WEBVTT - The Origins of Hulu

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to Tech Stuff, a production from iHeartRadio. Hey there,

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<v Speaker 1>and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm an executive producer with iHeart Podcasts and How the

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<v Speaker 1>tech are you? You know, I've talked about streaming an

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<v Speaker 1>awful lot on the show. Now just for context tech Stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>This podcast began after Netflix had already kind of got

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<v Speaker 1>the ball rolling back in January two thousand and seven,

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<v Speaker 1>so I didn't have an episode that covered the story

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<v Speaker 1>of Netflix launching its online video streaming But in twenty

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<v Speaker 1>thirteen we did do an episode about the Big three

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<v Speaker 1>streaming services, which at that time included Netflix, Amazon, and

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<v Speaker 1>Today's Star Hulu. So we're doing actually a two parter

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<v Speaker 1>on Hulu. This will be part one. So even back

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<v Speaker 1>then we mentioned how there were other offerings available beyond

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<v Speaker 1>the Big three, but today it's almost a joke with

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<v Speaker 1>how many services are out there, and it's come as

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<v Speaker 1>no surprise that we're starting to see these different services

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<v Speaker 1>kind of glom on and merge together, either in bundles

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<v Speaker 1>like the one Comcast is going to offer with Netflix,

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<v Speaker 1>Peacock and Apple TV Plus, or in outright mergers and

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<v Speaker 1>acquisitions such as what's happened with Disney and you know Hulu.

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<v Speaker 1>It's almost like the streaming landscape is slowly transforming into

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<v Speaker 1>what cable television used to be. And we already know

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<v Speaker 1>that cable TV's business model has a ceiling because we

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<v Speaker 1>hit that ceiling. That's why we're seeing things kind of

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<v Speaker 1>in a decline or one of the reasons why I

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<v Speaker 1>shouldn't be so definitive, I guess. Anyway, all that's beside

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<v Speaker 1>the point. I want to talk about Hulu. How Hulu

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<v Speaker 1>got started, because it's an interesting origin, and how the

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<v Speaker 1>service and company evolved, and how now it is co

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<v Speaker 1>mingling with Disney Plus, even as the actual acquisition deal

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<v Speaker 1>is still kind of finalizing, despite the fact that Disney

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<v Speaker 1>paid the quote unquote final fee last year. That whole

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<v Speaker 1>story is just it really just points to corporate shenanigans, honestly,

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<v Speaker 1>in my opinion at least, So let's start off at

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<v Speaker 1>the beginning, where I am told it's a very good

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<v Speaker 1>place to start. So hulu story, at least, the part

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<v Speaker 1>of Hulu's story that faced the public, began in March

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<v Speaker 1>two thousand and seven. Hulu, which was not named at

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<v Speaker 1>this point. It didn't have its name, but what would

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<v Speaker 1>become Hulu was announced as a joint venture between newscre

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<v Speaker 1>and what at that time was just plain old NBC Universal.

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<v Speaker 1>Comcast would announce plans to acquire NBC Universal two years later,

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<v Speaker 1>and so things would get more complicated down the line.

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<v Speaker 1>Now this is where my memory actually plays tricks on me,

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<v Speaker 1>because when I was thinking about this before I actually

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<v Speaker 1>started to dig into all the different articles and blog

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<v Speaker 1>posts and stuff around the time of Hulu's launch. In

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<v Speaker 1>my head, Hulu was meant to be a counter to

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<v Speaker 1>Netflix because Netflix was getting into video streaming. But as

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<v Speaker 1>it turns out, that really isn't the case when you're

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<v Speaker 1>talking about the two thousand and six two thousand and

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<v Speaker 1>seven era, because at that stage, Netflix wasn't really seen

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<v Speaker 1>as that large of a threat, right. I mean, Netflix

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<v Speaker 1>had killed Blockbuster arguably, but it wasn't thought to be

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<v Speaker 1>setting its sites on traditional broadcast and cable media. Instead,

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<v Speaker 1>Netflix was essentially viewed as Blockbuster by mail because it

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<v Speaker 1>was much better known for its DVD and Blu ray

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<v Speaker 1>rental services than as a video streaming platform. So this

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<v Speaker 1>was well before Netflix would shake things up with its

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<v Speaker 1>own original programming like House of Cards. House of Cards

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<v Speaker 1>didn't debut until twenty thirteen, so Netflix was not seen

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<v Speaker 1>as a existential threat at this point. Instead, Hulu's reisondetre

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<v Speaker 1>had more to do with piracy that was happening on

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<v Speaker 1>YouTube and how internet streaming was starting to show signs

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<v Speaker 1>that it could impact traditional cable television, as well as

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<v Speaker 1>concerns about a company that was on a metaphorical rocket

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<v Speaker 1>ship around this time, and in that case, I'm specifically

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<v Speaker 1>talking about Apple, not Netflix. But first let's start with YouTube.

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<v Speaker 1>So Steve Chen and jau Ed Karim and Chad Hurley

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<v Speaker 1>founded YouTube in two thousand and five. These days you

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<v Speaker 1>can find epic long videos on YouTube. In fact, over

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<v Speaker 1>the weekend yesterday, I was watching a four hour video

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<v Speaker 1>from Jenny Nicholson, who produces phenomenal video essays. They're few

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<v Speaker 1>and far between, but she puts a ton of work

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<v Speaker 1>into them, and she did a four hour video about

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<v Speaker 1>her experience at the Star Wars Galactic Cruiser Hotel at

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<v Speaker 1>Disney World, and it's fascinating. It's a little it's very

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<v Speaker 1>cringey at times if you're not into like participatory theater.

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<v Speaker 1>Even as someone who has performed in participatory theater. I

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<v Speaker 1>found it a bit cringey at times, not because of Jenny,

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<v Speaker 1>but because of the situation that was going on. And

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<v Speaker 1>it's also like just frustrating to see someone who is

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<v Speaker 1>clearly so passionate about Star Wars and who has a

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<v Speaker 1>really good platform ended up having a really, I would argue,

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<v Speaker 1>lackluster experience for a premium price. Anyway, I don't know

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<v Speaker 1>Jenny Nicholson, she doesn't know me. I just like her work.

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<v Speaker 1>And the point was that today you can watch four

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<v Speaker 1>hour long videos on YouTube if you want to. But

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<v Speaker 1>you know, the interesting thing is when YouTube first launched,

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<v Speaker 1>there wasn't really a limitation on video length back then either. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>the resolution for YouTube videos was way way lower, but yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>you weren't limited to short videos. However, that changed in

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<v Speaker 1>the spring of two thousand and six, and the reason

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<v Speaker 1>for that change is because a lot of the longer

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<v Speaker 1>videos that were getting uploaded to YouTube were bootlegs or

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<v Speaker 1>pirated copies or unauthorized uploads of films and TV shows.

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<v Speaker 1>So that was what was making studios angry. It was

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<v Speaker 1>copyright infringement. You know, it was going up without their

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<v Speaker 1>consent and without their compensation, and in fact, in those days,

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<v Speaker 1>YouTube wasn't monetizing anything. This was in the growth phase

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<v Speaker 1>for YouTube, so the whole media industry was starting to

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<v Speaker 1>get pretty prickly about this. And you know, just a

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<v Speaker 1>few years earlier, that industry ended up banding together and

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<v Speaker 1>did a number on peer to peer networking services like

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<v Speaker 1>Kaza and Napster like they sued those companies into oblivion.

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<v Speaker 1>So obviously YouTube was not super keen on get the

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<v Speaker 1>studio's iire in that same way, it could be a

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<v Speaker 1>threat to their very existence. So in March two thousand

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<v Speaker 1>and six, YouTube issued a new limitation on videos. They

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<v Speaker 1>could only be up to ten minutes long, and then

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<v Speaker 1>you would get cut off, So you couldn't post a

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<v Speaker 1>full television episode or a movie in one video. If

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<v Speaker 1>you were really trying to share that kind of thing,

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<v Speaker 1>you had to find places to break up the video

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<v Speaker 1>into ten minute or shorter increments and then do a

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<v Speaker 1>whole series of them. So you would have to go

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<v Speaker 1>to a lot of trouble. In other words, in order

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<v Speaker 1>to get just an episode of a television show up,

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<v Speaker 1>let alone a movie. Plus you would still potentially get

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<v Speaker 1>into trouble down the line if the studios found out, hey,

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<v Speaker 1>you're publishing stuff without our permission. But this is why

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<v Speaker 1>older YouTube videos, the really long stuff, would be divided

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<v Speaker 1>into multiple parts. I'm reminded of the infamous Star Wars

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<v Speaker 1>episode one review by Red Letter Media, the mister Plinkett

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<v Speaker 1>review that was originally in several segments because old man

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<v Speaker 1>mister Plinkett had a lot to say about it. Also,

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<v Speaker 1>I didn't realize this episode was going to be so

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<v Speaker 1>Star Wars heavy. That wasn't my intent. But in the

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<v Speaker 1>back half of two thousand and six, Google acquired YouTube

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<v Speaker 1>for the princely sum of one point sixty five billion

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<v Speaker 1>dollars in Google stock. Google definitely had a vested interest

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<v Speaker 1>in making certain that the piracy issue was addressed because

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<v Speaker 1>as a big company that had deep pockets, and you know,

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<v Speaker 1>there's nothing stopping the media companies from coming after that. Filthy,

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<v Speaker 1>filthy luker. If Google seemed complacent with piracy while the

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<v Speaker 1>company discouraged the practice, it's you know, the users who

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<v Speaker 1>ultimately were steering things, and the folks at major media

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<v Speaker 1>companies were not thrilled about not having control over this.

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<v Speaker 1>You did have major studios establish their own YouTube channels,

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<v Speaker 1>but I bet that didn't feel so great. To them. Either,

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<v Speaker 1>YouTube could help with marketing and spread awareness of shows

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<v Speaker 1>and that kind of thing, but monetizing your online publishing

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<v Speaker 1>was a different matter. I mean, the official YouTube Partner

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<v Speaker 1>program didn't launch until the end of two thousand and seven,

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<v Speaker 1>and you know, most businesses are not keen to give

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<v Speaker 1>away for free what they typically would earn revenue on,

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<v Speaker 1>so finding a way to deliver television content online in

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<v Speaker 1>a way that could actually generate revenue was a long

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<v Speaker 1>term goal. Perhaps of more concern, however, was Apple, at

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<v Speaker 1>least to NBC Universal's CEO Jeffrey Zucker at the time.

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<v Speaker 1>This has to do with the media industry's challenge of

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<v Speaker 1>figuring out how to incorporate streaming at all in its

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<v Speaker 1>overall strategy, let alone how to set streaming up as

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<v Speaker 1>a potential successor to broadcast in cable distribution. Apple already

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<v Speaker 1>had an established business in which folks could browse the

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<v Speaker 1>iTunes store for media content, which included television shows and films,

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<v Speaker 1>and users could purchase those things through the iTunes store,

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<v Speaker 1>which made Apple kind of a gatekeeper for media. Plus,

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<v Speaker 1>Apple could take a hefty cut of those transactions, which

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<v Speaker 1>means a lot less of that cheddar would make its

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<v Speaker 1>way to the studios that were actually responsible for producing

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<v Speaker 1>the content. And just as companies aren't keen to give

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<v Speaker 1>away for free what they usually make money off of,

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<v Speaker 1>they're also not super happy to share their lunch with

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<v Speaker 1>someone else. Dollars going to Apple should be going to

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<v Speaker 1>the studios. Gush, darn it. So this is what Jeff Zucker,

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<v Speaker 1>the CEO of NBC Universal, was up in arms about.

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<v Speaker 1>He proclaimed that iTunes, while an effective way to deliver

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<v Speaker 1>television content to digital customers, was really a way to

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<v Speaker 1>go quote from dollars into pennies end quote on those transactions,

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<v Speaker 1>meaning that media outlets like NBC Universal should be making

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<v Speaker 1>much more per transaction than what they were, and that

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<v Speaker 1>the business model heavily favored the gatekeepers like iTunes. So

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<v Speaker 1>what would be the solution. Well, the solution is to

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<v Speaker 1>make your own media streaming platform, as Bender from Futurama

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<v Speaker 1>would say, and you would control this platform. Zucker made

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<v Speaker 1>some pretty big decisions leading up to the announcement of Hulu.

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<v Speaker 1>He decided not to renew NBC Universal's contract with Apple,

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<v Speaker 1>which meant NBC content would disappear from the iTunes store.

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<v Speaker 1>He also had the company closed down the NBC Universal

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<v Speaker 1>YouTube channel, so you couldn't get NBC Universal content there either,

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<v Speaker 1>at least not legally, and all the while, NBC Universal

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<v Speaker 1>began to work with newscre the owners of Fox at

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<v Speaker 1>the time, to create what would become Hulu. All right,

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<v Speaker 1>we're going to continue this story in just a moment,

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<v Speaker 1>but first let's take a quick break to thank our sponsors.

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<v Speaker 1>So we're back, News Corp. Owners of Fox, twentieth Century

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<v Speaker 1>Fox at that time, and NBC Universal, which would soon

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<v Speaker 1>become the property of Comcast, get together and decide that

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<v Speaker 1>they want to make their own streaming thing, but they're

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<v Speaker 1>not entirely sure what that's gonna be. Originally, the plan

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<v Speaker 1>was to make a way to share or post content

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<v Speaker 1>from these two companies on various places across the Internet,

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<v Speaker 1>specifically on sites like Yahoo, Aol, and the king of

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<v Speaker 1>social media MySpace. That's a trio of names that at

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<v Speaker 1>one point in the Internet history, all three of those

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<v Speaker 1>were considered unassailable. They were thought of as being giants

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<v Speaker 1>and too big to fail, which really just proves the

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<v Speaker 1>too big to fail concept just isn't true. You're never

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<v Speaker 1>too big to fail. We humans can always find a

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<v Speaker 1>way to fail if we have enough time on our

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<v Speaker 1>hands to do it. Anyway, you probably know that you

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<v Speaker 1>can embed media players on web pages, right If you've

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<v Speaker 1>ever visited a web page that had a YouTube player

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<v Speaker 1>embedded in that page, you know what I'm talking about.

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<v Speaker 1>You can watch a YouTube video within a web page

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<v Speaker 1>without actually having to go to YouTube itself. Well, that's

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<v Speaker 1>what Hulu was trying to do originally. Of course, it

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<v Speaker 1>wasn't called Hulu yet. In fact, it wasn't called anything yet.

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<v Speaker 1>But the basic idea was to follow this particular strategy.

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<v Speaker 1>So why were the companies thinking in this way? What

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<v Speaker 1>largely had to do with the monumental acquisition that news

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<v Speaker 1>Corp Had made In the summer of two thousand and five.

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<v Speaker 1>News Corp bought MySpace for a whopping five hundred eighty

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<v Speaker 1>million dollars. This would later turn out to be a

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<v Speaker 1>colossal mistake, as news Corp would ultimately dump my Space

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<v Speaker 1>for just thirty five million dollars in two thy eleven.

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<v Speaker 1>So buying something for five hundred and eighty million and

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<v Speaker 1>then selling it for thirty five million not great. In fact,

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<v Speaker 1>for some it would rank as one of the worst

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<v Speaker 1>deals in tech history. I don't know if it quite

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<v Speaker 1>merits that because there have been some other whoppers that

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<v Speaker 1>have happened, Like it's not good, but there have been

0:13:52.080 --> 0:13:55.120
<v Speaker 1>other really bad ones. I will say that the MySpace

0:13:55.240 --> 0:14:00.400
<v Speaker 1>acquisition is perhaps one of the most infamous bad tech deals. Anyway,

0:14:00.760 --> 0:14:04.400
<v Speaker 1>NewsCorp had this social media platform, and they had it

0:14:04.440 --> 0:14:08.560
<v Speaker 1>since late two thousand and five. And remember Facebook wouldn't

0:14:08.600 --> 0:14:12.360
<v Speaker 1>really start its trajectory of crazy growth until late two

0:14:12.360 --> 0:14:14.920
<v Speaker 1>thousand and six, when it would finally open up to

0:14:15.080 --> 0:14:18.280
<v Speaker 1>people who weren't you know, college students. And it's easy

0:14:18.280 --> 0:14:20.640
<v Speaker 1>to forget, but we're talking about time when MySpace was

0:14:20.760 --> 0:14:24.560
<v Speaker 1>almost synonymous with social networks. I mean, nobody thinks about

0:14:24.600 --> 0:14:28.560
<v Speaker 1>it today, but at the time it was the dominant

0:14:28.600 --> 0:14:32.800
<v Speaker 1>social platform. So the thought was that this social platform

0:14:32.840 --> 0:14:35.560
<v Speaker 1>asset could serve as a brilliant way to serve media

0:14:35.640 --> 0:14:38.560
<v Speaker 1>to customers. You know, design a web delivery system that

0:14:38.680 --> 0:14:42.640
<v Speaker 1>leverages the places where people were already going online. That

0:14:42.680 --> 0:14:45.640
<v Speaker 1>would include the AOL landing page because tons of people

0:14:45.640 --> 0:14:49.040
<v Speaker 1>were still using Aol as their Internet service provider, or

0:14:49.160 --> 0:14:52.440
<v Speaker 1>the Yahoo landing page because Yahoo was essentially serving as

0:14:52.440 --> 0:14:55.080
<v Speaker 1>a web portal to the rest of the world. Wide Web,

0:14:55.360 --> 0:14:59.320
<v Speaker 1>and then MySpace the dominant social platform. You wouldn't have

0:14:59.360 --> 0:15:02.400
<v Speaker 1>to train people to go to your website. You would

0:15:02.480 --> 0:15:04.800
<v Speaker 1>just establish a foothold in the places where people were

0:15:04.840 --> 0:15:08.920
<v Speaker 1>already congregating. This strategy would change in large part due

0:15:08.960 --> 0:15:12.160
<v Speaker 1>to the companies coaxing a project leader from a different

0:15:12.280 --> 0:15:16.960
<v Speaker 1>Internet giant. So I'm talking about a man named Jason Kylar,

0:15:17.360 --> 0:15:20.920
<v Speaker 1>who was a senior vice president at Amazon, and he

0:15:21.040 --> 0:15:25.120
<v Speaker 1>got lured away to become the head of this still

0:15:25.360 --> 0:15:30.160
<v Speaker 1>unnamed project between newscre and NBC Universal. Now, Kaylar's career

0:15:30.480 --> 0:15:33.640
<v Speaker 1>would have a lot of interesting intersection points with streaming

0:15:33.640 --> 0:15:36.600
<v Speaker 1>in general and with Hulu in particular. So for example,

0:15:36.880 --> 0:15:40.000
<v Speaker 1>before he worked at Amazon, Kyler was an analyst with

0:15:40.080 --> 0:15:42.880
<v Speaker 1>the Walt Disney Company for a couple of years. Obviously,

0:15:42.960 --> 0:15:45.600
<v Speaker 1>Disney will go on to become an important part of

0:15:45.640 --> 0:15:47.960
<v Speaker 1>the Hulu story, and I might as well talk about

0:15:47.960 --> 0:15:52.040
<v Speaker 1>his time after he left Hulu, because this isn't an

0:15:52.080 --> 0:15:54.800
<v Speaker 1>episode about his career specifically, although he does play a

0:15:54.920 --> 0:15:57.960
<v Speaker 1>very important part in this particular episode. He would stick

0:15:57.960 --> 0:16:00.480
<v Speaker 1>with Hulu for six full years, which you know, it's

0:16:00.520 --> 0:16:04.000
<v Speaker 1>not bad for a CEO of a startup company. If

0:16:04.040 --> 0:16:06.960
<v Speaker 1>you're not like a founder, especially like he was brought

0:16:07.000 --> 0:16:09.280
<v Speaker 1>on to do this, although you could argue that the

0:16:09.280 --> 0:16:12.920
<v Speaker 1>work he did was at least equivalent to a regular founder.

0:16:13.080 --> 0:16:14.840
<v Speaker 1>He would then go on to co found a video

0:16:14.880 --> 0:16:17.920
<v Speaker 1>platform site called Vessel. He did that in twenty thirteen.

0:16:18.040 --> 0:16:22.480
<v Speaker 1>Verizon would acquire Vessel, and not long after that, Verizon

0:16:22.520 --> 0:16:24.680
<v Speaker 1>would shut down Vessel. But hey, you know that's a

0:16:24.680 --> 0:16:27.160
<v Speaker 1>big payout, baby. So Kyler would also sit on the

0:16:27.160 --> 0:16:30.520
<v Speaker 1>board of directors for several different organizations and companies, and

0:16:30.560 --> 0:16:34.200
<v Speaker 1>then he would become CEO of WarnerMedia in twenty twenty,

0:16:34.480 --> 0:16:38.640
<v Speaker 1>which means he was there during the early launch days

0:16:38.680 --> 0:16:42.640
<v Speaker 1>of HBO Max, that streaming platform, and he stuck around

0:16:42.680 --> 0:16:46.040
<v Speaker 1>as CEO of WarnerMedia until AT and T decided to

0:16:46.120 --> 0:16:49.960
<v Speaker 1>divest itself of WarnerMedia and sell it off to Discovery,

0:16:50.120 --> 0:16:53.680
<v Speaker 1>whereupon David Zaslov would take over the whole shebang. And

0:16:54.080 --> 0:16:58.320
<v Speaker 1>we all know about the Zaslov regime over at Warner

0:16:58.320 --> 0:17:02.360
<v Speaker 1>Brothers Discovery. So his departure, he's kind of been keeping

0:17:02.440 --> 0:17:04.600
<v Speaker 1>himself busy by being on the board of directors of

0:17:04.640 --> 0:17:08.879
<v Speaker 1>even more organizations and companies. But throughout his entire career,

0:17:08.920 --> 0:17:12.240
<v Speaker 1>he's been heavily involved in media in general and streaming

0:17:12.280 --> 0:17:16.600
<v Speaker 1>in particular, and it's a pretty impressive career. So Kyler

0:17:16.640 --> 0:17:20.359
<v Speaker 1>comes over from Amazon and leads this project, and the

0:17:20.400 --> 0:17:23.800
<v Speaker 1>strategy then starts to shift. It moves away from this

0:17:23.920 --> 0:17:26.920
<v Speaker 1>idea of an embedible player that will live in other

0:17:27.000 --> 0:17:31.840
<v Speaker 1>places to a destination media site similar to YouTube, but

0:17:31.960 --> 0:17:37.840
<v Speaker 1>specifically crafted to host studio produced entertainment. Right YouTube is

0:17:37.880 --> 0:17:41.920
<v Speaker 1>the user generated video site. You go to YouTube typically

0:17:42.040 --> 0:17:45.800
<v Speaker 1>to watch stuff that other YouTubers have created, not to

0:17:45.920 --> 0:17:49.840
<v Speaker 1>watch things that were produced by an established media company.

0:17:50.080 --> 0:17:53.040
<v Speaker 1>So this project would be more for the established stuff,

0:17:53.080 --> 0:17:57.400
<v Speaker 1>the studio stuff, the professional stuff, and the companies were

0:17:57.440 --> 0:18:01.680
<v Speaker 1>also hoping that this would discourage Netflix's growing relevance. Again,

0:18:01.800 --> 0:18:06.199
<v Speaker 1>Netflix really wasn't a threat yet, but the concern was

0:18:06.240 --> 0:18:10.320
<v Speaker 1>that they didn't want a company that was not part

0:18:10.320 --> 0:18:14.439
<v Speaker 1>of the established media industry to become the gatekeeper for

0:18:14.560 --> 0:18:18.959
<v Speaker 1>the online branch of media. For the longest time, television

0:18:18.960 --> 0:18:22.280
<v Speaker 1>and film studios had reigned supreme. They didn't have to

0:18:22.320 --> 0:18:25.840
<v Speaker 1>answer to anyone else. Really, you know, they were times

0:18:25.880 --> 0:18:29.280
<v Speaker 1>where they got broken up by various regulators and governments

0:18:29.320 --> 0:18:32.720
<v Speaker 1>because they owned so much of the entertainment landscape that

0:18:32.760 --> 0:18:34.560
<v Speaker 1>it was considered to be a monopoly. Like when a

0:18:34.880 --> 0:18:38.040
<v Speaker 1>company owns not just the movie studios but also movie

0:18:38.080 --> 0:18:42.399
<v Speaker 1>theaters and film processing companies, that becomes a problem. So

0:18:42.480 --> 0:18:44.920
<v Speaker 1>all that got broken up years and years and years ago,

0:18:45.000 --> 0:18:47.320
<v Speaker 1>but they still had a ton of power, so the

0:18:47.400 --> 0:18:49.919
<v Speaker 1>idea of seeding some of that power to a company

0:18:50.000 --> 0:18:53.840
<v Speaker 1>like Netflix was not very palatable when Kyler took over

0:18:53.880 --> 0:18:57.359
<v Speaker 1>the project. The nickname that folks gave to this because

0:18:57.359 --> 0:19:00.840
<v Speaker 1>it still didn't have an official name yet, was Clown

0:19:01.160 --> 0:19:04.840
<v Speaker 1>Co or Clown Company, And apparently it got that nickname

0:19:04.880 --> 0:19:08.880
<v Speaker 1>because the general consensus was any joint project that would

0:19:08.880 --> 0:19:13.399
<v Speaker 1>be helmed by two or more established media companies was

0:19:13.960 --> 0:19:17.280
<v Speaker 1>bound to fail. At some point, one company would try

0:19:17.320 --> 0:19:20.679
<v Speaker 1>to exert more authority than the other or object to

0:19:20.720 --> 0:19:24.800
<v Speaker 1>some fundamental aspect of the project, and nothing would ever resolve.

0:19:24.880 --> 0:19:28.720
<v Speaker 1>You would never get consensus among the stakeholders for what

0:19:29.000 --> 0:19:31.640
<v Speaker 1>was the right thing to do, and the whole thing

0:19:31.680 --> 0:19:35.720
<v Speaker 1>would crumble in on itself. Tech blogs, in particular, prophesied

0:19:36.119 --> 0:19:39.800
<v Speaker 1>doom from the get go. In July two thousand and seven,

0:19:39.880 --> 0:19:43.520
<v Speaker 1>a company called Providence Equity joined News Corp. At NBC

0:19:43.720 --> 0:19:46.920
<v Speaker 1>Universal as a stakeholder in the project, purchasing a ten

0:19:46.960 --> 0:19:51.640
<v Speaker 1>percent ownership in Hulu, and this was quoted as being

0:19:51.680 --> 0:19:56.000
<v Speaker 1>somewhere around one hundred million dollars of equity in the company.

0:19:56.359 --> 0:20:00.720
<v Speaker 1>Just pretty darn impressive. Now, the name Hulu, I don't

0:20:00.760 --> 0:20:03.840
<v Speaker 1>know exactly when it was arrived at, but I do

0:20:03.920 --> 0:20:06.680
<v Speaker 1>know when it was revealed. It was revealed in August

0:20:06.800 --> 0:20:10.200
<v Speaker 1>two thousand and seven when the website actually went live. However,

0:20:10.520 --> 0:20:14.040
<v Speaker 1>this website went live with no video. You couldn't go

0:20:14.119 --> 0:20:17.239
<v Speaker 1>there to watch anything. It was kind of like a

0:20:17.280 --> 0:20:20.280
<v Speaker 1>site that was parked there and was announcing the name

0:20:20.320 --> 0:20:22.840
<v Speaker 1>of the service, so there was no streaming player yet.

0:20:23.040 --> 0:20:25.960
<v Speaker 1>Kyler later said that the actual name came from a

0:20:26.000 --> 0:20:29.920
<v Speaker 1>Mandarin word that means gord, with the idea of Hulu

0:20:30.000 --> 0:20:32.919
<v Speaker 1>containing all this stuff in it, it'd be a streaming

0:20:32.960 --> 0:20:36.439
<v Speaker 1>service with access to lots of content, similar to a

0:20:36.480 --> 0:20:39.560
<v Speaker 1>stuffed gord. I guess I don't know. I don't really

0:20:40.000 --> 0:20:43.200
<v Speaker 1>get the analogy that much. I don't know how much

0:20:43.240 --> 0:20:46.720
<v Speaker 1>the actual word was super important. The point is the

0:20:46.840 --> 0:20:49.920
<v Speaker 1>name was short, it had a nice sound to it,

0:20:49.920 --> 0:20:53.080
<v Speaker 1>it was easy to remember, and folks wouldn't make it

0:20:53.200 --> 0:20:55.679
<v Speaker 1>so much fun of it, like you didn't hear people

0:20:55.760 --> 0:20:58.320
<v Speaker 1>making as much fun of the name Hulu as they

0:20:58.400 --> 0:21:02.240
<v Speaker 1>later would. For like Quibi Quibi was the source of

0:21:02.440 --> 0:21:05.119
<v Speaker 1>endless jokes, Hulu, I don't remember a lot of people

0:21:05.160 --> 0:21:07.440
<v Speaker 1>making fun of it. While the site would go into

0:21:07.520 --> 0:21:09.960
<v Speaker 1>beta testing before the end of two thousand and seven,

0:21:10.240 --> 0:21:14.840
<v Speaker 1>it would not officially launch as a service until October

0:21:14.960 --> 0:21:18.760
<v Speaker 1>two thousand and eight. By that time, Netflix's streaming service

0:21:18.840 --> 0:21:22.239
<v Speaker 1>had a year's head start, but Hulu had something that

0:21:22.280 --> 0:21:27.160
<v Speaker 1>Netflix didn't have. Hulu, with its agreements with the various studios,

0:21:27.160 --> 0:21:30.080
<v Speaker 1>which would change out fairly frequently in the year leading

0:21:30.160 --> 0:21:32.760
<v Speaker 1>up to launch, would be able to host episodes of

0:21:32.800 --> 0:21:37.560
<v Speaker 1>shows the day after they originally aired on TV. Netflix,

0:21:37.600 --> 0:21:41.159
<v Speaker 1>by comparison, would only be able to add shows in seasons,

0:21:41.440 --> 0:21:43.840
<v Speaker 1>So you would get an entire season of a show

0:21:43.880 --> 0:21:47.480
<v Speaker 1>added to Netflix once the company had secured a licensing

0:21:47.560 --> 0:21:50.560
<v Speaker 1>deal for that particular season, and then you could watch

0:21:50.600 --> 0:21:53.240
<v Speaker 1>all the episodes in that season, but you wouldn't be

0:21:53.280 --> 0:21:55.359
<v Speaker 1>able to see the latest stuff. Hulu was kind of

0:21:55.359 --> 0:21:57.879
<v Speaker 1>the opposite. You could see the latest stuff, but you

0:21:57.920 --> 0:22:00.840
<v Speaker 1>couldn't watch a full season early on. Hulu was free

0:22:00.880 --> 0:22:04.240
<v Speaker 1>to use and it was also ads supported, but Kyler

0:22:04.280 --> 0:22:07.960
<v Speaker 1>was also careful not to overload ads on episodes, which

0:22:08.000 --> 0:22:12.359
<v Speaker 1>is something I wish other companies would practice. I'm not

0:22:12.880 --> 0:22:17.320
<v Speaker 1>naming names, I'm not making any accusations about anyone specifically,

0:22:17.720 --> 0:22:21.760
<v Speaker 1>but on a totally unrelated note, I am obligated to

0:22:21.800 --> 0:22:35.199
<v Speaker 1>take another break to take our sponsors. We'll be right back. Okay,

0:22:35.320 --> 0:22:39.880
<v Speaker 1>so we are back. And besides me being cheeky about ads,

0:22:40.320 --> 0:22:45.080
<v Speaker 1>Kyler was very much aware of the effect ads have

0:22:45.440 --> 0:22:48.600
<v Speaker 1>on viewership. He would later publish a blog post that

0:22:48.600 --> 0:22:52.479
<v Speaker 1>would outline certain observations he had made while in the

0:22:52.640 --> 0:22:57.000
<v Speaker 1>entertainment business, and one really big one was about ads. Specifically.

0:22:57.040 --> 0:23:01.120
<v Speaker 1>He wrote in a memo that quote, traditional TV has

0:23:01.240 --> 0:23:04.399
<v Speaker 1>too many ads. Users have demonstrated that they will go

0:23:04.480 --> 0:23:07.880
<v Speaker 1>to great lengths to avoid the advertising load that traditional

0:23:07.920 --> 0:23:11.320
<v Speaker 1>DV places upon them. Setting aside sports and other live

0:23:11.359 --> 0:23:15.800
<v Speaker 1>events programming, consumers are increasingly moving to on demand viewing

0:23:16.160 --> 0:23:20.199
<v Speaker 1>in part because of the lighter ad load end quote.

0:23:20.280 --> 0:23:23.359
<v Speaker 1>To that end, Hulu typically limited ads to two minutes

0:23:23.359 --> 0:23:26.840
<v Speaker 1>of advertising per half hour of content, which was far

0:23:26.920 --> 0:23:28.959
<v Speaker 1>below what you would find if you were tuning in

0:23:29.000 --> 0:23:32.639
<v Speaker 1>to live TV. For films, studios had the option to

0:23:32.680 --> 0:23:36.200
<v Speaker 1>allow users in ad free experience during the film itself

0:23:36.359 --> 0:23:39.560
<v Speaker 1>if in return, the users agreed to view ads up

0:23:39.600 --> 0:23:42.760
<v Speaker 1>front before the film started. You've probably seen a message

0:23:42.760 --> 0:23:44.920
<v Speaker 1>that was something like, thanks to our sponsors, you can

0:23:44.960 --> 0:23:48.160
<v Speaker 1>watch the following presentation free of ads, or something like that.

0:23:48.600 --> 0:23:52.119
<v Speaker 1>In that same memo in which Kyler pointed out the

0:23:52.200 --> 0:23:55.880
<v Speaker 1>issue with ads, he also talked about how audiences were

0:23:56.080 --> 0:24:01.480
<v Speaker 1>increasingly migrating to on demand viewing experiences. Traditional television requires

0:24:01.560 --> 0:24:05.359
<v Speaker 1>viewers to watch on their schedule, not the viewers, So

0:24:06.160 --> 0:24:10.640
<v Speaker 1>that's frustrating, right when you have to be available when

0:24:10.680 --> 0:24:14.520
<v Speaker 1>the program airs. Technology started to allow for time shifting.

0:24:14.600 --> 0:24:17.280
<v Speaker 1>I mean VCRs led the way, at least for those

0:24:17.320 --> 0:24:19.200
<v Speaker 1>of us who are willing to learn how to set

0:24:19.240 --> 0:24:22.160
<v Speaker 1>a VCR to record a specific channel at a specific time,

0:24:22.280 --> 0:24:26.240
<v Speaker 1>which wasn't always user friendly or easy. Then we could

0:24:26.240 --> 0:24:29.000
<v Speaker 1>watch the programming whenever we wanted to, not just when

0:24:29.040 --> 0:24:32.119
<v Speaker 1>it was scheduled to air. More sophisticated methods like DVRs

0:24:32.119 --> 0:24:35.760
<v Speaker 1>would make this far more easy and accessible, and audiences

0:24:35.760 --> 0:24:38.920
<v Speaker 1>would respond to that. They really enjoyed the freedom that

0:24:38.960 --> 0:24:42.840
<v Speaker 1>this represented. The era of must SETV was changing. We

0:24:42.840 --> 0:24:46.360
<v Speaker 1>weren't necessarily glued to our couches on Thursday nights or whatever,

0:24:46.680 --> 0:24:50.600
<v Speaker 1>and the arrival of on demand viewing made this even better.

0:24:50.840 --> 0:24:53.440
<v Speaker 1>A service that let you select whatt to watch when

0:24:53.480 --> 0:24:56.040
<v Speaker 1>you wanted to watch it without having to decide ahead

0:24:56.040 --> 0:24:58.960
<v Speaker 1>of time, like without having to set a DVR or

0:24:59.000 --> 0:25:03.160
<v Speaker 1>VCR a big deal. Hulu, despite a bumpy ride in development,

0:25:03.560 --> 0:25:06.600
<v Speaker 1>was poised for great success. Sure, the media companies that

0:25:06.680 --> 0:25:09.639
<v Speaker 1>signed on to be part of the project kept shifting around,

0:25:09.680 --> 0:25:12.000
<v Speaker 1>which meant it was hard to predict what material would

0:25:12.000 --> 0:25:15.520
<v Speaker 1>actually be available to viewers once Hulu went live, but

0:25:15.680 --> 0:25:18.840
<v Speaker 1>it still set itself apart from both YouTube and Netflix.

0:25:19.119 --> 0:25:22.199
<v Speaker 1>There were limitations, however. Typically Hulu would only have a

0:25:22.200 --> 0:25:25.399
<v Speaker 1>handful of episodes available for viewing and would remove the

0:25:25.520 --> 0:25:28.879
<v Speaker 1>oldest of those episodes while adding new episodes, so you

0:25:28.960 --> 0:25:31.440
<v Speaker 1>might only be able to access the last few episodes

0:25:31.480 --> 0:25:33.600
<v Speaker 1>of any given show, but you wouldn't be able to

0:25:33.760 --> 0:25:37.000
<v Speaker 1>really dive into the entire history of a program. This

0:25:37.200 --> 0:25:39.480
<v Speaker 1>was in an era in which Kylar was trying to

0:25:39.760 --> 0:25:45.480
<v Speaker 1>establish Hulu and when companies were even learning which strategies

0:25:45.560 --> 0:25:49.200
<v Speaker 1>would be viable, so like this was all very experimental.

0:25:49.440 --> 0:25:51.560
<v Speaker 1>Everyone seemed to know that it would take time for

0:25:51.600 --> 0:25:55.199
<v Speaker 1>streaming to shake out to become a sustainable model, and

0:25:55.280 --> 0:25:57.160
<v Speaker 1>that this would mean that there'd be a lot of

0:25:57.240 --> 0:26:00.119
<v Speaker 1>investment and trial and error in the early days, and

0:26:00.160 --> 0:26:02.560
<v Speaker 1>that it would require careful thought to find a way

0:26:02.640 --> 0:26:06.440
<v Speaker 1>to make streaming work long term on a financial level.

0:26:06.440 --> 0:26:09.679
<v Speaker 1>That is. Meanwhile, the cord cutting apocalypse was kind of

0:26:09.680 --> 0:26:12.400
<v Speaker 1>on the horizon. Now. It wasn't quite to the point

0:26:12.440 --> 0:26:16.360
<v Speaker 1>where people were suddenly like severing their cable connections right

0:26:16.400 --> 0:26:18.640
<v Speaker 1>out of the gate, but young adults who had spent

0:26:18.720 --> 0:26:22.760
<v Speaker 1>more time consuming content online than through traditional media were

0:26:22.840 --> 0:26:25.760
<v Speaker 1>less likely to become cable subscribers, and that meant that

0:26:25.920 --> 0:26:29.400
<v Speaker 1>simply through attrition, the cable business was facing a crisis.

0:26:29.640 --> 0:26:32.680
<v Speaker 1>So there was a healthy incentive in place for streaming

0:26:32.720 --> 0:26:36.000
<v Speaker 1>platforms to figure it all out, and it really big

0:26:36.480 --> 0:26:40.760
<v Speaker 1>incentive for traditional media companies to figure a strategy that worked,

0:26:40.800 --> 0:26:44.960
<v Speaker 1>because if they didn't, they were kind of dooming themselves.

0:26:45.359 --> 0:26:49.520
<v Speaker 1>In two thousand and nine, Disney would join the Hulu party. Literally,

0:26:49.600 --> 0:26:52.960
<v Speaker 1>they purchased a stake in Hulu. Obviously, this was well

0:26:53.000 --> 0:26:56.040
<v Speaker 1>before the Walt Disney Company would launch its own Disney

0:26:56.080 --> 0:27:00.679
<v Speaker 1>Plus platform, so At this point, Disney, NBCU Universal, and

0:27:00.760 --> 0:27:06.199
<v Speaker 1>NewsCorp each owned approximately equivalent portions of Hulu, and then

0:27:06.359 --> 0:27:10.360
<v Speaker 1>you had ten percent left over for the investment company.

0:27:10.680 --> 0:27:13.359
<v Speaker 1>Disney agreed to make available some of their older Disney

0:27:13.359 --> 0:27:16.240
<v Speaker 1>films on the service, and they also chose Hulu as

0:27:16.280 --> 0:27:20.080
<v Speaker 1>the home for ABC programming because Disney owns ABC as

0:27:20.080 --> 0:27:22.440
<v Speaker 1>well as some of the originals that Disney had produced

0:27:22.480 --> 0:27:25.399
<v Speaker 1>for the Disney Channel. Now, at this stage, Hulu was

0:27:25.440 --> 0:27:28.600
<v Speaker 1>competing against a different streaming platform, and we're still not

0:27:28.720 --> 0:27:32.760
<v Speaker 1>talking about Netflix here. Instead, we're talking about TV dot Com,

0:27:32.960 --> 0:27:35.800
<v Speaker 1>which I had completely forgotten about. TV dot Com. I

0:27:35.840 --> 0:27:37.480
<v Speaker 1>knew about it when it came out, but I hadn't

0:27:37.480 --> 0:27:39.639
<v Speaker 1>thought about in years. But that was a company that

0:27:39.800 --> 0:27:44.960
<v Speaker 1>CBS Corporation acquired in two thousand and eight because again CBS,

0:27:45.000 --> 0:27:48.280
<v Speaker 1>since it wasn't a stakeholder in Hulu, wasn't exactly eager

0:27:48.720 --> 0:27:53.760
<v Speaker 1>to allow these competing media companies to be gatekeepers for

0:27:53.840 --> 0:27:56.280
<v Speaker 1>CBS materials. So instead they go out and they buy

0:27:56.320 --> 0:27:59.359
<v Speaker 1>their own streaming platform. At one point, the partners behind

0:27:59.400 --> 0:28:02.680
<v Speaker 1>Hulu had some of their programming on TV dot Com

0:28:02.720 --> 0:28:05.360
<v Speaker 1>as well, but that would change when CBS took control

0:28:05.440 --> 0:28:09.040
<v Speaker 1>and Hulu pulled all of its programs off TV dot com.

0:28:09.359 --> 0:28:12.840
<v Speaker 1>The camps were starting to form around streaming, with no

0:28:12.920 --> 0:28:15.960
<v Speaker 1>one wanting anyone else to be the dominant player or

0:28:16.000 --> 0:28:18.160
<v Speaker 1>to be able to have leverage over them. The big

0:28:18.200 --> 0:28:21.800
<v Speaker 1>networks continued their long standing rivalry, and pretty much all

0:28:21.880 --> 0:28:25.880
<v Speaker 1>of old media was looking at Netflix with suspicion also YouTube.

0:28:25.960 --> 0:28:28.520
<v Speaker 1>Even though YouTube, I would argue, wasn't really in the

0:28:28.560 --> 0:28:31.520
<v Speaker 1>same space as the others, it was a hated rival

0:28:31.760 --> 0:28:34.760
<v Speaker 1>among media companies because it was stealing a whole lot

0:28:34.800 --> 0:28:38.440
<v Speaker 1>of eyeballs, kind of like the Corinthian in the Sandman comics.

0:28:38.760 --> 0:28:43.400
<v Speaker 1>In twenty ten, Hulu introduced a subscription service called Hulu Plus.

0:28:43.520 --> 0:28:46.760
<v Speaker 1>Now this was different from the Hulu Free service and

0:28:46.800 --> 0:28:50.240
<v Speaker 1>that viewers would be able to access full current seasons

0:28:50.240 --> 0:28:53.160
<v Speaker 1>of shows, not just the last few episodes. You could

0:28:53.240 --> 0:28:55.920
<v Speaker 1>watch a full season at least the latest one. You

0:28:55.920 --> 0:29:00.640
<v Speaker 1>couldn't necessarily watch every season of a Showers would also

0:29:00.680 --> 0:29:03.480
<v Speaker 1>get earlier access to the latest episodes. Essentially, they'd be

0:29:03.480 --> 0:29:05.880
<v Speaker 1>able to watch an episode when that show went to

0:29:06.040 --> 0:29:09.280
<v Speaker 1>air on television, you could access it online if you

0:29:09.280 --> 0:29:13.160
<v Speaker 1>were a Hulu subscriber. That subscription cost nine dollars ninety

0:29:13.240 --> 0:29:15.800
<v Speaker 1>nine cents per month when it launched, and to the

0:29:15.840 --> 0:29:21.160
<v Speaker 1>bewilderment of many, that service would still include ads supported content,

0:29:21.440 --> 0:29:24.640
<v Speaker 1>so you're not paying to get ad free content, it

0:29:24.680 --> 0:29:27.920
<v Speaker 1>would still get ads. Some folks asked why would there

0:29:27.960 --> 0:29:31.160
<v Speaker 1>still be ads if you also had to pay a subscription,

0:29:31.400 --> 0:29:34.040
<v Speaker 1>and the best answer seemed to be, we want money

0:29:34.560 --> 0:29:37.560
<v Speaker 1>on that front. Twenty ten is also when Hulu planned

0:29:37.600 --> 0:29:41.080
<v Speaker 1>to hold an IPO, or initial public offering. That's when

0:29:41.080 --> 0:29:44.760
<v Speaker 1>a privately held company becomes a publicly traded company, but

0:29:44.920 --> 0:29:49.160
<v Speaker 1>Hulu would in fact not go public that year. Ultimately,

0:29:49.200 --> 0:29:52.080
<v Speaker 1>the stakeholders decided to keep it a privately held company,

0:29:52.240 --> 0:29:55.320
<v Speaker 1>and there were rumors of a real IPO cropping up

0:29:55.360 --> 0:29:58.080
<v Speaker 1>in late twenty twenty three, but as we will learn,

0:29:58.400 --> 0:30:00.440
<v Speaker 1>that's not the path that the company, but he would

0:30:00.480 --> 0:30:04.600
<v Speaker 1>ultimately take. One thing Hulu did fairly early on was

0:30:04.640 --> 0:30:09.320
<v Speaker 1>to produce original content specifically for the Hulu platform itself,

0:30:09.440 --> 0:30:12.640
<v Speaker 1>and this began in twenty eleven, which is two years

0:30:12.640 --> 0:30:15.280
<v Speaker 1>before Netflix would do the same thing. So for the

0:30:15.280 --> 0:30:17.880
<v Speaker 1>first few years, Hulu really just existed as a place

0:30:17.920 --> 0:30:22.080
<v Speaker 1>where folks could go to watch recent television programs, and

0:30:22.160 --> 0:30:24.440
<v Speaker 1>it was pretty handy if you happen to miss an

0:30:24.480 --> 0:30:26.920
<v Speaker 1>episode of your favorite show, you know, if it was

0:30:27.160 --> 0:30:29.760
<v Speaker 1>a show that was on a network that partnered with Hulu,

0:30:29.840 --> 0:30:33.560
<v Speaker 1>at least you could potentially catch that episode starting the

0:30:33.640 --> 0:30:36.840
<v Speaker 1>day after it originally aired, and you would also see

0:30:36.840 --> 0:30:38.960
<v Speaker 1>fewer commercials than you would if you had watched it

0:30:39.000 --> 0:30:40.800
<v Speaker 1>on television in the first place, which is not a

0:30:40.840 --> 0:30:45.000
<v Speaker 1>bad deal. Before getting into the content game directly, Hulu

0:30:45.040 --> 0:30:47.800
<v Speaker 1>also served as a place where web originals could find

0:30:47.840 --> 0:30:51.080
<v Speaker 1>a home. So these were programs made by other companies

0:30:51.320 --> 0:30:54.120
<v Speaker 1>but with the web in mind, as opposed to on

0:30:54.320 --> 0:30:58.400
<v Speaker 1>traditional media. The first actual Hulu original was a show

0:30:58.440 --> 0:31:01.280
<v Speaker 1>called The Morning After. This was a sort of pop

0:31:01.360 --> 0:31:05.800
<v Speaker 1>culture roundup show. The first scripted series would come out

0:31:05.840 --> 0:31:08.800
<v Speaker 1>in twenty twelve, and it was called battle Ground, which

0:31:08.840 --> 0:31:13.280
<v Speaker 1>was a satirical political comedy series that the showrunners originally

0:31:13.320 --> 0:31:16.200
<v Speaker 1>pitched as a TV show, but they couldn't find a

0:31:16.280 --> 0:31:19.840
<v Speaker 1>network to pick up the series. Hulu provided an alternative

0:31:19.840 --> 0:31:23.800
<v Speaker 1>pathway to find an audience. Hulu would increase its focus

0:31:23.880 --> 0:31:27.200
<v Speaker 1>on original content, and this gradually meant that the original

0:31:27.200 --> 0:31:31.040
<v Speaker 1>strategy of providing access to broadcast TV would start to

0:31:31.080 --> 0:31:34.480
<v Speaker 1>decline in importance, and another shift was coming as well.

0:31:34.640 --> 0:31:37.280
<v Speaker 1>Jason Kyler, who had led the company from when it

0:31:37.320 --> 0:31:39.880
<v Speaker 1>was still taking shape in two thousand and seven, announced

0:31:39.920 --> 0:31:43.600
<v Speaker 1>he would be resigning from the company in twenty thirteen. Now,

0:31:43.680 --> 0:31:47.560
<v Speaker 1>under Kyler's leadership, Hulu had gone from this nebulous idea

0:31:47.840 --> 0:31:50.120
<v Speaker 1>that the industry in general predicted was going to be

0:31:50.120 --> 0:31:52.960
<v Speaker 1>a colossal failure and had created a business that had

0:31:53.000 --> 0:31:56.640
<v Speaker 1>an upward revenue trajectory that was pretty impressive. For example,

0:31:56.720 --> 0:32:00.000
<v Speaker 1>the Hollywood Reporter said that in twenty twelve, Hulu posted

0:32:00.160 --> 0:32:04.280
<v Speaker 1>a sixty five percent increase in year over year revenue. However,

0:32:04.720 --> 0:32:07.640
<v Speaker 1>percentages never tell you the full story, right Because if

0:32:07.640 --> 0:32:10.360
<v Speaker 1>I gave you a dollar today and then tomorrow I

0:32:10.400 --> 0:32:13.280
<v Speaker 1>gave you two dollars, that's a one hundred percent increase

0:32:13.440 --> 0:32:16.360
<v Speaker 1>day to day. But that's still just two dollars or

0:32:16.400 --> 0:32:19.720
<v Speaker 1>three dollars total. However, that being said, the twenty twelve

0:32:19.800 --> 0:32:22.760
<v Speaker 1>revenue was six hundred and ninety five million dollars, which

0:32:22.800 --> 0:32:25.920
<v Speaker 1>is not chump change or you know, clown company dollars,

0:32:25.960 --> 0:32:29.440
<v Speaker 1>I guess. Also, by this time, the stakeholders had been

0:32:29.640 --> 0:32:34.000
<v Speaker 1>whittled down to news Corp, NBC, Universal, and Disney because

0:32:34.040 --> 0:32:38.400
<v Speaker 1>the three other stakeholders had bought out Providence Equities stake

0:32:38.440 --> 0:32:41.040
<v Speaker 1>for around two hundred million dollars according to Bloomberg. Now,

0:32:41.040 --> 0:32:44.760
<v Speaker 1>remember when Providence first invested, they were taking like one

0:32:44.800 --> 0:32:48.920
<v Speaker 1>hundred million dollar equity steak in Hulu, so they essentially

0:32:49.000 --> 0:32:53.160
<v Speaker 1>doubled that, which is not bad. Kylar wasn't the only

0:32:53.200 --> 0:32:55.960
<v Speaker 1>executive leaving the company at that point. Another was the

0:32:56.160 --> 0:32:59.840
<v Speaker 1>chief technology officer for Hulu, a guy named rich Tom,

0:33:00.120 --> 0:33:02.920
<v Speaker 1>which you know, that's a great name. Oh you mean

0:33:03.040 --> 0:33:06.600
<v Speaker 1>rich Tom. The rumor mill said that Kyler's decision was

0:33:06.640 --> 0:33:10.920
<v Speaker 1>one fueled by frustration he had with his corporate overlords,

0:33:11.000 --> 0:33:14.040
<v Speaker 1>that that Kyler had really wanted to secure more licensing

0:33:14.120 --> 0:33:17.760
<v Speaker 1>deals in order to feature a wider spectrum of programming

0:33:17.840 --> 0:33:21.360
<v Speaker 1>on Hulu, but that he was being stonewalled by the

0:33:21.440 --> 0:33:27.400
<v Speaker 1>various corporate stakeholders and denied these. These budgets and licensing

0:33:27.440 --> 0:33:30.440
<v Speaker 1>fees were growing pretty hefty, and this was largely because

0:33:30.480 --> 0:33:34.720
<v Speaker 1>Netflix was pouring buckets of cash into its own strategy.

0:33:34.840 --> 0:33:37.360
<v Speaker 1>And we'd get back to the conundrum that the media

0:33:37.400 --> 0:33:40.680
<v Speaker 1>companies were in, so in an ideal world from the

0:33:40.760 --> 0:33:44.400
<v Speaker 1>studio perspective, not the audience perspective. But if you're a studio,

0:33:44.600 --> 0:33:47.480
<v Speaker 1>the ideal is that you would have your owned and

0:33:47.560 --> 0:33:52.120
<v Speaker 1>operated streaming service specifically for your studio's output. And of course,

0:33:52.160 --> 0:33:54.200
<v Speaker 1>as we go down the timeline, that's kind of what

0:33:54.400 --> 0:33:57.840
<v Speaker 1>would happen, right, because we would get a bunch of platforms,

0:33:57.960 --> 0:34:00.560
<v Speaker 1>ridiculous ones. You know, you look out there and you've

0:34:00.600 --> 0:34:05.360
<v Speaker 1>got your your Peacock Paramount plus, CBS All Access, HBO Max.

0:34:05.400 --> 0:34:08.000
<v Speaker 1>All of these would start to pop up many years

0:34:08.280 --> 0:34:10.600
<v Speaker 1>further down the line, so we would see this kind

0:34:10.640 --> 0:34:12.680
<v Speaker 1>of come to pass. But that's something that all these

0:34:12.719 --> 0:34:16.840
<v Speaker 1>studios wanted early on. They just didn't have the infrastructure.

0:34:16.920 --> 0:34:21.200
<v Speaker 1>They didn't invest in building that out. So back then,

0:34:21.640 --> 0:34:24.680
<v Speaker 1>back in twenty thirteen, there were only a few options

0:34:24.719 --> 0:34:27.400
<v Speaker 1>open to you. If you wanted to make your material

0:34:27.520 --> 0:34:31.040
<v Speaker 1>available for streaming. You could sign on with Netflix, or

0:34:31.120 --> 0:34:33.719
<v Speaker 1>you could sign on with Hulu. Anything else was seen

0:34:33.760 --> 0:34:36.560
<v Speaker 1>as being a little too obscure to make much sense,

0:34:36.719 --> 0:34:38.920
<v Speaker 1>like it just wouldn't be a good return on investment.

0:34:39.120 --> 0:34:41.960
<v Speaker 1>And if you didn't sign licensing deals, well then you

0:34:42.000 --> 0:34:45.080
<v Speaker 1>were leaving money on the table. So while studios weren't

0:34:45.239 --> 0:34:48.279
<v Speaker 1>keen to turn a service like Netflix or Hulu into

0:34:48.360 --> 0:34:51.360
<v Speaker 1>a gatekeeper. There weren't a lot of alternatives, and with

0:34:51.520 --> 0:34:55.120
<v Speaker 1>Netflix willing to shell out crazy amounts of cash for licenses,

0:34:55.239 --> 0:34:57.600
<v Speaker 1>it meant that Hulu was losing out. Now, as we

0:34:57.640 --> 0:35:01.120
<v Speaker 1>would see, this isn't an episode about Netflix, but Netflix's

0:35:01.120 --> 0:35:03.960
<v Speaker 1>strategy would ultimately be to invest more and more in

0:35:04.000 --> 0:35:08.160
<v Speaker 1>original programming and kind of wean itself off of making

0:35:08.200 --> 0:35:12.040
<v Speaker 1>these big licensing deals, which suited the studios fine because

0:35:12.200 --> 0:35:15.360
<v Speaker 1>they would prefer to not have their stuff on Netflix

0:35:15.400 --> 0:35:17.920
<v Speaker 1>if they could have it on their own platform anyway.

0:35:17.960 --> 0:35:20.960
<v Speaker 1>The other big rumor behind Kyler's departure was that he

0:35:21.080 --> 0:35:25.120
<v Speaker 1>was still focused on growing the business and his corporate

0:35:25.160 --> 0:35:28.160
<v Speaker 1>overlords were hoping that he would switch more to a

0:35:28.560 --> 0:35:32.200
<v Speaker 1>near term profit model. These two things are not always

0:35:32.239 --> 0:35:35.719
<v Speaker 1>in alignment, right, because to grow often it means you

0:35:35.800 --> 0:35:38.880
<v Speaker 1>have to spend more money, invest more. You're not going

0:35:38.920 --> 0:35:41.120
<v Speaker 1>to see as big of a return. The folks who

0:35:41.160 --> 0:35:45.000
<v Speaker 1>were owning the stakes were getting itchy. They wanted profit,

0:35:45.280 --> 0:35:47.719
<v Speaker 1>and it also sounds like the various stakeholders were at

0:35:47.760 --> 0:35:51.040
<v Speaker 1>odds with one another over how to even achieve the

0:35:51.040 --> 0:35:53.280
<v Speaker 1>goals that they had, Like even when they had goals

0:35:53.280 --> 0:35:55.840
<v Speaker 1>that were in common, they disagreed with how they should

0:35:55.880 --> 0:35:58.640
<v Speaker 1>go about achieving those goals, and that put Hulu in

0:35:58.800 --> 0:36:02.080
<v Speaker 1>kind of a corporate ug of war between the different stakeholders.

0:36:02.160 --> 0:36:04.600
<v Speaker 1>So I wouldn't blame Kyler for a moment if that

0:36:04.840 --> 0:36:07.920
<v Speaker 1>contributed to his decision to step down. I've been in

0:36:08.200 --> 0:36:10.680
<v Speaker 1>corporate tug of wars in the middle of one, and

0:36:10.800 --> 0:36:15.920
<v Speaker 1>it is the most frustrated I think I've ever been professionally. Anyway,

0:36:16.000 --> 0:36:18.600
<v Speaker 1>it sounded kind of like the board level of Hulu

0:36:18.680 --> 0:36:21.239
<v Speaker 1>was turning into what naysayers had been predicting back in

0:36:21.280 --> 0:36:24.279
<v Speaker 1>the Clown Company days, right Like, it sounds like that's

0:36:24.320 --> 0:36:27.160
<v Speaker 1>what was coming true. I already mentioned that Kyler would

0:36:27.160 --> 0:36:29.640
<v Speaker 1>go on to co found a different video streaming site

0:36:29.680 --> 0:36:32.279
<v Speaker 1>similar in some ways to YouTube, and that Verizon would

0:36:32.280 --> 0:36:36.360
<v Speaker 1>subsequently acquire and then later shut down that website, and

0:36:36.400 --> 0:36:38.880
<v Speaker 1>that Kyler then went on to become the CEO of

0:36:38.960 --> 0:36:44.080
<v Speaker 1>Watermedia under at and T. Interestingly, in twenty sixteen, Time Warner,

0:36:44.520 --> 0:36:48.160
<v Speaker 1>which would later become WarnerMedia, acquired a ten percent steak

0:36:48.200 --> 0:36:51.919
<v Speaker 1>in Hulu. So again, those worlds would intersect a couple

0:36:51.920 --> 0:36:54.719
<v Speaker 1>of times. I've said, like the corporate overlords of Hulu.

0:36:54.800 --> 0:36:57.560
<v Speaker 1>The partnerships have changed over time, so at one time

0:36:58.040 --> 0:37:01.920
<v Speaker 1>Warner was one of the owners. When Kyler announced that

0:37:01.960 --> 0:37:03.960
<v Speaker 1>he was going to depart from Hulu in twenty thirteen,

0:37:04.000 --> 0:37:06.680
<v Speaker 1>the company had yet to announce a replacement, and in fact,

0:37:06.719 --> 0:37:09.200
<v Speaker 1>it took a little while before that would happen. It

0:37:09.239 --> 0:37:12.000
<v Speaker 1>was a luxury that a privately held company can enjoy,

0:37:12.120 --> 0:37:14.880
<v Speaker 1>I guess because if you're a publicly traded company, succession

0:37:14.880 --> 0:37:19.400
<v Speaker 1>planning is something that investors take very seriously see also Disney.

0:37:19.560 --> 0:37:23.520
<v Speaker 1>But eventually Hulu announced that Andy Forcell, who had been

0:37:23.680 --> 0:37:27.320
<v Speaker 1>senior vice president of content at Hulu since two thousand

0:37:27.360 --> 0:37:31.280
<v Speaker 1>and seven, would take on the job as an acting CEO.

0:37:31.840 --> 0:37:34.480
<v Speaker 1>He would not be on that job for long. He

0:37:34.520 --> 0:37:37.560
<v Speaker 1>would actually leave Hulu in late twenty thirteen. That's the

0:37:37.560 --> 0:37:40.279
<v Speaker 1>same year that Kylar stepped down. So we're talking one

0:37:40.360 --> 0:37:44.239
<v Speaker 1>year two different CEOs, really three, because the third one

0:37:44.239 --> 0:37:47.759
<v Speaker 1>would take over after Forcell would leave, And interestingly, Forceell's

0:37:48.040 --> 0:37:50.600
<v Speaker 1>journey would take him on to become the chief operating

0:37:50.640 --> 0:37:54.560
<v Speaker 1>officer at Full Screen and then Ottermedia. Now, if you

0:37:54.640 --> 0:37:58.040
<v Speaker 1>listen to my episodes about Rooster Teeth, those companies were

0:37:58.080 --> 0:38:01.000
<v Speaker 1>going to sound familiar. He was part of that whole thing,

0:38:01.239 --> 0:38:04.040
<v Speaker 1>and then ultimately would end up becoming the head of

0:38:04.239 --> 0:38:07.760
<v Speaker 1>HBO Max over at WarnerMedia, which meant that once again

0:38:07.800 --> 0:38:10.680
<v Speaker 1>he'd be working under his old boss, Kylar, who was

0:38:10.719 --> 0:38:13.640
<v Speaker 1>the CEO of WarnerMedia at that time, and just like

0:38:13.680 --> 0:38:17.120
<v Speaker 1>in twenty thirteen, Forceel would leave WarnerMedia around the same

0:38:17.160 --> 0:38:20.719
<v Speaker 1>time that Kyler did after AT and T divested itself

0:38:20.800 --> 0:38:24.200
<v Speaker 1>of WarnerMedia and sold it to Discovery. So time is

0:38:24.200 --> 0:38:27.600
<v Speaker 1>a flat circle. Mike Hopkins, who had been president of

0:38:27.680 --> 0:38:32.000
<v Speaker 1>Fox Networks Group, was then tapped to be CEO of Hulu,

0:38:32.160 --> 0:38:34.719
<v Speaker 1>and this capped off an era in which many of

0:38:34.760 --> 0:38:37.560
<v Speaker 1>the leaders who were part of the original team who

0:38:37.600 --> 0:38:41.279
<v Speaker 1>built Hulu had at this point left the company. Reportedly,

0:38:41.360 --> 0:38:44.920
<v Speaker 1>this had a pretty negative impact on employee morale. Hopkins

0:38:44.960 --> 0:38:48.680
<v Speaker 1>would stick around for four years and provide some leadership

0:38:48.719 --> 0:38:51.640
<v Speaker 1>stability at a time when it was sorely needed in

0:38:51.640 --> 0:38:55.240
<v Speaker 1>the company. He would eventually leave Hulu to become chairman

0:38:55.280 --> 0:38:57.600
<v Speaker 1>of Sony Pictures Television, and then after a couple of

0:38:57.680 --> 0:38:59.640
<v Speaker 1>years of doing that, he would go on to join

0:38:59.680 --> 0:39:02.640
<v Speaker 1>Ammazon on and became a senior vice president for Prime

0:39:02.719 --> 0:39:07.360
<v Speaker 1>Video and Amazon Studios. But anyway, Hopkins takes the helmet Hulu,

0:39:07.640 --> 0:39:10.359
<v Speaker 1>you might wonder what else was going on during his

0:39:10.560 --> 0:39:14.920
<v Speaker 1>era as CEO, which went from twenty thirteen to twenty seventeen.

0:39:15.280 --> 0:39:17.080
<v Speaker 1>That is what we're going to start to cover in

0:39:17.120 --> 0:39:19.640
<v Speaker 1>the next episode, along with the story of where Hulu

0:39:19.640 --> 0:39:21.960
<v Speaker 1>would go from there and how the company would reach

0:39:22.000 --> 0:39:24.360
<v Speaker 1>where we are now, which is in this weird limbo

0:39:24.480 --> 0:39:27.799
<v Speaker 1>because of a disagreement between Disney and Comcast over how

0:39:27.880 --> 0:39:30.879
<v Speaker 1>much the company is actually worth. We'll touch back on

0:39:30.920 --> 0:39:34.000
<v Speaker 1>that later this week. In the meantime, I hope you

0:39:34.040 --> 0:39:37.919
<v Speaker 1>are all well and I'll talk to you again really soon.

0:39:43.960 --> 0:39:48.640
<v Speaker 1>Tech Stuff is an iHeartRadio production. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio,

0:39:48.960 --> 0:39:52.640
<v Speaker 1>visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen

0:39:52.680 --> 0:39:57.520
<v Speaker 1>to your favorite shows.