1 00:00:03,080 --> 00:00:06,160 Speaker 1: Welcome to Stuff to Blow Your Mind from how Stuffworks 2 00:00:06,200 --> 00:00:15,280 Speaker 1: dot com. Hey, welcome to Stuff to Blow your Mind. 3 00:00:15,320 --> 00:00:17,639 Speaker 1: My name is Robert Lamb and I'm Joe McCormick in. 4 00:00:17,680 --> 00:00:19,759 Speaker 1: Today is going to be part two of a two 5 00:00:19,800 --> 00:00:24,040 Speaker 1: part episode on the illusion of explanatory depth. So if 6 00:00:24,040 --> 00:00:26,480 Speaker 1: you have not heard part one yet, it is sort 7 00:00:26,520 --> 00:00:29,440 Speaker 1: of foundational to the research we're gonna be talking about today, 8 00:00:29,640 --> 00:00:32,080 Speaker 1: you should go back listen to the episode before this one, 9 00:00:32,159 --> 00:00:36,120 Speaker 1: the first one about how we really don't understand half 10 00:00:36,120 --> 00:00:39,360 Speaker 1: of what we think we do. Right. Yeah. I was 11 00:00:39,400 --> 00:00:42,920 Speaker 1: reminded in researching this of a particular episode of Adventure Time, 12 00:00:43,600 --> 00:00:48,200 Speaker 1: the Fabulous Cartoon Network animated series, in which they encounter 13 00:00:48,280 --> 00:00:51,000 Speaker 1: a demon cat. It's kind of a riff on a 14 00:00:51,080 --> 00:00:54,640 Speaker 1: Dungeons and Dragons Displace or Beast. It's voiced by Clancy Brown. 15 00:00:54,760 --> 00:00:59,160 Speaker 1: Clancy Brown, the guy from what uh oh I'm thinking 16 00:00:59,280 --> 00:01:03,320 Speaker 1: shawngregation Highlander. He was the Kurgan. He's the villain in 17 00:01:03,360 --> 00:01:05,600 Speaker 1: both movies and oh yeah, I mean one is a 18 00:01:05,600 --> 00:01:09,000 Speaker 1: little more a little more evil than the other. Well, 19 00:01:09,040 --> 00:01:12,399 Speaker 1: I mean, I guess it's it's all subjective, but but 20 00:01:12,480 --> 00:01:15,720 Speaker 1: in this particular piece, he's a demon cat and a demon. 21 00:01:15,760 --> 00:01:20,040 Speaker 1: Cat probably informs the heroes that he has approximate knowledge 22 00:01:20,280 --> 00:01:24,440 Speaker 1: of all things. And that's how I often feel here 23 00:01:24,440 --> 00:01:28,119 Speaker 1: at how stuff works. That is what I'm afraid of. Yeah, 24 00:01:28,160 --> 00:01:30,680 Speaker 1: I mean, it's kind of what I'm jack of all trades, 25 00:01:30,720 --> 00:01:33,800 Speaker 1: master of none. We can when we're not experts in 26 00:01:33,840 --> 00:01:39,280 Speaker 1: any given topic, but we are continually diving down, often 27 00:01:39,400 --> 00:01:41,880 Speaker 1: rather deep, into a variety of topics. You have to 28 00:01:41,880 --> 00:01:45,080 Speaker 1: be explanatory generalists, and it means yeah, it means we 29 00:01:45,240 --> 00:01:49,200 Speaker 1: were We actually develop expertise in no one thing except 30 00:01:49,240 --> 00:01:53,200 Speaker 1: maybe hopefully in the process of explaining. But we'll see. 31 00:01:53,200 --> 00:01:56,200 Speaker 1: I mean that process is sticky enough, as we discovered 32 00:01:56,280 --> 00:01:59,600 Speaker 1: last time. So brief brief refresher on what we covered 33 00:01:59,640 --> 00:02:02,400 Speaker 1: in the last st episode. It's this idea of the 34 00:02:02,400 --> 00:02:05,480 Speaker 1: illusion of explanatory depth. This uh, this big two thousand 35 00:02:05,480 --> 00:02:09,200 Speaker 1: two paper uh that basically research has shown that people 36 00:02:09,240 --> 00:02:13,480 Speaker 1: display different levels of accuracy and how confident they are 37 00:02:13,520 --> 00:02:17,200 Speaker 1: about their own knowledge in different knowledge domains. So that 38 00:02:17,240 --> 00:02:20,040 Speaker 1: sounds kind of abstract, but here's how it means. People 39 00:02:20,080 --> 00:02:24,240 Speaker 1: are pretty accurate in guessing how well they know narratives 40 00:02:24,240 --> 00:02:26,919 Speaker 1: like movie plots. You can be pretty accurate in saying 41 00:02:26,919 --> 00:02:29,200 Speaker 1: I think I know that about a four out of seven, 42 00:02:29,240 --> 00:02:30,880 Speaker 1: and then you probably do know it about a four 43 00:02:30,880 --> 00:02:34,000 Speaker 1: out of seven. And procedures like how to tie a 44 00:02:34,080 --> 00:02:37,079 Speaker 1: bow tie or how to make a pizza. They're a 45 00:02:37,160 --> 00:02:40,480 Speaker 1: little bit less accurate in how well they know facts 46 00:02:40,520 --> 00:02:43,840 Speaker 1: like the capitals of countries, and they are much less 47 00:02:43,880 --> 00:02:47,560 Speaker 1: accurate in their ability to explain the workings of complex 48 00:02:47,600 --> 00:02:51,639 Speaker 1: causal systems or what has been called theory like knowledge. 49 00:02:51,840 --> 00:02:55,160 Speaker 1: Can you explain how a toaster works, or how a 50 00:02:55,200 --> 00:02:59,040 Speaker 1: cylinder lock works? Or natural phenomenon? Can you explain how 51 00:02:59,120 --> 00:03:02,920 Speaker 1: tides work or how rainbows are formed? And we just 52 00:03:02,960 --> 00:03:08,320 Speaker 1: tend to systematically overestimate how well we understand these latter 53 00:03:08,440 --> 00:03:11,400 Speaker 1: types of things. But the research has also shown that 54 00:03:11,440 --> 00:03:13,760 Speaker 1: we can be made aware of our own lack of 55 00:03:13,840 --> 00:03:17,240 Speaker 1: understanding in a very simple way, just being asked to 56 00:03:17,400 --> 00:03:20,720 Speaker 1: explain them. So you think you understand how a cylinder 57 00:03:20,760 --> 00:03:25,400 Speaker 1: lock works, can you please explain it? And then you say, oh, yeah, okay, 58 00:03:25,440 --> 00:03:27,440 Speaker 1: And then you try to explain it, and then if 59 00:03:27,480 --> 00:03:30,359 Speaker 1: you're asked to re rate again your confidence and how 60 00:03:30,360 --> 00:03:33,359 Speaker 1: well you understand it, you will rate your confidence lower 61 00:03:33,440 --> 00:03:36,720 Speaker 1: after having tried to explain, you'll realize there are big 62 00:03:36,760 --> 00:03:40,200 Speaker 1: gaps in your understanding. Yeah. I mean the example that 63 00:03:40,240 --> 00:03:43,320 Speaker 1: I throughout in the last episode was you something's wrong 64 00:03:43,320 --> 00:03:46,120 Speaker 1: with the sink. You get out your toolkit because you 65 00:03:46,160 --> 00:03:48,720 Speaker 1: think you can fix it yourself, and then you quickly realize, oh, 66 00:03:48,760 --> 00:03:53,080 Speaker 1: my understanding of how this sink works is not really 67 00:03:53,120 --> 00:03:55,960 Speaker 1: sufficient for the for the task at hand. Yeah, whoops. 68 00:03:56,080 --> 00:03:58,960 Speaker 1: I yeah, you realize you have you've bitten off more 69 00:03:59,000 --> 00:04:02,120 Speaker 1: than you can shoot. Uh. Yeah. And this again seems 70 00:04:02,160 --> 00:04:06,760 Speaker 1: to be mostly unique to explanatory knowledge how complex causal 71 00:04:06,840 --> 00:04:11,080 Speaker 1: systems work, like how machines work, how natural phenomena work, 72 00:04:11,120 --> 00:04:13,040 Speaker 1: and maybe some other things we can talk about in 73 00:04:13,040 --> 00:04:17,320 Speaker 1: this episode, maybe like how policies work. But the same 74 00:04:17,360 --> 00:04:19,680 Speaker 1: thing does not happen when people are asked to rate 75 00:04:19,720 --> 00:04:22,520 Speaker 1: and explain how to do something, or to recall the 76 00:04:22,560 --> 00:04:24,800 Speaker 1: plot of a movie they've seen it. Specifically with this 77 00:04:24,920 --> 00:04:29,680 Speaker 1: explanatory understanding of how things work. Now, one of the 78 00:04:29,720 --> 00:04:32,680 Speaker 1: first things I think we should look at today is 79 00:04:32,720 --> 00:04:35,680 Speaker 1: how the last study we looked at last time, it 80 00:04:35,880 --> 00:04:39,560 Speaker 1: talked about adults, But it might also be interesting to 81 00:04:39,640 --> 00:04:43,520 Speaker 1: ask is this same thing true of kids in second grade, 82 00:04:44,000 --> 00:04:48,320 Speaker 1: fourth grade? Kindergarten. I mean, Robert you you often have 83 00:04:48,400 --> 00:04:51,640 Speaker 1: wonderful insights about the minds of children, may be drawn 84 00:04:51,680 --> 00:04:54,720 Speaker 1: from experience. Oh yeah, well yeah, my son Bastion, it's 85 00:04:54,920 --> 00:04:58,520 Speaker 1: constant questions about how things work and what things are 86 00:04:58,600 --> 00:05:01,560 Speaker 1: and why they are that way. Uh, almost to the 87 00:05:01,600 --> 00:05:05,280 Speaker 1: point of insanity, on on on on the parents part. 88 00:05:05,960 --> 00:05:08,720 Speaker 1: But but yeah, I'm constantly having to explain things to him. 89 00:05:08,880 --> 00:05:11,720 Speaker 1: Do you think Baston would be very confident in his 90 00:05:11,760 --> 00:05:14,840 Speaker 1: own ability to explain how a toilet works or how 91 00:05:14,960 --> 00:05:18,800 Speaker 1: a cylinder lock works. No, he is, Well, he'll occasionally 92 00:05:20,000 --> 00:05:23,440 Speaker 1: have a bit of overconfidence in his understanding of something 93 00:05:23,640 --> 00:05:25,919 Speaker 1: is when he tries to explain it to us, but 94 00:05:25,960 --> 00:05:29,320 Speaker 1: then when we correct him on it. Uh, he's he 95 00:05:29,520 --> 00:05:32,279 Speaker 1: generally goes with it, and he he always goes goes 96 00:05:32,320 --> 00:05:34,240 Speaker 1: with it. He's willing to admit. Oh, I guess I 97 00:05:34,279 --> 00:05:36,920 Speaker 1: don't know how that works. But like the toilet scenario, 98 00:05:36,960 --> 00:05:38,080 Speaker 1: if I were to say, do you know how a 99 00:05:38,120 --> 00:05:40,400 Speaker 1: toilet works, and if he said he did, and then 100 00:05:40,400 --> 00:05:43,279 Speaker 1: he couldn't explain it, his response would be, let's go 101 00:05:43,360 --> 00:05:46,640 Speaker 1: look in the toilet. That's awesome. Well, yeah, that's a 102 00:05:46,680 --> 00:05:49,719 Speaker 1: great instinct. Except the sad part is and this is 103 00:05:49,760 --> 00:05:53,599 Speaker 1: a one of the realities of parenting. Uh, you think 104 00:05:53,600 --> 00:05:55,760 Speaker 1: you're gonna be able to you're gonna Well I told 105 00:05:55,760 --> 00:05:59,320 Speaker 1: myself this before my son came into our lives, that 106 00:05:59,839 --> 00:06:02,240 Speaker 1: I would answer all the questions. I would have the 107 00:06:02,680 --> 00:06:06,000 Speaker 1: patients to do it. And it's a wonderful thought, but 108 00:06:06,320 --> 00:06:09,760 Speaker 1: the reality is you just don't. You don't have the time. 109 00:06:09,800 --> 00:06:12,599 Speaker 1: So if the toilet, for example, or necessarily always the 110 00:06:12,680 --> 00:06:15,320 Speaker 1: understanding right right, Well, but like with the toilet, the 111 00:06:15,320 --> 00:06:17,360 Speaker 1: first two times he asked to look into the back 112 00:06:17,400 --> 00:06:19,520 Speaker 1: of the tank to take the heavy top off and 113 00:06:19,600 --> 00:06:24,200 Speaker 1: see the float system at all, I obliged because it 114 00:06:24,240 --> 00:06:27,560 Speaker 1: was fun. But it comes up again and again, Hey 115 00:06:27,560 --> 00:06:29,919 Speaker 1: can we go take the toilet apart? And it's just 116 00:06:30,000 --> 00:06:32,839 Speaker 1: often not time. Well, I think that is an admirable 117 00:06:32,920 --> 00:06:35,960 Speaker 1: curiosity to see the guts of the machines to sustain 118 00:06:36,000 --> 00:06:40,160 Speaker 1: our everyday lives. Uh yeah, But so my question also 119 00:06:40,200 --> 00:06:43,200 Speaker 1: would be you said, he's okay to be corrected when 120 00:06:43,240 --> 00:06:45,520 Speaker 1: you tell him no, that's not how something works. Here's 121 00:06:45,520 --> 00:06:49,039 Speaker 1: how it works. Does he does he catch himself like 122 00:06:49,040 --> 00:06:52,279 Speaker 1: like was described in the experiments here, if he's forced 123 00:06:52,320 --> 00:06:56,480 Speaker 1: to explain does he realize in the process of explaining 124 00:06:56,520 --> 00:07:02,440 Speaker 1: that he doesn't know. Not necessarily, he doesn't really throughout 125 00:07:02,480 --> 00:07:06,720 Speaker 1: a bunch of really robust explanations for things, but he'll 126 00:07:06,760 --> 00:07:10,720 Speaker 1: have to sort of a rough one to three point 127 00:07:10,800 --> 00:07:14,880 Speaker 1: explanation of something. And sometimes that he's pretty accurate. Uh, 128 00:07:15,000 --> 00:07:16,840 Speaker 1: and we have to say, oh, well, that is basically 129 00:07:16,840 --> 00:07:19,320 Speaker 1: how this thing works. But other times we're like, oh, no, no, 130 00:07:19,360 --> 00:07:21,840 Speaker 1: you're missing a major component here. Well, I think he 131 00:07:21,960 --> 00:07:24,720 Speaker 1: might be might be falling in line actually with some 132 00:07:24,760 --> 00:07:26,960 Speaker 1: research we're just about to look at. So one of 133 00:07:26,960 --> 00:07:30,280 Speaker 1: the authors of the original illusion of explanatory depth study, 134 00:07:30,600 --> 00:07:34,880 Speaker 1: Frank Sie Kyle, along with the psychologist Candice in Mills, 135 00:07:34,960 --> 00:07:37,920 Speaker 1: authored another study published in two thousand four in the 136 00:07:38,000 --> 00:07:41,119 Speaker 1: Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, and what they were looking 137 00:07:41,120 --> 00:07:43,000 Speaker 1: for was to see if they could find evidence of 138 00:07:43,000 --> 00:07:46,160 Speaker 1: the illusion of explanatory depth in children the same way 139 00:07:46,240 --> 00:07:50,080 Speaker 1: Kyle and associates had found it in adults. And so, 140 00:07:50,640 --> 00:07:53,080 Speaker 1: uh yeah, So this was published in two thousand four, 141 00:07:53,320 --> 00:07:56,440 Speaker 1: and they start by observing young children have a lot 142 00:07:56,440 --> 00:08:00,480 Speaker 1: of metacognitive shortcomings that that's not an insult to rag 143 00:08:00,520 --> 00:08:03,400 Speaker 1: on little kids like kids are so dumb, but they're 144 00:08:03,480 --> 00:08:06,280 Speaker 1: very bad at predicting how well they will do at 145 00:08:06,320 --> 00:08:09,560 Speaker 1: mental tasks. One example that the authors give is that 146 00:08:09,600 --> 00:08:13,400 Speaker 1: they tend to be overconfident in their abilities. For example, 147 00:08:13,440 --> 00:08:17,480 Speaker 1: school preschoolers in kindergarteners, they will tend to believe that 148 00:08:17,520 --> 00:08:20,600 Speaker 1: they will be able to recall more than a dozen 149 00:08:20,720 --> 00:08:23,520 Speaker 1: items from a list, but then they can only recall 150 00:08:23,560 --> 00:08:28,080 Speaker 1: two or three. Yeah. I have encountered shades of this with, 151 00:08:28,120 --> 00:08:30,320 Speaker 1: for instance, the question, hey, if you go with us 152 00:08:30,360 --> 00:08:32,320 Speaker 1: on this trip, will you be able to walk everywhere 153 00:08:32,320 --> 00:08:34,640 Speaker 1: because Daddy's not gonna be able to carry you? And 154 00:08:34,679 --> 00:08:36,760 Speaker 1: he might say yes, but then when it comes down 155 00:08:37,080 --> 00:08:40,680 Speaker 1: to the actual walk, uh, he's asking to be carried. Yeah. 156 00:08:42,400 --> 00:08:44,760 Speaker 1: I guess you could categorize that in a few different ways, 157 00:08:44,760 --> 00:08:46,280 Speaker 1: but it might line up with what we're talking about 158 00:08:46,480 --> 00:08:48,840 Speaker 1: motor categories versus mental. Do you see the same thing 159 00:08:48,880 --> 00:08:52,280 Speaker 1: with purely mental tasks or I guess it probably doesn't 160 00:08:52,320 --> 00:08:56,040 Speaker 1: come up that often. I guess not. I guess we 161 00:08:56,040 --> 00:08:57,800 Speaker 1: we tend to know what he's capable. I guess the 162 00:08:58,160 --> 00:09:01,120 Speaker 1: thing that we come to mind would be ability to 163 00:09:01,200 --> 00:09:06,040 Speaker 1: set still and maintain attention on something. But it's difficult 164 00:09:06,040 --> 00:09:08,440 Speaker 1: because we're It's not like we're saying, hey, you ready 165 00:09:08,480 --> 00:09:10,840 Speaker 1: to go see the Nutcracker and set there for two 166 00:09:10,840 --> 00:09:12,920 Speaker 1: hours and him saying yes, of course, Like we know 167 00:09:13,040 --> 00:09:14,840 Speaker 1: he's not gonna set there for two I'm gonna have 168 00:09:14,880 --> 00:09:17,800 Speaker 1: trouble setting there and watching the Nutcracker for two hours. 169 00:09:18,280 --> 00:09:20,319 Speaker 1: I guess for me, it would depend on how monstrous 170 00:09:20,360 --> 00:09:22,719 Speaker 1: the costumes are. Yeah, but then you're only going to 171 00:09:22,760 --> 00:09:24,839 Speaker 1: get monsters in in Act one. Act two of the 172 00:09:24,920 --> 00:09:28,280 Speaker 1: Nutcracker is just a bunch of silly dances. Oh you 173 00:09:28,320 --> 00:09:30,520 Speaker 1: know what, I just I just had an illusion of 174 00:09:30,640 --> 00:09:33,240 Speaker 1: narrative depth there where I thought I remembered what's in 175 00:09:33,240 --> 00:09:35,840 Speaker 1: the Nutcracker, but I opened my mouth to say, and 176 00:09:35,880 --> 00:09:38,360 Speaker 1: then I'm like, wait, what does happen? Well, because you 177 00:09:38,440 --> 00:09:41,079 Speaker 1: remember the Act one stuff, that's where all the action is. 178 00:09:41,120 --> 00:09:43,600 Speaker 1: That's where there's a rat king and sword fights, and 179 00:09:43,640 --> 00:09:46,439 Speaker 1: then the rest is just you know, setting their waiting 180 00:09:46,480 --> 00:09:49,600 Speaker 1: to go home. Well, I'm sorry, I'm being unfair to uh, 181 00:09:49,880 --> 00:09:53,319 Speaker 1: to a wonderful work of Russian art here. Okay, we 182 00:09:53,360 --> 00:09:56,120 Speaker 1: should get back on track with the study. So the 183 00:09:56,200 --> 00:09:59,559 Speaker 1: question is do children show the same illusion of explanatory 184 00:09:59,600 --> 00:10:02,960 Speaker 1: depth as adults or is it manifested slightly differently, or 185 00:10:03,000 --> 00:10:06,880 Speaker 1: do they not show it at all. Okay, now, in 186 00:10:06,960 --> 00:10:09,480 Speaker 1: answering this question, we do have to just quickly remind 187 00:10:09,520 --> 00:10:12,560 Speaker 1: everyone the children are not inhuman. They're born with a 188 00:10:12,559 --> 00:10:16,400 Speaker 1: lot of preloaded cognitive abilities. So every kid is kind 189 00:10:16,440 --> 00:10:20,520 Speaker 1: of a natural euclidean um. They they're born to navigate 190 00:10:20,559 --> 00:10:23,760 Speaker 1: a three dimensional world of fixed and movable objects. I mean, 191 00:10:23,760 --> 00:10:26,720 Speaker 1: that's just those are just a level of cognition you 192 00:10:26,760 --> 00:10:31,439 Speaker 1: need in order to live in the world. Uh, So 193 00:10:31,800 --> 00:10:35,400 Speaker 1: start utilizing geometry before you can even name stuff. And 194 00:10:35,440 --> 00:10:39,640 Speaker 1: then there's an innate understanding of basic physical laws. So 195 00:10:40,400 --> 00:10:44,160 Speaker 1: only adults really believe in magic, uh while a toddler 196 00:10:44,320 --> 00:10:47,559 Speaker 1: will see right through all the supernatural. There's an M I. 197 00:10:47,640 --> 00:10:50,600 Speaker 1: T study even came out that found that young children 198 00:10:50,679 --> 00:10:55,120 Speaker 1: understand that teleportation is not feasible. So the kids have 199 00:10:55,200 --> 00:10:58,439 Speaker 1: to essentially they have to learn that kind of blarkey 200 00:10:59,679 --> 00:11:02,960 Speaker 1: over time. But there they're they're born having a certain 201 00:11:03,200 --> 00:11:06,160 Speaker 1: a certain idea of how the world works at a 202 00:11:06,240 --> 00:11:08,880 Speaker 1: very basic level. Well, I mentioned in the last episode 203 00:11:08,880 --> 00:11:12,240 Speaker 1: the idea that in a lot of cases there is 204 00:11:12,280 --> 00:11:16,079 Speaker 1: no such thing as magical causation. I mean, mentally I'm 205 00:11:16,080 --> 00:11:18,920 Speaker 1: not saying in the real world. I mean even you're 206 00:11:19,000 --> 00:11:24,720 Speaker 1: not able to imagine magical causation, because if you're imagining causation, 207 00:11:24,800 --> 00:11:29,640 Speaker 1: it becomes in some sense physical and not magical. Magical 208 00:11:29,760 --> 00:11:33,080 Speaker 1: just means like the blurring of the concept of causation. 209 00:11:33,720 --> 00:11:36,360 Speaker 1: And so I wonder if if what it is is 210 00:11:36,400 --> 00:11:39,160 Speaker 1: that kids have this idea of causation and as they 211 00:11:39,160 --> 00:11:42,880 Speaker 1: grow up they learn to make an artificial distinction where 212 00:11:42,920 --> 00:11:46,480 Speaker 1: there's this other thing, magical causation, which in fact is 213 00:11:46,520 --> 00:11:49,520 Speaker 1: just not an intuitively real concept. Yeah. It kind of 214 00:11:49,520 --> 00:11:52,720 Speaker 1: goes back to the helium balloon magic example that I 215 00:11:52,720 --> 00:11:55,320 Speaker 1: I shared in the last episode. Ye, my son used 216 00:11:55,320 --> 00:11:58,440 Speaker 1: the word magic to describe it, basically the descriptive term 217 00:11:58,520 --> 00:12:01,360 Speaker 1: for something behaving in a way that that he did 218 00:12:01,360 --> 00:12:06,120 Speaker 1: not predict. Yeah, it's it's it's causally vague. Yeah. Um 219 00:12:06,200 --> 00:12:08,520 Speaker 1: so yeah, So what happened in this experiment, Well, the 220 00:12:08,559 --> 00:12:11,800 Speaker 1: experimenter has used a modified version of the device test 221 00:12:11,840 --> 00:12:15,720 Speaker 1: from the original research if you remember from the last episode. Uh, 222 00:12:15,760 --> 00:12:18,800 Speaker 1: they wanted to test the illusion of explanatory depth and 223 00:12:19,000 --> 00:12:22,320 Speaker 1: how well people think they understand devices from around their home, 224 00:12:22,520 --> 00:12:25,559 Speaker 1: like a toaster or something like that. Uh, And they 225 00:12:25,600 --> 00:12:28,360 Speaker 1: tested this in a group of kindergarteners, second graders, and 226 00:12:28,400 --> 00:12:32,280 Speaker 1: fourth graders, and then they also recruited adults to independently 227 00:12:32,480 --> 00:12:35,920 Speaker 1: rate the explanations given by the children as a measure 228 00:12:35,960 --> 00:12:39,920 Speaker 1: of sort of the directional accuracy of the children's adjustments 229 00:12:39,960 --> 00:12:44,040 Speaker 1: of their own confidence after giving the explanations. So, uh, 230 00:12:44,120 --> 00:12:47,040 Speaker 1: for example, the kids would give explanations of how a 231 00:12:47,080 --> 00:12:49,960 Speaker 1: toaster works. And because these were kids, this was done 232 00:12:50,040 --> 00:12:53,920 Speaker 1: orally instead of written, So I thought these were good 233 00:12:54,040 --> 00:12:57,760 Speaker 1: enough to read. Maybe kindergartener explains how a toaster works. 234 00:12:58,120 --> 00:13:02,040 Speaker 1: You put something in it. I love it's something. You 235 00:13:02,120 --> 00:13:04,760 Speaker 1: put something in it, and then you press a button, 236 00:13:04,880 --> 00:13:07,760 Speaker 1: and then you press the button, push it down and 237 00:13:07,840 --> 00:13:10,200 Speaker 1: leave it there and then it heats and then it 238 00:13:10,240 --> 00:13:15,160 Speaker 1: comes up to alright, well, yeah, fairly accurate, and not 239 00:13:15,200 --> 00:13:17,160 Speaker 1: a lot of detail about the parts and what they do, 240 00:13:17,320 --> 00:13:21,400 Speaker 1: but okay, uh. Second grader says, well, you put the 241 00:13:21,440 --> 00:13:23,920 Speaker 1: bread in and you push this little lever down, so 242 00:13:24,040 --> 00:13:27,640 Speaker 1: then there you go. It'll heat raise inside and it'll 243 00:13:27,640 --> 00:13:31,160 Speaker 1: make the bread really really hard and stuff, and it'll 244 00:13:31,200 --> 00:13:34,800 Speaker 1: just pop out. Okay, that maybe a little better, and 245 00:13:34,920 --> 00:13:37,679 Speaker 1: I wish I like worked in a restaurant now, because 246 00:13:37,720 --> 00:13:40,040 Speaker 1: I wanted I would want to make that the terminology 247 00:13:40,040 --> 00:13:42,560 Speaker 1: in our kitchen, like, hey, make that bread really really hard. 248 00:13:45,520 --> 00:13:48,760 Speaker 1: And then the fourth grader says, like, Okay, a toaster 249 00:13:48,960 --> 00:13:52,400 Speaker 1: is made by electricity. You plug it in, there's a cord, 250 00:13:52,480 --> 00:13:55,000 Speaker 1: it comes electricity, and then you put the bread in. 251 00:13:55,520 --> 00:13:57,920 Speaker 1: Then you press the button down. When you hit that 252 00:13:58,000 --> 00:14:00,680 Speaker 1: button all the way down, red lights, which is heat 253 00:14:00,760 --> 00:14:03,560 Speaker 1: coming out, which is from the electricity, and it heats 254 00:14:03,559 --> 00:14:07,440 Speaker 1: the bread and when it comes out it's toast. Okay, 255 00:14:07,559 --> 00:14:09,880 Speaker 1: so you're starting to get there. Yeah, I mean that 256 00:14:10,000 --> 00:14:13,600 Speaker 1: explanation I feel has some problems. Um, I feel like 257 00:14:13,679 --> 00:14:16,760 Speaker 1: it's I feel like it's at once more accurate and 258 00:14:16,800 --> 00:14:20,040 Speaker 1: more confusing. I think that's the process of growing up, 259 00:14:20,120 --> 00:14:22,920 Speaker 1: isn't it. Yeah, Yeah, well yeah, and I think that's 260 00:14:22,960 --> 00:14:26,360 Speaker 1: probably uh, that's probably that's probably my process with a 261 00:14:26,360 --> 00:14:28,680 Speaker 1: lot of things we research here when I'm thinking this 262 00:14:28,720 --> 00:14:30,280 Speaker 1: is this is making a lot more sense, and it's 263 00:14:30,360 --> 00:14:34,040 Speaker 1: raising so many additional questions at the same time, gaining 264 00:14:34,080 --> 00:14:37,640 Speaker 1: more correct knowledge and becoming more confused. Yeah, and this 265 00:14:37,680 --> 00:14:39,360 Speaker 1: will this will come back again when we get to 266 00:14:39,680 --> 00:14:42,640 Speaker 1: politics and policy and a bit right, Uh, So the 267 00:14:42,720 --> 00:14:46,880 Speaker 1: results from this experiment what happened when they essentially ran 268 00:14:46,920 --> 00:14:49,720 Speaker 1: the same test of the original study from two thousand 269 00:14:49,800 --> 00:14:54,480 Speaker 1: two on these children UM, Well, the older children definitely 270 00:14:54,520 --> 00:14:58,760 Speaker 1: showed an illusion of explanatory depth. The UH second graders 271 00:14:58,800 --> 00:15:02,120 Speaker 1: and the fourth graders showed clear awareness of the illusion 272 00:15:02,160 --> 00:15:06,040 Speaker 1: of explanatory depth UH the younger that. The younger the children, 273 00:15:06,160 --> 00:15:08,560 Speaker 1: the higher they rated their own understanding. By the way, 274 00:15:08,560 --> 00:15:11,800 Speaker 1: so the kindergarteners they rated their own understanding of how 275 00:15:11,800 --> 00:15:17,320 Speaker 1: a toaster works. The highest UH kindergarteners did overestimate their understanding, 276 00:15:17,720 --> 00:15:21,720 Speaker 1: meaning like independent judges read their explanations and rated them 277 00:15:21,760 --> 00:15:25,480 Speaker 1: lower than the kindergarteners rated their own explanations. But the 278 00:15:25,600 --> 00:15:30,520 Speaker 1: kindergarteners were much less likely to recognize this fact upon 279 00:15:30,640 --> 00:15:34,680 Speaker 1: being forced to give an explanation. Unlike most adults and 280 00:15:34,760 --> 00:15:38,320 Speaker 1: the second graders, in the fourth graders, sixteen of the 281 00:15:38,360 --> 00:15:42,400 Speaker 1: twenty four kindergarteners appeared to just remain oblivious to the 282 00:15:42,440 --> 00:15:46,720 Speaker 1: fact that their explanations were shallow after they gave them, 283 00:15:46,800 --> 00:15:49,520 Speaker 1: so that I thought, that's interesting. By second or fourth grade, 284 00:15:50,080 --> 00:15:53,480 Speaker 1: you experience this effect where you think you understand something 285 00:15:53,600 --> 00:15:56,960 Speaker 1: somebody asks you to explain it, and then you realize 286 00:15:56,960 --> 00:16:00,280 Speaker 1: you understand it less than you thought. Apparently kindergarten nurse 287 00:16:00,320 --> 00:16:03,080 Speaker 1: don't have that realization. They just give a not very 288 00:16:03,080 --> 00:16:06,760 Speaker 1: good explanation and they're still pretty confident. Huh. You know, 289 00:16:06,880 --> 00:16:09,600 Speaker 1: I wonder if this to possibly put the narrative spin 290 00:16:09,760 --> 00:16:13,160 Speaker 1: on this. I'm reminded of a scenario that I encounter 291 00:16:13,200 --> 00:16:16,520 Speaker 1: with my own son, and that my mother, who is 292 00:16:16,560 --> 00:16:20,280 Speaker 1: a kindergarten teacher, has encountered with kindergarten students and this, 293 00:16:20,400 --> 00:16:22,840 Speaker 1: and I'm sure parents out there can relate to this. 294 00:16:23,040 --> 00:16:25,160 Speaker 1: But the kid comes home from school, you ask, what 295 00:16:25,200 --> 00:16:27,560 Speaker 1: did you do at school today? And the answer is 296 00:16:28,480 --> 00:16:34,360 Speaker 1: nothing or I don't know, and and it's it's it's 297 00:16:34,920 --> 00:16:37,560 Speaker 1: confounding for an adult because you're like, how can you 298 00:16:37,640 --> 00:16:40,400 Speaker 1: not know? How can you not have the of course, 299 00:16:40,400 --> 00:16:44,080 Speaker 1: you know you were there like just half an hour ago. 300 00:16:44,720 --> 00:16:46,360 Speaker 1: Uh So, I wonder if part of that is like, 301 00:16:46,840 --> 00:16:49,040 Speaker 1: as you get older, you're more willing to just fall 302 00:16:49,120 --> 00:16:52,760 Speaker 1: back on on a on a very vague idea of 303 00:16:52,800 --> 00:16:56,160 Speaker 1: what the narrative was, Whereas when you're when you're younger, 304 00:16:56,160 --> 00:16:59,200 Speaker 1: when you're kindergartener or younger, you're more inclined to just 305 00:16:59,240 --> 00:17:01,400 Speaker 1: say I don't, no, I don't. I don't know what 306 00:17:01,440 --> 00:17:05,159 Speaker 1: I did today, And you know, as adults, maybe we 307 00:17:05,160 --> 00:17:08,320 Speaker 1: should be more open to that kind of self reflection. 308 00:17:08,440 --> 00:17:11,240 Speaker 1: I don't know what I did last week. Oh that's true. 309 00:17:11,280 --> 00:17:14,720 Speaker 1: You probably don't. Ye might you might remember a few things. Yeah, 310 00:17:14,760 --> 00:17:16,320 Speaker 1: But if you had to create a timeline, I mean, 311 00:17:16,359 --> 00:17:19,240 Speaker 1: we see this all the time with in cases where 312 00:17:19,240 --> 00:17:22,240 Speaker 1: people were called upon it to to create an alibi 313 00:17:22,359 --> 00:17:25,800 Speaker 1: criminal trials and they realized, oh, I have no clue. 314 00:17:25,840 --> 00:17:30,240 Speaker 1: There's this was like a month ago. You out there listening. 315 00:17:30,440 --> 00:17:35,600 Speaker 1: What were you doing four saturdays ago at four pm? 316 00:17:35,680 --> 00:17:37,439 Speaker 1: People might actually remember that because it might have been 317 00:17:37,440 --> 00:17:41,520 Speaker 1: a holiday. I'm not sure anyway, Okay, So they did 318 00:17:41,520 --> 00:17:43,760 Speaker 1: a second study in the same research and it was 319 00:17:43,840 --> 00:17:46,720 Speaker 1: the same kind of control for domains of knowledge that 320 00:17:46,760 --> 00:17:49,600 Speaker 1: we saw in the research from the last episode. So 321 00:17:49,720 --> 00:17:52,040 Speaker 1: they ran the same test again, but instead of asking 322 00:17:52,040 --> 00:17:54,320 Speaker 1: them to explain how a device works, they asked them 323 00:17:54,359 --> 00:17:56,879 Speaker 1: to explain how to do something to to look at 324 00:17:56,880 --> 00:18:01,439 Speaker 1: a procedure. UM So, so instead how do you make 325 00:18:01,480 --> 00:18:04,880 Speaker 1: a cheese pizza? You know, second graders, fourth graders, kindergarteners, 326 00:18:05,200 --> 00:18:07,199 Speaker 1: um how do you change a flat tire? How do 327 00:18:07,240 --> 00:18:09,439 Speaker 1: you catch a fish with a fishing rod? And the 328 00:18:09,440 --> 00:18:12,639 Speaker 1: results were just like adults. The kids did not show 329 00:18:12,680 --> 00:18:15,920 Speaker 1: the illusion of depth pattern for procedures. In fact, after 330 00:18:16,000 --> 00:18:18,919 Speaker 1: giving the explanations, their ratings of their initial knowledge were 331 00:18:18,960 --> 00:18:21,800 Speaker 1: adjusted upward. And that was the same thing we saw 332 00:18:21,840 --> 00:18:26,040 Speaker 1: for adults. So kids and adults both they don't overestimate 333 00:18:26,119 --> 00:18:28,439 Speaker 1: how well they know how to do things, though they 334 00:18:28,520 --> 00:18:33,000 Speaker 1: might overestimate how well they understand how external things work. Well. 335 00:18:33,040 --> 00:18:36,480 Speaker 1: That would that would line up with with my relationship 336 00:18:36,480 --> 00:18:39,000 Speaker 1: with Bastion, because he'll say he's more inclined to say, 337 00:18:39,359 --> 00:18:42,040 Speaker 1: I don't know if it's what did you do today, 338 00:18:42,280 --> 00:18:44,760 Speaker 1: But if it's something like how to volcanoes work? He 339 00:18:44,800 --> 00:18:48,520 Speaker 1: doesn't really have a firm knowledge of how volcanoes work, 340 00:18:48,600 --> 00:18:50,479 Speaker 1: but he I'm sure he could go on and on 341 00:18:50,560 --> 00:18:54,480 Speaker 1: about it, right, Okay. So that's some more replication and 342 00:18:54,600 --> 00:18:56,919 Speaker 1: some some things. It might give some things to think 343 00:18:56,960 --> 00:19:00,720 Speaker 1: about with with the raising of children and and how 344 00:19:00,760 --> 00:19:03,280 Speaker 1: we think about the education of our of our our 345 00:19:03,320 --> 00:19:07,040 Speaker 1: our young members of our species. But we should look 346 00:19:07,200 --> 00:19:10,880 Speaker 1: at the perhaps education of the adults of our species, 347 00:19:10,920 --> 00:19:14,359 Speaker 1: because adults, they have the power to do things with 348 00:19:14,480 --> 00:19:17,879 Speaker 1: their understanding of causal systems in the world, and in 349 00:19:17,880 --> 00:19:21,240 Speaker 1: this sense, the illusion of explanatory depth could actually have 350 00:19:21,280 --> 00:19:25,480 Speaker 1: many potential applications. For example, here's a very quick one. 351 00:19:25,560 --> 00:19:30,440 Speaker 1: In marketing and consumer behavior, research indicates that people's willingness 352 00:19:30,520 --> 00:19:33,119 Speaker 1: to spend money to buy a product. I saw this 353 00:19:33,200 --> 00:19:35,440 Speaker 1: reported in one of the papers we're talking about. Their 354 00:19:35,480 --> 00:19:38,480 Speaker 1: willingness to spend money on something is related to their 355 00:19:38,480 --> 00:19:42,359 Speaker 1: belief that they understand how the product works. So, given 356 00:19:42,400 --> 00:19:46,760 Speaker 1: our differential understanding, our confidence and understanding based on different 357 00:19:46,800 --> 00:19:50,480 Speaker 1: types of knowledge domains UH and the fact that you 358 00:19:50,560 --> 00:19:53,920 Speaker 1: can trigger people to realize their overconfidence by forcing them 359 00:19:53,920 --> 00:19:56,639 Speaker 1: to explain it. That could have some real impact on 360 00:19:56,680 --> 00:20:00,199 Speaker 1: stuff like marketing and consumer behavior. But another potential and 361 00:20:00,240 --> 00:20:05,280 Speaker 1: probably much more important application would be in political extremism. Yes, 362 00:20:06,200 --> 00:20:09,440 Speaker 1: so perhaps a lot of you are like like me. 363 00:20:10,040 --> 00:20:13,040 Speaker 1: I don't like to engage in political arguments, not with 364 00:20:13,080 --> 00:20:16,840 Speaker 1: friends and not with family because arguing about politics is 365 00:20:16,840 --> 00:20:20,080 Speaker 1: not is not terribly fun for me personally, usually not 366 00:20:20,160 --> 00:20:23,840 Speaker 1: terribly effective. Yeah, no one's mind has ever changed, especially 367 00:20:23,880 --> 00:20:27,040 Speaker 1: like the more strongly the opinion. I wouldn't say ever, 368 00:20:27,080 --> 00:20:30,240 Speaker 1: but almost never, almost never. Yeah, I mean it's nothing's 369 00:20:30,280 --> 00:20:32,760 Speaker 1: going to really come of it. Uh. And there, you know, 370 00:20:32,760 --> 00:20:35,640 Speaker 1: there's a good chance of the conflicting argument here isn't 371 00:20:35,640 --> 00:20:38,520 Speaker 1: even about the thing you're arguing about. You know, there's 372 00:20:38,560 --> 00:20:42,719 Speaker 1: some other underlying thing there, or some unspoken assumption about 373 00:20:44,840 --> 00:20:49,080 Speaker 1: national character, human behavior, what have you. Yeah, the the 374 00:20:49,080 --> 00:20:52,760 Speaker 1: the the supposed issue under debate is actually just a 375 00:20:52,800 --> 00:20:57,639 Speaker 1: battle ground where you are confronting people with with different 376 00:20:58,160 --> 00:21:03,000 Speaker 1: I don't know, feelings about different values that go unstated 377 00:21:03,040 --> 00:21:05,520 Speaker 1: in the conversation. Yeah. And there's a good chance, and 378 00:21:05,520 --> 00:21:10,119 Speaker 1: this this goes across is a bipartisan observation, there's a 379 00:21:10,200 --> 00:21:12,439 Speaker 1: chance you're not even arguing with that person. You're just 380 00:21:12,600 --> 00:21:17,080 Speaker 1: arguing with essentially bullet points that were covered by a 381 00:21:17,160 --> 00:21:20,600 Speaker 1: media personality or or even a something that came up 382 00:21:20,600 --> 00:21:22,840 Speaker 1: in a news article, and they're just kind of regurgitating 383 00:21:22,840 --> 00:21:25,439 Speaker 1: the information. Yeah. This is one of my least favorite 384 00:21:25,440 --> 00:21:28,760 Speaker 1: things about political debates is that we we tend to 385 00:21:28,880 --> 00:21:31,760 Speaker 1: argue not with the person sitting across from us, but 386 00:21:31,880 --> 00:21:36,240 Speaker 1: with people like you. Ben't that horrible, you know, this 387 00:21:36,320 --> 00:21:38,280 Speaker 1: is how people like you think. And I'm going to 388 00:21:38,480 --> 00:21:42,080 Speaker 1: argue with people like you instead of with you. Yeah, 389 00:21:42,119 --> 00:21:44,320 Speaker 1: and you just have yuks and zooks going out of 390 00:21:44,400 --> 00:21:46,520 Speaker 1: there talking about which side of the toast the better 391 00:21:47,400 --> 00:21:49,679 Speaker 1: goes on and plus on top of all of this, 392 00:21:49,800 --> 00:21:52,960 Speaker 1: of course, so often the topic isn't even that cut 393 00:21:52,960 --> 00:21:55,600 Speaker 1: and dry, right, I refer our listeners back to our episode, 394 00:21:55,600 --> 00:21:57,919 Speaker 1: and we could problems, which gets into so many of 395 00:21:57,920 --> 00:22:02,000 Speaker 1: the big problems in society are so complex at any 396 00:22:02,000 --> 00:22:05,399 Speaker 1: attempt to correct them just create more problems, etcetera. Uh, 397 00:22:05,760 --> 00:22:08,640 Speaker 1: it's it's a messy affair, right, So where the sense 398 00:22:08,640 --> 00:22:12,199 Speaker 1: of tying into our topic today, People like you and me, 399 00:22:12,400 --> 00:22:15,919 Speaker 1: but especially those uh you might wish to avoid an 400 00:22:16,000 --> 00:22:21,560 Speaker 1: argument with often hold extreme opinions about complex policies, and 401 00:22:21,600 --> 00:22:27,840 Speaker 1: they mistakenly think they understand the causal processes underlying those policies. Yeah. Yeah, 402 00:22:27,920 --> 00:22:31,679 Speaker 1: we we have strong opinions about things even without really 403 00:22:31,840 --> 00:22:37,560 Speaker 1: understanding those things super well understanding the uncontroversial factual character 404 00:22:37,640 --> 00:22:39,919 Speaker 1: of those things, right, Yes, Like you might have a 405 00:22:40,040 --> 00:22:45,199 Speaker 1: very strong opinion about medic care. I don't. I just 406 00:22:45,280 --> 00:22:48,800 Speaker 1: made that up because it's a complex government instrument. Um. 407 00:22:48,840 --> 00:22:53,080 Speaker 1: But if somebody asks you to explain how medicare works, 408 00:22:53,119 --> 00:22:57,280 Speaker 1: you'd be like, well, um, there's the government and you 409 00:22:57,480 --> 00:22:59,959 Speaker 1: you know, whether you're pro or or pro or against. 410 00:23:00,040 --> 00:23:03,200 Speaker 1: You know, we just we it's much easier to generate 411 00:23:03,240 --> 00:23:07,400 Speaker 1: an opinion than it is to comprehend a complex causal system, 412 00:23:07,680 --> 00:23:11,119 Speaker 1: right Like I'm always reminded just in politics, with politics 413 00:23:11,160 --> 00:23:13,560 Speaker 1: in general, but especially on this topic. I'm reminded of 414 00:23:13,560 --> 00:23:17,240 Speaker 1: the Simpsons Treehouse of Horror episode in which the aliens 415 00:23:17,560 --> 00:23:21,240 Speaker 1: King and kodos Uh replace Bill Clinton and Bob Dol 416 00:23:21,320 --> 00:23:24,199 Speaker 1: during the election. It's one of the finest moments in 417 00:23:24,200 --> 00:23:27,399 Speaker 1: the history of the Simpsons, ye is that there's that 418 00:23:27,440 --> 00:23:30,919 Speaker 1: wonderful moment where we believe it's King Um and I 419 00:23:30,960 --> 00:23:34,080 Speaker 1: forget what he's protempting. He's I think he's pretending to 420 00:23:34,119 --> 00:23:37,639 Speaker 1: be dull, okay, and he says, he bradly announces in 421 00:23:37,680 --> 00:23:39,800 Speaker 1: the I think they're doing a debate, and he says 422 00:23:39,840 --> 00:23:44,520 Speaker 1: abortions for all boom. He says, very well, no abortions 423 00:23:44,560 --> 00:23:48,560 Speaker 1: for anyone, boo, And then he thinks he says abortions 424 00:23:48,600 --> 00:23:51,840 Speaker 1: for some miniature American flags for others, and that that 425 00:23:51,880 --> 00:23:54,840 Speaker 1: tends to go up. The crowd is pacified. Now, now 426 00:23:54,920 --> 00:23:58,560 Speaker 1: King had an excuse for not understanding the human complexity. Right, 427 00:23:58,600 --> 00:24:03,120 Speaker 1: because he was a tentacled alien. Uh. Not every political 428 00:24:03,160 --> 00:24:07,120 Speaker 1: candidate has that handicap on their performance, But but each 429 00:24:07,160 --> 00:24:12,080 Speaker 1: attempt here by King at policy seemed like a decent solution. Now, 430 00:24:12,320 --> 00:24:15,040 Speaker 1: the rest of US voters, non voters, and even some 431 00:24:15,320 --> 00:24:18,840 Speaker 1: elected officials aren't much better off. American voters have an 432 00:24:18,840 --> 00:24:23,960 Speaker 1: amazing ability to maintain strong political views concerning complex policies 433 00:24:24,000 --> 00:24:27,880 Speaker 1: and yet at the same time remain relatively uninformed about 434 00:24:27,920 --> 00:24:31,240 Speaker 1: how such policies would bring about the desired outcome. Right, 435 00:24:31,240 --> 00:24:34,480 Speaker 1: your opinion is very strong, but you can't necessarily demonstrate 436 00:24:34,520 --> 00:24:38,320 Speaker 1: the factual knowledge on which your opinion is supposedly based. Yeah. Well, 437 00:24:38,359 --> 00:24:41,680 Speaker 1: like without even drawing any any specific examples, I'm sure 438 00:24:41,720 --> 00:24:44,560 Speaker 1: listeners out there, no matter which side of the the 439 00:24:44,680 --> 00:24:47,920 Speaker 1: vast gaping political divide you reside on, you can think 440 00:24:47,960 --> 00:24:52,520 Speaker 1: of an example where the other side has has presented 441 00:24:52,960 --> 00:24:58,280 Speaker 1: a simplistic solution for a complex problem and the people 442 00:24:58,280 --> 00:25:00,840 Speaker 1: on the other side, the you know, the butter side down, folks, 443 00:25:01,240 --> 00:25:05,240 Speaker 1: They they seem to believe that this will fix it, 444 00:25:06,320 --> 00:25:09,200 Speaker 1: contrary to our understanding that, yeah, that's not really how 445 00:25:09,200 --> 00:25:12,639 Speaker 1: you fix complex problems. And given the grammar of what 446 00:25:12,760 --> 00:25:15,120 Speaker 1: you just said. Of course your side does that too, 447 00:25:16,240 --> 00:25:18,520 Speaker 1: So what's going on here? I mean you can't just 448 00:25:18,560 --> 00:25:21,919 Speaker 1: say we're dumb Americans brainwashed by reality television, because that 449 00:25:22,280 --> 00:25:24,680 Speaker 1: too is boiling it down to a rather simplistic approach. 450 00:25:26,280 --> 00:25:28,240 Speaker 1: And this we get into the idea that maybe it 451 00:25:28,320 --> 00:25:31,440 Speaker 1: is the illusion of explanatory depth, Yeah, that that could 452 00:25:31,480 --> 00:25:36,120 Speaker 1: be contributing to this type of extremist opinion holding, right, 453 00:25:36,240 --> 00:25:39,080 Speaker 1: And so that's where this paper comes in two thousand thirteen, 454 00:25:39,119 --> 00:25:43,399 Speaker 1: published in Psychological Science. Political extremism is supported by an 455 00:25:43,440 --> 00:25:46,280 Speaker 1: illusion of understanding And this was by fern Boch, Rogers, 456 00:25:46,480 --> 00:25:50,720 Speaker 1: Fox and Sloman. So what did they do in this experiment, Well, 457 00:25:50,760 --> 00:25:52,800 Speaker 1: they set out to see if people really do have 458 00:25:53,119 --> 00:25:57,159 Speaker 1: unjustified confidence in their understanding of complex politics and to 459 00:25:57,200 --> 00:26:00,400 Speaker 1: see if this is this in turn contributes to polarization. 460 00:26:01,440 --> 00:26:03,959 Speaker 1: It's the same premise that we've been talking about, except 461 00:26:04,040 --> 00:26:08,520 Speaker 1: with causal systems instead of machines. Okay, so or well 462 00:26:08,600 --> 00:26:10,600 Speaker 1: it would be a different kind of causal system. Right, 463 00:26:11,000 --> 00:26:16,080 Speaker 1: So policies or proposals for uh, things that should be 464 00:26:16,119 --> 00:26:18,360 Speaker 1: done in a country, things that are in their own 465 00:26:18,359 --> 00:26:21,120 Speaker 1: way a kind of machine, but they're not a physical 466 00:26:21,200 --> 00:26:25,600 Speaker 1: device or a natural phenomenon, and this in turn would 467 00:26:25,600 --> 00:26:29,760 Speaker 1: affect preferences and behaviors. So if this is all the case, 468 00:26:29,800 --> 00:26:32,600 Speaker 1: if we can really look to explanatory depth for our 469 00:26:32,680 --> 00:26:36,880 Speaker 1: solution here, then merely asking people to explain the mechanisms 470 00:26:36,920 --> 00:26:42,520 Speaker 1: behind their policy ideas would decrease their sense of understanding 471 00:26:42,560 --> 00:26:45,120 Speaker 1: and those of those ideas and force them to express 472 00:26:45,160 --> 00:26:48,280 Speaker 1: more moderate political views. So this would be just like 473 00:26:48,320 --> 00:26:52,080 Speaker 1: the King scenario. Ricking says abortions for all, and he's 474 00:26:52,080 --> 00:26:55,359 Speaker 1: immediately shouted down and he realized, WHOA, maybe I don't 475 00:26:55,400 --> 00:26:59,080 Speaker 1: have a handle on this human abortion topic quite like 476 00:26:59,160 --> 00:27:02,400 Speaker 1: I had. I better go in the opposite direction. Yeah, yeah, 477 00:27:02,480 --> 00:27:04,679 Speaker 1: and it leads to this correction effect. Now, part of 478 00:27:04,720 --> 00:27:08,760 Speaker 1: what they're saying also is that they're drawing on this 479 00:27:08,840 --> 00:27:14,600 Speaker 1: idea that decreasing a person's subjective sense of understanding on 480 00:27:14,600 --> 00:27:18,480 Speaker 1: a topic will actually lead to moderation. And uh so 481 00:27:18,760 --> 00:27:20,600 Speaker 1: this is drawing, of course, on the research on the 482 00:27:20,600 --> 00:27:23,640 Speaker 1: illusion of explanatory depth. But also they mentioned that it's 483 00:27:23,680 --> 00:27:27,199 Speaker 1: drawing on research that they cite giving evidence that quote, 484 00:27:27,440 --> 00:27:30,520 Speaker 1: people are more likely to change their attitudes about a 485 00:27:30,560 --> 00:27:35,800 Speaker 1: policy when they have less confidence in their knowledge about it, right, 486 00:27:36,080 --> 00:27:39,159 Speaker 1: You're more likely to change your opinion when you're less 487 00:27:39,200 --> 00:27:42,640 Speaker 1: confident that you know about the subject of the opinion. 488 00:27:42,960 --> 00:27:46,239 Speaker 1: Note the opera operative word here is confidence when they 489 00:27:46,240 --> 00:27:48,800 Speaker 1: have less confidence in their knowledge, not when they actually 490 00:27:48,800 --> 00:27:52,000 Speaker 1: have less knowledge. This it doesn't address how much you 491 00:27:52,040 --> 00:27:54,840 Speaker 1: actually know, but if you don't think you know as 492 00:27:54,920 --> 00:27:58,479 Speaker 1: much about the subject, you might be more persuadable on 493 00:27:58,560 --> 00:28:01,679 Speaker 1: your opinion about that subject. Uh. And this is the 494 00:28:01,720 --> 00:28:04,679 Speaker 1: same gap explored in the illusion of explanatory depth research, 495 00:28:04,720 --> 00:28:08,840 Speaker 1: so that that's the basis of their their investigation. And 496 00:28:09,080 --> 00:28:12,920 Speaker 1: the researchers went into this realizing that this theory and 497 00:28:13,040 --> 00:28:15,719 Speaker 1: they'll we'll talk about this uh in more depth here, 498 00:28:15,760 --> 00:28:17,600 Speaker 1: but they realize that this kind of runs counter to 499 00:28:17,720 --> 00:28:20,280 Speaker 1: research that had previously shown that people tend to double 500 00:28:20,320 --> 00:28:24,119 Speaker 1: down on their crazy ideas, their extreme ideas when confronted 501 00:28:24,160 --> 00:28:26,840 Speaker 1: about Yeah, sort of the backfire effect. You might have 502 00:28:26,840 --> 00:28:30,440 Speaker 1: heard about this in politics. If somebody, uh, somebody has 503 00:28:30,480 --> 00:28:33,000 Speaker 1: an extreme opinion or has an opinion at all, and 504 00:28:33,040 --> 00:28:35,919 Speaker 1: you try to present them with counter evidence against their 505 00:28:35,960 --> 00:28:39,160 Speaker 1: opinion or ask them to state reasons for their opinion, 506 00:28:39,280 --> 00:28:42,040 Speaker 1: or do any kind of confrontation like that. People tend 507 00:28:42,120 --> 00:28:45,600 Speaker 1: to become more extreme, right. Uh. An example that has 508 00:28:45,720 --> 00:28:49,040 Speaker 1: been brought up before is when someone is conned by 509 00:28:49,120 --> 00:28:52,120 Speaker 1: con artists. Oh yeah, and you would think, oh, well, 510 00:28:52,600 --> 00:28:55,200 Speaker 1: the connors has been denounced. You should You're going to 511 00:28:55,320 --> 00:28:58,280 Speaker 1: denounce them to write. Depending on how much effort they 512 00:28:58,320 --> 00:29:01,440 Speaker 1: put into uh support warding the con artists, though, they 513 00:29:01,520 --> 00:29:04,760 Speaker 1: might just double down completely and say no, they're absolutely 514 00:29:04,840 --> 00:29:07,920 Speaker 1: right this. Yeah, this is complete milarchy. You're thrown out here. Yeah. Well, 515 00:29:07,960 --> 00:29:09,960 Speaker 1: I mean in that case, there's also a sunk cost 516 00:29:10,080 --> 00:29:13,120 Speaker 1: fallacy involved, Like you've you've thrown in with with a 517 00:29:13,200 --> 00:29:16,640 Speaker 1: con artist. You kind of don't want to accept the 518 00:29:16,680 --> 00:29:20,000 Speaker 1: possibility that you have you have squandered all of this 519 00:29:20,120 --> 00:29:24,560 Speaker 1: time and money and and and personal reputation getting hoodwinked. 520 00:29:24,960 --> 00:29:27,719 Speaker 1: Uh So, yeah, you pretty much have no choice. You've 521 00:29:27,720 --> 00:29:32,120 Speaker 1: got to double down, You've got to make Yeah, how 522 00:29:32,440 --> 00:29:37,080 Speaker 1: that's not coming off right? Uh so? Yeah. So often people, 523 00:29:37,400 --> 00:29:39,720 Speaker 1: uh it's it's hard to talk somebody out of an 524 00:29:39,760 --> 00:29:44,320 Speaker 1: extremist position. Confrontation often just leads to them either staying 525 00:29:44,320 --> 00:29:47,280 Speaker 1: where they are or becoming more extreme. So the real 526 00:29:47,360 --> 00:29:50,920 Speaker 1: question is can we exploit the the illusion of explanatory 527 00:29:51,000 --> 00:29:55,680 Speaker 1: depth the fact that showing people asking people to explain 528 00:29:56,200 --> 00:30:00,480 Speaker 1: makes them realize that they understood mechanistic process is less 529 00:30:00,480 --> 00:30:04,959 Speaker 1: than they thought. Can that perhaps change people's opinions? Well, 530 00:30:05,000 --> 00:30:06,760 Speaker 1: let's take a quick break, and when we come back 531 00:30:07,320 --> 00:30:09,920 Speaker 1: we will see if there's if this holds any water 532 00:30:10,000 --> 00:30:16,560 Speaker 1: at all. All Right, we're back. So let's look at 533 00:30:16,560 --> 00:30:20,480 Speaker 1: the first experiment in this study. Okay, So participants were 534 00:30:20,480 --> 00:30:24,760 Speaker 1: asked to rate their understanding of six political policies. One 535 00:30:24,800 --> 00:30:28,479 Speaker 1: group of participants provided ratings of their positions both before 536 00:30:28,560 --> 00:30:34,360 Speaker 1: and after they generated mechanistic explanations. Okay, so this is 537 00:30:34,400 --> 00:30:37,400 Speaker 1: a one to seven thing. Uh, As in previous studies, 538 00:30:37,400 --> 00:30:41,000 Speaker 1: we've looked at one strongly against, seven strongly in favor. 539 00:30:41,520 --> 00:30:44,960 Speaker 1: And if you're wondering about the policies, they were Iran sanctions, 540 00:30:45,160 --> 00:30:49,440 Speaker 1: raising the social security retirement age, single payer healthcare, cap 541 00:30:49,480 --> 00:30:52,520 Speaker 1: and trade, carbon emissions, national flat tax, and merit based 542 00:30:52,520 --> 00:30:54,800 Speaker 1: teacher pay. Okay, I think those are good examples because 543 00:30:54,840 --> 00:30:57,120 Speaker 1: they're all things that you can easily find a lot 544 00:30:57,200 --> 00:31:00,840 Speaker 1: of people having strong opinions about for or against. But 545 00:31:00,920 --> 00:31:05,360 Speaker 1: they're also uh complex in terms of detail and in 546 00:31:05,440 --> 00:31:07,239 Speaker 1: terms of effect, and so a lot of people might 547 00:31:07,280 --> 00:31:10,160 Speaker 1: not actually know very well how these things are supposed 548 00:31:10,160 --> 00:31:12,320 Speaker 1: to work. Yeah, and then there's some sort of hidden 549 00:31:12,360 --> 00:31:17,520 Speaker 1: complexity I think, to all of those two. So after this, 550 00:31:17,600 --> 00:31:20,360 Speaker 1: they they were asked to quantify their own level of 551 00:31:20,440 --> 00:31:22,400 Speaker 1: understanding of these positions. A lot of this is gonna 552 00:31:22,440 --> 00:31:26,120 Speaker 1: sound familiar because falling very similar methodology. And finally they 553 00:31:26,160 --> 00:31:29,840 Speaker 1: were asked to provide that they provide that mechanistic explanation, 554 00:31:30,080 --> 00:31:32,520 Speaker 1: and they were asked to then re rate their understanding 555 00:31:32,520 --> 00:31:37,640 Speaker 1: of the policies. So exactly the same essentially narrative flow 556 00:31:37,720 --> 00:31:42,800 Speaker 1: to this experiment as we encountered with previous experiments. As expected, 557 00:31:43,080 --> 00:31:48,880 Speaker 1: post explanation ratings of understanding were lower than pre explanation ratings. Okay, 558 00:31:48,920 --> 00:31:52,080 Speaker 1: so that's the that's the mechanism we've seen before, the 559 00:31:52,120 --> 00:31:55,680 Speaker 1: illusion of explanatory depth exposed by you trying to give 560 00:31:55,680 --> 00:31:59,080 Speaker 1: an explanation of a thing. And the same also proved 561 00:31:59,080 --> 00:32:03,080 Speaker 1: true with the differences between position extremity scores. Uh. Though 562 00:32:03,120 --> 00:32:06,000 Speaker 1: the authors point out that the social security and merit 563 00:32:06,000 --> 00:32:10,080 Speaker 1: pay issues differed the least judgments made after explanations were 564 00:32:10,200 --> 00:32:15,560 Speaker 1: less extreme than we're judgments made before explanation. So their 565 00:32:15,640 --> 00:32:18,000 Speaker 1: their quote here and this is quote. Our interpretation of 566 00:32:18,040 --> 00:32:20,840 Speaker 1: this pattern is that attempting to explain policies made people 567 00:32:20,840 --> 00:32:23,760 Speaker 1: feel uncertain about them, which in turn made them express 568 00:32:23,840 --> 00:32:28,080 Speaker 1: more moderate views. Well, that is interesting. Now, one thing 569 00:32:28,120 --> 00:32:29,959 Speaker 1: we should say, and it's gonna apply to a lot 570 00:32:29,960 --> 00:32:32,800 Speaker 1: of stuff throughout this uh, throughout the study. But it's 571 00:32:32,840 --> 00:32:36,480 Speaker 1: just worth noting that the statistical effects shown here, even 572 00:32:36,520 --> 00:32:38,920 Speaker 1: if it holds true in general and and the studies 573 00:32:39,000 --> 00:32:43,000 Speaker 1: results are valid and correct, the the effect is not drastic. 574 00:32:43,080 --> 00:32:46,200 Speaker 1: People aren't just like floored by the shallowness of their 575 00:32:46,280 --> 00:32:49,880 Speaker 1: understanding and completely converted to the opposite view or something, 576 00:32:50,040 --> 00:32:53,800 Speaker 1: or to an undecided position. But it is appearing to 577 00:32:53,840 --> 00:32:58,760 Speaker 1: show a modest moderation effect. People reduce the extremity of 578 00:32:58,840 --> 00:33:01,880 Speaker 1: their opinion. Now, one of the question that remained here 579 00:33:01,880 --> 00:33:04,800 Speaker 1: for the researchers was are we sure that it's uh? 580 00:33:05,040 --> 00:33:07,880 Speaker 1: It's their attempt to explain the mechanistic explanation at work 581 00:33:07,960 --> 00:33:12,840 Speaker 1: here and not merely reflection greater consideration of the topic. Right, 582 00:33:12,880 --> 00:33:15,760 Speaker 1: So what if instead of making them explain the mechanics 583 00:33:15,880 --> 00:33:18,840 Speaker 1: of raising the social security retirement age, what if we 584 00:33:18,920 --> 00:33:22,240 Speaker 1: just asked them to talk about the idea of raising 585 00:33:22,240 --> 00:33:24,760 Speaker 1: the social security retirement age. Would that do the same thing, 586 00:33:24,880 --> 00:33:27,320 Speaker 1: or give their reasons or something like that. All right, 587 00:33:27,360 --> 00:33:30,440 Speaker 1: so that's where experiment two comes in. Similar approach, except 588 00:33:30,480 --> 00:33:34,600 Speaker 1: one group was asked to explain why they held the positions. This, uh, 589 00:33:34,760 --> 00:33:37,960 Speaker 1: you know, as prior researcher has suggested that when people 590 00:33:38,000 --> 00:33:40,200 Speaker 1: think about why they hold a position, their attitudes tend 591 00:33:40,240 --> 00:33:44,959 Speaker 1: to become more extreme. The researchers predicted less attitude moderation 592 00:33:45,400 --> 00:33:48,840 Speaker 1: in the explain why group rather than the explain how group. 593 00:33:49,600 --> 00:33:51,600 Speaker 1: And this is what they found, they said, quote Experiment 594 00:33:51,720 --> 00:33:54,160 Speaker 1: number two replicated the results of experiment number one and 595 00:33:54,200 --> 00:33:59,280 Speaker 1: showed further that reductions in rated understanding of policies were 596 00:33:59,360 --> 00:34:03,240 Speaker 1: less pronoun among participants who enumerated reasons for their position 597 00:34:03,280 --> 00:34:08,160 Speaker 1: than among participants who generated causal explanations for them. Okay, so, uh, 598 00:34:08,320 --> 00:34:12,120 Speaker 1: stating the reasons why you think that we should or 599 00:34:12,160 --> 00:34:16,120 Speaker 1: shouldn't raise the social security retirement age that moderates your 600 00:34:16,120 --> 00:34:21,040 Speaker 1: position less, you know, But explaining how that process would 601 00:34:21,080 --> 00:34:26,040 Speaker 1: work moderates your position more right now. They didn't find 602 00:34:26,280 --> 00:34:29,480 Speaker 1: that enumerating reasons for supporting position led to an increase 603 00:34:29,600 --> 00:34:33,400 Speaker 1: in extremism. They said, although an analysis of individual reasons 604 00:34:33,400 --> 00:34:37,440 Speaker 1: suggests that it did increase overall attitude extremity when participants 605 00:34:37,440 --> 00:34:41,280 Speaker 1: provided a reason that was an evaluation of the policy. Okay, 606 00:34:42,360 --> 00:34:44,440 Speaker 1: so that's sort of also not going along with some 607 00:34:44,520 --> 00:34:47,759 Speaker 1: previous research said that if you give reasons why you 608 00:34:47,800 --> 00:34:51,400 Speaker 1: feel a certain way, that makes your opinion more extreme. Yeah, 609 00:34:51,480 --> 00:34:54,440 Speaker 1: that wasn't found here. Now I'm reminded in all of 610 00:34:54,440 --> 00:34:57,840 Speaker 1: this of a moment in the wonderful film Return of 611 00:34:57,880 --> 00:35:00,440 Speaker 1: the Living Dead. Oh it's one of my favorites. Wonderful 612 00:35:00,480 --> 00:35:06,160 Speaker 1: Clue Gallagher. Zombies. Yeah, fabulous film. Uh you know, one 613 00:35:06,160 --> 00:35:08,760 Speaker 1: of the best zombie films. The zombies talking this Yeah, 614 00:35:08,600 --> 00:35:11,320 Speaker 1: that's what makes this one unique. I mean, the zombies 615 00:35:11,360 --> 00:35:14,680 Speaker 1: actually start speaking. They're not especially profound, or maybe they are, 616 00:35:14,800 --> 00:35:17,799 Speaker 1: I don't know. Uh, yeah, the zombies can talk. And 617 00:35:17,880 --> 00:35:21,160 Speaker 1: so Robert you you were thinking of this particular scene 618 00:35:21,160 --> 00:35:24,160 Speaker 1: where they interrogate a zombie. Yeah, there's the character name 619 00:35:24,320 --> 00:35:26,960 Speaker 1: Ernie and he has like a half of a zombie 620 00:35:26,960 --> 00:35:30,520 Speaker 1: on the table there and he's he's asking it questions 621 00:35:30,560 --> 00:35:33,959 Speaker 1: and he says, uh, can you you can hear me? Yes? 622 00:35:34,400 --> 00:35:40,000 Speaker 1: Why do you eat people? Not people? Brains? Brains only yes, 623 00:35:40,040 --> 00:35:44,520 Speaker 1: why the pain? What about the pain? The pain of 624 00:35:44,640 --> 00:35:48,840 Speaker 1: being dead? It hurts to be dead. I can feel 625 00:35:48,920 --> 00:35:52,480 Speaker 1: myself rot eating brains. How does that make you feel? 626 00:35:52,960 --> 00:35:57,600 Speaker 1: It makes the pain go away? Okay, wait a minute. 627 00:35:57,640 --> 00:36:01,560 Speaker 1: So they're interrogating there almost like could you could you 628 00:36:01,600 --> 00:36:06,520 Speaker 1: reduce the extremity of the zombies position by forcing them 629 00:36:06,520 --> 00:36:09,880 Speaker 1: to give a mechanistic explanation of how eating brains reduces 630 00:36:09,920 --> 00:36:13,279 Speaker 1: the pain of being dead? Um? Maybe, But here in 631 00:36:13,320 --> 00:36:17,400 Speaker 1: this case, it is the zombie really explaining I don't know. 632 00:36:17,440 --> 00:36:20,680 Speaker 1: It's the zombies forced to provide some level of self 633 00:36:20,680 --> 00:36:23,560 Speaker 1: reflective explanation of its hunger for human brains. But it's 634 00:36:23,560 --> 00:36:26,520 Speaker 1: not really mechanistic. It's it's merely an explanation of really 635 00:36:26,560 --> 00:36:29,880 Speaker 1: why the zombie holds the position that it does. So 636 00:36:29,920 --> 00:36:32,520 Speaker 1: if it's if it's just giving reasons, it might be 637 00:36:32,600 --> 00:36:36,120 Speaker 1: staying where it is or actually becoming more extreme. Yeah. 638 00:36:36,320 --> 00:36:39,320 Speaker 1: So maybe what you should do if you want to 639 00:36:39,360 --> 00:36:42,560 Speaker 1: get moderation in the zombie is get the zombie to 640 00:36:42,840 --> 00:36:46,919 Speaker 1: explain the I don't know, the biological process by which 641 00:36:46,960 --> 00:36:49,799 Speaker 1: eating brains reduces the pain. Yeah, explain to me how 642 00:36:49,840 --> 00:36:53,239 Speaker 1: that could possibly work, zombie, Because because I'm drawn a 643 00:36:53,280 --> 00:36:56,440 Speaker 1: blank and then present it with a nice, you know, 644 00:36:56,920 --> 00:37:01,080 Speaker 1: soft pre shaved forehead and see if it goes after 645 00:37:01,120 --> 00:37:03,120 Speaker 1: the brain made it might be a little less likely. 646 00:37:03,200 --> 00:37:06,880 Speaker 1: Who knows? Well? That brings us to experiment three outside 647 00:37:06,880 --> 00:37:10,120 Speaker 1: of the zombie film, um, because you know we can. 648 00:37:10,160 --> 00:37:11,960 Speaker 1: We can go back and forth on whether the zombie 649 00:37:11,960 --> 00:37:15,000 Speaker 1: we eat the brain. But more important here would would 650 00:37:15,040 --> 00:37:18,440 Speaker 1: be would the reflective voter vote differently based on everything? 651 00:37:18,600 --> 00:37:22,880 Speaker 1: Might they choose to donate differently to campaigns or organizations? Okay, 652 00:37:22,920 --> 00:37:26,480 Speaker 1: so this is tracking the fact that just how extreme 653 00:37:26,640 --> 00:37:29,440 Speaker 1: you report your position is might be different than what 654 00:37:29,480 --> 00:37:33,359 Speaker 1: you would actually do based on your political feelings. Yeah. Yeah, 655 00:37:33,680 --> 00:37:36,239 Speaker 1: So the same steps were taken in as in the 656 00:37:36,239 --> 00:37:39,399 Speaker 1: previous two experiments, only this time the subjects were asked 657 00:37:39,440 --> 00:37:41,319 Speaker 1: at the end of the experiment to choose whether or 658 00:37:41,320 --> 00:37:44,400 Speaker 1: not they would donate a bonus payment to a relevant 659 00:37:44,480 --> 00:37:48,040 Speaker 1: advocate secret I believe the bonus payment was twenty cents, 660 00:37:50,440 --> 00:37:54,000 Speaker 1: and they found that yes, attempting to create a mechanistic 661 00:37:54,480 --> 00:37:58,840 Speaker 1: explanation resulted in a less likelihood of putting money behind 662 00:37:58,960 --> 00:38:03,239 Speaker 1: that uh uh, that cause via a donation. Okay, so 663 00:38:03,400 --> 00:38:08,919 Speaker 1: if you are strongly against the flat tax, and then 664 00:38:09,000 --> 00:38:12,279 Speaker 1: you are asked to explain how the flat tax would work, 665 00:38:13,200 --> 00:38:16,880 Speaker 1: and you have to give that mechanistic explanation. You're less 666 00:38:16,920 --> 00:38:20,640 Speaker 1: likely to donate money to organizations that advocate against the 667 00:38:20,640 --> 00:38:23,360 Speaker 1: flat tax than someone who was against it and didn't 668 00:38:23,400 --> 00:38:27,279 Speaker 1: have to explain what they're what how it worked. Yeah, 669 00:38:27,280 --> 00:38:29,160 Speaker 1: it would be like you've I don't know. Let's say 670 00:38:29,160 --> 00:38:32,799 Speaker 1: you're in ancient Egypt and uh, a pharaoh says we're 671 00:38:32,840 --> 00:38:34,799 Speaker 1: gonna build a pyramid and this is going to solve 672 00:38:34,800 --> 00:38:38,160 Speaker 1: our problems. And you're like, yeah, build that pyramid. I 673 00:38:38,160 --> 00:38:40,680 Speaker 1: I'm going to donate you know, X amount of labor 674 00:38:40,880 --> 00:38:43,840 Speaker 1: or whatnot. Huh uh. And then but if you were asked, actually, 675 00:38:43,960 --> 00:38:46,160 Speaker 1: can you explain how building the pyramid is gonna help 676 00:38:46,760 --> 00:38:48,719 Speaker 1: everybody out? And then you draw the blank and then 677 00:38:48,760 --> 00:38:50,960 Speaker 1: you think, well, maybe I'm not gonna donate as much 678 00:38:50,960 --> 00:38:54,000 Speaker 1: of my nice service here. Now. I wonder there because 679 00:38:54,120 --> 00:38:55,920 Speaker 1: if if you say how the pyramid is going to 680 00:38:56,040 --> 00:39:00,360 Speaker 1: help people, that seems like that may enter do some 681 00:39:00,480 --> 00:39:06,040 Speaker 1: value judgments. Well, but that might undercut the mechanistic explanation effect. Well, yeah, 682 00:39:06,080 --> 00:39:07,799 Speaker 1: I guess I should be more clear and say that 683 00:39:09,280 --> 00:39:11,440 Speaker 1: explain how that how the building of the pyramid is 684 00:39:11,480 --> 00:39:14,480 Speaker 1: going to achieve the stated goals. Yeah, what what will 685 00:39:14,520 --> 00:39:17,560 Speaker 1: it do? Yeah? And uh, you know, and if the 686 00:39:17,560 --> 00:39:19,560 Speaker 1: the answer is not that compelling or it seems more 687 00:39:19,600 --> 00:39:22,000 Speaker 1: complex than one has the grasp of, then yeah, it 688 00:39:22,120 --> 00:39:25,520 Speaker 1: might make you a little less supportive of it in 689 00:39:25,520 --> 00:39:28,440 Speaker 1: indeed's action or certainly money. Yeah, though I would also 690 00:39:28,760 --> 00:39:34,280 Speaker 1: certainly guess, just intuitively that mechanistic explanations of how something 691 00:39:34,400 --> 00:39:38,800 Speaker 1: will work are different than mechanistic explanations of a something 692 00:39:38,840 --> 00:39:42,360 Speaker 1: that already exists, either in terms of proposition as a 693 00:39:42,400 --> 00:39:46,239 Speaker 1: policy and is written down, or something that exists in 694 00:39:46,320 --> 00:39:49,879 Speaker 1: nature or as an artifact. So in this study they 695 00:39:49,920 --> 00:39:53,839 Speaker 1: said they summarize it at the saying explanation generation will 696 00:39:53,840 --> 00:39:57,600 Speaker 1: by no means it eliminate extremism, but our data suggests 697 00:39:57,640 --> 00:40:01,640 Speaker 1: that it offers a means of counteract a tendency supported 698 00:40:01,640 --> 00:40:05,360 Speaker 1: by multiple psychological factors. And that tendency, of course, is 699 00:40:05,480 --> 00:40:10,719 Speaker 1: political extremism, which is ultimately heartening because it it gives 700 00:40:10,800 --> 00:40:13,200 Speaker 1: us the message that, hey, if you don't want people 701 00:40:13,200 --> 00:40:18,040 Speaker 1: to hold ridiculous extreme views on things that are ultimately 702 00:40:18,040 --> 00:40:21,280 Speaker 1: going to be hurtful and harmful, and nothing and and 703 00:40:21,280 --> 00:40:23,040 Speaker 1: and nothing good is gonna come, and it's not actually 704 00:40:23,080 --> 00:40:25,080 Speaker 1: gonna help any of the problems they're attempting to solve. 705 00:40:26,040 --> 00:40:28,720 Speaker 1: It's a matter of education. It's a matter of getting people, 706 00:40:28,880 --> 00:40:31,880 Speaker 1: presenting people with facts, or at least not even that, 707 00:40:31,920 --> 00:40:35,520 Speaker 1: but just making them question. Yea, not presenting them with facts, 708 00:40:35,560 --> 00:40:40,680 Speaker 1: just asking them to explain the not not the politicized parts, 709 00:40:40,760 --> 00:40:43,560 Speaker 1: but the pure mechanical parts of how what they're saying 710 00:40:43,560 --> 00:40:47,360 Speaker 1: will work. Yeah, to just think about it, Think about 711 00:40:47,400 --> 00:40:51,200 Speaker 1: the topic, think about this proposed solution and the problem 712 00:40:51,239 --> 00:40:54,160 Speaker 1: that it's supposed to solve, and ask some critical questions. 713 00:40:54,800 --> 00:40:57,319 Speaker 1: Critical thinking we would have thought it. All Right, we're 714 00:40:57,320 --> 00:40:58,920 Speaker 1: gonna take a quick break, and when we come back, 715 00:40:58,960 --> 00:41:01,319 Speaker 1: we'll look at a couple more more topics before we 716 00:41:01,360 --> 00:41:09,760 Speaker 1: wrap up our discussion of the illusion of explanatory depth. Alright, 717 00:41:09,760 --> 00:41:12,680 Speaker 1: we're back. Okay. So, one topic that I thought of 718 00:41:12,800 --> 00:41:15,600 Speaker 1: as and it has come up in the research as 719 00:41:15,640 --> 00:41:19,840 Speaker 1: being related to the illusion of explanatory depth, but somewhat 720 00:41:19,880 --> 00:41:24,960 Speaker 1: different is the often cited, the very interesting but also 721 00:41:25,480 --> 00:41:31,279 Speaker 1: much misinterpreted and misused Dunning Krueger effect. So you may 722 00:41:31,280 --> 00:41:33,560 Speaker 1: have heard about this before, I think we should do 723 00:41:33,600 --> 00:41:35,520 Speaker 1: a whole episode about it at some point, So we're 724 00:41:35,560 --> 00:41:39,480 Speaker 1: not going to get into too much depth about it here. Um, 725 00:41:39,560 --> 00:41:42,960 Speaker 1: But it's one of those things that I find very interesting. 726 00:41:43,000 --> 00:41:45,840 Speaker 1: But I'm also very annoyed by much of the discussion 727 00:41:45,880 --> 00:41:50,160 Speaker 1: about because a lot of it I think boils down to, uh, 728 00:41:50,200 --> 00:41:54,080 Speaker 1: people like this effect too much. It's it's very interesting 729 00:41:54,160 --> 00:41:57,080 Speaker 1: in reality, but a lot of people, uh seem to 730 00:41:57,320 --> 00:41:59,120 Speaker 1: like to bring it up in a way just to 731 00:41:59,520 --> 00:42:03,360 Speaker 1: show that they are mentally superior to others. Yeah. Now, 732 00:42:03,719 --> 00:42:05,279 Speaker 1: if you're out there and you're and you're as you're 733 00:42:05,280 --> 00:42:08,080 Speaker 1: saying to yourself, I don't actually know what this is, Uh, 734 00:42:08,200 --> 00:42:11,040 Speaker 1: don't feel dumb about it. I actually it wasn't super 735 00:42:11,080 --> 00:42:14,480 Speaker 1: familiar with it prior to research for this episode. So, 736 00:42:14,600 --> 00:42:18,040 Speaker 1: in brief, the Dunning Kruger effect is all about cognitive bias. 737 00:42:18,520 --> 00:42:21,560 Speaker 1: The idea here is that relatively unskilled individuals feel a 738 00:42:21,600 --> 00:42:25,959 Speaker 1: false sense of superior superiority as they mistakenly assess their 739 00:42:26,000 --> 00:42:30,439 Speaker 1: ability to be much higher than it than it accurately is. Yeah. 740 00:42:30,520 --> 00:42:33,560 Speaker 1: So the very very brief summary, and we could get 741 00:42:33,560 --> 00:42:35,320 Speaker 1: into more detail in the future if we do a 742 00:42:35,400 --> 00:42:40,640 Speaker 1: full episode about this. Study and and its critics and interpretations. Um. 743 00:42:40,680 --> 00:42:43,239 Speaker 1: But the basic idea is that people who are very 744 00:42:43,360 --> 00:42:47,080 Speaker 1: unskilled at a particular type of task tend to judge 745 00:42:47,160 --> 00:42:50,959 Speaker 1: their own abilities way higher than they are because being 746 00:42:51,080 --> 00:42:54,479 Speaker 1: unskilled at the task usually comes along with a lack 747 00:42:54,520 --> 00:42:58,319 Speaker 1: of metacognitive ability. In other words, unskilled people tend to 748 00:42:58,480 --> 00:43:02,840 Speaker 1: be not aware of how unskilled they are and underestimate 749 00:43:02,880 --> 00:43:06,719 Speaker 1: the level of expertise required it takes to do that 750 00:43:06,880 --> 00:43:09,080 Speaker 1: is required to do something well. Yeah, and this was 751 00:43:09,120 --> 00:43:12,520 Speaker 1: first observed by the the study authors, David Dunning and 752 00:43:12,600 --> 00:43:18,120 Speaker 1: Justin Krueger of Cornell University. In they said, quote, we 753 00:43:18,200 --> 00:43:21,480 Speaker 1: propose that those with limited knowledge in a domain suffer 754 00:43:21,560 --> 00:43:24,680 Speaker 1: a dual burden. Not only do they reach mistaken conclusions 755 00:43:24,680 --> 00:43:28,080 Speaker 1: and make regrettable errors, but their incomfidence robs them of 756 00:43:28,120 --> 00:43:31,160 Speaker 1: the ability to realize it. As you said, though, here's 757 00:43:31,200 --> 00:43:34,520 Speaker 1: the thing. It's very easy and very appealing to throw 758 00:43:34,640 --> 00:43:37,680 Speaker 1: the Dunning Krueger effect effect around, Willy Nilliet, everyone you 759 00:43:37,719 --> 00:43:40,440 Speaker 1: don't like, you don't agree with anyone who seems to 760 00:43:40,480 --> 00:43:43,839 Speaker 1: be overstating their understanding of a topic. I think it's 761 00:43:43,840 --> 00:43:47,239 Speaker 1: a lot like labeling someone a sociopath. It's far too 762 00:43:47,239 --> 00:43:49,960 Speaker 1: easy to do if you have just a basics even 763 00:43:50,040 --> 00:43:53,319 Speaker 1: you know, surface level understanding of the symptoms and characteristics. Yeah, 764 00:43:53,360 --> 00:43:57,759 Speaker 1: and that's kind of interesting, like people shallowly engaging with 765 00:43:58,000 --> 00:44:01,000 Speaker 1: a with the idea of a psycholo logical concept that 766 00:44:01,080 --> 00:44:05,279 Speaker 1: has to do with shallow understandings of things. Yeah, the 767 00:44:05,280 --> 00:44:08,640 Speaker 1: the the the the doing. Thenn Kruger effect lines up 768 00:44:08,680 --> 00:44:11,759 Speaker 1: with the illusion of explanatory depth and runs contrary to 769 00:44:11,800 --> 00:44:14,640 Speaker 1: do to it. But it's also susceptible to misuse, in 770 00:44:14,760 --> 00:44:17,520 Speaker 1: part because we suffer from the illusion of explanatory depth 771 00:44:17,640 --> 00:44:22,040 Speaker 1: on the topic. Yeah. Well, I think we should definitely 772 00:44:22,080 --> 00:44:25,480 Speaker 1: come back and do a whole episode about this about 773 00:44:25,480 --> 00:44:28,520 Speaker 1: this subject sometime in the future, especially because I've read 774 00:44:28,520 --> 00:44:31,879 Speaker 1: some interesting criticisms of the Dunning Kruger effect and how 775 00:44:31,920 --> 00:44:34,799 Speaker 1: it's applied and and how it might not be all 776 00:44:34,840 --> 00:44:36,560 Speaker 1: it's cracked up to be. It's almost as if a 777 00:44:36,600 --> 00:44:41,440 Speaker 1: simplistic explanation for human behavior uh uh might have some 778 00:44:41,480 --> 00:44:43,640 Speaker 1: faults with it. Well. I don't want to entirely knock 779 00:44:43,640 --> 00:44:46,160 Speaker 1: it either, because I do think it's interesting research and 780 00:44:46,160 --> 00:44:48,920 Speaker 1: and it deserves our attention. So but but this seems 781 00:44:48,960 --> 00:44:51,239 Speaker 1: to be the this is the way things go. If 782 00:44:51,239 --> 00:44:54,440 Speaker 1: you have a a well, let's not say simple, but 783 00:44:54,560 --> 00:44:58,160 Speaker 1: let's say if you have a nice, streamlined theory for 784 00:44:58,320 --> 00:45:03,080 Speaker 1: why people do the stupid things they do. Um, it's 785 00:45:03,120 --> 00:45:06,080 Speaker 1: probably a little more nuanced. But but but it at 786 00:45:06,120 --> 00:45:08,279 Speaker 1: least gives us. The wonderful things about these theories is 787 00:45:08,320 --> 00:45:10,799 Speaker 1: they give us a starting point for the discussion, for 788 00:45:10,840 --> 00:45:14,040 Speaker 1: the further discussion of that thing. It's like like nailing 789 00:45:14,120 --> 00:45:17,440 Speaker 1: a metal steak into the side of a mountain when 790 00:45:17,480 --> 00:45:20,520 Speaker 1: you're climbing. It's not the only you're gonna have to 791 00:45:20,640 --> 00:45:22,480 Speaker 1: You're gonna have to hammer in more steaks to make 792 00:45:22,480 --> 00:45:25,560 Speaker 1: it at the top. But but but this is how 793 00:45:25,640 --> 00:45:28,840 Speaker 1: you scale the mountain of ignorance. That's a that's a 794 00:45:28,920 --> 00:45:32,399 Speaker 1: nice analogy, Robert would thank you. We're always scaling, aren't 795 00:45:32,440 --> 00:45:35,439 Speaker 1: we scale? We never reaching the top? Wait, no, sorry, 796 00:45:35,440 --> 00:45:37,400 Speaker 1: if it's the mountain of ignorance, maybe we start at 797 00:45:37,400 --> 00:45:39,800 Speaker 1: the top when we're trying to climb down without falling 798 00:45:39,800 --> 00:45:41,759 Speaker 1: off of a precipice. Yeah. I don't know. I'm thinking 799 00:45:41,760 --> 00:45:47,839 Speaker 1: of a divine comedy version of that. Yeah. Okay, So 800 00:45:48,200 --> 00:45:50,560 Speaker 1: the last thing I think we have to do is 801 00:45:51,239 --> 00:45:54,319 Speaker 1: offer our own, just based on our reading and our 802 00:45:54,400 --> 00:46:00,080 Speaker 1: our opinions. A a list of advice on how to 803 00:46:00,120 --> 00:46:03,640 Speaker 1: avoid illusory understanding. Now, this is not like this is 804 00:46:03,680 --> 00:46:06,680 Speaker 1: not like a doctor approved list. There is, as far 805 00:46:06,719 --> 00:46:09,520 Speaker 1: as we know, nobody has come up with us full 806 00:46:09,560 --> 00:46:14,799 Speaker 1: proof way to keep yourself from overestimating your understanding of 807 00:46:14,840 --> 00:46:17,480 Speaker 1: how things work. But Robert, I think you and I 808 00:46:17,520 --> 00:46:20,439 Speaker 1: can get behind a few recommendations coming from us non 809 00:46:20,520 --> 00:46:23,840 Speaker 1: experts on this subject. Yeah, just ways to remain conscious 810 00:46:23,920 --> 00:46:27,359 Speaker 1: of how the brain works. First thing I would say 811 00:46:27,600 --> 00:46:30,880 Speaker 1: is that there's some slight evidence that simply being aware 812 00:46:31,040 --> 00:46:34,359 Speaker 1: of the illusion of explanatory depth does not destroy our 813 00:46:34,400 --> 00:46:37,640 Speaker 1: susceptibility to it. That's important to remember. Just because you 814 00:46:37,640 --> 00:46:41,160 Speaker 1: know about it now doesn't mean you're immune to it. Uh. 815 00:46:41,200 --> 00:46:43,560 Speaker 1: One example is back in the original study we talked 816 00:46:43,560 --> 00:46:46,920 Speaker 1: about in the last episode, many of the participants subjectively 817 00:46:47,040 --> 00:46:50,600 Speaker 1: reported you might remember this. They said something like, oh, 818 00:46:50,640 --> 00:46:53,279 Speaker 1: if only I had gotten a different subset of the 819 00:46:53,320 --> 00:46:55,919 Speaker 1: devices on the list to explain, I would have done 820 00:46:56,000 --> 00:46:59,560 Speaker 1: much better. Uh. Though the effect presented broadly across all 821 00:46:59,640 --> 00:47:02,759 Speaker 1: the device paces and the different groups. Thus, even after 822 00:47:02,800 --> 00:47:05,480 Speaker 1: we're made aware of the gaps in our knowledge and 823 00:47:05,520 --> 00:47:08,440 Speaker 1: the fact that we overestimate how well we will do 824 00:47:08,480 --> 00:47:11,840 Speaker 1: in explaining things. Uh, these people were like, oh, I 825 00:47:11,840 --> 00:47:16,920 Speaker 1: would have done much better explaining different things. They probably 826 00:47:16,920 --> 00:47:19,439 Speaker 1: wouldn't have been until they got in the moment trying 827 00:47:19,480 --> 00:47:22,239 Speaker 1: to explain them that they would have realized that they 828 00:47:22,640 --> 00:47:25,719 Speaker 1: couldn't do any better on those things than they did 829 00:47:25,719 --> 00:47:28,920 Speaker 1: on the devices they originally had to explain. Uh, they 830 00:47:28,920 --> 00:47:32,359 Speaker 1: thought it was a fluke somehow. So that you are 831 00:47:32,400 --> 00:47:36,600 Speaker 1: not now inoculated having heard this, You're you're not immune, right, Yeah, 832 00:47:36,880 --> 00:47:40,560 Speaker 1: it's it's not just magically going to dispel You're you're 833 00:47:40,600 --> 00:47:44,040 Speaker 1: missing your misinterpretation of your own understanding. One of the 834 00:47:44,080 --> 00:47:47,400 Speaker 1: main things I would recommend to avoid the illusion of 835 00:47:47,440 --> 00:47:51,400 Speaker 1: explanatory depth is practice explaining things and be sure to 836 00:47:51,440 --> 00:47:54,080 Speaker 1: put them in your own words. Yeah, this is this 837 00:47:54,120 --> 00:47:57,040 Speaker 1: is a big one, and this is as we discussed earlier, 838 00:47:57,120 --> 00:48:00,160 Speaker 1: this is something that I find, Uh, in my own 839 00:48:00,200 --> 00:48:03,520 Speaker 1: experience a lot is that I'll be asked by my 840 00:48:03,600 --> 00:48:05,880 Speaker 1: wife what we were doing an episode on I'll have 841 00:48:05,920 --> 00:48:08,280 Speaker 1: to explain it in my own words, and that's sometimes 842 00:48:08,280 --> 00:48:12,520 Speaker 1: when I realized that I don't understand something well enough yet. Yeah. 843 00:48:12,800 --> 00:48:14,920 Speaker 1: Often I have the experience of like I read a 844 00:48:14,960 --> 00:48:18,719 Speaker 1: scientific article or something. I'll just read it, and then 845 00:48:18,760 --> 00:48:21,640 Speaker 1: I'll think, Okay, I I read that, I comprehended it. 846 00:48:21,760 --> 00:48:23,799 Speaker 1: I can I can explain it now. And then I 847 00:48:23,840 --> 00:48:26,120 Speaker 1: have this problem. I start talking. I get a few 848 00:48:26,160 --> 00:48:29,000 Speaker 1: sentences in, and I realized there are big gaps. There's like, wait, 849 00:48:29,040 --> 00:48:31,640 Speaker 1: there are parts I didn't understand that. And I don't 850 00:48:31,640 --> 00:48:35,080 Speaker 1: even realize those gaps are there. I'm completely blind to them. 851 00:48:35,120 --> 00:48:39,360 Speaker 1: And the way to eliminate them is to essentially summarize 852 00:48:39,440 --> 00:48:41,960 Speaker 1: what I have read in writing, to write a summary 853 00:48:42,040 --> 00:48:44,640 Speaker 1: myself in my own words, what did I just read, what, 854 00:48:44,640 --> 00:48:47,040 Speaker 1: what was it about? What did it say? And then 855 00:48:47,200 --> 00:48:49,560 Speaker 1: the gaps in my understanding become clear and I can 856 00:48:49,719 --> 00:48:53,040 Speaker 1: fill them in. So I think that helps a lot 857 00:48:53,600 --> 00:48:57,000 Speaker 1: in becoming aware of the limitations of your own knowledge 858 00:48:57,000 --> 00:49:00,840 Speaker 1: and comprehension. One of the things coming from the interpretations 859 00:49:01,040 --> 00:49:06,120 Speaker 1: of the the researchers themselves is be wary of mental animations. 860 00:49:06,600 --> 00:49:10,960 Speaker 1: If you're imagining how something, especially something physical, works, just 861 00:49:11,040 --> 00:49:14,600 Speaker 1: because you can play a cartoon in your head of 862 00:49:14,760 --> 00:49:18,200 Speaker 1: how this device works doesn't mean that the cartoon you're 863 00:49:18,200 --> 00:49:22,719 Speaker 1: playing in your head actually makes causal sense. You're the 864 00:49:22,880 --> 00:49:26,440 Speaker 1: imagination idea you have of something is not constrained by 865 00:49:26,440 --> 00:49:30,200 Speaker 1: the laws of physics and reality is so we're very 866 00:49:30,239 --> 00:49:33,879 Speaker 1: apt to run a mental movie of how it can 867 00:49:33,960 --> 00:49:37,040 Speaker 1: open our works or something that makes sense in our imagination. 868 00:49:37,320 --> 00:49:39,200 Speaker 1: And it's not until we try to explain it that 869 00:49:39,239 --> 00:49:42,640 Speaker 1: we realized that we're missing parts and it wouldn't actually 870 00:49:42,680 --> 00:49:44,520 Speaker 1: work if we tried to put it together the way 871 00:49:44,520 --> 00:49:47,400 Speaker 1: we're imagining it. One more I would say is be 872 00:49:47,440 --> 00:49:50,160 Speaker 1: wary of labels and vocabulary. This came up in the 873 00:49:50,160 --> 00:49:52,640 Speaker 1: first study. Also, just because you know the name of 874 00:49:52,719 --> 00:49:56,239 Speaker 1: components doesn't mean you understand what the components actually do. 875 00:49:57,040 --> 00:50:00,279 Speaker 1: And I think that that also applies to like I, 876 00:50:00,280 --> 00:50:02,359 Speaker 1: I didn't think of this earlier, but but now it's 877 00:50:02,360 --> 00:50:06,480 Speaker 1: occurring to me. Business jargon in terminology sort of the 878 00:50:06,719 --> 00:50:09,480 Speaker 1: synergized backward overflow kind of thing where you end up 879 00:50:09,760 --> 00:50:13,000 Speaker 1: thrown around these terms for things that that maybe have 880 00:50:13,120 --> 00:50:15,879 Speaker 1: definite meanings, but then they lose their stripped of those 881 00:50:15,920 --> 00:50:19,719 Speaker 1: meanings through repeated use and they just become kind of 882 00:50:19,719 --> 00:50:23,800 Speaker 1: just pointless mantras that are that are you know, thrown 883 00:50:23,800 --> 00:50:27,040 Speaker 1: back and forth. You know, with business terminology, I think 884 00:50:27,280 --> 00:50:30,360 Speaker 1: we talked about this in our euphemisms episode, where where 885 00:50:30,400 --> 00:50:33,560 Speaker 1: I think a lot of the business jargon kind of 886 00:50:33,600 --> 00:50:38,240 Speaker 1: avoids saying bluntly things that would not sound so pleasant 887 00:50:38,280 --> 00:50:40,160 Speaker 1: if you said them bluntly. But another thing that I 888 00:50:40,239 --> 00:50:43,719 Speaker 1: think it maybe does is helps give us an illusion 889 00:50:43,760 --> 00:50:47,440 Speaker 1: of understanding of the workings of complex systems that are 890 00:50:47,480 --> 00:50:49,920 Speaker 1: actually I mean, a business is a complex system. It's 891 00:50:49,920 --> 00:50:52,520 Speaker 1: a machine. It's hard to understand how all the parts 892 00:50:52,520 --> 00:50:57,040 Speaker 1: are actually working, and even harder probably to predict its behavior. 893 00:50:57,440 --> 00:51:00,480 Speaker 1: But if you have technical sounding names of things, and 894 00:51:00,520 --> 00:51:05,600 Speaker 1: you know lots of domain specific labels for business terms 895 00:51:05,640 --> 00:51:08,319 Speaker 1: and business phenomena, it might help give you a sense 896 00:51:08,360 --> 00:51:11,200 Speaker 1: of understanding and control over a thing that is actually 897 00:51:11,239 --> 00:51:15,240 Speaker 1: a wild dragon and you're just writing it. And then finally, 898 00:51:15,480 --> 00:51:18,600 Speaker 1: this one might sound kind of weird, but uh, just 899 00:51:18,880 --> 00:51:20,560 Speaker 1: stick with me for a second here. I want to 900 00:51:20,560 --> 00:51:23,719 Speaker 1: see how well this would work. What about trying to 901 00:51:23,800 --> 00:51:28,839 Speaker 1: embody the causality of a process you're trying to describe. Um, So, 902 00:51:29,040 --> 00:51:33,080 Speaker 1: when people are trying to describe processes of things that 903 00:51:33,160 --> 00:51:35,279 Speaker 1: they know how to do, procedures, you know how to 904 00:51:35,440 --> 00:51:40,160 Speaker 1: do something they generally understand pretty well. How how how 905 00:51:40,200 --> 00:51:43,600 Speaker 1: well they can explain it. They're pretty accurate, but not 906 00:51:43,719 --> 00:51:48,880 Speaker 1: so with explaining external events or external devices, like how 907 00:51:48,920 --> 00:51:51,840 Speaker 1: a camera works. So I wonder if that would change 908 00:51:51,880 --> 00:51:54,440 Speaker 1: if when you're trying to understand how a camera works, 909 00:51:54,880 --> 00:52:00,520 Speaker 1: you imagine yourself as the light entering the lens and 910 00:52:00,520 --> 00:52:03,560 Speaker 1: and you sort of walk through the process in an 911 00:52:03,560 --> 00:52:08,120 Speaker 1: embodied imaginative state, like going to all the places and 912 00:52:08,200 --> 00:52:11,160 Speaker 1: the inside the device and seeing what happens to the 913 00:52:11,280 --> 00:52:13,319 Speaker 1: energy and the matter there. I don't know if that's 914 00:52:13,320 --> 00:52:15,960 Speaker 1: really possible. Maybe that's just a really hair brained idea, 915 00:52:16,040 --> 00:52:18,920 Speaker 1: but I wonder if that would actually make a difference. Well, 916 00:52:19,480 --> 00:52:21,680 Speaker 1: I'm not sure about with the with the camera, but 917 00:52:21,760 --> 00:52:25,000 Speaker 1: I think that there's this is very valid with human anatomy, 918 00:52:25,239 --> 00:52:28,520 Speaker 1: or at least I found that in past episodes that 919 00:52:28,600 --> 00:52:32,000 Speaker 1: I've have done, in articles that I've written that have 920 00:52:32,160 --> 00:52:36,040 Speaker 1: to do with the functioning of various organs and systems, 921 00:52:36,640 --> 00:52:40,680 Speaker 1: I always fall back on the fantastic voyage scenario or 922 00:52:40,719 --> 00:52:44,200 Speaker 1: the inner space scenario of the miniaturized submarine inside the 923 00:52:44,280 --> 00:52:47,800 Speaker 1: human body, because it does it does put me there. 924 00:52:47,960 --> 00:52:53,360 Speaker 1: It transforms a distant, you know, small system into a 925 00:52:53,640 --> 00:52:57,400 Speaker 1: place that I can envision myself and that does help 926 00:52:57,680 --> 00:53:01,040 Speaker 1: in my situation. It helps me, you understand it, like 927 00:53:01,120 --> 00:53:04,959 Speaker 1: it can sort of mentally transform an external process into 928 00:53:04,960 --> 00:53:09,319 Speaker 1: a procedure. Yeah, I wonder about that. It might help, 929 00:53:09,360 --> 00:53:12,600 Speaker 1: It might be worth a try. Who knows, Uh, you 930 00:53:12,640 --> 00:53:14,840 Speaker 1: know all of this. I can't help but be reminded 931 00:53:14,880 --> 00:53:20,000 Speaker 1: of a much touted quote from Timothy Leary. Of course, um, 932 00:53:20,719 --> 00:53:22,360 Speaker 1: most of you've probably heard this one before, but I 933 00:53:22,400 --> 00:53:24,680 Speaker 1: think it bears repeating because it lines up directly what 934 00:53:24,719 --> 00:53:26,360 Speaker 1: a lot of we're talking about here, is that to 935 00:53:26,600 --> 00:53:29,200 Speaker 1: think for yourself, you miss question authority and learn how 936 00:53:29,200 --> 00:53:32,920 Speaker 1: to put yourself in a state of vulnerable open mindedness, chaotic, 937 00:53:33,000 --> 00:53:37,080 Speaker 1: confused vulnerability to inform yourself. It's I mean, I guess 938 00:53:37,160 --> 00:53:39,919 Speaker 1: maybe what that would mean in this context is um, 939 00:53:41,800 --> 00:53:45,759 Speaker 1: is I mean wanting to understand the causal mechanisms by 940 00:53:45,760 --> 00:53:49,040 Speaker 1: which things work, but also just recognizing and sort of 941 00:53:49,080 --> 00:53:52,799 Speaker 1: accepting that where you haven't forced yourself to make an 942 00:53:52,800 --> 00:53:56,840 Speaker 1: effort to understand things explicitly, you're going to be relying 943 00:53:56,880 --> 00:54:00,480 Speaker 1: on more magical understanding than you realize. Yeah, I mean, 944 00:54:01,080 --> 00:54:04,239 Speaker 1: in my own handling of of topics here at work, 945 00:54:04,320 --> 00:54:09,480 Speaker 1: I've I've tried to to put myself in in that space, 946 00:54:09,520 --> 00:54:11,520 Speaker 1: you know, and realize that. You know, however, I think 947 00:54:11,560 --> 00:54:16,560 Speaker 1: something works might not actually be accurate, uh, that there 948 00:54:16,600 --> 00:54:18,359 Speaker 1: there may be more to it. I mean, it's kind 949 00:54:18,400 --> 00:54:21,319 Speaker 1: of like the can open analogy. You keep mentioning that 950 00:54:21,600 --> 00:54:24,560 Speaker 1: the shows up as an example in these studies even 951 00:54:24,600 --> 00:54:27,480 Speaker 1: as you're mentioning it. I feel, on one hand, I 952 00:54:27,480 --> 00:54:29,879 Speaker 1: feel like I know how it can opener works. It's 953 00:54:29,880 --> 00:54:32,319 Speaker 1: the you know, the little tooth of metal sticking in there, 954 00:54:32,360 --> 00:54:34,719 Speaker 1: and then you you know, I can picture the scenario. 955 00:54:35,080 --> 00:54:38,040 Speaker 1: I have the mental imagination, and I, well, maybe you 956 00:54:38,120 --> 00:54:39,600 Speaker 1: do on that and I feel like I probably do. 957 00:54:39,680 --> 00:54:41,560 Speaker 1: But and then on the other hand, I'm willing to 958 00:54:42,160 --> 00:54:44,640 Speaker 1: I'm willing to admit that maybe there's something I'm missing. 959 00:54:44,920 --> 00:54:49,360 Speaker 1: Maybe there's an interesting physical property to the can opener, 960 00:54:49,600 --> 00:54:51,640 Speaker 1: or there's a there's some some sort of quirk of 961 00:54:51,640 --> 00:54:54,920 Speaker 1: physics at work, there's something, maybe there is some mystery 962 00:54:54,960 --> 00:54:57,000 Speaker 1: to the can opener and I and I want to 963 00:54:57,000 --> 00:55:00,120 Speaker 1: know more. And therefore I'm willing to admit, yeah, I 964 00:55:00,200 --> 00:55:02,719 Speaker 1: might not have the can opener down as a as 965 00:55:02,760 --> 00:55:05,640 Speaker 1: a human technology. Well, I think in this case, uh, 966 00:55:05,920 --> 00:55:09,680 Speaker 1: probably the best strategy for life is to uh take 967 00:55:09,719 --> 00:55:13,040 Speaker 1: a cue from your own story, is not not from yours, 968 00:55:13,080 --> 00:55:15,680 Speaker 1: but to go open up the toilet and see what's inside, 969 00:55:17,000 --> 00:55:20,640 Speaker 1: to to to you know, interact with the mechanisms that 970 00:55:20,719 --> 00:55:23,400 Speaker 1: we think we understand. Always try to open them up 971 00:55:23,440 --> 00:55:26,719 Speaker 1: and see what's happening. Yeah, get hands on with it. 972 00:55:27,520 --> 00:55:29,719 Speaker 1: One last thought that I thought might be interesting to 973 00:55:30,040 --> 00:55:34,200 Speaker 1: uh to bring up is that what is the biological 974 00:55:34,239 --> 00:55:38,000 Speaker 1: origin of a lusory understanding? Like? What would we say 975 00:55:38,040 --> 00:55:41,000 Speaker 1: that it's just a cognitive quirk that sort of it's 976 00:55:41,000 --> 00:55:44,239 Speaker 1: a byproduct of other cognitive systems that we need in 977 00:55:44,360 --> 00:55:48,080 Speaker 1: order to survive, or should we think of it as well? 978 00:55:48,120 --> 00:55:50,240 Speaker 1: You know, most of our traits are in some sense 979 00:55:50,280 --> 00:55:55,240 Speaker 1: selected for evolved It is the illusion of explanatory depth 980 00:55:55,400 --> 00:55:58,439 Speaker 1: and evolved trade. Is it something that has some kind 981 00:55:58,560 --> 00:56:02,440 Speaker 1: of value in our lives? Lives um and and is 982 00:56:02,480 --> 00:56:05,120 Speaker 1: it a necessary part of our minds? A trait with 983 00:56:05,200 --> 00:56:09,160 Speaker 1: real survival value? I would certainly say that it doesn't 984 00:56:09,160 --> 00:56:12,160 Speaker 1: pay to misunderstand the world around us, Like I can't 985 00:56:12,200 --> 00:56:14,319 Speaker 1: see any way in which it's a good thing to 986 00:56:14,480 --> 00:56:18,560 Speaker 1: not know how things work. But perhaps given the general 987 00:56:18,600 --> 00:56:22,360 Speaker 1: limitations of our understanding like, given the fact that we 988 00:56:22,440 --> 00:56:25,840 Speaker 1: don't understand how a lot of things works work, perhaps 989 00:56:25,920 --> 00:56:30,000 Speaker 1: it pays to operate with a sense of confidence that 990 00:56:30,080 --> 00:56:34,200 Speaker 1: allows us to interact with complex systems even when we 991 00:56:34,239 --> 00:56:36,799 Speaker 1: don't understand them as well as we think we do well. 992 00:56:36,800 --> 00:56:39,720 Speaker 1: It's like learning to use, say, learning to use a computer. 993 00:56:40,160 --> 00:56:43,480 Speaker 1: Like one of the problems that I've encountered before with 994 00:56:43,480 --> 00:56:47,920 Speaker 1: with individuals, you know, particularly older family members, Uh, like 995 00:56:47,960 --> 00:56:50,480 Speaker 1: that they they're scared of the computer, that they're scared 996 00:56:50,480 --> 00:56:54,879 Speaker 1: of doing something wrong. They don't have the blind confidence 997 00:56:55,160 --> 00:56:59,080 Speaker 1: that is necessary to just jump in there and make mistakes. Yeah, 998 00:56:59,120 --> 00:57:01,880 Speaker 1: And so I wonder if maybe that kind of blind 999 00:57:01,920 --> 00:57:04,840 Speaker 1: confidence is actually a trait that's selected for and it 1000 00:57:04,880 --> 00:57:07,279 Speaker 1: has Maybe it has a lot of bad consequences. Maybe 1001 00:57:07,320 --> 00:57:10,320 Speaker 1: it leads to political extremism when we think we understand 1002 00:57:10,360 --> 00:57:13,799 Speaker 1: how complex social phenomenon and government instruments work better than 1003 00:57:13,840 --> 00:57:17,440 Speaker 1: we actually do. Maybe it leads to misunderstanding of how 1004 00:57:17,560 --> 00:57:20,640 Speaker 1: our technology is really functioning and trouble with how to 1005 00:57:20,680 --> 00:57:23,120 Speaker 1: fix it, you know, over as all kinds of problems 1006 00:57:23,200 --> 00:57:25,880 Speaker 1: like this. But if we didn't have this trade, if 1007 00:57:25,920 --> 00:57:29,360 Speaker 1: we didn't have this overconfidence about how well we understood things. 1008 00:57:29,760 --> 00:57:33,040 Speaker 1: We might just be paralyzed. Maybe we couldn't interact with 1009 00:57:33,160 --> 00:57:37,560 Speaker 1: the world because we would never have enough, have enough boldness, 1010 00:57:37,560 --> 00:57:39,919 Speaker 1: have enough heart to just leap into things and live. 1011 00:57:40,160 --> 00:57:43,480 Speaker 1: It wouldn't be foolish enough to be brave. Now, just 1012 00:57:43,760 --> 00:57:47,200 Speaker 1: something to think about, all right, Well, hey, think about 1013 00:57:47,240 --> 00:57:50,240 Speaker 1: that everyone, And in the meantime, while you're mowing that over, 1014 00:57:50,280 --> 00:57:52,760 Speaker 1: you can head on Overdespeptable your Mind dot com. That 1015 00:57:52,960 --> 00:57:56,840 Speaker 1: is our homepage, our mothership. You'll find all the podcast 1016 00:57:56,880 --> 00:58:00,280 Speaker 1: episodes dating back to the very beginning of time. You 1017 00:58:00,320 --> 00:58:03,200 Speaker 1: will find uh blog post videos. You'll find links out 1018 00:58:03,200 --> 00:58:07,280 Speaker 1: to our very social media accounts such as Facebook, Twitter, Tumbler, Instagram, 1019 00:58:07,280 --> 00:58:09,320 Speaker 1: and who knows what else. And if you want to 1020 00:58:09,320 --> 00:58:11,480 Speaker 1: get in touch with us directly to give us feedback 1021 00:58:11,520 --> 00:58:14,560 Speaker 1: on this episode or any other, or to request episode 1022 00:58:14,600 --> 00:58:16,600 Speaker 1: topics for the future, or just let us know what 1023 00:58:16,680 --> 00:58:19,560 Speaker 1: you think, you can email us at blow the Mind 1024 00:58:19,720 --> 00:58:31,520 Speaker 1: at how stuff works dot com for more on this 1025 00:58:31,720 --> 00:58:34,240 Speaker 1: and thousands of other topics. Is that how stuff works 1026 00:58:34,240 --> 00:58:57,480 Speaker 1: dot com.