1 00:00:02,040 --> 00:00:07,160 Speaker 1: This is Masters in Business with Very Results on Bluebird Radio. 2 00:00:08,160 --> 00:00:11,440 Speaker 1: This week on the podcast, I have an extra special guest, 3 00:00:11,920 --> 00:00:15,000 Speaker 1: and strap yourself in because this is going to be fascinating. 4 00:00:15,560 --> 00:00:19,840 Speaker 1: Charity Dean is the protagonist of Michael Lewis's new book, 5 00:00:19,880 --> 00:00:22,840 Speaker 1: The Premonition. She's also I'm going to give her a 6 00:00:22,880 --> 00:00:26,760 Speaker 1: promotion the head of public health of the California Public 7 00:00:26,760 --> 00:00:30,600 Speaker 1: Health Department as well as the co founder of the 8 00:00:30,640 --> 00:00:33,800 Speaker 1: Public Health Company. And if you are at all interested 9 00:00:33,960 --> 00:00:38,320 Speaker 1: in how infectious disease spreads, what we're doing right and 10 00:00:38,440 --> 00:00:44,040 Speaker 1: wrong with vaccinations and containing COVID, and what the risks 11 00:00:44,080 --> 00:00:47,840 Speaker 1: are that we're looking at from our current circumstances, including 12 00:00:48,320 --> 00:00:51,360 Speaker 1: the very dangerous delta variant, you're going to find this 13 00:00:51,479 --> 00:00:55,880 Speaker 1: to be an absolutely fascinating conversation. So, with no further ado, 14 00:00:56,480 --> 00:01:02,960 Speaker 1: my conversation with Charity team, this is Mesters in Business 15 00:01:02,960 --> 00:01:08,000 Speaker 1: with Very Results on Bloomberg Radio. My special guest this 16 00:01:08,080 --> 00:01:12,240 Speaker 1: week is Dr Charity Dean. She was the deputy public 17 00:01:12,240 --> 00:01:16,240 Speaker 1: Health officer for the Santa Barbara County Public Health Department 18 00:01:16,680 --> 00:01:21,000 Speaker 1: before becoming assistant director at the California Department of Public Health. 19 00:01:21,319 --> 00:01:26,000 Speaker 1: In Michael Lewis called her one of the few people 20 00:01:26,040 --> 00:01:29,880 Speaker 1: who saw the real danger of the COVID virus before 21 00:01:29,959 --> 00:01:32,800 Speaker 1: the rest of the country did, and she was featured 22 00:01:33,200 --> 00:01:36,840 Speaker 1: as one of the main characters in his book The Premonition, 23 00:01:37,080 --> 00:01:41,160 Speaker 1: a Pandemic Story. She is co founder of the public 24 00:01:41,200 --> 00:01:46,160 Speaker 1: health company Charity Dean. Welcome to Bloomberg. It's a pleasure 25 00:01:46,200 --> 00:01:50,040 Speaker 1: to be with you. I'm really looking forward to this conversation. 26 00:01:50,480 --> 00:01:53,200 Speaker 1: I loved the book. I mean, I love everything Michael 27 00:01:53,280 --> 00:01:56,600 Speaker 1: Lewis writes, but the book was especially interesting. But I 28 00:01:56,640 --> 00:02:00,280 Speaker 1: want to roll back and start um with your back round. 29 00:02:01,400 --> 00:02:04,800 Speaker 1: Tell us what a public health officer is and how 30 00:02:04,840 --> 00:02:08,320 Speaker 1: did you become one. Well, a public health officer is 31 00:02:08,400 --> 00:02:13,079 Speaker 1: the local official for a county or a local jurisdiction 32 00:02:13,680 --> 00:02:17,400 Speaker 1: who is responsible for ensuring that the public is safe 33 00:02:17,680 --> 00:02:21,720 Speaker 1: against a host of different types of threats. MY favorite threat, 34 00:02:21,720 --> 00:02:24,840 Speaker 1: of course, is communicable disease control. But there's a number 35 00:02:24,880 --> 00:02:29,080 Speaker 1: of things they do. They oversee restaurant inspections or water safety. 36 00:02:29,160 --> 00:02:31,400 Speaker 1: I think the thing they're best known for, though, really 37 00:02:31,520 --> 00:02:35,640 Speaker 1: is disease threats. Because in the US, public health officers 38 00:02:35,680 --> 00:02:38,519 Speaker 1: sprung up across the US and responds to local needs. 39 00:02:38,720 --> 00:02:40,920 Speaker 1: You know, if we rewind a hundred years that might 40 00:02:40,960 --> 00:02:45,840 Speaker 1: have been tuberculosis or smallpox or cholera, polio, etcetera. So 41 00:02:45,919 --> 00:02:49,400 Speaker 1: today the local public health officers are largely unknown to 42 00:02:49,440 --> 00:02:54,040 Speaker 1: the general public, but their role is really important. And 43 00:02:54,440 --> 00:02:58,680 Speaker 1: in the book The Premonition, we learned that the local 44 00:02:58,720 --> 00:03:01,800 Speaker 1: public health officers have a lot of authority. They can 45 00:03:01,840 --> 00:03:05,880 Speaker 1: shut down doctors if they're a source of um malpractice 46 00:03:05,960 --> 00:03:08,640 Speaker 1: or a source of infection or in fact, there's some 47 00:03:08,680 --> 00:03:12,160 Speaker 1: really fascinating stories. People kind of push back and say, 48 00:03:12,240 --> 00:03:14,399 Speaker 1: you can't do that, and the answer seems to be 49 00:03:15,080 --> 00:03:18,919 Speaker 1: watch me well. I learned that on the fly when 50 00:03:18,960 --> 00:03:22,880 Speaker 1: I became the health officer for Santa Barbara County. The 51 00:03:22,960 --> 00:03:26,960 Speaker 1: thing that intrigued me the most is called layer jurisdictional authority, 52 00:03:27,000 --> 00:03:31,480 Speaker 1: and what that means is the police powers to enforce 53 00:03:31,560 --> 00:03:36,880 Speaker 1: communicable disease control in California set with the local health officer. 54 00:03:37,280 --> 00:03:40,080 Speaker 1: In some states they sit with the state health officer, 55 00:03:40,520 --> 00:03:44,000 Speaker 1: but in California it's with the local county public health officer, 56 00:03:44,160 --> 00:03:47,160 Speaker 1: and the law actually says that they can take whatever 57 00:03:47,320 --> 00:03:51,440 Speaker 1: measures are necessary to control the spread of disease. And 58 00:03:51,520 --> 00:03:56,160 Speaker 1: that's an incredible amount of police power. Authority, and it's 59 00:03:56,200 --> 00:03:59,600 Speaker 1: a huge responsibility. So really it's the job of the 60 00:03:59,640 --> 00:04:03,720 Speaker 1: local public health officer across the United States to protect 61 00:04:04,000 --> 00:04:07,280 Speaker 1: national security, health security, and now after COVID, we know 62 00:04:07,480 --> 00:04:10,840 Speaker 1: even the outcome of the local economy is impacted by 63 00:04:10,920 --> 00:04:14,440 Speaker 1: the decisions they make. Quite quite interesting. What was your 64 00:04:14,440 --> 00:04:18,640 Speaker 1: early experiences with infectious diseases? How did you gravitate in 65 00:04:18,680 --> 00:04:24,000 Speaker 1: that direction? You know, I was always interested in outbreaks, 66 00:04:24,040 --> 00:04:28,279 Speaker 1: even as a child. I was interested in pandemics um 67 00:04:28,320 --> 00:04:30,760 Speaker 1: as a child. As a child, I was interested in 68 00:04:30,800 --> 00:04:34,800 Speaker 1: the really awful gnarly hemorrhagic viruses that we see in 69 00:04:34,800 --> 00:04:38,880 Speaker 1: in Africa and interested in how they spread silently. And 70 00:04:38,920 --> 00:04:42,359 Speaker 1: I love bubonic plague. And I read about the Spanish 71 00:04:42,400 --> 00:04:47,279 Speaker 1: flu of nineteen eighteen, and cholera outbreaks, and just a 72 00:04:47,279 --> 00:04:50,080 Speaker 1: host of different diseases that have swept through society. So 73 00:04:50,560 --> 00:04:53,359 Speaker 1: when I went to college at age seventeen, I was 74 00:04:53,440 --> 00:04:56,600 Speaker 1: premed and I majored in microbiology, because that's where you 75 00:04:56,680 --> 00:05:01,479 Speaker 1: learn about all those horrific diseases. I don't think I've 76 00:05:01,520 --> 00:05:05,760 Speaker 1: ever heard the sentence quote I love bubonic plague unquote 77 00:05:05,839 --> 00:05:08,280 Speaker 1: ever ever stated before on at least not on this 78 00:05:08,400 --> 00:05:12,560 Speaker 1: radio station. Well, it's fascinating, right, I mean, public health 79 00:05:12,640 --> 00:05:17,920 Speaker 1: disease control has shaped societies, Its shaped the world, and 80 00:05:17,960 --> 00:05:21,159 Speaker 1: if you look at you know what's impacted societies and economies, 81 00:05:21,320 --> 00:05:24,720 Speaker 1: it's it's been disease. And what's what's the biggest intervention 82 00:05:24,800 --> 00:05:28,520 Speaker 1: public health has had has been vaccines, um and today 83 00:05:28,880 --> 00:05:32,080 Speaker 1: people tend to think it's something that is uh the 84 00:05:32,200 --> 00:05:34,599 Speaker 1: underbelly of society that they don't have to worry about. 85 00:05:34,680 --> 00:05:38,120 Speaker 1: Government's got that if that risk ever arises, government will 86 00:05:38,160 --> 00:05:40,400 Speaker 1: come and save us. But as local health officer, I 87 00:05:40,520 --> 00:05:43,720 Speaker 1: figured out really quickly, Uh, no one's coming to save you. 88 00:05:44,400 --> 00:05:47,520 Speaker 1: And yet you have this enormous responsibility. And if you're 89 00:05:47,800 --> 00:05:51,240 Speaker 1: really good at your job, nobody knows because that means 90 00:05:51,279 --> 00:05:54,240 Speaker 1: you've prevented it. You've stopped the outbreak. Right, they find 91 00:05:54,240 --> 00:05:57,560 Speaker 1: out when you mess up, and giant thing of merca 92 00:05:57,680 --> 00:06:01,320 Speaker 1: spreads all over the county. So how did you work 93 00:06:01,360 --> 00:06:05,880 Speaker 1: your way from Santa Barbara to State of California. Well, 94 00:06:05,920 --> 00:06:08,800 Speaker 1: I was the local health officer in Santa Barbara over 95 00:06:08,839 --> 00:06:12,680 Speaker 1: a number of different outbreaks disasters. I was the health 96 00:06:12,720 --> 00:06:16,000 Speaker 1: officer there during the Thomas Fire, which at the time 97 00:06:16,200 --> 00:06:19,159 Speaker 1: was the largest fire in the history of California. It's 98 00:06:19,200 --> 00:06:21,880 Speaker 1: a strange time of year. It was in December and 99 00:06:21,960 --> 00:06:25,640 Speaker 1: it was followed by a really powerful rainstorm that led 100 00:06:25,680 --> 00:06:28,520 Speaker 1: to the Mona Cito mud slides. And as I was 101 00:06:28,720 --> 00:06:32,520 Speaker 1: managing a number of different health risks around the mud slides, 102 00:06:32,600 --> 00:06:34,880 Speaker 1: not just communicable disease, but a host of other things, 103 00:06:35,200 --> 00:06:38,040 Speaker 1: I was in close, close communication with a state health officer, 104 00:06:38,160 --> 00:06:41,279 Speaker 1: Karen Smith, who was my person to call. You know, 105 00:06:41,320 --> 00:06:43,640 Speaker 1: when you're a local health officer and you need backup, 106 00:06:43,640 --> 00:06:46,240 Speaker 1: you need a thought partner, you call the state. So 107 00:06:46,320 --> 00:06:48,200 Speaker 1: Karen and I spent a lot of time on the phone, 108 00:06:49,080 --> 00:06:52,000 Speaker 1: and shortly after that, she called me one day and said, 109 00:06:52,560 --> 00:06:55,200 Speaker 1: what would you think about moving up to Sacramento to 110 00:06:55,279 --> 00:07:00,719 Speaker 1: be my number two? And I said yes, and uh, 111 00:07:00,760 --> 00:07:04,720 Speaker 1: that's how the adventure started. And I had always I 112 00:07:04,920 --> 00:07:07,680 Speaker 1: thought that that's where I wanted to end up, was 113 00:07:07,760 --> 00:07:10,120 Speaker 1: being state health officer, because I thought I could have, 114 00:07:10,200 --> 00:07:12,960 Speaker 1: you know, an incredible amount of impact there at that level. 115 00:07:13,560 --> 00:07:16,520 Speaker 1: But California has forty million people, and California is really 116 00:07:16,520 --> 00:07:20,640 Speaker 1: like its own nation. It's so diverse. So it made 117 00:07:20,640 --> 00:07:25,640 Speaker 1: me nervous moving from making risk based differential diagnoses on 118 00:07:25,720 --> 00:07:29,640 Speaker 1: behalf of four people at the county to doing that 119 00:07:29,720 --> 00:07:32,160 Speaker 1: at the state on behalf of forty million people. So 120 00:07:32,200 --> 00:07:35,280 Speaker 1: it's a different comfort level, right, stakes are higher, stakes 121 00:07:35,320 --> 00:07:39,160 Speaker 1: are higher, and mistakes are are more costly. And but 122 00:07:39,280 --> 00:07:42,760 Speaker 1: the same problem. If you succeed, nobody knows. It's always 123 00:07:42,760 --> 00:07:46,360 Speaker 1: the challenge of public health because we succeed and then 124 00:07:46,360 --> 00:07:48,720 Speaker 1: it's silent and you can't see that succeed in the 125 00:07:48,800 --> 00:07:52,160 Speaker 1: data and statistics if you're not tracking outcomes. And traditionally 126 00:07:52,200 --> 00:07:55,640 Speaker 1: public health disease control does not have a good way 127 00:07:55,680 --> 00:08:00,000 Speaker 1: to show return on investment other than nothing bad has happened. 128 00:08:00,360 --> 00:08:03,080 Speaker 1: Money must be well spent. But that's it's hard to 129 00:08:03,120 --> 00:08:06,040 Speaker 1: prove a negative, isn't isn't it? It is hard. We 130 00:08:06,080 --> 00:08:07,880 Speaker 1: can get to that later because I'll tell you why 131 00:08:07,960 --> 00:08:10,960 Speaker 1: I'm so passionate about the private sector need for this 132 00:08:11,680 --> 00:08:15,920 Speaker 1: and the mandate to show return on investment. So before 133 00:08:15,920 --> 00:08:18,040 Speaker 1: we get to the private sector, and I have lots 134 00:08:18,040 --> 00:08:21,840 Speaker 1: of questions for you about that. You were also the 135 00:08:21,920 --> 00:08:25,840 Speaker 1: co chair of the California Testing Task Force for COVID 136 00:08:25,960 --> 00:08:29,760 Speaker 1: nineteen and you ramp that up to over a hundred 137 00:08:29,760 --> 00:08:33,280 Speaker 1: thousand tests a day in a very short period of time. 138 00:08:33,760 --> 00:08:38,439 Speaker 1: Tell us about that. That sounds like a giant logistical undertaking. 139 00:08:38,559 --> 00:08:42,000 Speaker 1: It was. It was the greatest experience in rapid project 140 00:08:42,080 --> 00:08:44,800 Speaker 1: management I've ever had. And I would be remiss if 141 00:08:44,800 --> 00:08:48,720 Speaker 1: I didn't mention my amazing co lead, which is Paul Markovitch. 142 00:08:48,880 --> 00:08:52,320 Speaker 1: He's the CEO and president of Lucille, California. And what 143 00:08:52,480 --> 00:08:56,040 Speaker 1: happened is there was no testing in California or anywhere else. 144 00:08:56,840 --> 00:08:59,200 Speaker 1: The state was only able to do about two thousand 145 00:08:59,320 --> 00:09:03,360 Speaker 1: PCR today. And the backstory, as you know, is the 146 00:09:03,400 --> 00:09:06,120 Speaker 1: CDC and f d A had said nobody could test. 147 00:09:06,600 --> 00:09:09,560 Speaker 1: Wait for the CDCs test, so we waited. They rolled 148 00:09:09,600 --> 00:09:11,720 Speaker 1: it out, it didn't work. They said, wait, we'll fix it, 149 00:09:11,960 --> 00:09:14,439 Speaker 1: So we waited. They rolled it out again, it didn't work, 150 00:09:15,000 --> 00:09:18,680 Speaker 1: and so the United States missed that critical two month 151 00:09:18,720 --> 00:09:22,640 Speaker 1: window of containment. Without testing, there's no way you can 152 00:09:22,640 --> 00:09:25,559 Speaker 1: contain a threat because you can't find it. So by 153 00:09:25,600 --> 00:09:28,280 Speaker 1: the time they opened the floodgates that any microbiology lab 154 00:09:28,320 --> 00:09:31,839 Speaker 1: could test, the problem was that the labs weren't doing it, 155 00:09:32,440 --> 00:09:35,400 Speaker 1: and we had supply chain issues where everyone needed the 156 00:09:35,440 --> 00:09:39,040 Speaker 1: same testing supplies, and so we were asked, Paul and 157 00:09:39,120 --> 00:09:41,960 Speaker 1: I were asked to found and stand up the Testing 158 00:09:42,000 --> 00:09:45,480 Speaker 1: Task Force to fix testing for California and tell us 159 00:09:45,520 --> 00:09:49,280 Speaker 1: what you did, because California, at least in the beginning 160 00:09:49,320 --> 00:09:52,160 Speaker 1: of the crisis, seemed to have done a much better 161 00:09:52,240 --> 00:09:55,440 Speaker 1: job than a lot of other states, especially when you 162 00:09:55,480 --> 00:09:59,520 Speaker 1: consider the outbreak was in Washington, not that far away 163 00:09:59,559 --> 00:10:02,120 Speaker 1: from Cali. For it from Seattle, Washington. Yeah, well, I 164 00:10:02,120 --> 00:10:06,360 Speaker 1: would say the outbreaks were invisible. Communities in California were 165 00:10:06,400 --> 00:10:09,480 Speaker 1: burning up with COVID. It's just math and microbiology. I 166 00:10:09,520 --> 00:10:11,480 Speaker 1: was whiteboarding it out, you know, at home on my 167 00:10:11,480 --> 00:10:13,880 Speaker 1: white board. I knew exactly how many cases I thought 168 00:10:13,880 --> 00:10:17,120 Speaker 1: there were. The problem is we couldn't detect community spread 169 00:10:17,120 --> 00:10:21,200 Speaker 1: without testing, and so Paul and I put together a plan. Essentially, 170 00:10:21,240 --> 00:10:24,640 Speaker 1: I'd break it down in terms of supply and demand. Uh, 171 00:10:24,679 --> 00:10:27,440 Speaker 1: we were doing two thousand tests today. Our objective was 172 00:10:27,480 --> 00:10:29,439 Speaker 1: to get to a hundred thousand tests today. We ended 173 00:10:29,520 --> 00:10:31,400 Speaker 1: up blowing through that. We got to about a hundred 174 00:10:31,440 --> 00:10:34,439 Speaker 1: and forty thousand test today, much sooner than we thought 175 00:10:34,559 --> 00:10:38,199 Speaker 1: we would. And so the supply part is you need 176 00:10:38,240 --> 00:10:40,840 Speaker 1: to actually have the testing, you need to have testing 177 00:10:40,880 --> 00:10:44,000 Speaker 1: locations throughout the state. And the demand part is you 178 00:10:44,040 --> 00:10:47,800 Speaker 1: need people to show up and get tested, and so 179 00:10:47,920 --> 00:10:50,960 Speaker 1: we broke it down into project management. We had task 180 00:10:51,000 --> 00:10:54,640 Speaker 1: forces and work streams, and we had daily stand up 181 00:10:54,679 --> 00:10:57,480 Speaker 1: meetings twice a day. Was eighteen hours a day sprint, 182 00:10:57,559 --> 00:11:00,120 Speaker 1: you know, for about twelve weeks, and the way that 183 00:11:00,160 --> 00:11:03,720 Speaker 1: we managed it was just getting really tactical and operational. 184 00:11:04,320 --> 00:11:07,800 Speaker 1: Um At one point, I rewrote California's guidance for who 185 00:11:07,880 --> 00:11:10,959 Speaker 1: could be tested on a Friday night and we published 186 00:11:10,960 --> 00:11:13,680 Speaker 1: it on the website on a Sunday night, and it 187 00:11:13,760 --> 00:11:16,720 Speaker 1: was far more aggressive than the CDC's guidance. But we 188 00:11:16,800 --> 00:11:18,560 Speaker 1: needed people to show up to get tested, and the 189 00:11:18,600 --> 00:11:22,679 Speaker 1: CDC guidance was so restrictive nobody could get tested. What 190 00:11:22,720 --> 00:11:25,160 Speaker 1: was the CDC guidance? Because you would think, if you're 191 00:11:25,160 --> 00:11:28,840 Speaker 1: trying to stop an epidemic that could spread to anybody 192 00:11:29,120 --> 00:11:32,200 Speaker 1: with a respiratory system, you would want to say, that's 193 00:11:32,240 --> 00:11:36,079 Speaker 1: our our guideline. If you breathe there, you're eligible for testing. 194 00:11:37,040 --> 00:11:38,960 Speaker 1: That's that's right, That's what it should have been. The 195 00:11:38,960 --> 00:11:42,079 Speaker 1: CDC's guidance was very restrictive at that time. You had 196 00:11:42,120 --> 00:11:44,800 Speaker 1: to have symptoms, you had to be in certain risk 197 00:11:44,880 --> 00:11:49,440 Speaker 1: categories exactly and so so you know, from a practical 198 00:11:49,480 --> 00:11:53,160 Speaker 1: public health standpoint, the CDC's guidance was literally counter productive 199 00:11:53,559 --> 00:11:56,840 Speaker 1: to public health. And so looking at what we need 200 00:11:56,880 --> 00:11:59,960 Speaker 1: to do, we have to test essential workers. Obviously they're 201 00:12:00,000 --> 00:12:02,200 Speaker 1: on the front lines, and so putting it in buckets 202 00:12:02,200 --> 00:12:06,120 Speaker 1: that made more practical sense. Yeah, prioritizing them is really 203 00:12:06,120 --> 00:12:08,800 Speaker 1: what drove people into the testing centers. And so in 204 00:12:08,800 --> 00:12:11,640 Speaker 1: in parallel to that, we set up over the course 205 00:12:11,679 --> 00:12:15,000 Speaker 1: of two weeks, we stood up eighty testing centers across 206 00:12:15,000 --> 00:12:18,480 Speaker 1: the state of California, which is a big state, and 207 00:12:18,520 --> 00:12:21,520 Speaker 1: then of course revised the guidance for folks to get tested, 208 00:12:21,640 --> 00:12:24,240 Speaker 1: you know, started driving in people to those locations, and 209 00:12:24,280 --> 00:12:27,160 Speaker 1: so that's how we scaled it up quickly. Yeah, I 210 00:12:27,200 --> 00:12:29,440 Speaker 1: was kind of shocked in the early days of testing 211 00:12:30,000 --> 00:12:32,680 Speaker 1: that if you're an NBA player you can get tested, 212 00:12:33,000 --> 00:12:37,360 Speaker 1: but if you were a grocery worker deliveries into people's houses, 213 00:12:37,679 --> 00:12:40,680 Speaker 1: that's right, if you were literally going from place to 214 00:12:40,720 --> 00:12:43,920 Speaker 1: place as a supercarrier, you couldn't get tested. It made 215 00:12:43,920 --> 00:12:46,760 Speaker 1: no sense early days, that's right. It was bonkers, and 216 00:12:47,040 --> 00:12:49,760 Speaker 1: that's why the United States failed at containment. You know, 217 00:12:50,440 --> 00:12:54,040 Speaker 1: once you once you lose your chance to contain the threat. 218 00:12:54,480 --> 00:12:57,520 Speaker 1: Then you get to choose between something horrible and something 219 00:12:57,520 --> 00:13:01,800 Speaker 1: even more horrible, and that choyce of you know, massive 220 00:13:01,840 --> 00:13:05,319 Speaker 1: outbreaks everywhere and bad health outcomes and the economy. I 221 00:13:05,640 --> 00:13:08,760 Speaker 1: believe it's a false choice. If you put all your 222 00:13:08,880 --> 00:13:12,040 Speaker 1: energy at containing the threat in the beginning, and without 223 00:13:12,160 --> 00:13:16,880 Speaker 1: testing and without an operational infrastructure to contain COVID, the 224 00:13:16,960 --> 00:13:20,360 Speaker 1: US had no shot. There was no effort to contain 225 00:13:20,400 --> 00:13:22,640 Speaker 1: the pathogen in the beginning, which is why we're in 226 00:13:22,640 --> 00:13:25,560 Speaker 1: the circumstance we are. Now, let's talk a little bit 227 00:13:25,600 --> 00:13:28,800 Speaker 1: about where we are today. You've seen the best and 228 00:13:28,880 --> 00:13:32,760 Speaker 1: worst parts of the nation's medical system. What's your takeaway 229 00:13:32,920 --> 00:13:36,520 Speaker 1: about how well we did, how well should we have done? 230 00:13:36,720 --> 00:13:41,480 Speaker 1: And where did we go wrong? Sure, I would start 231 00:13:41,480 --> 00:13:48,280 Speaker 1: off by saying the COVID nineteen containment effort did not happen. 232 00:13:48,880 --> 00:13:51,520 Speaker 1: So that was a massive failure. But it didn't happen 233 00:13:51,600 --> 00:13:55,040 Speaker 1: because the United States of America does not have a 234 00:13:55,240 --> 00:14:00,240 Speaker 1: system's capability to contain a fast moving, novel pathogen that 235 00:14:00,320 --> 00:14:04,640 Speaker 1: emerges simultaneously at multiple locations in the US. Isn't that 236 00:14:04,720 --> 00:14:07,719 Speaker 1: in the modern world? How? I mean, we've seen a 237 00:14:07,800 --> 00:14:13,199 Speaker 1: Bola in Africa where it's restricted, but there's no NASS 238 00:14:13,200 --> 00:14:16,920 Speaker 1: transit aircraft. People hopping on a plane in one continent 239 00:14:17,000 --> 00:14:19,680 Speaker 1: and eight hours later on a different continent. That's a 240 00:14:19,920 --> 00:14:27,080 Speaker 1: very different world and economy. But in a modern interconnected economy, 241 00:14:27,160 --> 00:14:29,680 Speaker 1: isn't that how things are gonna pop up? There's going 242 00:14:29,720 --> 00:14:33,480 Speaker 1: to be the first super spreader can seede a million 243 00:14:33,520 --> 00:14:36,680 Speaker 1: people pretty quickly. Yeah, you're exactly right. You know, my 244 00:14:36,880 --> 00:14:39,760 Speaker 1: master's degree is in tropical medicine, which really is an 245 00:14:39,800 --> 00:14:44,240 Speaker 1: antiquated term. The diseases that we formerly thought were tropical, now, 246 00:14:44,480 --> 00:14:48,840 Speaker 1: thanks to globalization and and to some degree global warming, 247 00:14:49,600 --> 00:14:52,520 Speaker 1: can move much faster. And so what we're seeing is 248 00:14:52,560 --> 00:14:57,800 Speaker 1: that the pandemic pathogen spread has sped up, the risk 249 00:14:57,920 --> 00:15:01,240 Speaker 1: is higher, and those events are happen more and more frequently. 250 00:15:01,560 --> 00:15:03,560 Speaker 1: All right, So now we know we didn't do a 251 00:15:03,640 --> 00:15:07,880 Speaker 1: great job with containment. We did no job with containment. Um, 252 00:15:07,920 --> 00:15:10,520 Speaker 1: what about creating the vaccines? We seem to have done 253 00:15:10,520 --> 00:15:13,040 Speaker 1: a pretty good job with that. We did. The vaccines 254 00:15:13,080 --> 00:15:16,000 Speaker 1: were a shining success. You know, I think what Operation 255 00:15:16,120 --> 00:15:19,520 Speaker 1: Warp speed accomplished and full disclosure. Um, those guys are 256 00:15:19,520 --> 00:15:23,880 Speaker 1: my friends, Uh, they're Wolverines. And so you know from 257 00:15:23,880 --> 00:15:27,400 Speaker 1: the book from the Bush administration, the group who essentially 258 00:15:27,400 --> 00:15:30,600 Speaker 1: created the pandemic response, someone else in the White House 259 00:15:30,680 --> 00:15:33,720 Speaker 1: named them the Wolverines. I don't remember why. I think 260 00:15:33,720 --> 00:15:37,240 Speaker 1: there's some It was after a silly nineteen eighties movie 261 00:15:37,240 --> 00:15:42,120 Speaker 1: with Patrick Swayze called Red Dawn. Yeah, yeah, so I 262 00:15:42,200 --> 00:15:45,000 Speaker 1: think it was Richard Hatchett that nicknamed them the Wolverines 263 00:15:45,040 --> 00:15:46,880 Speaker 1: after this Red Dawn movie, and that was the name 264 00:15:46,880 --> 00:15:49,480 Speaker 1: of our email chain. But listen, even if they're not 265 00:15:49,560 --> 00:15:53,800 Speaker 1: your friends, even the most anti Trump hater in the 266 00:15:53,800 --> 00:15:57,520 Speaker 1: world has to admit that was the most successful thing 267 00:15:57,760 --> 00:16:01,840 Speaker 1: of the entire administration of vaccine was not only was 268 00:16:01,880 --> 00:16:05,040 Speaker 1: it created, it was safe, it was effective, and they 269 00:16:05,080 --> 00:16:07,600 Speaker 1: made sure that there would be sufficient doses at least 270 00:16:08,960 --> 00:16:11,080 Speaker 1: three quarters of the way. Make sure they were a 271 00:16:11,120 --> 00:16:13,880 Speaker 1: ton of doses in the you know, early days of 272 00:16:13,880 --> 00:16:17,680 Speaker 1: the vaccination process. That's right, Operation warp speed. To develop 273 00:16:17,720 --> 00:16:20,480 Speaker 1: a vaccine as fast as they did is a shining 274 00:16:20,560 --> 00:16:23,600 Speaker 1: success and there are many lessons learned from that where 275 00:16:23,680 --> 00:16:26,680 Speaker 1: we can get even better and faster. I think the 276 00:16:26,680 --> 00:16:30,960 Speaker 1: other success is the private sector. What we saw during 277 00:16:31,040 --> 00:16:33,520 Speaker 1: COVID and what I certainly saw a leading California in 278 00:16:33,560 --> 00:16:36,280 Speaker 1: the testing task force is the private sector ran to 279 00:16:36,360 --> 00:16:39,800 Speaker 1: the fight. They said, our resources are at your fingertips. 280 00:16:39,800 --> 00:16:41,960 Speaker 1: How can we help you. You know, you look at 281 00:16:42,000 --> 00:16:45,080 Speaker 1: different companies, whether it's you know, the pharmaceutical companies that 282 00:16:45,160 --> 00:16:48,520 Speaker 1: developed the vaccine or the testing companies that quickly developed 283 00:16:48,600 --> 00:16:53,200 Speaker 1: rapid tests. The private sector played an incredible role. I 284 00:16:53,200 --> 00:16:57,040 Speaker 1: think what's frustrating to me, you know, when I was 285 00:16:57,080 --> 00:17:00,680 Speaker 1: in government was that there was really a struggle to 286 00:17:00,880 --> 00:17:03,800 Speaker 1: leverage the private sector in the response. Meaning up to 287 00:17:03,880 --> 00:17:07,959 Speaker 1: this point, the response for public health was seen as 288 00:17:08,040 --> 00:17:12,679 Speaker 1: government's role alone. That didn't work. It has to be 289 00:17:12,720 --> 00:17:15,280 Speaker 1: a whole of society response. We have to have a 290 00:17:15,280 --> 00:17:19,720 Speaker 1: place for individual citizen volunteers, for the private sectors that 291 00:17:19,760 --> 00:17:23,080 Speaker 1: the whole society responds together instead of government trying to 292 00:17:23,119 --> 00:17:25,320 Speaker 1: peace mill it on their own. So let's stick with 293 00:17:25,359 --> 00:17:30,639 Speaker 1: the vaccinations. The numbers we're going up enormously in different 294 00:17:30,640 --> 00:17:34,160 Speaker 1: parts of the country, and then everything seems to have plateaued. 295 00:17:34,240 --> 00:17:36,800 Speaker 1: We we were going three million a day, two million 296 00:17:36,840 --> 00:17:40,760 Speaker 1: a day. We seem to be getting close to national 297 00:17:40,800 --> 00:17:43,000 Speaker 1: herd immunity. But when you break it down on a 298 00:17:43,040 --> 00:17:47,560 Speaker 1: state and county basis there are that whole supercluster between 299 00:17:47,600 --> 00:17:52,680 Speaker 1: Georgia and Texas. Is you know, vaccination rates you look 300 00:17:52,720 --> 00:17:54,919 Speaker 1: at the Northeast, you look at parts of the West, 301 00:17:55,440 --> 00:17:59,960 Speaker 1: and and the industrial Midwest are running well over fifty 302 00:18:00,000 --> 00:18:04,919 Speaker 1: percent in some places. Um, how do you evaluate the 303 00:18:05,000 --> 00:18:09,080 Speaker 1: state of our our vaccinated nation or not? You know, 304 00:18:09,080 --> 00:18:13,520 Speaker 1: it's a shame that vaccinations have become so politicized because 305 00:18:13,560 --> 00:18:17,200 Speaker 1: it's really just science. It's microbiology and math. The equation 306 00:18:17,240 --> 00:18:20,159 Speaker 1: for her immunity is one minus one over are not, 307 00:18:21,160 --> 00:18:25,000 Speaker 1: and that are not is how many people will one 308 00:18:25,160 --> 00:18:28,800 Speaker 1: contagious person infect? So there are not of the original 309 00:18:28,840 --> 00:18:31,840 Speaker 1: covid virus was somewhere between two point five and three 310 00:18:32,560 --> 00:18:35,600 Speaker 1: that are not. Of the delta variant is somewhere between 311 00:18:35,680 --> 00:18:39,680 Speaker 1: five and eight. That means one contagious person infects five 312 00:18:39,760 --> 00:18:42,239 Speaker 1: or eight other people. So if the equation for her 313 00:18:42,280 --> 00:18:44,320 Speaker 1: immunity is one minus one of her are not, what 314 00:18:44,359 --> 00:18:48,520 Speaker 1: that means exponential? That's right. It means we actually now 315 00:18:48,560 --> 00:18:51,960 Speaker 1: need a higher percentage of people who are immune in 316 00:18:52,080 --> 00:18:54,760 Speaker 1: order to stop the spread of the delta variant. So 317 00:18:54,840 --> 00:18:59,879 Speaker 1: how big a threat are these reluctant vaxers or anti 318 00:19:00,080 --> 00:19:04,840 Speaker 1: vaxers in that you know, Texas to Georgia, it's about 319 00:19:05,280 --> 00:19:08,560 Speaker 1: eights to parts of eight states. Um, that really seemed 320 00:19:08,560 --> 00:19:10,600 Speaker 1: to be when you look at a map of the country, 321 00:19:10,640 --> 00:19:15,199 Speaker 1: that's the reddest both politically ends in terms of the 322 00:19:15,280 --> 00:19:19,000 Speaker 1: lowest vaccination rate. Not a coincidence, but will hold that 323 00:19:19,160 --> 00:19:23,560 Speaker 1: argument aside till later. How dangerous are these groups of 324 00:19:23,720 --> 00:19:28,960 Speaker 1: unvaccinated people to themselves, to their friends and family, and 325 00:19:29,040 --> 00:19:31,639 Speaker 1: to the rest of the country. Well, I think you know. 326 00:19:31,640 --> 00:19:36,119 Speaker 1: And I get asked this question a lot around vaccine hesitancy, 327 00:19:36,200 --> 00:19:39,200 Speaker 1: and it's one of the oldest issues in public health, 328 00:19:39,240 --> 00:19:42,920 Speaker 1: and actually because back to Jacobson v. Massachusetts in nineteen 329 00:19:43,000 --> 00:19:46,640 Speaker 1: o five, the right of the individual to decline vaccination 330 00:19:47,080 --> 00:19:49,600 Speaker 1: versus the protection of the herd, the good of the whole. 331 00:19:50,280 --> 00:19:52,720 Speaker 1: And we've dealt with this a lot in California, and 332 00:19:52,840 --> 00:19:56,199 Speaker 1: I really understand vaccine hesitancy. And what I've told my 333 00:19:56,320 --> 00:19:58,760 Speaker 1: friends and family who are hesitant to get the vaccine 334 00:19:58,840 --> 00:20:02,920 Speaker 1: is stay down to my house. No, you don't just 335 00:20:02,960 --> 00:20:06,600 Speaker 1: get vaccinated to protect yourself. You get vaccinated for the 336 00:20:06,640 --> 00:20:09,280 Speaker 1: people that you love and the people that they love, 337 00:20:09,440 --> 00:20:13,000 Speaker 1: and the people that they love. Because the situation. The 338 00:20:13,040 --> 00:20:15,959 Speaker 1: reality is this, people have two choices. They can get 339 00:20:16,080 --> 00:20:19,680 Speaker 1: vaccinated or they can get COVID with adulta variant that 340 00:20:19,720 --> 00:20:21,560 Speaker 1: has an are not a five to eight. Those are 341 00:20:21,600 --> 00:20:24,879 Speaker 1: their two choices. You get vaccinated and protected, or you 342 00:20:24,920 --> 00:20:28,640 Speaker 1: are going to get COVID because this is spreading so rapidly. 343 00:20:29,680 --> 00:20:33,520 Speaker 1: M that's quite horrifying. So what do you do with 344 00:20:33,560 --> 00:20:36,520 Speaker 1: a person who basically says this whole thing is a hoax. 345 00:20:37,000 --> 00:20:40,160 Speaker 1: Six thousand Americans didn't die, it's just like the flu. 346 00:20:40,320 --> 00:20:42,200 Speaker 1: The President said that it will be gone like that. 347 00:20:42,680 --> 00:20:47,080 Speaker 1: How do you respond to somebody who's been propagandized to 348 00:20:47,240 --> 00:20:51,359 Speaker 1: that level. Yeah, I think it's a real challenge where 349 00:20:51,400 --> 00:20:56,919 Speaker 1: politics and misinformation has, unfortunately um found its way into 350 00:20:57,119 --> 00:21:00,840 Speaker 1: science messaging the way. You know, I struggle with it 351 00:21:00,880 --> 00:21:03,560 Speaker 1: when I have those conversations with people. What we know 352 00:21:03,960 --> 00:21:07,920 Speaker 1: from public health vaccine efforts in the past is that 353 00:21:07,960 --> 00:21:11,840 Speaker 1: coming down with a hammer doesn't work. UM. It tends 354 00:21:11,920 --> 00:21:18,600 Speaker 1: to uh, unless you're more literal than with an actual hammer. 355 00:21:18,920 --> 00:21:21,320 Speaker 1: Coming out with the metaphorical hammer, yeah, it doesn't work. 356 00:21:21,680 --> 00:21:25,080 Speaker 1: I think the caret works better, which is explaining to 357 00:21:25,200 --> 00:21:30,040 Speaker 1: people that protect Grandma, that's right, protect Grandma. That's worked 358 00:21:30,040 --> 00:21:32,800 Speaker 1: incredibly well in Mexico, which is a different set of 359 00:21:32,840 --> 00:21:36,880 Speaker 1: cultural values than we have where the message of protect 360 00:21:36,880 --> 00:21:40,560 Speaker 1: grandma really really works in the United States. What we 361 00:21:40,640 --> 00:21:44,199 Speaker 1: know works more is protect the vulnerable children around you, 362 00:21:44,400 --> 00:21:47,800 Speaker 1: protect the vulnerable people around you. So I don't know. 363 00:21:48,240 --> 00:21:50,159 Speaker 1: I mean, it's a hard conversation with people that are 364 00:21:50,240 --> 00:21:55,119 Speaker 1: vaccine hesitant today, but they need to understand that delta 365 00:21:55,200 --> 00:21:58,879 Speaker 1: variant is spreading so quickly, and it's just the variant 366 00:21:58,920 --> 00:22:01,360 Speaker 1: of the day. There will be a aditional variants that emerged. 367 00:22:01,400 --> 00:22:03,960 Speaker 1: It's only the fourth letter. There's more common exactly. You 368 00:22:04,000 --> 00:22:07,840 Speaker 1: know this, Uh. I trust the behavior of this virus 369 00:22:07,880 --> 00:22:10,719 Speaker 1: far more than I trust the predictive behavior of people. 370 00:22:11,080 --> 00:22:15,080 Speaker 1: Why pathogens do exactly what we know they'll do. I 371 00:22:15,160 --> 00:22:18,960 Speaker 1: love studying pathage, I love outbreaks, I love winning competition. 372 00:22:19,119 --> 00:22:22,040 Speaker 1: And they're going to get better and better at infecting 373 00:22:22,080 --> 00:22:24,840 Speaker 1: their hosts because if they don't do that, there's a 374 00:22:24,880 --> 00:22:28,280 Speaker 1: reason the delta variant is dominant. It's pushed aside the 375 00:22:28,320 --> 00:22:31,800 Speaker 1: previous variants. That's right. The virus is going to mutate 376 00:22:31,960 --> 00:22:34,400 Speaker 1: and it's going to spread, and it's going to mutate 377 00:22:34,480 --> 00:22:37,119 Speaker 1: to spread. So of course we see a strain of 378 00:22:37,119 --> 00:22:39,879 Speaker 1: the virus that spreads easier. It won't be the last strain. 379 00:22:39,920 --> 00:22:42,120 Speaker 1: There will there will be more. It will continue to mutate. 380 00:22:42,840 --> 00:22:45,960 Speaker 1: That's quite amazing. And what about the chip that Bill 381 00:22:46,000 --> 00:22:49,480 Speaker 1: Gates is putting in the vaccine to track me and 382 00:22:49,640 --> 00:22:53,840 Speaker 1: my iPhone? Which I always find hilarious. They're concerned about 383 00:22:53,840 --> 00:22:58,000 Speaker 1: being tracked, but this literally tracks everywhere you've been. How 384 00:22:58,040 --> 00:22:59,879 Speaker 1: do you respond to that sort of stuff? You know, 385 00:23:00,040 --> 00:23:02,080 Speaker 1: my my fourteen year old and twelve year old. Every 386 00:23:02,119 --> 00:23:04,240 Speaker 1: now and then we'll we'll send me some videos that 387 00:23:04,240 --> 00:23:08,080 Speaker 1: they see circulating online that have conspiracy theories, and I 388 00:23:08,160 --> 00:23:11,920 Speaker 1: watch them because I want to understand why people are 389 00:23:11,960 --> 00:23:14,560 Speaker 1: scared and hesitant, and I think it's important not to 390 00:23:14,680 --> 00:23:19,320 Speaker 1: discount their fears. At this point in the pandemic, people 391 00:23:19,400 --> 00:23:22,760 Speaker 1: don't know who to trust, and instead of discounting them, 392 00:23:22,920 --> 00:23:27,000 Speaker 1: the more interesting conversation to me is how might we, 393 00:23:27,400 --> 00:23:31,920 Speaker 1: as one united country build the kind of system solution 394 00:23:32,000 --> 00:23:35,920 Speaker 1: and leadership that a whole of society would trust, even 395 00:23:35,960 --> 00:23:38,800 Speaker 1: if they have different political beliefs, you know, red and blue, 396 00:23:38,840 --> 00:23:41,280 Speaker 1: extreme sides of the aisle. So I think it's really 397 00:23:41,520 --> 00:23:46,960 Speaker 1: a systems failure of government institutions in this pandemic response, 398 00:23:47,400 --> 00:23:51,120 Speaker 1: that we're at the point where people are so politicized 399 00:23:51,280 --> 00:23:54,160 Speaker 1: that getting a vaccine or not, which is just pure science, 400 00:23:54,840 --> 00:23:57,840 Speaker 1: is now made out to be full of conspiracy theories. Right. 401 00:23:58,000 --> 00:24:01,160 Speaker 1: I saw a hilarious cartoon this weekend. If we would 402 00:24:01,200 --> 00:24:04,320 Speaker 1: have had Fox News in the fifties, Um, we'd still 403 00:24:04,320 --> 00:24:07,920 Speaker 1: be fighting polio, which is kind of kind of amusing. Um, 404 00:24:08,040 --> 00:24:11,600 Speaker 1: let's move past vaccine hesitancy and talk a little bit 405 00:24:11,640 --> 00:24:16,320 Speaker 1: about where we are today about whatever the next pandemic 406 00:24:16,400 --> 00:24:19,440 Speaker 1: is going to be. Are we better equipped now than 407 00:24:19,520 --> 00:24:24,560 Speaker 1: we were in to fight an upcoming pandemic or do 408 00:24:24,600 --> 00:24:28,480 Speaker 1: we still have the same systemic problems that were revealed 409 00:24:28,680 --> 00:24:32,680 Speaker 1: last year? We still have the same systemic problems. Look, 410 00:24:33,600 --> 00:24:37,439 Speaker 1: the United States and companies and government have essentially duct 411 00:24:37,440 --> 00:24:42,959 Speaker 1: taped together a response to COVID with individual vigilance and 412 00:24:43,040 --> 00:24:48,080 Speaker 1: individual heroic efforts, but neither of those are an effective 413 00:24:48,080 --> 00:24:51,080 Speaker 1: strategy in the long term for managing what we now 414 00:24:51,119 --> 00:24:54,719 Speaker 1: know as an existential risk to the U S economy. 415 00:24:54,800 --> 00:24:58,280 Speaker 1: And so if if a different pathogen threat were to 416 00:24:58,359 --> 00:25:01,440 Speaker 1: occur today, we are no better are prepared. And that's 417 00:25:01,440 --> 00:25:05,440 Speaker 1: what I'm really focused on again, not just for private sector, 418 00:25:05,480 --> 00:25:08,679 Speaker 1: for government, but as a whole of society response. What 419 00:25:08,880 --> 00:25:12,199 Speaker 1: are the systems solutions for the country to contain a 420 00:25:12,240 --> 00:25:17,680 Speaker 1: fast moving, novel pathogen that occurs simultaneously across the US, 421 00:25:17,840 --> 00:25:20,440 Speaker 1: and and so what can we do? What should we 422 00:25:20,520 --> 00:25:24,200 Speaker 1: be doing? Well, there's a number of approaches UM. They 423 00:25:24,320 --> 00:25:29,240 Speaker 1: certainly include UM intelligence, leveraging everything. All the technology that 424 00:25:29,280 --> 00:25:32,679 Speaker 1: we have in Silicon Valley has not hit the public 425 00:25:32,680 --> 00:25:37,240 Speaker 1: health system, and in disease control, largely the decisions and 426 00:25:37,240 --> 00:25:41,240 Speaker 1: the operations are done manually or by individuals. I was 427 00:25:41,280 --> 00:25:45,359 Speaker 1: the individual doing that, and so there's an incredible opportunity 428 00:25:45,560 --> 00:25:50,080 Speaker 1: with Silicon Valley innovative technology to apply it to disease control. 429 00:25:50,960 --> 00:25:54,320 Speaker 1: There's also the operational aspect of it, meaning looking at 430 00:25:54,520 --> 00:25:58,720 Speaker 1: local public health health departments. They are the frontline generals. 431 00:25:58,720 --> 00:26:01,040 Speaker 1: They're on the ground. You know, my job, is Michael 432 00:26:01,040 --> 00:26:03,480 Speaker 1: describes in the book, was to control disease by all 433 00:26:03,560 --> 00:26:07,800 Speaker 1: means necessary. So operationally as a country, I really think 434 00:26:07,800 --> 00:26:11,800 Speaker 1: it's important that we rethink who's doing the frontline operations, 435 00:26:11,840 --> 00:26:14,520 Speaker 1: do they have enough resources, and do we have a 436 00:26:14,560 --> 00:26:18,480 Speaker 1: way to quickly get centralized intelligence out to all those people? 437 00:26:19,119 --> 00:26:21,640 Speaker 1: Right now, the way they share information is fax machines 438 00:26:21,680 --> 00:26:25,080 Speaker 1: and emails and phone calls, and that cannot move as 439 00:26:25,119 --> 00:26:28,160 Speaker 1: fast as the pathogen. Well, I guess you can fight 440 00:26:28,800 --> 00:26:33,560 Speaker 1: pandemics in the century with late twenty century technologies. That's right. 441 00:26:33,560 --> 00:26:36,080 Speaker 1: The pathogens are moving faster, and so we have to 442 00:26:36,119 --> 00:26:39,560 Speaker 1: develop systems that can move even faster than the pathogens. 443 00:26:39,920 --> 00:26:42,320 Speaker 1: And you know what I was inspired by was watching 444 00:26:42,359 --> 00:26:46,600 Speaker 1: Twitter and how fast rumors can spread on Twitter. Uh 445 00:26:46,640 --> 00:26:49,399 Speaker 1: in January, That's where I was going to look for 446 00:26:49,440 --> 00:26:53,480 Speaker 1: intelligence from. Yeah, I was watching you know, video feeds 447 00:26:53,480 --> 00:26:57,680 Speaker 1: and information on social media, and I realized Twitter moves 448 00:26:57,720 --> 00:27:01,439 Speaker 1: faster than the actual virus moves. Things go viral on 449 00:27:01,480 --> 00:27:04,959 Speaker 1: Twitter faster than the virus goes viral. I'm gonna confirm 450 00:27:05,000 --> 00:27:07,800 Speaker 1: what you said because I have a vivid recollection of 451 00:27:08,440 --> 00:27:11,800 Speaker 1: when Osama bin Laden was killed by the U S 452 00:27:11,800 --> 00:27:16,000 Speaker 1: Special Forces. That first was revealed to the public by 453 00:27:16,160 --> 00:27:20,959 Speaker 1: some local who was describing what was happening on go 454 00:27:21,040 --> 00:27:24,560 Speaker 1: back and recall that was the first confirmation about helicopters, 455 00:27:24,560 --> 00:27:27,880 Speaker 1: about the soul going on. And then subsequently we we 456 00:27:28,440 --> 00:27:31,320 Speaker 1: you know, everybody else put the pieces together. But yeah, 457 00:27:31,320 --> 00:27:34,119 Speaker 1: the speed of Twitter Twitter is the new when they 458 00:27:34,240 --> 00:27:36,280 Speaker 1: used to talk about in the stock market the tape. 459 00:27:36,680 --> 00:27:40,640 Speaker 1: Twitter's new tape across is Twitter before crosses anything else. Yeah, 460 00:27:40,920 --> 00:27:45,399 Speaker 1: you know, and even though it's oftentimes spreading misinformation, especially 461 00:27:45,400 --> 00:27:48,439 Speaker 1: around things like vaccinations, um and and that's you know, 462 00:27:48,520 --> 00:27:51,560 Speaker 1: something that we really need to address. The truth is 463 00:27:51,760 --> 00:27:55,560 Speaker 1: the speed at which information goes viral on Twitter is 464 00:27:55,600 --> 00:28:00,960 Speaker 1: what gave me hope that Silicon Valley technology can revolutionize 465 00:28:01,000 --> 00:28:04,560 Speaker 1: disease control to move faster than the pathogen, because that 466 00:28:04,640 --> 00:28:07,639 Speaker 1: kind of technology exists. So let's talk a little bit 467 00:28:07,680 --> 00:28:12,440 Speaker 1: about your new venture, the Public Health Company. The mission 468 00:28:12,560 --> 00:28:17,520 Speaker 1: is to protect business and communities from infectious disease. That's 469 00:28:17,640 --> 00:28:21,560 Speaker 1: quite That's quite an aggressive mission, isn't it. Absolutely? And 470 00:28:22,000 --> 00:28:27,480 Speaker 1: what inspired me leading the COVID response with Amazing Humans 471 00:28:27,480 --> 00:28:32,359 Speaker 1: in California was that the private sector was experiencing what 472 00:28:32,560 --> 00:28:35,240 Speaker 1: I had experienced as local health officer and a state 473 00:28:35,280 --> 00:28:37,840 Speaker 1: health officer, and that is, no one's coming to save you. 474 00:28:38,000 --> 00:28:43,240 Speaker 1: When there's a disease outbreak. You have limited intelligence, sketchy 475 00:28:43,280 --> 00:28:46,520 Speaker 1: information from scattered sources, but you have to make an 476 00:28:46,560 --> 00:28:51,160 Speaker 1: operational plan. And not making a decision is a decision. 477 00:28:51,720 --> 00:28:54,120 Speaker 1: In other words, you're damned if you do and damned 478 00:28:54,120 --> 00:28:57,440 Speaker 1: if you don't, and you've got to pick. And I 479 00:28:57,520 --> 00:29:00,680 Speaker 1: was amazed how the private sector business is ran to 480 00:29:00,720 --> 00:29:03,080 Speaker 1: the fight. They wanted to do everything they could to help, 481 00:29:03,080 --> 00:29:06,080 Speaker 1: but they did not have the tools. They didn't have 482 00:29:06,160 --> 00:29:08,520 Speaker 1: a public health department inside of them. Some of them 483 00:29:08,520 --> 00:29:13,680 Speaker 1: had duct taped one together. And we're really left having 484 00:29:13,760 --> 00:29:17,920 Speaker 1: transferred the risk management of infectious disease to local and 485 00:29:18,000 --> 00:29:23,080 Speaker 1: state government who were overwhelmed by the pandemic. And so 486 00:29:24,440 --> 00:29:28,680 Speaker 1: by may or June of I couldn't stand it anymore. 487 00:29:28,760 --> 00:29:31,480 Speaker 1: I knew what needed to happen. I knew that Silicon 488 00:29:31,560 --> 00:29:36,720 Speaker 1: Valley technology could revolutionize infectious disease risk management, and that 489 00:29:36,800 --> 00:29:40,200 Speaker 1: the tools, the way that I thought about risk, and 490 00:29:40,280 --> 00:29:43,400 Speaker 1: the differential diagnosis and the operational plan, all of that 491 00:29:43,840 --> 00:29:46,840 Speaker 1: could be revolutionized by tech. And why weren't we putting 492 00:29:46,880 --> 00:29:50,240 Speaker 1: that into scalable software? And honestly, there was nothing else 493 00:29:50,280 --> 00:29:52,360 Speaker 1: I could do with my life, you know, by by 494 00:29:52,520 --> 00:29:56,320 Speaker 1: July August than to launch that effort. And so really 495 00:29:56,320 --> 00:29:58,920 Speaker 1: our mission at the Public Health Company is we are 496 00:29:58,960 --> 00:30:03,960 Speaker 1: building those solution in technology to democratize access to risk 497 00:30:04,040 --> 00:30:08,720 Speaker 1: management of infectious disease, so that private sector businesses, globally 498 00:30:08,760 --> 00:30:12,360 Speaker 1: distributed enterprises that deal with infectious disease all the time, 499 00:30:12,960 --> 00:30:15,360 Speaker 1: that they have that kind of expertise at their fingertips. 500 00:30:15,720 --> 00:30:17,440 Speaker 1: So how is this set up? Is this going to 501 00:30:17,560 --> 00:30:21,280 Speaker 1: be like a dot org or and a philanthropic organization. 502 00:30:21,560 --> 00:30:24,360 Speaker 1: Are you setting it up like a consulting firm or 503 00:30:24,400 --> 00:30:27,640 Speaker 1: do you want this to become a scalable technology and 504 00:30:27,760 --> 00:30:30,880 Speaker 1: app that people can buy and used to manage their 505 00:30:30,880 --> 00:30:37,080 Speaker 1: own um prevention of infectious diseases. We are developing software 506 00:30:37,320 --> 00:30:41,120 Speaker 1: and as I looked at the very early applications we 507 00:30:41,160 --> 00:30:45,600 Speaker 1: had developed, I got really excited because it had to 508 00:30:45,600 --> 00:30:49,520 Speaker 1: do with genomic variants and how the virus mutates. And 509 00:30:49,560 --> 00:30:54,000 Speaker 1: it's a concept called genomic epidemiology or I affectionately also 510 00:30:54,080 --> 00:30:56,320 Speaker 1: call it genomic weather mapping. You know how you can 511 00:30:56,320 --> 00:30:57,800 Speaker 1: look at a weather map and you can see the 512 00:30:57,800 --> 00:31:01,040 Speaker 1: weather forecast and what's coming by region. So we can 513 00:31:01,080 --> 00:31:04,680 Speaker 1: actually do that for variance of the virus and say, 514 00:31:05,160 --> 00:31:08,160 Speaker 1: how is the delta variant different from the alpha variant 515 00:31:08,200 --> 00:31:10,880 Speaker 1: and what does that mean for the state of Georgia 516 00:31:11,120 --> 00:31:14,680 Speaker 1: or for a specific county. We can predict, you know, 517 00:31:15,240 --> 00:31:18,600 Speaker 1: in a time stamped way, the likelihood that cases are 518 00:31:18,600 --> 00:31:20,719 Speaker 1: going to go up or down. And not just for COVID, 519 00:31:20,800 --> 00:31:23,400 Speaker 1: but these are the kinds of models that every local 520 00:31:23,440 --> 00:31:26,840 Speaker 1: disease controller has to do in their head figuring out 521 00:31:27,080 --> 00:31:29,600 Speaker 1: what's the direction of the mannincha cockle outbreak, for example. 522 00:31:29,640 --> 00:31:32,800 Speaker 1: Michael Lewis tells that story in the book. So math 523 00:31:32,880 --> 00:31:37,080 Speaker 1: and microbiology really is, you know, very simple data science modeling, 524 00:31:37,760 --> 00:31:42,320 Speaker 1: codifying that into software and giving disease forecasting and then 525 00:31:42,440 --> 00:31:45,320 Speaker 1: the answer to the question what do I do now 526 00:31:45,400 --> 00:31:48,080 Speaker 1: based on it? Handing that to someone in a way 527 00:31:48,120 --> 00:31:52,920 Speaker 1: that is simple, accessible at their fingertips is an incredible 528 00:31:53,040 --> 00:31:56,200 Speaker 1: need and it doesn't exist. And it's for the private sector, 529 00:31:56,280 --> 00:31:58,920 Speaker 1: it's for the public sector, it's for healthcare systems. We 530 00:31:59,000 --> 00:32:02,920 Speaker 1: are creating some new not just with the technology platform, 531 00:32:03,000 --> 00:32:05,680 Speaker 1: but a new sector of someone that you can pick 532 00:32:05,760 --> 00:32:08,880 Speaker 1: up the phone and call when when there's an infectious 533 00:32:08,880 --> 00:32:11,640 Speaker 1: disease threat. So what's the company going to look like 534 00:32:11,800 --> 00:32:14,560 Speaker 1: in terms of a product. Will I be able to 535 00:32:14,600 --> 00:32:18,080 Speaker 1: get an app on my phone and get alerts that hey, 536 00:32:18,160 --> 00:32:21,440 Speaker 1: the region where you are is now showing an uptick 537 00:32:21,680 --> 00:32:25,840 Speaker 1: of infections and take steps to protect yourself or is 538 00:32:25,840 --> 00:32:28,360 Speaker 1: it going to be more for the private corporate sector. 539 00:32:28,480 --> 00:32:31,640 Speaker 1: Tell us what the product is going to look like. Sure, well, 540 00:32:31,680 --> 00:32:33,880 Speaker 1: I think the best way to explain it would be 541 00:32:34,160 --> 00:32:37,360 Speaker 1: the analogy of cybersecurity. You know, there were some really 542 00:32:37,440 --> 00:32:40,520 Speaker 1: high profile cyber attacks in two thousand ten, two thousand 543 00:32:40,520 --> 00:32:46,160 Speaker 1: and eleven, and after that private enterprise realized, oh, this 544 00:32:46,240 --> 00:32:48,880 Speaker 1: is a risk that we own. We own this potentially 545 00:32:48,920 --> 00:32:52,600 Speaker 1: catastrophic risk to our enterprise, and so we have to 546 00:32:52,640 --> 00:32:56,920 Speaker 1: have that capability running in the background, monitoring the risk 547 00:32:57,120 --> 00:33:00,360 Speaker 1: that can ramp up or ramp down. And so the 548 00:33:00,480 --> 00:33:04,600 Speaker 1: quietly humming machine in the background of cybersecurity is a 549 00:33:04,680 --> 00:33:07,840 Speaker 1: perfect analogy to what we're creating because really, as a 550 00:33:07,840 --> 00:33:11,520 Speaker 1: as a tech enabled service, we are scalable software, but 551 00:33:11,600 --> 00:33:14,280 Speaker 1: we are humans behind it. I would argue the best 552 00:33:14,520 --> 00:33:17,040 Speaker 1: humans in the world, you know um Carter, Measher and 553 00:33:17,120 --> 00:33:19,520 Speaker 1: Jodorici from the book or advisers to the company. I 554 00:33:19,560 --> 00:33:23,120 Speaker 1: talked to those guys every day. We're codifying that thinking 555 00:33:23,160 --> 00:33:27,160 Speaker 1: in those tools into scalable software in a way that 556 00:33:27,200 --> 00:33:30,800 Speaker 1: we can help a business in an ongoing way manage 557 00:33:30,840 --> 00:33:34,840 Speaker 1: the risk the potential threats in all geographic regions. But 558 00:33:34,880 --> 00:33:37,120 Speaker 1: then help them know how do what do we do 559 00:33:37,240 --> 00:33:43,240 Speaker 1: practically tactically operationally for our business? Quite intriguing. So you're, 560 00:33:43,600 --> 00:33:46,200 Speaker 1: for lack of a bit of where your logo is 561 00:33:46,440 --> 00:33:53,600 Speaker 1: prevent detects contain explain what those three words mean in 562 00:33:53,760 --> 00:33:58,840 Speaker 1: terms of providing a shield for the private sector or 563 00:33:58,920 --> 00:34:03,760 Speaker 1: the public sect against an infectious outbreak. Sure, So I 564 00:34:03,760 --> 00:34:09,560 Speaker 1: would start with explaining it by the most important skill 565 00:34:10,480 --> 00:34:13,560 Speaker 1: is index of suspicion. So for any doctor or for 566 00:34:13,640 --> 00:34:18,400 Speaker 1: any frontline public health officer, having an index of suspicion 567 00:34:19,320 --> 00:34:23,680 Speaker 1: means you've gathered data from all the sketchy sources, maybe 568 00:34:23,680 --> 00:34:27,520 Speaker 1: which are somewhat unreliable, but taken together, it gives you 569 00:34:27,560 --> 00:34:30,839 Speaker 1: a sense of the direction things are headed. So that's 570 00:34:30,960 --> 00:34:35,320 Speaker 1: infectious disease modeling and certainly can be codified into software. 571 00:34:35,640 --> 00:34:39,360 Speaker 1: So being able to look at disease forecasting and predict 572 00:34:39,440 --> 00:34:42,880 Speaker 1: what the potential threats are, having a plan of action 573 00:34:43,040 --> 00:34:46,360 Speaker 1: of how you're going to prevent that from happening, and 574 00:34:46,400 --> 00:34:50,000 Speaker 1: then being able to detect it. You know, testing, looking 575 00:34:50,040 --> 00:34:52,759 Speaker 1: at the different capabilities we have from what we've seen 576 00:34:52,800 --> 00:34:56,920 Speaker 1: in COVID is vast development of rapid tests. The rapid 577 00:34:56,920 --> 00:34:58,759 Speaker 1: tests that have been developed by the private sector are 578 00:34:58,800 --> 00:35:02,719 Speaker 1: incredible and are very very good. And then containment, you know, 579 00:35:02,760 --> 00:35:07,280 Speaker 1: like I mentioned before, containment is where all the effort 580 00:35:07,320 --> 00:35:09,920 Speaker 1: has to be for the government because the risk of 581 00:35:09,960 --> 00:35:14,200 Speaker 1: failing at containment, as the United States did in means 582 00:35:14,239 --> 00:35:17,080 Speaker 1: that then we have to make these awful choices, you 583 00:35:17,080 --> 00:35:20,400 Speaker 1: know that impact the economy and impact health, and so 584 00:35:20,920 --> 00:35:25,640 Speaker 1: for our clients, both government and private businesses. Really the 585 00:35:26,120 --> 00:35:30,560 Speaker 1: value proposition is the ability to have disease forecasting, take 586 00:35:30,600 --> 00:35:34,040 Speaker 1: action based on it, decrease your risk, and find that 587 00:35:34,120 --> 00:35:38,120 Speaker 1: balance between continuity of operation and the health of your employees, 588 00:35:38,120 --> 00:35:40,800 Speaker 1: the health of the community, and knowing that that brand 589 00:35:41,200 --> 00:35:44,279 Speaker 1: has a safe environment. And from what I've read, this 590 00:35:44,360 --> 00:35:47,840 Speaker 1: is more than just the germ of a startup idea. 591 00:35:48,160 --> 00:35:51,160 Speaker 1: This is a real company that's funded, that has clients. 592 00:35:51,400 --> 00:35:54,200 Speaker 1: Tell us a little bit about where you are in 593 00:35:54,239 --> 00:35:58,040 Speaker 1: the growth curve of the public health company. Sure, well, 594 00:35:58,800 --> 00:36:01,319 Speaker 1: my archetype is a public health official, right, That's what 595 00:36:01,400 --> 00:36:04,200 Speaker 1: I had been my whole career, And I jumped from 596 00:36:04,239 --> 00:36:07,880 Speaker 1: being a health official of a state the large estate 597 00:36:08,440 --> 00:36:13,440 Speaker 1: UH to learning Silicon Valley in business and understanding the 598 00:36:13,480 --> 00:36:17,440 Speaker 1: pain points of the private sector. And of governments and 599 00:36:17,520 --> 00:36:22,200 Speaker 1: of healthcare systems and architecting a technology based solution. It 600 00:36:22,320 --> 00:36:25,640 Speaker 1: has been an adventure. And what has happened is our 601 00:36:25,640 --> 00:36:28,759 Speaker 1: partners in Silicon Valley have rallied behind the public health 602 00:36:28,800 --> 00:36:33,200 Speaker 1: company and our seed funding was in the spring. I'm 603 00:36:33,239 --> 00:36:36,520 Speaker 1: thrilled to have partnered with ven Rock. I was introduced 604 00:36:36,520 --> 00:36:38,719 Speaker 1: to them by Todd Park, who's on our board of 605 00:36:38,760 --> 00:36:41,960 Speaker 1: directors and was really a thought partner to me as 606 00:36:42,000 --> 00:36:45,000 Speaker 1: I founded this company, and he introduced me to ven 607 00:36:45,080 --> 00:36:49,120 Speaker 1: Rock because they are very thoughtful at the kind of 608 00:36:49,120 --> 00:36:53,520 Speaker 1: partnerships that they have around tech enabled services and healthcare 609 00:36:53,680 --> 00:36:56,960 Speaker 1: I T companies, and so it's been an incredible growth 610 00:36:57,000 --> 00:37:00,919 Speaker 1: curve for me and learning curve. And we have about 611 00:37:00,920 --> 00:37:05,040 Speaker 1: twenty employees right now at this point, actually as of recently, 612 00:37:05,120 --> 00:37:07,560 Speaker 1: I believe the numbers about up to twenty five. We 613 00:37:07,600 --> 00:37:11,840 Speaker 1: are growing and scaling fast to build out these capabilities 614 00:37:11,840 --> 00:37:15,000 Speaker 1: in software and if memory serves. Vent Rock has been 615 00:37:15,000 --> 00:37:17,439 Speaker 1: around for quite a while, haven't they, I believe, since 616 00:37:17,480 --> 00:37:21,520 Speaker 1: the nineteen sixties. One of the older silicon companies. Yeah, 617 00:37:21,560 --> 00:37:25,200 Speaker 1: they were one of the first, and you know, partnering 618 00:37:25,200 --> 00:37:27,920 Speaker 1: with them has been incredible for me as a first 619 00:37:27,920 --> 00:37:31,480 Speaker 1: time founder and first time CEO. I have a ton 620 00:37:31,600 --> 00:37:35,200 Speaker 1: to learn, and doing that in partnership with someone who 621 00:37:35,640 --> 00:37:37,399 Speaker 1: is so well versed in this and has a lot 622 00:37:37,400 --> 00:37:40,920 Speaker 1: of experience has been incredible. And tell us a little bit. 623 00:37:41,320 --> 00:37:47,120 Speaker 1: What is an index of suspicion? It sounds so so clandestine. 624 00:37:47,320 --> 00:37:51,320 Speaker 1: What is an index of suspicion? An index of suspicion 625 00:37:51,440 --> 00:37:54,160 Speaker 1: is if you told me I have a nineteen year 626 00:37:54,200 --> 00:37:57,400 Speaker 1: old college kid that has Ninja cockle disease and lives 627 00:37:57,400 --> 00:38:01,960 Speaker 1: in a fraternity, My next thought as well, I generally 628 00:38:02,000 --> 00:38:07,120 Speaker 1: know how fraternity social behavior goes, and I know there's 629 00:38:07,160 --> 00:38:11,040 Speaker 1: probably a lot of cross pollination, so I suspect there 630 00:38:11,080 --> 00:38:15,880 Speaker 1: are grab a whiteboard and a pen twelve other cases 631 00:38:16,000 --> 00:38:20,440 Speaker 1: currently that are undetected, and that immediately informs the action 632 00:38:20,480 --> 00:38:24,160 Speaker 1: that I take. So an index of suspicion is having 633 00:38:24,200 --> 00:38:29,840 Speaker 1: a strong situational awareness of the environment, knowing the pathogen 634 00:38:29,920 --> 00:38:32,520 Speaker 1: and how it behaves, and then doing the math and 635 00:38:32,600 --> 00:38:36,320 Speaker 1: microbiology to figure out very quickly what is the risk 636 00:38:36,680 --> 00:38:39,200 Speaker 1: this is about to get really big, how contagious is 637 00:38:39,239 --> 00:38:41,640 Speaker 1: this and how bad is the outcome for that disease? 638 00:38:41,760 --> 00:38:45,319 Speaker 1: That's right, quite quite interesting, Uh, There's a quote from 639 00:38:45,320 --> 00:38:47,520 Speaker 1: the book that I grabbed that I really liked, which 640 00:38:47,719 --> 00:38:50,720 Speaker 1: was quote, what scares me the most is our ability 641 00:38:50,719 --> 00:38:54,160 Speaker 1: to respond to a new pathogen, maybe one we've never 642 00:38:54,160 --> 00:38:58,680 Speaker 1: seen before, or an old pathogen like influenza that's mutated. 643 00:38:59,120 --> 00:39:02,160 Speaker 1: We know we have to be prepared for that. Are 644 00:39:02,239 --> 00:39:05,399 Speaker 1: we prepared for that? I do not believe that we are, 645 00:39:05,560 --> 00:39:09,720 Speaker 1: And that's what motivated me to launch the Public Health Company, 646 00:39:10,000 --> 00:39:14,680 Speaker 1: because unless we have a technology platform that can move 647 00:39:14,840 --> 00:39:20,000 Speaker 1: faster than the pathogen, we will never be prepared. Quite 648 00:39:20,120 --> 00:39:25,480 Speaker 1: interesting and and frightening. So when you got the finished book, 649 00:39:25,800 --> 00:39:27,799 Speaker 1: and then I want to circle back to how you 650 00:39:27,840 --> 00:39:30,680 Speaker 1: met Michael. But when you got the finished book, what 651 00:39:30,760 --> 00:39:36,440 Speaker 1: was it like reading about yourself? How surreal was that experience? 652 00:39:37,000 --> 00:39:42,000 Speaker 1: You know, it was really painful because I'm a fairly 653 00:39:42,560 --> 00:39:45,960 Speaker 1: private person. I've been a government official my whole career, 654 00:39:46,800 --> 00:39:50,319 Speaker 1: and to see my life story in print in a 655 00:39:50,440 --> 00:39:55,439 Speaker 1: book was shocking. And it's also really hard to read 656 00:39:55,480 --> 00:39:59,400 Speaker 1: about yourself in print. That's kind of interesting. So let's 657 00:40:00,120 --> 00:40:04,680 Speaker 1: circle back to the beginning. How did Michael Lewis find you? 658 00:40:04,680 --> 00:40:07,440 Speaker 1: You know, he texted me randomly out of the blue, 659 00:40:07,800 --> 00:40:11,200 Speaker 1: and I had never read a Michael Lewis book. I 660 00:40:11,239 --> 00:40:13,280 Speaker 1: recognized his name. I was going to say, I assume 661 00:40:13,360 --> 00:40:16,040 Speaker 1: you kind of know who he is, kind of. I 662 00:40:16,080 --> 00:40:18,760 Speaker 1: recognized his name. I mainly knew who he was because 663 00:40:18,800 --> 00:40:21,560 Speaker 1: my friend DJ Pittill had told me about the Fifth 664 00:40:21,680 --> 00:40:23,879 Speaker 1: Risk and that process of being in the Fifth risk. 665 00:40:24,040 --> 00:40:26,120 Speaker 1: And so wait, wait, let me just stop you here. 666 00:40:26,760 --> 00:40:31,160 Speaker 1: Money Ball, the movies, money Ball, The blind Side, the 667 00:40:31,200 --> 00:40:35,000 Speaker 1: Big Short, these were all pretty big movies. Certainly, The 668 00:40:35,040 --> 00:40:37,920 Speaker 1: Big Short was a giant movie when it came out. No, 669 00:40:38,120 --> 00:40:40,319 Speaker 1: not your cup didn't didn't catch you? Well, the Big 670 00:40:40,320 --> 00:40:44,880 Speaker 1: Short was not a giant movie for internal medicine microbiology docs. 671 00:40:45,800 --> 00:40:48,600 Speaker 1: So you know, let's just say I had seen The 672 00:40:48,640 --> 00:40:52,120 Speaker 1: blind Side and I loved that movie, but certainly didn't 673 00:40:52,160 --> 00:40:55,000 Speaker 1: remember who wrote the book. Should I be saying this publicly? 674 00:40:55,400 --> 00:40:57,280 Speaker 1: You could say that I had never read a Michael 675 00:40:57,320 --> 00:41:00,759 Speaker 1: Lewis book. I recognized his name, I mean because DJ 676 00:41:00,840 --> 00:41:03,160 Speaker 1: Patil had told me about his experience being in the 677 00:41:03,200 --> 00:41:06,839 Speaker 1: Fifth Risk. But you know, Michael texted me, and on 678 00:41:06,880 --> 00:41:09,000 Speaker 1: that first phone call, I said, I'm happy to speak 679 00:41:09,000 --> 00:41:11,879 Speaker 1: with you. I googled him. On that first phone call, 680 00:41:11,960 --> 00:41:14,840 Speaker 1: he said who are you? And I said, what do 681 00:41:14,880 --> 00:41:17,440 Speaker 1: you what do you mean? And he said, well, you 682 00:41:17,440 --> 00:41:20,480 Speaker 1: know the Wolverines and read Dawn said to speak to 683 00:41:20,560 --> 00:41:24,520 Speaker 1: Charity Dean and um, he'd contacted DJ and Todd Park 684 00:41:24,600 --> 00:41:26,319 Speaker 1: and they said, talked to Charity Dean and then Joe 685 00:41:26,360 --> 00:41:29,080 Speaker 1: Deesi at bio hub and said, he said, I've never 686 00:41:29,120 --> 00:41:33,640 Speaker 1: heard of you, and I thought, well, okay, yeah, okay, 687 00:41:33,800 --> 00:41:37,640 Speaker 1: that's fine. But it was a funny first conversation. In fact, 688 00:41:38,320 --> 00:41:40,880 Speaker 1: it started off the first two minutes. I said, Michael, 689 00:41:41,640 --> 00:41:43,080 Speaker 1: I know I don't know you, but I've got to 690 00:41:43,080 --> 00:41:45,359 Speaker 1: make a fifty one forty nine decision. Have you ever 691 00:41:45,360 --> 00:41:48,040 Speaker 1: had to make one of those? And he said, well, 692 00:41:48,080 --> 00:41:50,279 Speaker 1: I'm making one right now. I'm deciding whether or not 693 00:41:50,360 --> 00:41:53,960 Speaker 1: I'm going to write a book. And so we talked 694 00:41:54,040 --> 00:41:58,320 Speaker 1: through the meaning you have a certainty and how brave 695 00:41:58,320 --> 00:42:00,879 Speaker 1: are you going to be? Are you gonna pull the clip? Essentially, yeah, 696 00:42:00,920 --> 00:42:03,200 Speaker 1: So we talked through the decision I was making and 697 00:42:03,200 --> 00:42:06,399 Speaker 1: the decision he was making, And of course what I 698 00:42:06,480 --> 00:42:09,000 Speaker 1: didn't know at the time is I think by the 699 00:42:09,080 --> 00:42:11,279 Speaker 1: end of the conversation he had decided to write a 700 00:42:11,280 --> 00:42:13,320 Speaker 1: book and I was going to be in it, and 701 00:42:13,600 --> 00:42:17,919 Speaker 1: I had no clue, no clue about that, So what 702 00:42:17,960 --> 00:42:20,200 Speaker 1: was the next step? So you you finished the conversation, 703 00:42:20,320 --> 00:42:23,120 Speaker 1: you leave thinking, oh, so that seemed like an interesting guy. 704 00:42:23,480 --> 00:42:26,840 Speaker 1: He leaves saying, Oh, I'm writing this book now. Meanwhile, 705 00:42:26,960 --> 00:42:30,080 Speaker 1: the way he operates, he's already been assembling, he's been 706 00:42:30,080 --> 00:42:34,440 Speaker 1: collecting characters, he's been lighting, writing vignettes all year. He 707 00:42:34,480 --> 00:42:37,279 Speaker 1: sees a thread that connects all of these together, and 708 00:42:37,360 --> 00:42:41,160 Speaker 1: suddenly there's a full narrative. What was the next step 709 00:42:41,200 --> 00:42:43,040 Speaker 1: with him? How did he how did he proceed from 710 00:42:43,040 --> 00:42:46,200 Speaker 1: there with you and and the rest of the characters 711 00:42:46,200 --> 00:42:48,800 Speaker 1: in the book. Well, what I didn't know at that time, 712 00:42:48,880 --> 00:42:53,000 Speaker 1: and he told me later, is before he even called me, 713 00:42:53,520 --> 00:42:55,920 Speaker 1: he had an entire file with my name on it, 714 00:42:56,520 --> 00:42:59,120 Speaker 1: everything I'd ever done, anything that was out there publicly 715 00:42:59,120 --> 00:43:03,120 Speaker 1: about me. And it makes a ton of sense because 716 00:43:03,160 --> 00:43:06,839 Speaker 1: as he asked me questions and you know, would come 717 00:43:06,880 --> 00:43:09,520 Speaker 1: interview me and talk through how the public health system 718 00:43:09,520 --> 00:43:13,040 Speaker 1: works from microbiology or my own story, Um, he already 719 00:43:13,080 --> 00:43:15,239 Speaker 1: knew the answer to some of that about me, And 720 00:43:15,320 --> 00:43:18,160 Speaker 1: so I think I think he was getting to know 721 00:43:18,200 --> 00:43:22,120 Speaker 1: a potential character. I was clueless when he asked if 722 00:43:22,160 --> 00:43:26,080 Speaker 1: I would be willing to be a character in the book. Um, 723 00:43:26,160 --> 00:43:28,880 Speaker 1: I thought I was one of twenty. Maybe there'd be 724 00:43:28,920 --> 00:43:33,080 Speaker 1: one or two lines from me. I never imagined I 725 00:43:33,120 --> 00:43:36,080 Speaker 1: would be the protagonist. Not only are you the one 726 00:43:36,080 --> 00:43:38,800 Speaker 1: of the key protagonists in the book, but the book 727 00:43:38,920 --> 00:43:44,000 Speaker 1: begins with your story. That That was the surprise that 728 00:43:44,160 --> 00:43:47,279 Speaker 1: you're the opening scene. It was a total surprise. I 729 00:43:47,360 --> 00:43:49,799 Speaker 1: had no idea until I read the book, which was 730 00:43:49,880 --> 00:43:53,040 Speaker 1: the day before I sat down with sixty Minutes. So 731 00:43:53,560 --> 00:43:58,080 Speaker 1: I had no clue. And and yet I had made 732 00:43:58,080 --> 00:44:01,920 Speaker 1: a decision in July of when he asked me to 733 00:44:01,960 --> 00:44:04,120 Speaker 1: be a character in the book. I was either going 734 00:44:04,200 --> 00:44:07,839 Speaker 1: to let him into my life or not. And I 735 00:44:07,880 --> 00:44:10,000 Speaker 1: had been such a private person up to that point. 736 00:44:10,120 --> 00:44:12,960 Speaker 1: But I don't have any secrets. It's a fairly vanilla 737 00:44:13,040 --> 00:44:16,440 Speaker 1: life of a mom and a public servant. I'm gonna 738 00:44:16,480 --> 00:44:18,960 Speaker 1: throw a yellow card on that one, but we'll circle 739 00:44:19,000 --> 00:44:22,880 Speaker 1: back to it, because it clearly is not a vanilla life. 740 00:44:23,400 --> 00:44:26,440 Speaker 1: You're basically calling governors and saying, hey, idiot, if you 741 00:44:26,440 --> 00:44:28,360 Speaker 1: don't do this, you're gonna kill a lot of people. 742 00:44:28,840 --> 00:44:30,680 Speaker 1: You need to you need to step up your game. 743 00:44:30,760 --> 00:44:34,840 Speaker 1: That's not exactly dropping the kids off at soccer. Yeah. Well, 744 00:44:34,920 --> 00:44:37,480 Speaker 1: to me, you know, I took my oath of office 745 00:44:37,880 --> 00:44:42,000 Speaker 1: very seriously to protect and defend the United States against 746 00:44:42,080 --> 00:44:45,600 Speaker 1: all threats for and in domestic and that includes pathogens. 747 00:44:45,719 --> 00:44:48,560 Speaker 1: And so for me, it was always just fulfilling the 748 00:44:48,600 --> 00:44:52,440 Speaker 1: oath that I took to protect communities by all means necessary. Well, 749 00:44:52,480 --> 00:44:54,680 Speaker 1: it's good to see that some people still honor their 750 00:44:54,760 --> 00:44:58,000 Speaker 1: oath of office. But we won't digress into that direction. 751 00:44:58,080 --> 00:45:00,600 Speaker 1: Let's stick with the book, which by the way, is 752 00:45:00,640 --> 00:45:05,120 Speaker 1: sitting on the credenza of my house where by the 753 00:45:05,160 --> 00:45:07,000 Speaker 1: front door, where I was going to bring it with 754 00:45:07,040 --> 00:45:10,440 Speaker 1: me to have you signed. Well, that means that we 755 00:45:10,480 --> 00:45:12,040 Speaker 1: have to see each other again. I'll come back and 756 00:45:12,040 --> 00:45:15,080 Speaker 1: sign it. I was gonna say, after we open up again, 757 00:45:15,120 --> 00:45:18,400 Speaker 1: but we're kind of open up again. This just to 758 00:45:18,520 --> 00:45:20,959 Speaker 1: digress a little bit. Not only is this the first 759 00:45:21,000 --> 00:45:23,319 Speaker 1: time I'm in the Bloomberg building in a year and 760 00:45:23,840 --> 00:45:26,240 Speaker 1: almost a year and a half, today was my first 761 00:45:26,800 --> 00:45:30,719 Speaker 1: uh COVID test, right, And how was it? I know 762 00:45:30,800 --> 00:45:32,920 Speaker 1: I'm here talking, so I assumed they wouldn't let me 763 00:45:32,960 --> 00:45:35,920 Speaker 1: in the building without it. So you're having this conversation 764 00:45:35,960 --> 00:45:39,040 Speaker 1: back and forth with him, not only are are you 765 00:45:39,120 --> 00:45:41,320 Speaker 1: unaware of the fact that you're becoming the lead character 766 00:45:41,400 --> 00:45:45,640 Speaker 1: in the book, but you're educating him on infectious disease. 767 00:45:46,360 --> 00:45:49,480 Speaker 1: I know he's a quick learner and an in depth learner, 768 00:45:49,840 --> 00:45:52,040 Speaker 1: but tell us a little bit about what that back 769 00:45:52,080 --> 00:45:54,120 Speaker 1: and forth was like, you know it was. It was 770 00:45:54,440 --> 00:45:59,080 Speaker 1: really painful at times. Um Dice basically spent a year 771 00:45:59,160 --> 00:46:05,440 Speaker 1: teaching Michael is microbiology and public health disease control. And 772 00:46:06,640 --> 00:46:08,919 Speaker 1: I took him on a tour of the places where 773 00:46:08,960 --> 00:46:11,239 Speaker 1: some of those stories took place in Santa Barbara. So 774 00:46:11,280 --> 00:46:14,840 Speaker 1: I took him to the homeless shelter, the coroner's office 775 00:46:14,960 --> 00:46:18,400 Speaker 1: where the autopsy was done, which, by the way, again, 776 00:46:18,920 --> 00:46:22,040 Speaker 1: that's an insane I hope that makes it into the 777 00:46:22,040 --> 00:46:25,480 Speaker 1: movie if they make a movie. That's an insane scene 778 00:46:25,520 --> 00:46:27,880 Speaker 1: in the book about you, Like, all right, you two 779 00:46:27,960 --> 00:46:31,680 Speaker 1: idiot stopped falling around and outcomes the knife and you 780 00:46:31,719 --> 00:46:35,560 Speaker 1: crack open the sternum and start pulling out internal organs, 781 00:46:35,600 --> 00:46:39,640 Speaker 1: and the corner and his assistant stood there horrified. In 782 00:46:39,719 --> 00:46:42,480 Speaker 1: the book, was that an accurate depiction of what was 783 00:46:42,520 --> 00:46:45,480 Speaker 1: going on the way that Michael wrote it in the 784 00:46:45,520 --> 00:46:49,680 Speaker 1: book was accurate? And what was funny about that scenario 785 00:46:49,880 --> 00:46:54,120 Speaker 1: is I knew how risk averse and hesitant. Uh, the 786 00:46:54,320 --> 00:46:58,839 Speaker 1: pathologist was to cut open her chest because of the 787 00:46:58,920 --> 00:47:03,200 Speaker 1: fear that using a bone saw could theoretically there was 788 00:47:03,239 --> 00:47:07,560 Speaker 1: one report in the literature spread aerisolized the tuberculosis bacteria, 789 00:47:08,280 --> 00:47:10,759 Speaker 1: and so I understood the fear. But by the way, 790 00:47:10,840 --> 00:47:14,959 Speaker 1: she's masked and has a full um face shield. Right 791 00:47:15,200 --> 00:47:19,120 Speaker 1: when I showed up, everyone was wearing full ppe But 792 00:47:19,200 --> 00:47:21,920 Speaker 1: I was the tuberculosis controller. I was. I had literally 793 00:47:21,960 --> 00:47:26,480 Speaker 1: just been elected president of the California Tuberculosis Controllers Association. 794 00:47:26,640 --> 00:47:28,160 Speaker 1: You never knew it existed. I was going to say, 795 00:47:28,160 --> 00:47:30,640 Speaker 1: who even I was the president? That must be Those 796 00:47:30,719 --> 00:47:33,440 Speaker 1: must be wild parties. They are super fun because we 797 00:47:33,480 --> 00:47:37,640 Speaker 1: talk about things like drug resistant tuberculosis treatment. Sounds like fun. 798 00:47:37,719 --> 00:47:40,200 Speaker 1: Does sound like a So TV doesn't scare me, you know. 799 00:47:40,360 --> 00:47:43,239 Speaker 1: It's so you show up and you're like, I'll crack 800 00:47:43,280 --> 00:47:45,439 Speaker 1: her open. I don't care. Like they thought they were 801 00:47:45,520 --> 00:47:48,479 Speaker 1: intimidating you by saying you want those organs, you break 802 00:47:48,480 --> 00:47:52,560 Speaker 1: her open. I think that they thought, and I should 803 00:47:52,560 --> 00:47:54,920 Speaker 1: be careful here projecting what I think they thought. But 804 00:47:55,000 --> 00:47:57,960 Speaker 1: I think my impression was if it was if they 805 00:47:58,200 --> 00:48:00,560 Speaker 1: if I was going to issue a health offs or order, 806 00:48:00,600 --> 00:48:03,080 Speaker 1: which I had, then it would have to be done 807 00:48:03,120 --> 00:48:07,000 Speaker 1: under their terms, which was outside and that I couldn't 808 00:48:07,680 --> 00:48:10,040 Speaker 1: be absent and not only had to be present, but 809 00:48:10,080 --> 00:48:14,080 Speaker 1: had to be a very active participant. And what they 810 00:48:14,080 --> 00:48:16,720 Speaker 1: didn't know is I had started out as a surgeon. 811 00:48:16,880 --> 00:48:20,240 Speaker 1: I've done surgery for you know, some time in Africa, 812 00:48:20,280 --> 00:48:22,720 Speaker 1: and I had been a general surgery resident at Cottage. 813 00:48:22,760 --> 00:48:25,560 Speaker 1: I was super comfortable in the trauma bay cracking a 814 00:48:25,640 --> 00:48:28,399 Speaker 1: chest open or you know, making fast decisions. And so 815 00:48:29,200 --> 00:48:32,640 Speaker 1: what might have scared another doctor h to me was 816 00:48:32,719 --> 00:48:34,880 Speaker 1: just Okay, so this is what we're doing today, Alright, 817 00:48:35,800 --> 00:48:39,680 Speaker 1: let's go. It's really an amazing part of the book, 818 00:48:39,719 --> 00:48:43,160 Speaker 1: and it sets the tone for who you are. It's like, 819 00:48:43,400 --> 00:48:46,040 Speaker 1: you're not gonna you boys are not gonna look down 820 00:48:46,040 --> 00:48:48,399 Speaker 1: at me and intimidate me because I know you show 821 00:48:48,520 --> 00:48:51,560 Speaker 1: up your five foot nothing blond and these guys think 822 00:48:51,560 --> 00:48:54,000 Speaker 1: they're going to run rough shot over you. Is that 823 00:48:54,120 --> 00:48:58,080 Speaker 1: is that your life experience? I should be careful what 824 00:48:58,160 --> 00:49:00,200 Speaker 1: I say here. No, you could say whatever you want 825 00:49:00,239 --> 00:49:03,080 Speaker 1: to tell you. Listen, your life has already spread out 826 00:49:03,120 --> 00:49:06,960 Speaker 1: in Michael Lewis's book, and he implied, you know, I'm 827 00:49:07,000 --> 00:49:12,880 Speaker 1: following his lead. He implied as much that historically you 828 00:49:13,040 --> 00:49:17,399 Speaker 1: were very much underestimated by the Boys Club and this 829 00:49:17,560 --> 00:49:20,879 Speaker 1: was the perfect manifestation of that and the opportunity to say, 830 00:49:21,600 --> 00:49:24,760 Speaker 1: my beer, watch this. You know, it's funny. So, uh, 831 00:49:24,800 --> 00:49:26,440 Speaker 1: for those of us not here in this studio, I'm 832 00:49:26,480 --> 00:49:30,840 Speaker 1: five ft four, I'm a solid hundred and fifteen pounds, solid, solid, 833 00:49:31,200 --> 00:49:33,880 Speaker 1: long blonde hair. I always wear a suit and heels, 834 00:49:34,120 --> 00:49:37,480 Speaker 1: and so I get that the way that I look 835 00:49:37,719 --> 00:49:42,080 Speaker 1: projects a certain impression. And all my life, all my career, 836 00:49:42,200 --> 00:49:44,560 Speaker 1: I've been in the house of medicine. The house of 837 00:49:44,600 --> 00:49:47,839 Speaker 1: medicine feels like a fraternity at times. The boys Club 838 00:49:47,960 --> 00:49:53,040 Speaker 1: evenlike finance, which you know, so even in medical school, 839 00:49:53,120 --> 00:49:55,040 Speaker 1: you know, I went to med school at Tulane in 840 00:49:55,080 --> 00:49:57,680 Speaker 1: New Orleans, and um, you know, the halls are lined 841 00:49:57,760 --> 00:50:01,719 Speaker 1: with with photos and portraits of of men, and so 842 00:50:01,880 --> 00:50:04,680 Speaker 1: as a woman, it feels like a very different game. 843 00:50:04,880 --> 00:50:08,160 Speaker 1: And I figured out early on that in general, I 844 00:50:08,200 --> 00:50:11,440 Speaker 1: was going to be assumed to be one type of person. 845 00:50:11,680 --> 00:50:14,640 Speaker 1: And that's why I love trauma surgery. It's fast decisions, 846 00:50:14,719 --> 00:50:18,120 Speaker 1: it's blood and guts, it's taking action. You're judged on 847 00:50:18,160 --> 00:50:21,640 Speaker 1: what you actually do, and so I love that. So, yeah, 848 00:50:21,719 --> 00:50:25,960 Speaker 1: Michael definitely locked onto that story as kind of an example, 849 00:50:26,040 --> 00:50:30,200 Speaker 1: an archetypal example of what I had experienced throughout my career. 850 00:50:30,600 --> 00:50:34,960 Speaker 1: And he wasn't wrong to say the very least. So 851 00:50:34,960 --> 00:50:38,719 Speaker 1: so let's talk about a couple of things um from 852 00:50:38,719 --> 00:50:41,400 Speaker 1: the book that I liked, that I thought was really interesting, 853 00:50:41,440 --> 00:50:44,799 Speaker 1: and see if we can extrapolate forward to today. So 854 00:50:44,960 --> 00:50:49,440 Speaker 1: I like the concept that measuring hospitalizations and deaths are 855 00:50:49,480 --> 00:50:52,560 Speaker 1: a bit like starlight. You're dealing with the phenomena that 856 00:50:52,600 --> 00:50:56,799 Speaker 1: has taken place long before. Everything that you're seeing in 857 00:50:56,920 --> 00:50:59,920 Speaker 1: terms of data is ancient, because if someone's in the 858 00:51:00,040 --> 00:51:04,280 Speaker 1: hospital today, it means they were infected ten, four, twenty 859 00:51:04,360 --> 00:51:08,680 Speaker 1: one days ago or longer. What does this mean for 860 00:51:09,840 --> 00:51:15,279 Speaker 1: detecting and containing infectious outbreaks? And secondly, what does it 861 00:51:15,320 --> 00:51:17,200 Speaker 1: mean when you have an entity like the c d 862 00:51:17,320 --> 00:51:20,520 Speaker 1: C that all they want is more data and the 863 00:51:20,560 --> 00:51:23,680 Speaker 1: more data you get, the later you are in that 864 00:51:23,760 --> 00:51:27,680 Speaker 1: containment curve. That's right, It's such a good point, which 865 00:51:27,760 --> 00:51:32,680 Speaker 1: is basically, by design, a system or a thinker a 866 00:51:32,800 --> 00:51:38,000 Speaker 1: human that can contain a fast moving novel pathogen by 867 00:51:38,040 --> 00:51:42,359 Speaker 1: design has to operate in the setting of uncertainty. And 868 00:51:42,400 --> 00:51:46,640 Speaker 1: the challenge with the CDC, and I include myself in 869 00:51:46,640 --> 00:51:51,560 Speaker 1: this local and state public health departments, is that they've 870 00:51:51,600 --> 00:51:57,239 Speaker 1: been or they they were created under an architecture to 871 00:51:57,400 --> 00:52:02,520 Speaker 1: reward being risk averse to only act under certainty, to 872 00:52:02,600 --> 00:52:06,000 Speaker 1: have a lot of data. The problem is, in an 873 00:52:06,080 --> 00:52:11,000 Speaker 1: uncertain circumstance, not taking action is action. It means you 874 00:52:11,040 --> 00:52:13,759 Speaker 1: lose your chance at containment and a worse outcome if 875 00:52:13,800 --> 00:52:16,480 Speaker 1: if the numbers chake out that way, that's right. And 876 00:52:16,520 --> 00:52:19,479 Speaker 1: so if you wait until you're certain, you've waited too long, 877 00:52:19,560 --> 00:52:21,800 Speaker 1: you've lost your chance. And that's what we saw happen 878 00:52:21,880 --> 00:52:26,680 Speaker 1: with COVID. There was no effort by CDC states I 879 00:52:26,680 --> 00:52:28,839 Speaker 1: would say locals, but there really was an effort by 880 00:52:28,880 --> 00:52:32,480 Speaker 1: some locals to contain this when when we had the chance. 881 00:52:32,520 --> 00:52:37,880 Speaker 1: And the reason is that an institution that needs certainty, 882 00:52:37,880 --> 00:52:41,040 Speaker 1: by definition, it will be too late, too late to act. 883 00:52:41,400 --> 00:52:44,640 Speaker 1: So so let's talk about states. What states got it right, 884 00:52:45,200 --> 00:52:47,279 Speaker 1: what states got it wrong, or if you want to 885 00:52:47,320 --> 00:52:51,560 Speaker 1: be a little more circumspect, what were the actions taken 886 00:52:51,680 --> 00:52:53,920 Speaker 1: that you thought were right and what were some of 887 00:52:53,920 --> 00:52:58,879 Speaker 1: the actions taken that had adverse outcomes. I don't even 888 00:52:58,920 --> 00:53:01,960 Speaker 1: know how to answer that, because we all got it wrong. 889 00:53:03,120 --> 00:53:05,160 Speaker 1: Who got it less wrong? Who got it more wrong? 890 00:53:06,360 --> 00:53:11,360 Speaker 1: I have tremendous respect for Governor Newsom in California. Every 891 00:53:11,400 --> 00:53:15,120 Speaker 1: decision I saw him make was right. He wanted to 892 00:53:15,200 --> 00:53:19,720 Speaker 1: understand the science, he wanted to understand the modeling, and 893 00:53:20,040 --> 00:53:22,919 Speaker 1: he was brave and bold and leaned forward and led 894 00:53:22,960 --> 00:53:25,399 Speaker 1: the country when he issued the stay at home order. 895 00:53:26,480 --> 00:53:29,440 Speaker 1: What was hard about that is governors had a horrible 896 00:53:29,560 --> 00:53:33,200 Speaker 1: choice where suddenly they were not being led at the 897 00:53:33,239 --> 00:53:36,520 Speaker 1: federal level. They were not given any tools to test. 898 00:53:37,200 --> 00:53:39,960 Speaker 1: They were basically told, you're on your own, no one's 899 00:53:40,000 --> 00:53:43,239 Speaker 1: coming to save you. Does that sound familiar? Um? And 900 00:53:43,320 --> 00:53:47,000 Speaker 1: so you know, the way that California led the country 901 00:53:47,040 --> 00:53:50,480 Speaker 1: I absolutely believe was right. But I don't want to 902 00:53:50,480 --> 00:53:54,960 Speaker 1: give anyone anymore than a D minus in this response. 903 00:53:55,520 --> 00:53:58,000 Speaker 1: And that is a system's failure. In other words, like 904 00:53:58,400 --> 00:54:01,239 Speaker 1: the humans got it right, the humans did exactly what 905 00:54:01,280 --> 00:54:05,560 Speaker 1: they should have done with heroic efforts, but the system failed. 906 00:54:05,560 --> 00:54:08,200 Speaker 1: The whole system failed. And so no matter how good 907 00:54:08,280 --> 00:54:11,759 Speaker 1: a governor's leadership was or individual vigilance. It was it 908 00:54:11,800 --> 00:54:14,319 Speaker 1: was going to be no match for this pathogen. What 909 00:54:14,400 --> 00:54:19,680 Speaker 1: are your thoughts on school closing lockdowns? Because we from 910 00:54:19,680 --> 00:54:25,799 Speaker 1: what we've learned about pandemic, that was very effective. When 911 00:54:25,800 --> 00:54:30,000 Speaker 1: you look at Pennsylvania in Philadelphia versus Um, was it 912 00:54:30,120 --> 00:54:35,640 Speaker 1: Cincinnati was the comparable state where city St. Louis versus Philadelphia. 913 00:54:35,840 --> 00:54:40,040 Speaker 1: That was really an interesting comparison. And when you actually 914 00:54:40,080 --> 00:54:45,399 Speaker 1: run the numbers, the faster UM lockdown was much more 915 00:54:45,440 --> 00:54:48,560 Speaker 1: effective at containment. That's right. And the reason why it 916 00:54:48,600 --> 00:54:51,160 Speaker 1: was more effective is what you had pointed out earlier 917 00:54:51,200 --> 00:54:54,839 Speaker 1: that if you wait until you have deaths and hospitalizations, 918 00:54:55,200 --> 00:54:57,839 Speaker 1: then you're too far behind. You haven't acted fast enough. 919 00:54:57,920 --> 00:55:00,319 Speaker 1: So with the very first death, at the very first case, 920 00:55:00,360 --> 00:55:02,400 Speaker 1: you have to act quickly. So you asked what I 921 00:55:02,400 --> 00:55:05,759 Speaker 1: think about schools? Well, what I love about having met 922 00:55:05,800 --> 00:55:08,839 Speaker 1: Carter Mesher and Richard Hatchett is they did not tell 923 00:55:08,880 --> 00:55:11,080 Speaker 1: me through the whole time we're on phone calls, as 924 00:55:11,200 --> 00:55:13,440 Speaker 1: as Wolverine's on the Red Don calls, they did not 925 00:55:13,560 --> 00:55:16,480 Speaker 1: tell me that they had written the pandemic plan for 926 00:55:16,520 --> 00:55:21,319 Speaker 1: the CDC under the Bush administration. They're so humble, but 927 00:55:21,440 --> 00:55:24,000 Speaker 1: the premise of that is, they had gone back and 928 00:55:24,080 --> 00:55:27,680 Speaker 1: re examined nineteen eighteen and discovered that the difference between St. 929 00:55:27,680 --> 00:55:31,440 Speaker 1: Louis and Philadelphia was St. Louis lockdown sooner and prevented 930 00:55:31,640 --> 00:55:35,360 Speaker 1: a number of deaths and bad outcomes. And so schools 931 00:55:35,360 --> 00:55:37,880 Speaker 1: play a huge role. You know, with COVID, children are 932 00:55:37,960 --> 00:55:40,799 Speaker 1: less likely to show symptoms. This is opposite than a 933 00:55:40,880 --> 00:55:45,160 Speaker 1: century You go, right, that was a well, So the 934 00:55:45,200 --> 00:55:48,920 Speaker 1: pathogen is different in that the Spanish flu of nineteen eighteen. 935 00:55:49,000 --> 00:55:51,280 Speaker 1: Not to get too wonky here, but the death curve 936 00:55:51,320 --> 00:55:54,759 Speaker 1: looked like a wright so very young were very fay girl, 937 00:55:55,360 --> 00:55:58,600 Speaker 1: very young, but also twenty year old, so high spike 938 00:55:58,640 --> 00:56:01,440 Speaker 1: and the children high spike year olds, and then high 939 00:56:01,440 --> 00:56:05,120 Speaker 1: spike and the elderly. The difference with COVID is children 940 00:56:05,120 --> 00:56:09,400 Speaker 1: are largely asymptomatic, but they absolutely still spread it. And 941 00:56:09,480 --> 00:56:13,000 Speaker 1: so that was the logic behind closing down schools is 942 00:56:13,520 --> 00:56:16,759 Speaker 1: children can spread it to each other. Uh, we did 943 00:56:16,800 --> 00:56:19,879 Speaker 1: not have ample testing to detect that, and children can't 944 00:56:19,880 --> 00:56:23,360 Speaker 1: be vaccinated. Right now, I think it's really important. You know, 945 00:56:23,360 --> 00:56:25,440 Speaker 1: I have three kids and I homeschooled them for a 946 00:56:25,520 --> 00:56:29,080 Speaker 1: year during COVID while running the COVID response, It was hard. 947 00:56:29,440 --> 00:56:32,360 Speaker 1: I think getting kids back to school is critical. Kids 948 00:56:32,440 --> 00:56:34,640 Speaker 1: need to be back to school. What does that mean 949 00:56:34,920 --> 00:56:38,160 Speaker 1: all of us adults need to be vaccinated and tools 950 00:56:38,200 --> 00:56:41,640 Speaker 1: like rapid tests and masking and decreasing the risk where 951 00:56:41,640 --> 00:56:43,839 Speaker 1: we can, we need to implement that to make sure 952 00:56:43,840 --> 00:56:45,680 Speaker 1: our kiddos can get back to school in the fall. 953 00:56:46,320 --> 00:56:50,800 Speaker 1: Makes a lot of sense. Uh, what happened in cities 954 00:56:50,880 --> 00:56:54,360 Speaker 1: where they cave to pressure from either business interests or 955 00:56:54,400 --> 00:56:58,320 Speaker 1: political interests about reopening more quickly. What with the results 956 00:56:58,320 --> 00:57:02,279 Speaker 1: of that? You mean now we're in nine team both. Well, 957 00:57:02,320 --> 00:57:06,440 Speaker 1: that's the great St. Louis versus Philadelphia comparison from nineteen eighteen. 958 00:57:06,480 --> 00:57:09,759 Speaker 1: And Philadelphia they move forward and had their parade as 959 00:57:09,800 --> 00:57:13,200 Speaker 1: planned with thousands and thousands of people breathing and coughing 960 00:57:13,239 --> 00:57:16,160 Speaker 1: on each other, and you know, a few weeks later 961 00:57:16,200 --> 00:57:20,400 Speaker 1: it was a massacre of deaths in Philadelphia. And what 962 00:57:20,440 --> 00:57:23,240 Speaker 1: we're about to see in the United States is what 963 00:57:23,400 --> 00:57:26,400 Speaker 1: Carter Mesher calls a tale of two America's and I agree, 964 00:57:26,960 --> 00:57:30,800 Speaker 1: meaning in communities that are under vaccinated, the delta variant 965 00:57:30,920 --> 00:57:33,680 Speaker 1: is going to move very fast. Remember, restrictions have been 966 00:57:33,720 --> 00:57:36,960 Speaker 1: lifted a lot of people are not masking. Congregate gatherings 967 00:57:37,000 --> 00:57:40,560 Speaker 1: are taking place, and so we're about to see two America's, 968 00:57:40,640 --> 00:57:45,680 Speaker 1: vaccinated America versus unvaccinated America. And I'm very, very concerned 969 00:57:45,800 --> 00:57:50,720 Speaker 1: about the delta variant causing wreaking havoc in unvaccinated regions. 970 00:57:51,920 --> 00:57:56,160 Speaker 1: Quite quite shocking. So so, like so many other of 971 00:57:56,200 --> 00:57:59,720 Speaker 1: Michael Lewis's book, this book like looks like it's heading 972 00:58:00,520 --> 00:58:03,880 Speaker 1: uh to be made as a major motion picture. If 973 00:58:03,920 --> 00:58:07,600 Speaker 1: you could pick somebody to play you in the film, 974 00:58:07,760 --> 00:58:10,440 Speaker 1: assuming they make a film, who would you pick? Because 975 00:58:10,480 --> 00:58:13,080 Speaker 1: I have a couple of actresses I would I would 976 00:58:13,320 --> 00:58:16,800 Speaker 1: think about like Natalie Portman or Claire Danes or there's 977 00:58:16,800 --> 00:58:20,840 Speaker 1: a handful of people I think could take your role. Um, 978 00:58:20,960 --> 00:58:23,880 Speaker 1: Julia Roberts already did Aaron Rockovic, so she's off the table. 979 00:58:24,120 --> 00:58:27,360 Speaker 1: Who would you pick to play yourself? I am neutral. 980 00:58:27,640 --> 00:58:30,960 Speaker 1: I don't have an opinion. Reese Witherspoon, that could be 981 00:58:31,000 --> 00:58:34,840 Speaker 1: a good actress. What I told Universal Studios is I 982 00:58:35,000 --> 00:58:37,480 Speaker 1: offer my support and help if I can be helpful 983 00:58:37,480 --> 00:58:40,880 Speaker 1: to you anyway, and I I want to just be supportive. 984 00:58:41,040 --> 00:58:43,200 Speaker 1: They are the artists. This is what they do. They're 985 00:58:43,240 --> 00:58:46,440 Speaker 1: really good at it. I'm a nerdy public health doctor, 986 00:58:46,560 --> 00:58:48,360 Speaker 1: so I think I'll let Hollywood do what it does. 987 00:58:48,440 --> 00:58:50,800 Speaker 1: Come on, you know, there has to be someone you 988 00:58:50,840 --> 00:58:53,920 Speaker 1: think would do a good job playing you. I'm neutral, alright, 989 00:58:54,200 --> 00:58:57,840 Speaker 1: let me so I'm gonna throw a different curve ball 990 00:58:58,120 --> 00:59:01,440 Speaker 1: at you. That's movie related. Let's talk a little bit 991 00:59:01,440 --> 00:59:07,520 Speaker 1: about Star Wars. Oh, let's talk about stars looking for So. 992 00:59:07,720 --> 00:59:10,439 Speaker 1: I have to assume you've been watching The Mandalorian, right 993 00:59:10,720 --> 00:59:14,000 Speaker 1: I did. Have you watched any of the other animated 994 00:59:14,040 --> 00:59:17,600 Speaker 1: features on Disney, like Rebels, Oh, I can't bring myself 995 00:59:17,640 --> 00:59:19,400 Speaker 1: to do it, because some of them are really good. 996 00:59:19,560 --> 00:59:22,160 Speaker 1: I'm a Star Wars purist. So I watched The Mandalorian 997 00:59:22,200 --> 00:59:24,240 Speaker 1: because my my I have three boys, they're ten, twelve, 998 00:59:24,240 --> 00:59:26,280 Speaker 1: and fourteen, and they begged me and convinced me to 999 00:59:26,280 --> 00:59:29,600 Speaker 1: watch the man. It was great. It was good, but 1000 00:59:29,760 --> 00:59:32,240 Speaker 1: it's not a Star Wars. So the reason I love 1001 00:59:32,280 --> 00:59:34,840 Speaker 1: Star Wars is I first got interested in The Hero's 1002 00:59:34,920 --> 00:59:39,200 Speaker 1: Journey by Joseph Campbell, Man of a Thousand Faces, And 1003 00:59:39,240 --> 00:59:41,960 Speaker 1: when I discovered that Joseph Campbell had been a thought 1004 00:59:42,000 --> 00:59:45,920 Speaker 1: partner in designing Star Wars to be the classic heroes Journey. 1005 00:59:45,960 --> 00:59:47,520 Speaker 1: That's why I fell in love with Star Wars. So 1006 00:59:47,520 --> 00:59:50,720 Speaker 1: I haven't been able to watch any of the spinoffs. Yeah, 1007 00:59:50,720 --> 00:59:55,920 Speaker 1: but you watched all right, so if um you watched, 1008 00:59:56,560 --> 00:59:59,280 Speaker 1: obviously we all started with Star Wars and then Empire 1009 00:59:59,360 --> 01:00:03,000 Speaker 1: and then Jef Die. But then you know the episode 1010 01:00:03,040 --> 01:00:06,840 Speaker 1: the first couple sort of went off the rails after that, 1011 01:00:07,080 --> 01:00:10,440 Speaker 1: and it was only the most recent You want to 1012 01:00:10,440 --> 01:00:13,840 Speaker 1: talk about jaw Banks, that's scandalous. I so I love 1013 01:00:13,920 --> 01:00:16,760 Speaker 1: the pod race scene in episode one with Anakin as 1014 01:00:16,800 --> 01:00:19,040 Speaker 1: a little kiddo. That is one of my all time 1015 01:00:19,040 --> 01:00:23,520 Speaker 1: favorite stars. That's a good scene in a not great particular. 1016 01:00:23,960 --> 01:00:27,240 Speaker 1: I love that movie. The most recent few have been 1017 01:00:27,360 --> 01:00:31,640 Speaker 1: a huge improvement over the previous view. They're fantastic. And 1018 01:00:31,680 --> 01:00:34,920 Speaker 1: what I love about um, you know the first three. 1019 01:00:35,360 --> 01:00:38,600 Speaker 1: So if you look at Anakin Skywalker, Luke Skywalker, and 1020 01:00:38,680 --> 01:00:41,520 Speaker 1: certainly Ray, all of them are orphans in the desert 1021 01:00:41,800 --> 01:00:44,120 Speaker 1: who don't know who their family of origin is and 1022 01:00:44,120 --> 01:00:46,320 Speaker 1: they don't know what they're calling is. And I think 1023 01:00:46,360 --> 01:00:49,120 Speaker 1: that resonates with every human, you know, groping our way 1024 01:00:49,120 --> 01:00:50,840 Speaker 1: in the darkness to figure out who am I and 1025 01:00:50,880 --> 01:00:52,880 Speaker 1: what am I supposed to do? On Earth. I love 1026 01:00:52,920 --> 01:00:55,320 Speaker 1: how animated this this makes you. I can't get you 1027 01:00:55,360 --> 01:00:58,960 Speaker 1: off the fence on who should play you, Reese Witherspoon, 1028 01:00:59,000 --> 01:01:01,280 Speaker 1: give me a call, but Star Wars and you're just 1029 01:01:01,360 --> 01:01:04,960 Speaker 1: suddenly so I only have you for a few more minutes. 1030 01:01:05,080 --> 01:01:08,480 Speaker 1: Let me jump to my favorite questions that we ask 1031 01:01:08,560 --> 01:01:12,280 Speaker 1: all of our guests, and speaking of of Star Wars, 1032 01:01:12,320 --> 01:01:14,960 Speaker 1: tell us what you're streaming? What do you What are 1033 01:01:14,960 --> 01:01:18,360 Speaker 1: you when the boys watching during lockdown on Netflix or 1034 01:01:18,400 --> 01:01:29,280 Speaker 1: Amazon Prime besides the Mandalorian, Oh, I nothing, nothing. Um, 1035 01:01:29,400 --> 01:01:31,439 Speaker 1: that's not the answer you want. No, I don't. I'm 1036 01:01:31,480 --> 01:01:36,400 Speaker 1: just curious. It's answer. Yeah, it's listen. It's always a 1037 01:01:36,480 --> 01:01:41,040 Speaker 1: curiosity when you find out that someone who studies infectious 1038 01:01:41,080 --> 01:01:44,080 Speaker 1: disease love Star Wars. That sort of stuff is so 1039 01:01:44,360 --> 01:01:49,000 Speaker 1: honestly during lockdown, like your boys are not watching The Crown, No, 1040 01:01:49,080 --> 01:01:52,080 Speaker 1: they're not watching The Crown. The question over dinner is 1041 01:01:52,160 --> 01:01:54,480 Speaker 1: which Star Wars episode are you gonna watch? But you 1042 01:01:54,480 --> 01:01:56,840 Speaker 1: don't watch. It's been a year. You're not watching a 1043 01:01:56,880 --> 01:02:00,360 Speaker 1: different Star Wars every night, Episode seven about fifty six times, 1044 01:02:00,400 --> 01:02:03,160 Speaker 1: to the point that my kids say, over dinner, Mom, 1045 01:02:03,160 --> 01:02:05,960 Speaker 1: it's not episode seven. We're not watching that again, and 1046 01:02:06,040 --> 01:02:11,080 Speaker 1: so we we do watch Star Wars a lot. That's frightening. Yeah, um, 1047 01:02:11,120 --> 01:02:15,520 Speaker 1: all right, so let me let me go on, but 1048 01:02:15,560 --> 01:02:19,680 Speaker 1: it's Star Wars. Well, we watched The Mandaloriana. We watched 1049 01:02:19,720 --> 01:02:23,840 Speaker 1: Stranger Things. We repeated season one of Stranger Things because 1050 01:02:23,840 --> 01:02:27,080 Speaker 1: it's so good. We love Stranger Things. Um. I think 1051 01:02:27,120 --> 01:02:29,520 Speaker 1: that's it that we pretty much were pretty we stick 1052 01:02:29,560 --> 01:02:33,960 Speaker 1: to the same stuff. Yeah, um this, I'm gonna make 1053 01:02:34,000 --> 01:02:36,280 Speaker 1: a recommendation for you. But I'm drawing a blank on 1054 01:02:36,320 --> 01:02:39,800 Speaker 1: the name now, which is pretty awful, and I'll circle back. 1055 01:02:39,880 --> 01:02:42,880 Speaker 1: I also make them watch any movies about carbon. Did 1056 01:02:42,880 --> 01:02:47,120 Speaker 1: you see Altered Carbon? Altered Carbon? Now? It could be 1057 01:02:47,200 --> 01:02:51,840 Speaker 1: the best sci fi series I've seen this year. And 1058 01:02:51,920 --> 01:02:54,760 Speaker 1: that includes Well, The Boys might be a little too 1059 01:02:54,760 --> 01:02:57,280 Speaker 1: gross and violent for you. I don't know if that. Oh, 1060 01:02:57,280 --> 01:03:00,000 Speaker 1: we don't mind gross and violence. I generally I generally 1061 01:03:00,040 --> 01:03:03,200 Speaker 1: avoid you know, certain other categories. But gross and violent 1062 01:03:03,320 --> 01:03:05,560 Speaker 1: is Finally, there's some sexual stuff in it, but it's 1063 01:03:05,600 --> 01:03:13,560 Speaker 1: mostly just what happens if superheroes are corrupt corporate players. 1064 01:03:14,080 --> 01:03:16,880 Speaker 1: Is the theme on that. It's from a graphic novel, 1065 01:03:17,160 --> 01:03:20,080 Speaker 1: and if if If The Boys is a little too 1066 01:03:20,120 --> 01:03:23,920 Speaker 1: grizzly for you. Umbrella Academy was really interesting in the 1067 01:03:23,960 --> 01:03:27,640 Speaker 1: same orphan theme runs through that, as as Star Wars 1068 01:03:27,640 --> 01:03:30,360 Speaker 1: such is kind of interesting. There's a ton of really 1069 01:03:30,400 --> 01:03:33,240 Speaker 1: interesting sci fi that have come out but altered carbon. 1070 01:03:33,600 --> 01:03:38,680 Speaker 1: It's two seasons and it's just everybody I've recommended that too, 1071 01:03:38,720 --> 01:03:42,480 Speaker 1: has come back and said five stars. It's just so good. Okay, So, 1072 01:03:42,600 --> 01:03:44,760 Speaker 1: and I'm a Star Wars so I'm gonna tell you 1073 01:03:44,800 --> 01:03:47,320 Speaker 1: if I'm gonna make one wreck, that that's the one. 1074 01:03:47,480 --> 01:03:50,080 Speaker 1: Let's talk about your career a little bit. Who were 1075 01:03:50,160 --> 01:03:53,360 Speaker 1: some of your mentors that helped shape and guide your career. 1076 01:03:56,000 --> 01:03:59,280 Speaker 1: When I was at Tulane, I decided I wanted to 1077 01:03:59,360 --> 01:04:02,480 Speaker 1: do trauma surgery because I was working with Norm McSwain 1078 01:04:02,880 --> 01:04:05,800 Speaker 1: and Dr Norm McSwain was a famous trauma surgeon at 1079 01:04:05,840 --> 01:04:09,840 Speaker 1: Tulane and I absolutely adored him. And even though my 1080 01:04:09,880 --> 01:04:13,840 Speaker 1: path ended up twisting and turning into public health disease control, 1081 01:04:14,280 --> 01:04:17,960 Speaker 1: the way that I think about taking fast action, you know, 1082 01:04:18,120 --> 01:04:21,320 Speaker 1: cut the patient open, a lot of it goes back 1083 01:04:21,560 --> 01:04:26,120 Speaker 1: to Norm McSwain. The other mentor was doctor Steve Jose, 1084 01:04:26,360 --> 01:04:28,919 Speaker 1: who was an infectious disease doctor that Michael Lewis talked 1085 01:04:28,920 --> 01:04:31,440 Speaker 1: about in the book, and he trained me how to 1086 01:04:31,520 --> 01:04:35,280 Speaker 1: think about infectious disease. And so it's really the combination of, 1087 01:04:36,080 --> 01:04:38,960 Speaker 1: you know, the fast scalpel of a trauma surgeon with 1088 01:04:39,040 --> 01:04:42,480 Speaker 1: the critical risk management of an infectious disease doctor. That 1089 01:04:42,560 --> 01:04:47,560 Speaker 1: shaped how I manage outbreaks. Very interesting. Let's talk about books. 1090 01:04:47,600 --> 01:04:49,440 Speaker 1: What are some of your favorite books and what are 1091 01:04:49,440 --> 01:04:52,120 Speaker 1: you reading right now? Sure? Well, I'm reading a book 1092 01:04:52,120 --> 01:04:54,600 Speaker 1: by Ben Horrow. It's called The Hard Thing About Hard Things, 1093 01:04:55,360 --> 01:04:57,480 Speaker 1: and I absolutely love it. You know, I'm a new 1094 01:04:57,560 --> 01:05:01,080 Speaker 1: CEO and I'm learning and I'm learning fast, and so 1095 01:05:01,560 --> 01:05:05,000 Speaker 1: that book has really influenced my thinking around making hard 1096 01:05:05,040 --> 01:05:09,800 Speaker 1: decisions and doing them sooner. Uh. And I let's see 1097 01:05:09,840 --> 01:05:13,240 Speaker 1: what podcasts am I listening? Oh, the podcast I'm listening 1098 01:05:13,240 --> 01:05:16,320 Speaker 1: to is by Reid Hoffman, Masters of Scale. He interviews 1099 01:05:16,400 --> 01:05:19,560 Speaker 1: really interesting business leaders and actually met him last week 1100 01:05:19,600 --> 01:05:23,040 Speaker 1: for the first time, and so the Reid Hoffman podcast 1101 01:05:23,080 --> 01:05:25,280 Speaker 1: is really helpful to me to hear from other startup 1102 01:05:25,360 --> 01:05:27,800 Speaker 1: CEOs who ended up being very successful. What were their 1103 01:05:27,880 --> 01:05:30,640 Speaker 1: challenges and strategies in the very beginning. I'm trying to 1104 01:05:30,640 --> 01:05:36,280 Speaker 1: remember the name of Ben Horowitz is colleague Scott Poor, 1105 01:05:36,760 --> 01:05:40,640 Speaker 1: whose general counsel at UM Entrees and Horowitz, wrote a 1106 01:05:40,680 --> 01:05:43,840 Speaker 1: book on the Secret to Silicon Value of the Secret 1107 01:05:44,280 --> 01:05:48,680 Speaker 1: of Venture Capital, and it's really just a very smart, 1108 01:05:48,800 --> 01:05:51,000 Speaker 1: basic how to. Here's what you should know if you're 1109 01:05:51,000 --> 01:05:53,640 Speaker 1: setting up a company, if you're taking outside financing, and 1110 01:05:53,680 --> 01:05:57,160 Speaker 1: it's just written from someone from the inside. So if 1111 01:05:57,160 --> 01:06:00,360 Speaker 1: you like Ben's book, his colleague Scott's book is really 1112 01:06:01,920 --> 01:06:05,040 Speaker 1: what's interesting. I've kind of worked my way through UM 1113 01:06:05,160 --> 01:06:10,720 Speaker 1: half the A sixteen Z crew. They're they're really interesting guys. UM. 1114 01:06:10,920 --> 01:06:14,840 Speaker 1: Next question, what sort of advice would you give to 1115 01:06:14,960 --> 01:06:18,320 Speaker 1: a recent college grad who was interested in a career 1116 01:06:18,840 --> 01:06:25,800 Speaker 1: in either public health or infectious disease. I would ask 1117 01:06:25,840 --> 01:06:29,040 Speaker 1: them what they really want to do. Because of what 1118 01:06:29,080 --> 01:06:32,880 Speaker 1: they really want to do is change the world or 1119 01:06:33,120 --> 01:06:37,120 Speaker 1: protect communities, then they need to think hard about what 1120 01:06:37,160 --> 01:06:41,480 Speaker 1: their career path is because becoming a medical doctor, you know, 1121 01:06:41,560 --> 01:06:44,360 Speaker 1: my path was I went to medical school at the 1122 01:06:44,400 --> 01:06:47,160 Speaker 1: same time in parallel, doing a master's in public health 1123 01:06:47,160 --> 01:06:51,080 Speaker 1: and tropical medicine, then did general surgery, then did internal medicine. 1124 01:06:51,120 --> 01:06:53,600 Speaker 1: It is many, many years, and I would tell them 1125 01:06:53,640 --> 01:06:56,160 Speaker 1: to think long and hard about what's the endgame, what 1126 01:06:56,200 --> 01:06:59,800 Speaker 1: are they hoping to do? Because public health and medicine 1127 01:06:59,840 --> 01:07:03,800 Speaker 1: is not the only path to accomplishing what they want 1128 01:07:03,840 --> 01:07:06,920 Speaker 1: to I think people tend to think, oh, I need 1129 01:07:06,960 --> 01:07:09,960 Speaker 1: to become a doctor and or get a PhD in 1130 01:07:10,040 --> 01:07:12,680 Speaker 1: public health to make a difference, But there's lots of 1131 01:07:12,720 --> 01:07:15,880 Speaker 1: ways to make a difference that are not as long 1132 01:07:15,880 --> 01:07:20,160 Speaker 1: of a path. Interesting and our final question, what do 1133 01:07:20,200 --> 01:07:22,960 Speaker 1: you know about the world of public health today that 1134 01:07:23,040 --> 01:07:25,960 Speaker 1: you wish you knew twenty five or so years ago 1135 01:07:26,000 --> 01:07:29,040 Speaker 1: when you were first getting started? Sure, well, I'm forty 1136 01:07:29,080 --> 01:07:32,360 Speaker 1: three years old, so twenty five or so years ago 1137 01:07:32,480 --> 01:07:36,400 Speaker 1: would put me at what call years ago? Though? So 1138 01:07:36,440 --> 01:07:39,320 Speaker 1: when you were first thinking about public health and and 1139 01:07:39,880 --> 01:07:44,840 Speaker 1: what what insight do you have today might have helped you? Um, 1140 01:07:44,920 --> 01:07:49,960 Speaker 1: when you were just getting out of medical school. I 1141 01:07:50,000 --> 01:07:52,400 Speaker 1: wish I had known that I was just as smart 1142 01:07:53,320 --> 01:07:57,240 Speaker 1: that a poor kid from rural California, I'm sorry, a 1143 01:07:57,280 --> 01:08:00,880 Speaker 1: poor kid from rural Oregon that grew up on government 1144 01:08:00,960 --> 01:08:06,040 Speaker 1: assistance with parents that didn't have college degrees, could not 1145 01:08:06,160 --> 01:08:11,360 Speaker 1: only be just as successful, but could absolutely lead a 1146 01:08:11,400 --> 01:08:14,400 Speaker 1: public health department or lead an entire state. I didn't 1147 01:08:14,440 --> 01:08:17,680 Speaker 1: know that then. I was very intimidated by my classmates 1148 01:08:17,680 --> 01:08:21,479 Speaker 1: who came from wealthy families and ivy league colleges and 1149 01:08:21,560 --> 01:08:26,400 Speaker 1: I didn't. And that impostor syndrome has plagued me my 1150 01:08:26,479 --> 01:08:30,879 Speaker 1: whole career, and I still struggle with it. And today, 1151 01:08:31,040 --> 01:08:34,200 Speaker 1: you know, covid response to such a great example where 1152 01:08:34,240 --> 01:08:37,479 Speaker 1: what really matters is how brave someone is and how 1153 01:08:37,600 --> 01:08:42,120 Speaker 1: committed they are, and how much they persevere, not necessarily 1154 01:08:43,000 --> 01:08:46,439 Speaker 1: the privilege or their family of origin. But when you're 1155 01:08:46,479 --> 01:08:49,679 Speaker 1: twenty three years old you don't know that yet. That's 1156 01:08:49,760 --> 01:08:53,600 Speaker 1: quite interesting. Thank you, Charity for being so generous with 1157 01:08:53,680 --> 01:08:57,240 Speaker 1: your time. We have been speaking with Charity Dean. She 1158 01:08:57,640 --> 01:09:01,200 Speaker 1: is the co founder of the Public Health Company, as 1159 01:09:01,240 --> 01:09:05,480 Speaker 1: well as the protagonist of Michael Lewis's new book, The Premonition. 1160 01:09:05,880 --> 01:09:08,439 Speaker 1: If you enjoy this conversation, well, be sure and check 1161 01:09:08,479 --> 01:09:11,920 Speaker 1: out any of our previous UH three and fifty or 1162 01:09:11,960 --> 01:09:15,679 Speaker 1: so such podcasts that we've done over the past seven years. 1163 01:09:16,040 --> 01:09:20,479 Speaker 1: You can find those at iTunes, Spotify, wherever finer podcasts 1164 01:09:20,520 --> 01:09:24,439 Speaker 1: are found. We love your comments, feedback and suggestions right 1165 01:09:24,520 --> 01:09:27,840 Speaker 1: to us at m IB podcast at Bloomberg dot net. 1166 01:09:28,360 --> 01:09:31,320 Speaker 1: You can sign up from my Daily Reads at Ridolts 1167 01:09:31,400 --> 01:09:35,080 Speaker 1: dot com. Check out my weekly column on Bloomberg dot 1168 01:09:35,120 --> 01:09:39,360 Speaker 1: com slash Opinion. Follow me on Twitter at rit Halts. 1169 01:09:39,560 --> 01:09:41,320 Speaker 1: I would be remiss if I did not thank the 1170 01:09:41,360 --> 01:09:44,880 Speaker 1: crack staff that helps put this conversation together each week. 1171 01:09:45,320 --> 01:09:49,480 Speaker 1: Paris Wald is my producer. Charlie Wouldner is my audio engineer. 1172 01:09:49,760 --> 01:09:53,439 Speaker 1: A Tika val Bron is our project manager. Michael Batnick 1173 01:09:53,640 --> 01:09:57,640 Speaker 1: is my researcher. I'm Barry Hults. You've been listening to 1174 01:09:57,760 --> 01:10:01,200 Speaker 1: b STOOD Business on Bloomberg Radio.