WEBVTT - Tech News: TikTok Might Be Working on a Contingency Plan 0:00:04.519 --> 0:00:12.360 Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from iHeartRadio. Hey there, 0:00:12.400 --> 0:00:15.400 and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host Jonathan Strickland. 0:00:15.400 --> 0:00:18.439 I'm an executive producer with iHeart Podcasts and how the 0:00:18.480 --> 0:00:20.880 tech are you. It's time for the tech News Inning 0:00:20.920 --> 0:00:24.959 on Friday May thirty first, twenty twenty four, and let's 0:00:25.000 --> 0:00:29.840 start off with some news about TikTok. The Independent reports 0:00:29.880 --> 0:00:34.159 that part of TikTok's Project Texas plan. Project Texas was 0:00:34.200 --> 0:00:38.720 the company's attempt to reassure American politicians that TikTok isn't 0:00:38.760 --> 0:00:42.199 a data funnel that leads directly to China, was to 0:00:42.200 --> 0:00:47.080 give the US government a remarkable amount of control and oversight. So, 0:00:47.200 --> 0:00:50.720 for one thing, it would have let federal officials elect 0:00:50.880 --> 0:00:54.360 some of the board members for TikTok. The government would 0:00:54.400 --> 0:00:57.720 be given access to TikTok's source code to look for 0:00:57.800 --> 0:01:01.640 evidence of backdoor access and that sort of thing. And 0:01:01.760 --> 0:01:05.400 apparently there even would have been a kill switch feature 0:01:05.520 --> 0:01:09.320 built into TikTok should someone determine that it was serving 0:01:09.360 --> 0:01:13.039 as some sort of insidious tool belonging to a foreign adversary. 0:01:13.600 --> 0:01:16.480 But the White House rejected this plan and said it 0:01:16.480 --> 0:01:20.720 would not be sufficient to address national security concerns. Now, 0:01:20.760 --> 0:01:24.080 I have only read the reporting around this plan. I 0:01:24.080 --> 0:01:26.759 have not actually read the full details of the plan itself, 0:01:27.000 --> 0:01:29.920 so I don't really have any more insight into this. 0:01:30.360 --> 0:01:34.000 But we all know what actually happened instead of it right. 0:01:34.200 --> 0:01:36.720 Congress passed a law that, if it holds up to 0:01:36.800 --> 0:01:41.360 TikTok's legal challenges, will ultimately force TikTok to either separate 0:01:41.640 --> 0:01:45.520 entirely from its Chinese parent company, byte Dance, or face 0:01:45.600 --> 0:01:50.120 a nationwide ban in the United States. This brings me 0:01:50.240 --> 0:01:54.240 to the next TikTok story. Reuter's reports that TikTok has 0:01:54.320 --> 0:01:58.440 secretly been working on creating a recommendation algorithm that would 0:01:58.440 --> 0:02:02.400 be completely independent from the one that Byteedance uses for 0:02:02.680 --> 0:02:06.560 the sister app du Jin, which is the you know, 0:02:06.680 --> 0:02:11.079 the Chinese variant of TikTok, or you could argue TikTok's 0:02:11.080 --> 0:02:14.920 the American variant of Douyin. The implication is that this 0:02:15.160 --> 0:02:18.480 is a potential preparation in the event that TikTok is 0:02:18.639 --> 0:02:24.040 forced to separate from the mothership. Reuter's sites unnamed sources 0:02:24.080 --> 0:02:26.920 who say the project is massive and could take a 0:02:26.960 --> 0:02:30.520 year or so to complete. These sources claim that TikTok 0:02:30.600 --> 0:02:33.520 executives have talked about the project in all hands meetings 0:02:33.520 --> 0:02:38.920 and such, but TikTok representatives have disputed Reuter's report and 0:02:39.080 --> 0:02:43.840 said it was quote misleading and factually inaccurate in the quote, 0:02:43.880 --> 0:02:48.640 and that the divestiture from Byteedance is quote simply not possible. 0:02:48.880 --> 0:02:51.680 End the quote where the truth lies. I don't know. 0:02:52.160 --> 0:02:56.000 I have no doubt that divesting TikTok would be really challenging. 0:02:56.600 --> 0:03:00.400 I do not think it would be impossible. It might 0:03:00.480 --> 0:03:03.560 be very difficult, and it might also mean that the 0:03:03.639 --> 0:03:06.560 effort to do so would cost so much in resources 0:03:06.600 --> 0:03:09.720 that economically it's not viable. So maybe you know, from 0:03:09.760 --> 0:03:12.760 an economic standpoint, you could say, yeah, it's not possible, 0:03:12.840 --> 0:03:18.160 But I don't think that it's technologically impossible. And it 0:03:18.240 --> 0:03:21.840 is also within the realm of possibility that TikTok representatives 0:03:21.880 --> 0:03:24.880 are just saying this, because if they were to admit 0:03:25.000 --> 0:03:28.680 otherwise that the company is working on this independent algorithm, 0:03:29.160 --> 0:03:31.840 that could potentially give the US government a bit more 0:03:31.919 --> 0:03:35.240 leverage to say, well, you're already making preparations, so there's 0:03:35.240 --> 0:03:38.640 no problem here. But as I mentioned earlier, TikTok is 0:03:38.680 --> 0:03:42.320 already suing to challenge this law, and this matter is 0:03:42.360 --> 0:03:47.680 far from settled. So my guess is the US recommendation algorithm, 0:03:47.760 --> 0:03:50.520 if in fact that really does exist and Royer sources 0:03:50.600 --> 0:03:55.040 are truthful, I think that that's the contingency plan. I 0:03:55.120 --> 0:03:59.440 think that's TikTok having a worst case scenario for the company, 0:03:59.840 --> 0:04:02.240 the worst case being that it actually is forced to 0:04:02.360 --> 0:04:06.360 divest itself or for byte Dance rather to divest itself 0:04:06.440 --> 0:04:10.920 of TikTok. A security firm called black Lotus Labs has 0:04:10.960 --> 0:04:14.160 a report that might explain a massive technological failing that 0:04:14.240 --> 0:04:17.599 happened last year. So back in October of twenty twenty three, 0:04:18.080 --> 0:04:21.120 more than half a million customers of the internet service 0:04:21.160 --> 0:04:25.840 provider Windstream lost service. So what was the problem. Well, 0:04:25.920 --> 0:04:29.440 the customers found that their routers had become bricked, though 0:04:29.480 --> 0:04:32.320 they didn't actually necessarily know that's what had happened. Some 0:04:32.839 --> 0:04:35.599 of them did, but most people were probably just thinking, 0:04:35.839 --> 0:04:39.600 my Internet don't work no more. But it meant that 0:04:39.680 --> 0:04:43.000 like six hundred thousand customers or so were without Internet 0:04:43.040 --> 0:04:46.440 service and that's not good. And eventually Windstream would send 0:04:46.480 --> 0:04:49.919 out replacement routers once it finally kind of got to 0:04:49.960 --> 0:04:52.680 the conclusion that, yeah, it's the routers that failed, and 0:04:52.720 --> 0:04:55.760 there was nothing on the fault of the customers As 0:04:55.760 --> 0:04:59.320 far as anyone can tell. These failures happened over the 0:04:59.320 --> 0:05:02.840 course of three days. So what can make so many 0:05:02.880 --> 0:05:05.960 routers fail in such a short time. Well, according to 0:05:06.040 --> 0:05:09.160 Black Lotus Labs, it was malware. Now I should add that, 0:05:09.279 --> 0:05:13.200 as Dan Gooden of Ours Technica reports, Black Lotus Labs 0:05:13.240 --> 0:05:18.240 did not specifically name Windstream in their report. Instead, the 0:05:18.279 --> 0:05:21.560 firms spelled out the parameters of this malware attack and 0:05:21.640 --> 0:05:24.520 the effects it had, and Goodin makes the case that 0:05:25.760 --> 0:05:28.560 it's a pretty darn good match for what seems to 0:05:28.600 --> 0:05:32.200 have happened over at Windstream, and I would agree with that. Now, 0:05:32.279 --> 0:05:34.760 I would argue that the most concerning elements of this 0:05:34.839 --> 0:05:37.800 report are the things we still do not know. We 0:05:37.920 --> 0:05:40.600 do not know who carried out the attack. We do 0:05:40.680 --> 0:05:43.919 not know why they did this attack. We also don't 0:05:43.960 --> 0:05:46.679 know how the attacker was able to get initial access 0:05:46.720 --> 0:05:49.440 to these routers in the first place. Like they used 0:05:49.640 --> 0:05:52.080 a specific kind of malware in order to overwrite the 0:05:52.160 --> 0:05:55.080 firmware on the router. We know that, like we know 0:05:55.160 --> 0:05:58.120 what kind of malware they used, but how they got 0:05:58.200 --> 0:06:01.919 that entry point in to the routers in the first place. 0:06:02.000 --> 0:06:05.000 That is still an unknown variable. It could be that 0:06:05.040 --> 0:06:08.640 there's a vulnerability that's in these routers that the cybersecurity 0:06:08.640 --> 0:06:12.359 community doesn't know about yet but the attacker does, or 0:06:12.360 --> 0:06:15.200 it could be something else. We also don't know if 0:06:15.240 --> 0:06:19.080 the attack was you know, backed by a nation state. 0:06:19.640 --> 0:06:25.560 Was this a state back hacking attack? No clue, And 0:06:25.839 --> 0:06:30.680 because we know so little about the actual attack, like 0:06:31.200 --> 0:06:33.640 who carried it out and how it was done, we 0:06:33.680 --> 0:06:35.680 don't have a lot of good advice on how to 0:06:35.760 --> 0:06:38.200 avoid this kind of thing in the future and how 0:06:38.200 --> 0:06:41.480 to protect ourselves against future attacks, apart from just you know, 0:06:41.520 --> 0:06:44.720 the general words of wisdom, like you know, when you 0:06:44.760 --> 0:06:47.719 get a router or a modem or whatever, change the 0:06:47.760 --> 0:06:50.440 default password, change it to something that only you know 0:06:50.600 --> 0:06:54.360 and it's a strong password, or you know, reboot your 0:06:54.400 --> 0:06:58.000 router on occasion in order to try and protect yourself 0:06:58.000 --> 0:07:00.680 against attacks, that kind of thing, which I mean, those 0:07:00.680 --> 0:07:06.159 are good rules to follow, but it's not very reassuring, 0:07:06.440 --> 0:07:10.960 like it's not specific to this particular case. Blake Montgomery 0:07:11.000 --> 0:07:14.320 reports in the Guardian the US authorities shut down a 0:07:14.360 --> 0:07:18.720 botnet and not just any botnet, but the world's largest 0:07:18.840 --> 0:07:22.840 buttonnet ever. So a botnet, for those of you unfamiliar 0:07:22.840 --> 0:07:26.600 with the term, is a network of comprised computers. I mean, 0:07:26.640 --> 0:07:30.320 the name kind of gives it away, a network of bots. 0:07:30.560 --> 0:07:36.440 So typically a hacker uses malware or phishing attacks in 0:07:36.560 --> 0:07:40.720 order to establish some kind of backdoor access to a 0:07:40.760 --> 0:07:44.760 network of computers. So these are computers belonging to people 0:07:44.800 --> 0:07:48.840 and companies and such and organizations that the hacker then 0:07:49.280 --> 0:07:52.480 is able to at least take some partial control over. 0:07:53.120 --> 0:07:56.200 And then typically the hacker puts these computers to work 0:07:56.520 --> 0:08:00.640 to do something. This can include anything from using this 0:08:00.760 --> 0:08:04.800 network of zombie computers zombie computers. That's another kind of 0:08:04.920 --> 0:08:08.360 term for a botnet, a zombie army. You might use 0:08:08.400 --> 0:08:12.920 those to blast some web server with Internet traffic in 0:08:12.960 --> 0:08:16.560 an attempt to overwhelm it. Now that's a distributed denial 0:08:16.600 --> 0:08:21.200 of service attack. Or you might put this network of 0:08:21.440 --> 0:08:25.560 computers to work in the cryptocurrency minds. But in this 0:08:25.600 --> 0:08:29.600 particular case, this compromised network was used to do several 0:08:29.680 --> 0:08:33.640 different things, but the big one was an alleged COVID 0:08:33.800 --> 0:08:39.000 insurance fraud scam that amounted to around six billion dollars 0:08:39.120 --> 0:08:43.079 in fraud. The takedown operation, which was code named Endgame 0:08:43.120 --> 0:08:46.240 because I guess cybersecurity folks like to feel cool and 0:08:46.559 --> 0:08:50.520 presumably really enjoy the Avengers movies. It relied upon joint 0:08:50.520 --> 0:08:55.800 cooperation of authorities in the United States, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, 0:08:56.000 --> 0:09:01.320 the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, and France. The US Department of 0:09:01.480 --> 0:09:05.560 Justice arrested Yunhi Wang, who is a Chinese national, and 0:09:05.600 --> 0:09:09.960 accused Wang of essentially spearheading the botnet operations. Wang did 0:09:10.000 --> 0:09:14.040 not do it on his own, but was allegedly a 0:09:14.240 --> 0:09:18.200 large part of this, and if Wang in fact has 0:09:18.240 --> 0:09:20.520 found guilty, he could face up to sixty five years 0:09:20.600 --> 0:09:24.240 in prison. He's thirty five years old now, so that's 0:09:24.280 --> 0:09:29.000 a big old wolf. The United States National Security Agency, 0:09:29.080 --> 0:09:32.600 or NSA, says it's a good idea for smartphone owners 0:09:32.640 --> 0:09:35.720 to completely power it down their devices at least once 0:09:35.760 --> 0:09:38.320 a week. The agency says that doing this can help 0:09:38.360 --> 0:09:41.600 mitigate issues like spearfishing, but it's not a guarantee that 0:09:41.640 --> 0:09:44.720 you'll be free and clear of all risks. It just helps. 0:09:45.920 --> 0:09:49.960 So essentially, just the turning your device off and on 0:09:50.080 --> 0:09:53.679 again on a regular basis should be considered a best practice, 0:09:54.080 --> 0:09:56.959 and the NSSA should know because they are experts at 0:09:57.120 --> 0:09:59.800 spying on people. If you'd like more information on that, 0:10:00.080 --> 0:10:03.680 look up stories about prism or main way that kind 0:10:03.679 --> 0:10:06.000 of thing. But to be less cheeky, I agree that 0:10:06.120 --> 0:10:09.480 regularly doing a full power down and then power up 0:10:09.559 --> 0:10:12.439 of your device is probably a good idea for lots 0:10:12.480 --> 0:10:14.640 of different reasons, not least of which is that it 0:10:14.679 --> 0:10:19.960 could provide an extra bit of security against threats. All right, 0:10:20.040 --> 0:10:22.360 we've got a lot more tech news stories to cover, 0:10:22.440 --> 0:10:24.200 but before we get to that, let's take a quick 0:10:24.200 --> 0:10:37.240 break to thank our sponsors. We're back and now for 0:10:37.320 --> 0:10:40.520 a couple of stories about using technology to spread propaganda 0:10:40.559 --> 0:10:44.000 and misinformation. First up, META says that it identified and 0:10:44.040 --> 0:10:48.360 subsequently removed six influenced campaigns. This is coming from an 0:10:48.440 --> 0:10:51.720 article I saw on the Verge by Nick Barclay. Meta 0:10:51.800 --> 0:10:54.679 says that a couple of these campaigns were using AI 0:10:54.840 --> 0:10:57.960 in an attempt to push certain political viewpoints and to 0:10:57.960 --> 0:11:00.480 make it seem as if that particular point view had 0:11:00.480 --> 0:11:03.920 a larger amount of support than it really did. Meta 0:11:04.120 --> 0:11:09.440 disclosed that the campaigns originated out of places such as Croatia, China, Bangladesh, 0:11:09.559 --> 0:11:14.320 Israel and Iran. Apparently, the Israeli campaign made use of 0:11:14.360 --> 0:11:17.280 AI to create comments to try and boost engagement and 0:11:17.360 --> 0:11:21.520 the spread of messaging, and the Chinese campaign allegedly used 0:11:21.520 --> 0:11:24.880 AI to generate images as part of that campaign. Now, 0:11:24.920 --> 0:11:28.640 according to Meta, these attempts weren't particularly sophisticated or hard 0:11:28.679 --> 0:11:32.400 to identify. But obviously folks expect that AI will get 0:11:32.440 --> 0:11:35.360 better at creating this kind of stuff that people will 0:11:35.400 --> 0:11:40.600 not be as readily available to detect. It'll be easier 0:11:40.640 --> 0:11:45.640 for the stuff to kind of pass casual glance and 0:11:45.760 --> 0:11:49.520 considering discourse on some social platforms, I expect it is 0:11:49.559 --> 0:11:51.000 not going to take a whole lot of work to 0:11:51.000 --> 0:11:53.760 craft something that fits right in, because goodness knows, I've 0:11:53.760 --> 0:11:58.040 seen some garbage on social networks. On a similar note, 0:11:58.080 --> 0:12:00.720 the New York Times reports that open Aye has said 0:12:01.040 --> 0:12:04.480 it identified five online campaigns that were making use of 0:12:04.520 --> 0:12:10.280 AI to boost messaging. These campaigns originated in places like Russia, China, Iran, 0:12:10.400 --> 0:12:13.080 and Israel. There's no word on whether or not any 0:12:13.120 --> 0:12:15.840 of these are the same ones that Meta mentioned. This week, 0:12:16.200 --> 0:12:19.160 The Register had a rather snarky article about this that 0:12:19.200 --> 0:12:22.360 talks about how these campaigns were relatively low stakes because 0:12:22.400 --> 0:12:25.839 they hadn't seen much penetration. They were largely you know, 0:12:26.240 --> 0:12:30.520 unseen by actual human people. Instead, they mostly consisted mainly 0:12:30.559 --> 0:12:33.720 of bots posting stuff that other bots had created, or 0:12:33.760 --> 0:12:36.080 maybe the same stuff that those same bots had created. 0:12:36.200 --> 0:12:39.160 At any rate, it sounds like the actual impact of 0:12:39.200 --> 0:12:42.040 these campaigns was minimal. And again some of that has 0:12:42.080 --> 0:12:44.760 to do with the fact that the efforts of using 0:12:44.880 --> 0:12:48.800 AI are not terribly sophisticated yet. But I do stress 0:12:48.840 --> 0:12:52.120 the word yet, because there's every reason to expect these 0:12:52.120 --> 0:12:54.800 attacks will get more sophisticated over time, and the real 0:12:54.880 --> 0:12:57.880 concern is whether open AI will be as effective at 0:12:57.880 --> 0:13:02.840 detecting and disrupting such campaigns when they inevitably surface. And 0:13:02.880 --> 0:13:06.120 now in the AI is Coming for Creatives category, I 0:13:06.160 --> 0:13:08.720 submit for your approval a story written by Winston Show 0:13:08.760 --> 0:13:12.160 for The Hollywood Reporter about a company called Fable Studio. 0:13:12.840 --> 0:13:16.760 This company is launching an AI powered platform called Showrunner, 0:13:16.840 --> 0:13:19.679 which the studio claims will be able to create AI 0:13:19.880 --> 0:13:23.680 generated television series. So it sounds to me like the 0:13:23.760 --> 0:13:27.080 idea is you give AI some guidelines on what you want, 0:13:27.400 --> 0:13:31.360 and then the AI creates an animated episode and voice 0:13:31.440 --> 0:13:35.440 acted episode that consists of scenes that are based off 0:13:35.440 --> 0:13:38.600 your prompts. So imagine that you're sitting there and you're thinking, man, 0:13:38.679 --> 0:13:42.640 I really wish they hadn't canceled Firefly. And then imagine 0:13:42.640 --> 0:13:44.960 you're thinking, hey, wait a minute, I can create new 0:13:44.960 --> 0:13:48.880 episodes of Firefly using this tool and wash lives in 0:13:48.960 --> 0:13:52.280 my version. Spoiler alert if you haven't seen Serenity. So 0:13:52.920 --> 0:13:55.600 the actors might not look quite right, because again, the 0:13:55.600 --> 0:13:58.400 tool can only make animated characters at the moment, it 0:13:58.440 --> 0:14:03.560 can't do video AI generation. They might not sound right. 0:14:04.200 --> 0:14:06.680 And sure, it probably won't come across like a real 0:14:06.800 --> 0:14:10.160 Firefly episode and sound like something that Joss Whedon wrote, 0:14:10.679 --> 0:14:15.200 but you could technically do it. If you're also thinking, hey, 0:14:15.240 --> 0:14:17.160 this kind of sounds like the sort of stuff that 0:14:17.200 --> 0:14:20.120 the Writers Guild of America and the Screen Actors Guild 0:14:20.160 --> 0:14:22.680 were really worried about, you would be right on the money. 0:14:23.120 --> 0:14:25.960 Fable Studio is launching a closed beta test of the 0:14:26.000 --> 0:14:28.640 platform in the near future that will likely last the 0:14:28.680 --> 0:14:31.880 rest of this year before it is able to launch 0:14:31.960 --> 0:14:34.800 the service for reals's I will not be joining the 0:14:34.840 --> 0:14:38.640 waitlist for this test. I have serious ethical objections to 0:14:38.920 --> 0:14:42.800 AI generated entertainment, and they are far too numerous to 0:14:42.840 --> 0:14:46.960 get into here. Now. I say that, but our next 0:14:46.960 --> 0:14:49.880 story actually goes into one of the big reasons why so. 0:14:50.080 --> 0:14:54.400 Jesus Diaz, a fast company, reports that Instagram is training 0:14:54.440 --> 0:14:58.240 AI models using user data on the platform, and worse, 0:14:58.880 --> 0:15:01.720 most users have no way to opt out of it. 0:15:02.040 --> 0:15:04.640 So if you're an artist of any type and you 0:15:04.760 --> 0:15:08.360 use Instagram to showcase your work, whether that's dance or 0:15:08.800 --> 0:15:12.440 visual arts or photography, whatever it might be, your work 0:15:12.480 --> 0:15:16.040 is being used to train up Meta's AI generative models. 0:15:16.360 --> 0:15:19.200 The only people who even have the option to opt 0:15:19.240 --> 0:15:22.040 out of this are citizens of the European Union, where 0:15:22.080 --> 0:15:26.360 the rules of General Data Protection Regulation or GDPR provide 0:15:26.520 --> 0:15:30.000 some protection. But as Das reports, Meta has taken some 0:15:30.080 --> 0:15:33.720 rather extraordinary steps to obfuscate the option to opt out. 0:15:34.240 --> 0:15:37.320 First up is the initial message alerting users in the 0:15:37.360 --> 0:15:40.240 EU to the practice. In the first place, there's this 0:15:40.280 --> 0:15:43.840 big old blue clothes button, and if you hit clothes, 0:15:43.960 --> 0:15:46.840 essentially that serves as a I'm cool with this, you know, 0:15:46.880 --> 0:15:50.960 it's essentially sending the opt in message, so your opt 0:15:50.960 --> 0:15:54.760 out option is gone. Within the message itself is a 0:15:54.800 --> 0:15:58.040 phrase that says quote this means you have the right 0:15:58.120 --> 0:16:01.240 to object to how your information is used for these 0:16:01.280 --> 0:16:06.000 purposes end quote, and the right to object phrase within 0:16:06.040 --> 0:16:09.800 that is a link to the actual opt out feature. Now, 0:16:09.840 --> 0:16:12.920 as you might imagine, this is much smaller than the 0:16:12.920 --> 0:16:18.160 blue close button. Now, if you did click the right 0:16:18.320 --> 0:16:21.440 to object phrase, it takes you to a rather intimidating 0:16:21.520 --> 0:16:24.840 looking form that I would argue appears to be designed 0:16:24.880 --> 0:16:28.080 to discourage users from taking the time to opt out. 0:16:28.440 --> 0:16:31.480 That is my opinion. I am just saying. My opinion 0:16:31.600 --> 0:16:37.080 is this was a calculated move to discourage people from 0:16:37.080 --> 0:16:40.000 opting out. And what's more, Das rightly points out that 0:16:40.080 --> 0:16:44.160 GDPR makes it illegal for Meta to deny anyone their 0:16:44.160 --> 0:16:47.040 request to opt out of data capture and usage practices. 0:16:47.320 --> 0:16:49.760 You don't have to give a reason, you don't have 0:16:49.840 --> 0:16:52.360 to justify it. You just have to say I opt 0:16:52.400 --> 0:16:55.440 out and that's it. So Meta has made this more 0:16:55.560 --> 0:16:59.080 complicated than it needs to be. However, the form makes 0:16:59.120 --> 0:17:00.800 it seem like you have to make a case to 0:17:00.880 --> 0:17:03.080 opt out and then Meta has the right to deny 0:17:03.120 --> 0:17:06.520 your request. They do not have that right. So if 0:17:06.560 --> 0:17:08.639 you do live in the EU and you want to 0:17:08.680 --> 0:17:11.160 opt out of this and you see that message pop up. 0:17:11.520 --> 0:17:14.200 I suggest that when Meta asks you to explain why 0:17:14.240 --> 0:17:16.239 you want to opt out, you write in something like 0:17:16.640 --> 0:17:19.320 GDPR says, I don't have to give you a reason, 0:17:19.359 --> 0:17:22.640 you jark face, or something to that effect. I feel 0:17:22.680 --> 0:17:24.960 like Meta is really playing it fast and loose in 0:17:25.000 --> 0:17:28.040 the EU with this approach, as I believe certain regulators, 0:17:28.040 --> 0:17:30.320 and I'm thinking specifically of ones who happen to live 0:17:30.320 --> 0:17:33.760 in Ireland might argue that the UX design that Meta 0:17:33.800 --> 0:17:37.399 has employed is purposefully attempting to trick users into opting 0:17:37.480 --> 0:17:41.800 in without necessarily wanting to, And if I had to 0:17:41.880 --> 0:17:43.959 lay money on it, I would say that they're going 0:17:44.040 --> 0:17:47.320 to face some lawsuits about this in the future. The 0:17:47.480 --> 0:17:51.520 US Federal Aviation Administration, or FAA, has given Amazon the 0:17:51.560 --> 0:17:55.440 clearance to operate delivery drones outside of the direct view 0:17:55.560 --> 0:17:59.400 of a ground spotter. So previously, the FAA required Amazon 0:17:59.440 --> 0:18:02.280 to employ ground spotters to make sure that drones weren't 0:18:02.320 --> 0:18:05.680 putting people in property at risk while zooming around delivering 0:18:05.720 --> 0:18:08.919 you know, socks and Taylor Swift albums and that kind 0:18:08.960 --> 0:18:12.080 of thing. Without that requirement, Amazon will now have the 0:18:12.200 --> 0:18:15.399 chance to expand operations beyond a few test markets and 0:18:15.480 --> 0:18:19.000 potentially make it a viable means of delivering packages to 0:18:19.080 --> 0:18:22.320 more customers. Now, this doesn't necessarily mean the air is 0:18:22.359 --> 0:18:25.040 soon going to be buzzing with drones in the near future, 0:18:25.080 --> 0:18:27.719 because the company has made some staffing cuts to the 0:18:27.760 --> 0:18:31.960 Prime Air division in the recent past, and Amazon announced 0:18:32.000 --> 0:18:33.920 just a few weeks ago it would be ending drone 0:18:33.960 --> 0:18:37.399 operations in California entirely. So it might be a while 0:18:37.440 --> 0:18:40.760 before you start seeing these suckers dropping off impulse purchases 0:18:40.800 --> 0:18:43.520 in your neck of the woods, But a major regulatory 0:18:43.640 --> 0:18:47.480 hurdle is now out of the way. Today mark's the 0:18:47.520 --> 0:18:51.200 last day of employment for Twitch's current Safety Advisory Council. 0:18:51.720 --> 0:18:55.840 This group of nine folks, which included industry experts and streamers, 0:18:56.080 --> 0:18:59.240 were responsible for advising Twitch on how to improve safety 0:18:59.280 --> 0:19:01.720 measures on the plot and to build trust among the 0:19:01.760 --> 0:19:05.399 community of creators and users alike. They were alerted at 0:19:05.440 --> 0:19:07.520 the beginning of this month that their services would no 0:19:07.640 --> 0:19:10.800 longer be required at the end of May. Instead, Twitch 0:19:10.840 --> 0:19:14.760 plans to create a new group consisting solely of Twitch ambassadors. 0:19:15.240 --> 0:19:18.800 As Hayden Field of CNBC puts it, the language around 0:19:18.800 --> 0:19:22.040 this decision is aligned with the general corporate speak that 0:19:22.200 --> 0:19:25.960 typically boils down to we're cutting costs and safety is 0:19:26.000 --> 0:19:29.440 a real hassle. That's me paraphrasing. By the way, Field 0:19:29.560 --> 0:19:32.800 is far more professional and responsible than i am. Field 0:19:32.840 --> 0:19:35.919 also points out that in twenty twenty three, Twitch sacked 0:19:35.920 --> 0:19:39.040 around fifty folks in their trust and safety team, so 0:19:39.160 --> 0:19:41.239 this move seems to be in alignment with that one 0:19:41.320 --> 0:19:44.280 from last year. Considering the numerous stories that have come 0:19:44.320 --> 0:19:47.439 out around how important security is and how risks and 0:19:47.520 --> 0:19:50.160 threats are growing each year, partly due to the use 0:19:50.200 --> 0:19:53.359 of AI, this to me seems like a short term 0:19:53.400 --> 0:19:57.840 decision that could potentially have disastrous long term consequences. But 0:19:57.880 --> 0:20:00.440 then Twitch has also made several policy chain over the 0:20:00.480 --> 0:20:02.280 last couple of years that have really blown up in 0:20:02.280 --> 0:20:05.159 the company's proverbial face, so maybe this is just the 0:20:05.160 --> 0:20:09.880 platform saying the council hasn't been a good fit. In gadgets, 0:20:09.880 --> 0:20:13.080 Will Shanklin reports that Spotify, after some resistance, has agreed 0:20:13.119 --> 0:20:16.040 to issue refunds to folks who purchased a car thing. 0:20:16.680 --> 0:20:19.359 That's the actual name for the product, the car Thing. 0:20:19.800 --> 0:20:22.359 Spotify launched this a couple of years ago. It's a 0:20:22.400 --> 0:20:24.919 device that attaches to your car's entertainment system, and it 0:20:24.960 --> 0:20:28.520 provides streaming media from Spotify to your vehicle. But the 0:20:28.560 --> 0:20:30.480 company announced last week that it was going to end 0:20:30.560 --> 0:20:33.320 support for the devices on December ninth of this year, 0:20:33.400 --> 0:20:36.560 at which point all those car things will become useless 0:20:36.600 --> 0:20:40.480 things because they'll be bricked. Those puppies cost ninety bucks 0:20:40.520 --> 0:20:42.920 a pop, and since the service is only a couple 0:20:42.880 --> 0:20:46.480 of years old, that cheesed a lot of people off. Reportedly, 0:20:46.560 --> 0:20:50.080 Spotify wasn't going to offer refunds at first, but the 0:20:50.119 --> 0:20:53.800 company subsequently didn't about face, and did so just before 0:20:53.840 --> 0:20:57.000 a class action lawsuit rolled in against them that was 0:20:57.040 --> 0:21:01.119 accusing them of unfair business practices. So whether the change 0:21:01.160 --> 0:21:04.680 of heart was in anticipation of that lawsuit or Spotify 0:21:04.800 --> 0:21:07.000 just arrived at the conclusion that maybe it was a 0:21:07.000 --> 0:21:10.760 bad idea to ignore customer complaints independently, I don't know. 0:21:11.160 --> 0:21:13.119 But if you bought one, you can reach out the 0:21:13.119 --> 0:21:16.280 customer service for a refund. You do have to provide 0:21:16.440 --> 0:21:20.520 proof of purchase, however, And finally, it's the end of 0:21:20.520 --> 0:21:25.120 an era. ICQ. The Venerable Instant Messenger service will shuffle 0:21:25.160 --> 0:21:28.680 off this mortal coil. On my birthday, which doesn't mean 0:21:28.720 --> 0:21:31.800 anything to you. But on June twenty sixth, the Russian 0:21:31.840 --> 0:21:36.440 company VK, which is where ICQ ultimately landed, is going 0:21:36.480 --> 0:21:39.679 to shut down the service, so anyone still using ICQ 0:21:39.800 --> 0:21:43.240 will have to shift to some other instant messenger client. Now, 0:21:43.240 --> 0:21:45.959 if you've never used the service, it was a bit peculiar. 0:21:46.400 --> 0:21:48.879 You didn't get to choose a handle or use your 0:21:48.960 --> 0:21:51.480 name or anything like that. Instead, the service would assign 0:21:51.560 --> 0:21:54.600 you a number, you know, nice and personal like, and 0:21:54.640 --> 0:21:56.919 it worked kind of like a phone number, and you 0:21:56.960 --> 0:22:00.440 could initiate chat sessions with other users. And I used 0:22:00.480 --> 0:22:02.640 it a lot back in my younger days, though honestly, 0:22:02.680 --> 0:22:05.520 I can't remember the last time I popped on. It's 0:22:05.640 --> 0:22:09.199 likely been at least two decades or more at this point. Honestly, 0:22:09.240 --> 0:22:11.880 if you had told me that ICQ would outlive Aol 0:22:11.960 --> 0:22:15.080 instant Messenger which shut down at the end of twenty seventeen, 0:22:15.359 --> 0:22:17.399 I would have thought you were bunkers. But that's how 0:22:17.400 --> 0:22:19.960 it turned out. Well, you had a good run ICQ. 0:22:20.400 --> 0:22:23.360 I'll give you one final uh oh. That's the sound 0:22:23.400 --> 0:22:25.520 that would play when you got a message on ICQ. 0:22:26.520 --> 0:22:28.760 That's it for this episode, and the news for the 0:22:28.800 --> 0:22:32.000 week ending on May thirty first, twenty twenty four. I 0:22:32.080 --> 0:22:34.560 hope that you are all well, and I'll talk to 0:22:34.600 --> 0:22:44.360 you again really soon. Tech Stuff is an iHeartRadio production. 0:22:44.800 --> 0:22:49.840 For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, 0:22:49.920 --> 0:22:55.199 or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.