year old Chinese girl. You know, she had

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Speaker 2: befriended him, she had become his girlfriend. She had told

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Speaker 2: him that she had family running businesses in me and Mark.

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Speaker 2: They flew to Thailand. They traveled overland to the border,

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Speaker 2: and when they arrived at the border, there's a bunch

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Speaker 2: of goons to grab a hold of him. She went

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Speaker 2: and had a ten day holiday in Thailand, and she

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Speaker 2: had pocketed her I think it was something in the

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Speaker 2: order of fifteen thousand dollars she'd got paid for selling him,

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Speaker 2: selling him to slavery. And to be fair to the

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Speaker 2: Chinese government, who are alive to this problem, they are

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Speaker 2: now prosecuting her. She returned to China and they're going

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Speaker 2: to do something about her. But that poor boy was

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Speaker 2: working sixteen twenty hour shifts in the scam compound in

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Speaker 2: Myanmark for four months until his friends and family were

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Speaker 2: able to pull together a ransom of five thousand dollars

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Speaker 2: to get him out. In the meantime, the poor lad

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Speaker 2: was beaten, beaten because he's not meeting his targets. That

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Speaker 2: poor Ladders lost some of his hearing as a result

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Speaker 2: of the beating. And that's not even by far the

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Speaker 2: worst case that I could recount to you. I mean,

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Speaker 2: there are some absolutely appalling stories. The only good thing

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Speaker 2: you can say about AI is that if AI gets

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Speaker 2: so good that you don't need to make a human

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Speaker 2: being a slave to do it anymore, at least we

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Speaker 2: won't have the problem with the human trafficking In a way,

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Speaker 2: I look forward to that because the level of human

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Speaker 2: misery that's occurring in some places is it's quite upsetting.

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Speaker 2: It's quite upsetting when you.

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Speaker 1: Read the stories. A lot of the scam text that

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Speaker 1: you get about stocks or selling crypto, or job recruiting

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Speaker 1: or the random high mom oops, wrong number, those kind

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00:19:50,000 --> 00:19:52,240
Speaker 1: of texts, the ones that are after the long game,

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Speaker 1: these likely originate from these scam compounds. This kind of

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Speaker 1: scam has exploded since twenty twenty. Why well, there is

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Speaker 1: a pretty simple theory behind it. Chinese organized criminals had

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Speaker 1: built casinos that were sitting empty during the pandemic, and

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00:20:07,080 --> 00:20:09,960
Speaker 1: they needed something to do with the empty buildings, so

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Speaker 1: they converted them into scam compounds. So if you engage

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Speaker 1: with one of those scam texts, there's a good chance

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Speaker 1: of the person you'll end up talking to is in

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Speaker 1: one of those buildings being watched by guards in case

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Speaker 1: they try to escape.

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Speaker 2: I'm the criminal. I will hook you into talking to

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Speaker 2: somebody who's gonna appear like a beautiful woman. I'm will

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Speaker 2: to talking to somebody who's gonna try and sell your cryptocouncy.

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Speaker 2: So what do I do, I send you a message

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Speaker 2: and then oh, whoops, it was the wrong number. I'm sorry,

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Speaker 2: I didn't mean to message you right. That message was

364
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Speaker 2: an automated message. The follow up message was an automated message.

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Speaker 2: They're sat in the scam compound waiting to see if

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Speaker 2: you're the kind of person who's gonna respond, who's gonna

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Speaker 2: get into a conversation. And that's why they employ all

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Speaker 2: these people in these scam compounds, just to haveversations with people,

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00:21:01,560 --> 00:21:05,560
Speaker 2: weeding through the population to find who are the ones

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Speaker 2: who can be exploited, who will be open to this idea,

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Speaker 2: that idea. Maybe your weakness is a pretty girl. You

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Speaker 2: don't know that you're messaging some guy from Manila, but

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Speaker 2: you're going to be seeing a picture of a beautiful woman.

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Speaker 2: They'll have a beautiful woman in the compound who will

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Speaker 2: be brought out to do the live video conversation when

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Speaker 2: it's needed. The rest of the time, they're just working,

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Speaker 2: you working, you working.

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Speaker 1: This is the background of all this stuff. On the

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Speaker 1: receiving end, we just see an annoying text, but the

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Speaker 1: operation behind each message can be massive. There's a technology

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Speaker 1: on the ground, and then there's the buildings full of

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Speaker 1: forced laborers. This hurts a lot of people, but it

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Speaker 1: continues because it's a viable business. How many people have

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Speaker 1: to actually answer and get hooked into this thing for

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Speaker 1: it to make money for you?

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Speaker 2: It will depend on the scam. If I'm running a

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Speaker 2: scam compound and i have somebody who's my prisoner who

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00:22:03,560 --> 00:22:06,879
Speaker 2: has to sit at like a screen and then cheat

389
00:22:06,960 --> 00:22:09,159
Speaker 2: you over the course of six months, well I'm going

390
00:22:09,200 --> 00:22:11,119
Speaker 2: to need a much bigger amount of money from you

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Speaker 2: to make it worthwhile to do it. So it does

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Speaker 2: very a lot depending upon the scam. But what I

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00:22:16,080 --> 00:22:21,320
Speaker 2: would say is all the evidence shows that these scams

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00:22:21,440 --> 00:22:24,680
Speaker 2: are so incredibly lucrative, whether at the low end or

395
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Speaker 2: at the high end. This thing is just ramping up

396
00:22:27,359 --> 00:22:30,880
Speaker 2: and up and up. They're just taking the accumulated profits

397
00:22:30,920 --> 00:22:34,399
Speaker 2: that they're generating from crime reinvesting it in more crime.

398
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Speaker 2: And the things that we're doing to chip away to

399
00:22:37,040 --> 00:22:40,479
Speaker 2: we're not keeping pace. We're falling further and further behind.

400
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Speaker 2: So their margins, their profits are getting higher and higher

401
00:22:43,560 --> 00:22:46,680
Speaker 2: and higher, and we are not at all sophisticated and

402
00:22:46,800 --> 00:22:48,399
Speaker 2: doing anything about tackling it.

403
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Speaker 1: So far, authorities haven't been able to stop these scams

404
00:22:52,800 --> 00:22:55,800
Speaker 1: from continuing to pop up. But is there anything that

405
00:22:55,920 --> 00:22:59,440
Speaker 1: we can do to stop these scam texts? That's after

406
00:22:59,480 --> 00:23:10,800
Speaker 1: the break. When it comes to stopping scam text the

407
00:23:10,800 --> 00:23:13,360
Speaker 1: advice you usually hear is learning how to spot them,

408
00:23:13,720 --> 00:23:16,240
Speaker 1: watch out from misspellings or weird formatting in the text,

409
00:23:16,440 --> 00:23:18,800
Speaker 1: don't click links if you don't know the sinder, maybe

410
00:23:18,920 --> 00:23:21,959
Speaker 1: don't reply. We also hear that certain demographics are more

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00:23:22,000 --> 00:23:24,000
Speaker 1: vulnerable and that we need to teach them to be

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Speaker 1: more savvy. But all of this is kind of missing

413
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Speaker 1: the bigger picture.

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Speaker 2: It's been argued that all the people are more vulnerable

415
00:23:32,320 --> 00:23:35,520
Speaker 2: to scams, but then there's also some conflicting data that

416
00:23:35,560 --> 00:23:38,359
Speaker 2: says actually, young people spend a lot more time on

417
00:23:38,400 --> 00:23:42,160
Speaker 2: the phone, they're a lot more casual, shall we say,

418
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Speaker 2: about what they do. They think of themselves as savvy,

419
00:23:45,600 --> 00:23:48,440
Speaker 2: so they fall for scams. And I think, really what

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00:23:48,920 --> 00:23:53,040
Speaker 2: we should be learning from the criminals is however much

421
00:23:53,080 --> 00:23:56,320
Speaker 2: you train people, how much you educate people to be

422
00:23:56,480 --> 00:23:59,080
Speaker 2: scam aware to improve the whether it's still be less

423
00:23:59,160 --> 00:24:03,080
Speaker 2: likelyful for it. Those criminals, they're gaining a lot of

424
00:24:03,160 --> 00:24:08,920
Speaker 2: data about what works in terms of mental tricks, psychological ploys, manipulations,

425
00:24:09,400 --> 00:24:12,399
Speaker 2: Their masters are it, and they have an enormous amount

426
00:24:12,440 --> 00:24:17,040
Speaker 2: of data about what actually works in practice, so they're

427
00:24:17,080 --> 00:24:20,440
Speaker 2: always getting better and better and better. I'm not a psychologist,

428
00:24:20,800 --> 00:24:25,080
Speaker 2: but from what I understand about the topic, suggestibility is

429
00:24:25,160 --> 00:24:29,480
Speaker 2: not well correlated to intelligence, and that's what the criminals

430
00:24:29,560 --> 00:24:32,840
Speaker 2: are looking for. Are you suggestible in some ways? Can

431
00:24:32,920 --> 00:24:36,120
Speaker 2: they plant an idea that you will act upon? Can

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00:24:36,160 --> 00:24:39,600
Speaker 2: they hook you with something that tempts you and motivates

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00:24:39,600 --> 00:24:41,520
Speaker 2: you in a certain way? And they're looking for your

434
00:24:41,560 --> 00:24:44,359
Speaker 2: weakness and different people will have different weaknesses.

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Speaker 1: I mean, I think this is the really difficult thing

436
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Speaker 1: here is because I think there are probably some people

437
00:24:48,000 --> 00:24:50,560
Speaker 1: who started listening to this who are thinking this is

438
00:24:50,600 --> 00:24:52,720
Speaker 1: going to be great. Dexter got an expert here who's

439
00:24:52,760 --> 00:24:54,760
Speaker 1: going to give me the top three tips for that

440
00:24:54,920 --> 00:24:59,120
Speaker 1: far and victim to a scam. And it doesn't sound

441
00:24:59,200 --> 00:25:00,320
Speaker 1: like you want to give that to me.

442
00:25:03,240 --> 00:25:05,480
Speaker 2: I mean, look, I could do that, and I could

443
00:25:05,520 --> 00:25:08,760
Speaker 2: say things like don't let your phone get downgraded to

444
00:25:08,840 --> 00:25:11,760
Speaker 2: a two G network because that's typical for the format

445
00:25:11,840 --> 00:25:15,080
Speaker 2: for SMS blasters, And I could say look for spelling

446
00:25:15,240 --> 00:25:17,439
Speaker 2: errors in the message, and you know, if there's a

447
00:25:17,520 --> 00:25:20,440
Speaker 2: high pull link, if it's a link that's been shortened,

448
00:25:20,520 --> 00:25:23,639
Speaker 2: be suspicious or stuff like that. You know, if someone

449
00:25:23,640 --> 00:25:26,760
Speaker 2: makes a call, don't receive the call, call back to

450
00:25:26,800 --> 00:25:29,639
Speaker 2: your bank rather than it's all that's all good stuff,

451
00:25:29,680 --> 00:25:31,520
Speaker 2: that's all common sense stuff. I'm not going to argue

452
00:25:31,560 --> 00:25:34,560
Speaker 2: that you shouldn't do that, but it's not enough. It's

453
00:25:34,600 --> 00:25:38,679
Speaker 2: never going to be enough. The rate of acceleration in

454
00:25:38,800 --> 00:25:42,600
Speaker 2: criminal sophistication. To try to solve the problem like that

455
00:25:42,880 --> 00:25:44,679
Speaker 2: is fundamentally the wrong method.

456
00:25:46,920 --> 00:25:48,720
Speaker 1: So there is one small thing that you may be

457
00:25:48,760 --> 00:25:51,520
Speaker 1: able to do. If you have an Android phone, assuming

458
00:25:51,560 --> 00:25:55,040
Speaker 1: it's relatively recent, you can block those SMS blasters from

459
00:25:55,119 --> 00:25:56,880
Speaker 1: even being able to connect to your phone at all.

460
00:25:57,160 --> 00:26:00,440
Speaker 1: It's pretty simple. You just disabled two G switch in

461
00:26:00,480 --> 00:26:02,439
Speaker 1: your settings to do it. I put a link in

462
00:26:02,440 --> 00:26:04,720
Speaker 1: the show notes to a guide that walks you through it,

463
00:26:04,760 --> 00:26:07,720
Speaker 1: and trust me, its very simple. It takes like thirty seconds.

464
00:26:08,160 --> 00:26:12,520
Speaker 1: For iPhones. Unfortunately, you're kind of stuck. You can't turn

465
00:26:12,560 --> 00:26:15,640
Speaker 1: off two G unless you use lockdown mode, which would

466
00:26:15,680 --> 00:26:18,119
Speaker 1: also limit other functions in your phone that you probably

467
00:26:18,160 --> 00:26:21,760
Speaker 1: want to keep on other than that. Again, base rule.

468
00:26:21,880 --> 00:26:23,199
Speaker 1: If you get a text with a link in it,

469
00:26:23,480 --> 00:26:26,000
Speaker 1: don't click it, even if it looks legit, even if

470
00:26:26,040 --> 00:26:28,880
Speaker 1: it's a text from your bank or your doctor, call

471
00:26:28,960 --> 00:26:32,119
Speaker 1: them and confirm that it is actually from them. I

472
00:26:32,119 --> 00:26:35,760
Speaker 1: know it's annoying, but it's better safe than sorry. But again,

473
00:26:36,000 --> 00:26:38,800
Speaker 1: all these things, even the features that let you report scams,

474
00:26:39,240 --> 00:26:42,200
Speaker 1: that's treating the symptom. If we really want to stop

475
00:26:42,240 --> 00:26:45,960
Speaker 1: these scams, the solution probably isn't in your phone settings.

476
00:26:46,680 --> 00:26:47,840
Speaker 1: It's in the phone companies.

477
00:26:49,200 --> 00:26:52,359
Speaker 2: The correct method is for the businesses to look at

478
00:26:52,440 --> 00:26:55,920
Speaker 2: who they do business squit, who's buying the SIM college,

479
00:26:56,080 --> 00:27:00,359
Speaker 2: who's making the book communications these criminals. I had one

480
00:27:00,480 --> 00:27:05,959
Speaker 2: hundred thousand SIM cards in New York. Now that's a

481
00:27:06,000 --> 00:27:09,080
Speaker 2: lot of SIM cards. A phone network should be saying,

482
00:27:09,200 --> 00:27:11,480
Speaker 2: where have all our SIM card's gone? Well, all these

483
00:27:11,520 --> 00:27:13,960
Speaker 2: strange customers on a network, why are they not behaving

484
00:27:14,040 --> 00:27:15,760
Speaker 2: like a normal person. Let me give you an example

485
00:27:15,800 --> 00:27:18,920
Speaker 2: about normal and abnormal behavior that a network should pick

486
00:27:18,960 --> 00:27:21,399
Speaker 2: up on. When you carry your phone around, When you

487
00:27:21,440 --> 00:27:24,919
Speaker 2: go around, you move, you move from place to place.

488
00:27:25,440 --> 00:27:28,320
Speaker 2: While simbox doesn't move. When it's in a New York apartment,

489
00:27:28,880 --> 00:27:32,480
Speaker 2: it's sat there, not moving at all. That should be

490
00:27:32,880 --> 00:27:36,920
Speaker 2: a red flashing warning like, why have I got such

491
00:27:36,960 --> 00:27:41,080
Speaker 2: a peculiar customer? Why have I got so many peculiar

492
00:27:41,119 --> 00:27:46,080
Speaker 2: customers are in the same place, never moving. Perhaps they

493
00:27:46,160 --> 00:27:49,720
Speaker 2: only make outbound communication. That would be weird because of

494
00:27:49,840 --> 00:27:54,040
Speaker 2: normal person sends and receives. There should be lots of

495
00:27:54,200 --> 00:27:57,200
Speaker 2: flashing warning lights going off in those telcoasts.

496
00:27:57,800 --> 00:28:00,520
Speaker 1: I mean, this really reminds me of also of the

497
00:28:00,520 --> 00:28:04,480
Speaker 1: conversation about detecting AI right, which is to say, there

498
00:28:04,520 --> 00:28:07,160
Speaker 1: was a point at which you could give people tips

499
00:28:07,280 --> 00:28:10,240
Speaker 1: and you'd tell them, hey, look for too many fingers

500
00:28:10,240 --> 00:28:12,200
Speaker 1: on one hand. And I remember, and I was saying

501
00:28:12,200 --> 00:28:14,800
Speaker 1: this back here on the same show back then. You

502
00:28:14,840 --> 00:28:18,520
Speaker 1: were fooling yourself if you think that you were gonna

503
00:28:18,520 --> 00:28:21,640
Speaker 1: be able to use those same tricks six months from now.

504
00:28:22,280 --> 00:28:25,639
Speaker 1: And sure enough, you look at AI generated pictures, AI

505
00:28:25,680 --> 00:28:29,159
Speaker 1: generated videos, the hands look perfect. The idea that we

506
00:28:29,280 --> 00:28:32,720
Speaker 1: can just educate the public and that will solve everything.

507
00:28:32,920 --> 00:28:35,080
Speaker 1: It sounds like bringing a knife to a nuke fight,

508
00:28:35,160 --> 00:28:38,560
Speaker 1: you know, pardon the American violent imagery here, but it

509
00:28:39,040 --> 00:28:41,360
Speaker 1: just seems like it's not functional.

510
00:28:41,720 --> 00:28:46,120
Speaker 2: So true. I mean, for myself personal experience, a few

511
00:28:46,120 --> 00:28:51,440
Speaker 2: months ago, I received my first ever spam call from

512
00:28:51,440 --> 00:28:55,240
Speaker 2: an AI, and I think I'm a pretty savvy guy

513
00:28:55,280 --> 00:28:58,240
Speaker 2: about this kind of stuff. And I listened to the

514
00:28:58,320 --> 00:29:01,560
Speaker 2: spam AI talked to me, and I had to ask

515
00:29:01,640 --> 00:29:08,800
Speaker 2: the question, are you an AI? Because it was not obvious. Now, thankfully,

516
00:29:09,200 --> 00:29:14,280
Speaker 2: that particular spam AI did honestly answer the question. Yes,

517
00:29:14,720 --> 00:29:18,320
Speaker 2: I am an artificial intelligence because it had been programmed

518
00:29:18,320 --> 00:29:20,480
Speaker 2: that way. But I had to think about it. I

519
00:29:20,520 --> 00:29:22,840
Speaker 2: had to ask the question. But what really upset me

520
00:29:22,880 --> 00:29:26,680
Speaker 2: about that interaction was I continued my conversation with the AI,

521
00:29:27,120 --> 00:29:29,280
Speaker 2: not trying to buy the thing it wanted to sell me,

522
00:29:29,440 --> 00:29:33,400
Speaker 2: but actually trying to investigate learn what was happening. It

523
00:29:33,520 --> 00:29:37,320
Speaker 2: claimed it received my phone number from one of the

524
00:29:37,320 --> 00:29:43,200
Speaker 2: world's biggest telecoms industry associations, a conference that I had

525
00:29:43,240 --> 00:29:47,320
Speaker 2: attended shortly beforehand, where I have to hand over my

526
00:29:47,480 --> 00:29:51,000
Speaker 2: phone number in order to register and participate. What does

527
00:29:51,040 --> 00:29:56,560
Speaker 2: that say about our attitude towards data? That call was illegal.

528
00:29:57,080 --> 00:29:59,960
Speaker 2: It was illegal because my number is on the list

529
00:30:00,120 --> 00:30:03,000
Speaker 2: in the UK. There's essentially you're not allowed to call

530
00:30:03,040 --> 00:30:05,920
Speaker 2: me for marketing purposes. And yet one of the world's

531
00:30:06,000 --> 00:30:11,800
Speaker 2: biggest telecoms associations has handed over that data to another company,

532
00:30:12,080 --> 00:30:15,000
Speaker 2: doesn't bother to check the laws. Just made the spam

533
00:30:15,080 --> 00:30:18,320
Speaker 2: call because they're going to make some money from me today.

534
00:30:18,520 --> 00:30:23,040
Speaker 2: And that's where the rotten heart of it lies. In

535
00:30:23,120 --> 00:30:28,080
Speaker 2: the end, the problem we're trying to solve this is

536
00:30:28,120 --> 00:30:32,520
Speaker 2: that a phone company makes money for carrying calls, for

537
00:30:32,600 --> 00:30:36,320
Speaker 2: transmitting messages, for doing the communications. They don't make money

538
00:30:36,320 --> 00:30:40,280
Speaker 2: for blocking things. If all those calls got blocked, if

539
00:30:40,280 --> 00:30:43,200
Speaker 2: all those messages got blocked, if all those bad actors

540
00:30:43,200 --> 00:30:47,760
Speaker 2: were taking out the ecosystem, revenues would go down. Why

541
00:30:47,800 --> 00:30:51,280
Speaker 2: would you go out of your way to find crime

542
00:30:52,320 --> 00:30:55,440
Speaker 2: if your job is to increase the amount of traffic

543
00:30:55,520 --> 00:30:58,200
Speaker 2: on your network, if your job is to increase the

544
00:30:58,240 --> 00:31:02,520
Speaker 2: revenues of that network. That's the conflict of interest, that's

545
00:31:02,600 --> 00:31:08,160
Speaker 2: the fundamental issue here. They may not be actively choosing

546
00:31:08,360 --> 00:31:12,040
Speaker 2: to enable crime, but they'll also not get any reason

547
00:31:12,120 --> 00:31:15,239
Speaker 2: to work harder to prevent crime. There's a lot of

548
00:31:15,280 --> 00:31:21,120
Speaker 2: money being made off the back of scams. Ultimately, the

549
00:31:21,160 --> 00:31:24,400
Speaker 2: result is corrosive for society. You don't trust the call

550
00:31:24,480 --> 00:31:27,440
Speaker 2: coming into your phone, you don't trust the messages. I

551
00:31:27,480 --> 00:31:32,120
Speaker 2: don't answer phone calls anymore. I use other modes of

552
00:31:32,200 --> 00:31:36,560
Speaker 2: communication now, And that's sad that when somebody maybe really

553
00:31:36,560 --> 00:31:38,240
Speaker 2: does want to speak to me on the phone, that

554
00:31:38,320 --> 00:31:42,280
Speaker 2: I'm rejecting them. But it's also bad for society. The

555
00:31:42,360 --> 00:31:45,320
Speaker 2: phone network was a beautiful thing. It was a thing

556
00:31:45,360 --> 00:31:48,120
Speaker 2: where you could pick up a phone and with ninety

557
00:31:48,200 --> 00:31:52,720
Speaker 2: nine point nine nine percent probability you could dial a

558
00:31:52,840 --> 00:31:55,720
Speaker 2: number to anywhere in the world and it would connect.

559
00:31:56,280 --> 00:31:58,680
Speaker 2: And now people don't want to pick up the phone

560
00:31:58,680 --> 00:32:01,520
Speaker 2: at the other end, what does that say about how

561
00:32:01,520 --> 00:32:03,920
Speaker 2: we've gone backwards spending terms of how we communicate with

562
00:32:03,960 --> 00:32:04,400
Speaker 2: each other.

563
00:32:04,720 --> 00:32:07,320
Speaker 1: I mean, you're not wrong, I'm thinking of Actually, there's

564
00:32:07,400 --> 00:32:09,560
Speaker 1: a text thread that I got added to that I

565
00:32:09,680 --> 00:32:14,080
Speaker 1: just assumed was spam, and people are making plans for

566
00:32:14,160 --> 00:32:17,560
Speaker 1: having dinner here in LA and I'm thinking, man, they're

567
00:32:17,560 --> 00:32:22,080
Speaker 1: getting sophisticated. Come to find out these were actually people

568
00:32:22,840 --> 00:32:24,920
Speaker 1: A friend had added me into a group. I just

569
00:32:25,000 --> 00:32:27,880
Speaker 1: wasn't familiar with everybody. After the event, they sent pictures

570
00:32:27,880 --> 00:32:30,520
Speaker 1: in the thread it looked like a good time. I

571
00:32:30,560 --> 00:32:33,200
Speaker 1: didn't respond once because I thought it was a scam.

572
00:32:33,360 --> 00:32:35,960
Speaker 1: Now I got like ten people I got to apologize

573
00:32:36,000 --> 00:32:38,920
Speaker 1: to because they think I'm ignoring them. Because I'm scared

574
00:32:38,920 --> 00:32:39,640
Speaker 1: to answer text.

575
00:32:39,720 --> 00:32:42,720
Speaker 2: And here's the thing, right, it's about what we comes

576
00:32:42,760 --> 00:32:46,520
Speaker 2: to the normal. There was a time your phone you

577
00:32:46,560 --> 00:32:50,440
Speaker 2: could trust that people are basically only people. You know,

578
00:32:50,520 --> 00:32:53,440
Speaker 2: people want to communicate you. Someone with a genuine reason

579
00:32:53,520 --> 00:32:55,360
Speaker 2: to call you would call you. And that was your

580
00:32:55,400 --> 00:32:58,920
Speaker 2: attitude towards your phone. Right, what's your attitude towards email.

581
00:32:59,000 --> 00:33:01,760
Speaker 2: It's not the same, is it. No, your email is full.

582
00:33:01,840 --> 00:33:04,440
Speaker 2: You've got a junk folder. There's lots of crap in

583
00:33:04,480 --> 00:33:07,680
Speaker 2: your junk folder. Maybe sometimes a good message gets into

584
00:33:07,720 --> 00:33:10,000
Speaker 2: your junk folder. Maybe you send a message and you're

585
00:33:10,000 --> 00:33:12,120
Speaker 2: annoyed it didn't get through to someone else because it

586
00:33:12,240 --> 00:33:13,520
Speaker 2: ended up in their junk folder.

587
00:33:13,680 --> 00:33:14,480
Speaker 1: M hm.

588
00:33:14,520 --> 00:33:18,280
Speaker 2: We are transferring from a scenario where essentially your phone

589
00:33:18,560 --> 00:33:23,080
Speaker 2: voice communications, message communications, you generally would trust them, to

590
00:33:23,200 --> 00:33:26,800
Speaker 2: the scenario like email. It's gonna be like that in future.

591
00:33:26,920 --> 00:33:29,240
Speaker 2: And yeah, we're gonna use technology, and yeah we're gonna

592
00:33:29,280 --> 00:33:30,920
Speaker 2: weed it out and we're gonna get with some of

593
00:33:31,000 --> 00:33:33,560
Speaker 2: the bad stuff. But is that the level that we

594
00:33:33,640 --> 00:33:36,520
Speaker 2: now want to be communicating at that level of trust

595
00:33:36,560 --> 00:33:38,200
Speaker 2: and confidence. That's a step back.

596
00:33:38,480 --> 00:33:39,680
Speaker 1: Yeah, And that's.

597
00:33:39,440 --> 00:33:42,120
Speaker 2: Sadly the way we're going about solving problem because a

598
00:33:42,200 --> 00:33:43,560
Speaker 2: lot of it is that we're trying to solve the

599
00:33:43,560 --> 00:33:46,240
Speaker 2: problem in the way that the problem was solved for email. Email.

600
00:33:46,280 --> 00:33:49,200
Speaker 2: This email, it's not something where I am in an

601
00:33:49,200 --> 00:33:51,880
Speaker 2: emergency and I want to speak to you, I send.

602
00:33:51,720 --> 00:33:52,400
Speaker 1: You an email.

603
00:33:52,760 --> 00:33:54,480
Speaker 2: When I'm in an emergency and I want to speak

604
00:33:54,480 --> 00:33:55,520
Speaker 2: to you, I want to call you.

605
00:33:55,800 --> 00:33:57,400
Speaker 1: Yeah, So to start.

606
00:33:57,200 --> 00:34:00,840
Speaker 2: Turning that kind of communication into level of email, we're

607
00:34:00,880 --> 00:34:03,720
Speaker 2: losing something in society that makes me shock.

608
00:34:04,080 --> 00:34:09,440
Speaker 1: It makes me shock, you know. A little after we

609
00:34:09,480 --> 00:34:11,960
Speaker 1: recorded this conversation, a friend of mine sent me a

610
00:34:12,000 --> 00:34:14,040
Speaker 1: song that I had not heard in a long time.

611
00:34:14,480 --> 00:34:17,439
Speaker 1: It's this really simple and beautiful song by this guy

612
00:34:17,520 --> 00:34:20,600
Speaker 1: named labby Siffrey, and apparently it's been going viral recently.

613
00:34:21,120 --> 00:34:23,400
Speaker 1: I can't play it here, you know, copyright all that

614
00:34:23,440 --> 00:34:25,319
Speaker 1: sort of thing, but I can read you part of

615
00:34:25,320 --> 00:34:29,319
Speaker 1: the lyrics. It's strange how a phone call can change

616
00:34:29,320 --> 00:34:31,960
Speaker 1: your day and take you away from the feeling of

617
00:34:32,040 --> 00:34:36,279
Speaker 1: being alone. Blessed the Telephone, and that's the name of

618
00:34:36,320 --> 00:34:39,359
Speaker 1: the song, Blessed the Telephone, which is something I think

619
00:34:39,400 --> 00:34:42,640
Speaker 1: you could still say. Sincerely in nineteen seventy one, when

620
00:34:42,640 --> 00:34:45,200
Speaker 1: it's recorded, and then I think to twenty years later,

621
00:34:45,239 --> 00:34:47,920
Speaker 1: to nineteen ninety one when Tribe call Quest put out

622
00:34:47,920 --> 00:34:51,160
Speaker 1: a song called Skypager, which is seriously just a song

623
00:34:51,160 --> 00:34:52,880
Speaker 1: about how cool it is to have a device that

624
00:34:52,960 --> 00:34:57,000
Speaker 1: lets people contact you when you're outside. At some point,

625
00:34:57,080 --> 00:35:00,480
Speaker 1: the ability to contact someone instantly was this future or

626
00:35:00,520 --> 00:35:04,239
Speaker 1: even magical thing. I'm not that young, but I guess

627
00:35:04,280 --> 00:35:06,720
Speaker 1: I'm not old enough to really remember that time period

628
00:35:06,960 --> 00:35:09,120
Speaker 1: because by the time I was really using my own

629
00:35:09,160 --> 00:35:12,640
Speaker 1: phone and especially using email, it was already something that

630
00:35:12,680 --> 00:35:16,880
Speaker 1: we saw as potentially suspicious. And now forget about it.

631
00:35:16,960 --> 00:35:18,759
Speaker 1: When's the last time you heard someone say that they

632
00:35:18,800 --> 00:35:22,319
Speaker 1: even like their phone. Anyway, we'll leave the links to

633
00:35:22,400 --> 00:35:24,239
Speaker 1: those songs and the show notes if you want to

634
00:35:24,320 --> 00:35:30,280
Speaker 1: check that out. Thank you for listening to another episode

635
00:35:30,480 --> 00:35:32,279
Speaker 1: kill Switch. If you want to talk to us, you

636
00:35:32,280 --> 00:35:36,000
Speaker 1: could email us at kill Switch at Kaleidoscope dot NYC,

637
00:35:36,480 --> 00:35:39,600
Speaker 1: or we're also on Instagram at kill Switch Pod, and

638
00:35:39,760 --> 00:35:42,040
Speaker 1: you know, please think about leaving us a review. It

639
00:35:42,080 --> 00:35:44,719
Speaker 1: helps other people find the show, which in turn helps

640
00:35:44,800 --> 00:35:47,080
Speaker 1: us keep doing our thing. And once you've done that,

641
00:35:47,239 --> 00:35:49,640
Speaker 1: you know we're also on YouTube, so if you want

642
00:35:49,680 --> 00:35:51,920
Speaker 1: to watch this interview rather than just listen to it.

643
00:35:52,239 --> 00:35:54,680
Speaker 1: There you go. The link for that and everything else

644
00:35:54,719 --> 00:35:57,960
Speaker 1: again is in the show notes. Kill Switch is hosted

645
00:35:57,960 --> 00:36:01,760
Speaker 1: by Me Dexter Thomas. It's produce by Sheen Ozaki, darl

646
00:36:01,760 --> 00:36:05,000
Speaker 1: Of Potts and Julian Nutter. Our theme song is by

647
00:36:05,080 --> 00:36:07,839
Speaker 1: me and Kyle Murdoch and Kyle also mixed the show

648
00:36:08,120 --> 00:36:12,480
Speaker 1: from Kaleidoscope. Our executive producers are Oswa Lashin, Mcgueshatikadur and

649
00:36:12,760 --> 00:36:16,680
Speaker 1: Kate Osborne. From iHeart, our executive producers are Katrina Norville

650
00:36:16,840 --> 00:36:27,680
Speaker 1: and Nikki E. Tor Catch on the next one, Goodbye,