1 00:00:04,480 --> 00:00:12,319 Speaker 1: Welcome to Tech Stuff, a production from iHeartRadio. Hey there, 2 00:00:12,320 --> 00:00:15,520 Speaker 1: and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. 3 00:00:15,520 --> 00:00:19,080 Speaker 1: I'm an executive producer with iHeart Podcasts and How the 4 00:00:19,079 --> 00:00:22,760 Speaker 1: tech are you? You know, I've talked about streaming an 5 00:00:22,840 --> 00:00:27,040 Speaker 1: awful lot on the show. Now just for context tech Stuff. 6 00:00:27,160 --> 00:00:31,120 Speaker 1: This podcast began after Netflix had already kind of got 7 00:00:31,120 --> 00:00:34,400 Speaker 1: the ball rolling back in January two thousand and seven, 8 00:00:34,720 --> 00:00:37,760 Speaker 1: so I didn't have an episode that covered the story 9 00:00:37,800 --> 00:00:43,160 Speaker 1: of Netflix launching its online video streaming But in twenty 10 00:00:43,200 --> 00:00:46,560 Speaker 1: thirteen we did do an episode about the Big three 11 00:00:46,840 --> 00:00:52,319 Speaker 1: streaming services, which at that time included Netflix, Amazon, and 12 00:00:52,760 --> 00:00:57,600 Speaker 1: Today's Star Hulu. So we're doing actually a two parter 13 00:00:57,880 --> 00:01:00,880 Speaker 1: on Hulu. This will be part one. So even back 14 00:01:00,920 --> 00:01:04,440 Speaker 1: then we mentioned how there were other offerings available beyond 15 00:01:05,000 --> 00:01:07,920 Speaker 1: the Big three, but today it's almost a joke with 16 00:01:08,000 --> 00:01:10,600 Speaker 1: how many services are out there, and it's come as 17 00:01:10,600 --> 00:01:14,080 Speaker 1: no surprise that we're starting to see these different services 18 00:01:14,200 --> 00:01:17,840 Speaker 1: kind of glom on and merge together, either in bundles 19 00:01:18,080 --> 00:01:20,640 Speaker 1: like the one Comcast is going to offer with Netflix, 20 00:01:20,800 --> 00:01:24,800 Speaker 1: Peacock and Apple TV Plus, or in outright mergers and 21 00:01:24,840 --> 00:01:29,319 Speaker 1: acquisitions such as what's happened with Disney and you know Hulu. 22 00:01:29,840 --> 00:01:34,240 Speaker 1: It's almost like the streaming landscape is slowly transforming into 23 00:01:34,280 --> 00:01:37,600 Speaker 1: what cable television used to be. And we already know 24 00:01:37,640 --> 00:01:41,240 Speaker 1: that cable TV's business model has a ceiling because we 25 00:01:41,360 --> 00:01:44,520 Speaker 1: hit that ceiling. That's why we're seeing things kind of 26 00:01:44,560 --> 00:01:46,760 Speaker 1: in a decline or one of the reasons why I 27 00:01:46,760 --> 00:01:50,600 Speaker 1: shouldn't be so definitive, I guess. Anyway, all that's beside 28 00:01:50,600 --> 00:01:54,680 Speaker 1: the point. I want to talk about Hulu. How Hulu 29 00:01:54,680 --> 00:01:59,040 Speaker 1: got started, because it's an interesting origin, and how the 30 00:01:59,160 --> 00:02:02,520 Speaker 1: service and company evolved, and how now it is co 31 00:02:02,680 --> 00:02:07,440 Speaker 1: mingling with Disney Plus, even as the actual acquisition deal 32 00:02:07,600 --> 00:02:10,480 Speaker 1: is still kind of finalizing, despite the fact that Disney 33 00:02:10,520 --> 00:02:14,960 Speaker 1: paid the quote unquote final fee last year. That whole 34 00:02:15,240 --> 00:02:20,240 Speaker 1: story is just it really just points to corporate shenanigans, honestly, 35 00:02:20,400 --> 00:02:23,720 Speaker 1: in my opinion at least, So let's start off at 36 00:02:23,720 --> 00:02:26,840 Speaker 1: the beginning, where I am told it's a very good 37 00:02:26,880 --> 00:02:29,960 Speaker 1: place to start. So hulu story, at least, the part 38 00:02:29,960 --> 00:02:33,840 Speaker 1: of Hulu's story that faced the public, began in March 39 00:02:33,880 --> 00:02:37,440 Speaker 1: two thousand and seven. Hulu, which was not named at 40 00:02:37,440 --> 00:02:40,280 Speaker 1: this point. It didn't have its name, but what would 41 00:02:40,320 --> 00:02:44,440 Speaker 1: become Hulu was announced as a joint venture between newscre 42 00:02:44,960 --> 00:02:49,000 Speaker 1: and what at that time was just plain old NBC Universal. 43 00:02:49,280 --> 00:02:53,320 Speaker 1: Comcast would announce plans to acquire NBC Universal two years later, 44 00:02:53,600 --> 00:02:56,720 Speaker 1: and so things would get more complicated down the line. 45 00:02:57,040 --> 00:02:59,960 Speaker 1: Now this is where my memory actually plays tricks on me, 46 00:03:00,200 --> 00:03:02,760 Speaker 1: because when I was thinking about this before I actually 47 00:03:02,800 --> 00:03:06,920 Speaker 1: started to dig into all the different articles and blog 48 00:03:06,960 --> 00:03:10,360 Speaker 1: posts and stuff around the time of Hulu's launch. In 49 00:03:10,440 --> 00:03:13,000 Speaker 1: my head, Hulu was meant to be a counter to 50 00:03:13,120 --> 00:03:17,359 Speaker 1: Netflix because Netflix was getting into video streaming. But as 51 00:03:17,360 --> 00:03:21,160 Speaker 1: it turns out, that really isn't the case when you're 52 00:03:21,200 --> 00:03:23,760 Speaker 1: talking about the two thousand and six two thousand and 53 00:03:23,800 --> 00:03:27,720 Speaker 1: seven era, because at that stage, Netflix wasn't really seen 54 00:03:27,760 --> 00:03:30,959 Speaker 1: as that large of a threat, right. I mean, Netflix 55 00:03:31,000 --> 00:03:35,480 Speaker 1: had killed Blockbuster arguably, but it wasn't thought to be 56 00:03:35,960 --> 00:03:41,040 Speaker 1: setting its sites on traditional broadcast and cable media. Instead, 57 00:03:41,080 --> 00:03:44,720 Speaker 1: Netflix was essentially viewed as Blockbuster by mail because it 58 00:03:44,800 --> 00:03:48,040 Speaker 1: was much better known for its DVD and Blu ray 59 00:03:48,160 --> 00:03:53,000 Speaker 1: rental services than as a video streaming platform. So this 60 00:03:53,160 --> 00:03:56,040 Speaker 1: was well before Netflix would shake things up with its 61 00:03:56,040 --> 00:03:59,080 Speaker 1: own original programming like House of Cards. House of Cards 62 00:03:59,080 --> 00:04:03,920 Speaker 1: didn't debut until twenty thirteen, so Netflix was not seen 63 00:04:03,960 --> 00:04:09,240 Speaker 1: as a existential threat at this point. Instead, Hulu's reisondetre 64 00:04:09,720 --> 00:04:12,400 Speaker 1: had more to do with piracy that was happening on 65 00:04:12,440 --> 00:04:17,400 Speaker 1: YouTube and how internet streaming was starting to show signs 66 00:04:17,400 --> 00:04:21,200 Speaker 1: that it could impact traditional cable television, as well as 67 00:04:21,279 --> 00:04:24,880 Speaker 1: concerns about a company that was on a metaphorical rocket 68 00:04:24,920 --> 00:04:28,240 Speaker 1: ship around this time, and in that case, I'm specifically 69 00:04:28,279 --> 00:04:33,040 Speaker 1: talking about Apple, not Netflix. But first let's start with YouTube. 70 00:04:33,080 --> 00:04:37,159 Speaker 1: So Steve Chen and jau Ed Karim and Chad Hurley 71 00:04:37,360 --> 00:04:41,240 Speaker 1: founded YouTube in two thousand and five. These days you 72 00:04:41,320 --> 00:04:44,720 Speaker 1: can find epic long videos on YouTube. In fact, over 73 00:04:44,760 --> 00:04:49,880 Speaker 1: the weekend yesterday, I was watching a four hour video 74 00:04:50,200 --> 00:04:55,719 Speaker 1: from Jenny Nicholson, who produces phenomenal video essays. They're few 75 00:04:55,720 --> 00:04:57,920 Speaker 1: and far between, but she puts a ton of work 76 00:04:57,960 --> 00:05:00,960 Speaker 1: into them, and she did a four hour video about 77 00:05:00,960 --> 00:05:04,880 Speaker 1: her experience at the Star Wars Galactic Cruiser Hotel at 78 00:05:04,880 --> 00:05:08,599 Speaker 1: Disney World, and it's fascinating. It's a little it's very 79 00:05:08,640 --> 00:05:12,839 Speaker 1: cringey at times if you're not into like participatory theater. 80 00:05:13,080 --> 00:05:16,640 Speaker 1: Even as someone who has performed in participatory theater. I 81 00:05:16,680 --> 00:05:19,320 Speaker 1: found it a bit cringey at times, not because of Jenny, 82 00:05:19,400 --> 00:05:22,320 Speaker 1: but because of the situation that was going on. And 83 00:05:22,360 --> 00:05:25,159 Speaker 1: it's also like just frustrating to see someone who is 84 00:05:25,200 --> 00:05:28,960 Speaker 1: clearly so passionate about Star Wars and who has a 85 00:05:29,000 --> 00:05:32,880 Speaker 1: really good platform ended up having a really, I would argue, 86 00:05:33,000 --> 00:05:37,120 Speaker 1: lackluster experience for a premium price. Anyway, I don't know 87 00:05:37,200 --> 00:05:40,360 Speaker 1: Jenny Nicholson, she doesn't know me. I just like her work. 88 00:05:40,600 --> 00:05:43,440 Speaker 1: And the point was that today you can watch four 89 00:05:43,480 --> 00:05:45,599 Speaker 1: hour long videos on YouTube if you want to. But 90 00:05:45,839 --> 00:05:48,880 Speaker 1: you know, the interesting thing is when YouTube first launched, 91 00:05:48,960 --> 00:05:53,320 Speaker 1: there wasn't really a limitation on video length back then either. Now, 92 00:05:53,440 --> 00:05:58,560 Speaker 1: the resolution for YouTube videos was way way lower, but yeah, 93 00:05:58,600 --> 00:06:02,960 Speaker 1: you weren't limited to short videos. However, that changed in 94 00:06:03,000 --> 00:06:05,960 Speaker 1: the spring of two thousand and six, and the reason 95 00:06:06,240 --> 00:06:09,200 Speaker 1: for that change is because a lot of the longer 96 00:06:09,279 --> 00:06:13,240 Speaker 1: videos that were getting uploaded to YouTube were bootlegs or 97 00:06:13,400 --> 00:06:18,359 Speaker 1: pirated copies or unauthorized uploads of films and TV shows. 98 00:06:18,880 --> 00:06:22,320 Speaker 1: So that was what was making studios angry. It was 99 00:06:22,400 --> 00:06:25,880 Speaker 1: copyright infringement. You know, it was going up without their 100 00:06:26,120 --> 00:06:29,919 Speaker 1: consent and without their compensation, and in fact, in those days, 101 00:06:29,960 --> 00:06:33,520 Speaker 1: YouTube wasn't monetizing anything. This was in the growth phase 102 00:06:33,560 --> 00:06:37,240 Speaker 1: for YouTube, so the whole media industry was starting to 103 00:06:37,600 --> 00:06:40,880 Speaker 1: get pretty prickly about this. And you know, just a 104 00:06:40,880 --> 00:06:45,840 Speaker 1: few years earlier, that industry ended up banding together and 105 00:06:46,080 --> 00:06:49,680 Speaker 1: did a number on peer to peer networking services like 106 00:06:49,760 --> 00:06:54,640 Speaker 1: Kaza and Napster like they sued those companies into oblivion. 107 00:06:55,040 --> 00:07:00,719 Speaker 1: So obviously YouTube was not super keen on get the 108 00:07:00,760 --> 00:07:04,440 Speaker 1: studio's iire in that same way, it could be a 109 00:07:04,480 --> 00:07:07,200 Speaker 1: threat to their very existence. So in March two thousand 110 00:07:07,200 --> 00:07:12,000 Speaker 1: and six, YouTube issued a new limitation on videos. They 111 00:07:12,040 --> 00:07:14,880 Speaker 1: could only be up to ten minutes long, and then 112 00:07:15,080 --> 00:07:18,000 Speaker 1: you would get cut off, So you couldn't post a 113 00:07:18,120 --> 00:07:22,000 Speaker 1: full television episode or a movie in one video. If 114 00:07:22,000 --> 00:07:24,400 Speaker 1: you were really trying to share that kind of thing, 115 00:07:24,680 --> 00:07:27,920 Speaker 1: you had to find places to break up the video 116 00:07:28,080 --> 00:07:31,720 Speaker 1: into ten minute or shorter increments and then do a 117 00:07:31,720 --> 00:07:34,640 Speaker 1: whole series of them. So you would have to go 118 00:07:34,680 --> 00:07:36,640 Speaker 1: to a lot of trouble. In other words, in order 119 00:07:36,720 --> 00:07:39,080 Speaker 1: to get just an episode of a television show up, 120 00:07:39,240 --> 00:07:42,440 Speaker 1: let alone a movie. Plus you would still potentially get 121 00:07:42,480 --> 00:07:45,960 Speaker 1: into trouble down the line if the studios found out, hey, 122 00:07:46,200 --> 00:07:49,239 Speaker 1: you're publishing stuff without our permission. But this is why 123 00:07:49,440 --> 00:07:52,440 Speaker 1: older YouTube videos, the really long stuff, would be divided 124 00:07:52,440 --> 00:07:55,880 Speaker 1: into multiple parts. I'm reminded of the infamous Star Wars 125 00:07:55,880 --> 00:07:59,280 Speaker 1: episode one review by Red Letter Media, the mister Plinkett 126 00:07:59,280 --> 00:08:04,480 Speaker 1: review that was originally in several segments because old man 127 00:08:04,560 --> 00:08:06,600 Speaker 1: mister Plinkett had a lot to say about it. Also, 128 00:08:06,640 --> 00:08:08,240 Speaker 1: I didn't realize this episode was going to be so 129 00:08:08,280 --> 00:08:10,960 Speaker 1: Star Wars heavy. That wasn't my intent. But in the 130 00:08:11,000 --> 00:08:14,560 Speaker 1: back half of two thousand and six, Google acquired YouTube 131 00:08:14,560 --> 00:08:17,440 Speaker 1: for the princely sum of one point sixty five billion 132 00:08:17,560 --> 00:08:21,520 Speaker 1: dollars in Google stock. Google definitely had a vested interest 133 00:08:21,560 --> 00:08:24,120 Speaker 1: in making certain that the piracy issue was addressed because 134 00:08:24,160 --> 00:08:27,240 Speaker 1: as a big company that had deep pockets, and you know, 135 00:08:27,640 --> 00:08:30,960 Speaker 1: there's nothing stopping the media companies from coming after that. Filthy, 136 00:08:31,000 --> 00:08:36,480 Speaker 1: filthy luker. If Google seemed complacent with piracy while the 137 00:08:36,480 --> 00:08:39,839 Speaker 1: company discouraged the practice, it's you know, the users who 138 00:08:39,920 --> 00:08:43,120 Speaker 1: ultimately were steering things, and the folks at major media 139 00:08:43,160 --> 00:08:46,400 Speaker 1: companies were not thrilled about not having control over this. 140 00:08:46,760 --> 00:08:49,920 Speaker 1: You did have major studios establish their own YouTube channels, 141 00:08:49,920 --> 00:08:52,520 Speaker 1: but I bet that didn't feel so great. To them. Either, 142 00:08:52,920 --> 00:08:57,040 Speaker 1: YouTube could help with marketing and spread awareness of shows 143 00:08:57,080 --> 00:09:01,120 Speaker 1: and that kind of thing, but monetizing your online publishing 144 00:09:01,200 --> 00:09:03,680 Speaker 1: was a different matter. I mean, the official YouTube Partner 145 00:09:03,679 --> 00:09:06,319 Speaker 1: program didn't launch until the end of two thousand and seven, 146 00:09:06,559 --> 00:09:09,120 Speaker 1: and you know, most businesses are not keen to give 147 00:09:09,160 --> 00:09:12,600 Speaker 1: away for free what they typically would earn revenue on, 148 00:09:13,000 --> 00:09:17,200 Speaker 1: so finding a way to deliver television content online in 149 00:09:17,240 --> 00:09:20,920 Speaker 1: a way that could actually generate revenue was a long 150 00:09:21,000 --> 00:09:25,000 Speaker 1: term goal. Perhaps of more concern, however, was Apple, at 151 00:09:25,080 --> 00:09:29,040 Speaker 1: least to NBC Universal's CEO Jeffrey Zucker at the time. 152 00:09:29,400 --> 00:09:31,720 Speaker 1: This has to do with the media industry's challenge of 153 00:09:31,760 --> 00:09:35,360 Speaker 1: figuring out how to incorporate streaming at all in its 154 00:09:35,400 --> 00:09:38,320 Speaker 1: overall strategy, let alone how to set streaming up as 155 00:09:38,320 --> 00:09:42,640 Speaker 1: a potential successor to broadcast in cable distribution. Apple already 156 00:09:42,720 --> 00:09:45,520 Speaker 1: had an established business in which folks could browse the 157 00:09:45,600 --> 00:09:49,600 Speaker 1: iTunes store for media content, which included television shows and films, 158 00:09:49,800 --> 00:09:53,840 Speaker 1: and users could purchase those things through the iTunes store, 159 00:09:53,960 --> 00:09:57,439 Speaker 1: which made Apple kind of a gatekeeper for media. Plus, 160 00:09:57,480 --> 00:10:00,520 Speaker 1: Apple could take a hefty cut of those transactions, which 161 00:10:00,559 --> 00:10:02,600 Speaker 1: means a lot less of that cheddar would make its 162 00:10:02,640 --> 00:10:05,959 Speaker 1: way to the studios that were actually responsible for producing 163 00:10:06,200 --> 00:10:08,959 Speaker 1: the content. And just as companies aren't keen to give 164 00:10:08,960 --> 00:10:11,480 Speaker 1: away for free what they usually make money off of, 165 00:10:11,720 --> 00:10:14,040 Speaker 1: they're also not super happy to share their lunch with 166 00:10:14,120 --> 00:10:17,040 Speaker 1: someone else. Dollars going to Apple should be going to 167 00:10:17,080 --> 00:10:20,240 Speaker 1: the studios. Gush, darn it. So this is what Jeff Zucker, 168 00:10:20,280 --> 00:10:23,320 Speaker 1: the CEO of NBC Universal, was up in arms about. 169 00:10:23,400 --> 00:10:26,439 Speaker 1: He proclaimed that iTunes, while an effective way to deliver 170 00:10:26,600 --> 00:10:30,080 Speaker 1: television content to digital customers, was really a way to 171 00:10:30,200 --> 00:10:36,000 Speaker 1: go quote from dollars into pennies end quote on those transactions, 172 00:10:36,000 --> 00:10:39,319 Speaker 1: meaning that media outlets like NBC Universal should be making 173 00:10:39,800 --> 00:10:42,440 Speaker 1: much more per transaction than what they were, and that 174 00:10:42,600 --> 00:10:46,440 Speaker 1: the business model heavily favored the gatekeepers like iTunes. So 175 00:10:47,160 --> 00:10:49,880 Speaker 1: what would be the solution. Well, the solution is to 176 00:10:49,880 --> 00:10:54,000 Speaker 1: make your own media streaming platform, as Bender from Futurama 177 00:10:54,040 --> 00:10:57,680 Speaker 1: would say, and you would control this platform. Zucker made 178 00:10:57,679 --> 00:11:00,800 Speaker 1: some pretty big decisions leading up to the announcement of Hulu. 179 00:11:00,880 --> 00:11:04,720 Speaker 1: He decided not to renew NBC Universal's contract with Apple, 180 00:11:05,000 --> 00:11:08,600 Speaker 1: which meant NBC content would disappear from the iTunes store. 181 00:11:08,840 --> 00:11:12,360 Speaker 1: He also had the company closed down the NBC Universal 182 00:11:12,400 --> 00:11:16,360 Speaker 1: YouTube channel, so you couldn't get NBC Universal content there either, 183 00:11:16,400 --> 00:11:20,319 Speaker 1: at least not legally, and all the while, NBC Universal 184 00:11:20,600 --> 00:11:24,480 Speaker 1: began to work with newscre the owners of Fox at 185 00:11:24,480 --> 00:11:28,880 Speaker 1: the time, to create what would become Hulu. All right, 186 00:11:29,200 --> 00:11:31,240 Speaker 1: we're going to continue this story in just a moment, 187 00:11:31,400 --> 00:11:42,440 Speaker 1: but first let's take a quick break to thank our sponsors. 188 00:11:43,960 --> 00:11:48,800 Speaker 1: So we're back, News Corp. Owners of Fox, twentieth Century 189 00:11:48,840 --> 00:11:52,680 Speaker 1: Fox at that time, and NBC Universal, which would soon 190 00:11:52,720 --> 00:11:56,120 Speaker 1: become the property of Comcast, get together and decide that 191 00:11:56,120 --> 00:11:59,560 Speaker 1: they want to make their own streaming thing, but they're 192 00:11:59,559 --> 00:12:02,439 Speaker 1: not entirely sure what that's gonna be. Originally, the plan 193 00:12:02,559 --> 00:12:04,840 Speaker 1: was to make a way to share or post content 194 00:12:05,280 --> 00:12:09,040 Speaker 1: from these two companies on various places across the Internet, 195 00:12:09,280 --> 00:12:15,320 Speaker 1: specifically on sites like Yahoo, Aol, and the king of 196 00:12:15,559 --> 00:12:19,160 Speaker 1: social media MySpace. That's a trio of names that at 197 00:12:19,200 --> 00:12:21,600 Speaker 1: one point in the Internet history, all three of those 198 00:12:21,640 --> 00:12:25,640 Speaker 1: were considered unassailable. They were thought of as being giants 199 00:12:26,080 --> 00:12:29,080 Speaker 1: and too big to fail, which really just proves the 200 00:12:29,120 --> 00:12:32,480 Speaker 1: too big to fail concept just isn't true. You're never 201 00:12:32,600 --> 00:12:35,000 Speaker 1: too big to fail. We humans can always find a 202 00:12:35,000 --> 00:12:36,920 Speaker 1: way to fail if we have enough time on our 203 00:12:36,960 --> 00:12:40,520 Speaker 1: hands to do it. Anyway, you probably know that you 204 00:12:40,559 --> 00:12:43,960 Speaker 1: can embed media players on web pages, right If you've 205 00:12:43,960 --> 00:12:46,640 Speaker 1: ever visited a web page that had a YouTube player 206 00:12:46,800 --> 00:12:49,560 Speaker 1: embedded in that page, you know what I'm talking about. 207 00:12:49,640 --> 00:12:53,240 Speaker 1: You can watch a YouTube video within a web page 208 00:12:53,240 --> 00:12:55,720 Speaker 1: without actually having to go to YouTube itself. Well, that's 209 00:12:55,760 --> 00:12:58,880 Speaker 1: what Hulu was trying to do originally. Of course, it 210 00:12:58,920 --> 00:13:01,959 Speaker 1: wasn't called Hulu yet. In fact, it wasn't called anything yet. 211 00:13:02,280 --> 00:13:05,880 Speaker 1: But the basic idea was to follow this particular strategy. 212 00:13:06,040 --> 00:13:09,160 Speaker 1: So why were the companies thinking in this way? What 213 00:13:09,320 --> 00:13:12,200 Speaker 1: largely had to do with the monumental acquisition that news 214 00:13:12,200 --> 00:13:14,480 Speaker 1: Corp Had made In the summer of two thousand and five. 215 00:13:14,920 --> 00:13:19,520 Speaker 1: News Corp bought MySpace for a whopping five hundred eighty 216 00:13:19,840 --> 00:13:23,800 Speaker 1: million dollars. This would later turn out to be a 217 00:13:23,960 --> 00:13:28,560 Speaker 1: colossal mistake, as news Corp would ultimately dump my Space 218 00:13:28,600 --> 00:13:32,640 Speaker 1: for just thirty five million dollars in two thy eleven. 219 00:13:33,000 --> 00:13:36,640 Speaker 1: So buying something for five hundred and eighty million and 220 00:13:36,640 --> 00:13:40,120 Speaker 1: then selling it for thirty five million not great. In fact, 221 00:13:40,360 --> 00:13:43,079 Speaker 1: for some it would rank as one of the worst 222 00:13:43,280 --> 00:13:46,480 Speaker 1: deals in tech history. I don't know if it quite 223 00:13:46,679 --> 00:13:49,640 Speaker 1: merits that because there have been some other whoppers that 224 00:13:49,679 --> 00:13:52,000 Speaker 1: have happened, Like it's not good, but there have been 225 00:13:52,080 --> 00:13:55,120 Speaker 1: other really bad ones. I will say that the MySpace 226 00:13:55,240 --> 00:14:00,400 Speaker 1: acquisition is perhaps one of the most infamous bad tech deals. Anyway, 227 00:14:00,760 --> 00:14:04,400 Speaker 1: NewsCorp had this social media platform, and they had it 228 00:14:04,440 --> 00:14:08,560 Speaker 1: since late two thousand and five. And remember Facebook wouldn't 229 00:14:08,600 --> 00:14:12,360 Speaker 1: really start its trajectory of crazy growth until late two 230 00:14:12,360 --> 00:14:14,920 Speaker 1: thousand and six, when it would finally open up to 231 00:14:15,080 --> 00:14:18,280 Speaker 1: people who weren't you know, college students. And it's easy 232 00:14:18,280 --> 00:14:20,640 Speaker 1: to forget, but we're talking about time when MySpace was 233 00:14:20,760 --> 00:14:24,560 Speaker 1: almost synonymous with social networks. I mean, nobody thinks about 234 00:14:24,600 --> 00:14:28,560 Speaker 1: it today, but at the time it was the dominant 235 00:14:28,600 --> 00:14:32,800 Speaker 1: social platform. So the thought was that this social platform 236 00:14:32,840 --> 00:14:35,560 Speaker 1: asset could serve as a brilliant way to serve media 237 00:14:35,640 --> 00:14:38,560 Speaker 1: to customers. You know, design a web delivery system that 238 00:14:38,680 --> 00:14:42,640 Speaker 1: leverages the places where people were already going online. That 239 00:14:42,680 --> 00:14:45,640 Speaker 1: would include the AOL landing page because tons of people 240 00:14:45,640 --> 00:14:49,040 Speaker 1: were still using Aol as their Internet service provider, or 241 00:14:49,160 --> 00:14:52,440 Speaker 1: the Yahoo landing page because Yahoo was essentially serving as 242 00:14:52,440 --> 00:14:55,080 Speaker 1: a web portal to the rest of the world. Wide Web, 243 00:14:55,360 --> 00:14:59,320 Speaker 1: and then MySpace the dominant social platform. You wouldn't have 244 00:14:59,360 --> 00:15:02,400 Speaker 1: to train people to go to your website. You would 245 00:15:02,480 --> 00:15:04,800 Speaker 1: just establish a foothold in the places where people were 246 00:15:04,840 --> 00:15:08,920 Speaker 1: already congregating. This strategy would change in large part due 247 00:15:08,960 --> 00:15:12,160 Speaker 1: to the companies coaxing a project leader from a different 248 00:15:12,280 --> 00:15:16,960 Speaker 1: Internet giant. So I'm talking about a man named Jason Kylar, 249 00:15:17,360 --> 00:15:20,920 Speaker 1: who was a senior vice president at Amazon, and he 250 00:15:21,040 --> 00:15:25,120 Speaker 1: got lured away to become the head of this still 251 00:15:25,360 --> 00:15:30,160 Speaker 1: unnamed project between newscre and NBC Universal. Now, Kaylar's career 252 00:15:30,480 --> 00:15:33,640 Speaker 1: would have a lot of interesting intersection points with streaming 253 00:15:33,640 --> 00:15:36,600 Speaker 1: in general and with Hulu in particular. So for example, 254 00:15:36,880 --> 00:15:40,000 Speaker 1: before he worked at Amazon, Kyler was an analyst with 255 00:15:40,080 --> 00:15:42,880 Speaker 1: the Walt Disney Company for a couple of years. Obviously, 256 00:15:42,960 --> 00:15:45,600 Speaker 1: Disney will go on to become an important part of 257 00:15:45,640 --> 00:15:47,960 Speaker 1: the Hulu story, and I might as well talk about 258 00:15:47,960 --> 00:15:52,040 Speaker 1: his time after he left Hulu, because this isn't an 259 00:15:52,080 --> 00:15:54,800 Speaker 1: episode about his career specifically, although he does play a 260 00:15:54,920 --> 00:15:57,960 Speaker 1: very important part in this particular episode. He would stick 261 00:15:57,960 --> 00:16:00,480 Speaker 1: with Hulu for six full years, which you know, it's 262 00:16:00,520 --> 00:16:04,000 Speaker 1: not bad for a CEO of a startup company. If 263 00:16:04,040 --> 00:16:06,960 Speaker 1: you're not like a founder, especially like he was brought 264 00:16:07,000 --> 00:16:09,280 Speaker 1: on to do this, although you could argue that the 265 00:16:09,280 --> 00:16:12,920 Speaker 1: work he did was at least equivalent to a regular founder. 266 00:16:13,080 --> 00:16:14,840 Speaker 1: He would then go on to co found a video 267 00:16:14,880 --> 00:16:17,920 Speaker 1: platform site called Vessel. He did that in twenty thirteen. 268 00:16:18,040 --> 00:16:22,480 Speaker 1: Verizon would acquire Vessel, and not long after that, Verizon 269 00:16:22,520 --> 00:16:24,680 Speaker 1: would shut down Vessel. But hey, you know that's a 270 00:16:24,680 --> 00:16:27,160 Speaker 1: big payout, baby. So Kyler would also sit on the 271 00:16:27,160 --> 00:16:30,520 Speaker 1: board of directors for several different organizations and companies, and 272 00:16:30,560 --> 00:16:34,200 Speaker 1: then he would become CEO of WarnerMedia in twenty twenty, 273 00:16:34,480 --> 00:16:38,640 Speaker 1: which means he was there during the early launch days 274 00:16:38,680 --> 00:16:42,640 Speaker 1: of HBO Max, that streaming platform, and he stuck around 275 00:16:42,680 --> 00:16:46,040 Speaker 1: as CEO of WarnerMedia until AT and T decided to 276 00:16:46,120 --> 00:16:49,960 Speaker 1: divest itself of WarnerMedia and sell it off to Discovery, 277 00:16:50,120 --> 00:16:53,680 Speaker 1: whereupon David Zaslov would take over the whole shebang. And 278 00:16:54,080 --> 00:16:58,320 Speaker 1: we all know about the Zaslov regime over at Warner 279 00:16:58,320 --> 00:17:02,360 Speaker 1: Brothers Discovery. So his departure, he's kind of been keeping 280 00:17:02,440 --> 00:17:04,600 Speaker 1: himself busy by being on the board of directors of 281 00:17:04,640 --> 00:17:08,879 Speaker 1: even more organizations and companies. But throughout his entire career, 282 00:17:08,920 --> 00:17:12,240 Speaker 1: he's been heavily involved in media in general and streaming 283 00:17:12,280 --> 00:17:16,600 Speaker 1: in particular, and it's a pretty impressive career. So Kyler 284 00:17:16,640 --> 00:17:20,359 Speaker 1: comes over from Amazon and leads this project, and the 285 00:17:20,400 --> 00:17:23,800 Speaker 1: strategy then starts to shift. It moves away from this 286 00:17:23,920 --> 00:17:26,920 Speaker 1: idea of an embedible player that will live in other 287 00:17:27,000 --> 00:17:31,840 Speaker 1: places to a destination media site similar to YouTube, but 288 00:17:31,960 --> 00:17:37,840 Speaker 1: specifically crafted to host studio produced entertainment. Right YouTube is 289 00:17:37,880 --> 00:17:41,920 Speaker 1: the user generated video site. You go to YouTube typically 290 00:17:42,040 --> 00:17:45,800 Speaker 1: to watch stuff that other YouTubers have created, not to 291 00:17:45,920 --> 00:17:49,840 Speaker 1: watch things that were produced by an established media company. 292 00:17:50,080 --> 00:17:53,040 Speaker 1: So this project would be more for the established stuff, 293 00:17:53,080 --> 00:17:57,400 Speaker 1: the studio stuff, the professional stuff, and the companies were 294 00:17:57,440 --> 00:18:01,680 Speaker 1: also hoping that this would discourage Netflix's growing relevance. Again, 295 00:18:01,800 --> 00:18:06,199 Speaker 1: Netflix really wasn't a threat yet, but the concern was 296 00:18:06,240 --> 00:18:10,320 Speaker 1: that they didn't want a company that was not part 297 00:18:10,320 --> 00:18:14,439 Speaker 1: of the established media industry to become the gatekeeper for 298 00:18:14,560 --> 00:18:18,959 Speaker 1: the online branch of media. For the longest time, television 299 00:18:18,960 --> 00:18:22,280 Speaker 1: and film studios had reigned supreme. They didn't have to 300 00:18:22,320 --> 00:18:25,840 Speaker 1: answer to anyone else. Really, you know, they were times 301 00:18:25,880 --> 00:18:29,280 Speaker 1: where they got broken up by various regulators and governments 302 00:18:29,320 --> 00:18:32,720 Speaker 1: because they owned so much of the entertainment landscape that 303 00:18:32,760 --> 00:18:34,560 Speaker 1: it was considered to be a monopoly. Like when a 304 00:18:34,880 --> 00:18:38,040 Speaker 1: company owns not just the movie studios but also movie 305 00:18:38,080 --> 00:18:42,399 Speaker 1: theaters and film processing companies, that becomes a problem. So 306 00:18:42,480 --> 00:18:44,920 Speaker 1: all that got broken up years and years and years ago, 307 00:18:45,000 --> 00:18:47,320 Speaker 1: but they still had a ton of power, so the 308 00:18:47,400 --> 00:18:49,919 Speaker 1: idea of seeding some of that power to a company 309 00:18:50,000 --> 00:18:53,840 Speaker 1: like Netflix was not very palatable when Kyler took over 310 00:18:53,880 --> 00:18:57,359 Speaker 1: the project. The nickname that folks gave to this because 311 00:18:57,359 --> 00:19:00,840 Speaker 1: it still didn't have an official name yet, was Clown 312 00:19:01,160 --> 00:19:04,840 Speaker 1: Co or Clown Company, And apparently it got that nickname 313 00:19:04,880 --> 00:19:08,880 Speaker 1: because the general consensus was any joint project that would 314 00:19:08,880 --> 00:19:13,399 Speaker 1: be helmed by two or more established media companies was 315 00:19:13,960 --> 00:19:17,280 Speaker 1: bound to fail. At some point, one company would try 316 00:19:17,320 --> 00:19:20,679 Speaker 1: to exert more authority than the other or object to 317 00:19:20,720 --> 00:19:24,800 Speaker 1: some fundamental aspect of the project, and nothing would ever resolve. 318 00:19:24,880 --> 00:19:28,720 Speaker 1: You would never get consensus among the stakeholders for what 319 00:19:29,000 --> 00:19:31,640 Speaker 1: was the right thing to do, and the whole thing 320 00:19:31,680 --> 00:19:35,720 Speaker 1: would crumble in on itself. Tech blogs, in particular, prophesied 321 00:19:36,119 --> 00:19:39,800 Speaker 1: doom from the get go. In July two thousand and seven, 322 00:19:39,880 --> 00:19:43,520 Speaker 1: a company called Providence Equity joined News Corp. At NBC 323 00:19:43,720 --> 00:19:46,920 Speaker 1: Universal as a stakeholder in the project, purchasing a ten 324 00:19:46,960 --> 00:19:51,640 Speaker 1: percent ownership in Hulu, and this was quoted as being 325 00:19:51,680 --> 00:19:56,000 Speaker 1: somewhere around one hundred million dollars of equity in the company. 326 00:19:56,359 --> 00:20:00,720 Speaker 1: Just pretty darn impressive. Now, the name Hulu, I don't 327 00:20:00,760 --> 00:20:03,840 Speaker 1: know exactly when it was arrived at, but I do 328 00:20:03,920 --> 00:20:06,680 Speaker 1: know when it was revealed. It was revealed in August 329 00:20:06,800 --> 00:20:10,200 Speaker 1: two thousand and seven when the website actually went live. However, 330 00:20:10,520 --> 00:20:14,040 Speaker 1: this website went live with no video. You couldn't go 331 00:20:14,119 --> 00:20:17,239 Speaker 1: there to watch anything. It was kind of like a 332 00:20:17,280 --> 00:20:20,280 Speaker 1: site that was parked there and was announcing the name 333 00:20:20,320 --> 00:20:22,840 Speaker 1: of the service, so there was no streaming player yet. 334 00:20:23,040 --> 00:20:25,960 Speaker 1: Kyler later said that the actual name came from a 335 00:20:26,000 --> 00:20:29,920 Speaker 1: Mandarin word that means gord, with the idea of Hulu 336 00:20:30,000 --> 00:20:32,919 Speaker 1: containing all this stuff in it, it'd be a streaming 337 00:20:32,960 --> 00:20:36,439 Speaker 1: service with access to lots of content, similar to a 338 00:20:36,480 --> 00:20:39,560 Speaker 1: stuffed gord. I guess I don't know. I don't really 339 00:20:40,000 --> 00:20:43,200 Speaker 1: get the analogy that much. I don't know how much 340 00:20:43,240 --> 00:20:46,720 Speaker 1: the actual word was super important. The point is the 341 00:20:46,840 --> 00:20:49,920 Speaker 1: name was short, it had a nice sound to it, 342 00:20:49,920 --> 00:20:53,080 Speaker 1: it was easy to remember, and folks wouldn't make it 343 00:20:53,200 --> 00:20:55,679 Speaker 1: so much fun of it, like you didn't hear people 344 00:20:55,760 --> 00:20:58,320 Speaker 1: making as much fun of the name Hulu as they 345 00:20:58,400 --> 00:21:02,240 Speaker 1: later would. For like Quibi Quibi was the source of 346 00:21:02,440 --> 00:21:05,119 Speaker 1: endless jokes, Hulu, I don't remember a lot of people 347 00:21:05,160 --> 00:21:07,440 Speaker 1: making fun of it. While the site would go into 348 00:21:07,520 --> 00:21:09,960 Speaker 1: beta testing before the end of two thousand and seven, 349 00:21:10,240 --> 00:21:14,840 Speaker 1: it would not officially launch as a service until October 350 00:21:14,960 --> 00:21:18,760 Speaker 1: two thousand and eight. By that time, Netflix's streaming service 351 00:21:18,840 --> 00:21:22,239 Speaker 1: had a year's head start, but Hulu had something that 352 00:21:22,280 --> 00:21:27,160 Speaker 1: Netflix didn't have. Hulu, with its agreements with the various studios, 353 00:21:27,160 --> 00:21:30,080 Speaker 1: which would change out fairly frequently in the year leading 354 00:21:30,160 --> 00:21:32,760 Speaker 1: up to launch, would be able to host episodes of 355 00:21:32,800 --> 00:21:37,560 Speaker 1: shows the day after they originally aired on TV. Netflix, 356 00:21:37,600 --> 00:21:41,159 Speaker 1: by comparison, would only be able to add shows in seasons, 357 00:21:41,440 --> 00:21:43,840 Speaker 1: So you would get an entire season of a show 358 00:21:43,880 --> 00:21:47,480 Speaker 1: added to Netflix once the company had secured a licensing 359 00:21:47,560 --> 00:21:50,560 Speaker 1: deal for that particular season, and then you could watch 360 00:21:50,600 --> 00:21:53,240 Speaker 1: all the episodes in that season, but you wouldn't be 361 00:21:53,280 --> 00:21:55,359 Speaker 1: able to see the latest stuff. Hulu was kind of 362 00:21:55,359 --> 00:21:57,879 Speaker 1: the opposite. You could see the latest stuff, but you 363 00:21:57,920 --> 00:22:00,840 Speaker 1: couldn't watch a full season early on. Hulu was free 364 00:22:00,880 --> 00:22:04,240 Speaker 1: to use and it was also ads supported, but Kyler 365 00:22:04,280 --> 00:22:07,960 Speaker 1: was also careful not to overload ads on episodes, which 366 00:22:08,000 --> 00:22:12,359 Speaker 1: is something I wish other companies would practice. I'm not 367 00:22:12,880 --> 00:22:17,320 Speaker 1: naming names, I'm not making any accusations about anyone specifically, 368 00:22:17,720 --> 00:22:21,760 Speaker 1: but on a totally unrelated note, I am obligated to 369 00:22:21,800 --> 00:22:35,199 Speaker 1: take another break to take our sponsors. We'll be right back. Okay, 370 00:22:35,320 --> 00:22:39,880 Speaker 1: so we are back. And besides me being cheeky about ads, 371 00:22:40,320 --> 00:22:45,080 Speaker 1: Kyler was very much aware of the effect ads have 372 00:22:45,440 --> 00:22:48,600 Speaker 1: on viewership. He would later publish a blog post that 373 00:22:48,600 --> 00:22:52,479 Speaker 1: would outline certain observations he had made while in the 374 00:22:52,640 --> 00:22:57,000 Speaker 1: entertainment business, and one really big one was about ads. Specifically. 375 00:22:57,040 --> 00:23:01,120 Speaker 1: He wrote in a memo that quote, traditional TV has 376 00:23:01,240 --> 00:23:04,399 Speaker 1: too many ads. Users have demonstrated that they will go 377 00:23:04,480 --> 00:23:07,880 Speaker 1: to great lengths to avoid the advertising load that traditional 378 00:23:07,920 --> 00:23:11,320 Speaker 1: DV places upon them. Setting aside sports and other live 379 00:23:11,359 --> 00:23:15,800 Speaker 1: events programming, consumers are increasingly moving to on demand viewing 380 00:23:16,160 --> 00:23:20,199 Speaker 1: in part because of the lighter ad load end quote. 381 00:23:20,280 --> 00:23:23,359 Speaker 1: To that end, Hulu typically limited ads to two minutes 382 00:23:23,359 --> 00:23:26,840 Speaker 1: of advertising per half hour of content, which was far 383 00:23:26,920 --> 00:23:28,959 Speaker 1: below what you would find if you were tuning in 384 00:23:29,000 --> 00:23:32,639 Speaker 1: to live TV. For films, studios had the option to 385 00:23:32,680 --> 00:23:36,200 Speaker 1: allow users in ad free experience during the film itself 386 00:23:36,359 --> 00:23:39,560 Speaker 1: if in return, the users agreed to view ads up 387 00:23:39,600 --> 00:23:42,760 Speaker 1: front before the film started. You've probably seen a message 388 00:23:42,760 --> 00:23:44,920 Speaker 1: that was something like, thanks to our sponsors, you can 389 00:23:44,960 --> 00:23:48,160 Speaker 1: watch the following presentation free of ads, or something like that. 390 00:23:48,600 --> 00:23:52,119 Speaker 1: In that same memo in which Kyler pointed out the 391 00:23:52,200 --> 00:23:55,880 Speaker 1: issue with ads, he also talked about how audiences were 392 00:23:56,080 --> 00:24:01,480 Speaker 1: increasingly migrating to on demand viewing experiences. Traditional television requires 393 00:24:01,560 --> 00:24:05,359 Speaker 1: viewers to watch on their schedule, not the viewers, So 394 00:24:06,160 --> 00:24:10,640 Speaker 1: that's frustrating, right when you have to be available when 395 00:24:10,680 --> 00:24:14,520 Speaker 1: the program airs. Technology started to allow for time shifting. 396 00:24:14,600 --> 00:24:17,280 Speaker 1: I mean VCRs led the way, at least for those 397 00:24:17,320 --> 00:24:19,200 Speaker 1: of us who are willing to learn how to set 398 00:24:19,240 --> 00:24:22,160 Speaker 1: a VCR to record a specific channel at a specific time, 399 00:24:22,280 --> 00:24:26,240 Speaker 1: which wasn't always user friendly or easy. Then we could 400 00:24:26,240 --> 00:24:29,000 Speaker 1: watch the programming whenever we wanted to, not just when 401 00:24:29,040 --> 00:24:32,119 Speaker 1: it was scheduled to air. More sophisticated methods like DVRs 402 00:24:32,119 --> 00:24:35,760 Speaker 1: would make this far more easy and accessible, and audiences 403 00:24:35,760 --> 00:24:38,920 Speaker 1: would respond to that. They really enjoyed the freedom that 404 00:24:38,960 --> 00:24:42,840 Speaker 1: this represented. The era of must SETV was changing. We 405 00:24:42,840 --> 00:24:46,360 Speaker 1: weren't necessarily glued to our couches on Thursday nights or whatever, 406 00:24:46,680 --> 00:24:50,600 Speaker 1: and the arrival of on demand viewing made this even better. 407 00:24:50,840 --> 00:24:53,440 Speaker 1: A service that let you select whatt to watch when 408 00:24:53,480 --> 00:24:56,040 Speaker 1: you wanted to watch it without having to decide ahead 409 00:24:56,040 --> 00:24:58,960 Speaker 1: of time, like without having to set a DVR or 410 00:24:59,000 --> 00:25:03,160 Speaker 1: VCR a big deal. Hulu, despite a bumpy ride in development, 411 00:25:03,560 --> 00:25:06,600 Speaker 1: was poised for great success. Sure, the media companies that 412 00:25:06,680 --> 00:25:09,639 Speaker 1: signed on to be part of the project kept shifting around, 413 00:25:09,680 --> 00:25:12,000 Speaker 1: which meant it was hard to predict what material would 414 00:25:12,000 --> 00:25:15,520 Speaker 1: actually be available to viewers once Hulu went live, but 415 00:25:15,680 --> 00:25:18,840 Speaker 1: it still set itself apart from both YouTube and Netflix. 416 00:25:19,119 --> 00:25:22,199 Speaker 1: There were limitations, however. Typically Hulu would only have a 417 00:25:22,200 --> 00:25:25,399 Speaker 1: handful of episodes available for viewing and would remove the 418 00:25:25,520 --> 00:25:28,879 Speaker 1: oldest of those episodes while adding new episodes, so you 419 00:25:28,960 --> 00:25:31,440 Speaker 1: might only be able to access the last few episodes 420 00:25:31,480 --> 00:25:33,600 Speaker 1: of any given show, but you wouldn't be able to 421 00:25:33,760 --> 00:25:37,000 Speaker 1: really dive into the entire history of a program. This 422 00:25:37,200 --> 00:25:39,480 Speaker 1: was in an era in which Kylar was trying to 423 00:25:39,760 --> 00:25:45,480 Speaker 1: establish Hulu and when companies were even learning which strategies 424 00:25:45,560 --> 00:25:49,200 Speaker 1: would be viable, so like this was all very experimental. 425 00:25:49,440 --> 00:25:51,560 Speaker 1: Everyone seemed to know that it would take time for 426 00:25:51,600 --> 00:25:55,199 Speaker 1: streaming to shake out to become a sustainable model, and 427 00:25:55,280 --> 00:25:57,160 Speaker 1: that this would mean that there'd be a lot of 428 00:25:57,240 --> 00:26:00,119 Speaker 1: investment and trial and error in the early days, and 429 00:26:00,160 --> 00:26:02,560 Speaker 1: that it would require careful thought to find a way 430 00:26:02,640 --> 00:26:06,440 Speaker 1: to make streaming work long term on a financial level. 431 00:26:06,440 --> 00:26:09,679 Speaker 1: That is. Meanwhile, the cord cutting apocalypse was kind of 432 00:26:09,680 --> 00:26:12,400 Speaker 1: on the horizon. Now. It wasn't quite to the point 433 00:26:12,440 --> 00:26:16,360 Speaker 1: where people were suddenly like severing their cable connections right 434 00:26:16,400 --> 00:26:18,640 Speaker 1: out of the gate, but young adults who had spent 435 00:26:18,720 --> 00:26:22,760 Speaker 1: more time consuming content online than through traditional media were 436 00:26:22,840 --> 00:26:25,760 Speaker 1: less likely to become cable subscribers, and that meant that 437 00:26:25,920 --> 00:26:29,400 Speaker 1: simply through attrition, the cable business was facing a crisis. 438 00:26:29,640 --> 00:26:32,680 Speaker 1: So there was a healthy incentive in place for streaming 439 00:26:32,720 --> 00:26:36,000 Speaker 1: platforms to figure it all out, and it really big 440 00:26:36,480 --> 00:26:40,760 Speaker 1: incentive for traditional media companies to figure a strategy that worked, 441 00:26:40,800 --> 00:26:44,960 Speaker 1: because if they didn't, they were kind of dooming themselves. 442 00:26:45,359 --> 00:26:49,520 Speaker 1: In two thousand and nine, Disney would join the Hulu party. Literally, 443 00:26:49,600 --> 00:26:52,960 Speaker 1: they purchased a stake in Hulu. Obviously, this was well 444 00:26:53,000 --> 00:26:56,040 Speaker 1: before the Walt Disney Company would launch its own Disney 445 00:26:56,080 --> 00:27:00,679 Speaker 1: Plus platform, so At this point, Disney, NBCU Universal, and 446 00:27:00,760 --> 00:27:06,199 Speaker 1: NewsCorp each owned approximately equivalent portions of Hulu, and then 447 00:27:06,359 --> 00:27:10,360 Speaker 1: you had ten percent left over for the investment company. 448 00:27:10,680 --> 00:27:13,359 Speaker 1: Disney agreed to make available some of their older Disney 449 00:27:13,359 --> 00:27:16,240 Speaker 1: films on the service, and they also chose Hulu as 450 00:27:16,280 --> 00:27:20,080 Speaker 1: the home for ABC programming because Disney owns ABC as 451 00:27:20,080 --> 00:27:22,440 Speaker 1: well as some of the originals that Disney had produced 452 00:27:22,480 --> 00:27:25,399 Speaker 1: for the Disney Channel. Now, at this stage, Hulu was 453 00:27:25,440 --> 00:27:28,600 Speaker 1: competing against a different streaming platform, and we're still not 454 00:27:28,720 --> 00:27:32,760 Speaker 1: talking about Netflix here. Instead, we're talking about TV dot Com, 455 00:27:32,960 --> 00:27:35,800 Speaker 1: which I had completely forgotten about. TV dot Com. I 456 00:27:35,840 --> 00:27:37,480 Speaker 1: knew about it when it came out, but I hadn't 457 00:27:37,480 --> 00:27:39,639 Speaker 1: thought about in years. But that was a company that 458 00:27:39,800 --> 00:27:44,960 Speaker 1: CBS Corporation acquired in two thousand and eight because again CBS, 459 00:27:45,000 --> 00:27:48,280 Speaker 1: since it wasn't a stakeholder in Hulu, wasn't exactly eager 460 00:27:48,720 --> 00:27:53,760 Speaker 1: to allow these competing media companies to be gatekeepers for 461 00:27:53,840 --> 00:27:56,280 Speaker 1: CBS materials. So instead they go out and they buy 462 00:27:56,320 --> 00:27:59,359 Speaker 1: their own streaming platform. At one point, the partners behind 463 00:27:59,400 --> 00:28:02,680 Speaker 1: Hulu had some of their programming on TV dot Com 464 00:28:02,720 --> 00:28:05,360 Speaker 1: as well, but that would change when CBS took control 465 00:28:05,440 --> 00:28:09,040 Speaker 1: and Hulu pulled all of its programs off TV dot com. 466 00:28:09,359 --> 00:28:12,840 Speaker 1: The camps were starting to form around streaming, with no 467 00:28:12,920 --> 00:28:15,960 Speaker 1: one wanting anyone else to be the dominant player or 468 00:28:16,000 --> 00:28:18,160 Speaker 1: to be able to have leverage over them. The big 469 00:28:18,200 --> 00:28:21,800 Speaker 1: networks continued their long standing rivalry, and pretty much all 470 00:28:21,880 --> 00:28:25,880 Speaker 1: of old media was looking at Netflix with suspicion also YouTube. 471 00:28:25,960 --> 00:28:28,520 Speaker 1: Even though YouTube, I would argue, wasn't really in the 472 00:28:28,560 --> 00:28:31,520 Speaker 1: same space as the others, it was a hated rival 473 00:28:31,760 --> 00:28:34,760 Speaker 1: among media companies because it was stealing a whole lot 474 00:28:34,800 --> 00:28:38,440 Speaker 1: of eyeballs, kind of like the Corinthian in the Sandman comics. 475 00:28:38,760 --> 00:28:43,400 Speaker 1: In twenty ten, Hulu introduced a subscription service called Hulu Plus. 476 00:28:43,520 --> 00:28:46,760 Speaker 1: Now this was different from the Hulu Free service and 477 00:28:46,800 --> 00:28:50,240 Speaker 1: that viewers would be able to access full current seasons 478 00:28:50,240 --> 00:28:53,160 Speaker 1: of shows, not just the last few episodes. You could 479 00:28:53,240 --> 00:28:55,920 Speaker 1: watch a full season at least the latest one. You 480 00:28:55,920 --> 00:29:00,640 Speaker 1: couldn't necessarily watch every season of a Showers would also 481 00:29:00,680 --> 00:29:03,480 Speaker 1: get earlier access to the latest episodes. Essentially, they'd be 482 00:29:03,480 --> 00:29:05,880 Speaker 1: able to watch an episode when that show went to 483 00:29:06,040 --> 00:29:09,280 Speaker 1: air on television, you could access it online if you 484 00:29:09,280 --> 00:29:13,160 Speaker 1: were a Hulu subscriber. That subscription cost nine dollars ninety 485 00:29:13,240 --> 00:29:15,800 Speaker 1: nine cents per month when it launched, and to the 486 00:29:15,840 --> 00:29:21,160 Speaker 1: bewilderment of many, that service would still include ads supported content, 487 00:29:21,440 --> 00:29:24,640 Speaker 1: so you're not paying to get ad free content, it 488 00:29:24,680 --> 00:29:27,920 Speaker 1: would still get ads. Some folks asked why would there 489 00:29:27,960 --> 00:29:31,160 Speaker 1: still be ads if you also had to pay a subscription, 490 00:29:31,400 --> 00:29:34,040 Speaker 1: and the best answer seemed to be, we want money 491 00:29:34,560 --> 00:29:37,560 Speaker 1: on that front. Twenty ten is also when Hulu planned 492 00:29:37,600 --> 00:29:41,080 Speaker 1: to hold an IPO, or initial public offering. That's when 493 00:29:41,080 --> 00:29:44,760 Speaker 1: a privately held company becomes a publicly traded company, but 494 00:29:44,920 --> 00:29:49,160 Speaker 1: Hulu would in fact not go public that year. Ultimately, 495 00:29:49,200 --> 00:29:52,080 Speaker 1: the stakeholders decided to keep it a privately held company, 496 00:29:52,240 --> 00:29:55,320 Speaker 1: and there were rumors of a real IPO cropping up 497 00:29:55,360 --> 00:29:58,080 Speaker 1: in late twenty twenty three, but as we will learn, 498 00:29:58,400 --> 00:30:00,440 Speaker 1: that's not the path that the company, but he would 499 00:30:00,480 --> 00:30:04,600 Speaker 1: ultimately take. One thing Hulu did fairly early on was 500 00:30:04,640 --> 00:30:09,320 Speaker 1: to produce original content specifically for the Hulu platform itself, 501 00:30:09,440 --> 00:30:12,640 Speaker 1: and this began in twenty eleven, which is two years 502 00:30:12,640 --> 00:30:15,280 Speaker 1: before Netflix would do the same thing. So for the 503 00:30:15,280 --> 00:30:17,880 Speaker 1: first few years, Hulu really just existed as a place 504 00:30:17,920 --> 00:30:22,080 Speaker 1: where folks could go to watch recent television programs, and 505 00:30:22,160 --> 00:30:24,440 Speaker 1: it was pretty handy if you happen to miss an 506 00:30:24,480 --> 00:30:26,920 Speaker 1: episode of your favorite show, you know, if it was 507 00:30:27,160 --> 00:30:29,760 Speaker 1: a show that was on a network that partnered with Hulu, 508 00:30:29,840 --> 00:30:33,560 Speaker 1: at least you could potentially catch that episode starting the 509 00:30:33,640 --> 00:30:36,840 Speaker 1: day after it originally aired, and you would also see 510 00:30:36,840 --> 00:30:38,960 Speaker 1: fewer commercials than you would if you had watched it 511 00:30:39,000 --> 00:30:40,800 Speaker 1: on television in the first place, which is not a 512 00:30:40,840 --> 00:30:45,000 Speaker 1: bad deal. Before getting into the content game directly, Hulu 513 00:30:45,040 --> 00:30:47,800 Speaker 1: also served as a place where web originals could find 514 00:30:47,840 --> 00:30:51,080 Speaker 1: a home. So these were programs made by other companies 515 00:30:51,320 --> 00:30:54,120 Speaker 1: but with the web in mind, as opposed to on 516 00:30:54,320 --> 00:30:58,400 Speaker 1: traditional media. The first actual Hulu original was a show 517 00:30:58,440 --> 00:31:01,280 Speaker 1: called The Morning After. This was a sort of pop 518 00:31:01,360 --> 00:31:05,800 Speaker 1: culture roundup show. The first scripted series would come out 519 00:31:05,840 --> 00:31:08,800 Speaker 1: in twenty twelve, and it was called battle Ground, which 520 00:31:08,840 --> 00:31:13,280 Speaker 1: was a satirical political comedy series that the showrunners originally 521 00:31:13,320 --> 00:31:16,200 Speaker 1: pitched as a TV show, but they couldn't find a 522 00:31:16,280 --> 00:31:19,840 Speaker 1: network to pick up the series. Hulu provided an alternative 523 00:31:19,840 --> 00:31:23,800 Speaker 1: pathway to find an audience. Hulu would increase its focus 524 00:31:23,880 --> 00:31:27,200 Speaker 1: on original content, and this gradually meant that the original 525 00:31:27,200 --> 00:31:31,040 Speaker 1: strategy of providing access to broadcast TV would start to 526 00:31:31,080 --> 00:31:34,480 Speaker 1: decline in importance, and another shift was coming as well. 527 00:31:34,640 --> 00:31:37,280 Speaker 1: Jason Kyler, who had led the company from when it 528 00:31:37,320 --> 00:31:39,880 Speaker 1: was still taking shape in two thousand and seven, announced 529 00:31:39,920 --> 00:31:43,600 Speaker 1: he would be resigning from the company in twenty thirteen. Now, 530 00:31:43,680 --> 00:31:47,560 Speaker 1: under Kyler's leadership, Hulu had gone from this nebulous idea 531 00:31:47,840 --> 00:31:50,120 Speaker 1: that the industry in general predicted was going to be 532 00:31:50,120 --> 00:31:52,960 Speaker 1: a colossal failure and had created a business that had 533 00:31:53,000 --> 00:31:56,640 Speaker 1: an upward revenue trajectory that was pretty impressive. For example, 534 00:31:56,720 --> 00:32:00,000 Speaker 1: the Hollywood Reporter said that in twenty twelve, Hulu posted 535 00:32:00,160 --> 00:32:04,280 Speaker 1: a sixty five percent increase in year over year revenue. However, 536 00:32:04,720 --> 00:32:07,640 Speaker 1: percentages never tell you the full story, right Because if 537 00:32:07,640 --> 00:32:10,360 Speaker 1: I gave you a dollar today and then tomorrow I 538 00:32:10,400 --> 00:32:13,280 Speaker 1: gave you two dollars, that's a one hundred percent increase 539 00:32:13,440 --> 00:32:16,360 Speaker 1: day to day. But that's still just two dollars or 540 00:32:16,400 --> 00:32:19,720 Speaker 1: three dollars total. However, that being said, the twenty twelve 541 00:32:19,800 --> 00:32:22,760 Speaker 1: revenue was six hundred and ninety five million dollars, which 542 00:32:22,800 --> 00:32:25,920 Speaker 1: is not chump change or you know, clown company dollars, 543 00:32:25,960 --> 00:32:29,440 Speaker 1: I guess. Also, by this time, the stakeholders had been 544 00:32:29,640 --> 00:32:34,000 Speaker 1: whittled down to news Corp, NBC, Universal, and Disney because 545 00:32:34,040 --> 00:32:38,400 Speaker 1: the three other stakeholders had bought out Providence Equities stake 546 00:32:38,440 --> 00:32:41,040 Speaker 1: for around two hundred million dollars according to Bloomberg. Now, 547 00:32:41,040 --> 00:32:44,760 Speaker 1: remember when Providence first invested, they were taking like one 548 00:32:44,800 --> 00:32:48,920 Speaker 1: hundred million dollar equity steak in Hulu, so they essentially 549 00:32:49,000 --> 00:32:53,160 Speaker 1: doubled that, which is not bad. Kylar wasn't the only 550 00:32:53,200 --> 00:32:55,960 Speaker 1: executive leaving the company at that point. Another was the 551 00:32:56,160 --> 00:32:59,840 Speaker 1: chief technology officer for Hulu, a guy named rich Tom, 552 00:33:00,120 --> 00:33:02,920 Speaker 1: which you know, that's a great name. Oh you mean 553 00:33:03,040 --> 00:33:06,600 Speaker 1: rich Tom. The rumor mill said that Kyler's decision was 554 00:33:06,640 --> 00:33:10,920 Speaker 1: one fueled by frustration he had with his corporate overlords, 555 00:33:11,000 --> 00:33:14,040 Speaker 1: that that Kyler had really wanted to secure more licensing 556 00:33:14,120 --> 00:33:17,760 Speaker 1: deals in order to feature a wider spectrum of programming 557 00:33:17,840 --> 00:33:21,360 Speaker 1: on Hulu, but that he was being stonewalled by the 558 00:33:21,440 --> 00:33:27,400 Speaker 1: various corporate stakeholders and denied these. These budgets and licensing 559 00:33:27,440 --> 00:33:30,440 Speaker 1: fees were growing pretty hefty, and this was largely because 560 00:33:30,480 --> 00:33:34,720 Speaker 1: Netflix was pouring buckets of cash into its own strategy. 561 00:33:34,840 --> 00:33:37,360 Speaker 1: And we'd get back to the conundrum that the media 562 00:33:37,400 --> 00:33:40,680 Speaker 1: companies were in, so in an ideal world from the 563 00:33:40,760 --> 00:33:44,400 Speaker 1: studio perspective, not the audience perspective. But if you're a studio, 564 00:33:44,600 --> 00:33:47,480 Speaker 1: the ideal is that you would have your owned and 565 00:33:47,560 --> 00:33:52,120 Speaker 1: operated streaming service specifically for your studio's output. And of course, 566 00:33:52,160 --> 00:33:54,200 Speaker 1: as we go down the timeline, that's kind of what 567 00:33:54,400 --> 00:33:57,840 Speaker 1: would happen, right, because we would get a bunch of platforms, 568 00:33:57,960 --> 00:34:00,560 Speaker 1: ridiculous ones. You know, you look out there and you've 569 00:34:00,600 --> 00:34:05,360 Speaker 1: got your your Peacock Paramount plus, CBS All Access, HBO Max. 570 00:34:05,400 --> 00:34:08,000 Speaker 1: All of these would start to pop up many years 571 00:34:08,280 --> 00:34:10,600 Speaker 1: further down the line, so we would see this kind 572 00:34:10,640 --> 00:34:12,680 Speaker 1: of come to pass. But that's something that all these 573 00:34:12,719 --> 00:34:16,840 Speaker 1: studios wanted early on. They just didn't have the infrastructure. 574 00:34:16,920 --> 00:34:21,200 Speaker 1: They didn't invest in building that out. So back then, 575 00:34:21,640 --> 00:34:24,680 Speaker 1: back in twenty thirteen, there were only a few options 576 00:34:24,719 --> 00:34:27,400 Speaker 1: open to you. If you wanted to make your material 577 00:34:27,520 --> 00:34:31,040 Speaker 1: available for streaming. You could sign on with Netflix, or 578 00:34:31,120 --> 00:34:33,719 Speaker 1: you could sign on with Hulu. Anything else was seen 579 00:34:33,760 --> 00:34:36,560 Speaker 1: as being a little too obscure to make much sense, 580 00:34:36,719 --> 00:34:38,920 Speaker 1: like it just wouldn't be a good return on investment. 581 00:34:39,120 --> 00:34:41,960 Speaker 1: And if you didn't sign licensing deals, well then you 582 00:34:42,000 --> 00:34:45,080 Speaker 1: were leaving money on the table. So while studios weren't 583 00:34:45,239 --> 00:34:48,279 Speaker 1: keen to turn a service like Netflix or Hulu into 584 00:34:48,360 --> 00:34:51,360 Speaker 1: a gatekeeper. There weren't a lot of alternatives, and with 585 00:34:51,520 --> 00:34:55,120 Speaker 1: Netflix willing to shell out crazy amounts of cash for licenses, 586 00:34:55,239 --> 00:34:57,600 Speaker 1: it meant that Hulu was losing out. Now, as we 587 00:34:57,640 --> 00:35:01,120 Speaker 1: would see, this isn't an episode about Netflix, but Netflix's 588 00:35:01,120 --> 00:35:03,960 Speaker 1: strategy would ultimately be to invest more and more in 589 00:35:04,000 --> 00:35:08,160 Speaker 1: original programming and kind of wean itself off of making 590 00:35:08,200 --> 00:35:12,040 Speaker 1: these big licensing deals, which suited the studios fine because 591 00:35:12,200 --> 00:35:15,360 Speaker 1: they would prefer to not have their stuff on Netflix 592 00:35:15,400 --> 00:35:17,920 Speaker 1: if they could have it on their own platform anyway. 593 00:35:17,960 --> 00:35:20,960 Speaker 1: The other big rumor behind Kyler's departure was that he 594 00:35:21,080 --> 00:35:25,120 Speaker 1: was still focused on growing the business and his corporate 595 00:35:25,160 --> 00:35:28,160 Speaker 1: overlords were hoping that he would switch more to a 596 00:35:28,560 --> 00:35:32,200 Speaker 1: near term profit model. These two things are not always 597 00:35:32,239 --> 00:35:35,719 Speaker 1: in alignment, right, because to grow often it means you 598 00:35:35,800 --> 00:35:38,880 Speaker 1: have to spend more money, invest more. You're not going 599 00:35:38,920 --> 00:35:41,120 Speaker 1: to see as big of a return. The folks who 600 00:35:41,160 --> 00:35:45,000 Speaker 1: were owning the stakes were getting itchy. They wanted profit, 601 00:35:45,280 --> 00:35:47,719 Speaker 1: and it also sounds like the various stakeholders were at 602 00:35:47,760 --> 00:35:51,040 Speaker 1: odds with one another over how to even achieve the 603 00:35:51,040 --> 00:35:53,280 Speaker 1: goals that they had, Like even when they had goals 604 00:35:53,280 --> 00:35:55,840 Speaker 1: that were in common, they disagreed with how they should 605 00:35:55,880 --> 00:35:58,640 Speaker 1: go about achieving those goals, and that put Hulu in 606 00:35:58,800 --> 00:36:02,080 Speaker 1: kind of a corporate ug of war between the different stakeholders. 607 00:36:02,160 --> 00:36:04,600 Speaker 1: So I wouldn't blame Kyler for a moment if that 608 00:36:04,840 --> 00:36:07,920 Speaker 1: contributed to his decision to step down. I've been in 609 00:36:08,200 --> 00:36:10,680 Speaker 1: corporate tug of wars in the middle of one, and 610 00:36:10,800 --> 00:36:15,920 Speaker 1: it is the most frustrated I think I've ever been professionally. Anyway, 611 00:36:16,000 --> 00:36:18,600 Speaker 1: it sounded kind of like the board level of Hulu 612 00:36:18,680 --> 00:36:21,239 Speaker 1: was turning into what naysayers had been predicting back in 613 00:36:21,280 --> 00:36:24,279 Speaker 1: the Clown Company days, right Like, it sounds like that's 614 00:36:24,320 --> 00:36:27,160 Speaker 1: what was coming true. I already mentioned that Kyler would 615 00:36:27,160 --> 00:36:29,640 Speaker 1: go on to co found a different video streaming site 616 00:36:29,680 --> 00:36:32,279 Speaker 1: similar in some ways to YouTube, and that Verizon would 617 00:36:32,280 --> 00:36:36,360 Speaker 1: subsequently acquire and then later shut down that website, and 618 00:36:36,400 --> 00:36:38,880 Speaker 1: that Kyler then went on to become the CEO of 619 00:36:38,960 --> 00:36:44,080 Speaker 1: Watermedia under at and T. Interestingly, in twenty sixteen, Time Warner, 620 00:36:44,520 --> 00:36:48,160 Speaker 1: which would later become WarnerMedia, acquired a ten percent steak 621 00:36:48,200 --> 00:36:51,919 Speaker 1: in Hulu. So again, those worlds would intersect a couple 622 00:36:51,920 --> 00:36:54,719 Speaker 1: of times. I've said, like the corporate overlords of Hulu. 623 00:36:54,800 --> 00:36:57,560 Speaker 1: The partnerships have changed over time, so at one time 624 00:36:58,040 --> 00:37:01,920 Speaker 1: Warner was one of the owners. When Kyler announced that 625 00:37:01,960 --> 00:37:03,960 Speaker 1: he was going to depart from Hulu in twenty thirteen, 626 00:37:04,000 --> 00:37:06,680 Speaker 1: the company had yet to announce a replacement, and in fact, 627 00:37:06,719 --> 00:37:09,200 Speaker 1: it took a little while before that would happen. It 628 00:37:09,239 --> 00:37:12,000 Speaker 1: was a luxury that a privately held company can enjoy, 629 00:37:12,120 --> 00:37:14,880 Speaker 1: I guess because if you're a publicly traded company, succession 630 00:37:14,880 --> 00:37:19,400 Speaker 1: planning is something that investors take very seriously see also Disney. 631 00:37:19,560 --> 00:37:23,520 Speaker 1: But eventually Hulu announced that Andy Forcell, who had been 632 00:37:23,680 --> 00:37:27,320 Speaker 1: senior vice president of content at Hulu since two thousand 633 00:37:27,360 --> 00:37:31,280 Speaker 1: and seven, would take on the job as an acting CEO. 634 00:37:31,840 --> 00:37:34,480 Speaker 1: He would not be on that job for long. He 635 00:37:34,520 --> 00:37:37,560 Speaker 1: would actually leave Hulu in late twenty thirteen. That's the 636 00:37:37,560 --> 00:37:40,279 Speaker 1: same year that Kylar stepped down. So we're talking one 637 00:37:40,360 --> 00:37:44,239 Speaker 1: year two different CEOs, really three, because the third one 638 00:37:44,239 --> 00:37:47,759 Speaker 1: would take over after Forcell would leave, And interestingly, Forceell's 639 00:37:48,040 --> 00:37:50,600 Speaker 1: journey would take him on to become the chief operating 640 00:37:50,640 --> 00:37:54,560 Speaker 1: officer at Full Screen and then Ottermedia. Now, if you 641 00:37:54,640 --> 00:37:58,040 Speaker 1: listen to my episodes about Rooster Teeth, those companies were 642 00:37:58,080 --> 00:38:01,000 Speaker 1: going to sound familiar. He was part of that whole thing, 643 00:38:01,239 --> 00:38:04,040 Speaker 1: and then ultimately would end up becoming the head of 644 00:38:04,239 --> 00:38:07,760 Speaker 1: HBO Max over at WarnerMedia, which meant that once again 645 00:38:07,800 --> 00:38:10,680 Speaker 1: he'd be working under his old boss, Kylar, who was 646 00:38:10,719 --> 00:38:13,640 Speaker 1: the CEO of WarnerMedia at that time, and just like 647 00:38:13,680 --> 00:38:17,120 Speaker 1: in twenty thirteen, Forceel would leave WarnerMedia around the same 648 00:38:17,160 --> 00:38:20,719 Speaker 1: time that Kyler did after AT and T divested itself 649 00:38:20,800 --> 00:38:24,200 Speaker 1: of WarnerMedia and sold it to Discovery. So time is 650 00:38:24,200 --> 00:38:27,600 Speaker 1: a flat circle. Mike Hopkins, who had been president of 651 00:38:27,680 --> 00:38:32,000 Speaker 1: Fox Networks Group, was then tapped to be CEO of Hulu, 652 00:38:32,160 --> 00:38:34,719 Speaker 1: and this capped off an era in which many of 653 00:38:34,760 --> 00:38:37,560 Speaker 1: the leaders who were part of the original team who 654 00:38:37,600 --> 00:38:41,279 Speaker 1: built Hulu had at this point left the company. Reportedly, 655 00:38:41,360 --> 00:38:44,920 Speaker 1: this had a pretty negative impact on employee morale. Hopkins 656 00:38:44,960 --> 00:38:48,680 Speaker 1: would stick around for four years and provide some leadership 657 00:38:48,719 --> 00:38:51,640 Speaker 1: stability at a time when it was sorely needed in 658 00:38:51,640 --> 00:38:55,240 Speaker 1: the company. He would eventually leave Hulu to become chairman 659 00:38:55,280 --> 00:38:57,600 Speaker 1: of Sony Pictures Television, and then after a couple of 660 00:38:57,680 --> 00:38:59,640 Speaker 1: years of doing that, he would go on to join 661 00:38:59,680 --> 00:39:02,640 Speaker 1: Ammazon on and became a senior vice president for Prime 662 00:39:02,719 --> 00:39:07,360 Speaker 1: Video and Amazon Studios. But anyway, Hopkins takes the helmet Hulu, 663 00:39:07,640 --> 00:39:10,359 Speaker 1: you might wonder what else was going on during his 664 00:39:10,560 --> 00:39:14,920 Speaker 1: era as CEO, which went from twenty thirteen to twenty seventeen. 665 00:39:15,280 --> 00:39:17,080 Speaker 1: That is what we're going to start to cover in 666 00:39:17,120 --> 00:39:19,640 Speaker 1: the next episode, along with the story of where Hulu 667 00:39:19,640 --> 00:39:21,960 Speaker 1: would go from there and how the company would reach 668 00:39:22,000 --> 00:39:24,360 Speaker 1: where we are now, which is in this weird limbo 669 00:39:24,480 --> 00:39:27,799 Speaker 1: because of a disagreement between Disney and Comcast over how 670 00:39:27,880 --> 00:39:30,879 Speaker 1: much the company is actually worth. We'll touch back on 671 00:39:30,920 --> 00:39:34,000 Speaker 1: that later this week. In the meantime, I hope you 672 00:39:34,040 --> 00:39:37,919 Speaker 1: are all well and I'll talk to you again really soon. 673 00:39:43,960 --> 00:39:48,640 Speaker 1: Tech Stuff is an iHeartRadio production. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, 674 00:39:48,960 --> 00:39:52,640 Speaker 1: visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen 675 00:39:52,680 --> 00:39:57,520 Speaker 1: to your favorite shows.