WEBVTT - Lawsuit Challenges Trump 2-for-1 Regulation Rules (Audio)

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<v Speaker 1>More pushback to President Trump's use of executive orders and

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<v Speaker 1>a lawsuit to go with it. Trump is being sued

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<v Speaker 1>over his directive that federal agencies repealed two regulations for

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<v Speaker 1>every new rule they put on the books. Do you

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<v Speaker 1>remember last Monday when Trump signed the order in front

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<v Speaker 1>of small business representatives. If you have a regulation you

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<v Speaker 1>want number one, We're not going to approve it because

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<v Speaker 1>it's already been approved, probably in seventeen different forms. But

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<v Speaker 1>if we do, the only way you have a chance

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<v Speaker 1>is we have to knock out two regulations for every

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<v Speaker 1>new regulations. To advocacy groups and a union claim that

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<v Speaker 1>Trump's order exceeds his constitutional authority, requires arbitrary actions by

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<v Speaker 1>agencies and will be harmful to the American public. Our

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<v Speaker 1>guests are Gregory Warro, professor at Columbia University, and Brian Mannox,

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<v Speaker 1>professor at George Washington University. Gregory Trump has vowed to

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<v Speaker 1>repeal sent of all federal regulations, which is a heavy

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<v Speaker 1>lift consider there are more than a hundred and seventy

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<v Speaker 1>eight thousand rules on the books. But is this the

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<v Speaker 1>legal way to do that? Well, there are different components

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<v Speaker 1>to the executive order, and UH I'm not sure that

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<v Speaker 1>all of them will survive judicial judicial scrutiny. I think

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<v Speaker 1>the especially the two for one part of it just

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<v Speaker 1>seems to be odd and unenforceable. UM. But I think

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<v Speaker 1>you know, there there's there's certainly a legal basis for

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<v Speaker 1>what he has done, and there's precedent for an attempt

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<v Speaker 1>like this to reduce the introduction of new regulations UM.

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<v Speaker 1>Ronald Reagan famously introduced regulatory review UM within a few

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<v Speaker 1>months and starting his presidency. And you know, that's widely

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<v Speaker 1>attributed to the slowdown in regulations that we saw during

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<v Speaker 1>the Reagan administration. It wasn't a Reagan was was, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>campaign heavily on the idea of regular Tory reform. I

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<v Speaker 1>wouldn't say that, you know, he really cut back regulations.

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<v Speaker 1>He certainly reduced the rate of new regulations being added

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<v Speaker 1>to the books. UM. So it's I think it's highly

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<v Speaker 1>unlikely that Trump will be successful either with this regulatory

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<v Speaker 1>review that he's instituting or other kinds of reform to

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<v Speaker 1>to reduce regulations to the extent that he's claiming he will. Brian,

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<v Speaker 1>what do you think about that? Do you think that this, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>either this Executive Order. Are the things that Donald Trump

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<v Speaker 1>is doing is going to be effective at reducing regulations. Uh,

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<v Speaker 1>it's certainly a big challenge. Uh. And Uh, it's true.

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<v Speaker 1>Is something that strikes me is unrealistic. Um. But it's

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<v Speaker 1>not just Ronald Reagan who has tried this before. Jimmy

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<v Speaker 1>Carter in Executive Word twelve or four four asked the

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<v Speaker 1>agencies to review old regulations and recent ones that were obsolete.

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<v Speaker 1>Other presidents have done it. Barack Obama did it. He

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<v Speaker 1>claimed to be institutionalizing rich respective review of regulations in

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<v Speaker 1>Executive Order. Let me see, I think it was one

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<v Speaker 1>three five six three. Um. But the problem is in

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<v Speaker 1>the past, the agencies uh tend to ignore this. Um.

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<v Speaker 1>They did a little bit under Ronald Reagan to slow

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<v Speaker 1>down the pace. Under Obama, they they made some motions

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<v Speaker 1>to look at old regulations for maybe a year, and

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<v Speaker 1>then the effort peter out. They went back to, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>full throttle on on issuing new regulations. UM. So it's

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<v Speaker 1>hard for any president to to change that dynamic. UM.

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<v Speaker 1>I think what's different about this executive order is that

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<v Speaker 1>the president's directing the agencies to work on deregulation as

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<v Speaker 1>much as a new regulation or maybe more um. And

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<v Speaker 1>he intends to measure them and hold them accountable for that.

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<v Speaker 1>So that's how I think of the two for one rule. Uh,

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<v Speaker 1>that he wants his appointees to be working on de

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<v Speaker 1>regulation and he will know if they're not gregory. I

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<v Speaker 1>want to go back to the two for one because

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<v Speaker 1>that seems to be what's most unusual about this. And

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<v Speaker 1>he's requiring agencies new rules to have a net cost

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<v Speaker 1>of zero dollars a year. So the plaintiffs, particularly the

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<v Speaker 1>president of the Communication Workers of America, said that workers

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<v Speaker 1>shouldn't be required to trade off one set of job

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<v Speaker 1>health or safety protections in order to get protection from

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<v Speaker 1>perhaps another equally dangerous condition. Can he enforce the two

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<v Speaker 1>for one rule. I think that would be very hard

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<v Speaker 1>to do. Uh. You know, my sense is that it

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<v Speaker 1>makes a better sound bite than it does for sound policy. UM.

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<v Speaker 1>And you know, just the idea that that uh you know,

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<v Speaker 1>if I if I'm a bureaucrat and I have the

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<v Speaker 1>kind of expertise that bureaucrats have, I can find rules

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<v Speaker 1>that are relatively minor. If I want to create a

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<v Speaker 1>new one, I can find two relative of the minor

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<v Speaker 1>ones to to repeal that will you know that will

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<v Speaker 1>will will put me in compliance with this UH, with

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<v Speaker 1>this executive order. UH. You know the zero costs provision

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<v Speaker 1>in the executive order. UM, that strikes me as kind

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<v Speaker 1>of like the UH you know, the idea behind the

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<v Speaker 1>balanced budget amendment that basically, you know, if you're going

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<v Speaker 1>to increase spending, you've got to you've got to either

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<v Speaker 1>increase revenue or cut or cut spending somewhere else. UM.

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<v Speaker 1>And and you know the idea that that UH, that

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<v Speaker 1>that these regulations somehow I have to have zero costs.

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<v Speaker 1>I think it's I think it's probably not enforceable. What

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<v Speaker 1>I do think the order might be effective at doing

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<v Speaker 1>is is basically giving UH agencies pause when they try

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<v Speaker 1>to issue new regulations. So you know, my senses that

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<v Speaker 1>what past presidents have done is they've just made it

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<v Speaker 1>harder to issue new regulations. UM, not necessarily preventing or

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<v Speaker 1>agencies from issuing new regulations or forcing them to scale

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<v Speaker 1>back regulations. And it just kind of raises the bar.

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<v Speaker 1>It it adds some new hoops that that agencies have

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<v Speaker 1>to jump through. UM. Whether this will withstand judicial scrutiny,

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<v Speaker 1>I mean that that's an entirely different, entirely different question, Brian.

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<v Speaker 1>It strikes me that maybe this lawsuit is premature and

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<v Speaker 1>that maybe it would have a better chance after an

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<v Speaker 1>agency resends a regulation and explains it by saying, oh,

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<v Speaker 1>we had to resend this regulation plus another one because

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<v Speaker 1>we wanted to enact this new regulation in another area.

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<v Speaker 1>Do you agree with my analysis there? That is absolutely true.

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<v Speaker 1>I think this this particular lawsuit will fail on ripeness

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<v Speaker 1>and standing grounds. Um. It doesn't actually do anything to anybody. Uh.

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<v Speaker 1>In contrast to travel band executive order, whether are people

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<v Speaker 1>suffering immediate and concrete injuries? You know, maybe that the

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<v Speaker 1>President has a strong, stronger legal case there on the merits,

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<v Speaker 1>but there were you know, an injured individuals who had

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<v Speaker 1>justiciable claims to bring to a court. Um. So it's

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<v Speaker 1>not surprising that executive order went there. But I don't

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<v Speaker 1>think the court will take this case. And even if

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<v Speaker 1>they passed those hurdles. Uh. You know, the executive order

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<v Speaker 1>includes all the usual caveats unless prohibited by law, to

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<v Speaker 1>the extent permitted by law. All that language is in there,

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<v Speaker 1>and so there's nothing facially in the order that the

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<v Speaker 1>court could use to set it aside, especially with you know,

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<v Speaker 1>a newly elected president just taking charge of the government.

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<v Speaker 1>It would be extraordinary for a court to come in

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<v Speaker 1>and say no, no, you can't touch the regular street

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<v Speaker 1>agencies and give them guidance on the stuff you just

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<v Speaker 1>ran for and got elected president. So I don't think

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<v Speaker 1>this will go anywhere, but I think it is a

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<v Speaker 1>roadmap to future challenges, and in many ways, I think

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<v Speaker 1>it may be designed to encourage future challenges, just like

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<v Speaker 1>the resist banner that Green Peace Unfur old over Washington

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<v Speaker 1>after rought after the inauguration. I think this is an

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<v Speaker 1>indication to agencies if you don't want Donald Trump interfering

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<v Speaker 1>with your regulatory program, make sure to put the right

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<v Speaker 1>arguments into the rule making records so we can bring

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<v Speaker 1>these arguments into court. I just had a quick question

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<v Speaker 1>for you, freg because um, it's a it's we're running

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<v Speaker 1>out of time, about thirty seconds. But a draft report

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<v Speaker 1>to Congress from the White House o MB estimated the

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<v Speaker 1>annual benefits from all major regulations over the past ten

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<v Speaker 1>years were between two hundred sixty nine and eight hundred

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<v Speaker 1>seventy two billion, while the costs were between seventy four

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<v Speaker 1>billion and one billion. So is there a real danger

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<v Speaker 1>in having these kinds of regulations or do they help sometimes?

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<v Speaker 1>I think there's no doubt that regulations help sometimes. But

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<v Speaker 1>you know, uh, you know, it's very easy to paint

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<v Speaker 1>this as as a black and white issue. The regulations

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<v Speaker 1>are bad and we should deregulate. But you know, those

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<v Speaker 1>regulations are there for the reason, and there's a process

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<v Speaker 1>by which those regulations get adopted. It's not there that

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<v Speaker 1>they're just made out out of thin air, uh, And

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<v Speaker 1>so agencies have to justify the issue of new regulations.

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<v Speaker 1>And so it's it's just not the case that that

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<v Speaker 1>agencies do this frivolously or or in an in an

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<v Speaker 1>ad hoc manner, despite what some politicians might portray agency

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<v Speaker 1>behavior as we will have to leave it at their

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<v Speaker 1>Thank you. Gregory Wiro, Professor Columbia University and Brian Mannix,

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<v Speaker 1>Professor at George Washington University. Coming up on Bloomberg Law,

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<v Speaker 1>Anthem's forty eight billion dollar deal to buy Signa blocked

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<v Speaker 1>by a federal judge. This is Bloomberg