WEBVTT - Why Asset Allocators Love Multi-Strategy Hedge Funds

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<v Speaker 1>Hello, Odd Lots listeners.

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<v Speaker 2>I'm Joe Wisenthal and I'm Tracy Alloway. Tracy, We're doing

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<v Speaker 2>another live show and it's right here in New York City.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, this one should be our biggest yet, and we're

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<v Speaker 3>going to have a bunch of Odd Lots favorites and

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<v Speaker 3>previous live podcast recordings.

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<v Speaker 2>When the guests are revealed, the show is going to

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<v Speaker 4>Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News.

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<v Speaker 3>Hello and welcome to another episode of the Authoughts podcast.

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<v Speaker 3>I'm Tracy Alloway.

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<v Speaker 1>And I'm Joe Wisenthal.

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<v Speaker 3>Joe, did you, at some point last month when markets

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<v Speaker 3>were being very, very dramatic, did you maybe hear that

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<v Speaker 3>a pod was blowing up? Maybe just maybe.

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<v Speaker 2>I probably saw some tweets, probably tongue in cheek. I

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<v Speaker 2>may have sent some dms to people saying jokingly, have

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<v Speaker 2>you heard of any pods blowing up? But no, it's

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<v Speaker 2>become such a meme. Anytime like the market moves half

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<v Speaker 2>a percent, I imagine some pods did blow up. But it

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<v Speaker 2>is a funny joke, good intro.

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<v Speaker 3>It's definitely become a thing. But I think it kind

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<v Speaker 3>of highlights something something very real, which is there is

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<v Speaker 3>this mystique around pod shops, the multi strategy hedge funds,

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<v Speaker 3>and whenever something weird is happening in markets now, they

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<v Speaker 3>tend to get blamed or people start joking about them.

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<v Speaker 3>And also part of the mystique is there's just a

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<v Speaker 3>lot of interest in why they seem to be so

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<v Speaker 3>hot right now blowing up in a very different way.

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<v Speaker 3>And what exactly is the attraction for big allocators of capital,

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<v Speaker 3>because I always think it's not like big investors can't

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<v Speaker 3>create their own diversified portfolios or invest in a fund

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<v Speaker 3>of funds or traditional two and twenty or whatever. So

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<v Speaker 3>what exactly is it about the pod shops that makes

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<v Speaker 3>them so attractive.

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<v Speaker 2>We've done a lot of episodes on the multistreads at

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<v Speaker 2>this point, the pod shops so various flavors.

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<v Speaker 1>There are still a lot of things I don't understand.

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<v Speaker 2>First of all, my understanding is that they sort of

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<v Speaker 2>continue to prove their metal. I mean, it seems like

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<v Speaker 2>they didn't lose a lot of money in April during

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<v Speaker 2>some of that volatility, So they have this promise uncorrelated returns.

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<v Speaker 2>We'll get into how they deliver that. So far, it

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<v Speaker 2>seems like they continue to more or less do what's advertised.

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<v Speaker 2>I have a lot of questions about how and what

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<v Speaker 2>is the actual source of alpha and how long can

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<v Speaker 2>this go on, and whether there are a lot of

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<v Speaker 2>copycats and whether that will cause alpha decay and all

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<v Speaker 2>this stuff.

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<v Speaker 3>I have questions about comp the most important thing.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, this is really important, and actually, you know, we

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<v Speaker 2>did that episode with the founder of Freestone, Grove dan Morello,

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<v Speaker 2>just a lot of the conversation was about comp And

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<v Speaker 2>I'm interested in comp because I'm interested in the topic

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<v Speaker 2>of making a lot of money, But also I get

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<v Speaker 2>the impression that comp and incentive alignment more broadly is

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<v Speaker 2>actually one of the key problems that people are trying

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<v Speaker 2>to solve for all the time.

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<v Speaker 3>I think that's right. Okay, So I am very pleased

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<v Speaker 3>to say we do, in fact have the perfect guest.

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<v Speaker 3>We're going to be speaking with Ronan Cosgrave. He is

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<v Speaker 3>a partner at Alburn Partners. So Ronan, thank you so

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<v Speaker 3>much for coming on all thoughts.

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<v Speaker 5>Thank you very much. I'm really honored to be here.

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<v Speaker 3>First question, what exactly is Alborn Partners because it's not

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<v Speaker 3>a pod shop itself.

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<v Speaker 5>No, No, we're so.

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<v Speaker 6>I co lead multi strategy heads fund coverage at Alborn.

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<v Speaker 6>We are an advisory only independently owned consultant. We help

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<v Speaker 6>institutional investors invest in hedge funds, private equity, real estate,

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<v Speaker 6>all across the alternate that spectrum. We have about three

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<v Speaker 6>undred and fifty clients worldwide and we advise on greater

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<v Speaker 6>than seven hundred and fifty billion dollars in assets.

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<v Speaker 2>Okay, give us a little bit more of your background.

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<v Speaker 2>You're the perfect guests to talk about multi strategy hedge

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<v Speaker 2>funds and why allocators like allocating to them. Talk to

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<v Speaker 2>us about like how you built up your familiarity with

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<v Speaker 2>the space and how you've built up your like understanding

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<v Speaker 2>of their inner mechanics.

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<v Speaker 6>That's a long answer. I've been over twenty years in

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<v Speaker 6>the hedge front industry.

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<v Speaker 5>Okay.

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<v Speaker 6>I worked at a fund of funds called Pamco for

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<v Speaker 6>fifteen years or the partner there did a whole lot

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<v Speaker 6>of stuff there, covered pretty much kind of the constituent

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<v Speaker 6>strategies of many of the multi strats, right, so you're

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<v Speaker 6>talking about longstrared equity, long shot credit, convert arab ballarb.

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<v Speaker 6>As it got more difficult, I got more involved, you know.

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<v Speaker 6>Since then, I've worked with Albourne. I joined Albourne for

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<v Speaker 6>four and a bit years ago, and you know, with

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<v Speaker 6>my colleague Martina, we cover the multi strategy universe globally.

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<v Speaker 6>So part of our job really is to kind of

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<v Speaker 6>dig in deep into the multistrats, not just learn about

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<v Speaker 6>the people, but the process, the inner mechanisms of what

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<v Speaker 6>differentiates one particular multi strat from another. And the really

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<v Speaker 6>cool thing is that they're all actually really different, you know.

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<v Speaker 6>And one of the fun things listening to you guys

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<v Speaker 6>is when you talk about pod shops and so on

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<v Speaker 6>and so forth, or multi strats in general, I mean,

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<v Speaker 6>there's huge differences in how they're run internally, you know.

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<v Speaker 6>And the other thing I distinguish in the multi strategy

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<v Speaker 6>space is the pod shops, which are the classic ones

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<v Speaker 6>that are you know, you know, with the three layer

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<v Speaker 6>of the fees versus the more traditional multi strategy hedge funds,

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<v Speaker 6>which are two and twenty.

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<v Speaker 1>Oh.

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<v Speaker 3>That is an important difference, isn't it. Before we get

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<v Speaker 3>into that, I want to ask, when you're doing due

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<v Speaker 3>diligence on possible hedge fund investments, how do you go

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<v Speaker 3>about doing that? Actually, because you just said you dig

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<v Speaker 3>into you know, the culture, the people, risk management. How

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<v Speaker 3>much access do you have and how do you do that?

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<v Speaker 5>That's another big question.

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<v Speaker 6>So the thing is with the multi strategy hedge fund

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<v Speaker 6>space is you start really with the single strategy stuff,

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<v Speaker 6>and it's not really fair to ask anybody to cover

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<v Speaker 6>multi strategies if they haven't worked hard at understanding the

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<v Speaker 6>individual contributions of all the different trades and trade types

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<v Speaker 6>that make up a multi strategy. But the critical thing,

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<v Speaker 6>and you alluded to this, is that multi strategy hedge

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<v Speaker 6>funds are another level of abstraction away from the markets.

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<v Speaker 6>Because yes, we do look at trades, at traders and

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<v Speaker 6>pms and stuff like that, but almost as important as

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<v Speaker 6>you're evaluating them as business models, you're evaluating them as

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<v Speaker 6>risk models and investment models, and you know, they're all

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<v Speaker 6>super interlinked. And one of the things that we look

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<v Speaker 6>at and look for is kind of consistency between all

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<v Speaker 6>the strands, because if you have things that are in

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<v Speaker 6>conflict internally, you end up with a suboptimal outcome, right,

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<v Speaker 6>I mean, we've all lived that in our own personal

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<v Speaker 6>and professional lives. But if things aren't in a line,

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<v Speaker 6>and you mentioned compensation, competition is a huge part of that,

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<v Speaker 6>and I'm you know, one of the things I'd argue

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<v Speaker 6>is that comp affects far, far, far more dimensions of

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<v Speaker 6>a multi strategy hedge fund than almost any aspect.

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<v Speaker 5>Yeah.

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<v Speaker 2>No, this seems very interesting to me because often it

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<v Speaker 2>feels as though, okay, you have some investment strategy and

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<v Speaker 2>then make a lot of money and then okay, some

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<v Speaker 2>of it goes to the manager and some of it

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<v Speaker 2>goes to the outside investor. That's how I conceive of things.

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<v Speaker 2>But it really does seem like comp structure is actually

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<v Speaker 2>core to the business model. But before we get to that,

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<v Speaker 2>why don't you actually go back for listeners, and for

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<v Speaker 2>my sake, when you distinguish between the sort of traditional

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<v Speaker 2>two and twenty multistrats with the so called podshops, In

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<v Speaker 2>my mind, I associate with the millenniums of the world

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<v Speaker 2>but talk to us about the differences in these business

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<v Speaker 2>models when you use these terms.

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<v Speaker 6>Yeah, so I refer to two and twenty simple it's

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<v Speaker 6>a straight management fee of two, but it could be

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<v Speaker 6>any fixed number, and a performance fee of twenty percent

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<v Speaker 6>on the overall portfolio.

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<v Speaker 5>So the only fees paid.

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<v Speaker 6>By the investor are the management fee, which is idignated

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<v Speaker 6>in advance, plus a cut of the gross performance of

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<v Speaker 6>the portfolio as the whole. And that's a really critical

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<v Speaker 6>distinction between between them and the platforms or pod shops. Right,

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<v Speaker 6>so a pod shop has all that right now. First off,

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<v Speaker 6>the first thing that happens is that the management fee

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<v Speaker 6>may or may not be fixed. It can be what's

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<v Speaker 6>known as a pass through fee, where it's kind of

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<v Speaker 6>a blank check in many ways. For the most part,

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<v Speaker 6>they do take good care of that. But the third

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<v Speaker 6>layer of fees that's really important is that there's fees

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<v Speaker 6>payable at the level of the PM, not at the

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<v Speaker 6>overall fund. And when you get to that level, there's

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<v Speaker 6>a lot of things that people take for granted and

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<v Speaker 6>investing just simply breakdown, you know. And to go on

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<v Speaker 6>to that, like the one thing that I keep getting told,

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<v Speaker 6>you know, in my own personal investing life and everybody's

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<v Speaker 6>personal investing life, is that diversification is the only fee

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<v Speaker 6>launch R. When you are paying performance fees on a

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<v Speaker 6>on individual components of a portfolio. Diversification is not a

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<v Speaker 6>free launch. It costs you money, real money.

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<v Speaker 3>Wait, can you explain how do clients? How do investors

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<v Speaker 3>actually pay individual pms? Like, how does that work?

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<v Speaker 5>Yeah?

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<v Speaker 6>So in a pod shop, what you have you think

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<v Speaker 6>about it is you have you know a number of pms,

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<v Speaker 6>anything between five to three hundred and something. They each

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<v Speaker 6>basically have their own individual P and L. Right, so

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<v Speaker 6>they the manager, the overall fund manager track tracks each

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<v Speaker 6>PM and their p and L. They'll charge back all

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<v Speaker 6>the appropriate stuff that would be charged to that. They

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<v Speaker 6>will normally be charged Bloomberg for example, all other trading costs,

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<v Speaker 6>the analysts costs perhaps, and then if that number is

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<v Speaker 6>above zero, the PM gets a payment from the manager

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<v Speaker 6>out of the fund and that's their performance fees. So

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<v Speaker 6>the investors themselves don't actually pay them, paid.

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<v Speaker 5>For them by the manager.

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<v Speaker 2>Now, you said that there can be the instances in

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<v Speaker 2>when diversification is not a free launch, and so I

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<v Speaker 2>take that to mean that you can have situations in

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<v Speaker 2>which at the fund level you don't have a good

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<v Speaker 2>year and you're not making any money. But some pod

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<v Speaker 2>managers had a great year and they still have to

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<v Speaker 2>get paid. And so you talk to us a little

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<v Speaker 2>bit about these conditions under which that diversification can be costly.

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<v Speaker 6>Yeah, let's use a simple, simple model. So you have

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<v Speaker 6>a pod shop, but you want to got two pods,

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<v Speaker 6>and at the end of the year, one pod is

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<v Speaker 6>up ten dollars and one pod is down ten dollars.

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<v Speaker 6>Because it's pod shop, you're paying on the panel of

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<v Speaker 6>each individual PM. So let's say it's twenty percent. Right,

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<v Speaker 6>So on a gross before fees basis your flat. However,

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<v Speaker 6>you're paying the guy who was up ten dollars two dollars, right.

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<v Speaker 6>So after this is added together, now your portfolio is

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<v Speaker 6>down two dollars. And that is netting risk. And the

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<v Speaker 6>interesting thing about netting risk is because to bring it

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<v Speaker 6>out further, is that netting risk you could argue, well,

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<v Speaker 6>that's you and be an issue for the ones that

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<v Speaker 6>pay at the top level.

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<v Speaker 5>Well, the issue is.

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<v Speaker 6>That because they exist in a competitive landscape for pms,

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<v Speaker 6>pod shops can go to a PM who didn't get paid.

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<v Speaker 5>Right, So, if you think.

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<v Speaker 6>About it, if that was a traditional two and twenty

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<v Speaker 6>multi strat ten dollars up, ten dollars down, flash, nobody

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<v Speaker 6>gets paid. The fact is you've got a very very

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<v Speaker 6>unhappy PM who's up ten dollars, he's made ten dollars,

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<v Speaker 6>who's like sitting there in the corner really angry because

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<v Speaker 6>they worked really hard, they made a lot of money

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<v Speaker 6>and they get nothing.

0:11:29.880 --> 0:11:31.439
<v Speaker 5>And the pod shop can ring them up.

0:11:31.400 --> 0:11:33.679
<v Speaker 6>And says we'll take you, yeah you know, and will

0:11:33.679 --> 0:11:36.319
<v Speaker 6>guarantee if you make money you will get paid it.

0:11:36.559 --> 0:11:39.160
<v Speaker 6>The other thing to remember as regards netting risk is

0:11:39.200 --> 0:11:42.040
<v Speaker 6>it's actually we've modeled it at Albourne. We've worked it

0:11:42.080 --> 0:11:45.800
<v Speaker 6>out and using various simulations, it averages for a just

0:11:45.840 --> 0:11:48.959
<v Speaker 6>a regular set of managers and pms around one percent

0:11:48.960 --> 0:11:49.280
<v Speaker 6>a year.

0:11:49.960 --> 0:11:50.160
<v Speaker 5>Right.

0:11:50.160 --> 0:11:52.760
<v Speaker 6>When you think about a two and twenty hedge fund,

0:11:52.880 --> 0:11:56.280
<v Speaker 6>yeah you might, you kind of expectationally, should expect to

0:11:56.320 --> 0:11:58.959
<v Speaker 6>pay one percent of that two percent management fee to

0:11:59.040 --> 0:12:01.199
<v Speaker 6>people who've made money when everybody halse has lost money.

0:12:01.440 --> 0:12:03.120
<v Speaker 6>And it can be way more than that, and that's

0:12:03.160 --> 0:12:17.520
<v Speaker 6>a real business risk.

0:12:20.559 --> 0:12:22.880
<v Speaker 3>So one thing I wanted to ask is I get

0:12:22.880 --> 0:12:28.800
<v Speaker 3>the impression that podshops are very, very competitive, and you know,

0:12:28.840 --> 0:12:32.520
<v Speaker 3>the talent is competitive, but the pod shop itself is

0:12:32.559 --> 0:12:36.120
<v Speaker 3>supposed to kind of work together, right and the positions

0:12:36.160 --> 0:12:40.360
<v Speaker 3>are supposed to diversify and even each other out and

0:12:40.400 --> 0:12:42.559
<v Speaker 3>all of that. So I guess my question is how

0:12:42.640 --> 0:12:45.360
<v Speaker 3>cutthroat is it actually working at a pod shop?

0:12:46.559 --> 0:12:47.240
<v Speaker 5>It varies.

0:12:47.720 --> 0:12:51.880
<v Speaker 6>The fact is that a podshop is an entity that

0:12:51.960 --> 0:12:55.600
<v Speaker 6>can make certain decisions to create either competition or cooperation.

0:12:56.120 --> 0:12:59.440
<v Speaker 6>Any multistract can do this in a pure eat what

0:12:59.520 --> 0:13:03.800
<v Speaker 6>you kill and vironment. Obviously there's no incentive to do cooperation,

0:13:04.040 --> 0:13:07.840
<v Speaker 6>but people do recognize this, right, And what I would

0:13:07.880 --> 0:13:12.520
<v Speaker 6>say for that is that it's all about what do

0:13:12.559 --> 0:13:15.640
<v Speaker 6>you want as what does the manager want to produce?

0:13:16.080 --> 0:13:18.960
<v Speaker 6>And one of the things what I would say is

0:13:19.000 --> 0:13:21.120
<v Speaker 6>there's a real choice that you have to make between

0:13:21.240 --> 0:13:24.080
<v Speaker 6>kind of talent and structure. And what do I mean

0:13:24.120 --> 0:13:27.200
<v Speaker 6>by that? What I mean by that is to use

0:13:27.200 --> 0:13:30.000
<v Speaker 6>the sports context. There's kind of two ways assemble professional

0:13:30.000 --> 0:13:32.840
<v Speaker 6>sports teams. The first is to get a big pilot

0:13:32.840 --> 0:13:35.560
<v Speaker 6>cash and go hire the best players in this position

0:13:35.840 --> 0:13:38.679
<v Speaker 6>and put them on the field and hope for the best. Right,

0:13:38.720 --> 0:13:41.040
<v Speaker 6>that's a focus on talent. The other way is to

0:13:41.120 --> 0:13:43.240
<v Speaker 6>hire a really really good coach with a really good

0:13:43.240 --> 0:13:47.880
<v Speaker 6>system and to have him or her go with their

0:13:47.920 --> 0:13:50.640
<v Speaker 6>team kind of a moneyball system where you put together

0:13:50.679 --> 0:13:52.880
<v Speaker 6>people who fit in the structure. And what that means

0:13:53.000 --> 0:13:56.240
<v Speaker 6>is the first one is like the emphasis on the individual,

0:13:56.800 --> 0:13:58.760
<v Speaker 6>and the second one of the emphasises on it on

0:13:58.800 --> 0:14:02.760
<v Speaker 6>the whole. And when you talk about competition, one of

0:14:02.760 --> 0:14:05.160
<v Speaker 6>the main ways you enforce competition.

0:14:04.800 --> 0:14:06.320
<v Speaker 5>Is probably obviously compensation.

0:14:06.800 --> 0:14:10.280
<v Speaker 6>If you have a situation where it's purely what you

0:14:10.360 --> 0:14:12.080
<v Speaker 6>kill and you get a presentive of your own P

0:14:12.160 --> 0:14:15.240
<v Speaker 6>and L and that's it, it's very very hard to

0:14:15.520 --> 0:14:19.840
<v Speaker 6>enforce that level of That's where you get those cutthroat stories, right.

0:14:19.880 --> 0:14:21.960
<v Speaker 6>But there are many others out there who have other

0:14:22.040 --> 0:14:25.160
<v Speaker 6>ways of doing this who recognize that. You know, if

0:14:25.200 --> 0:14:27.840
<v Speaker 6>you just have everybody in it for themselves, you produce

0:14:27.840 --> 0:14:30.560
<v Speaker 6>a portfolio that's actually suboptimal at the top level.

0:14:30.800 --> 0:14:32.280
<v Speaker 3>This is what I was going to ask. Have you

0:14:32.360 --> 0:14:36.119
<v Speaker 3>noticed a difference in performance between the sort of cutthroat

0:14:36.200 --> 0:14:38.880
<v Speaker 3>competitive firms versus the more cooperative ones.

0:14:38.960 --> 0:14:41.320
<v Speaker 6>That's a really good question, and the short answer is

0:14:41.360 --> 0:14:44.760
<v Speaker 6>it's really hard to distinguish between them. On the outside

0:14:45.320 --> 0:14:49.080
<v Speaker 6>The interesting thing really is more around what happens when

0:14:49.080 --> 0:14:51.760
<v Speaker 6>things are going badly for both that you're more likely

0:14:51.800 --> 0:14:53.800
<v Speaker 6>to have people kind of like quickly leave the more

0:14:53.800 --> 0:14:56.480
<v Speaker 6>competitive and cut throat one. Ah then you would have

0:14:56.720 --> 0:14:59.400
<v Speaker 6>then maybe they're more cooperative, you know. I mean the

0:14:59.480 --> 0:15:02.120
<v Speaker 6>cool thing about the pod shop and the platform space

0:15:02.520 --> 0:15:05.000
<v Speaker 6>is there's literally no right way to do this. There's

0:15:05.040 --> 0:15:08.080
<v Speaker 6>a real series of trade offs, right, and there's choices

0:15:08.120 --> 0:15:11.680
<v Speaker 6>you make have cost many different different dimensions. Because, for example,

0:15:11.960 --> 0:15:15.560
<v Speaker 6>if you choose to do cooperation right and you incentivize everybody,

0:15:15.600 --> 0:15:16.880
<v Speaker 6>you typically would do it in a kind of a

0:15:16.880 --> 0:15:20.920
<v Speaker 6>traditional multi strategy context, right. What that means is that

0:15:20.960 --> 0:15:23.320
<v Speaker 6>you're not going to have the eat what you kill mentality.

0:15:23.360 --> 0:15:26.080
<v Speaker 6>You may have certain bits around that, but if you

0:15:26.200 --> 0:15:30.000
<v Speaker 6>use that thing, you have a very good place to work,

0:15:30.880 --> 0:15:31.280
<v Speaker 6>but you.

0:15:31.320 --> 0:15:32.320
<v Speaker 5>End up with a situation.

0:15:32.400 --> 0:15:34.400
<v Speaker 6>Where As we talked about earlier, netting risk is a

0:15:34.440 --> 0:15:37.640
<v Speaker 6>real cost. So what that often means is that compensation

0:15:37.840 --> 0:15:41.400
<v Speaker 6>choice drives you to be a bit more correlated within

0:15:41.480 --> 0:15:43.960
<v Speaker 6>your own portfolio and be a bit bit less, bit less,

0:15:44.360 --> 0:15:47.400
<v Speaker 6>little lower sharp ratio. Why is that Because if netting

0:15:47.480 --> 0:15:49.760
<v Speaker 6>risk or the cost of netting is a real business risk.

0:15:49.800 --> 0:15:51.840
<v Speaker 6>You choose to minimize it, and the way easily to

0:15:51.920 --> 0:15:54.160
<v Speaker 6>minimize it has had everybody kind of make money at

0:15:54.160 --> 0:15:56.600
<v Speaker 6>the same time everybody kind of lose money at the

0:15:56.600 --> 0:15:58.560
<v Speaker 6>same time, and then you won't be picked off by

0:15:58.560 --> 0:16:03.440
<v Speaker 6>the pod Shopsimilarly, if you have competition, right, competition is

0:16:03.560 --> 0:16:08.120
<v Speaker 6>an incredibly powerful human thing, but it gets out of

0:16:08.120 --> 0:16:10.720
<v Speaker 6>control and you end up with a situation where people

0:16:10.800 --> 0:16:13.640
<v Speaker 6>just burn out and just leave you. People are unhappy.

0:16:14.160 --> 0:16:15.880
<v Speaker 6>You know, you have to kind of keep feeding people

0:16:15.960 --> 0:16:18.000
<v Speaker 6>into it, and you know that that's totally fine because

0:16:18.040 --> 0:16:20.480
<v Speaker 6>there are many other industries out there besides finance that

0:16:20.520 --> 0:16:24.080
<v Speaker 6>does this, you know. But at the same time, you know,

0:16:24.120 --> 0:16:25.720
<v Speaker 6>you end up with a whole lot of scenarios that

0:16:25.760 --> 0:16:27.960
<v Speaker 6>are kind of you end up with a kind of

0:16:27.960 --> 0:16:30.880
<v Speaker 6>a team of rivals, you know, and then that's it's

0:16:30.880 --> 0:16:32.400
<v Speaker 6>a dynamic, but it is the one that you have

0:16:32.440 --> 0:16:34.640
<v Speaker 6>to really control zooming out.

0:16:34.920 --> 0:16:38.120
<v Speaker 2>Obviously, the performance of a lot of the well known

0:16:38.240 --> 0:16:42.680
<v Speaker 2>names has done really well. You're talking to institutional allocators

0:16:43.240 --> 0:16:45.800
<v Speaker 2>other than I guess the fact that the top line

0:16:45.840 --> 0:16:48.760
<v Speaker 2>performance is good and everyone likes making money, what is

0:16:48.800 --> 0:16:52.560
<v Speaker 2>the general pitch? And we've seen this trend obviously from

0:16:52.720 --> 0:16:56.680
<v Speaker 2>allocation to single fund managers. You know your traditional guys

0:16:56.680 --> 0:16:58.560
<v Speaker 2>who would like go on TV and they unveil their

0:16:58.600 --> 0:17:01.680
<v Speaker 2>long or whatever. As a digression. I always think it's

0:17:01.680 --> 0:17:04.760
<v Speaker 2>funny when you see these pod managers on TV and

0:17:04.760 --> 0:17:07.400
<v Speaker 2>they get asked about their thoughts about the market, because

0:17:07.400 --> 0:17:09.800
<v Speaker 2>it's clearly that's not really even what their focus is

0:17:09.920 --> 0:17:12.359
<v Speaker 2>on in terms of business structure design. So I'm always

0:17:12.359 --> 0:17:15.480
<v Speaker 2>sort of raise an eyebrow when I see these conversations.

0:17:15.800 --> 0:17:18.800
<v Speaker 2>Talk to us about what it is about these entities

0:17:18.800 --> 0:17:21.639
<v Speaker 2>in general that holds so much an appeal for an

0:17:21.640 --> 0:17:22.720
<v Speaker 2>institutional allocator.

0:17:23.000 --> 0:17:26.080
<v Speaker 6>They hold appeal for a variety of different reasons, and

0:17:26.119 --> 0:17:28.879
<v Speaker 6>obviously it will depend on the individual mandate of the allocator,

0:17:29.280 --> 0:17:31.880
<v Speaker 6>but there's a couple of fundamental things that really hold

0:17:31.960 --> 0:17:34.880
<v Speaker 6>true across all multi threats. The first one is that

0:17:35.880 --> 0:17:38.640
<v Speaker 6>it's interesting that we talk about pods like there's something new,

0:17:38.640 --> 0:17:40.679
<v Speaker 6>But if you actually if all three of us decided

0:17:40.680 --> 0:17:43.719
<v Speaker 6>to go out and invest into twenty individual hedge funds,

0:17:44.560 --> 0:17:47.320
<v Speaker 6>we'd have the same issue. A. They would be paid

0:17:47.560 --> 0:17:49.919
<v Speaker 6>on what they eat, what they kill. Yeah, B we

0:17:50.000 --> 0:17:52.200
<v Speaker 6>would have to hire and fire people. By the way,

0:17:52.600 --> 0:17:55.240
<v Speaker 6>hiring and firing people. Hiring is fun, Firing sucks.

0:17:55.400 --> 0:17:57.920
<v Speaker 5>Yeah, But the point, but the.

0:17:57.880 --> 0:18:00.800
<v Speaker 6>Overall thing is that each individual pe in that set

0:18:00.840 --> 0:18:04.280
<v Speaker 6>of single strategy hedge funds is allocating according to what

0:18:04.520 --> 0:18:07.440
<v Speaker 6>two things, what they think in their set of investors

0:18:07.480 --> 0:18:10.159
<v Speaker 6>want and be what they're willing to bear because it's

0:18:10.160 --> 0:18:13.600
<v Speaker 6>their only job and their name on the above the door.

0:18:14.119 --> 0:18:15.960
<v Speaker 6>And so what you end up is is your set

0:18:16.000 --> 0:18:19.640
<v Speaker 6>of allocations that when you're roll them up together, are

0:18:19.840 --> 0:18:24.080
<v Speaker 6>individually way under risked, right, and you're not making as

0:18:24.160 --> 0:18:25.920
<v Speaker 6>much money as you should given the talent that you're

0:18:25.920 --> 0:18:28.280
<v Speaker 6>paying for and the amount of fees you're paying. So

0:18:28.320 --> 0:18:30.639
<v Speaker 6>when you hire a multistrats, and part of the thesis

0:18:30.680 --> 0:18:33.320
<v Speaker 6>of multi strats, which which is true, is that because

0:18:33.359 --> 0:18:36.399
<v Speaker 6>they're a unitary portfolio with somebody atop in charge of

0:18:36.440 --> 0:18:39.720
<v Speaker 6>it driving the risk of the individual pms, not the

0:18:39.720 --> 0:18:43.239
<v Speaker 6>individual pms themselves, you can and you really should end

0:18:43.320 --> 0:18:45.879
<v Speaker 6>up with a better return stream because you've coalested all

0:18:45.880 --> 0:18:49.240
<v Speaker 6>together under a single unitary authority and they can put

0:18:49.280 --> 0:18:50.920
<v Speaker 6>them to you know, they put leverage to work, risk

0:18:51.000 --> 0:18:54.280
<v Speaker 6>to work, so that the individual PM might be more

0:18:54.359 --> 0:18:56.400
<v Speaker 6>risky than they really really want to be or maybe

0:18:56.440 --> 0:18:58.879
<v Speaker 6>it's probably obscured from them usually, but at the end

0:18:58.880 --> 0:19:01.280
<v Speaker 6>of the day, that rolls up into an appropriately risk

0:19:01.359 --> 0:19:04.280
<v Speaker 6>portfolio return. Right, And you know, having somebody who worked

0:19:04.320 --> 0:19:05.960
<v Speaker 6>in fund of funds, one of the issues of fund

0:19:05.960 --> 0:19:08.360
<v Speaker 6>of funds is just that you had fantastic sharp ratios,

0:19:08.440 --> 0:19:09.400
<v Speaker 6>but the returns were low.

0:19:10.880 --> 0:19:13.520
<v Speaker 3>That's a really important point. One other thing I wanted

0:19:13.520 --> 0:19:17.240
<v Speaker 3>to ask just on the why allocators are interested in

0:19:17.320 --> 0:19:20.879
<v Speaker 3>multi strats. Point One thing you sometimes hear is that, well,

0:19:21.119 --> 0:19:24.440
<v Speaker 3>multistrats or pod shops they can dip in and out

0:19:24.480 --> 0:19:27.280
<v Speaker 3>of positions really really fast, and they can react to

0:19:27.320 --> 0:19:30.080
<v Speaker 3>the market very very quickly. How true is that?

0:19:31.040 --> 0:19:33.720
<v Speaker 6>So let's go back to two and twenty funds versus

0:19:33.760 --> 0:19:35.880
<v Speaker 6>pod shops, because it's differently.

0:19:35.440 --> 0:19:36.520
<v Speaker 5>True for both of them.

0:19:36.880 --> 0:19:39.840
<v Speaker 6>Let's talk about pod shops first, right in the kind

0:19:39.840 --> 0:19:42.040
<v Speaker 6>of the stylized pod shop, you get to set up,

0:19:42.080 --> 0:19:44.440
<v Speaker 6>you get money, you ale, you invested as a PM,

0:19:44.520 --> 0:19:47.040
<v Speaker 6>and you get paid on that. If you get cut,

0:19:47.320 --> 0:19:49.800
<v Speaker 6>if your capital you get cut substantially. Even with the

0:19:49.800 --> 0:19:52.000
<v Speaker 6>best will in the world and the promises from above

0:19:52.000 --> 0:19:54.160
<v Speaker 6>saying it'll come back to you, your pay has been cut.

0:19:55.119 --> 0:19:57.560
<v Speaker 6>And I mean we're all professionals here. If your pay

0:19:57.600 --> 0:20:01.199
<v Speaker 6>is cut by fifty percent, your updated your CV and

0:20:01.240 --> 0:20:04.639
<v Speaker 6>you're checking the job market. Okay, So in the context

0:20:04.640 --> 0:20:08.560
<v Speaker 6>of responding to opportunities in the market, it's hard to

0:20:08.720 --> 0:20:11.040
<v Speaker 6>move too much too quickly in the context of a

0:20:11.080 --> 0:20:14.800
<v Speaker 6>pod shop, why because of that reason, and be because

0:20:14.840 --> 0:20:16.920
<v Speaker 6>that person may not be there to do when it's

0:20:16.920 --> 0:20:20.640
<v Speaker 6>an opportunity there. So it's kind of hard. They do

0:20:20.640 --> 0:20:22.200
<v Speaker 6>do it, They absolutely do do it. They will lever

0:20:22.280 --> 0:20:25.160
<v Speaker 6>up into opportunity. But when you think about what people's

0:20:25.320 --> 0:20:27.439
<v Speaker 6>kind of perception in their heads of what it is,

0:20:27.760 --> 0:20:31.600
<v Speaker 6>it's completely more static than you'd imagine. In the context

0:20:31.680 --> 0:20:36.120
<v Speaker 6>of a traditional fee structure, the two and twenty, it's different, right,

0:20:36.680 --> 0:20:39.480
<v Speaker 6>everybody is incentivized to get the top line to be

0:20:39.480 --> 0:20:42.240
<v Speaker 6>the highest number it can be. And so if I'm

0:20:42.280 --> 0:20:45.560
<v Speaker 6>a convert manager and your merger art manager, I'm cool

0:20:46.119 --> 0:20:48.040
<v Speaker 6>with being my capital be given away. I assume I

0:20:48.040 --> 0:20:50.520
<v Speaker 6>get it back eventually. But if it makes the overall

0:20:50.560 --> 0:20:53.040
<v Speaker 6>proibly larger, I can benefit in the long run too.

0:20:53.720 --> 0:20:57.119
<v Speaker 6>So the ability and then quite frankly, the willingness to

0:20:57.280 --> 0:21:02.560
<v Speaker 6>move capital in size around it is really that's where

0:21:02.600 --> 0:21:04.359
<v Speaker 6>camp comes in. Camp has now led us to the

0:21:04.400 --> 0:21:07.359
<v Speaker 6>situation where it's hard to move capital right, and you

0:21:07.359 --> 0:21:09.080
<v Speaker 6>think about, like we talked about it, kind of the

0:21:09.080 --> 0:21:11.720
<v Speaker 6>theme of this for me is comp kind of drives everything.

0:21:11.720 --> 0:21:14.160
<v Speaker 6>How you structure your camp is one of the principal

0:21:14.840 --> 0:21:17.400
<v Speaker 6>underlying features or a and how multi strategies work.

0:21:18.000 --> 0:21:21.080
<v Speaker 2>I think this is such an important point because again

0:21:21.160 --> 0:21:23.320
<v Speaker 2>I think, like comp structure.

0:21:23.880 --> 0:21:25.520
<v Speaker 7>You hear about it like people love.

0:21:25.400 --> 0:21:29.639
<v Speaker 2>Reading stories about bonuses, et cetera. And people love reading

0:21:29.680 --> 0:21:32.399
<v Speaker 2>stories about people getting paid a lot of money, or

0:21:32.600 --> 0:21:35.440
<v Speaker 2>maybe they hate read these stories about people love getting

0:21:35.480 --> 0:21:38.360
<v Speaker 2>mayde but this idea that no, this is the business

0:21:38.600 --> 0:21:40.959
<v Speaker 2>you know people. I think when people hear bonuses, they're like, oh,

0:21:40.960 --> 0:21:43.199
<v Speaker 2>you get some extra money. But the business is design.

0:21:43.280 --> 0:21:46.199
<v Speaker 2>I mean, to hear you describe it. The business is

0:21:46.240 --> 0:21:48.879
<v Speaker 2>the design of the bonus. The business is the design

0:21:48.960 --> 0:21:49.760
<v Speaker 2>of the comp.

0:21:50.000 --> 0:21:52.360
<v Speaker 6>It kind of is you know, it drives so much

0:21:52.440 --> 0:21:54.320
<v Speaker 6>if you just think about, like we talked about, how

0:21:54.320 --> 0:21:58.520
<v Speaker 6>a capital allocation is basically held back or you know,

0:21:58.560 --> 0:21:59.960
<v Speaker 6>you're the way you can do it is changed by

0:22:00.040 --> 0:22:02.639
<v Speaker 6>how you compensate people, you know, or constrained is the

0:22:02.640 --> 0:22:05.400
<v Speaker 6>better world. There's other things like I mean you think

0:22:05.440 --> 0:22:08.439
<v Speaker 6>about in the context I going back to like the

0:22:08.600 --> 0:22:11.000
<v Speaker 6>story about the single strategy hedge funds, you also have

0:22:11.040 --> 0:22:14.840
<v Speaker 6>the similar problems. Were given too much leeway in an

0:22:14.840 --> 0:22:17.040
<v Speaker 6>e EQ what you kill environment, pms will start to

0:22:17.080 --> 0:22:19.560
<v Speaker 6>set risk to suit themselves than they do for the

0:22:19.600 --> 0:22:23.119
<v Speaker 6>overall portfolio, because after all, why should they care, you know,

0:22:23.160 --> 0:22:25.720
<v Speaker 6>why should they care about the overall portfolio performance? If

0:22:25.800 --> 0:22:28.600
<v Speaker 6>if I can you know, if I've made money for

0:22:28.680 --> 0:22:31.560
<v Speaker 6>the first nine months of the year, you know, the

0:22:31.600 --> 0:22:34.879
<v Speaker 6>temptation is a lockdown risk and have Christmas, you know,

0:22:35.400 --> 0:22:37.199
<v Speaker 6>enjoy Christmas rather than take more risks where at the

0:22:37.200 --> 0:22:40.560
<v Speaker 6>portfolio at the top level may not want that, you know,

0:22:40.600 --> 0:22:43.520
<v Speaker 6>So you have all these other things that drive others,

0:22:43.760 --> 0:22:47.480
<v Speaker 6>drive these decisions of people, you know, across so many

0:22:47.480 --> 0:22:49.959
<v Speaker 6>different dimensions. It's one of the most fascinating things because

0:22:50.359 --> 0:22:53.119
<v Speaker 6>you know, at Albourn we've done a huge amount of

0:22:53.119 --> 0:22:54.080
<v Speaker 6>work trying to understand this.

0:22:54.200 --> 0:22:59.040
<v Speaker 5>But I learned Python to do this. God help me. Yeah,

0:22:59.160 --> 0:23:00.000
<v Speaker 5>it's just one of those things.

0:23:00.480 --> 0:23:02.280
<v Speaker 7>How does the what.

0:23:02.320 --> 0:23:08.080
<v Speaker 2>You kill environment solve for the problem of the PM

0:23:08.440 --> 0:23:10.560
<v Speaker 2>who's made money for nine months of the year and

0:23:10.600 --> 0:23:13.160
<v Speaker 2>then want to lock it down? What types of risk

0:23:13.240 --> 0:23:16.639
<v Speaker 2>controls or I guess controls for under risk because in

0:23:16.640 --> 0:23:19.040
<v Speaker 2>a way, the thing that they don't want is someone

0:23:19.119 --> 0:23:22.600
<v Speaker 2>taking some risk or you know, getting too conservative. What

0:23:22.640 --> 0:23:26.400
<v Speaker 2>are the approaches that they have to align those incentives

0:23:26.400 --> 0:23:28.080
<v Speaker 2>so that you have to keep going for those final

0:23:28.119 --> 0:23:30.160
<v Speaker 2>three months of the year, even if it means risking

0:23:30.200 --> 0:23:30.800
<v Speaker 2>your great year.

0:23:31.119 --> 0:23:34.800
<v Speaker 6>I mean, sometimes it's very simple minimum amounts of capital

0:23:34.840 --> 0:23:38.320
<v Speaker 6>deployment requiring. You know, it's kind of hard, right because

0:23:38.320 --> 0:23:39.680
<v Speaker 6>at the end of the day, if you've got successful

0:23:39.720 --> 0:23:41.840
<v Speaker 6>PM on the year, yeah, and you want to keep

0:23:41.880 --> 0:23:45.399
<v Speaker 6>them or her, it's not an easy question to answer.

0:23:45.560 --> 0:23:47.800
<v Speaker 6>And like there are more hybrid approaches to these what

0:23:47.840 --> 0:23:51.520
<v Speaker 6>you kill right for example, partnership so you know, many

0:23:51.560 --> 0:23:54.440
<v Speaker 6>funds offer partnership to the pms where they do participate

0:23:54.440 --> 0:23:57.680
<v Speaker 6>in the overall fund fund profits. You know, there's other

0:23:57.800 --> 0:24:00.439
<v Speaker 6>kind of you know, fancier trade ways to make you know,

0:24:00.640 --> 0:24:03.040
<v Speaker 6>increase say the payoffs to the PM depending on the

0:24:03.359 --> 0:24:04.200
<v Speaker 6>fund's performance.

0:24:04.640 --> 0:24:06.000
<v Speaker 5>It fun's overall performance.

0:24:06.400 --> 0:24:09.000
<v Speaker 6>But yeah, it's a really hard problem because it's a camp.

0:24:09.040 --> 0:24:13.160
<v Speaker 6>It's a personal relations problem, you know. I mean sometimes

0:24:13.440 --> 0:24:15.160
<v Speaker 6>you just got to accept it. You got a guy

0:24:15.200 --> 0:24:17.000
<v Speaker 6>who's up coming to the end of the year and

0:24:17.040 --> 0:24:19.520
<v Speaker 6>they're just going to de risking. Look, the thing beyond

0:24:19.520 --> 0:24:21.760
<v Speaker 6>camp is really culture, right, and you can say comp

0:24:21.840 --> 0:24:22.760
<v Speaker 6>drives culture.

0:24:22.480 --> 0:24:24.120
<v Speaker 5>But it's not quite that simple.

0:24:24.280 --> 0:24:26.240
<v Speaker 6>You couldn't just hire the sort of individual who won't

0:24:26.320 --> 0:24:28.040
<v Speaker 6>do that, you know, and a lot of funds will

0:24:28.040 --> 0:24:30.959
<v Speaker 6>talk about we talked about the war for talent. I

0:24:31.040 --> 0:24:34.600
<v Speaker 6>often call it the war on talent. But people go

0:24:34.760 --> 0:24:36.520
<v Speaker 6>to places they want to work with, people who they

0:24:36.520 --> 0:24:38.639
<v Speaker 6>want to work for, and you do try to just

0:24:38.680 --> 0:24:42.080
<v Speaker 6>hire professionals, regular people like us who work through the holidays,

0:24:42.080 --> 0:24:43.359
<v Speaker 6>you know, and stuff like that, you know, just to

0:24:43.359 --> 0:24:45.719
<v Speaker 6>finish off top for the year. You know, you've got

0:24:45.760 --> 0:24:46.520
<v Speaker 6>to hire the right people.

0:25:03.040 --> 0:25:07.879
<v Speaker 3>So listening to talk on pass throughs versus traditional fees

0:25:07.960 --> 0:25:10.480
<v Speaker 3>the two and twenty, I'm kind of wondering why would

0:25:10.560 --> 0:25:13.879
<v Speaker 3>you ever invest in a pass through because when you

0:25:13.960 --> 0:25:18.320
<v Speaker 3>describe the downsides, it's like you don't have as much cooperation.

0:25:18.640 --> 0:25:22.119
<v Speaker 3>Maybe it's harder to move capital around. It seems like

0:25:22.200 --> 0:25:25.680
<v Speaker 3>the traditional fee structure might be the better choice here.

0:25:25.800 --> 0:25:27.439
<v Speaker 3>But tell me why I'm wrong.

0:25:27.640 --> 0:25:30.480
<v Speaker 6>Well, we've been taking I mean that this is partially

0:25:30.480 --> 0:25:33.040
<v Speaker 6>my training, taking the side of the alligator here and

0:25:33.080 --> 0:25:36.400
<v Speaker 6>you're right, like superficially at the top level, a pass

0:25:36.440 --> 0:25:38.520
<v Speaker 6>through it seems like a bad idea for the allocator,

0:25:38.720 --> 0:25:41.639
<v Speaker 6>but there's kind of three people, three entities getting commed.

0:25:41.680 --> 0:25:45.840
<v Speaker 6>Here is the alligator, they're the manager and they're the PM.

0:25:46.520 --> 0:25:48.159
<v Speaker 6>And the thing is one of the one of the

0:25:48.160 --> 0:25:51.640
<v Speaker 6>standout features phychologically of most pms is they all think

0:25:51.640 --> 0:25:53.679
<v Speaker 6>they're really good. That's how you become a PM. You

0:25:53.720 --> 0:25:57.119
<v Speaker 6>become ambitious, you press yourself to test yourself against the market.

0:25:57.840 --> 0:26:01.280
<v Speaker 6>A pass through manager will give you the max compensation

0:26:01.880 --> 0:26:04.679
<v Speaker 6>if you're a good PM, right, And at the end

0:26:04.680 --> 0:26:07.359
<v Speaker 6>of the day, what we're describing is an industry that

0:26:07.600 --> 0:26:10.479
<v Speaker 6>relies on pms to do good work and who are

0:26:10.480 --> 0:26:13.000
<v Speaker 6>really smart. And if you have a situation where they're

0:26:13.040 --> 0:26:15.199
<v Speaker 6>going to get paid in a particular entity more than

0:26:15.320 --> 0:26:18.760
<v Speaker 6>another sort, they will gravitate towards that. So the answer

0:26:18.800 --> 0:26:21.320
<v Speaker 6>to your question is, if alligators had their way, they

0:26:21.359 --> 0:26:22.400
<v Speaker 6>probably wouldn't.

0:26:22.040 --> 0:26:23.200
<v Speaker 5>Want to invest in pass throughs.

0:26:23.200 --> 0:26:26.560
<v Speaker 6>But the fact is that they don't have a choice,

0:26:26.880 --> 0:26:28.879
<v Speaker 6>and pass throughs are you know. The other thing to

0:26:28.920 --> 0:26:31.560
<v Speaker 6>remember is past throughs are good for pms. But the

0:26:31.640 --> 0:26:34.600
<v Speaker 6>interesting thing and people do forget about. This is in

0:26:34.640 --> 0:26:38.640
<v Speaker 6>a past through situation in a pod shop, the PM

0:26:38.760 --> 0:26:41.439
<v Speaker 6>is getting paid from their own P and L. The

0:26:41.520 --> 0:26:45.480
<v Speaker 6>manager themselves is fully aligned with the investor, with the

0:26:45.520 --> 0:26:48.840
<v Speaker 6>allocator because they're only getting paid off the netted of

0:26:48.880 --> 0:26:51.280
<v Speaker 6>all the pass throughs. They're paying off the same P

0:26:51.400 --> 0:26:54.600
<v Speaker 6>and L at the top line as the investor. So

0:26:55.160 --> 0:26:57.560
<v Speaker 6>there is somebody and I mean people do talk about

0:26:57.560 --> 0:26:59.399
<v Speaker 6>how much has been paid, how much they make and whatever.

0:26:59.600 --> 0:27:02.080
<v Speaker 6>It's a an like I've heard it described as the

0:27:02.200 --> 0:27:05.560
<v Speaker 6>worst best job in the world, but it's an incredible

0:27:06.320 --> 0:27:09.359
<v Speaker 6>thing of coordination and getting people together. But they're actually

0:27:09.359 --> 0:27:12.239
<v Speaker 6>incentivized and in aligned within allocator and to give them

0:27:12.280 --> 0:27:13.960
<v Speaker 6>their due. They do their best to do that because

0:27:13.960 --> 0:27:16.479
<v Speaker 6>they are conscious of keeping costs under control because that's

0:27:16.520 --> 0:27:18.960
<v Speaker 6>their profit margin that's eating into I mean the other

0:27:19.040 --> 0:27:20.520
<v Speaker 6>I mean, the other thing is which is kind of

0:27:20.520 --> 0:27:22.760
<v Speaker 6>scary for allocators is the extra layer of.

0:27:22.720 --> 0:27:24.960
<v Speaker 5>Fees, right, and it does cost money.

0:27:25.240 --> 0:27:28.280
<v Speaker 6>And fundamentally speaking, the other thing that camp is driving

0:27:28.320 --> 0:27:32.000
<v Speaker 6>in that case is risk. Right, they're driving leverage. We've

0:27:32.000 --> 0:27:36.119
<v Speaker 6>done simulations and a pass through manager has to be

0:27:36.240 --> 0:27:39.520
<v Speaker 6>around one third more leverage than then the two layer

0:27:39.560 --> 0:27:42.160
<v Speaker 6>of fees two and twenty manager. I mean they have

0:27:42.280 --> 0:27:44.199
<v Speaker 6>to be because they have to make more money to

0:27:44.240 --> 0:27:46.880
<v Speaker 6>pay that extra cache out and it costs.

0:27:46.600 --> 0:27:47.600
<v Speaker 5>Real money to do that.

0:27:48.320 --> 0:27:51.200
<v Speaker 6>And you know, you know, in one sense, price is

0:27:51.240 --> 0:27:53.080
<v Speaker 6>what you pay, values what you get. Returns have been

0:27:53.119 --> 0:27:55.760
<v Speaker 6>really good because of the pass through manager has been

0:27:55.760 --> 0:27:59.320
<v Speaker 6>a really effective business model investing side. Yeah, but yeah,

0:27:59.400 --> 0:28:01.520
<v Speaker 6>I mean alecators do complain about the cost.

0:28:02.760 --> 0:28:05.639
<v Speaker 2>It's something I'm curious about with the very traditional hedge

0:28:05.640 --> 0:28:09.800
<v Speaker 2>fund model, which you described very a good articulation. If

0:28:09.800 --> 0:28:13.520
<v Speaker 2>I'm an institutional allocator, I'm diversified. Therefore, I want my

0:28:13.600 --> 0:28:17.760
<v Speaker 2>allocations to take max risk. The individual hedge fund manager

0:28:18.160 --> 0:28:21.080
<v Speaker 2>might not want to take mask max risk because it's

0:28:21.080 --> 0:28:24.000
<v Speaker 2>their whole career and name on the line. What is

0:28:24.240 --> 0:28:28.200
<v Speaker 2>actually the expectation in the sort of traditional hedge fund

0:28:28.200 --> 0:28:31.400
<v Speaker 2>model for like, how much of the manager's net worth

0:28:31.480 --> 0:28:33.280
<v Speaker 2>is in the fund and how do you establish that?

0:28:33.480 --> 0:28:35.240
<v Speaker 2>And by the way, if I were a hedge fund

0:28:35.280 --> 0:28:37.600
<v Speaker 2>manager had done really well, I would buy a lot

0:28:37.640 --> 0:28:40.560
<v Speaker 2>of mansions and yachts and stuff so that if my

0:28:40.600 --> 0:28:43.440
<v Speaker 2>fund ever went to zero, I still have a lot

0:28:43.480 --> 0:28:43.920
<v Speaker 2>of wealth.

0:28:44.600 --> 0:28:48.720
<v Speaker 6>You've thought this through, jah, Yeah, mentions where in particular.

0:28:48.640 --> 0:28:54.840
<v Speaker 2>Miami, Aspen, the Golf States, New York City and anyway.

0:28:55.560 --> 0:28:57.960
<v Speaker 2>But like, how do they like, how do you how

0:28:57.960 --> 0:29:01.760
<v Speaker 2>do they actually establish that the man is fully aligned

0:29:01.880 --> 0:29:03.040
<v Speaker 2>with the performance of their fund.

0:29:03.240 --> 0:29:07.200
<v Speaker 6>So that is a really really good question because opinions

0:29:07.240 --> 0:29:11.840
<v Speaker 6>really vary there, right, And the standard answer to that

0:29:11.920 --> 0:29:15.080
<v Speaker 6>question is the majority of the manager's liquid net worth

0:29:15.520 --> 0:29:17.480
<v Speaker 6>and you can define that whichever way you want.

0:29:18.320 --> 0:29:21.480
<v Speaker 1>Is their way to audit there. I mean, I say, hey, look,

0:29:21.480 --> 0:29:22.560
<v Speaker 1>I have it all on my fund.

0:29:22.960 --> 0:29:24.000
<v Speaker 5>You can, you can have to admin.

0:29:24.480 --> 0:29:27.640
<v Speaker 6>The manager can authorize the administrator of the fund to

0:29:27.680 --> 0:29:30.160
<v Speaker 6>disclod their investment in the fund to you if you

0:29:30.200 --> 0:29:30.840
<v Speaker 6>ask them nicely.

0:29:31.040 --> 0:29:32.240
<v Speaker 1>They don't know that I have.

0:29:32.400 --> 0:29:34.680
<v Speaker 2>They wouldn't know if I had a billion dollars in

0:29:34.720 --> 0:29:36.120
<v Speaker 2>bitcoin on a private wallet.

0:29:36.160 --> 0:29:37.840
<v Speaker 1>That's not any any key.

0:29:37.880 --> 0:29:41.280
<v Speaker 2>I'm just saying I would when I hear this, I

0:29:41.320 --> 0:29:43.560
<v Speaker 2>saw this in your notes. When I hear this, my

0:29:43.640 --> 0:29:46.560
<v Speaker 2>first mind goes to how can I pocket net worth

0:29:46.600 --> 0:29:49.040
<v Speaker 2>and places that aren't easily visible, and so I'm not

0:29:49.080 --> 0:29:50.360
<v Speaker 2>fully exposed to my own fund.

0:29:50.760 --> 0:29:55.560
<v Speaker 5>Sorry, look, I mean they actually big They's a bigger question.

0:29:55.400 --> 0:29:58.040
<v Speaker 6>There, okay, In which you mentioned at the starter your

0:29:58.120 --> 0:30:00.160
<v Speaker 6>question before you went on about the nice mansion an

0:30:00.160 --> 0:30:02.280
<v Speaker 6>aspect which is kind of distracting me right now. But

0:30:02.400 --> 0:30:05.240
<v Speaker 6>to be clear, the fact is that if you have

0:30:05.320 --> 0:30:08.160
<v Speaker 6>all your money in a fund, yeah, you're kind of

0:30:08.160 --> 0:30:10.480
<v Speaker 6>going to mind it differently, yeah right.

0:30:10.560 --> 0:30:12.720
<v Speaker 5>Yeah. And if I'm an investor who's got a hundred

0:30:12.720 --> 0:30:14.240
<v Speaker 5>of funds like that, I don't want.

0:30:14.400 --> 0:30:16.120
<v Speaker 6>Yeah, yeah, you're going to be You're going to under

0:30:16.160 --> 0:30:18.560
<v Speaker 6>risk it relative what I want as an investor, and

0:30:19.080 --> 0:30:21.080
<v Speaker 6>so it's a real dance.

0:30:21.200 --> 0:30:21.400
<v Speaker 2>Right.

0:30:21.520 --> 0:30:23.720
<v Speaker 6>Again, it goes back to the character the person you're hiring,

0:30:24.160 --> 0:30:26.000
<v Speaker 6>which we talked about earlier on about the pad shot

0:30:26.000 --> 0:30:30.120
<v Speaker 6>with the similar scenario. It really depends on how you

0:30:30.160 --> 0:30:33.080
<v Speaker 6>want to risk manage your investments as an alligator, right

0:30:33.120 --> 0:30:35.680
<v Speaker 6>because at the end of the day, when you're asking

0:30:35.680 --> 0:30:37.880
<v Speaker 6>a manager to put their own capital in the fund,

0:30:38.440 --> 0:30:40.479
<v Speaker 6>you're signing them a certain role as a risk manager

0:30:40.760 --> 0:30:45.000
<v Speaker 6>because and you have to assess honestly, my answer is,

0:30:45.120 --> 0:30:46.960
<v Speaker 6>it really depends on the person who I'm dealing with

0:30:47.280 --> 0:30:49.000
<v Speaker 6>and the sort of person who I think we're dealing with.

0:30:49.080 --> 0:30:49.240
<v Speaker 4>Right.

0:30:49.280 --> 0:30:52.480
<v Speaker 6>If I think it's somebody who is just really professional

0:30:52.480 --> 0:30:55.200
<v Speaker 6>and good, I'm not so sure. That having all their

0:30:55.200 --> 0:30:58.160
<v Speaker 6>money in the fund is necessary, you know, if I

0:30:58.200 --> 0:30:59.440
<v Speaker 6>think it's somebody where.

0:30:59.600 --> 0:31:02.240
<v Speaker 2>They see other funds too, you know, big fund managers

0:31:02.280 --> 0:31:03.080
<v Speaker 2>see they do.

0:31:03.160 --> 0:31:04.440
<v Speaker 6>Yeah, I mean I used to see that at my

0:31:04.480 --> 0:31:06.760
<v Speaker 6>former job, you know, and it was a real issue

0:31:06.760 --> 0:31:08.959
<v Speaker 6>because you did have people who, you know, they had

0:31:09.000 --> 0:31:12.040
<v Speaker 6>made decent money. But like, what we really wanted to

0:31:12.040 --> 0:31:14.840
<v Speaker 6>see at the time that PAMCO was people putting their

0:31:14.880 --> 0:31:18.120
<v Speaker 6>money into the business, you know, paying for Bloomberg, paying

0:31:18.160 --> 0:31:20.960
<v Speaker 6>for office space, you know, all that over over putting

0:31:20.960 --> 0:31:23.640
<v Speaker 6>money in the fund, because that was commitment to the business. Interesting, right,

0:31:23.720 --> 0:31:25.800
<v Speaker 6>I mean that's something that we're you know, we were

0:31:25.800 --> 0:31:29.680
<v Speaker 6>comfortable more as comfortable with them putting working capital into

0:31:29.680 --> 0:31:30.560
<v Speaker 6>a functioning business.

0:31:30.680 --> 0:31:31.040
<v Speaker 5>Interesting.

0:31:31.240 --> 0:31:33.960
<v Speaker 6>We then maybe putting more an extra five hundred thousand,

0:31:34.000 --> 0:31:35.960
<v Speaker 6>a million, two million million dollars into a fund.

0:31:36.080 --> 0:31:36.640
<v Speaker 1>Very interesting.

0:31:37.000 --> 0:31:40.880
<v Speaker 3>So much of what you're describing it sounds very very granular,

0:31:41.080 --> 0:31:43.640
<v Speaker 3>like the idea of looking at individual talent to see

0:31:43.640 --> 0:31:47.800
<v Speaker 3>how they operate, looking at something like culture, which tends

0:31:47.840 --> 0:31:52.000
<v Speaker 3>to be difficult to define. If I'm an allocator, how

0:31:52.080 --> 0:31:56.000
<v Speaker 3>much transparency or how much information am I actually getting

0:31:56.200 --> 0:31:59.160
<v Speaker 3>from one of these funds? And I realized allocators will

0:31:59.240 --> 0:32:02.080
<v Speaker 3>hire your company Albourne to actually do a lot of

0:32:02.080 --> 0:32:05.080
<v Speaker 3>this due diligence for them. But if Albourne was out

0:32:05.080 --> 0:32:08.440
<v Speaker 3>of the picture, what would I be seeing if I'm

0:32:08.440 --> 0:32:09.640
<v Speaker 3>a potential allocator.

0:32:10.840 --> 0:32:13.120
<v Speaker 6>So that's a a long there's a long answer to

0:32:13.120 --> 0:32:15.840
<v Speaker 6>that question, and it really does depend on a if

0:32:15.880 --> 0:32:17.600
<v Speaker 6>you're a certain size of an alligator.

0:32:18.320 --> 0:32:19.600
<v Speaker 5>There's there's kind of the fast lane.

0:32:19.720 --> 0:32:22.480
<v Speaker 3>Ah so if I'm PIMCO or something, if.

0:32:22.360 --> 0:32:24.600
<v Speaker 6>You're in you get in the executive lounge, you know,

0:32:24.720 --> 0:32:27.080
<v Speaker 6>you'll get treated more, you know, get more access. You

0:32:27.080 --> 0:32:29.200
<v Speaker 6>know that, and there's nothing wrong with that because simply

0:32:29.240 --> 0:32:31.960
<v Speaker 6>these people have limited time, you know, and somebody who's

0:32:31.960 --> 0:32:33.440
<v Speaker 6>going to be a larger client will get more in

0:32:33.480 --> 0:32:36.880
<v Speaker 6>almost any line of business, you know, in terms of access,

0:32:37.080 --> 0:32:39.960
<v Speaker 6>it does vary, I think, you know if I you know,

0:32:40.080 --> 0:32:43.600
<v Speaker 6>speaking of an allocator's shoes. You know, basic stuff is

0:32:43.680 --> 0:32:48.040
<v Speaker 6>regular meetings, good substantial risk reports, helping me understand where

0:32:48.040 --> 0:32:52.000
<v Speaker 6>and how risk is our plays, you know, updates when necessary,

0:32:52.400 --> 0:32:55.000
<v Speaker 6>and then you know, just it's really it is granular.

0:32:55.160 --> 0:32:59.000
<v Speaker 6>It's multi strategies are a combination of both zooming out

0:32:59.200 --> 0:33:01.720
<v Speaker 6>and taking the big But we talked about what camp

0:33:01.760 --> 0:33:03.560
<v Speaker 6>means in the global scale and how it's all that,

0:33:03.680 --> 0:33:06.800
<v Speaker 6>but it's also super super granular, so understanding you really

0:33:06.840 --> 0:33:09.160
<v Speaker 6>want to understand, like where their real competency is as

0:33:09.160 --> 0:33:12.840
<v Speaker 6>the multi strated, because many places start off with a

0:33:12.840 --> 0:33:13.920
<v Speaker 6>particular kind of thing.

0:33:13.920 --> 0:33:14.560
<v Speaker 5>They're good at.

0:33:14.920 --> 0:33:17.640
<v Speaker 6>Equities, Yeah, right, you know, at the end of the day,

0:33:17.880 --> 0:33:20.920
<v Speaker 6>most multi strategies make most of their money from kind

0:33:20.920 --> 0:33:23.440
<v Speaker 6>of I would call it equity alpha for lack of

0:33:23.480 --> 0:33:26.280
<v Speaker 6>a better word, which can include traditional long short equity,

0:33:26.680 --> 0:33:30.120
<v Speaker 6>quant equities index rebaal. We've heard about that a couple

0:33:30.160 --> 0:33:32.000
<v Speaker 6>of times. You know, all this sort of stuff that's

0:33:32.040 --> 0:33:33.840
<v Speaker 6>kind of equity alpha. Then you have other ones who

0:33:33.880 --> 0:33:36.240
<v Speaker 6>have more focused on kind of fixed income and credit,

0:33:36.440 --> 0:33:38.280
<v Speaker 6>you know, and you've got to understand what you're getting.

0:33:38.360 --> 0:33:40.920
<v Speaker 6>And I mean, then you've got to think about, given

0:33:40.960 --> 0:33:43.760
<v Speaker 6>what I think that my heuristic or my mental map

0:33:43.800 --> 0:33:47.240
<v Speaker 6>of what these guys are, does each incremental change what

0:33:47.280 --> 0:33:50.280
<v Speaker 6>they do. Does that makes sense because you know, I

0:33:50.280 --> 0:33:52.480
<v Speaker 6>mean one of the things I like to think about

0:33:52.600 --> 0:33:54.440
<v Speaker 6>is making sure that the stories are aligned.

0:33:54.920 --> 0:33:55.720
<v Speaker 5>Very simple stuff.

0:33:55.760 --> 0:33:57.760
<v Speaker 6>Right, Let's say I'm a pod shot manager, you're an

0:33:57.760 --> 0:33:59.680
<v Speaker 6>allocator in here, and.

0:33:59.600 --> 0:34:02.000
<v Speaker 5>I go on you know to ask a constructure, Well,

0:34:02.080 --> 0:34:02.800
<v Speaker 5>my pms.

0:34:03.000 --> 0:34:05.400
<v Speaker 6>You know, we put them in a room, give them Bloomberg,

0:34:05.440 --> 0:34:07.239
<v Speaker 6>We give them all the facility they need.

0:34:07.280 --> 0:34:09.319
<v Speaker 5>We charge them for that, and they just get paid

0:34:09.320 --> 0:34:10.560
<v Speaker 5>on their own P and L. Yeah.

0:34:10.719 --> 0:34:13.479
<v Speaker 6>Oh okay, you say, I find good And then you say, okay,

0:34:13.520 --> 0:34:15.200
<v Speaker 6>well talk to me about you know what sort of

0:34:15.239 --> 0:34:17.200
<v Speaker 6>culture you have? Oh yeah, well, actually you know what

0:34:17.239 --> 0:34:19.360
<v Speaker 6>we also, you know, we have a real cooperative culture

0:34:19.480 --> 0:34:22.279
<v Speaker 6>becomes loved here. You know, they all get back massages

0:34:22.480 --> 0:34:24.919
<v Speaker 6>and we all work together as across the team as well,

0:34:25.320 --> 0:34:28.680
<v Speaker 6>you know, and you're kind of going answer one and

0:34:28.800 --> 0:34:31.600
<v Speaker 6>answer to don't make sense together, right, And you see

0:34:31.600 --> 0:34:33.160
<v Speaker 6>this in all sorts of sort of ways, you know,

0:34:33.200 --> 0:34:35.840
<v Speaker 6>And the thing is that what happened is that people

0:34:35.880 --> 0:34:38.399
<v Speaker 6>have you know, the successful funds are the ones who's

0:34:38.440 --> 0:34:41.520
<v Speaker 6>answered made answer one and answer to come I line

0:34:41.600 --> 0:34:44.319
<v Speaker 6>up together, you know, in whichever way it needs to be.

0:34:44.560 --> 0:34:45.840
<v Speaker 5>They've worked on ways.

0:34:45.600 --> 0:34:48.520
<v Speaker 6>That makes sense that they're kind of I hate to

0:34:48.520 --> 0:34:50.880
<v Speaker 6>say about like a narrative alignment and how they do things.

0:34:51.080 --> 0:34:53.759
<v Speaker 6>They know what they're good at, you know, like what

0:34:53.840 --> 0:34:56.440
<v Speaker 6>for example, you don't have somebody who's really really got

0:34:56.480 --> 0:35:00.480
<v Speaker 6>an equities background to suddenly decide to hire some you know,

0:35:00.560 --> 0:35:04.200
<v Speaker 6>rockstar and allocate forty percent into commodities. You know, that

0:35:04.239 --> 0:35:05.399
<v Speaker 6>would be kind of a weird thing.

0:35:05.960 --> 0:35:08.359
<v Speaker 2>Well, so I know you're not going to like name

0:35:08.719 --> 0:35:11.960
<v Speaker 2>any specific names. I will name some names, but you

0:35:11.960 --> 0:35:14.719
<v Speaker 2>don't have to talk about them directly, you know, like

0:35:14.800 --> 0:35:19.080
<v Speaker 2>I mentioned someone like Ken Griffin or in Izy England

0:35:19.160 --> 0:35:23.160
<v Speaker 2>or at Millennium. When you look at the managers who

0:35:23.239 --> 0:35:26.440
<v Speaker 2>have done really well in this space, what are they

0:35:26.480 --> 0:35:27.640
<v Speaker 2>good at?

0:35:27.840 --> 0:35:31.240
<v Speaker 6>They are good at what I said, kind of bringing

0:35:31.480 --> 0:35:34.880
<v Speaker 6>alignment to finding that align, finding that solvement for align,

0:35:34.960 --> 0:35:38.480
<v Speaker 6>you know, solving for kind of the business issues, the

0:35:38.600 --> 0:35:41.640
<v Speaker 6>risk issues, the investment issues, and the personnel issues, and

0:35:41.680 --> 0:35:43.160
<v Speaker 6>making sure that they all work together.

0:35:43.719 --> 0:35:45.440
<v Speaker 5>You know, they're really successful.

0:35:45.520 --> 0:35:48.520
<v Speaker 6>People are just not that they are in it for

0:35:48.560 --> 0:35:51.280
<v Speaker 6>the money, but now they're in it for the competition

0:35:51.760 --> 0:35:54.560
<v Speaker 6>to improve because like I said, it's the best worst

0:35:54.600 --> 0:35:55.200
<v Speaker 6>job in the world.

0:35:55.239 --> 0:35:56.160
<v Speaker 5>You know, I would like.

0:35:56.200 --> 0:35:57.680
<v Speaker 1>To try it out at least for a little bit

0:35:57.760 --> 0:35:58.680
<v Speaker 1>see how good it is.

0:35:59.040 --> 0:35:59.760
<v Speaker 7>I have a question.

0:36:00.040 --> 0:36:02.520
<v Speaker 2>Part of the appeal of any multi strategy hedge fund

0:36:02.680 --> 0:36:06.719
<v Speaker 2>is the internal diversification. Obviously, whether we're talking about the

0:36:06.760 --> 0:36:08.800
<v Speaker 2>two and twenty or whether we're talking about the pure

0:36:09.000 --> 0:36:14.480
<v Speaker 2>pod model. You have these periods where one trade more

0:36:14.560 --> 0:36:16.520
<v Speaker 2>or less works out very well for a long time.

0:36:16.800 --> 0:36:20.200
<v Speaker 2>In the twenty tens, it was the disinflationary trade, which

0:36:20.280 --> 0:36:23.319
<v Speaker 2>represented in rates, and it was the tech trade or

0:36:23.800 --> 0:36:26.680
<v Speaker 2>various flavors of that. What do you see when you

0:36:26.719 --> 0:36:30.160
<v Speaker 2>do due diligence on a fund? What do you look for?

0:36:30.680 --> 0:36:31.680
<v Speaker 7>Because I would just.

0:36:31.640 --> 0:36:34.560
<v Speaker 2>Think, yeah, here's a bunch of people, but all you

0:36:34.600 --> 0:36:36.640
<v Speaker 2>all want to make money, so y'all put on the

0:36:36.680 --> 0:36:39.720
<v Speaker 2>same trade in different clothing, right, and there's different ways

0:36:39.760 --> 0:36:42.200
<v Speaker 2>to play the same trade. How do the good funds

0:36:42.280 --> 0:36:44.160
<v Speaker 2>actually establish diversification?

0:36:46.320 --> 0:36:50.440
<v Speaker 6>So there's actually April is a really good example of

0:36:50.520 --> 0:36:53.440
<v Speaker 6>the versification at work and what it means for how

0:36:53.520 --> 0:36:57.600
<v Speaker 6>funds work. And I'm going to loosely describe April very loosely,

0:36:57.880 --> 0:37:00.720
<v Speaker 6>and I'm sure somebody in your audience will go completely wrong,

0:37:01.239 --> 0:37:05.000
<v Speaker 6>but loosely, April was mostly in equity story, right, And

0:37:06.160 --> 0:37:09.480
<v Speaker 6>what we had, what we saw was equity only focused

0:37:09.480 --> 0:37:11.279
<v Speaker 6>managers had a much tougher time of it than the

0:37:11.320 --> 0:37:15.680
<v Speaker 6>diversified managers. Okay, so diverse fight I being cross commodities

0:37:16.040 --> 0:37:17.760
<v Speaker 6>rates converts other stuff.

0:37:17.800 --> 0:37:18.680
<v Speaker 5>And why is that important?

0:37:18.719 --> 0:37:21.239
<v Speaker 6>Because last year one of the biggest trades that worked

0:37:21.239 --> 0:37:25.359
<v Speaker 6>with equities, right, And so the way you stay and

0:37:25.600 --> 0:37:29.120
<v Speaker 6>so the way you stay diversified is really disciplined, right.

0:37:29.640 --> 0:37:31.800
<v Speaker 6>And you know, in the context of what you're trying

0:37:31.840 --> 0:37:35.040
<v Speaker 6>to do. One of the interesting things about running simulations

0:37:35.040 --> 0:37:38.160
<v Speaker 6>around multistrats, right is you actually don't need to have

0:37:38.200 --> 0:37:40.120
<v Speaker 6>such great pms or great trades to have a really

0:37:40.120 --> 0:37:43.560
<v Speaker 6>good multi strat if you risk manage it right. Okay,

0:37:44.000 --> 0:37:45.719
<v Speaker 6>if you actually have a set of people who are

0:37:45.880 --> 0:37:48.720
<v Speaker 6>very lowly correlated with each other and you put them together,

0:37:49.040 --> 0:37:51.719
<v Speaker 6>you lever them up, you can have a very good business.

0:37:51.880 --> 0:37:54.160
<v Speaker 6>So to your question is, like, the answer is, you

0:37:54.239 --> 0:37:57.520
<v Speaker 6>got to be disciplined, You got to have like you

0:37:57.600 --> 0:37:59.719
<v Speaker 6>put the right amount of risk into your twenty ten

0:37:59.719 --> 0:38:02.319
<v Speaker 6>different inflationary trade, put the right amount of risk into

0:38:02.600 --> 0:38:06.120
<v Speaker 6>fundamental fundamental equity market neutral last year. But you make

0:38:06.160 --> 0:38:08.600
<v Speaker 6>sure that you're not over the limit, right, and you

0:38:08.680 --> 0:38:09.640
<v Speaker 6>stay disciplined so.

0:38:09.600 --> 0:38:11.360
<v Speaker 7>That our equity market neutral.

0:38:11.480 --> 0:38:13.359
<v Speaker 2>I would still find a way to make it long

0:38:13.440 --> 0:38:15.280
<v Speaker 2>tech and disguise there.

0:38:14.840 --> 0:38:16.000
<v Speaker 5>Well, people totally do. Yeah.

0:38:16.000 --> 0:38:18.760
<v Speaker 6>I mean, look, we haven't even got into factor factor

0:38:18.760 --> 0:38:21.839
<v Speaker 6>controls and stuff like that, and so on and so forth. Look,

0:38:21.920 --> 0:38:25.719
<v Speaker 6>the fact is that and there's multiple answers to that

0:38:25.800 --> 0:38:28.319
<v Speaker 6>question across how multi strates have implemented this in terms

0:38:28.360 --> 0:38:29.880
<v Speaker 6>of what they're willing to take in terms of factor

0:38:29.960 --> 0:38:32.560
<v Speaker 6>risk or sector risk and stuff like that and when.

0:38:32.640 --> 0:38:35.160
<v Speaker 6>But when you get down to it, look, the job

0:38:35.880 --> 0:38:39.440
<v Speaker 6>of an investor, any investor is to take risk in

0:38:39.480 --> 0:38:43.080
<v Speaker 6>the way they're supposed to. And multi strategy funds they

0:38:43.120 --> 0:38:45.959
<v Speaker 6>take risk. You know, there's no getting around that. Key

0:38:46.120 --> 0:38:48.080
<v Speaker 6>is is how you take it, how disciplined you stay

0:38:48.120 --> 0:38:50.120
<v Speaker 6>with it, the quality of the people, the quality of

0:38:50.120 --> 0:38:54.000
<v Speaker 6>the structure around that, and just you know, sometimes some

0:38:54.080 --> 0:38:54.640
<v Speaker 6>look as well.

0:38:55.400 --> 0:38:57.920
<v Speaker 3>Just on the risk management side, it sounds like a

0:38:57.960 --> 0:39:02.160
<v Speaker 3>lot depends on historical core correlations when it comes to diversification,

0:39:02.760 --> 0:39:06.320
<v Speaker 3>and what we've seen in recent years and in April

0:39:06.480 --> 0:39:09.680
<v Speaker 3>is some of those historic correlations breaking down, So for instance,

0:39:09.800 --> 0:39:13.759
<v Speaker 3>bonds not being a good hedge for equities, or more

0:39:13.840 --> 0:39:16.480
<v Speaker 3>recently the dollars selling off at the same time that

0:39:16.520 --> 0:39:20.239
<v Speaker 3>bonds were selling off. How are people managing or judging

0:39:20.400 --> 0:39:23.800
<v Speaker 3>that correlation risk because that seems to be a potential

0:39:23.800 --> 0:39:25.600
<v Speaker 3>area of weakness for multi strats.

0:39:25.880 --> 0:39:28.800
<v Speaker 6>It's a weakness for everybody, potential area weakness for everybody.

0:39:28.840 --> 0:39:33.600
<v Speaker 6>I think, look, management of correlation is super fundamental to

0:39:33.680 --> 0:39:35.920
<v Speaker 6>management of risk. In the context of any multi strategy

0:39:35.960 --> 0:39:40.520
<v Speaker 6>hedge fund. There's tremendous benefits to keeping your correlation low

0:39:40.520 --> 0:39:43.560
<v Speaker 6>between your strategies, in terms of risk management, in terms

0:39:43.600 --> 0:39:45.800
<v Speaker 6>of how much you can lever, in terms of everything.

0:39:46.040 --> 0:39:48.359
<v Speaker 6>When I look at managers, when I test managers, when

0:39:48.400 --> 0:39:51.040
<v Speaker 6>they you know, when I simulate managers, I look at

0:39:51.120 --> 0:39:53.960
<v Speaker 6>kind of two regimes, low and high correlation, and everything

0:39:53.960 --> 0:39:57.040
<v Speaker 6>that works in low is punishes you in high correlation. Right.

0:39:57.120 --> 0:40:01.120
<v Speaker 6>For example, when you're creating diversified portfolio of really cool

0:40:01.120 --> 0:40:03.240
<v Speaker 6>trades that have nothing to do with each other, is great.

0:40:03.280 --> 0:40:06.160
<v Speaker 6>When it works in a high correlation environment is a

0:40:06.239 --> 0:40:09.000
<v Speaker 6>nightmare because it's things you've never heard of blowing up.

0:40:09.080 --> 0:40:10.680
<v Speaker 6>Because I mean, there's a limited amount of things that

0:40:10.760 --> 0:40:13.760
<v Speaker 6>any any one person can know, right, So every choice

0:40:13.760 --> 0:40:16.600
<v Speaker 6>you make at a low correlation environment will come back

0:40:16.600 --> 0:40:20.080
<v Speaker 6>to bite you in a high correlation environment. Correlations between

0:40:20.120 --> 0:40:22.920
<v Speaker 6>asset classes is a fundamental part of that. But the

0:40:23.000 --> 0:40:26.480
<v Speaker 6>critical thing around that is the and this is one

0:40:26.520 --> 0:40:28.480
<v Speaker 6>of my managers said to this, it's like, when you're

0:40:28.480 --> 0:40:31.960
<v Speaker 6>sufficiently diversified, each individual line it him you ad makes

0:40:32.000 --> 0:40:34.279
<v Speaker 6>no difference to the portfolio risk or innd like that,

0:40:34.880 --> 0:40:38.640
<v Speaker 6>except what you're actually looking to allocate when you're at

0:40:38.640 --> 0:40:41.279
<v Speaker 6>that diversified is how much of a loss you can

0:40:41.320 --> 0:40:43.520
<v Speaker 6>make in that high correlational environment, how much of a

0:40:43.520 --> 0:40:46.120
<v Speaker 6>loss you're willing to bear, And so if that individual

0:40:46.200 --> 0:40:48.480
<v Speaker 6>component is something that's additive to that loss or makes

0:40:48.520 --> 0:40:51.400
<v Speaker 6>it worse, that's where you judge it. Right, when you're

0:40:51.400 --> 0:40:54.600
<v Speaker 6>sufficiently diversified, so you try to insulate yourself from breakdown

0:40:54.640 --> 0:40:57.840
<v Speaker 6>and correlation by having a budget for that breakdown and

0:40:57.880 --> 0:41:00.840
<v Speaker 6>correlation and making sure that you're individ you a components.

0:41:01.400 --> 0:41:03.640
<v Speaker 6>You know what each individual component for portfolio is going

0:41:03.640 --> 0:41:06.000
<v Speaker 6>to do for that and if you do that, then

0:41:06.040 --> 0:41:07.880
<v Speaker 6>you're kind of that's how you kind of figure that

0:41:07.920 --> 0:41:08.239
<v Speaker 6>one out.

0:41:08.400 --> 0:41:08.560
<v Speaker 1>Look.

0:41:08.600 --> 0:41:11.080
<v Speaker 6>You can buy hedges as well, and people do explicitly

0:41:11.120 --> 0:41:13.839
<v Speaker 6>do tail hedging to provide kind of return and cash

0:41:13.880 --> 0:41:16.919
<v Speaker 6>in those sorts of scenarios. But allocating that tail risk,

0:41:17.080 --> 0:41:19.680
<v Speaker 6>especially in a pod shot because they're more diversified, is

0:41:19.719 --> 0:41:22.239
<v Speaker 6>probably the most important job that these guys have.

0:41:23.120 --> 0:41:25.680
<v Speaker 2>One of the things that I'm interested in is you know,

0:41:25.719 --> 0:41:30.160
<v Speaker 2>there's still new multistrats being launched. A lot of them

0:41:30.239 --> 0:41:32.399
<v Speaker 2>continue to make a lot of money, but there has

0:41:32.480 --> 0:41:38.279
<v Speaker 2>to be some limit to the alpha generated capacity of

0:41:38.320 --> 0:41:42.120
<v Speaker 2>these vehicles. I would think, and I'm trying to wrap

0:41:42.120 --> 0:41:44.560
<v Speaker 2>around my head about what happened. Does more and more

0:41:44.600 --> 0:41:47.840
<v Speaker 2>funds launch and what is the capacity? And based on

0:41:47.880 --> 0:41:49.279
<v Speaker 2>this conversation, if I had to.

0:41:49.239 --> 0:41:51.400
<v Speaker 1>Guess about what degrades alpha over.

0:41:51.280 --> 0:41:54.640
<v Speaker 2>Time, it would be something to do with compensation, where

0:41:54.760 --> 0:41:57.960
<v Speaker 2>just like all the money accruise at the PM level

0:41:58.040 --> 0:42:01.160
<v Speaker 2>because there's such competition with more talk to us about

0:42:01.200 --> 0:42:04.360
<v Speaker 2>like how you would articulate the source of alpha and

0:42:04.360 --> 0:42:08.640
<v Speaker 2>how much can realistically be captured as more and more

0:42:08.680 --> 0:42:11.080
<v Speaker 2>people and more and more money flows into this space.

0:42:12.080 --> 0:42:15.840
<v Speaker 6>Okay, so articulating a source of alpha, that's probably the

0:42:15.880 --> 0:42:17.200
<v Speaker 6>biggest question there is.

0:42:17.120 --> 0:42:19.959
<v Speaker 5>An investing for hedge funds. Can I cope with a metric?

0:42:20.000 --> 0:42:22.840
<v Speaker 6>I probably could in terms of just volatility and markets extract,

0:42:22.880 --> 0:42:25.520
<v Speaker 6>you know, you know, alpha extraction from that, you know,

0:42:25.680 --> 0:42:27.799
<v Speaker 6>I mean for me that they're kind of critical things

0:42:27.800 --> 0:42:30.480
<v Speaker 6>in terms of understanding what alpha is. Is most of

0:42:30.520 --> 0:42:34.600
<v Speaker 6>the time in most markets there's a large number of

0:42:34.640 --> 0:42:38.279
<v Speaker 6>people with different mandates, different things going on their head,

0:42:38.320 --> 0:42:41.680
<v Speaker 6>different things going on their institutions. As long as there's

0:42:41.680 --> 0:42:46.880
<v Speaker 6>a sufficient ecosystem of time horizons, capital constraints, there's always

0:42:46.880 --> 0:42:48.919
<v Speaker 6>going to be the alpha. And the interesting thing about

0:42:49.040 --> 0:42:53.279
<v Speaker 6>you know, certain markets, for example, is like alpha and

0:42:53.320 --> 0:42:56.720
<v Speaker 6>this may sound a little bit of philosophical, alpha can

0:42:56.800 --> 0:42:59.719
<v Speaker 6>be something other than money. For example, if you take

0:42:59.760 --> 0:43:02.520
<v Speaker 6>a tap simple tail edging situation, buying puts on the

0:43:02.600 --> 0:43:07.440
<v Speaker 6>S and P, right, they're notoriously expensive, right, But the

0:43:07.520 --> 0:43:09.279
<v Speaker 6>alpha that the people who buy puts get is the

0:43:09.360 --> 0:43:10.799
<v Speaker 6>kind of the alpha of a peace of mind for

0:43:10.840 --> 0:43:11.800
<v Speaker 6>the rest of their portfolio.

0:43:12.360 --> 0:43:12.600
<v Speaker 5>Right.

0:43:12.680 --> 0:43:15.000
<v Speaker 6>So I mean, if you're a hard edged to hedge funds,

0:43:15.000 --> 0:43:17.600
<v Speaker 6>you're monetizing the alpha by doing a dispersion trade. But

0:43:17.800 --> 0:43:20.520
<v Speaker 6>like for people who are like feel can they can

0:43:20.520 --> 0:43:23.640
<v Speaker 6>sleep at night by buying puts, that's fine. You know

0:43:23.640 --> 0:43:25.960
<v Speaker 6>they're taking their alpha and kind of non manatory form.

0:43:26.080 --> 0:43:29.279
<v Speaker 6>Now that I said that's philosophical. In other cases, you know,

0:43:30.320 --> 0:43:33.319
<v Speaker 6>the hedge fund space, they're the pushing the pull going

0:43:33.360 --> 0:43:36.200
<v Speaker 6>on here, right, And so you talk about multi strategies

0:43:36.280 --> 0:43:37.960
<v Speaker 6>hedge funds, but they're not the only sort of hedge

0:43:37.960 --> 0:43:41.760
<v Speaker 6>funds the whole set of other hedge funds doing other things.

0:43:42.360 --> 0:43:44.560
<v Speaker 6>And so you know, if you just what's been happening,

0:43:44.600 --> 0:43:46.439
<v Speaker 6>and that's why we're talking about multi strategy hedge funds.

0:43:46.480 --> 0:43:50.160
<v Speaker 6>Is broadly speaking, hedge fund investing is more or less

0:43:50.160 --> 0:43:52.840
<v Speaker 6>the same size for the past couple of years. But

0:43:52.920 --> 0:43:55.080
<v Speaker 6>this share of multi strategies have gone up because, like

0:43:55.120 --> 0:43:57.040
<v Speaker 6>as I said, they kind of offer a pretty good

0:43:57.080 --> 0:43:58.799
<v Speaker 6>deal to a PM. You know, they take away all

0:43:58.800 --> 0:44:00.319
<v Speaker 6>the business risks that they have to deal with. They

0:44:00.320 --> 0:44:02.920
<v Speaker 6>don't talk to me, you know, they just get to

0:44:02.960 --> 0:44:07.120
<v Speaker 6>INVESTI trade, thank you. But you know, they take away

0:44:07.160 --> 0:44:08.879
<v Speaker 6>all that sort of risk, and so the pms they

0:44:08.920 --> 0:44:11.000
<v Speaker 6>kind of have a different maybe better life, depending on

0:44:11.040 --> 0:44:13.080
<v Speaker 6>what their admissions are and stuff. And as I said,

0:44:13.080 --> 0:44:17.839
<v Speaker 6>for investors, the underlying risk taking inside of a multi

0:44:17.880 --> 0:44:19.719
<v Speaker 6>strat makes for a better kind of return and level

0:44:19.760 --> 0:44:22.440
<v Speaker 6>at the top level. You know, I think this will reverse,

0:44:22.719 --> 0:44:25.560
<v Speaker 6>you know, over time, but like for the moment, like multistrats,

0:44:25.600 --> 0:44:27.719
<v Speaker 6>and you ask about how big individual multi strats can

0:44:27.800 --> 0:44:30.239
<v Speaker 6>get it as well, which is an interesting question. Empirically,

0:44:30.520 --> 0:44:33.560
<v Speaker 6>kap is around fifty fifty to seventy billion dollars right

0:44:33.600 --> 0:44:36.560
<v Speaker 6>now you know, whether that's liquidit in markets, whether that's

0:44:36.800 --> 0:44:41.280
<v Speaker 6>share of Wall Street's bank's credit book, you know that's

0:44:41.480 --> 0:44:43.719
<v Speaker 6>or where it's just organizational sites because you know they're

0:44:43.760 --> 0:44:47.960
<v Speaker 6>hard to manage, you know, hundreds of pms right, physically

0:44:48.000 --> 0:44:49.600
<v Speaker 6>and mathematically different to do that.

0:44:50.239 --> 0:44:53.440
<v Speaker 3>Is prime brokerage a factor as well, because I imagine,

0:44:53.520 --> 0:44:55.520
<v Speaker 3>you know, if you have a multi strat that suddenly

0:44:55.560 --> 0:44:59.640
<v Speaker 3>becomes as big as JP Morgan or something that's unrealistic,

0:44:59.680 --> 0:45:02.680
<v Speaker 3>but just as an extreme example, I can't imagine the

0:45:02.760 --> 0:45:04.360
<v Speaker 3>prime brokers.

0:45:04.360 --> 0:45:07.440
<v Speaker 5>Are going to be okay with that, with what exactly.

0:45:07.360 --> 0:45:11.240
<v Speaker 3>With the size and the risk of a giant multi

0:45:11.360 --> 0:45:14.080
<v Speaker 3>of having a relationship with a giant multi strat.

0:45:14.600 --> 0:45:17.839
<v Speaker 6>They would not love it because you know it just

0:45:17.880 --> 0:45:20.439
<v Speaker 6>put it's this famous story. If a few ten dollars

0:45:20.480 --> 0:45:22.719
<v Speaker 6>to the bank, it's your problem. Yeah, billion dollars the bank,

0:45:22.760 --> 0:45:26.000
<v Speaker 6>it's their problem. So you know, banks across the world

0:45:26.160 --> 0:45:29.040
<v Speaker 6>avoid try to avoid having customers so large that they

0:45:29.120 --> 0:45:30.480
<v Speaker 6>it becomes their problem.

0:45:30.680 --> 0:45:32.719
<v Speaker 5>So yes, the answer is yes.

0:45:33.200 --> 0:45:35.759
<v Speaker 3>Ronan Cosgrave, thank you so much for coming on all

0:45:35.800 --> 0:45:38.640
<v Speaker 3>thoughts and explaining to us why comp is important.

0:45:38.800 --> 0:45:41.719
<v Speaker 2>That was fantastic come back on the podcast again for

0:45:41.760 --> 0:45:42.719
<v Speaker 2>a further conversation.

0:45:42.880 --> 0:45:43.880
<v Speaker 1>But that's great, Thank.

0:45:43.760 --> 0:45:57.239
<v Speaker 8>You guys, Joe.

0:45:57.320 --> 0:45:57.960
<v Speaker 3>That was fun.

0:45:58.160 --> 0:45:59.040
<v Speaker 7>That was great. Yeah.

0:45:59.080 --> 0:46:01.880
<v Speaker 3>I like digging in to the business model of these things.

0:46:02.160 --> 0:46:05.960
<v Speaker 3>One thing I hadn't come to appreciate is the idea

0:46:06.120 --> 0:46:09.240
<v Speaker 3>of how difficult it might be to actually move around

0:46:09.320 --> 0:46:13.239
<v Speaker 3>capital because no one wants to be firing pms that

0:46:13.320 --> 0:46:16.160
<v Speaker 3>you fought like tooth and nail to actually hire in

0:46:16.200 --> 0:46:17.320
<v Speaker 3>a competitive environment.

0:46:17.800 --> 0:46:20.440
<v Speaker 2>I mean, so this gets to something that actually I

0:46:20.560 --> 0:46:23.200
<v Speaker 2>thought about after we did that recent episode with Scott

0:46:23.200 --> 0:46:25.400
<v Speaker 2>back on boutique investment banks.

0:46:25.480 --> 0:46:27.759
<v Speaker 7>Which is the idea of where.

0:46:27.520 --> 0:46:31.799
<v Speaker 2>Does franchise value come in in a talent driven business? Yeah,

0:46:32.160 --> 0:46:35.880
<v Speaker 2>in boutique investment banking, there's another area where it's like, Okay,

0:46:35.920 --> 0:46:38.920
<v Speaker 2>you build this talent, but is there any franchise value

0:46:38.960 --> 0:46:41.560
<v Speaker 2>external that? And so it was really interesting to hear

0:46:41.719 --> 0:46:45.040
<v Speaker 2>Ronan talk about at any hedge fund, not just the

0:46:45.160 --> 0:46:48.759
<v Speaker 2>degree to which the manager has actual money tied to

0:46:48.800 --> 0:46:52.080
<v Speaker 2>the investments in this space, but to which they're invested

0:46:52.200 --> 0:46:54.960
<v Speaker 2>in the business as a business, as opposed to just

0:46:55.000 --> 0:46:58.000
<v Speaker 2>the fund. I thought that was a super fantastic Yeah.

0:46:57.760 --> 0:47:00.359
<v Speaker 3>And also like the idea of looking at over head

0:47:00.560 --> 0:47:04.279
<v Speaker 3>spending as like an indication how much people care about

0:47:04.320 --> 0:47:04.880
<v Speaker 3>the business.

0:47:05.080 --> 0:47:07.640
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, I hadn't thought of that. You know, I would

0:47:07.680 --> 0:47:10.000
<v Speaker 2>like to be in this space one day. That's never

0:47:10.040 --> 0:47:13.560
<v Speaker 2>going to happen for obvious reasons. But it's very fun

0:47:14.160 --> 0:47:17.839
<v Speaker 2>thinking about ways in which, depending on what seat we have,

0:47:18.160 --> 0:47:19.600
<v Speaker 2>we're gaming the system.

0:47:19.719 --> 0:47:19.920
<v Speaker 1>You know.

0:47:20.040 --> 0:47:23.080
<v Speaker 2>So it's like, if I'm at the manager level, I'm

0:47:23.080 --> 0:47:26.480
<v Speaker 2>thinking about how I can have personal wealth that is

0:47:26.600 --> 0:47:27.319
<v Speaker 2>visible to me.

0:47:27.520 --> 0:47:30.000
<v Speaker 3>But is it not that your mind immediately goes to

0:47:30.040 --> 0:47:30.760
<v Speaker 3>gaming the system.

0:47:30.800 --> 0:47:33.560
<v Speaker 2>It's not visible to the LPs. I think about how

0:47:33.640 --> 0:47:36.880
<v Speaker 2>if I were at the PM level, I was like, yeah,

0:47:36.920 --> 0:47:39.759
<v Speaker 2>of course I'm taking a market neutral long short book,

0:47:39.800 --> 0:47:42.560
<v Speaker 2>but I'm really just finding a closet way to go

0:47:42.719 --> 0:47:46.239
<v Speaker 2>long in video. During the AI bull market, it does

0:47:46.320 --> 0:47:49.600
<v Speaker 2>feel though that like part of the entire game is here.

0:47:49.680 --> 0:47:52.440
<v Speaker 2>You have these parameters and risk constraints and so forth,

0:47:52.719 --> 0:47:55.919
<v Speaker 2>and this cat and mouse game between those who want

0:47:56.040 --> 0:47:59.640
<v Speaker 2>to essentially find a way out of the constraints and

0:47:59.680 --> 0:48:01.400
<v Speaker 2>those who want to put them back in the box.

0:48:01.560 --> 0:48:04.120
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, that seems to be a fundamental tension, although I

0:48:04.120 --> 0:48:07.560
<v Speaker 3>imagine it exists, you know, in some other funds as well.

0:48:07.440 --> 0:48:09.680
<v Speaker 2>And I just like the fact that all this bonus

0:48:09.719 --> 0:48:12.120
<v Speaker 2>money is the business itself. I think that's a really

0:48:12.160 --> 0:48:15.560
<v Speaker 2>important idea when you hear about bonuses, et cetera. This

0:48:15.600 --> 0:48:17.800
<v Speaker 2>is not just like someone getting their Christmas bonus.

0:48:17.880 --> 0:48:20.800
<v Speaker 1>This is the business. This is the business.

0:48:20.880 --> 0:48:21.640
<v Speaker 3>Shall we leave it there?

0:48:21.719 --> 0:48:22.479
<v Speaker 1>Let's leave it there.

0:48:22.719 --> 0:48:25.239
<v Speaker 3>This has been another episode of the Odd Lots podcast.

0:48:25.320 --> 0:48:28.800
<v Speaker 3>I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway.

0:48:28.520 --> 0:48:31.240
<v Speaker 1>And I'm Jill Wisenthal. You can follow me at the Stalwart.

0:48:31.520 --> 0:48:34.960
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0:48:34.960 --> 0:48:38.479
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0:48:38.480 --> 0:48:41.000
<v Speaker 2>Lots content, go to Bloomberg dot com slash odd Lots,

0:48:41.000 --> 0:48:43.320
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0:48:49.760 --> 0:48:52.239
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