1
00:00:04,400 --> 00:00:07,800
Speaker 1: Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio.

2
00:00:11,840 --> 00:00:14,200
Speaker 1: Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host,

3
00:00:14,240 --> 00:00:17,040
Speaker 1: Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio.

4
00:00:17,120 --> 00:00:19,560
Speaker 1: And how the tech are you. It's time for the

5
00:00:19,600 --> 00:00:24,239
Speaker 1: tech news for Tuesday, September six, twenty twenty two. Let's

6
00:00:24,239 --> 00:00:27,440
Speaker 1: get to it. And last week in the news episode,

7
00:00:27,440 --> 00:00:30,760
Speaker 1: I talked about how NASA had to scrub the planned

8
00:00:30,880 --> 00:00:34,120
Speaker 1: Artemist one launch due to sensors indicating that one of

9
00:00:34,120 --> 00:00:37,000
Speaker 1: the engines in the Space Launch System or s l

10
00:00:37,280 --> 00:00:41,320
Speaker 1: S failed to get down to the proper temperature. The

11
00:00:41,440 --> 00:00:44,600
Speaker 1: Artemist project is NASA's plan to return astronauts to the

12
00:00:44,640 --> 00:00:47,919
Speaker 1: Moon and to set up stuff like lunar bases, including

13
00:00:47,960 --> 00:00:52,440
Speaker 1: a lunar space station, with the idea that those assets

14
00:00:52,479 --> 00:00:56,160
Speaker 1: in the future will support missions to Mars. Anyway, I

15
00:00:56,240 --> 00:00:59,520
Speaker 1: mentioned last week that NASA had pushed the launch to

16
00:00:59,640 --> 00:01:03,440
Speaker 1: this path as Saturday, and if it didn't happen on Saturday,

17
00:01:03,480 --> 00:01:08,479
Speaker 1: they would have another chance today Tuesday. Well, the launch

18
00:01:08,520 --> 00:01:12,360
Speaker 1: didn't happen on Saturday, and it's not gonna happen today either.

19
00:01:12,880 --> 00:01:15,440
Speaker 1: The culprit responsible for the scrub this time was a

20
00:01:15,520 --> 00:01:19,960
Speaker 1: quote unquote large hydrogen leak. That's according to mission manager

21
00:01:20,080 --> 00:01:24,479
Speaker 1: Michael Seraphin. And these sorts of things happen. NASA's history

22
00:01:24,560 --> 00:01:29,119
Speaker 1: is filled with scrubbed launches and engineering issues. From one

23
00:01:29,160 --> 00:01:32,160
Speaker 1: point of view, this is a good thing because NASA

24
00:01:32,200 --> 00:01:34,880
Speaker 1: detected an issue and stopped it before it could escalate

25
00:01:34,920 --> 00:01:38,240
Speaker 1: into something like an accident. Now, keep in mind this

26
00:01:38,280 --> 00:01:41,160
Speaker 1: particular mission, the Artemist one, has no crew on it.

27
00:01:41,200 --> 00:01:44,880
Speaker 1: There are no human beings aboard the spacecraft. But obviously

28
00:01:44,920 --> 00:01:47,199
Speaker 1: you never want there to be an accident. There's always

29
00:01:47,240 --> 00:01:50,440
Speaker 1: a risk not just two equipment, but to human life. Anyway,

30
00:01:50,680 --> 00:01:54,160
Speaker 1: that didn't happen. However, the scrub also comes as a

31
00:01:54,160 --> 00:01:56,800
Speaker 1: big disappointment because the s l S has been in

32
00:01:56,840 --> 00:02:02,000
Speaker 1: development for a really long time. It was originally part

33
00:02:02,040 --> 00:02:05,640
Speaker 1: of the now shelved constellation programs, so it's been a

34
00:02:05,680 --> 00:02:09,359
Speaker 1: long time coming. The idea originally was that the s

35
00:02:09,480 --> 00:02:11,280
Speaker 1: l S would have been in service for quite some

36
00:02:11,320 --> 00:02:16,400
Speaker 1: time by now, so obviously each delay comes as a

37
00:02:16,440 --> 00:02:19,800
Speaker 1: setback and a disappointment. Now, I mentioned last week that

38
00:02:19,919 --> 00:02:23,240
Speaker 1: NASA often faces challenges when it comes to tackling huge

39
00:02:23,280 --> 00:02:25,600
Speaker 1: projects due to the fact that the agency has to

40
00:02:25,639 --> 00:02:29,680
Speaker 1: depend upon the government for funding, and then when there

41
00:02:29,720 --> 00:02:33,040
Speaker 1: are shifts in the government due to you know, elections

42
00:02:33,120 --> 00:02:36,480
Speaker 1: changing things up, well what once seemed like a solid

43
00:02:36,520 --> 00:02:42,720
Speaker 1: plan can disappear. Thus the Constellation program, although that program

44
00:02:42,800 --> 00:02:46,880
Speaker 1: had so many problems with it due to lots of

45
00:02:46,880 --> 00:02:50,960
Speaker 1: different factors. Anyway, NASA has to address the problems with

46
00:02:51,000 --> 00:02:55,959
Speaker 1: the s l S and the agency essentially has to options.

47
00:02:56,520 --> 00:03:00,400
Speaker 1: Time is running out, however, so option one is to

48
00:03:00,480 --> 00:03:03,760
Speaker 1: try and do the repairs on the launch pad itself. Now,

49
00:03:03,800 --> 00:03:07,400
Speaker 1: that would require NASA to also construct an environmental enclosure

50
00:03:07,960 --> 00:03:11,360
Speaker 1: around the launch vehicle while they do this work. But

51
00:03:11,440 --> 00:03:15,440
Speaker 1: on the pad, NASA can actually test the system at

52
00:03:15,480 --> 00:03:18,480
Speaker 1: cryogenic temperature, so the temperatures that the engines would be

53
00:03:18,520 --> 00:03:22,120
Speaker 1: operating at during a launch. They can lower those temperatures

54
00:03:22,160 --> 00:03:25,480
Speaker 1: down for those kind of tests on the pad. However,

55
00:03:25,960 --> 00:03:28,000
Speaker 1: time for doing that is starting to run out, like

56
00:03:28,080 --> 00:03:30,560
Speaker 1: there is a deadline for that because there are other

57
00:03:30,639 --> 00:03:32,960
Speaker 1: launches that have to happen, so the pad has to

58
00:03:33,000 --> 00:03:35,880
Speaker 1: be cleared and prepared for the next set of launches.

59
00:03:36,120 --> 00:03:40,160
Speaker 1: So the other option is to transport the Space Launch

60
00:03:40,240 --> 00:03:44,200
Speaker 1: System back to the Vehicle Assembly Building or v a

61
00:03:44,320 --> 00:03:48,920
Speaker 1: B and to do repairs there. However, in the v

62
00:03:49,000 --> 00:03:53,240
Speaker 1: A B they cannot lower the SLS down to cryogenic

63
00:03:53,280 --> 00:03:56,480
Speaker 1: temperatures to do their tests. They can't do that inside

64
00:03:56,520 --> 00:03:59,160
Speaker 1: the v A B, which means that any tests they

65
00:03:59,240 --> 00:04:02,680
Speaker 1: do are going to be done at ambient temperatures and

66
00:04:02,720 --> 00:04:08,040
Speaker 1: could potentially miss issues that will emerge under actual operating conditions.

67
00:04:08,640 --> 00:04:11,920
Speaker 1: And if NASA does use the v A B, then

68
00:04:12,200 --> 00:04:14,080
Speaker 1: the s l S will have to stay put for

69
00:04:14,080 --> 00:04:15,800
Speaker 1: a while because there won't be enough time to bring

70
00:04:15,800 --> 00:04:18,680
Speaker 1: it back out before the next launch, which is a

71
00:04:18,680 --> 00:04:21,960
Speaker 1: scheduled trip to the International Space Station, and that would

72
00:04:21,960 --> 00:04:24,120
Speaker 1: mean that the earliest that the s l S would

73
00:04:24,120 --> 00:04:28,920
Speaker 1: be able to try again would be in October. Space

74
00:04:29,040 --> 00:04:34,200
Speaker 1: is hard y'all tomorrow, which is Wednesday, September seven, for

75
00:04:34,279 --> 00:04:37,000
Speaker 1: those of you from the future who, for some reason

76
00:04:37,000 --> 00:04:39,640
Speaker 1: I have decided to listen to an old tech news episode.

77
00:04:39,880 --> 00:04:44,040
Speaker 1: Apple is holding its September event where we expect to

78
00:04:44,120 --> 00:04:48,080
Speaker 1: see unveilings of the iPhone fourteen, the Pro and Pro

79
00:04:48,240 --> 00:04:51,839
Speaker 1: Max models. The Pro Max might actually get a name

80
00:04:51,920 --> 00:04:55,279
Speaker 1: change and be called the Pro Plus. They're likely to

81
00:04:55,320 --> 00:04:58,680
Speaker 1: receive the most attention. The base model probably won't be

82
00:04:58,720 --> 00:05:02,080
Speaker 1: talked about nearly as my much. Now watch me eat

83
00:05:02,080 --> 00:05:04,960
Speaker 1: those words. After tomorrow, we'll see. But rumor has it

84
00:05:05,120 --> 00:05:08,360
Speaker 1: that Apple is adding in some new privacy and security

85
00:05:08,360 --> 00:05:12,160
Speaker 1: features around the camera and phone in particular. Now, if

86
00:05:12,200 --> 00:05:14,880
Speaker 1: I had to guess, I would say that this is

87
00:05:14,920 --> 00:05:19,560
Speaker 1: in part a reaction to malware like Pegasus, which the

88
00:05:19,680 --> 00:05:22,680
Speaker 1: Israeli company ns A Group developed and then sold to

89
00:05:22,760 --> 00:05:28,520
Speaker 1: various clients, including authoritarian governments. So the Pegasus malware exploited

90
00:05:28,520 --> 00:05:32,800
Speaker 1: a vulnerability long since patch now, but a vulnerability in

91
00:05:32,839 --> 00:05:36,000
Speaker 1: Apple's I Message app where if you knew the phone

92
00:05:36,080 --> 00:05:39,320
Speaker 1: number of your intended target, you could send them a message,

93
00:05:39,800 --> 00:05:43,080
Speaker 1: and that message, just by hitting the target phone would

94
00:05:43,080 --> 00:05:45,600
Speaker 1: turn that phone into a surveillance device that you could

95
00:05:45,640 --> 00:05:48,560
Speaker 1: then control. That would give you the chance to listen

96
00:05:48,600 --> 00:05:52,039
Speaker 1: in on the phone's microphone and whatever the camera could

97
00:05:52,040 --> 00:05:55,760
Speaker 1: see and spy on your target. So my guess is

98
00:05:56,040 --> 00:05:58,400
Speaker 1: the Apples created some features that will indicate when the

99
00:05:58,440 --> 00:06:01,560
Speaker 1: camera and microphone are in use, so the owners will

100
00:06:01,600 --> 00:06:04,880
Speaker 1: be aware when their phones are you know, snooping on them,

101
00:06:05,200 --> 00:06:07,400
Speaker 1: or when an app is making use of a camera

102
00:06:07,680 --> 00:06:09,640
Speaker 1: or the microphone. And it might not be obvious in

103
00:06:09,680 --> 00:06:13,840
Speaker 1: the app itself, but users need to know that they

104
00:06:13,920 --> 00:06:17,680
Speaker 1: might be on camera or on mike. Analysts expect that

105
00:06:17,760 --> 00:06:20,880
Speaker 1: the Pro and the Pro Max or Pro Plus models

106
00:06:21,200 --> 00:06:25,120
Speaker 1: will likely sport Apple's new A sixteen processor, and that

107
00:06:25,240 --> 00:06:28,919
Speaker 1: the base I Phone fourteen will stick with the A

108
00:06:29,080 --> 00:06:32,880
Speaker 1: fifteen processor that's used in the last generation of the iPhone.

109
00:06:33,640 --> 00:06:37,840
Speaker 1: We'll probably also see some new Apple Watch models, maybe

110
00:06:37,920 --> 00:06:40,920
Speaker 1: some new air pods. As for what else we'll see, well,

111
00:06:40,960 --> 00:06:44,360
Speaker 1: there are a lot of rumors, but nothing really confirmed.

112
00:06:45,080 --> 00:06:47,960
Speaker 1: H One question is, are we finally going to get

113
00:06:48,000 --> 00:06:51,080
Speaker 1: a look at the mixed reality headset that Apple has

114
00:06:51,120 --> 00:06:55,279
Speaker 1: been working on, also known as Apple's second worst kept secret,

115
00:06:55,720 --> 00:06:59,760
Speaker 1: the first being Apple's electric vehicle project. If we do,

116
00:06:59,800 --> 00:07:03,040
Speaker 1: that would surprise me. There is at least one analyst

117
00:07:03,120 --> 00:07:06,800
Speaker 1: who thinks that Apple might have a mixed reality headset

118
00:07:06,880 --> 00:07:10,760
Speaker 1: on the market by early next year, and if that's true,

119
00:07:11,240 --> 00:07:13,840
Speaker 1: then maybe we will get a glimpse of it tomorrow.

120
00:07:14,360 --> 00:07:17,480
Speaker 1: I am not holding my breath. I I mean they

121
00:07:17,520 --> 00:07:20,320
Speaker 1: could make that a one more thing and and make

122
00:07:20,320 --> 00:07:26,080
Speaker 1: it a big, big splash more. They might save that

123
00:07:26,760 --> 00:07:30,200
Speaker 1: for its own dedicated event where they can just have

124
00:07:30,320 --> 00:07:34,720
Speaker 1: an entire presentation around mixed reality. I honestly don't know

125
00:07:34,760 --> 00:07:39,000
Speaker 1: which way they'll go. The folks at Apple are artists

126
00:07:39,080 --> 00:07:42,200
Speaker 1: when it comes to PR so we'll just have to

127
00:07:42,240 --> 00:07:45,400
Speaker 1: wait and see what happens tomorrow. And if there's no

128
00:07:45,480 --> 00:07:48,120
Speaker 1: information about mixed reality, we know we're gonna have to

129
00:07:48,120 --> 00:07:51,640
Speaker 1: wait a while. Also an Apple news, Brazil's government has

130
00:07:51,720 --> 00:07:55,080
Speaker 1: ordered Apple to stop selling iPhones without a battery charger

131
00:07:55,200 --> 00:07:57,960
Speaker 1: in the country, and the government says that Apple's practice

132
00:07:58,040 --> 00:08:01,920
Speaker 1: of not including a battery charger hurts consumers because then

133
00:08:01,960 --> 00:08:03,720
Speaker 1: they have to go out and buy a charger in

134
00:08:03,760 --> 00:08:07,240
Speaker 1: addition to their phone. Now, Apple says it made the

135
00:08:07,280 --> 00:08:10,880
Speaker 1: move to stop including chargers because you know chargers, First

136
00:08:10,880 --> 00:08:14,320
Speaker 1: of all, they're interchangeable, at least for Apple iPhones anyway,

137
00:08:14,440 --> 00:08:17,040
Speaker 1: so really you just need one. Right you buy an iPhone,

138
00:08:17,120 --> 00:08:19,520
Speaker 1: you can use that same charger for the next iPhone

139
00:08:19,560 --> 00:08:22,760
Speaker 1: you buy two years later, So even if you buy

140
00:08:22,920 --> 00:08:25,440
Speaker 1: an iPhone every couple of generations, you can keep using

141
00:08:25,480 --> 00:08:28,560
Speaker 1: the old charger. Now in the EU, this goes even

142
00:08:28,600 --> 00:08:32,680
Speaker 1: further because the EU is requiring phone manufacturers to all

143
00:08:32,760 --> 00:08:37,200
Speaker 1: adopt the USB C charging port as a standard, which

144
00:08:37,240 --> 00:08:40,319
Speaker 1: includes telling Apple the future iPhones and the EU are

145
00:08:40,320 --> 00:08:43,480
Speaker 1: supposed to include such a port, and the goal there

146
00:08:43,559 --> 00:08:46,880
Speaker 1: is to reduce compatibility issues and waste, because then you

147
00:08:46,920 --> 00:08:49,520
Speaker 1: just have to buy one charger for whatever phone you use,

148
00:08:49,600 --> 00:08:52,440
Speaker 1: and that same charger will work on any phone you

149
00:08:52,559 --> 00:08:56,240
Speaker 1: buy from that point forward until standards change again where

150
00:08:56,240 --> 00:09:00,720
Speaker 1: we have to upgrade Brazil. Meanwhile, it's claiming that there's

151
00:09:00,720 --> 00:09:04,319
Speaker 1: no evidence that not including a charger has any significance

152
00:09:04,360 --> 00:09:07,600
Speaker 1: when it comes to environmental impact. In other words, Apples

153
00:09:07,640 --> 00:09:10,440
Speaker 1: not saving the world by not including a battery charger

154
00:09:10,640 --> 00:09:13,679
Speaker 1: with their iPhones, and that Apple will have to include

155
00:09:13,679 --> 00:09:17,360
Speaker 1: them if it wants to sell iPhones in Brazil. Also

156
00:09:17,440 --> 00:09:21,280
Speaker 1: in Brazil, an advocacy group called some of Us That's

157
00:09:21,600 --> 00:09:25,560
Speaker 1: s U m of US says that meta slash Facebook

158
00:09:25,559 --> 00:09:28,960
Speaker 1: has been boosting rhetoric and information from Bolsonaro in his

159
00:09:29,040 --> 00:09:32,920
Speaker 1: bid to hold on to the presidency. Bolsonaro has been

160
00:09:32,960 --> 00:09:37,040
Speaker 1: pulling poorly as of late, and some of Us says

161
00:09:37,200 --> 00:09:40,079
Speaker 1: that he has turned to using social media platforms to

162
00:09:40,120 --> 00:09:42,559
Speaker 1: push a narrative claiming that the integrity of the vote

163
00:09:42,559 --> 00:09:47,440
Speaker 1: in Brazil is in question. Essentially, Bolsonaro is laying groundwork

164
00:09:47,480 --> 00:09:51,160
Speaker 1: to question any election results that are not in his favor.

165
00:09:51,559 --> 00:09:54,520
Speaker 1: The group claims that Meta has allowed Bulsonaro and his

166
00:09:54,640 --> 00:09:58,800
Speaker 1: campaign to leverage Facebook to spread this misinformation freely, with

167
00:09:58,880 --> 00:10:01,880
Speaker 1: no signs of con tent moderation or steps to label

168
00:10:01,920 --> 00:10:06,120
Speaker 1: such posts as containing misinformation. While we've seen Meta make

169
00:10:06,160 --> 00:10:09,599
Speaker 1: at least some moves to address misinformation campaigns here in

170
00:10:09,600 --> 00:10:12,360
Speaker 1: the United States, it has long been said that the

171
00:10:12,400 --> 00:10:16,439
Speaker 1: company fails to take such steps in non English speaking countries,

172
00:10:16,760 --> 00:10:20,920
Speaker 1: so places like Brazil receive even less protection against misinformation

173
00:10:20,960 --> 00:10:24,319
Speaker 1: campaigns than we do here in the States. The group

174
00:10:24,320 --> 00:10:27,200
Speaker 1: published a report that does not mince words. It is

175
00:10:27,240 --> 00:10:30,880
Speaker 1: titled Stop the Steel two point oh, How Meta is

176
00:10:30,920 --> 00:10:35,560
Speaker 1: subverting Brazilian democracy. The group is calling on Meta to

177
00:10:35,679 --> 00:10:39,280
Speaker 1: invest in content moderation, to ensure that all political ads

178
00:10:39,320 --> 00:10:43,640
Speaker 1: meet both Meta's criteria and they don't break Brazilian laws,

179
00:10:43,720 --> 00:10:45,720
Speaker 1: and to do a better job at assessing and then

180
00:10:45,760 --> 00:10:48,480
Speaker 1: addressing threats to human rights that are coming from Facebook

181
00:10:48,520 --> 00:10:53,120
Speaker 1: profiles and groups, also allowing third parties to come in

182
00:10:53,160 --> 00:10:57,640
Speaker 1: and evaluate Facebook's own investigation and mitigation actions to see

183
00:10:57,640 --> 00:11:00,720
Speaker 1: if the company is actually following through on reps have

184
00:11:00,840 --> 00:11:06,360
Speaker 1: repeatedly claimed, in an effort to be more transparent, all

185
00:11:06,400 --> 00:11:08,400
Speaker 1: right We've got several more stories, but before we get

186
00:11:08,440 --> 00:11:20,480
Speaker 1: to that, let's take a quick break. Next up, we've

187
00:11:20,480 --> 00:11:24,120
Speaker 1: got kind of a whirlwind news item. Alright, So, earlier

188
00:11:24,200 --> 00:11:27,760
Speaker 1: this week, some cybersecurity analysts spread word that there was

189
00:11:27,800 --> 00:11:31,320
Speaker 1: evidence of a data breach over at TikTok, and that

190
00:11:31,480 --> 00:11:36,000
Speaker 1: hackers might have accessed a ton of user information in

191
00:11:36,040 --> 00:11:39,120
Speaker 1: the process, as well as TikTok's own source code. In fact,

192
00:11:39,559 --> 00:11:43,240
Speaker 1: some reports said as many as two billion different data

193
00:11:43,320 --> 00:11:48,520
Speaker 1: records could have been stolen, and early on some analysts

194
00:11:48,559 --> 00:11:52,040
Speaker 1: were urging users to update their passwords and also to

195
00:11:52,200 --> 00:11:55,520
Speaker 1: enable multi factor authentication in order to protect their accounts.

196
00:11:55,880 --> 00:11:59,800
Speaker 1: As I always say, it's a good idea to enable

197
00:12:00,040 --> 00:12:02,960
Speaker 1: multi factor authentication. If you have that option, you should

198
00:12:03,000 --> 00:12:06,600
Speaker 1: do it. It is a great way to provide extra

199
00:12:06,679 --> 00:12:08,960
Speaker 1: protection for your online accounts. I know it can be

200
00:12:08,960 --> 00:12:12,000
Speaker 1: a hassle when you're logging in, you're like, I need

201
00:12:12,040 --> 00:12:15,520
Speaker 1: to put in a code. I get that, but it

202
00:12:15,720 --> 00:12:20,440
Speaker 1: is incredibly helpful for keeping your stuff protected anyway. A

203
00:12:20,520 --> 00:12:24,720
Speaker 1: Twitter user with the account named blue Hornet, who is

204
00:12:25,080 --> 00:12:28,720
Speaker 1: reportedly with a hacker group calling themselves Against the West,

205
00:12:29,480 --> 00:12:32,959
Speaker 1: claimed that the data was found on an Ali baba

206
00:12:33,040 --> 00:12:37,120
Speaker 1: Cloud account with only a week password protecting it, that

207
00:12:37,160 --> 00:12:40,800
Speaker 1: they were able to find this password through uh a

208
00:12:40,920 --> 00:12:45,600
Speaker 1: wee chat messaging exchange and all this other stuff, and

209
00:12:46,240 --> 00:12:51,360
Speaker 1: that obviously launched an understandable tirade against TikTok from folks

210
00:12:51,480 --> 00:12:54,480
Speaker 1: about the alleged poor security, Like if this story is true,

211
00:12:55,200 --> 00:12:59,320
Speaker 1: then you know it is. It is almost criminal how

212
00:12:59,400 --> 00:13:04,079
Speaker 1: poor the scurity was to protect all this user information. However,

213
00:13:04,679 --> 00:13:07,160
Speaker 1: TikTok reps said they took a look at the code

214
00:13:07,240 --> 00:13:09,520
Speaker 1: that was posted to various hacker forums and said the

215
00:13:09,600 --> 00:13:13,120
Speaker 1: code in question is completely unrelated to TikTok's back in

216
00:13:13,240 --> 00:13:17,880
Speaker 1: source code, So they're implying that the hackers are I

217
00:13:17,880 --> 00:13:21,600
Speaker 1: think the technical term is lying out of their behinds

218
00:13:21,640 --> 00:13:27,360
Speaker 1: about hacking into TikTok's systems. And some early investigations into

219
00:13:27,360 --> 00:13:30,880
Speaker 1: the posted data seemed to indicate that at least some

220
00:13:30,960 --> 00:13:35,240
Speaker 1: of it was either public facing information meaning you don't

221
00:13:35,440 --> 00:13:40,000
Speaker 1: need to hack anything because it's literally public info, or

222
00:13:40,440 --> 00:13:43,720
Speaker 1: it could have been test data used for production purposes

223
00:13:43,800 --> 00:13:46,240
Speaker 1: and reflected no real data. So in other words, when

224
00:13:46,280 --> 00:13:50,240
Speaker 1: TikTok is building out something in its service, it has

225
00:13:50,280 --> 00:13:52,240
Speaker 1: to use test data to make sure that you know,

226
00:13:52,400 --> 00:13:56,200
Speaker 1: the something works properly, but that test data doesn't reflect

227
00:13:56,760 --> 00:13:59,280
Speaker 1: any real person's information. It would be like if you

228
00:13:59,320 --> 00:14:03,080
Speaker 1: had to create an account called Joe public just to

229
00:14:03,120 --> 00:14:06,480
Speaker 1: test some features on an online tool you had created. Well,

230
00:14:06,559 --> 00:14:08,760
Speaker 1: Joe public is not a real person in this case.

231
00:14:09,320 --> 00:14:11,320
Speaker 1: I mean, there probably is someone out there called Joe

232
00:14:11,360 --> 00:14:14,079
Speaker 1: public who has parents who I think their sense of

233
00:14:14,160 --> 00:14:17,600
Speaker 1: humor is more important than their child's mental health. But anyway,

234
00:14:18,040 --> 00:14:22,280
Speaker 1: the whole point is that test data is not real

235
00:14:22,400 --> 00:14:25,760
Speaker 1: information about people. Right. So in short, if the hackers

236
00:14:26,320 --> 00:14:29,520
Speaker 1: really did access information, they could be in possession of

237
00:14:29,560 --> 00:14:33,040
Speaker 1: around two billion data records, which is, you know, a

238
00:14:33,080 --> 00:14:38,160
Speaker 1: lot plus the alleged source code for TikTok. That's one possibility.

239
00:14:38,320 --> 00:14:41,120
Speaker 1: Or it could be that the hackers have cobbled together

240
00:14:41,400 --> 00:14:44,840
Speaker 1: or copied some data records that are publicly available, or

241
00:14:44,880 --> 00:14:48,240
Speaker 1: they represent meaningless test data, and that there was no

242
00:14:48,320 --> 00:14:53,320
Speaker 1: actual exposure of real private information. We will have to

243
00:14:53,360 --> 00:14:55,240
Speaker 1: keep our eyes on this to see how it unfolds,

244
00:14:55,280 --> 00:14:59,800
Speaker 1: because I mean, I honestly don't know whether TikTok was

245
00:15:00,000 --> 00:15:02,760
Speaker 1: act or not. Um you know, again, the company says no,

246
00:15:02,920 --> 00:15:06,120
Speaker 1: we were not. There's no evidence of that. Everything that's

247
00:15:06,120 --> 00:15:09,400
Speaker 1: been posted isn't from our systems, and the hackers are

248
00:15:09,400 --> 00:15:13,560
Speaker 1: claiming we toats did it um. It's not like I

249
00:15:13,600 --> 00:15:17,160
Speaker 1: feel inclined to just automatically believe either groups, So I'm

250
00:15:17,160 --> 00:15:19,600
Speaker 1: gonna wait for more evidence to come out. In a

251
00:15:19,640 --> 00:15:24,120
Speaker 1: TikTok related news story, Byte Dance is shutting down some

252
00:15:24,200 --> 00:15:28,000
Speaker 1: of its gaming sectors inside the company. So Byte Dances

253
00:15:28,040 --> 00:15:32,200
Speaker 1: the parent company, the Chinese parent company that owns TikTok Um.

254
00:15:32,320 --> 00:15:35,640
Speaker 1: Of course, I should add that TikTok has long maintained

255
00:15:36,040 --> 00:15:40,840
Speaker 1: that it operates practically independently of Byte Dance, that there

256
00:15:40,960 --> 00:15:44,960
Speaker 1: is little connective tissue between the two. That's something that

257
00:15:45,040 --> 00:15:47,720
Speaker 1: often comes up when there are discussions about whether or

258
00:15:47,720 --> 00:15:54,040
Speaker 1: not TikTok represents a potential danger to things like national security. Anyway,

259
00:15:54,640 --> 00:15:58,960
Speaker 1: Byte Dance also, you know, poured millions of dollars, hundreds

260
00:15:58,960 --> 00:16:04,040
Speaker 1: of millions of dollars into developing video game UH divisions

261
00:16:04,120 --> 00:16:07,600
Speaker 1: within the company to help create games that could maybe

262
00:16:07,680 --> 00:16:13,080
Speaker 1: leverage the hundreds of millions of users of TikTok and

263
00:16:13,080 --> 00:16:15,400
Speaker 1: make more money off of them. Essentially, it is what

264
00:16:15,440 --> 00:16:19,560
Speaker 1: we're getting down to. However, in China, the Chinese government

265
00:16:19,640 --> 00:16:26,080
Speaker 1: has been taking an increasingly strict response to the video

266
00:16:26,120 --> 00:16:30,520
Speaker 1: game industry and to video games in particular, uh reviewing

267
00:16:30,600 --> 00:16:33,880
Speaker 1: games for any material that could be considered objectionable by

268
00:16:33,920 --> 00:16:37,320
Speaker 1: the Chinese government standards, which would obviously be required to

269
00:16:37,360 --> 00:16:39,760
Speaker 1: have all of that stripped or else that game would

270
00:16:39,800 --> 00:16:41,840
Speaker 1: never make it to the markets in China, at least

271
00:16:41,840 --> 00:16:46,000
Speaker 1: not legally. And a lot of companies in China that

272
00:16:46,120 --> 00:16:48,880
Speaker 1: had been focusing on video games are now looking to

273
00:16:50,600 --> 00:16:54,000
Speaker 1: kind of spread out from the Chinese market or to

274
00:16:54,080 --> 00:16:59,960
Speaker 1: abandon the sector entirely because that intense amount of scrutiny

275
00:17:00,160 --> 00:17:03,720
Speaker 1: has made it very difficult to do business in China.

276
00:17:03,920 --> 00:17:07,960
Speaker 1: So we've seen the company ten Cent, which is famous

277
00:17:08,040 --> 00:17:11,760
Speaker 1: for having a stake in numerous video game companies around

278
00:17:11,760 --> 00:17:16,200
Speaker 1: the world, really pushed to increase that steak in companies

279
00:17:16,200 --> 00:17:20,560
Speaker 1: like Ubisoft that are centered outside of China, potentially because

280
00:17:21,480 --> 00:17:25,560
Speaker 1: that's an avenue for them to make revenue without having to,

281
00:17:26,240 --> 00:17:30,040
Speaker 1: you know, cow tow to the Chinese government's demands. Um. Yeah,

282
00:17:30,080 --> 00:17:32,919
Speaker 1: So doing business in China has always been kind of

283
00:17:32,920 --> 00:17:38,760
Speaker 1: a risky proposition because the government is so extremely hands

284
00:17:38,840 --> 00:17:41,120
Speaker 1: on when it comes to the business sector, and we're

285
00:17:41,119 --> 00:17:45,639
Speaker 1: starting to see now companies realize that, especially once they

286
00:17:45,640 --> 00:17:49,840
Speaker 1: reached a certain size, that continuing to do business in

287
00:17:49,960 --> 00:17:54,840
Speaker 1: specific areas within China is untenable. China has also accused

288
00:17:54,880 --> 00:17:59,120
Speaker 1: the United States of conducting quote tens of thousands end

289
00:17:59,160 --> 00:18:04,080
Speaker 1: quote of fiber attacks against Chinese companies and institutions, including

290
00:18:04,119 --> 00:18:09,000
Speaker 1: a university, which you know could be true because cyber

291
00:18:09,040 --> 00:18:12,840
Speaker 1: warfare is definitely a thing, and China definitely knows the

292
00:18:12,880 --> 00:18:16,159
Speaker 1: thing and two about it, as there are reportedly several large,

293
00:18:16,240 --> 00:18:19,679
Speaker 1: well funded hacker groups operating in and around China and

294
00:18:19,760 --> 00:18:24,680
Speaker 1: with Chinese support, although the government staunchly denies that's the case,

295
00:18:25,600 --> 00:18:28,640
Speaker 1: but no one believes them. China has said that the

296
00:18:28,800 --> 00:18:32,880
Speaker 1: n s A, the National Security Agency, has infiltrated computer

297
00:18:32,960 --> 00:18:37,840
Speaker 1: systems belonging to the Northwestern Polytechnical University of Chian. The

298
00:18:38,000 --> 00:18:40,800
Speaker 1: n s A has not responded, at least not publicly,

299
00:18:40,880 --> 00:18:47,360
Speaker 1: to this accusation. Now, could it be an accurate accusation? Um? Yeah,

300
00:18:47,440 --> 00:18:50,040
Speaker 1: I don't see why not. I mean n s A

301
00:18:50,119 --> 00:18:52,400
Speaker 1: did a heck of a job planting surveillance on US

302
00:18:52,480 --> 00:18:55,800
Speaker 1: based communication systems. We all heard about that, how we

303
00:18:55,800 --> 00:18:57,760
Speaker 1: were all being spied upon by the n s A.

304
00:18:57,920 --> 00:19:02,760
Speaker 1: Thanks to them planting essentially snoops at every major connection

305
00:19:02,800 --> 00:19:06,000
Speaker 1: point within the communications infrastructure of the United States. I

306
00:19:06,000 --> 00:19:09,520
Speaker 1: can only imagine what the n s A would do

307
00:19:09,760 --> 00:19:12,479
Speaker 1: in order to devote some of that expertise to our

308
00:19:12,680 --> 00:19:17,760
Speaker 1: conducting espionage on China. Still, we should always be skeptical

309
00:19:17,840 --> 00:19:20,359
Speaker 1: of any communications from China. You know, you can't just

310
00:19:20,400 --> 00:19:24,320
Speaker 1: take that on face value. So while there's nothing in

311
00:19:24,359 --> 00:19:27,639
Speaker 1: this story that immediately makes me say, well, that's impossible

312
00:19:27,800 --> 00:19:31,520
Speaker 1: or that's a lie, there's also nothing solid in the

313
00:19:31,600 --> 00:19:36,240
Speaker 1: story that would make me say China is telling the truth. Uh,

314
00:19:36,840 --> 00:19:41,000
Speaker 1: I just don't know enough in this case. But it's

315
00:19:41,040 --> 00:19:46,280
Speaker 1: certainly is plausible. It doesn't mean that it's actually true. However, again,

316
00:19:47,080 --> 00:19:49,600
Speaker 1: cyber warfare is a real thing, and you know, we

317
00:19:49,720 --> 00:19:55,200
Speaker 1: often hear stories about how hackers working on behalf of

318
00:19:55,280 --> 00:20:00,359
Speaker 1: China or North Korea or Russia, we're infiltrating various systems

319
00:20:00,359 --> 00:20:04,359
Speaker 1: in the United States. I can guarantee you that the

320
00:20:04,480 --> 00:20:08,359
Speaker 1: same sort of of ops are happening within the US

321
00:20:09,000 --> 00:20:13,720
Speaker 1: against targets like China, Russia, and North Korea. Um, we

322
00:20:13,760 --> 00:20:16,280
Speaker 1: don't tend to hear about them, but you know that

323
00:20:16,359 --> 00:20:19,159
Speaker 1: has to be happening, because for it not to be

324
00:20:19,240 --> 00:20:23,399
Speaker 1: happening is just naive. Okay, we've got a couple more

325
00:20:23,480 --> 00:20:27,520
Speaker 1: news stories to cover before we finish this episode out,

326
00:20:27,960 --> 00:20:41,040
Speaker 1: so let's take another quick break. We're back. The Data

327
00:20:41,080 --> 00:20:45,440
Speaker 1: Protection Commission or DPC in Ireland has levied more than

328
00:20:45,560 --> 00:20:50,960
Speaker 1: four hundred million dollars in fines against Meta. The DPC

329
00:20:51,080 --> 00:20:55,920
Speaker 1: says that Meta mishandled personal data belonging to teen Instagram users,

330
00:20:56,160 --> 00:21:01,360
Speaker 1: failing to comply with the data privacy standards of the EU. Specifically,

331
00:21:01,359 --> 00:21:05,120
Speaker 1: the investigation looked into how privacy settings would change if

332
00:21:05,240 --> 00:21:08,840
Speaker 1: a teenage user switched from a personal account to a

333
00:21:08,960 --> 00:21:13,720
Speaker 1: business account. So Instagram's business accounts provide users with more

334
00:21:13,800 --> 00:21:17,399
Speaker 1: analytics than they would get if they were just using

335
00:21:17,480 --> 00:21:22,760
Speaker 1: a regular personal Instagram accounts, so sometimes influencers or people

336
00:21:22,800 --> 00:21:25,800
Speaker 1: who want to be influencers will switch to a business

337
00:21:25,840 --> 00:21:29,880
Speaker 1: account for that reason. But a business account would make

338
00:21:29,920 --> 00:21:35,080
Speaker 1: contact information publicly available, and if the user was under

339
00:21:35,119 --> 00:21:37,560
Speaker 1: the age of eighteen, that would be a problem because

340
00:21:37,560 --> 00:21:40,800
Speaker 1: it violates privacy laws under g d p R in

341
00:21:40,840 --> 00:21:44,639
Speaker 1: the EU. The DPC also says that Meta made some

342
00:21:44,680 --> 00:21:48,160
Speaker 1: accounts public by default, even if the accounts were being

343
00:21:48,200 --> 00:21:51,919
Speaker 1: held by underage users. Now, Meta, for its part, says

344
00:21:52,000 --> 00:21:55,600
Speaker 1: that in addressed the public by default problem a year ago.

345
00:21:56,080 --> 00:21:59,200
Speaker 1: This entire investigation has taken a couple of years in total,

346
00:21:59,320 --> 00:22:03,480
Speaker 1: so it actually spans from before Meta made those changes.

347
00:22:04,000 --> 00:22:08,480
Speaker 1: The company also plans to appeal this fine. The US

348
00:22:08,560 --> 00:22:14,119
Speaker 1: Federal Trade Commission, or FTC, is investigating Amazon's planned acquisition

349
00:22:14,119 --> 00:22:17,119
Speaker 1: of a couple of companies, namely i Robot, which is

350
00:22:17,200 --> 00:22:21,840
Speaker 1: the maker of the popular roomba vacuum cleaner, and a

351
00:22:21,880 --> 00:22:25,480
Speaker 1: healthcare company called one Medical. Now the purpose of the

352
00:22:25,520 --> 00:22:29,520
Speaker 1: investigation is to determine if Amazon's purchases of these companies

353
00:22:30,040 --> 00:22:36,560
Speaker 1: represent anti competitive behavior that Amazon would be uh significantly

354
00:22:36,600 --> 00:22:40,760
Speaker 1: reducing competition in these various markets. So part of the

355
00:22:40,800 --> 00:22:44,240
Speaker 1: concern is that not long after Amazon announced it was

356
00:22:44,280 --> 00:22:47,800
Speaker 1: acquiring one Medical, which was back in July of this year,

357
00:22:48,680 --> 00:22:51,400
Speaker 1: Amazon then said it was going to shut down its

358
00:22:51,440 --> 00:22:55,840
Speaker 1: own virtual health service. Now, the FTC might see this

359
00:22:56,119 --> 00:22:59,639
Speaker 1: as Amazon admitting that it wasn't able to compete in

360
00:22:59,680 --> 00:23:03,560
Speaker 1: the healthcare space, so rather than support their own in

361
00:23:03,760 --> 00:23:10,119
Speaker 1: house department, they just bought the competition, which would be

362
00:23:10,160 --> 00:23:14,040
Speaker 1: anti competitive behavior. It's also something that we've seen lots

363
00:23:14,080 --> 00:23:16,320
Speaker 1: of like it's only been recently that we've started to

364
00:23:16,359 --> 00:23:21,000
Speaker 1: see the FTC kind of opposed this kind of of strategy.

365
00:23:21,720 --> 00:23:26,280
Speaker 1: I'm reminded of the eighties and nineties in the UH

366
00:23:26,400 --> 00:23:29,879
Speaker 1: the cable industry, like the actual cable company industry here

367
00:23:29,880 --> 00:23:33,199
Speaker 1: in the United States, Buying up all your competitors was

368
00:23:33,800 --> 00:23:35,960
Speaker 1: the name of the game. I mean, that's how that's

369
00:23:36,000 --> 00:23:38,480
Speaker 1: how Comcast got as big as it was. It wasn't

370
00:23:38,480 --> 00:23:41,199
Speaker 1: that the company was building out new networks. It was

371
00:23:41,240 --> 00:23:45,720
Speaker 1: just buying up regional networks wherever it could. And those

372
00:23:45,760 --> 00:23:48,399
Speaker 1: were in the days where the FTC really just didn't

373
00:23:49,200 --> 00:23:55,600
Speaker 1: care about that. So things have changed, It's what I'm saying. Anyway,

374
00:23:55,640 --> 00:23:59,880
Speaker 1: these investigations may not stop either acquisition in the long run,

375
00:24:00,160 --> 00:24:04,000
Speaker 1: will have to see. They will likely impact the timing

376
00:24:04,200 --> 00:24:07,359
Speaker 1: of these deals. They may take longer to complete because

377
00:24:07,400 --> 00:24:11,199
Speaker 1: of these investigations. Then again, there has been this increased

378
00:24:11,240 --> 00:24:14,280
Speaker 1: focus on the rise of monopolies in recent years and

379
00:24:14,920 --> 00:24:17,320
Speaker 1: a general view that big tech companies are a kind

380
00:24:17,359 --> 00:24:21,600
Speaker 1: of consolidating power to a point where they are dominant

381
00:24:21,800 --> 00:24:24,680
Speaker 1: in their respective wedge of the tech sector. Like it

382
00:24:24,720 --> 00:24:28,160
Speaker 1: would be hard to argue that Google is not the

383
00:24:28,200 --> 00:24:32,680
Speaker 1: dominant player in search for example, So maybe the FTC

384
00:24:32,840 --> 00:24:37,360
Speaker 1: will actually block this acquisition or these acquisitions from happening.

385
00:24:37,480 --> 00:24:41,199
Speaker 1: Will have to wait and see. Last week, Snap, the

386
00:24:41,280 --> 00:24:45,639
Speaker 1: company behind Snapchat, shuttered a messaging app called zen Le.

387
00:24:46,320 --> 00:24:49,760
Speaker 1: Now Snap purchase zen Lee back in for more than

388
00:24:49,800 --> 00:24:53,440
Speaker 1: two million bucks, so it's quite the investment. But now

389
00:24:53,720 --> 00:24:57,320
Speaker 1: Snap is on shaky financial ground and the company is

390
00:24:57,320 --> 00:25:01,000
Speaker 1: cutting way back on expenses, and that include holding lots

391
00:25:01,000 --> 00:25:05,560
Speaker 1: of layoffs around folks, or about twenty percent of the

392
00:25:05,640 --> 00:25:10,040
Speaker 1: overall workforce to be precise. Zen Ley appears to be

393
00:25:10,119 --> 00:25:13,960
Speaker 1: a casualty of those cutbacks. The entire team found out

394
00:25:14,000 --> 00:25:17,960
Speaker 1: about this last week. News first leaked on Twitter before

395
00:25:18,000 --> 00:25:21,720
Speaker 1: snaps CEOs sent the zen Ley staff a letter about

396
00:25:21,760 --> 00:25:26,240
Speaker 1: shutting down the service. And that is always a bad look, y'all.

397
00:25:26,400 --> 00:25:31,840
Speaker 1: I mean, you never want to learn about layoffs from

398
00:25:31,880 --> 00:25:37,040
Speaker 1: a public source like Twitter before leaders actually address it

399
00:25:37,119 --> 00:25:39,320
Speaker 1: to the people who are going to be directly affected.

400
00:25:39,359 --> 00:25:43,760
Speaker 1: That's just nasty. Now, apparently there was no chance that

401
00:25:43,840 --> 00:25:46,560
Speaker 1: Snap was going to sell zen Ly off to some

402
00:25:46,680 --> 00:25:50,120
Speaker 1: interested buyer like In other words, there is no hope

403
00:25:50,119 --> 00:25:53,280
Speaker 1: for Zinly. Much like the Bad Girl film that will

404
00:25:53,400 --> 00:25:57,800
Speaker 1: never be commercially released. Zen Ley would never be sold

405
00:25:57,960 --> 00:26:01,400
Speaker 1: by Snap, not because Snap doesn't want the money. It's

406
00:26:01,480 --> 00:26:07,360
Speaker 1: because Zenly relies on I P that is critical to Snap,

407
00:26:07,880 --> 00:26:10,080
Speaker 1: and that means that Snap is not going to sell

408
00:26:10,119 --> 00:26:13,240
Speaker 1: Zenlely because it's not willing to share this intellectual property

409
00:26:13,320 --> 00:26:17,480
Speaker 1: with some other party that isn't Snap. Now, this stinks,

410
00:26:17,520 --> 00:26:19,600
Speaker 1: and it points to something really ugly in the tech

411
00:26:19,640 --> 00:26:22,639
Speaker 1: sector in particular, that there's often this push to create

412
00:26:23,520 --> 00:26:26,760
Speaker 1: a tool or a company that's enticing enough to convince

413
00:26:27,119 --> 00:26:30,280
Speaker 1: some other larger company to come along and swoop it

414
00:26:30,359 --> 00:26:32,560
Speaker 1: up for a pretty penny. Like we've seen this with

415
00:26:32,680 --> 00:26:36,040
Speaker 1: lots of company strategies like their their plan isn't to

416
00:26:36,200 --> 00:26:42,320
Speaker 1: grow into a viable, revenue generating business, but rather to

417
00:26:42,480 --> 00:26:45,520
Speaker 1: be seen as so attractive by a larger entity like

418
00:26:45,600 --> 00:26:49,960
Speaker 1: Amazon or Google or Meta that one of those companies

419
00:26:50,000 --> 00:26:55,840
Speaker 1: are going to come along and by the startup that

420
00:26:55,840 --> 00:26:59,520
Speaker 1: that is like go to strategy and startups, not all

421
00:26:59,560 --> 00:27:02,160
Speaker 1: of them, but a lot of them. But that means

422
00:27:02,760 --> 00:27:06,359
Speaker 1: that when things like this happen where a company gets

423
00:27:06,400 --> 00:27:10,920
Speaker 1: bought but then later abandoned, then the thing that everyone

424
00:27:11,080 --> 00:27:15,720
Speaker 1: spent their time, talent and effort on building has gone away,

425
00:27:16,119 --> 00:27:18,879
Speaker 1: and it feels like all of that was put to waste.

426
00:27:19,400 --> 00:27:22,520
Speaker 1: See also about three quarters of the projects that Google

427
00:27:22,560 --> 00:27:27,800
Speaker 1: has overseen over the years. On October one, Massa Yasu

428
00:27:27,880 --> 00:27:31,280
Speaker 1: Itto will be retiring from Sony. Itto is the hardware

429
00:27:31,320 --> 00:27:34,920
Speaker 1: chief for the PlayStation division within Sony and has overseen

430
00:27:34,960 --> 00:27:38,080
Speaker 1: the engineering of the PS four and the PS VR

431
00:27:38,200 --> 00:27:41,320
Speaker 1: headset and the PS five during his time in that role.

432
00:27:41,840 --> 00:27:46,040
Speaker 1: Now he's retiring because he's reached the age for retirement.

433
00:27:46,280 --> 00:27:48,800
Speaker 1: So this this isn't coming as a surprise. There's no

434
00:27:48,920 --> 00:27:53,320
Speaker 1: drama attached. This is not he underperformed or anything like that.

435
00:27:53,520 --> 00:27:57,840
Speaker 1: It's literally it's his time to retire. Lynn Tao, who

436
00:27:57,960 --> 00:28:01,520
Speaker 1: has served as the s VP of Finance, Corporate Development,

437
00:28:01,520 --> 00:28:05,280
Speaker 1: and Strategy at Sony Interactive Entertainment, is going to officially

438
00:28:05,320 --> 00:28:09,159
Speaker 1: take over his role. Now. Is it possible that Sony

439
00:28:09,240 --> 00:28:12,600
Speaker 1: is looking to ramp up development on the next generation

440
00:28:12,640 --> 00:28:15,080
Speaker 1: of PlayStation designs now that they're going to have a

441
00:28:15,119 --> 00:28:17,760
Speaker 1: new hardware chief in place, like that seems like a

442
00:28:17,840 --> 00:28:22,920
Speaker 1: great time to really start focusing on that. Well, it's possible.

443
00:28:22,960 --> 00:28:24,879
Speaker 1: But even if that is the case, and I'm not

444
00:28:24,920 --> 00:28:27,359
Speaker 1: saying it is it's just possible. But even if it

445
00:28:27,520 --> 00:28:31,040
Speaker 1: is what's happening, we're not likely to see anything new

446
00:28:31,359 --> 00:28:34,840
Speaker 1: in the PlayStation world for several more years because these

447
00:28:34,840 --> 00:28:38,960
Speaker 1: development cycles can take half a decade or longer. Besides,

448
00:28:39,560 --> 00:28:42,720
Speaker 1: you still can't get a current generation PlayStation five most

449
00:28:42,800 --> 00:28:47,560
Speaker 1: days due to inventory shortages. And finally, LG is joining

450
00:28:47,560 --> 00:28:50,840
Speaker 1: Samsung by incorporating a feature that will let LG television

451
00:28:50,880 --> 00:28:55,600
Speaker 1: owners of more recent models anyway purchase and view an

452
00:28:55,640 --> 00:28:58,640
Speaker 1: f T artwork on their TV sets. So Samsung has

453
00:28:58,640 --> 00:29:01,880
Speaker 1: done this, now LG is doing us. Now. There's not

454
00:29:02,040 --> 00:29:05,160
Speaker 1: much to look at yet. According to the Virgins Emma Roth,

455
00:29:05,200 --> 00:29:08,920
Speaker 1: who reported on this, she actually downloaded and installed the

456
00:29:08,960 --> 00:29:11,880
Speaker 1: app on her TV and checked it out. And the

457
00:29:11,920 --> 00:29:15,840
Speaker 1: idea is that folks who have an LG television capable

458
00:29:16,000 --> 00:29:19,280
Speaker 1: of running web os five point oh or higher, we'll

459
00:29:19,320 --> 00:29:21,920
Speaker 1: be able to install an app that lets them brows,

460
00:29:22,160 --> 00:29:25,640
Speaker 1: purchase and display n f T artwork. The n f

461
00:29:25,760 --> 00:29:28,760
Speaker 1: T s in this case aren't on a blockchain. Instead,

462
00:29:28,800 --> 00:29:31,920
Speaker 1: they are on what is called a hash graph, which

463
00:29:31,960 --> 00:29:34,080
Speaker 1: sounds to me like you're trying to put line charts

464
00:29:34,120 --> 00:29:38,320
Speaker 1: on a potato. But no hash graph is a distributed

465
00:29:38,480 --> 00:29:41,840
Speaker 1: consensus platform. So in other words, it's a platform in

466
00:29:41,880 --> 00:29:45,720
Speaker 1: which users, or rather their machines that are connected to

467
00:29:45,720 --> 00:29:48,800
Speaker 1: the network, come to an agreement when it comes to

468
00:29:48,840 --> 00:29:52,400
Speaker 1: stuff like the order in which transactions were made. So

469
00:29:52,600 --> 00:29:57,160
Speaker 1: a ridiculously oversimplified explanation would be that the network has

470
00:29:57,200 --> 00:29:59,880
Speaker 1: to come together and decide that yes. In fact, su

471
00:30:00,120 --> 00:30:05,400
Speaker 1: Zy did purchase the twenty two Chiron Bugatti before Tommy

472
00:30:05,600 --> 00:30:07,800
Speaker 1: bought a mint edition collection of the full set of

473
00:30:07,800 --> 00:30:11,360
Speaker 1: Pokemon cards, So in that way, it is kind of

474
00:30:11,400 --> 00:30:16,120
Speaker 1: similar to blockchain, but it works through a different mechanism.

475
00:30:16,280 --> 00:30:18,880
Speaker 1: Another way you can think of this is that blockchain

476
00:30:19,440 --> 00:30:25,000
Speaker 1: and the hash graph work to create the same result,

477
00:30:25,200 --> 00:30:29,880
Speaker 1: but they do it through a different methodology. Anyway, I

478
00:30:29,920 --> 00:30:33,320
Speaker 1: don't want to put words in Mr Roth's mouth, but

479
00:30:33,760 --> 00:30:37,600
Speaker 1: the article seems to at least be indifferent towards this

480
00:30:37,680 --> 00:30:40,840
Speaker 1: new feature, which could largely be due to the fact

481
00:30:40,880 --> 00:30:44,000
Speaker 1: that there just isn't much on there yet. But I

482
00:30:44,040 --> 00:30:46,040
Speaker 1: want to say I feel pretty much the same way.

483
00:30:46,120 --> 00:30:48,160
Speaker 1: It is very hard for me to imagine a world

484
00:30:48,320 --> 00:30:52,120
Speaker 1: where folks are buying digital art to display on their

485
00:30:52,160 --> 00:30:57,520
Speaker 1: television's as if their TVs were framed fine art you know,

486
00:30:57,760 --> 00:31:01,880
Speaker 1: essentially turning this digital art to the equivalent of a

487
00:31:01,920 --> 00:31:06,400
Speaker 1: screen saver. Now, maybe I'm just too shortsighted and and

488
00:31:06,440 --> 00:31:08,840
Speaker 1: too old fashioned, and I'm just I just don't get it.

489
00:31:09,080 --> 00:31:12,120
Speaker 1: Maybe I'm completely wrong about this, but yet to me,

490
00:31:12,160 --> 00:31:15,320
Speaker 1: it kind of feels like when all the TV manufacturers

491
00:31:15,320 --> 00:31:18,160
Speaker 1: were pushing three D on us. It's not that we

492
00:31:18,320 --> 00:31:21,520
Speaker 1: wanted three D, but the company's needed to have new

493
00:31:21,560 --> 00:31:24,320
Speaker 1: features to tout in order to sell new TVs to us.

494
00:31:25,240 --> 00:31:28,720
Speaker 1: It's not enough to say this television this year is

495
00:31:28,760 --> 00:31:31,080
Speaker 1: just like the one last year and it's just as good,

496
00:31:31,240 --> 00:31:34,160
Speaker 1: so by the new one like that, that doesn't get customers.

497
00:31:34,200 --> 00:31:37,640
Speaker 1: You have to have something new and exciting incorporated into

498
00:31:37,680 --> 00:31:42,320
Speaker 1: the television. Sometimes those are really awesome features, and a

499
00:31:42,360 --> 00:31:46,560
Speaker 1: lot of times it just ends up being like meaningless

500
00:31:46,680 --> 00:31:49,280
Speaker 1: bells and whistles that don't really add to the experience.

501
00:31:49,360 --> 00:31:52,440
Speaker 1: This feels more like the latter to me. But again,

502
00:31:52,440 --> 00:31:56,760
Speaker 1: to be fair, I am notoriously anti n f T

503
00:31:56,880 --> 00:31:59,000
Speaker 1: at least in the way that they're being treated right now,

504
00:31:59,720 --> 00:32:03,400
Speaker 1: and so I admit I have a bias against this

505
00:32:03,440 --> 00:32:06,080
Speaker 1: sort of thing, and I could be completely off base.

506
00:32:07,520 --> 00:32:10,920
Speaker 1: That's it for the tech News for Tuesday, September six,

507
00:32:10,920 --> 00:32:14,000
Speaker 1: two twenty two. Hope you are all well. If you'd

508
00:32:14,000 --> 00:32:15,080
Speaker 1: like to get in touch with me, you can do

509
00:32:15,120 --> 00:32:16,640
Speaker 1: that in a couple of different ways. One way is

510
00:32:16,640 --> 00:32:20,360
Speaker 1: to download the i Heart Radio app, navigate over to

511
00:32:20,360 --> 00:32:23,120
Speaker 1: the tech Stuff podcast. Just do a search and in

512
00:32:23,200 --> 00:32:25,320
Speaker 1: a little search bar will bring you right over to it.

513
00:32:25,960 --> 00:32:28,400
Speaker 1: You'll see there's a little microphone icon there. If you

514
00:32:28,440 --> 00:32:30,560
Speaker 1: click on that, you can leave a voice message up

515
00:32:30,600 --> 00:32:32,600
Speaker 1: to thirty seconds in length and let me know what

516
00:32:32,680 --> 00:32:35,120
Speaker 1: you think, maybe any show ideas you would like me

517
00:32:35,160 --> 00:32:38,040
Speaker 1: to tackle that kind of stuff. Uh. The other way

518
00:32:38,080 --> 00:32:40,440
Speaker 1: to reach out is on Twitter. The handle we use

519
00:32:40,560 --> 00:32:44,360
Speaker 1: for the show is tech Stuff hs W and I'll

520
00:32:44,360 --> 00:32:53,480
Speaker 1: talk to you again really soon. Y. Tech Stuff is

521
00:32:53,520 --> 00:32:56,640
Speaker 1: an i Heart Radio production. For more podcasts from my

522
00:32:56,760 --> 00:32:59,880
Speaker 1: Heart Radio, visit the i Heart Radio app. Apple pod

523
00:33:00,040 --> 00:33:02,480
Speaker 1: Casts wherever you listen to your favorite shows.