1 00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:04,720 Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is 2 00:00:04,800 --> 00:00:09,119 Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or 3 00:00:09,200 --> 00:00:12,079 Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A 4 00:00:12,240 --> 00:00:25,640 Speaker 1: production of My Heart Grading. Hello, welcome back to the show. 5 00:00:25,720 --> 00:00:28,320 Speaker 1: My name is Matt, my name is dol. They called 6 00:00:28,320 --> 00:00:31,760 Speaker 1: me Ben. We're joined as always with our superproducer Paul. 7 00:00:31,920 --> 00:00:36,360 Speaker 1: Mission Control deconds. Most importantly, you are you. You are here, 8 00:00:36,520 --> 00:00:39,760 Speaker 1: and that makes this the stuff they don't want you 9 00:00:39,920 --> 00:00:44,159 Speaker 1: to know. It's the top of yet another strange, bizarre, 10 00:00:44,159 --> 00:00:47,800 Speaker 1: troubling and joyful week, which is why we are here, 11 00:00:48,320 --> 00:00:52,680 Speaker 1: coming to you live ish from the metropolis of Atlanta, Georgia, 12 00:00:52,840 --> 00:00:56,800 Speaker 1: with some strange news, the things that don't always make 13 00:00:56,840 --> 00:01:00,280 Speaker 1: it into the Western headlines, or the things that don't 14 00:01:00,320 --> 00:01:05,399 Speaker 1: get explored perhaps the way they should. Today, we're going 15 00:01:05,440 --> 00:01:09,959 Speaker 1: to learn that Amazon is snitching. We're going to learn 16 00:01:10,040 --> 00:01:13,840 Speaker 1: that there is a a bit of high story going 17 00:01:13,840 --> 00:01:17,040 Speaker 1: down in Los Angeles. The rumors are true. The stuff 18 00:01:17,080 --> 00:01:20,920 Speaker 1: we talked about earlier. Robot dogs are getting guns mounted 19 00:01:20,959 --> 00:01:25,080 Speaker 1: on them in Eastern Europe. That's a thing now. And uh. Also, 20 00:01:25,160 --> 00:01:29,600 Speaker 1: we're gonna learn about an alleged super soldier program above 21 00:01:29,680 --> 00:01:32,360 Speaker 1: those ben Which one was the joyful one? You promised 22 00:01:32,440 --> 00:01:34,920 Speaker 1: us joyful at the top of the show. Is it 23 00:01:35,000 --> 00:01:38,199 Speaker 1: maybe the guns mounting on the dogs that shoot bees 24 00:01:38,240 --> 00:01:41,560 Speaker 1: out of their mouths? Is that you leaning end the 25 00:01:41,640 --> 00:01:46,000 Speaker 1: BE thing? If the BE technology is there yet, but 26 00:01:46,240 --> 00:01:49,920 Speaker 1: you know it's there to dream it's coming. Usually, if 27 00:01:49,960 --> 00:01:54,520 Speaker 1: we predict something bad as a possibility, it tends to happen, 28 00:01:54,880 --> 00:01:57,880 Speaker 1: Which is a strange thing about this show. How is 29 00:01:57,920 --> 00:02:00,720 Speaker 1: that bad? Guys? We need to help the bees. They 30 00:02:00,720 --> 00:02:08,160 Speaker 1: need to repopulate if we could somehow. And back in 31 00:02:08,240 --> 00:02:10,880 Speaker 1: two thousand, Back in two thousand and eight, when we're 32 00:02:10,919 --> 00:02:15,120 Speaker 1: still doing a blog, I had pointed out neo nicotinoids 33 00:02:15,280 --> 00:02:19,200 Speaker 1: are indeed bad for bees, which was treated as an 34 00:02:19,280 --> 00:02:22,640 Speaker 1: unfounded conspiracy until it turned out it was a hundred 35 00:02:23,040 --> 00:02:26,120 Speaker 1: percent true. And speaking of things that turn out to 36 00:02:26,200 --> 00:02:31,400 Speaker 1: be a hundred percent true. After being dismissed as conspiratorial, 37 00:02:31,520 --> 00:02:38,840 Speaker 1: thought um Amazon big online situations with lots of access 38 00:02:38,919 --> 00:02:43,000 Speaker 1: to the innermost secrets people's habits and lives. To call 39 00:02:43,040 --> 00:02:48,600 Speaker 1: it Big Daddy m and Chambridge analyticum may take issue, 40 00:02:48,680 --> 00:02:51,600 Speaker 1: but you know, we're we're focusing. We're gonna give Amazon 41 00:02:52,080 --> 00:02:58,120 Speaker 1: their infamous flowers today. We've talked about this extensively. Matt Nolan. 42 00:02:58,240 --> 00:03:02,680 Speaker 1: I were on on a friend show Alien State with 43 00:03:02,760 --> 00:03:06,400 Speaker 1: our pal MJ earlier and we were talking a little 44 00:03:06,400 --> 00:03:13,560 Speaker 1: bit about tech conspiracies like the long denied but often 45 00:03:13,600 --> 00:03:18,200 Speaker 1: anecdotally confirmed belief that your phone listens to you and 46 00:03:18,360 --> 00:03:22,880 Speaker 1: takes that data and farms it out into targeted ads, etcetera, etcetera. 47 00:03:23,440 --> 00:03:25,960 Speaker 1: The terms of service for lie these companies and apps, 48 00:03:26,720 --> 00:03:31,240 Speaker 1: Amazon included anything you download on your phone. Honestly, uh, 49 00:03:31,400 --> 00:03:35,560 Speaker 1: they all have some sort of PR language that is 50 00:03:35,600 --> 00:03:45,080 Speaker 1: about how your information is managed and um language legal language, yes, yeah, 51 00:03:45,200 --> 00:03:50,720 Speaker 1: legal language, I would say, purposely obscure and obtuse. Um. Amazon, 52 00:03:50,920 --> 00:03:55,040 Speaker 1: which unbelievably used to just be an online bookstore, now 53 00:03:55,120 --> 00:03:59,560 Speaker 1: has its fingers or tentacles and multiple pies of Western 54 00:03:59,640 --> 00:04:02,920 Speaker 1: society a D. And you know, a while back we 55 00:04:03,040 --> 00:04:08,440 Speaker 1: talked about those, uh, the digital cameras basically closed circuit 56 00:04:08,520 --> 00:04:12,440 Speaker 1: cameras that are now available to households across the world. Yeah. Yeah. 57 00:04:12,480 --> 00:04:15,160 Speaker 1: Back in last year in June, we talked about the 58 00:04:15,200 --> 00:04:19,880 Speaker 1: Mesh network right that Amazon was putting together with with 59 00:04:20,040 --> 00:04:25,040 Speaker 1: Ring and Echo. So the whole concept that everyone who owns. 60 00:04:25,080 --> 00:04:28,160 Speaker 1: One of these machines would be connected if you wanted to, 61 00:04:28,600 --> 00:04:30,920 Speaker 1: unless you opted out. Actually that was the thing. You 62 00:04:30,960 --> 00:04:33,080 Speaker 1: had to opt out. It was just gonna Happen't that 63 00:04:33,160 --> 00:04:35,760 Speaker 1: sort of like creating like a Wi Fi hotspot like 64 00:04:36,040 --> 00:04:38,960 Speaker 1: that you were not necessarily that you're contributing to, sort 65 00:04:38,960 --> 00:04:42,040 Speaker 1: of like crowdsourcing like public Internet. Wasn't that it was 66 00:04:42,080 --> 00:04:43,640 Speaker 1: a it was Yeah, it was a mesh network. So 67 00:04:43,640 --> 00:04:45,920 Speaker 1: they would all work together in a thing called sidewalk 68 00:04:46,040 --> 00:04:50,279 Speaker 1: or there's a new thing called sence pro. And uh, 69 00:04:50,360 --> 00:04:54,400 Speaker 1: it's still happening, it's still occurring. But today we're we're 70 00:04:54,400 --> 00:04:58,720 Speaker 1: going to talk about a story that is about Ring again, 71 00:04:58,760 --> 00:05:01,800 Speaker 1: about these cameras that everybody is putting up on the 72 00:05:01,800 --> 00:05:03,720 Speaker 1: front of their houses and the side of their houses, 73 00:05:03,760 --> 00:05:06,000 Speaker 1: and the back of their houses, sometimes inside their houses. 74 00:05:06,720 --> 00:05:12,680 Speaker 1: Um and uh, and what access third parties have to 75 00:05:12,920 --> 00:05:17,719 Speaker 1: that data, to those video and audio recordings. So we're 76 00:05:17,720 --> 00:05:19,840 Speaker 1: going to jump to a story that came out of 77 00:05:19,880 --> 00:05:25,520 Speaker 1: Politico very recently as of the of July. The title 78 00:05:25,680 --> 00:05:31,400 Speaker 1: is Amazon gave Ring videos to police without owners per mission. 79 00:05:32,120 --> 00:05:38,080 Speaker 1: Oh that doesn't sound good, Okay, so the folks ring 80 00:05:38,240 --> 00:05:41,440 Speaker 1: is right, Yeah, exactly. So Ring is a company that 81 00:05:41,520 --> 00:05:45,520 Speaker 1: was purchased by Amazon acquired, if you will, And this 82 00:05:45,560 --> 00:05:48,279 Speaker 1: is a company that builds doorbells that have cameras in 83 00:05:48,320 --> 00:05:51,719 Speaker 1: them and smart devices that connect your home to provide 84 00:05:51,800 --> 00:05:54,840 Speaker 1: mostly security, but also you know, just other kinds of 85 00:05:55,000 --> 00:05:57,640 Speaker 1: helpful activities, of helpful things you can do in your house. 86 00:05:57,880 --> 00:06:01,000 Speaker 1: Full disclosure. I just got my rings that up going 87 00:06:01,160 --> 00:06:03,680 Speaker 1: yesterday and I went out on the porch to do 88 00:06:03,720 --> 00:06:05,720 Speaker 1: something and I got a notification that someone was on 89 00:06:05,760 --> 00:06:07,719 Speaker 1: my porch and it was me, and it was a 90 00:06:07,760 --> 00:06:11,400 Speaker 1: picture of me looking quite foolish. Uh So, I'm just 91 00:06:11,839 --> 00:06:14,320 Speaker 1: getting my head around this technology. It's cool, but it's 92 00:06:14,320 --> 00:06:18,360 Speaker 1: also super weird. Just in your boxers with a cup 93 00:06:18,360 --> 00:06:22,400 Speaker 1: of coffee. Yeah, pretty much that we'll call it a 94 00:06:22,400 --> 00:06:25,000 Speaker 1: cup of coffee. Yet, Oh if only I had a 95 00:06:25,080 --> 00:06:28,200 Speaker 1: ring on my door, The things things the police would see. 96 00:06:28,560 --> 00:06:32,440 Speaker 1: Um well, okay, so no, the police aren't necessarily looking 97 00:06:32,440 --> 00:06:35,560 Speaker 1: at that footage, thankfully, but they are looking at footage 98 00:06:35,640 --> 00:06:38,880 Speaker 1: when some kind of public safety issue occurs in a 99 00:06:38,920 --> 00:06:42,000 Speaker 1: place where that camera can see, right, does that make sense? 100 00:06:42,320 --> 00:06:46,120 Speaker 1: Or just in a basic geographic location where where it's 101 00:06:46,160 --> 00:06:49,680 Speaker 1: thought that perhaps that camera would have caught something right, 102 00:06:49,839 --> 00:06:53,599 Speaker 1: either ingress or egress or whatever it may be, within 103 00:06:53,640 --> 00:06:56,599 Speaker 1: a certain radius. Now, as as creepy as it sounds, 104 00:06:56,640 --> 00:06:59,760 Speaker 1: the concept of your or local police department or maybe 105 00:06:59,800 --> 00:07:02,480 Speaker 1: even some kind of federal agency being able to access 106 00:07:02,920 --> 00:07:07,560 Speaker 1: your front door and anyone that comes and goes from it, 107 00:07:07,800 --> 00:07:10,320 Speaker 1: anything that happens out in front of it, any car 108 00:07:10,360 --> 00:07:12,960 Speaker 1: that drives by, any car that drives up in parks. Uh, 109 00:07:13,000 --> 00:07:15,880 Speaker 1: this is you know, generally personal information that we don't 110 00:07:15,920 --> 00:07:19,320 Speaker 1: want spread everywhere, we maybe don't even want the authorities 111 00:07:19,400 --> 00:07:23,920 Speaker 1: to know about. Well, it sounds really scary. Thankfully, we're 112 00:07:23,920 --> 00:07:26,120 Speaker 1: gonna throw a little bit of water on it because 113 00:07:26,200 --> 00:07:30,560 Speaker 1: it's only occurred eleven times so far in two as 114 00:07:30,600 --> 00:07:33,320 Speaker 1: of a couple of days ago. That's at least according 115 00:07:33,360 --> 00:07:37,560 Speaker 1: to a statement from Amazon. But that is eleven times 116 00:07:38,080 --> 00:07:41,200 Speaker 1: that you know, if if you were one of the people, 117 00:07:41,560 --> 00:07:45,360 Speaker 1: you would have no idea. And Amazon, the company that 118 00:07:45,480 --> 00:07:49,080 Speaker 1: owns that doorbell just sent some footage to a police 119 00:07:49,160 --> 00:07:53,000 Speaker 1: officer somewhere, doesn't have to legally tell you. M I 120 00:07:53,040 --> 00:07:55,800 Speaker 1: believe they're not they're not breaking a law. This this 121 00:07:55,880 --> 00:07:59,800 Speaker 1: is a fun one for our fellow conspiracy realist and 122 00:07:59,800 --> 00:08:05,720 Speaker 1: the audience today who work in any form of cybersecurity, right, 123 00:08:05,840 --> 00:08:10,400 Speaker 1: any kind of tech security, because I see into you folks. 124 00:08:10,840 --> 00:08:14,800 Speaker 1: I know based on many conversations that one way to 125 00:08:14,920 --> 00:08:17,920 Speaker 1: figure out who's really about their business and the cybersecurity 126 00:08:17,960 --> 00:08:21,680 Speaker 1: stuff is to look at their house and how analog 127 00:08:21,840 --> 00:08:24,480 Speaker 1: the tech is there. It's like, the more people learn 128 00:08:24,520 --> 00:08:28,360 Speaker 1: about cybersecurity, the less likely they are to have things 129 00:08:28,440 --> 00:08:32,959 Speaker 1: like Google Home or an Alexa or a ring. Um, 130 00:08:33,040 --> 00:08:36,440 Speaker 1: oh yeah, is it is this opt outable or no? 131 00:08:37,000 --> 00:08:42,240 Speaker 1: It depends. This kind of thing occurs when Amazon or 132 00:08:42,400 --> 00:08:45,080 Speaker 1: Ring or you know, whenever, whichever part of the company 133 00:08:45,160 --> 00:08:49,160 Speaker 1: is handling it, when they are approached by law enforcement 134 00:08:49,280 --> 00:08:53,199 Speaker 1: officers to get specific footage for a specific date at 135 00:08:53,200 --> 00:08:56,760 Speaker 1: a specific time, And that is when it occurs. And 136 00:08:56,840 --> 00:08:59,360 Speaker 1: that's the only time that Amazon says, at least that 137 00:08:59,400 --> 00:09:03,120 Speaker 1: they've really that kind of footage in this manner. Otherwise, 138 00:09:03,880 --> 00:09:08,800 Speaker 1: police are working with everybody that owns a ring through 139 00:09:08,840 --> 00:09:14,280 Speaker 1: an app called Neighbors. It's a nice sound app, righteous, 140 00:09:14,400 --> 00:09:20,400 Speaker 1: but I'm only because right, I literally got a notification 141 00:09:20,440 --> 00:09:24,240 Speaker 1: it's within the ring app Neighbors, and you stopped in. 142 00:09:24,360 --> 00:09:27,200 Speaker 1: But I literally got a notification having never opted in 143 00:09:27,240 --> 00:09:30,360 Speaker 1: at all saying some somebody found a dog in their 144 00:09:30,400 --> 00:09:34,880 Speaker 1: backyard in my area. Um, so that was weird, man. 145 00:09:34,920 --> 00:09:38,319 Speaker 1: You give all kinds of things to think about. We'll 146 00:09:38,400 --> 00:09:42,520 Speaker 1: check it out through neighbors. Often people will just post 147 00:09:42,679 --> 00:09:46,520 Speaker 1: their videos or share their ring footage of like an occurrence, 148 00:09:46,840 --> 00:09:51,199 Speaker 1: you know, uh, strange person walking in the neighborhood at 149 00:09:50,720 --> 00:09:55,080 Speaker 1: two am, caught on my ring camera. Right, We've we've 150 00:09:55,120 --> 00:09:57,160 Speaker 1: seen that kind of post before. We've heard about that 151 00:09:57,240 --> 00:10:01,240 Speaker 1: kind of thing. Um, whether it's positive or negative is 152 00:10:01,920 --> 00:10:04,440 Speaker 1: up to the circumstance. Because maybe there was somebody really 153 00:10:04,440 --> 00:10:07,320 Speaker 1: suspicious walking around and something occurred. There's a break in 154 00:10:07,320 --> 00:10:11,079 Speaker 1: in a car, but maybe it was just somebody walking home. Uh. 155 00:10:11,200 --> 00:10:15,520 Speaker 1: That's why this kind of crowdsourcing can be dangerous. Maybe 156 00:10:15,559 --> 00:10:20,360 Speaker 1: it's a member of Congress because facially recognition sure seems 157 00:10:20,360 --> 00:10:24,640 Speaker 1: to confuse them with active criminals, elite and what was 158 00:10:24,720 --> 00:10:28,600 Speaker 1: it political? Say at least twenty eight cases. Yeah, it's 159 00:10:28,600 --> 00:10:32,520 Speaker 1: just it's not a there I do think. Just as 160 00:10:32,520 --> 00:10:35,160 Speaker 1: a note, we have to talk a little bit about 161 00:10:35,240 --> 00:10:39,920 Speaker 1: the expectation of privacy in the figurative public square. Amazon 162 00:10:40,160 --> 00:10:44,679 Speaker 1: and Ring are required to comply with stuff like emergency 163 00:10:44,720 --> 00:10:48,080 Speaker 1: request in subpoenas. So think about this. What if there 164 00:10:48,320 --> 00:10:54,200 Speaker 1: is a carjacking and the thief drives the stolen vehicle 165 00:10:55,080 --> 00:10:58,240 Speaker 1: through your street, right through your neighborhood, and your your 166 00:10:58,400 --> 00:11:00,840 Speaker 1: ring somehow picks it up or maybe even gets the 167 00:11:00,880 --> 00:11:03,840 Speaker 1: license number, which is weird to think about with the 168 00:11:03,880 --> 00:11:07,480 Speaker 1: placement of the camera, But in that case, would that 169 00:11:07,559 --> 00:11:11,120 Speaker 1: not be doing a public good? In terms of expectation 170 00:11:11,200 --> 00:11:14,320 Speaker 1: of privacy, A good rule of thumb is if it's 171 00:11:14,360 --> 00:11:17,559 Speaker 1: something people can see happening at the front of your 172 00:11:17,600 --> 00:11:22,320 Speaker 1: house from a public space like the street, it's kind 173 00:11:22,320 --> 00:11:25,240 Speaker 1: of up for grabs. Yeah, I mean that's a good 174 00:11:25,240 --> 00:11:27,720 Speaker 1: way to That's a really good way to think about it. 175 00:11:27,920 --> 00:11:31,120 Speaker 1: You're not wrong, then, it's just I think because the 176 00:11:31,320 --> 00:11:36,160 Speaker 1: camera is like attached to personal property, there's this concept 177 00:11:36,280 --> 00:11:39,200 Speaker 1: that that camera is, you know, a part of that 178 00:11:39,280 --> 00:11:42,240 Speaker 1: personal property. And even if it is shooting footage in 179 00:11:42,280 --> 00:11:45,800 Speaker 1: a public space, that doesn't matter because the camera is mine, 180 00:11:46,960 --> 00:11:50,280 Speaker 1: right right, such a matter of perception. You you just 181 00:11:50,320 --> 00:11:55,000 Speaker 1: put it beautifully, Matt, because I also think by and 182 00:11:55,040 --> 00:11:57,440 Speaker 1: I'm not playing Devil's advocate, We're just we're playing with 183 00:11:57,480 --> 00:12:01,160 Speaker 1: this idea like a Rubik's cube. But think about it 184 00:12:01,280 --> 00:12:04,640 Speaker 1: in these terms. By that logic, then could we not 185 00:12:04,800 --> 00:12:09,079 Speaker 1: say nobody can look at my door you're walking by, 186 00:12:09,280 --> 00:12:11,960 Speaker 1: don't look at my door. Put your eyes off my porch. 187 00:12:13,360 --> 00:12:19,959 Speaker 1: You know. That's that's why we have gates, gates and fences. 188 00:12:20,720 --> 00:12:22,920 Speaker 1: I mean, look at a look at a house anywhere 189 00:12:23,000 --> 00:12:25,880 Speaker 1: wherever you live. A house that looks like it's worth 190 00:12:25,880 --> 00:12:28,160 Speaker 1: a million dollars, I'm just saying, looks like it's worth 191 00:12:28,160 --> 00:12:31,720 Speaker 1: a million dollars, maybe twelve million dollars, there's probably a 192 00:12:31,720 --> 00:12:35,520 Speaker 1: big gate. Uh, there's probably a huge fence, a privacy 193 00:12:35,640 --> 00:12:40,880 Speaker 1: fence to make sure you can't say door. What do 194 00:12:40,920 --> 00:12:43,920 Speaker 1: they say, like fences make good neighbors or something like that. 195 00:12:44,920 --> 00:12:50,560 Speaker 1: Maybe Robert Frost has a great poem about it, about 196 00:12:50,640 --> 00:12:54,160 Speaker 1: fences and neighbors. No, no, I'm totally not. If it's 197 00:12:54,160 --> 00:12:57,360 Speaker 1: a joke, it's accidental on my part. Robert Robert Frost is. 198 00:12:57,760 --> 00:13:00,559 Speaker 1: I mean, sometimes hype can be your best enemy. But 199 00:13:00,640 --> 00:13:03,839 Speaker 1: he's he's talented, hated people from the South, by the way, 200 00:13:04,080 --> 00:13:07,920 Speaker 1: that was one of his things. Anyway, Well, okay, so 201 00:13:08,480 --> 00:13:11,520 Speaker 1: let's start ba into this. So right now, according to Amazon, 202 00:13:11,520 --> 00:13:14,960 Speaker 1: at least their official statements. Video from a RING system 203 00:13:15,000 --> 00:13:18,400 Speaker 1: will not be shared with local authorities, law enforcement, or 204 00:13:18,400 --> 00:13:23,520 Speaker 1: police unless it is shared publicly, like on that Neighbor's app. Right, 205 00:13:24,040 --> 00:13:27,880 Speaker 1: then then it can be up for grabs because you 206 00:13:27,920 --> 00:13:31,719 Speaker 1: know who else uses the Neighbor's app, law enforcement agencies 207 00:13:32,000 --> 00:13:37,920 Speaker 1: all over the United States. There is a map. It's 208 00:13:37,920 --> 00:13:41,839 Speaker 1: called the Active Agency Map. If you click on this link, 209 00:13:42,440 --> 00:13:44,920 Speaker 1: it takes a second to load, but there's a down 210 00:13:44,920 --> 00:13:47,680 Speaker 1: below it says Active Agency Map and you can zoom 211 00:13:47,679 --> 00:13:51,600 Speaker 1: in and if you go to Atlanta, zoom all the 212 00:13:51,600 --> 00:13:54,199 Speaker 1: way down in there. You can see all the different 213 00:13:54,280 --> 00:13:57,480 Speaker 1: local law enforcement agencies that are directly connected to the 214 00:13:57,480 --> 00:14:03,560 Speaker 1: Neighbor's App where they operate and everybody's doing it. Guys. Yeah, 215 00:14:03,600 --> 00:14:07,480 Speaker 1: and this is important. Uh, this is shout out to 216 00:14:07,520 --> 00:14:10,760 Speaker 1: that podcast. Uh. This this is important to note that 217 00:14:11,280 --> 00:14:14,800 Speaker 1: the map that you're bringing up here, Matt, is not 218 00:14:14,920 --> 00:14:20,119 Speaker 1: a third party thing. This is on RINGS official site. Yes, exactly. 219 00:14:20,680 --> 00:14:24,000 Speaker 1: A quick look at what you will see if you 220 00:14:24,360 --> 00:14:27,640 Speaker 1: zoom into your neck of the woods, folks. Uh, you'll 221 00:14:27,640 --> 00:14:31,240 Speaker 1: see a map very much like Google Maps or something, 222 00:14:31,360 --> 00:14:38,280 Speaker 1: and there are icons indicating the specific first responders and 223 00:14:38,720 --> 00:14:44,080 Speaker 1: law enforcement using the map. Now, Matt, here I am. 224 00:14:44,120 --> 00:14:49,040 Speaker 1: I am right over Metro Atlanta surrounding areas, and primarily 225 00:14:49,080 --> 00:14:53,320 Speaker 1: what I'm seeing in the I T P part of 226 00:14:53,840 --> 00:14:57,320 Speaker 1: part of the city is uh is a mix between 227 00:14:57,680 --> 00:15:02,800 Speaker 1: police departments and then fire rescue, which, by the way, 228 00:15:03,160 --> 00:15:06,720 Speaker 1: fire and emergency services. I agree with that. If there's 229 00:15:06,760 --> 00:15:10,920 Speaker 1: a building burning, get on it, do it now, dude, 230 00:15:11,000 --> 00:15:13,920 Speaker 1: or someone having a health emergency, like on the street 231 00:15:13,960 --> 00:15:15,760 Speaker 1: in a cul de sac or just you know, out 232 00:15:15,880 --> 00:15:18,800 Speaker 1: on you know, fourteenth Street or something like, if there 233 00:15:18,840 --> 00:15:21,720 Speaker 1: was a ring there and fire department or first responder 234 00:15:21,720 --> 00:15:24,800 Speaker 1: could see that, that could be hugely helpful. If there's 235 00:15:24,840 --> 00:15:32,320 Speaker 1: a zeb that happened, that happened a Grant Park lookout. Um. 236 00:15:32,360 --> 00:15:35,760 Speaker 1: But you know, if you look at Decatur Knoll or 237 00:15:35,960 --> 00:15:37,600 Speaker 1: like one of these other places in kind of East 238 00:15:37,640 --> 00:15:41,120 Speaker 1: Atlanta a little bit where I am, Um, when you're 239 00:15:41,120 --> 00:15:45,600 Speaker 1: getting just towards the outside of the perimeter, you can 240 00:15:45,640 --> 00:15:49,040 Speaker 1: just see that every one of these agencies is using 241 00:15:49,720 --> 00:15:54,480 Speaker 1: using neighbors every Yeah, Matt, I know where this is 242 00:15:54,520 --> 00:15:59,800 Speaker 1: going right. Um. Surely Amazon has said something about this, well, 243 00:15:59,800 --> 00:16:03,240 Speaker 1: they have, they have, and this all started because Senator Markey. 244 00:16:04,000 --> 00:16:09,160 Speaker 1: Senator Ed Markey from Massachusetts, the Fighting mass He sent 245 00:16:09,240 --> 00:16:12,560 Speaker 1: a letter to Amazon asking very specific information about what 246 00:16:12,720 --> 00:16:15,360 Speaker 1: can be shared when somebody owns a ring camera, what 247 00:16:15,440 --> 00:16:18,480 Speaker 1: can't be shared, just asking very specific questions, and then 248 00:16:18,520 --> 00:16:21,440 Speaker 1: Amazon replied, and that's how we know about the eleven 249 00:16:21,480 --> 00:16:27,160 Speaker 1: instances of you know, video being shared. Amazon's reply also says, 250 00:16:27,320 --> 00:16:31,160 Speaker 1: I'm gonna read this from the Politico article. Quote police 251 00:16:31,200 --> 00:16:34,720 Speaker 1: can't view recordings unless clips are posted publicly or shared 252 00:16:34,760 --> 00:16:38,960 Speaker 1: directly with police, though that doesn't apply to police subpoenas 253 00:16:38,960 --> 00:16:45,480 Speaker 1: and emergency requests. So if the police specifically subpoenas for 254 00:16:45,600 --> 00:16:49,320 Speaker 1: footage within a certain radius because of an event that 255 00:16:49,440 --> 00:16:53,360 Speaker 1: might go without your understanding or knowledge, or if there's 256 00:16:53,400 --> 00:16:56,080 Speaker 1: some kind of emergency requests and I don't know exactly 257 00:16:56,080 --> 00:17:00,200 Speaker 1: what that entails, it says this, uh, this if ormation 258 00:17:00,200 --> 00:17:03,720 Speaker 1: should be shared without a user's consent. This letter, the 259 00:17:03,760 --> 00:17:06,680 Speaker 1: one that was in a response to a Markee. It's 260 00:17:06,720 --> 00:17:08,920 Speaker 1: the first time the company has ever confirmed that it's 261 00:17:08,960 --> 00:17:12,439 Speaker 1: handed over information without an owner's consent. So, I mean, 262 00:17:12,440 --> 00:17:15,320 Speaker 1: if you think about the typical like detective work kind 263 00:17:15,320 --> 00:17:17,280 Speaker 1: of version of this, you know, you you think, oh, 264 00:17:17,400 --> 00:17:21,200 Speaker 1: this security camera that belongs to this privately owned business, 265 00:17:21,359 --> 00:17:24,320 Speaker 1: you know, a gas station or whatever likely caught something. 266 00:17:24,560 --> 00:17:27,399 Speaker 1: Usually have to go in and haggle with the you know, 267 00:17:27,520 --> 00:17:30,160 Speaker 1: the owner, and and and and hopefully the tapes haven't 268 00:17:30,160 --> 00:17:32,000 Speaker 1: been a race because they only have one tape in 269 00:17:32,040 --> 00:17:34,520 Speaker 1: the machine that's like antiquated. That would be the typical 270 00:17:34,560 --> 00:17:36,280 Speaker 1: way you would go about. And then you could obviously 271 00:17:36,320 --> 00:17:39,040 Speaker 1: subpoena that information, but you would have to you know, 272 00:17:39,240 --> 00:17:41,560 Speaker 1: alert the individual that was happening because it would have 273 00:17:41,560 --> 00:17:44,480 Speaker 1: to be turned over with their cooperation. Now it's all 274 00:17:44,520 --> 00:17:47,679 Speaker 1: in the cloud and can be taken from you without 275 00:17:47,680 --> 00:17:50,000 Speaker 1: you even knowing it was used. Is that the long 276 00:17:50,040 --> 00:17:52,640 Speaker 1: and short of it. I mean, it can be right now, 277 00:17:52,680 --> 00:17:56,240 Speaker 1: it's in you know, it's not happening often at all 278 00:17:56,440 --> 00:17:58,840 Speaker 1: compared to the number of rings that are active at 279 00:17:58,880 --> 00:18:04,800 Speaker 1: all times. Right, but it can happen depending on the 280 00:18:04,880 --> 00:18:08,840 Speaker 1: events that take place near you. I guess Amazon snitching. 281 00:18:09,720 --> 00:18:13,720 Speaker 1: But also the there is a bit of a conundrum here, 282 00:18:14,080 --> 00:18:19,199 Speaker 1: which is first, in defense of this company and others 283 00:18:19,280 --> 00:18:24,879 Speaker 1: like it, ring the subsidiary specifically, UH, they do not 284 00:18:25,200 --> 00:18:29,760 Speaker 1: really have a legal right to turn down types of 285 00:18:30,240 --> 00:18:33,959 Speaker 1: law enforcement request. But the tricky part of that conundrum 286 00:18:33,960 --> 00:18:37,560 Speaker 1: The reason it's a dilemma is because those companies don't 287 00:18:37,600 --> 00:18:43,919 Speaker 1: really have any meaningful incentive to fight back against that 288 00:18:44,000 --> 00:18:47,199 Speaker 1: kind of policy, like why why would they make a 289 00:18:47,280 --> 00:18:50,520 Speaker 1: stink with Johnny Law when it can just be business 290 00:18:50,520 --> 00:18:56,800 Speaker 1: as usual because of the time customers don't read terms 291 00:18:56,800 --> 00:19:01,720 Speaker 1: of service. It's true, a guy from the support dot 292 00:19:01,800 --> 00:19:04,800 Speaker 1: ring dot com website isn't part of an f a 293 00:19:04,880 --> 00:19:08,280 Speaker 1: Q can local public safety agencies. I love how they 294 00:19:08,280 --> 00:19:11,960 Speaker 1: call them public safety agencies. See the location of my 295 00:19:12,040 --> 00:19:15,400 Speaker 1: house and or camera when they use the Neighbor's app 296 00:19:15,960 --> 00:19:19,280 Speaker 1: and it says neighbors does not share the addresses at 297 00:19:19,280 --> 00:19:22,959 Speaker 1: which any devices are located unless you post it on 298 00:19:23,000 --> 00:19:26,480 Speaker 1: the Neighbor's app or share a video recording in response 299 00:19:26,560 --> 00:19:31,280 Speaker 1: to a quote request for assistance post from a public 300 00:19:31,320 --> 00:19:36,240 Speaker 1: safety organization. Uh, guys, this is a thing that happens. 301 00:19:36,520 --> 00:19:39,879 Speaker 1: It becomes our consent every time a little one step 302 00:19:39,920 --> 00:19:43,920 Speaker 1: further down our consent. So we as users can post 303 00:19:43,960 --> 00:19:46,640 Speaker 1: our video content to neighbors, then it can be Once 304 00:19:46,640 --> 00:19:49,040 Speaker 1: it's there, it's public. It can be accessed by public 305 00:19:49,080 --> 00:19:52,399 Speaker 1: safety officers, or public safety officers can make one of 306 00:19:52,400 --> 00:19:56,760 Speaker 1: those requests that they said, request for assistance, and then 307 00:19:57,040 --> 00:19:59,399 Speaker 1: you can post it again and again. It's your consent, 308 00:19:59,600 --> 00:20:02,440 Speaker 1: You make it happen, you choose to do it, which 309 00:20:02,440 --> 00:20:04,240 Speaker 1: could be a really good thing. You're helping solve a 310 00:20:04,280 --> 00:20:08,800 Speaker 1: crime potentially, or depending how you feel about it, you're 311 00:20:08,840 --> 00:20:12,919 Speaker 1: just contributing to the over policing of everyone at all times. 312 00:20:13,680 --> 00:20:17,040 Speaker 1: One of the big questions that I'm sure comes to 313 00:20:17,320 --> 00:20:21,399 Speaker 1: a lot of our fellow audience members today is what 314 00:20:21,400 --> 00:20:25,720 Speaker 1: what else can law enforcement do with this footage? How 315 00:20:25,760 --> 00:20:30,240 Speaker 1: does this work out in say, a small town with 316 00:20:30,480 --> 00:20:34,320 Speaker 1: a known corruption problem. Small town corruption is very difficult 317 00:20:34,320 --> 00:20:36,919 Speaker 1: to root out, you know what I mean, It's like 318 00:20:37,000 --> 00:20:40,600 Speaker 1: getting the smell of fox urine out of something um 319 00:20:40,720 --> 00:20:44,879 Speaker 1: where the specific references indeed, but I've I've learned a 320 00:20:44,920 --> 00:20:49,000 Speaker 1: lot recently about fox here, and but the like the 321 00:20:49,000 --> 00:20:51,960 Speaker 1: the question is where I love the point you're making 322 00:20:51,960 --> 00:20:55,800 Speaker 1: about the erosion of consent here, matt Um. But the 323 00:20:55,920 --> 00:21:00,800 Speaker 1: question then becomes, is it conceivable that one day law 324 00:21:00,920 --> 00:21:05,360 Speaker 1: enforcement could gain the right not just to access footage 325 00:21:06,000 --> 00:21:09,400 Speaker 1: but to remove it. That can't happen right now from 326 00:21:09,400 --> 00:21:12,600 Speaker 1: what I understand. But it's not it's not a bridge 327 00:21:12,680 --> 00:21:17,800 Speaker 1: that's too far away. Man it's a bridge pro from Amazone. 328 00:21:18,280 --> 00:21:22,240 Speaker 1: It's a bridge pro al Right. Well, hey, we've spent 329 00:21:22,359 --> 00:21:24,520 Speaker 1: enough time on this. Good luck to you and everyone else. 330 00:21:25,680 --> 00:21:29,080 Speaker 1: Hopefully our ring cameras are gonna be fine. Good Luck 331 00:21:29,160 --> 00:21:34,320 Speaker 1: Noel to you specifically, Thank you kindly. I'll report back, Yes, 332 00:21:34,400 --> 00:21:44,200 Speaker 1: we'll report back with more strange news. And we're back 333 00:21:44,280 --> 00:21:48,880 Speaker 1: with more strange news this one. It's kind of exciting, fellas. 334 00:21:49,480 --> 00:21:51,600 Speaker 1: Uh been a while since we've heard about a real 335 00:21:51,920 --> 00:21:56,159 Speaker 1: fashion heist, um, you know, like Ocean's eleven Style or 336 00:21:56,240 --> 00:21:59,040 Speaker 1: like you know, like the Wild Bunch. I don't know 337 00:21:59,080 --> 00:22:00,640 Speaker 1: what they're doing in the Wild Ones. I know it's 338 00:22:00,760 --> 00:22:03,360 Speaker 1: very violent. Obviously we're trying to steal something. I had 339 00:22:03,400 --> 00:22:06,399 Speaker 1: to it been, um, but yeah, I mean it's not 340 00:22:06,560 --> 00:22:11,280 Speaker 1: something that that really crosses our radar very often these days. 341 00:22:11,440 --> 00:22:13,760 Speaker 1: And you think it's because of the kind of nanny 342 00:22:13,800 --> 00:22:16,040 Speaker 1: steak stuff that that Matt was talking about in the 343 00:22:16,119 --> 00:22:18,520 Speaker 1: last story. How do you get away with stuff like this? 344 00:22:18,640 --> 00:22:23,800 Speaker 1: You know and this are are always on everywhere you look, surveillance, um, 345 00:22:24,000 --> 00:22:27,240 Speaker 1: you know kind of world. Uh, it's a good question. 346 00:22:27,240 --> 00:22:29,879 Speaker 1: I think the answer is, well, it doesn't happen as 347 00:22:29,960 --> 00:22:31,760 Speaker 1: much as it maybe it did or maybe it never 348 00:22:31,800 --> 00:22:34,320 Speaker 1: really happened how much in the first place, Ben is 349 00:22:34,359 --> 00:22:38,040 Speaker 1: the always quick to point out how, um, it's not 350 00:22:38,200 --> 00:22:41,439 Speaker 1: a very good business model robbing banks. It takes a 351 00:22:41,440 --> 00:22:44,560 Speaker 1: lot more effort and risk than you could possibly be 352 00:22:44,720 --> 00:22:48,680 Speaker 1: rewarded for, isn't that right? Yes, yeah, do check out 353 00:22:49,359 --> 00:22:53,000 Speaker 1: uh the brain Stuff video from My brain Stuff Days 354 00:22:53,720 --> 00:22:57,560 Speaker 1: did a deep dive into the economics being a professional 355 00:22:57,600 --> 00:23:01,080 Speaker 1: bank robber, and just like the economics of being a 356 00:23:01,119 --> 00:23:04,960 Speaker 1: corner boy slinging dimebags out in the street, you will 357 00:23:05,000 --> 00:23:08,840 Speaker 1: be surprised to learn how much work you have to 358 00:23:08,840 --> 00:23:13,679 Speaker 1: do for how little actual money. In addition, there's no insurance. 359 00:23:13,960 --> 00:23:16,680 Speaker 1: Uh you know, you don't really get vacation days. Bank 360 00:23:16,760 --> 00:23:20,119 Speaker 1: robbery itself is pretty tough because a lot of people 361 00:23:20,200 --> 00:23:23,480 Speaker 1: want you know, end up getting a crew when they're professionals, 362 00:23:23,640 --> 00:23:25,919 Speaker 1: and you have to divide that up. But yeah, just 363 00:23:25,960 --> 00:23:29,800 Speaker 1: go to It's something like don't rob banks on brain 364 00:23:29,880 --> 00:23:33,600 Speaker 1: stuff thanks for of course, I mean, it's good advice 365 00:23:33,640 --> 00:23:36,560 Speaker 1: even just not not you know, logistically and and and 366 00:23:36,760 --> 00:23:39,800 Speaker 1: economically speaking, is probably not a great idea for a 367 00:23:39,840 --> 00:23:41,760 Speaker 1: thing to do better ways to use your time. But 368 00:23:42,240 --> 00:23:44,720 Speaker 1: if you're gonna do. If you're gonna go, go large, 369 00:23:45,000 --> 00:23:47,200 Speaker 1: and by large, I think that's exactly what we see 370 00:23:47,240 --> 00:23:51,840 Speaker 1: here in this UM armored truck robbery that took place 371 00:23:51,960 --> 00:23:54,840 Speaker 1: on July eleven in the wee hours of the morning, 372 00:23:54,880 --> 00:23:58,440 Speaker 1: between around two and two thirty am, around eighty miles 373 00:23:58,880 --> 00:24:04,720 Speaker 1: outside of Los Angeles. Sheriff's deputies responded to a was 374 00:24:04,800 --> 00:24:09,399 Speaker 1: being described by the the Brinks Armored Truck Company and 375 00:24:09,440 --> 00:24:14,200 Speaker 1: the UH associated insurance providers as a loss incident, which 376 00:24:14,240 --> 00:24:17,560 Speaker 1: just about the least sexy way of referring to a 377 00:24:17,640 --> 00:24:20,400 Speaker 1: thrilling heist that I could possibly imagine. You know, these 378 00:24:20,480 --> 00:24:23,840 Speaker 1: organizations all have their terms. UM, so we don't know 379 00:24:24,400 --> 00:24:28,280 Speaker 1: much about like how this actually went down, but we 380 00:24:28,359 --> 00:24:32,800 Speaker 1: do know that the Brinks truck was transporting a cash 381 00:24:32,920 --> 00:24:38,600 Speaker 1: of gems, jewelry, loose diamonds, all sorts of pieces from 382 00:24:38,680 --> 00:24:42,639 Speaker 1: one gem show to another. UM. It was going to 383 00:24:42,840 --> 00:24:46,720 Speaker 1: the International Gym and Jewelry Show in San Mateo, which 384 00:24:46,720 --> 00:24:49,000 Speaker 1: is just a little bit south of San Francisco in 385 00:24:49,040 --> 00:24:52,680 Speaker 1: northern California. UM. This truck was driven by two armed 386 00:24:52,720 --> 00:24:56,880 Speaker 1: guards were employees of the the Brinks Company UH. They 387 00:24:56,920 --> 00:25:01,680 Speaker 1: walked away from UM their their charge. I guess presumably 388 00:25:01,680 --> 00:25:04,320 Speaker 1: to get a slush ear, you know, maybe a red 389 00:25:04,359 --> 00:25:07,760 Speaker 1: bull or some rooster booster to keep them awake. Um. 390 00:25:07,880 --> 00:25:09,440 Speaker 1: You know, it's just the middle of the night and there, 391 00:25:09,600 --> 00:25:12,560 Speaker 1: you know, obviously on a deadline. Um. And the way 392 00:25:12,560 --> 00:25:16,080 Speaker 1: it's described by the hill uh dot com is they 393 00:25:16,119 --> 00:25:20,920 Speaker 1: returned from their snack run and they found that their 394 00:25:20,960 --> 00:25:24,119 Speaker 1: cargo had been stolen, which I don't know if I 395 00:25:24,240 --> 00:25:26,480 Speaker 1: buy like like, I mean, that would require some pretty 396 00:25:26,480 --> 00:25:31,560 Speaker 1: gross negligence or some very very crafty and cunning you know, 397 00:25:31,840 --> 00:25:35,119 Speaker 1: um breaking and entering. But I would have pictured it 398 00:25:35,160 --> 00:25:36,760 Speaker 1: more as like, you know, one of those things where 399 00:25:36,760 --> 00:25:39,399 Speaker 1: you your head off, you block off their path and 400 00:25:39,440 --> 00:25:42,720 Speaker 1: forward and pull guns and and then then presumably there's 401 00:25:43,000 --> 00:25:47,960 Speaker 1: masks involved of who knows what variety Halloween perhaps William Shatner, 402 00:25:48,040 --> 00:25:51,640 Speaker 1: you know, maybe a good old fashioned ski mask. Um. 403 00:25:51,640 --> 00:25:53,359 Speaker 1: But no, this just makes it sound like these twos 404 00:25:53,359 --> 00:25:55,960 Speaker 1: went in to get some some doughnuts and coffee or whatever, 405 00:25:56,000 --> 00:25:59,000 Speaker 1: it came back and it whoops, it's gone. Um. The 406 00:25:59,040 --> 00:26:02,320 Speaker 1: director of the Jewelry Show, Brandy Swanson, gave a statement 407 00:26:02,359 --> 00:26:04,480 Speaker 1: to the Associated Press staying in between twenty five and 408 00:26:04,560 --> 00:26:07,560 Speaker 1: thirty bags were taken from the truck UH and that 409 00:26:07,960 --> 00:26:12,480 Speaker 1: around eighteen different vendors were affected. I also saw it 410 00:26:12,840 --> 00:26:16,159 Speaker 1: on the New York Times as having been two large 411 00:26:16,400 --> 00:26:21,520 Speaker 1: foot lockers, each waying a hundred pounds a piece. UM. 412 00:26:21,560 --> 00:26:23,840 Speaker 1: And here's the funny part. Maybe not funny, I don't know. 413 00:26:23,880 --> 00:26:26,320 Speaker 1: It depends on how you ask. I guess the estimates 414 00:26:26,400 --> 00:26:30,000 Speaker 1: of the value of the stolen goods is depending on 415 00:26:30,000 --> 00:26:35,359 Speaker 1: who you ask. Again, between ten, twenty fifty and even 416 00:26:35,400 --> 00:26:39,920 Speaker 1: a hundred million dollars, pretty big disparity. And the ten 417 00:26:40,520 --> 00:26:45,360 Speaker 1: figure comes from, surprise, surprise, the Brinks armored truck company, 418 00:26:45,800 --> 00:26:49,439 Speaker 1: who you know, are technically on the hook for this 419 00:26:49,680 --> 00:26:52,600 Speaker 1: stuff to a degree. I'm not I wanted to ask 420 00:26:52,640 --> 00:26:54,280 Speaker 1: you guys what you thought about this, and I'd love 421 00:26:54,320 --> 00:26:55,959 Speaker 1: to do a little more research myself. But it's like, 422 00:26:56,600 --> 00:27:00,040 Speaker 1: surely insurance plays a huge part in this UM. I 423 00:27:00,080 --> 00:27:04,120 Speaker 1: saw in one report that the vendors for these types 424 00:27:04,160 --> 00:27:07,880 Speaker 1: of things, they don't ensure the goods for their full 425 00:27:08,040 --> 00:27:11,280 Speaker 1: sale price or their full wholesale price when they're being transported, 426 00:27:11,280 --> 00:27:15,320 Speaker 1: instead relying on the security offered by the armored truck 427 00:27:15,320 --> 00:27:20,320 Speaker 1: company who A spokesperson from that company said that they 428 00:27:20,359 --> 00:27:23,119 Speaker 1: believe the items in the truck were they weren't insured 429 00:27:23,160 --> 00:27:26,080 Speaker 1: for any more than ten million dollars, so that while 430 00:27:26,119 --> 00:27:29,520 Speaker 1: they they do assure the party is affected, would be 431 00:27:29,560 --> 00:27:34,560 Speaker 1: getting reimbursed for that amount. All of this twenty fifty 432 00:27:34,640 --> 00:27:38,600 Speaker 1: two hundred million dollars talk is absolutely absurd, pretty wild. Yeah. 433 00:27:38,600 --> 00:27:42,520 Speaker 1: It was Dana Callaghan, whose spokesperson for brinks Um, and 434 00:27:42,600 --> 00:27:45,040 Speaker 1: she said, according to the information the customers provided to 435 00:27:45,119 --> 00:27:47,639 Speaker 1: us before they ship their items, the total value of 436 00:27:47,640 --> 00:27:50,159 Speaker 1: the missing items is less than ten million. We are 437 00:27:50,200 --> 00:27:52,399 Speaker 1: working with law enforcement and we will fully reimburse our 438 00:27:52,400 --> 00:27:54,560 Speaker 1: customers for the value of their assets that were stole. 439 00:27:54,640 --> 00:27:56,800 Speaker 1: In accordance, Here's the part that I wanted to check 440 00:27:56,840 --> 00:27:59,080 Speaker 1: with you guys on with the terms of our contract. 441 00:27:59,480 --> 00:28:01,720 Speaker 1: So if they guys that, when you know, an armored 442 00:28:01,720 --> 00:28:05,399 Speaker 1: truck company like that provides their service, there's almost an 443 00:28:05,400 --> 00:28:08,240 Speaker 1: f D I C kind of like you know, guarantee 444 00:28:08,280 --> 00:28:12,720 Speaker 1: in place. Yeah, kind of said there was a term 445 00:28:12,800 --> 00:28:16,080 Speaker 1: of the contracts, so obviously varies depending on the you know, 446 00:28:16,440 --> 00:28:21,080 Speaker 1: the job. We may have to send something, Yeah, we 447 00:28:21,080 --> 00:28:23,040 Speaker 1: may have to send something VI armor truck just to 448 00:28:23,320 --> 00:28:27,280 Speaker 1: get a look at one of those Oh yeah, I 449 00:28:27,320 --> 00:28:32,080 Speaker 1: know a guy, um uh, you raise a really important 450 00:28:32,119 --> 00:28:36,800 Speaker 1: point here, and I'm so glad to see this, to 451 00:28:36,920 --> 00:28:40,920 Speaker 1: see this highlighted. We will fully reimburse our customers for 452 00:28:40,960 --> 00:28:43,440 Speaker 1: the value of their assets that we're stolen. Let me 453 00:28:43,520 --> 00:28:46,479 Speaker 1: fine if the sentence ends there, but it says in 454 00:28:46,560 --> 00:28:50,960 Speaker 1: accordance with the terms of our contract, and that that 455 00:28:51,040 --> 00:28:54,960 Speaker 1: sticks out to me because that is basically a long 456 00:28:55,080 --> 00:28:59,880 Speaker 1: form version of an asterisk, you know districts. So with 457 00:29:00,080 --> 00:29:04,600 Speaker 1: out seeing the terms of the contract, we can't say 458 00:29:04,640 --> 00:29:07,400 Speaker 1: for sure if it's similar to f D I C 459 00:29:07,800 --> 00:29:13,600 Speaker 1: f D I C. Laws don't have a minimum guaranteed safety, 460 00:29:13,680 --> 00:29:18,840 Speaker 1: they have a maximum safety. So if they get to ye, 461 00:29:20,200 --> 00:29:24,760 Speaker 1: I don't know, man find jewelry and gemstones. It's so 462 00:29:25,160 --> 00:29:30,240 Speaker 1: crooked h or the opportunities for corruption are so big. 463 00:29:30,280 --> 00:29:33,080 Speaker 1: If I lost something and I knew it was worth 464 00:29:33,440 --> 00:29:36,880 Speaker 1: probably ten to twelve million dollars, but I do I 465 00:29:36,880 --> 00:29:39,959 Speaker 1: could make a solid case that it was more like 466 00:29:40,000 --> 00:29:42,560 Speaker 1: twenty million, then of course you would do that. That's 467 00:29:42,680 --> 00:29:46,080 Speaker 1: human nature. It makes me think. It makes me think too, 468 00:29:46,240 --> 00:29:49,080 Speaker 1: is still lives rent free in my head? As the 469 00:29:49,080 --> 00:29:52,200 Speaker 1: Internet used to say, I still think of one of 470 00:29:52,200 --> 00:29:55,280 Speaker 1: the episodes on Jeffrey Epstein when I found out all 471 00:29:55,320 --> 00:29:57,400 Speaker 1: the stuff that was in his safe during the raid, 472 00:29:57,840 --> 00:30:00,400 Speaker 1: and he just had a he just had loose diamonds, 473 00:30:00,800 --> 00:30:04,640 Speaker 1: which is like the most billionaire creepy thing ever. You know. 474 00:30:04,720 --> 00:30:07,680 Speaker 1: He had like some passports, he had some uh some cash, 475 00:30:07,680 --> 00:30:11,000 Speaker 1: and then just loose diamonds in case. So I'm saying 476 00:30:11,040 --> 00:30:14,000 Speaker 1: that to admit my bias that I may be totally 477 00:30:14,400 --> 00:30:17,800 Speaker 1: unfairly seeing corruption where there might not necessarily be corruption 478 00:30:17,840 --> 00:30:21,200 Speaker 1: involved just because jewelry is in the mix. Now I'm 479 00:30:21,240 --> 00:30:23,520 Speaker 1: with you, man for sure. And also like it's it's 480 00:30:23,520 --> 00:30:26,600 Speaker 1: just it's a trope. I mean, you see loose diamonds 481 00:30:26,720 --> 00:30:30,200 Speaker 1: used as a very compact way of moving large quantities 482 00:30:30,240 --> 00:30:33,000 Speaker 1: of wealth, you know, I mean, way smaller and easier 483 00:30:33,040 --> 00:30:34,640 Speaker 1: to to hide. You can hide it in the sock, 484 00:30:34,920 --> 00:30:37,840 Speaker 1: whereas like cash you gotta have like duffle bags or suitcases. 485 00:30:37,920 --> 00:30:41,040 Speaker 1: That stuff, you know, takes up space. Um. But another 486 00:30:41,080 --> 00:30:45,240 Speaker 1: interesting point here is the notion you know, a value 487 00:30:45,360 --> 00:30:48,640 Speaker 1: in general, Like I always whenever I see stories like this, um, 488 00:30:49,080 --> 00:30:51,720 Speaker 1: I am always a little bit thrown by how much 489 00:30:51,840 --> 00:30:54,840 Speaker 1: value he assigned to these shiny objects that are like 490 00:30:54,920 --> 00:30:57,960 Speaker 1: not good for anything, uh, I know we talked about 491 00:30:57,960 --> 00:31:00,760 Speaker 1: this in our discussion of the beers and you know, blood, 492 00:31:00,800 --> 00:31:04,680 Speaker 1: diamonds and all that stuff. It's just an inherent weird flaw, 493 00:31:04,760 --> 00:31:08,040 Speaker 1: I would argue in human beings that we just at 494 00:31:08,080 --> 00:31:10,960 Speaker 1: some point on our basic levels, are really just animals 495 00:31:10,960 --> 00:31:14,480 Speaker 1: that like shiny things. Um. I just don't get it. 496 00:31:14,480 --> 00:31:18,080 Speaker 1: It's never gonna be something that I'm going to understand, um, 497 00:31:18,560 --> 00:31:20,320 Speaker 1: and just you know, And and it's sad because I 498 00:31:20,360 --> 00:31:23,920 Speaker 1: mean a lot of these uh vendors are smaller mom 499 00:31:23,920 --> 00:31:25,840 Speaker 1: and pop sellers, so that could be in their family. 500 00:31:26,240 --> 00:31:28,760 Speaker 1: Uh and they you know, do these gym shows. Um, 501 00:31:28,880 --> 00:31:31,480 Speaker 1: but this could have been their entire livelihood, you know, 502 00:31:31,680 --> 00:31:34,440 Speaker 1: dumped into these precious rocks. But I don't know what 503 00:31:34,480 --> 00:31:37,880 Speaker 1: y'all think about just the the the inherent weird nature 504 00:31:37,880 --> 00:31:40,480 Speaker 1: of value when it comes to things like this. I 505 00:31:40,520 --> 00:31:45,640 Speaker 1: am on record for years expounding on this, so anything 506 00:31:45,720 --> 00:31:48,480 Speaker 1: I say is going to be very familiar to long 507 00:31:48,560 --> 00:31:52,560 Speaker 1: term listeners, and I hope you agree. You can get 508 00:31:52,640 --> 00:31:57,320 Speaker 1: a look at the arbitrary nature of value currency, money, 509 00:31:57,480 --> 00:32:02,760 Speaker 1: fiat currency by just just hop on your browser choice 510 00:32:02,920 --> 00:32:06,320 Speaker 1: and look into the weird things that have been used 511 00:32:06,360 --> 00:32:10,960 Speaker 1: as currency or signifiers of value across human history. We're 512 00:32:10,960 --> 00:32:15,880 Speaker 1: talking huge rocks for some reason, We're talking peppercorns, different 513 00:32:15,960 --> 00:32:21,000 Speaker 1: kinds of spices, and of course, uh, living things like cattle, 514 00:32:21,920 --> 00:32:28,080 Speaker 1: and people from disadvantaged tribes, rival tribes or disadvantaged communities. 515 00:32:28,480 --> 00:32:32,080 Speaker 1: Uh there is again years ago, and I'll say it 516 00:32:32,320 --> 00:32:34,440 Speaker 1: because I'm still waiting for a good response on this. 517 00:32:34,760 --> 00:32:37,440 Speaker 1: Years ago, I asked what the difference was between an 518 00:32:37,440 --> 00:32:44,040 Speaker 1: economy as a vision today and a religion, and to date, Uh, 519 00:32:44,160 --> 00:32:48,440 Speaker 1: there hasn't been a really solid objective distinction between the two. 520 00:32:48,480 --> 00:32:52,480 Speaker 1: So I'm I'm with you as well. Uh said it earlier. 521 00:32:53,440 --> 00:32:56,240 Speaker 1: So much of human experience is just the stories they 522 00:32:56,240 --> 00:33:01,520 Speaker 1: tell themselves. From your own identity, what you what you 523 00:33:01,560 --> 00:33:05,320 Speaker 1: mean when you say me all the way to the 524 00:33:05,360 --> 00:33:10,600 Speaker 1: idea of value and what should have value ascribed to it. Well, 525 00:33:10,920 --> 00:33:13,440 Speaker 1: and now we're obviously seeing that written large with all 526 00:33:13,440 --> 00:33:18,240 Speaker 1: this n f T and and and cryptocurrency shenanigans. You know, 527 00:33:18,400 --> 00:33:21,560 Speaker 1: at least we know precious gems are hard to get. 528 00:33:21,960 --> 00:33:24,280 Speaker 1: You know that that in and of itself implies a 529 00:33:24,360 --> 00:33:27,320 Speaker 1: sort of value. But like board apes and like you know, 530 00:33:27,480 --> 00:33:32,520 Speaker 1: crypto punks or whatever, that is just the next level 531 00:33:32,560 --> 00:33:37,000 Speaker 1: of weird. Uh the signings of value. Guys. I feel 532 00:33:37,040 --> 00:33:39,080 Speaker 1: like we're missing a major part of the story, and 533 00:33:39,120 --> 00:33:40,840 Speaker 1: I just I want to bring it up. I have 534 00:33:40,960 --> 00:33:44,960 Speaker 1: to why did both security guards if there are only 535 00:33:45,280 --> 00:33:48,720 Speaker 1: two guards present, why did both of them go into 536 00:33:48,760 --> 00:33:52,200 Speaker 1: a store or leave the sketch Super sketch a very 537 00:33:52,200 --> 00:33:55,400 Speaker 1: good point. Man. Again, I feel like the story isn't complete. 538 00:33:55,680 --> 00:33:57,480 Speaker 1: I feel like that doesn't make sense. It does not 539 00:33:57,600 --> 00:34:00,840 Speaker 1: make sense. Even if they were gone, it's like moments 540 00:34:00,960 --> 00:34:02,760 Speaker 1: and how and unless it was an inside job, how 541 00:34:02,800 --> 00:34:06,200 Speaker 1: do they like crack into this this armored truck? You know, 542 00:34:06,280 --> 00:34:10,040 Speaker 1: these things are like severely difficult to break into. I 543 00:34:10,080 --> 00:34:13,160 Speaker 1: have personally seen many a drop off and pick up 544 00:34:13,200 --> 00:34:17,680 Speaker 1: with several different armored car armored truck agencies, and never 545 00:34:17,840 --> 00:34:21,200 Speaker 1: once have I seen the driver get out of the 546 00:34:21,680 --> 00:34:24,839 Speaker 1: your at least one person not remain in a car 547 00:34:25,520 --> 00:34:27,479 Speaker 1: when the other person goes in to do the drop 548 00:34:27,520 --> 00:34:30,160 Speaker 1: off or pick up. Never have I seen that. I 549 00:34:30,160 --> 00:34:32,400 Speaker 1: don't care what time it is, like, it feels like 550 00:34:32,520 --> 00:34:35,040 Speaker 1: that's just against protocol and that's not what should happen. 551 00:34:35,760 --> 00:34:37,560 Speaker 1: I think we need to look at an inside job 552 00:34:37,600 --> 00:34:40,440 Speaker 1: situation here. I'm just saying no offense to individual drivers. 553 00:34:40,440 --> 00:34:42,200 Speaker 1: Maybe you didn't do anything, but we should at least 554 00:34:42,200 --> 00:34:46,000 Speaker 1: investigate it with you. With you, these are the good questions. Uh. 555 00:34:46,040 --> 00:34:47,640 Speaker 1: And it really is just something that kind of brings 556 00:34:47,719 --> 00:34:51,160 Speaker 1: up a lot of other, um, you know, little weird 557 00:34:51,520 --> 00:34:54,960 Speaker 1: conversations around this kind of thing. But similar Matt, have 558 00:34:55,000 --> 00:34:57,640 Speaker 1: you have you seen anything further about the the theft 559 00:34:57,680 --> 00:35:01,839 Speaker 1: of that golden taberne cole remember that story? I did 560 00:35:01,960 --> 00:35:05,520 Speaker 1: see that there was I think they upped the amount 561 00:35:05,560 --> 00:35:08,480 Speaker 1: of money if they were they were offering as a reward, 562 00:35:08,560 --> 00:35:12,000 Speaker 1: But I haven't seen any news about it. That's a heist, yeah, 563 00:35:12,080 --> 00:35:14,239 Speaker 1: as a total heist. I have a different of a 564 00:35:14,320 --> 00:35:16,919 Speaker 1: different kind. But I know maybe we're entering back into 565 00:35:16,960 --> 00:35:20,600 Speaker 1: like the wild West, like heist the territory. It's it's interesting. 566 00:35:21,120 --> 00:35:23,600 Speaker 1: But um, if you guys don't have anything else to 567 00:35:23,640 --> 00:35:26,440 Speaker 1: add to this one, I think we'd raise some interesting points. 568 00:35:26,480 --> 00:35:28,520 Speaker 1: And it was a pleasure chatting about it with y'all. 569 00:35:28,520 --> 00:35:30,600 Speaker 1: And keep an eye on this one and we'll take 570 00:35:30,640 --> 00:35:32,520 Speaker 1: a break and then be back with one more piece 571 00:35:32,520 --> 00:35:43,480 Speaker 1: of strange news. We have returned, and to round out 572 00:35:43,640 --> 00:35:47,840 Speaker 1: our weekly strange news segments will be honest, I was. 573 00:35:48,400 --> 00:35:50,799 Speaker 1: It's a bid at an in past. It's tough to 574 00:35:50,960 --> 00:35:54,560 Speaker 1: choose just one story, it's tough to choose just three, 575 00:35:55,400 --> 00:35:59,560 Speaker 1: but something did catch my eye. I want to introduce 576 00:35:59,640 --> 00:36:03,040 Speaker 1: you guys to it. And then opened the door, fellow 577 00:36:03,080 --> 00:36:10,960 Speaker 1: conspiracy realist to a larger mission critical conversation about reporting 578 00:36:11,120 --> 00:36:14,960 Speaker 1: and narratives. Let me give you the headline. First, super 579 00:36:15,000 --> 00:36:18,160 Speaker 1: Soldier fans, if you have been obsessed with dark as 580 00:36:18,160 --> 00:36:20,839 Speaker 1: secret research for as long as I have, and mad 581 00:36:20,920 --> 00:36:24,080 Speaker 1: as well, Uh, then you know they're mad scientists cooking 582 00:36:24,160 --> 00:36:27,760 Speaker 1: up all kinds of crazy, amazing stuff. And uh, DARPA 583 00:36:27,880 --> 00:36:31,200 Speaker 1: was definitely paying attention to this report that happened quite recently. 584 00:36:31,880 --> 00:36:39,239 Speaker 1: Russia accuses Ukraine of growing mutant soldiers mutant soldiers, real 585 00:36:39,280 --> 00:36:43,600 Speaker 1: life super soldiers, similar to the Winter Soldiers, similar to 586 00:36:44,160 --> 00:36:48,040 Speaker 1: uh so many works of science fiction that you are 587 00:36:48,160 --> 00:36:52,000 Speaker 1: doubtlessly thinking of as you hear this. Um, there are 588 00:36:52,520 --> 00:36:57,120 Speaker 1: multiple news sources about this, but they're all doing something 589 00:36:57,320 --> 00:36:59,960 Speaker 1: a little bit sneaky, a little bit of a shell gay, 590 00:37:00,080 --> 00:37:02,680 Speaker 1: a little bit of three card monty. Uh. And then 591 00:37:02,719 --> 00:37:04,360 Speaker 1: we'll tell you what it is in a second. But 592 00:37:04,480 --> 00:37:08,399 Speaker 1: first let's give you the Western sources, and then we'll 593 00:37:08,400 --> 00:37:11,000 Speaker 1: talk about the primary source. So if you go over 594 00:37:11,080 --> 00:37:13,520 Speaker 1: to Daily Beast and I love some of the reporting 595 00:37:13,560 --> 00:37:18,439 Speaker 1: Daily Beast does. UH. News editor Alison Quinn comes in 596 00:37:18,680 --> 00:37:22,080 Speaker 1: heart and fast with Russia says it's losing because Ukraine 597 00:37:22,120 --> 00:37:27,680 Speaker 1: has experimental mutant troops created in secret bio labs. Uh. 598 00:37:27,840 --> 00:37:34,200 Speaker 1: This was made I think this Monday, and it comes 599 00:37:34,200 --> 00:37:37,640 Speaker 1: from two Russian lawmakers who are part of a commission 600 00:37:37,920 --> 00:37:43,160 Speaker 1: to investigate what they're calling bio laboratories in Ukraine. Careful 601 00:37:43,200 --> 00:37:46,000 Speaker 1: with that translation. This is coming to us from Russian 602 00:37:46,280 --> 00:37:51,040 Speaker 1: and bio laboratory could mean all sorts of things. It 603 00:37:51,080 --> 00:37:57,000 Speaker 1: could be everything from a top secret facility experimenting with 604 00:37:57,320 --> 00:38:01,759 Speaker 1: biological weaponry right like small box and stuff. Or it 605 00:38:01,800 --> 00:38:04,000 Speaker 1: could be one of those little places in your local 606 00:38:04,040 --> 00:38:07,000 Speaker 1: strip mall that make sure people don't piss dirty before 607 00:38:07,000 --> 00:38:10,720 Speaker 1: they get hired for a job. Bio laboratory's umbrella term. 608 00:38:10,719 --> 00:38:12,640 Speaker 1: It means a lot of things in English, you know. 609 00:38:13,480 --> 00:38:19,400 Speaker 1: So let's introduce you to Constantine Close and Arina Rovaya. 610 00:38:19,840 --> 00:38:23,040 Speaker 1: That's the Deputy Speaker of Russia's Federation Council and the 611 00:38:23,080 --> 00:38:28,920 Speaker 1: Deputy Chair of the State Duma, respectively. They believe or 612 00:38:28,960 --> 00:38:34,239 Speaker 1: they stated that they had found bombshell evidence from the 613 00:38:34,280 --> 00:38:39,040 Speaker 1: investigation of their committee, and they claim to have uncovered, 614 00:38:39,320 --> 00:38:43,120 Speaker 1: through analysis of the blood from Ukrainian prisoners of war, 615 00:38:43,640 --> 00:38:47,759 Speaker 1: a range of diseases that suggested these soldiers had been 616 00:38:47,840 --> 00:38:53,439 Speaker 1: experimented on for military purposes. That's a quotation. I guess 617 00:38:53,520 --> 00:38:56,560 Speaker 1: they're pointing out military purposes so that no one thinks 618 00:38:56,600 --> 00:39:00,400 Speaker 1: they were getting experimented on, like for funzies, you know 619 00:39:00,400 --> 00:39:02,640 Speaker 1: what I mean. They're they're on scientists and a lab 620 00:39:02,719 --> 00:39:06,400 Speaker 1: saying like hold my beer. Um. One quote from yedo 621 00:39:06,480 --> 00:39:10,400 Speaker 1: Vaya uh stood out, like to read it here quote 622 00:39:10,440 --> 00:39:13,839 Speaker 1: and we see the cruelty and barbarity with which the 623 00:39:13,920 --> 00:39:18,160 Speaker 1: military personnel of Ukraine behave, the crimes that they commit 624 00:39:18,200 --> 00:39:22,320 Speaker 1: against the civilian population, those monstrous crimes that they commit 625 00:39:22,360 --> 00:39:26,080 Speaker 1: against prisoners of war. Confirmed that this system for the 626 00:39:26,120 --> 00:39:30,640 Speaker 1: control and creation of a cruel murder machine was implemented 627 00:39:31,200 --> 00:39:37,160 Speaker 1: under the management of the United States. Don't don't cruel 628 00:39:37,280 --> 00:39:43,880 Speaker 1: murder machine like that as opposed to a whimsical right, right, honestly, 629 00:39:44,080 --> 00:39:48,040 Speaker 1: just seriously, this is my take. I think they've got 630 00:39:48,160 --> 00:39:53,280 Speaker 1: a translated season of the Boys that they've been watching 631 00:39:54,120 --> 00:39:59,160 Speaker 1: their conflating vaut and compound V or at least temp 632 00:39:59,280 --> 00:40:04,160 Speaker 1: V for um this latest season spoilers UM and they're 633 00:40:04,200 --> 00:40:07,000 Speaker 1: like they're put it all together, and they're like, this 634 00:40:07,040 --> 00:40:09,560 Speaker 1: is the thing that's happening. This is how we're justifying 635 00:40:09,840 --> 00:40:13,360 Speaker 1: our committee. Well, did that look like jack Quaid? That 636 00:40:13,400 --> 00:40:17,799 Speaker 1: looks like jack Quaid. This is so, this is the thing. 637 00:40:18,000 --> 00:40:22,080 Speaker 1: Western journalists are doing great work and it's very important. 638 00:40:22,560 --> 00:40:25,680 Speaker 1: But this leads us to the other part of this conversation. 639 00:40:25,800 --> 00:40:28,759 Speaker 1: So you go to the source where this was first reported, 640 00:40:29,280 --> 00:40:34,040 Speaker 1: and it's a Russian media source obviously is Commerce dot Argue, 641 00:40:34,800 --> 00:40:37,839 Speaker 1: and you can you can find translations of this from 642 00:40:37,920 --> 00:40:42,600 Speaker 1: Russian to English. The story differs from what's getting reported 643 00:40:43,520 --> 00:40:47,080 Speaker 1: our headlined in the West. I should say they do 644 00:40:47,320 --> 00:40:51,480 Speaker 1: confirm these co chairs confirmed that blood test of Ukrainian 645 00:40:51,480 --> 00:40:57,200 Speaker 1: po ws uh indicate that they were turned into the 646 00:40:57,239 --> 00:41:01,840 Speaker 1: most cruel monsters the some sort of a secret experiments, 647 00:41:02,600 --> 00:41:05,799 Speaker 1: and part of what they said, what they've released so far, 648 00:41:06,360 --> 00:41:09,120 Speaker 1: is that they not only found diseases in the blood 649 00:41:09,160 --> 00:41:13,600 Speaker 1: of these soldiers, but they also found these diseases were 650 00:41:13,640 --> 00:41:18,520 Speaker 1: not normal for folks living in Ukraine, living in that 651 00:41:18,560 --> 00:41:20,879 Speaker 1: part of the world and be Russian media. Of course, 652 00:41:20,880 --> 00:41:24,319 Speaker 1: it calls it the territory of Ukraine. UH and they 653 00:41:24,360 --> 00:41:28,279 Speaker 1: said the content of the substances, the unusual stuff in 654 00:41:28,280 --> 00:41:33,400 Speaker 1: their blood was far higher than the normal expected amount, 655 00:41:33,840 --> 00:41:36,759 Speaker 1: which led them to say experiments were made on them, 656 00:41:36,880 --> 00:41:40,400 Speaker 1: meaning the soldiers, and they were carried out with extremely 657 00:41:40,480 --> 00:41:45,279 Speaker 1: dangerous diseases which under certain circumstances could be distributed for 658 00:41:45,480 --> 00:41:48,680 Speaker 1: military purposes. Keep in mind, this is not like they 659 00:41:48,719 --> 00:41:54,560 Speaker 1: don't have video of some Ukrainian pow sticking to walls, right, 660 00:41:54,840 --> 00:41:58,880 Speaker 1: or bending the iron bars of their cell, or you know, 661 00:41:59,040 --> 00:42:02,280 Speaker 1: laser eyes one that's fun laser eyes, they have any 662 00:42:02,320 --> 00:42:07,360 Speaker 1: of that. What they do have is this this idea 663 00:42:07,440 --> 00:42:10,640 Speaker 1: that there maybe what they're trying to ultimately do is 664 00:42:10,680 --> 00:42:13,960 Speaker 1: imply that there's going to be biological or chemical warfare 665 00:42:14,400 --> 00:42:18,120 Speaker 1: and they want NATO and or Ukraine to be blamed 666 00:42:18,160 --> 00:42:21,960 Speaker 1: for this. You also see reports of bank notes allegedly 667 00:42:21,960 --> 00:42:28,280 Speaker 1: infected with tuberculosis they're in eastern Ukraine, and the finding 668 00:42:28,480 --> 00:42:34,720 Speaker 1: of what they're calling gas gang green in a veterinary laboratory. 669 00:42:34,840 --> 00:42:38,840 Speaker 1: And this also of all stuff like high rates of 670 00:42:38,920 --> 00:42:45,400 Speaker 1: hepatitis A and then traces of drugs which aren't aren't 671 00:42:45,520 --> 00:42:49,880 Speaker 1: fully explained here. Um, they want to tie it to 672 00:42:49,880 --> 00:42:54,280 Speaker 1: the US military and the allegation that Uncle Sam launched 673 00:42:54,320 --> 00:42:59,160 Speaker 1: a campaign to accuse Russia of allegedly carried out some 674 00:42:59,239 --> 00:43:02,279 Speaker 1: kind of biology tical attacks. So the message of this 675 00:43:02,360 --> 00:43:05,480 Speaker 1: is a little mixed up, kind of like how Brotherhood 676 00:43:05,520 --> 00:43:07,920 Speaker 1: of the Wolf could never decide what genre of film 677 00:43:07,920 --> 00:43:12,279 Speaker 1: it wanted to be. There is a wonderful film, and 678 00:43:12,320 --> 00:43:14,320 Speaker 1: go watch it. Now. A lot of people are calling 679 00:43:14,320 --> 00:43:19,040 Speaker 1: it the New Vibes, but the I picked up the 680 00:43:19,080 --> 00:43:21,879 Speaker 1: Donald Trump habit of just saying a lot of level uh. 681 00:43:21,960 --> 00:43:26,000 Speaker 1: So the thing that here is, um, there are multiple 682 00:43:26,080 --> 00:43:29,719 Speaker 1: purposes that this statement seems to aim. For one, the 683 00:43:29,800 --> 00:43:37,239 Speaker 1: allegation of uh super soldiers or human experimentation to the 684 00:43:37,280 --> 00:43:41,280 Speaker 1: allegation that the US is doing a frame up job 685 00:43:41,640 --> 00:43:45,440 Speaker 1: right to make it look like Russia's guilty biological weapons. 686 00:43:45,520 --> 00:43:52,080 Speaker 1: And three the foreshadowing or the groundwork for a for 687 00:43:52,160 --> 00:43:55,640 Speaker 1: an accusation that it is the US, Ukraine and its 688 00:43:56,000 --> 00:44:01,040 Speaker 1: Western allies who are actually using biological warfare. So that's 689 00:44:01,080 --> 00:44:02,840 Speaker 1: mainly what they're saying there. There are a couple of 690 00:44:02,920 --> 00:44:04,959 Speaker 1: you know, there are a couple of different aims here, 691 00:44:05,080 --> 00:44:08,720 Speaker 1: and they're not hyper focused on one. But the phrase 692 00:44:09,600 --> 00:44:16,359 Speaker 1: mutant super soldiers in a post m c U society, 693 00:44:16,600 --> 00:44:19,160 Speaker 1: that's clickable gold, you know what I mean. That's the 694 00:44:19,239 --> 00:44:23,040 Speaker 1: value they assigned to that word. Uh. This, this is 695 00:44:23,080 --> 00:44:26,320 Speaker 1: tricky though, and it's misleading because what is a mutant. 696 00:44:26,480 --> 00:44:30,960 Speaker 1: A mutant is a life form that carries a mutation, 697 00:44:31,719 --> 00:44:36,560 Speaker 1: whether that mutation has occurred through the weird yachtzi game 698 00:44:36,640 --> 00:44:40,759 Speaker 1: of evolution, or whether that mutation has occurred due to 699 00:44:40,960 --> 00:44:46,360 Speaker 1: an environmental factor like exposure to radiation or purposeful tinkering 700 00:44:46,840 --> 00:44:50,839 Speaker 1: by scientists who had a lot of coffee and just 701 00:44:50,960 --> 00:44:54,000 Speaker 1: learned about crisper, you know what I mean. Like again, 702 00:44:54,160 --> 00:44:56,200 Speaker 1: mutation can mean a lot of things, but the one 703 00:44:56,200 --> 00:45:00,719 Speaker 1: thing it means is tinkering on a genetic level, insformation 704 00:45:00,880 --> 00:45:04,279 Speaker 1: on a genetic level. And that's not what that does 705 00:45:04,360 --> 00:45:09,000 Speaker 1: not appear to be what the Russian side is saying here, Greed, Now, 706 00:45:09,040 --> 00:45:12,000 Speaker 1: I still I still think they just got copies of 707 00:45:12,280 --> 00:45:17,200 Speaker 1: hero orgasm. Uh did you read the books? Did you 708 00:45:17,200 --> 00:45:20,359 Speaker 1: read the books? The six part series heregasm? Yeah yeah, 709 00:45:20,440 --> 00:45:25,280 Speaker 1: yeah yeah. But watching love Sausage like on the screen 710 00:45:25,480 --> 00:45:29,879 Speaker 1: was a very different experience. It's nice. IM sorry hearing 711 00:45:29,880 --> 00:45:33,640 Speaker 1: you say loves of watching love sausage just sorry something 712 00:45:33,680 --> 00:45:35,880 Speaker 1: to me. I don't know, I'm I'm glad he was 713 00:45:35,920 --> 00:45:39,919 Speaker 1: in the in the adaptation, but man, this series, which 714 00:45:40,000 --> 00:45:44,360 Speaker 1: is kind of agelordy the love Sausage of the of 715 00:45:44,440 --> 00:45:48,760 Speaker 1: the graphic novel series is more of a developed character. 716 00:45:49,360 --> 00:45:53,839 Speaker 1: I just can't wait till he gets homeland. I can well, 717 00:45:53,960 --> 00:45:56,719 Speaker 1: I just love all those characters. Okay, Anyway, I think 718 00:45:56,760 --> 00:45:59,120 Speaker 1: I think they're I think whoever is putting out this 719 00:45:59,200 --> 00:46:03,360 Speaker 1: information is just a little too excited about How about 720 00:46:03,760 --> 00:46:09,160 Speaker 1: compound V Well, the claims that these Russian politicians are making. 721 00:46:09,480 --> 00:46:13,840 Speaker 1: You don't need to add mutants into the mix. You 722 00:46:14,040 --> 00:46:18,160 Speaker 1: can look at what they're saying, which is essentially biological 723 00:46:18,200 --> 00:46:21,240 Speaker 1: warfare or performance enhancing drugs, and you can say that's 724 00:46:21,360 --> 00:46:30,400 Speaker 1: nuts already, that's pretty bonkers, and it's more plausible right now. Right, 725 00:46:30,480 --> 00:46:32,839 Speaker 1: just a little a little meth, a little coke, a 726 00:46:32,880 --> 00:46:35,360 Speaker 1: little something that you give the troops before they go 727 00:46:35,400 --> 00:46:38,480 Speaker 1: out to stimulate them up. I mean, we've we've definitely 728 00:46:38,560 --> 00:46:41,040 Speaker 1: done it in the past, right, So that's sweep free 729 00:46:41,040 --> 00:46:43,680 Speaker 1: pill the darkest still won't give me. I know you 730 00:46:43,719 --> 00:46:47,000 Speaker 1: guys listen to the show. Uh, there's a there's an 731 00:46:47,000 --> 00:46:50,719 Speaker 1: oyster head song called Armies on Ecstasy Apparently, I mean 732 00:46:50,920 --> 00:46:53,320 Speaker 1: m d m A was initially established by the government 733 00:46:53,360 --> 00:46:56,200 Speaker 1: for Houston, not necessarily in combat with for like therapy 734 00:46:56,239 --> 00:46:57,560 Speaker 1: and stuff. So the song is sort of a joke 735 00:46:57,640 --> 00:46:59,799 Speaker 1: that said, it's hard to kill the enemy on old 736 00:46:59,920 --> 00:47:03,239 Speaker 1: m d m A. There's also h One of our 737 00:47:03,280 --> 00:47:06,880 Speaker 1: full listeners turned me on to a band called the 738 00:47:07,080 --> 00:47:10,480 Speaker 1: viagraa Boys, and they have this great song for any 739 00:47:10,520 --> 00:47:15,200 Speaker 1: conspiracy fans called Creepy Crawlers. I think check it out. 740 00:47:15,680 --> 00:47:18,759 Speaker 1: Be aware that it's it's got to be satire, but 741 00:47:18,840 --> 00:47:20,600 Speaker 1: it's it's a great listen. It's a great listen with 742 00:47:20,719 --> 00:47:25,359 Speaker 1: us your genre. Uh. And this is the conversation about 743 00:47:25,360 --> 00:47:28,400 Speaker 1: the realistic danger we need to have here, which is 744 00:47:28,440 --> 00:47:32,680 Speaker 1: that unless you do digging right, unless you practice your 745 00:47:32,719 --> 00:47:36,680 Speaker 1: due diligence and hunt down some sources, primary sources, then 746 00:47:36,840 --> 00:47:40,879 Speaker 1: you are placing a lot of trust in people that 747 00:47:40,920 --> 00:47:44,279 Speaker 1: you have not met and maybe we'll never meet, and 748 00:47:44,320 --> 00:47:47,120 Speaker 1: you're placing a lot of trust in their translation abilities 749 00:47:47,239 --> 00:47:50,480 Speaker 1: as well. We talked about this little bit in our 750 00:47:50,719 --> 00:47:54,480 Speaker 1: upcoming book stuff. They don't want you to know. Translation 751 00:47:54,600 --> 00:48:00,840 Speaker 1: presents an excellent opportunity to diminish the claims of someone 752 00:48:00,880 --> 00:48:05,640 Speaker 1: speaking in another language. It also presents an enormous opportunity 753 00:48:05,960 --> 00:48:10,640 Speaker 1: to muddle or alter those claims to make it sound 754 00:48:10,760 --> 00:48:15,480 Speaker 1: more like the image you want your domestic audience to read. 755 00:48:16,120 --> 00:48:19,520 Speaker 1: And that's what happens. Like. Yeah, you could argue that 756 00:48:19,560 --> 00:48:23,200 Speaker 1: I'm being a little nitpicky when I say, hey, technically 757 00:48:23,400 --> 00:48:25,520 Speaker 1: not mutants, But I spent a lot of time thinking 758 00:48:25,560 --> 00:48:30,080 Speaker 1: about this, and we know clearly the association people are 759 00:48:30,120 --> 00:48:34,560 Speaker 1: going to make is not It's not what the original 760 00:48:34,600 --> 00:48:39,520 Speaker 1: sources saying. Now, on a high note, I want to 761 00:48:39,560 --> 00:48:43,880 Speaker 1: say it is absolutely time to do a full episode 762 00:48:44,080 --> 00:48:47,440 Speaker 1: updated on the future of Super Soldiers. The time is now, 763 00:48:47,480 --> 00:48:51,160 Speaker 1: a gentleman, because right now, if we get in kind 764 00:48:51,160 --> 00:48:53,560 Speaker 1: of on the ground or second to third floor of this, 765 00:48:54,120 --> 00:48:59,000 Speaker 1: then we can we can make those terrible predictions that 766 00:48:59,080 --> 00:49:03,760 Speaker 1: will end up becoming true. You know. Uh, the exoskeleton 767 00:49:03,960 --> 00:49:07,080 Speaker 1: is definitely gonna happen, right You're gonna be You're gonna 768 00:49:07,080 --> 00:49:12,200 Speaker 1: be neuralinked maybe to a robot dog that's got a gun, 769 00:49:12,600 --> 00:49:14,520 Speaker 1: you know, and you can just sort of call it 770 00:49:14,560 --> 00:49:17,600 Speaker 1: with your mind here can also communicate psychically with the 771 00:49:17,600 --> 00:49:19,600 Speaker 1: bees that are coming out of his mouth. Again, be 772 00:49:19,760 --> 00:49:25,560 Speaker 1: technology is not there yet. If and when it is, 773 00:49:25,960 --> 00:49:28,239 Speaker 1: you've got to include neuralink to the bees. To think 774 00:49:28,360 --> 00:49:30,280 Speaker 1: all the damage you could do if you have individual 775 00:49:30,320 --> 00:49:35,000 Speaker 1: access to each bee. Nano drones are a thing. Uh, 776 00:49:35,040 --> 00:49:39,399 Speaker 1: and to control them hive mind style is not an 777 00:49:39,400 --> 00:49:43,200 Speaker 1: impossible or um. Yeah, it's not an impossible thing for 778 00:49:43,239 --> 00:49:48,080 Speaker 1: the future. Knowing world militaries, they would probably if they 779 00:49:48,080 --> 00:49:53,759 Speaker 1: were using a blend of organic and human made technology, 780 00:49:53,960 --> 00:49:56,680 Speaker 1: they would probably go as something that could sting repeatedly 781 00:49:56,840 --> 00:49:59,799 Speaker 1: without being a one and done like a honey bees. 782 00:49:59,840 --> 00:50:02,440 Speaker 1: So they would probably go with wasps. You know leak 783 00:50:02,560 --> 00:50:06,440 Speaker 1: wasper psychopaths. You know what I mean? Wasper one of 784 00:50:06,480 --> 00:50:11,319 Speaker 1: the one of the animals that just kills to kill. Right, 785 00:50:11,480 --> 00:50:17,200 Speaker 1: it's not necessarily protecting anything. It's not like going for food. Uh, 786 00:50:17,200 --> 00:50:20,600 Speaker 1: it is. It is the equivalent of somebody walking by 787 00:50:20,640 --> 00:50:22,960 Speaker 1: you on the other side of the street, seed you 788 00:50:23,160 --> 00:50:26,520 Speaker 1: and saying hey that guy, and then running at you 789 00:50:26,800 --> 00:50:30,200 Speaker 1: all gas, no breaks, and they stab stab stab stab stab, 790 00:50:30,239 --> 00:50:32,840 Speaker 1: stab stab stab stab. It's not just one stab and 791 00:50:32,880 --> 00:50:36,920 Speaker 1: move on for Safety's concern for self preservation. No, they 792 00:50:37,160 --> 00:50:39,520 Speaker 1: they will make a meal out of you. I am 793 00:50:39,600 --> 00:50:44,800 Speaker 1: spreading anti WASP propaganda, perhaps, but I fundamentally believe it 794 00:50:44,880 --> 00:50:48,800 Speaker 1: to be true. I I can't get behind this anti 795 00:50:48,840 --> 00:50:52,640 Speaker 1: WASP rhetoric. But uh, I hear what you're saying. I 796 00:50:52,719 --> 00:50:55,360 Speaker 1: just I can't fully get on board. Guys, you're in 797 00:50:55,400 --> 00:50:59,120 Speaker 1: the pocket of big Wasp. Matt, this this strange news 798 00:50:59,200 --> 00:51:03,680 Speaker 1: is over. No, seriously, it is over. We we well. 799 00:51:03,760 --> 00:51:06,440 Speaker 1: I love the idea of some of the things that 800 00:51:06,480 --> 00:51:08,360 Speaker 1: we're just touching on that we're going to explore in 801 00:51:08,480 --> 00:51:11,560 Speaker 1: future episodes. We want to hear your stories of heist. 802 00:51:12,200 --> 00:51:17,320 Speaker 1: We want to know if your ring or your home 803 00:51:17,440 --> 00:51:20,680 Speaker 1: camera has ever done anything a little bit weird, right, 804 00:51:21,120 --> 00:51:23,960 Speaker 1: a little bit black mirror. And we want to know, 805 00:51:24,600 --> 00:51:29,080 Speaker 1: especially for our veterans of various militaries and armed services 806 00:51:29,080 --> 00:51:32,400 Speaker 1: in the crowd today, I want to know your thoughts 807 00:51:32,640 --> 00:51:37,359 Speaker 1: on the so called super soldier research. As Matt Noell 808 00:51:37,440 --> 00:51:40,840 Speaker 1: pointed out, it is not a secret that the United 809 00:51:40,880 --> 00:51:47,520 Speaker 1: States has often experimented on soldiers on prisoners on the disadvantage. 810 00:51:47,920 --> 00:51:51,480 Speaker 1: I mean, meth amphetamine or amphetamine speed of some sort 811 00:51:51,800 --> 00:51:56,360 Speaker 1: have still been used for certain long haul Navy and 812 00:51:56,400 --> 00:51:59,400 Speaker 1: Air Force operations. I believe they definitely were used in 813 00:51:59,440 --> 00:52:02,879 Speaker 1: the past, so give us an inside scoop. Do our best, 814 00:52:02,920 --> 00:52:06,120 Speaker 1: as always to preserve anonymity. If that's what you wish. 815 00:52:06,160 --> 00:52:09,279 Speaker 1: We try to be easy to find online. That's absolutely true. 816 00:52:09,320 --> 00:52:13,239 Speaker 1: You can find us on Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook at 817 00:52:13,239 --> 00:52:16,400 Speaker 1: the handle conspiracy Stuff. Check out our Facebook group on 818 00:52:16,440 --> 00:52:19,799 Speaker 1: Conspiracy Stuff. It's called Here's where it Gets Crazy. Uh. 819 00:52:19,840 --> 00:52:22,239 Speaker 1: You can also find us on Instagram a Conspiracy Stuff show, 820 00:52:22,360 --> 00:52:26,000 Speaker 1: or as human individuals, which we are. We're not superfied 821 00:52:26,080 --> 00:52:29,160 Speaker 1: quite yet, but I am exclusively on Instagram at how 822 00:52:29,200 --> 00:52:33,439 Speaker 1: now Noel Brown, Mr Boland. How about yourself? Well, I 823 00:52:33,520 --> 00:52:36,759 Speaker 1: don't usually do this on this show, but if you 824 00:52:36,880 --> 00:52:39,680 Speaker 1: would like a peek behind the scenes at the research 825 00:52:39,760 --> 00:52:41,560 Speaker 1: I'm doing, if you would like to be a part 826 00:52:41,719 --> 00:52:45,839 Speaker 1: of some of my upcoming misadventures, which I cannot say 827 00:52:45,880 --> 00:52:48,560 Speaker 1: too much about on air right now, uh, then go 828 00:52:48,920 --> 00:52:52,439 Speaker 1: find me on Instagram. In a burst of creativity, I'm 829 00:52:52,480 --> 00:52:56,439 Speaker 1: calling myself at Ben Boland bow l I n if 830 00:52:56,480 --> 00:52:59,880 Speaker 1: you want to see me interact with various other source 831 00:53:00,160 --> 00:53:03,399 Speaker 1: is and colleagues in the field, as well as some 832 00:53:03,560 --> 00:53:07,399 Speaker 1: of of our cohort in the world of podcasting. Hit 833 00:53:07,440 --> 00:53:09,600 Speaker 1: me up on Twitter where I'm at Ben bull in 834 00:53:09,960 --> 00:53:14,279 Speaker 1: hs W Now, Matt, I believe you are still coke 835 00:53:14,360 --> 00:53:23,320 Speaker 1: bro sixty nine, No man, Billy's nine No, I'm Billy 836 00:53:23,480 --> 00:53:29,040 Speaker 1: and HUEI forever renumber four. At its on Instagram you 837 00:53:29,040 --> 00:53:33,600 Speaker 1: you'll find it's a picture of Billy Butcher and Hughie embracing. 838 00:53:34,040 --> 00:53:36,239 Speaker 1: I liked your carl urban accent to man. I thought 839 00:53:36,239 --> 00:53:40,080 Speaker 1: that was well done. Uh. If you don't sip the 840 00:53:40,200 --> 00:53:43,680 Speaker 1: social needs, never fear if you think it is another 841 00:53:43,840 --> 00:53:48,680 Speaker 1: like positive feedback loop of bubbling algorithms and weird self promotion, 842 00:53:48,920 --> 00:53:51,800 Speaker 1: we totally get it. If you're about the straight poop, 843 00:53:51,800 --> 00:53:53,520 Speaker 1: as they say in the Midwest, and you have a 844 00:53:53,560 --> 00:53:56,399 Speaker 1: story to tell us, why not give us a phone call? Yes, 845 00:53:56,680 --> 00:54:00,360 Speaker 1: call one three three st d w y T. Hey. 846 00:54:00,520 --> 00:54:02,920 Speaker 1: When you call in, please give yourself a cool nickname. 847 00:54:03,120 --> 00:54:05,440 Speaker 1: Then you've got three minutes tell us anything you'd like. 848 00:54:05,800 --> 00:54:08,640 Speaker 1: Please do include within that three minutes whether or not 849 00:54:08,680 --> 00:54:11,000 Speaker 1: we can use your name and message on the air. 850 00:54:11,640 --> 00:54:13,440 Speaker 1: If you've got more to say, then can fit in 851 00:54:13,480 --> 00:54:16,399 Speaker 1: that their voicemail. Why not instead send us a good 852 00:54:16,400 --> 00:54:19,160 Speaker 1: old fashioned email we are conspiracy at i heeart radio 853 00:54:19,200 --> 00:54:40,000 Speaker 1: dot com. Stuff they Don't want you to know is 854 00:54:40,040 --> 00:54:43,040 Speaker 1: a production of I heart Radio. For more podcasts from 855 00:54:43,080 --> 00:54:46,120 Speaker 1: my heart Radio, visit the i heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, 856 00:54:46,239 --> 00:54:48,080 Speaker 1: or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.