1 00:00:03,040 --> 00:00:06,800 Speaker 1: Welcome to Stuff to Blow Your Mind, a production of iHeartRadio. 2 00:00:12,800 --> 00:00:15,160 Speaker 2: Hey, welcome to Stuff to Blow Your Mind. My name 3 00:00:15,200 --> 00:00:15,800 Speaker 2: is Robert. 4 00:00:15,600 --> 00:00:18,840 Speaker 3: Lamb and I am Joe McCormick, and today we are 5 00:00:18,880 --> 00:00:22,840 Speaker 3: back to continue our series on the psychology concept known 6 00:00:22,960 --> 00:00:28,360 Speaker 3: as the illusion of control. This is a cognitive illusion 7 00:00:28,480 --> 00:00:31,400 Speaker 3: or a common error in thinking and judgment, in which 8 00:00:31,440 --> 00:00:36,280 Speaker 3: we overestimate the amount of control we have over outcomes 9 00:00:36,440 --> 00:00:39,720 Speaker 3: in the world, even outcomes that are in no way 10 00:00:40,280 --> 00:00:44,479 Speaker 3: determined by our actions. So if you haven't heard part one, 11 00:00:44,520 --> 00:00:46,440 Speaker 3: you should probably go back and listen to that first. 12 00:00:46,520 --> 00:00:49,600 Speaker 3: But for a brief recap. We talked about some examples 13 00:00:49,680 --> 00:00:53,199 Speaker 3: last time of the illusion of control. One would be 14 00:00:53,280 --> 00:00:56,640 Speaker 3: the belief that you can control your chances of winning 15 00:00:56,680 --> 00:01:00,320 Speaker 3: at a slot machine based on who presses the the 16 00:01:00,320 --> 00:01:02,960 Speaker 3: button and how when actually you know it's a purely 17 00:01:03,040 --> 00:01:06,360 Speaker 3: random process. There's no like. You know, you can't be 18 00:01:06,440 --> 00:01:09,640 Speaker 3: like better at working a slot machine. But other examples 19 00:01:09,640 --> 00:01:12,560 Speaker 3: would include like the belief that you can improve your 20 00:01:12,680 --> 00:01:15,640 Speaker 3: chances of hitting a desired number on a dice throw 21 00:01:15,720 --> 00:01:18,039 Speaker 3: by concentrating before the throw. 22 00:01:18,280 --> 00:01:21,840 Speaker 2: I do this, yeah, yeah, and yeah, I was going 23 00:01:21,880 --> 00:01:23,160 Speaker 2: to save this for a listener mail, but I go 24 00:01:23,200 --> 00:01:25,759 Speaker 2: ahead and mention it. Now heard from a listener on 25 00:01:25,920 --> 00:01:30,720 Speaker 2: Discord who pointed out this is I believe it's pass cish. 26 00:01:31,160 --> 00:01:34,560 Speaker 2: I'm not sure if I'm pronouncing that correctly, use your name, 27 00:01:34,600 --> 00:01:36,720 Speaker 2: but anyway, may point it out that in Dungeons and 28 00:01:36,800 --> 00:01:40,600 Speaker 2: Dragons there's an additional element here that we didn't touch on, 29 00:01:40,640 --> 00:01:43,960 Speaker 2: and that's the drama of rolling your dice, of rolling 30 00:01:43,959 --> 00:01:46,880 Speaker 2: that D twenty, doing that saving throw. You may put 31 00:01:46,880 --> 00:01:49,600 Speaker 2: some concentration into it, not because not as much because 32 00:01:49,640 --> 00:01:52,960 Speaker 2: you're hoping to influence the roll, but because this matters, 33 00:01:53,000 --> 00:01:56,920 Speaker 2: This is an important role. Perhaps the life or death 34 00:01:56,960 --> 00:02:00,200 Speaker 2: of your character may hinge on the outcome. You can 35 00:02:00,320 --> 00:02:01,160 Speaker 2: play it up a little bit. 36 00:02:01,440 --> 00:02:04,000 Speaker 3: Yeah, it's a socially performative drum roll. 37 00:02:04,440 --> 00:02:07,320 Speaker 2: But I think undeniably there's off also that sense of like, 38 00:02:07,520 --> 00:02:09,560 Speaker 2: all right, NAT twenty, let's do it. 39 00:02:09,880 --> 00:02:10,640 Speaker 3: I can do this. 40 00:02:11,560 --> 00:02:12,840 Speaker 2: Yeah. 41 00:02:13,200 --> 00:02:15,560 Speaker 3: Other examples would be like the belief that you can 42 00:02:15,600 --> 00:02:18,760 Speaker 3: influence the outcome of a sporting event hundreds of miles 43 00:02:18,760 --> 00:02:22,080 Speaker 3: away by wearing a lucky charm. We talked about the 44 00:02:22,240 --> 00:02:25,919 Speaker 3: childhood belief that you can control gameplay on a video 45 00:02:26,000 --> 00:02:28,920 Speaker 3: game with like a controller, that's not plugged in, or 46 00:02:28,960 --> 00:02:32,040 Speaker 3: by moving the joystick on a on an arcade cabinet, 47 00:02:32,080 --> 00:02:33,440 Speaker 3: you haven't put any quarters in. 48 00:02:34,000 --> 00:02:34,240 Speaker 2: Yeah. 49 00:02:34,360 --> 00:02:37,760 Speaker 3: Yeah, And we also ended up talking about an influential 50 00:02:37,800 --> 00:02:41,120 Speaker 3: early paper on the illusion of control from nineteen seventy 51 00:02:41,160 --> 00:02:44,280 Speaker 3: five called the Illusion of Control in the Journal of 52 00:02:44,280 --> 00:02:49,160 Speaker 3: Personality and Social Psychology by the American psychologist Ellen J. Langer. 53 00:02:50,160 --> 00:02:52,760 Speaker 3: And for a quick summary of this paper, it used 54 00:02:52,840 --> 00:02:58,800 Speaker 3: experiments involving games of chance with superficial elements inserted from 55 00:02:59,040 --> 00:03:03,000 Speaker 3: games of skill to see if people would behave consistent 56 00:03:03,120 --> 00:03:06,320 Speaker 3: with a belief that they had impossible levels of control 57 00:03:06,480 --> 00:03:10,640 Speaker 3: over chance outcomes. And this study found that yes, in 58 00:03:10,720 --> 00:03:13,520 Speaker 3: its experiments, people did behave in a way that was 59 00:03:13,600 --> 00:03:19,800 Speaker 3: consistent with overestimating their level of control over chance determined outcomes. However, 60 00:03:20,120 --> 00:03:23,119 Speaker 3: the thing about this paper was the experiments did use 61 00:03:23,360 --> 00:03:28,720 Speaker 3: indirect methods of studying the phenomenon, so these results came 62 00:03:28,720 --> 00:03:31,760 Speaker 3: with some limitations that I'll describe in just a minute. 63 00:03:32,200 --> 00:03:34,600 Speaker 3: I wanted to learn some more about the history of 64 00:03:34,639 --> 00:03:37,520 Speaker 3: how the illusion of control has been studied, because there 65 00:03:37,520 --> 00:03:40,680 Speaker 3: have been tons of papers on this, tons of experiments, 66 00:03:41,080 --> 00:03:43,600 Speaker 3: and I wanted to kind of general overview, so I 67 00:03:43,680 --> 00:03:47,400 Speaker 3: turned to a very helpful book chapter by a psychologist 68 00:03:47,440 --> 00:03:52,080 Speaker 3: named Suzanne C. Thompson. The chapter is called Illusions of 69 00:03:52,240 --> 00:03:56,680 Speaker 3: Control and it appears in a book called Cognitive Illusions 70 00:03:56,840 --> 00:04:01,400 Speaker 3: edited by Rudiger F. Pohl published by Psychology Press twenty sixteen, 71 00:04:02,200 --> 00:04:04,120 Speaker 3: though the version I read seems to have been an 72 00:04:04,160 --> 00:04:08,680 Speaker 3: updated edition because it included references to more recent studies, 73 00:04:08,680 --> 00:04:11,440 Speaker 3: such as one paper from twenty twenty one. So in 74 00:04:11,480 --> 00:04:15,680 Speaker 3: this overview, Thompson uses a broader definition of the illusion 75 00:04:15,680 --> 00:04:19,800 Speaker 3: of control than Langer did. Langer's definition was specifically about 76 00:04:20,400 --> 00:04:27,000 Speaker 3: seeking desired outcomes in chance determined events. Thompson says, instead, quote, 77 00:04:27,040 --> 00:04:32,640 Speaker 3: illusions of control occur when individuals overestimate their personal influence 78 00:04:32,800 --> 00:04:36,920 Speaker 3: influence over an outcome. So that's a more general way 79 00:04:36,960 --> 00:04:38,960 Speaker 3: of stating it. You know, maybe your influence could be 80 00:04:39,000 --> 00:04:41,400 Speaker 3: good or bad. It could be in getting something you 81 00:04:41,440 --> 00:04:42,840 Speaker 3: want or in something you don't want. 82 00:04:43,160 --> 00:04:46,279 Speaker 2: Yeah, so this broader definition could apply to like various 83 00:04:46,279 --> 00:04:48,360 Speaker 2: games that have some sort of random element that you 84 00:04:48,440 --> 00:04:51,040 Speaker 2: truly can't control. For you may be really great at 85 00:04:51,040 --> 00:04:53,600 Speaker 2: the game, but you have this added level of illusion 86 00:04:53,600 --> 00:04:55,599 Speaker 2: of control that thinks that you can you can definitely 87 00:04:55,680 --> 00:04:58,480 Speaker 2: navigate any random occurrence. And I guess you could also 88 00:04:58,560 --> 00:05:02,760 Speaker 2: apply it even to interperson relationships, you know, thinking that 89 00:05:02,839 --> 00:05:05,360 Speaker 2: you have more control over other people in your circle 90 00:05:05,360 --> 00:05:06,000 Speaker 2: than you do. 91 00:05:06,320 --> 00:05:09,040 Speaker 3: Right, because this idea would also apply to things where 92 00:05:09,040 --> 00:05:11,960 Speaker 3: you do have some control, but you're imagining you have 93 00:05:12,200 --> 00:05:16,320 Speaker 3: more control than you actually do. And Thompson says that 94 00:05:16,440 --> 00:05:19,200 Speaker 3: since the origins of this research in the nineteen seventies, 95 00:05:19,240 --> 00:05:23,920 Speaker 3: there have been basically three different ways of experimentally demonstrating 96 00:05:23,960 --> 00:05:28,680 Speaker 3: that people experience illusory control. There's like three branches of 97 00:05:28,720 --> 00:05:32,520 Speaker 3: experiments on this tree. So approach number one that she 98 00:05:32,680 --> 00:05:37,239 Speaker 3: outlines is the main example here is the original research 99 00:05:37,279 --> 00:05:40,760 Speaker 3: by Ellen Langer, which we already described in the last episode. 100 00:05:41,120 --> 00:05:46,440 Speaker 3: This general strategy involves gauging people's guesses about their likelihood 101 00:05:46,440 --> 00:05:50,680 Speaker 3: of success in chance games that have superficial elements of 102 00:05:50,680 --> 00:05:54,760 Speaker 3: skill games introduced. So to emphasize again, this approach does 103 00:05:54,839 --> 00:06:00,400 Speaker 3: not actually directly measure people's perceptions of control. Instead, these 104 00:06:00,440 --> 00:06:03,400 Speaker 3: experiments would kind of infer it from their behavior in 105 00:06:03,440 --> 00:06:06,480 Speaker 3: a game. So you see that people bet more money, 106 00:06:06,880 --> 00:06:10,880 Speaker 3: that suggests they think they have more control over the outcome. 107 00:06:11,279 --> 00:06:14,640 Speaker 3: But it's possible there's another factor operating there, so there's 108 00:06:14,720 --> 00:06:19,000 Speaker 3: less certainty that you're testing for the variable you're actually 109 00:06:19,040 --> 00:06:23,680 Speaker 3: looking for. And Thompson explains some other ways of doing 110 00:06:23,760 --> 00:06:27,760 Speaker 3: these kind of tests apart from like Langer's original experimental design. 111 00:06:27,880 --> 00:06:31,599 Speaker 3: One thing she talks about is a type of study 112 00:06:31,680 --> 00:06:36,359 Speaker 3: that you could call like observer participant discrepancies. So an 113 00:06:36,400 --> 00:06:38,600 Speaker 3: example of this would be you get a test group, 114 00:06:38,680 --> 00:06:41,400 Speaker 3: you know, maybe a classroom of students or whatever, and 115 00:06:41,440 --> 00:06:44,160 Speaker 3: you split them up into pairs, and you give each 116 00:06:44,360 --> 00:06:48,919 Speaker 3: pair of subjects a random number generating apparatus, maybe a 117 00:06:49,000 --> 00:06:52,440 Speaker 3: die that's a simple one. So in each pair, there's 118 00:06:52,680 --> 00:06:55,640 Speaker 3: one person who gets to roll the die, and the 119 00:06:55,720 --> 00:06:59,400 Speaker 3: other person records all the numbers that they roll, and 120 00:06:59,440 --> 00:07:03,800 Speaker 3: participants do this like twenty times, and then across the 121 00:07:03,839 --> 00:07:07,240 Speaker 3: whole test group, whichever pair in the group has the 122 00:07:07,320 --> 00:07:11,680 Speaker 3: highest total sum of roles wins a cash prize, and 123 00:07:11,880 --> 00:07:16,640 Speaker 3: both subjects in each pair guess their likelihood of winning 124 00:07:16,720 --> 00:07:20,240 Speaker 3: before the game. Thompson says that if you try to 125 00:07:20,240 --> 00:07:23,480 Speaker 3: replicate this sort of experiment with students, you will usually 126 00:07:23,520 --> 00:07:26,880 Speaker 3: find that subjects, on average rate their chance of winning 127 00:07:27,160 --> 00:07:29,840 Speaker 3: a little bit higher if they're the one rolling the 128 00:07:29,960 --> 00:07:33,480 Speaker 3: die than if they're the one recording the roles. Again, 129 00:07:33,520 --> 00:07:36,280 Speaker 3: that should not make a difference. So even though we 130 00:07:36,360 --> 00:07:39,480 Speaker 3: both rationally know that the outcome is random, it just 131 00:07:39,680 --> 00:07:44,920 Speaker 3: feels a little luckier if I'm the one doing it. However, 132 00:07:45,040 --> 00:07:48,240 Speaker 3: and I thought this was interesting. Thompson says that some 133 00:07:48,360 --> 00:07:51,200 Speaker 3: research has found that this effect can be reduced or 134 00:07:51,240 --> 00:07:56,160 Speaker 3: even neutralized completely by the context of the game, for example, 135 00:07:56,600 --> 00:07:59,640 Speaker 3: if it takes place in a classroom that has previously 136 00:07:59,680 --> 00:08:04,200 Speaker 3: discs us the correct way to estimate probability on games 137 00:08:04,360 --> 00:08:09,000 Speaker 3: like this. And that was interesting to me because it 138 00:08:09,120 --> 00:08:13,320 Speaker 3: made me think about how people overcome cognitive biases and 139 00:08:13,360 --> 00:08:18,160 Speaker 3: cognitive illusions. You know, sometimes the unfortunate fact is that 140 00:08:18,720 --> 00:08:23,080 Speaker 3: simply being aware of a cognitive illusion, like knowing that 141 00:08:23,120 --> 00:08:26,720 Speaker 3: sometimes our brains have a certain kind of bias, is 142 00:08:26,760 --> 00:08:30,400 Speaker 3: not sufficient to keep us from falling for that bias. 143 00:08:30,680 --> 00:08:33,679 Speaker 3: So you can, like know about the tricks your brain plays, 144 00:08:34,000 --> 00:08:36,000 Speaker 3: and you can fall for them anyway. It happens to 145 00:08:36,040 --> 00:08:38,000 Speaker 3: all of us, but in every case. 146 00:08:37,880 --> 00:08:40,800 Speaker 2: And this obviously applies to many other aspects of the 147 00:08:40,880 --> 00:08:45,120 Speaker 2: human psyche as well. I mean awareness, self awareness is 148 00:08:45,280 --> 00:08:48,559 Speaker 2: often the first step, but that doesn't mean you've completely 149 00:08:49,120 --> 00:08:52,480 Speaker 2: defeated the illusion or illusion that you are having to 150 00:08:52,520 --> 00:08:54,080 Speaker 2: deal with exactly. 151 00:08:54,120 --> 00:08:56,880 Speaker 3: This is true for everybody, but in other cases, and 152 00:08:57,200 --> 00:08:59,880 Speaker 3: it varies from case to case. So in some cases, 153 00:09:00,320 --> 00:09:04,600 Speaker 3: research has shown that we can be successfully inoculated mentally 154 00:09:04,720 --> 00:09:08,160 Speaker 3: from certain irrational tendencies by being made aware of them, 155 00:09:08,600 --> 00:09:10,560 Speaker 3: and this seems to be one of those cases. You 156 00:09:10,679 --> 00:09:15,400 Speaker 3: can sometimes neutralize illusions of control just by like having 157 00:09:15,400 --> 00:09:18,959 Speaker 3: a context in which people have already been reminded about 158 00:09:18,960 --> 00:09:23,960 Speaker 3: how probabilities work. And I think that's interesting because you 159 00:09:24,040 --> 00:09:29,160 Speaker 3: might naturally assume that the variable in resistance to cognitive 160 00:09:29,200 --> 00:09:32,720 Speaker 3: illusions like the illusion of control is the person you know, 161 00:09:32,800 --> 00:09:37,080 Speaker 3: like permanent features of a person's personality, and you might 162 00:09:37,080 --> 00:09:39,959 Speaker 3: be inclined to think like, well, a more rational person 163 00:09:40,120 --> 00:09:43,040 Speaker 3: is better able to overcome their biases and think clearly. 164 00:09:43,600 --> 00:09:45,640 Speaker 3: But I don't know if that's always the case. I 165 00:09:45,720 --> 00:09:50,200 Speaker 3: wonder if it's really more about setting and context. Maybe 166 00:09:50,240 --> 00:09:55,240 Speaker 3: setting and context are equally, if not more, powerful predictors 167 00:09:55,840 --> 00:09:59,160 Speaker 3: of how well people overcome cognitive illusions. In other words, 168 00:09:59,200 --> 00:10:02,760 Speaker 3: does like currently being in the setting of a statistics 169 00:10:02,800 --> 00:10:07,800 Speaker 3: class inoculate you against the illusion of control better than 170 00:10:07,880 --> 00:10:11,160 Speaker 3: being a person who is generally aware of cognitive illusions. 171 00:10:11,440 --> 00:10:13,680 Speaker 3: I don't know the answer for sure there, but it 172 00:10:13,720 --> 00:10:18,079 Speaker 3: seems worth considering rather than just defaulting to the explanation 173 00:10:18,200 --> 00:10:24,120 Speaker 3: of permanent internal personality based differences. But anyway, so to 174 00:10:24,160 --> 00:10:27,439 Speaker 3: move on, That was approach number one. Experimental approach number 175 00:10:27,440 --> 00:10:32,360 Speaker 3: two is different. In this type of experiment, you give 176 00:10:32,480 --> 00:10:38,160 Speaker 3: subjects a laboratory task where researchers can program exactly how 177 00:10:38,240 --> 00:10:41,840 Speaker 3: much control the subject actually has, and in many of 178 00:10:41,880 --> 00:10:45,360 Speaker 3: these experiments the subject has zero control. Sometimes they have 179 00:10:45,480 --> 00:10:49,040 Speaker 3: more control, and then you ask the subject how much 180 00:10:49,080 --> 00:10:52,520 Speaker 3: control they think they had. So an experiment typical of 181 00:10:52,559 --> 00:10:55,000 Speaker 3: this type is one that was done by Alloy and 182 00:10:55,040 --> 00:10:59,840 Speaker 3: Abrahamson in nineteen seventy nine, in which subjects would be 183 00:11:00,360 --> 00:11:04,120 Speaker 3: given a button to press and they're told to see 184 00:11:04,160 --> 00:11:07,160 Speaker 3: if they can use that button to control whether or 185 00:11:07,240 --> 00:11:10,160 Speaker 3: not a light comes on, and then they're asked to 186 00:11:10,280 --> 00:11:13,520 Speaker 3: judge at the end what amount of control they think 187 00:11:13,559 --> 00:11:17,240 Speaker 3: the button had over the light. In reality, the light 188 00:11:17,400 --> 00:11:20,880 Speaker 3: had no relationship to whether the button was pressed or not. 189 00:11:21,000 --> 00:11:23,280 Speaker 3: It was simply programmed to come on at some fixed 190 00:11:23,320 --> 00:11:27,280 Speaker 3: percentage of the trials with each subject, and unsurprisingly even 191 00:11:27,320 --> 00:11:30,640 Speaker 3: though it had nothing to do with whether the button 192 00:11:30,720 --> 00:11:34,000 Speaker 3: was pushed or not, or when subjects broadly thought they 193 00:11:34,000 --> 00:11:37,480 Speaker 3: had some amount of control, and experiments when the light 194 00:11:37,600 --> 00:11:41,600 Speaker 3: came on more frequently but again unconnected to the button, 195 00:11:41,960 --> 00:11:45,080 Speaker 3: caused people to believe that they had more control over 196 00:11:45,120 --> 00:11:48,280 Speaker 3: the light. So, at least in some cases, it seems 197 00:11:48,360 --> 00:11:53,160 Speaker 3: like success at getting a desired outcome makes people more 198 00:11:53,320 --> 00:11:56,319 Speaker 3: likely to believe they have control over that outcome, whether 199 00:11:56,400 --> 00:12:00,720 Speaker 3: or not they do. And while at the risk of 200 00:12:00,800 --> 00:12:04,440 Speaker 3: over extrapolating from a very contained laboratory outcome, this does 201 00:12:04,559 --> 00:12:08,080 Speaker 3: sort of suggest to me connections to behaviors in the world, 202 00:12:08,240 --> 00:12:11,160 Speaker 3: Like you know, when somebody has very good fortune at 203 00:12:11,160 --> 00:12:16,840 Speaker 3: a particular juncture, they're like, yep, that was all me. Later, 204 00:12:16,960 --> 00:12:20,240 Speaker 3: Thompson describes another version of this kind of test. This 205 00:12:20,240 --> 00:12:23,320 Speaker 3: one is called the computer screen on set task. And 206 00:12:23,360 --> 00:12:25,160 Speaker 3: so in this test, like you sit in front of 207 00:12:25,200 --> 00:12:28,040 Speaker 3: a computer and you're looking at a screen, and the 208 00:12:28,080 --> 00:12:32,160 Speaker 3: screen will sequentially produce a series of forty images, and 209 00:12:32,240 --> 00:12:35,240 Speaker 3: all of these images are either a green X or 210 00:12:35,280 --> 00:12:38,120 Speaker 3: a red O. And with each new screen, you can 211 00:12:38,200 --> 00:12:40,760 Speaker 3: choose to press a button or not press a button, 212 00:12:41,200 --> 00:12:43,959 Speaker 3: and your goal is to make the green X appear 213 00:12:44,040 --> 00:12:46,839 Speaker 3: as many times as possible, so people will be trying 214 00:12:46,880 --> 00:12:49,360 Speaker 3: to figure out if there's some pattern like pressing the 215 00:12:49,360 --> 00:12:52,400 Speaker 3: button or not, you know, pressing it or not in 216 00:12:52,400 --> 00:12:56,800 Speaker 3: what sequence, etc. That'll make the greenexes appear. Actually, once again, 217 00:12:56,840 --> 00:12:59,800 Speaker 3: the button has no relation whatsoever to whether the symbols 218 00:13:00,040 --> 00:13:03,240 Speaker 3: here on the screen. The button doesn't do anything, and 219 00:13:03,280 --> 00:13:07,160 Speaker 3: you can vary what percentage of each symbol the subjects get. 220 00:13:07,440 --> 00:13:09,240 Speaker 3: At the end of the test, you have them rate 221 00:13:09,280 --> 00:13:11,360 Speaker 3: on a scale of zero to one hundred how much 222 00:13:11,440 --> 00:13:14,640 Speaker 3: control they think they had over what appeared on the screen. 223 00:13:15,080 --> 00:13:17,920 Speaker 3: People who got the green ex seventy five percent of 224 00:13:17,960 --> 00:13:21,000 Speaker 3: their random screens believed that they had a lot of 225 00:13:21,040 --> 00:13:22,439 Speaker 3: control over the display. 226 00:13:22,960 --> 00:13:25,160 Speaker 2: This is also interesting to think of in terms of 227 00:13:25,200 --> 00:13:27,920 Speaker 2: the example we discussed in the last episode about as 228 00:13:27,960 --> 00:13:31,040 Speaker 2: a child thinking you had control over a video game. Yeah, 229 00:13:32,360 --> 00:13:35,760 Speaker 2: maybe this doesn't play out. I'd be interesting to hear 230 00:13:35,760 --> 00:13:39,240 Speaker 2: from folks much younger than me. But looking back on 231 00:13:39,280 --> 00:13:41,920 Speaker 2: the video games that I was doing this on, like 232 00:13:41,960 --> 00:13:47,280 Speaker 2: these were the old school arcade games where it was 233 00:13:47,440 --> 00:13:50,480 Speaker 2: maybe a little more directly comparable to just pressing a 234 00:13:50,520 --> 00:13:53,040 Speaker 2: button and seeing a random o or an ax on 235 00:13:53,080 --> 00:13:55,000 Speaker 2: the screen, like there was a lot more room to 236 00:13:55,160 --> 00:13:57,880 Speaker 2: ask the question, Am I controlling it? I have fifty 237 00:13:57,920 --> 00:13:59,120 Speaker 2: percent chance I am. 238 00:13:59,400 --> 00:14:02,360 Speaker 3: In a way, I'm almost nostalgic for that mindset, Like 239 00:14:02,400 --> 00:14:06,320 Speaker 3: there's something kind of beautiful about the ambiguity of wondering 240 00:14:06,400 --> 00:14:09,160 Speaker 3: if you're controlling what's happening on the screen. I feel 241 00:14:09,200 --> 00:14:11,720 Speaker 3: like maybe I'm wrong about this. I feel like I 242 00:14:11,720 --> 00:14:14,120 Speaker 3: wouldn't fall for that now, but I kind of wish 243 00:14:14,160 --> 00:14:18,040 Speaker 3: I could, because it suggests a more I don't know, 244 00:14:18,240 --> 00:14:22,040 Speaker 3: just kind of like totally radically opened state of mind 245 00:14:22,120 --> 00:14:24,640 Speaker 3: in which anything is possible, a more magical way of 246 00:14:24,680 --> 00:14:25,680 Speaker 3: relating to the world. 247 00:14:26,080 --> 00:14:28,560 Speaker 2: It's a cheaper way to go about going to the arcade, 248 00:14:28,680 --> 00:14:30,640 Speaker 2: you know. I wonder what they would think if if 249 00:14:30,640 --> 00:14:32,760 Speaker 2: there was an adult who regularly came into the arcade 250 00:14:32,760 --> 00:14:34,800 Speaker 2: and they're like, oh man, he never spends anything. He 251 00:14:34,960 --> 00:14:37,000 Speaker 2: just stands at the machines and pretends to play. 252 00:14:37,520 --> 00:14:39,800 Speaker 3: Yeah, just toggling the joystick at the demo. 253 00:14:40,000 --> 00:14:44,480 Speaker 2: It's great, I gotta sell this guy's nacho do something Okay? 254 00:14:44,480 --> 00:14:48,440 Speaker 3: Anyway, that's approach number two. These very tightly controlled laboratory experiments. 255 00:14:48,480 --> 00:14:52,080 Speaker 3: Approach number three is different. Once again, you get people 256 00:14:52,120 --> 00:14:55,920 Speaker 3: to report their judgments of control in real life scenarios. 257 00:14:56,520 --> 00:14:59,360 Speaker 3: An example here is a study by McKenna in nineteen 258 00:14:59,440 --> 00:15:01,479 Speaker 3: ninety three. Not that McKenna different. 259 00:15:01,240 --> 00:15:03,280 Speaker 2: McCay, I think this is Frank P. McKenna. 260 00:15:03,560 --> 00:15:08,520 Speaker 3: Yeah. Ask participants to rate the likelihood that, compared to 261 00:15:08,680 --> 00:15:13,920 Speaker 3: other drivers, they would experience an auto collision, and they 262 00:15:13,920 --> 00:15:17,280 Speaker 3: were asked to judge this when imagining themselves as the 263 00:15:17,360 --> 00:15:22,760 Speaker 3: driver versus imagining themselves as the passenger. Perhaps unsurprisingly, most 264 00:15:22,800 --> 00:15:26,720 Speaker 3: people thought that accidents would be relatively less likely if 265 00:15:26,720 --> 00:15:27,600 Speaker 3: they were the driver. 266 00:15:28,240 --> 00:15:31,360 Speaker 2: This absolutely matches up with my experience. You know, even 267 00:15:31,360 --> 00:15:33,160 Speaker 2: when I'm in the car with a driver that I 268 00:15:33,280 --> 00:15:36,400 Speaker 2: definitely trust and even know that they are a better 269 00:15:36,480 --> 00:15:40,240 Speaker 2: driver than me, you know, maybe they have more experience 270 00:15:40,360 --> 00:15:43,480 Speaker 2: or they've undergone training, they're still like that gut feeling 271 00:15:43,520 --> 00:15:46,680 Speaker 2: of like I am not actually in control. I can't 272 00:15:46,760 --> 00:15:49,120 Speaker 2: hit the brake when I see the brake lights ahead 273 00:15:49,120 --> 00:15:52,440 Speaker 2: getting closer, and therefore I feel like a little more 274 00:15:52,480 --> 00:15:56,240 Speaker 2: anxious about the whole scenario oftentimes, like realizing that this 275 00:15:56,360 --> 00:15:59,320 Speaker 2: is irrational, but feeling it Nonetheless. 276 00:15:59,000 --> 00:16:00,960 Speaker 3: I totally relate to that. I feel that too the 277 00:16:00,960 --> 00:16:03,600 Speaker 3: same thing. It's not like I actually think this other 278 00:16:03,680 --> 00:16:06,160 Speaker 3: person is a more dangerous driver than me. I just 279 00:16:06,480 --> 00:16:09,640 Speaker 3: it's just hard to get over that feeling. In a 280 00:16:09,680 --> 00:16:14,120 Speaker 3: second study, in this McKenna paper, participants were asked about 281 00:16:14,200 --> 00:16:17,920 Speaker 3: specific types of collisions, those that would seem to involve 282 00:16:17,960 --> 00:16:20,960 Speaker 3: either more or less driver control. So they were talking 283 00:16:21,000 --> 00:16:24,920 Speaker 3: about like rear ending someone versus being rear ended versus 284 00:16:24,960 --> 00:16:29,680 Speaker 3: having a tire blowout, And the idea was rear ending 285 00:16:29,760 --> 00:16:34,000 Speaker 3: someone is generally thought to be largely subject to driver control. 286 00:16:34,320 --> 00:16:36,560 Speaker 3: Of course, we know that there are factors that other 287 00:16:36,560 --> 00:16:39,920 Speaker 3: factors that can intervene, breaks, could fail whatever, whereas getting 288 00:16:39,960 --> 00:16:42,600 Speaker 3: rear ended seems to be out of the driver's hands, 289 00:16:43,160 --> 00:16:46,640 Speaker 3: and people were highly likely to say that they were 290 00:16:47,080 --> 00:16:50,400 Speaker 3: less likely to have the type of collision in which 291 00:16:50,440 --> 00:16:54,040 Speaker 3: the driver was in control has high control, So I 292 00:16:54,080 --> 00:16:57,440 Speaker 3: am much less likely than other people to rear end someone. 293 00:16:58,200 --> 00:17:00,800 Speaker 3: Whether it's me or someone else, makes less difference in 294 00:17:00,920 --> 00:17:01,920 Speaker 3: getting rear ended. 295 00:17:03,200 --> 00:17:03,600 Speaker 2: Quote. 296 00:17:03,800 --> 00:17:07,680 Speaker 3: Thus, people show illusory control over avoiding an accident by 297 00:17:07,720 --> 00:17:11,520 Speaker 3: assuming that they will be able to exert control that 298 00:17:11,720 --> 00:17:12,680 Speaker 3: others cannot. 299 00:17:13,400 --> 00:17:14,919 Speaker 2: And I guess this is what's in play when you 300 00:17:14,920 --> 00:17:19,719 Speaker 2: see drivers so many drivers just riding bumpers through terrifyingly 301 00:17:19,760 --> 00:17:22,320 Speaker 2: fast traffic all the time, like they just maybe they 302 00:17:22,320 --> 00:17:26,400 Speaker 2: have just heightened control over things. But I would tend 303 00:17:26,400 --> 00:17:26,879 Speaker 2: to doubt it. 304 00:17:27,200 --> 00:17:29,439 Speaker 3: Yeah, that would be dangerous if someone else did it. 305 00:17:29,480 --> 00:17:31,080 Speaker 3: But I can handle it. 306 00:17:31,320 --> 00:17:34,359 Speaker 2: I alone can weave in and out of traffic and 307 00:17:34,480 --> 00:17:38,200 Speaker 2: make it to my destination two minutes ahead of schedule. 308 00:17:38,440 --> 00:17:41,159 Speaker 3: So this type of experiment is taken to show that 309 00:17:41,200 --> 00:17:44,600 Speaker 3: people have an illusion of control when they consider themselves 310 00:17:44,680 --> 00:17:48,359 Speaker 3: relative to other people. A driver has some degree of 311 00:17:48,359 --> 00:17:51,560 Speaker 3: control over whether they end up in a collision on average, 312 00:17:51,600 --> 00:17:54,280 Speaker 3: people think that they are better able to avoid that 313 00:17:54,359 --> 00:17:57,440 Speaker 3: outcome than other people are. And so looking back over 314 00:17:57,480 --> 00:18:00,320 Speaker 3: these three methodologies, Thompson says, you know each of them 315 00:18:00,320 --> 00:18:03,240 Speaker 3: have strengths and weaknesses. So approach number one kind of 316 00:18:03,240 --> 00:18:06,959 Speaker 3: the Langer approach. The pros are that it uses realistic 317 00:18:07,000 --> 00:18:10,600 Speaker 3: situations that people engage in every day, like lottery drawings 318 00:18:10,680 --> 00:18:14,720 Speaker 3: and games and stuff. And also it has the pro 319 00:18:14,920 --> 00:18:18,840 Speaker 3: that the indirect measure can help detect an illusory belief 320 00:18:19,119 --> 00:18:23,560 Speaker 3: in control that does in reality guide behavior, but which 321 00:18:23,600 --> 00:18:27,479 Speaker 3: people might resist admitting if they were asked directly, And 322 00:18:27,520 --> 00:18:30,439 Speaker 3: that does seem big to me. It helps avoid like 323 00:18:30,880 --> 00:18:35,639 Speaker 3: people tailoring their answers to avoid embarrassment. Cons on the 324 00:18:35,640 --> 00:18:39,760 Speaker 3: other hand, are it's indirect, so it doesn't test whether 325 00:18:39,840 --> 00:18:42,879 Speaker 3: control is really the deciding factor. You kind of have 326 00:18:42,960 --> 00:18:46,440 Speaker 3: to infer that and wonder if other factors could be 327 00:18:46,520 --> 00:18:50,639 Speaker 3: contributing as well. Approach number two the laboratory experiments like 328 00:18:50,680 --> 00:18:53,240 Speaker 3: Alloy and Abramson with like you know, the light coming on, 329 00:18:53,840 --> 00:18:56,280 Speaker 3: or the greenexes and red o's on the computer screen. 330 00:18:56,680 --> 00:19:00,399 Speaker 3: The pros of that are that the dependent variable is 331 00:19:00,520 --> 00:19:04,480 Speaker 3: definitely judgment of control, like it's a very tightly controlled experiment. 332 00:19:05,160 --> 00:19:07,840 Speaker 3: Cons would be that these tasks do not have what 333 00:19:07,920 --> 00:19:13,240 Speaker 3: psychologists call external validity, so they're like weird tasks with 334 00:19:13,400 --> 00:19:16,399 Speaker 3: no close analogy in our day to day lives, so 335 00:19:16,640 --> 00:19:19,160 Speaker 3: they might not be telling us how people would actually 336 00:19:19,160 --> 00:19:22,159 Speaker 3: behave in reality. They might just be like producing a 337 00:19:22,200 --> 00:19:25,119 Speaker 3: weird kind of behavior that's specific to the lab task. 338 00:19:26,840 --> 00:19:30,440 Speaker 3: Approach number three the self reporting of control judgments about 339 00:19:30,440 --> 00:19:35,240 Speaker 3: everyday activities like driving Ala McKenna. Pros are this does 340 00:19:35,280 --> 00:19:40,440 Speaker 3: have external validity. Cons are it relies on reflective self reporting, 341 00:19:40,520 --> 00:19:43,119 Speaker 3: which can be subject to all kinds of biases. You 342 00:19:43,160 --> 00:19:44,960 Speaker 3: know when you're trying to when you ask people to 343 00:19:45,080 --> 00:19:49,520 Speaker 3: self report on their own judgments about their lives. However, 344 00:19:49,600 --> 00:19:52,600 Speaker 3: Thompson says that a strength of illusion of control research 345 00:19:52,680 --> 00:19:56,160 Speaker 3: is that even though these methodologies all have their strengths 346 00:19:56,160 --> 00:20:00,720 Speaker 3: and weaknesses, they mostly point to a similar conclusion, which 347 00:20:00,760 --> 00:20:03,240 Speaker 3: is the fact that on average, people believe we have 348 00:20:03,400 --> 00:20:07,880 Speaker 3: more control over outcomes than we actually do. And there 349 00:20:07,920 --> 00:20:11,080 Speaker 3: do seem to be some doubts about in exactly what 350 00:20:11,160 --> 00:20:15,320 Speaker 3: scenarios this applies and what causes it, but the core 351 00:20:15,400 --> 00:20:18,280 Speaker 3: finding seems fairly robust, though I'm going to talk about 352 00:20:18,280 --> 00:20:22,040 Speaker 3: one paper later in this episode that has some theoretical 353 00:20:22,080 --> 00:20:26,639 Speaker 3: criticisms of how this research and how these experimental findings 354 00:20:26,640 --> 00:20:39,640 Speaker 3: are framed. So it seems there probably is an illusion 355 00:20:39,680 --> 00:20:42,760 Speaker 3: of control, especially for outcomes that we have very little 356 00:20:42,800 --> 00:20:46,200 Speaker 3: control over. But it would be very surprising if people 357 00:20:46,240 --> 00:20:50,280 Speaker 3: showed an illusory belief in control over all variables in 358 00:20:50,400 --> 00:20:53,640 Speaker 3: all situations equally. So there has to be some more 359 00:20:53,680 --> 00:20:57,960 Speaker 3: granular research on like when illusions of control happen, Like 360 00:20:58,359 --> 00:21:01,040 Speaker 3: what are the kinds of things is that we think 361 00:21:01,080 --> 00:21:04,600 Speaker 3: we have more control of than others, more illusory control 362 00:21:04,640 --> 00:21:08,480 Speaker 3: over than others, and what kind of situations or states 363 00:21:08,520 --> 00:21:11,879 Speaker 3: can we be in that heighten this illusion? And to 364 00:21:11,960 --> 00:21:16,520 Speaker 3: continue with Thompson's overview, Thompson highlights seven variables that have 365 00:21:16,560 --> 00:21:19,560 Speaker 3: been studied and found to affect the illusion of control. 366 00:21:20,200 --> 00:21:22,240 Speaker 3: This list does not mean that these are the only 367 00:21:22,320 --> 00:21:25,040 Speaker 3: factors influencing it. It's just that these have been studied 368 00:21:25,080 --> 00:21:28,040 Speaker 3: well enough to discuss in this book chapter. So the 369 00:21:28,080 --> 00:21:32,359 Speaker 3: first one is skill related factors. Now, this was a 370 00:21:32,400 --> 00:21:35,919 Speaker 3: major part of the original nineteen seventy five paper by Langer. 371 00:21:36,720 --> 00:21:39,760 Speaker 3: A lot of studies have found that if a situation 372 00:21:39,960 --> 00:21:45,120 Speaker 3: has features we associate with dependence on skill, we're more 373 00:21:45,240 --> 00:21:48,960 Speaker 3: likely to experience an illusion of control. And examples of 374 00:21:49,000 --> 00:21:55,399 Speaker 3: these features could include quote, familiarity, making choices, active engagement 375 00:21:55,440 --> 00:22:01,080 Speaker 3: with the material, competition, and four knowledge. Talked about several 376 00:22:01,119 --> 00:22:04,680 Speaker 3: of these in the previous episode. For example, familiarity you 377 00:22:04,720 --> 00:22:07,520 Speaker 3: know you might be more inclined to think you have 378 00:22:07,680 --> 00:22:10,639 Speaker 3: control over the outcome of a chance game if you 379 00:22:10,720 --> 00:22:13,760 Speaker 3: are familiar with the game, or if there are elements 380 00:22:13,800 --> 00:22:16,399 Speaker 3: of the game that are familiar to you. And this 381 00:22:16,600 --> 00:22:19,320 Speaker 3: is generally true of skill based games, but wouldn't affect 382 00:22:19,400 --> 00:22:23,119 Speaker 3: chance based games. One of these variables, though, actually there 383 00:22:23,160 --> 00:22:25,440 Speaker 3: was a twenty twenty one paper that casts some doubt 384 00:22:25,520 --> 00:22:29,840 Speaker 3: over whether it affects illusions of control, and that variable 385 00:22:30,000 --> 00:22:33,639 Speaker 3: is choice. So the original idea is that if you 386 00:22:33,720 --> 00:22:37,600 Speaker 3: have a choice to make, that gives you illusions of control. 387 00:22:38,080 --> 00:22:40,680 Speaker 3: An example would be a lottery type game. So imagine 388 00:22:40,680 --> 00:22:43,600 Speaker 3: a game where you buy a lottery ticket. The ticket 389 00:22:43,720 --> 00:22:46,080 Speaker 3: has a random series of numbers on it, and you 390 00:22:46,119 --> 00:22:49,080 Speaker 3: win a prize if the winning number matches your ticket. 391 00:22:49,680 --> 00:22:52,399 Speaker 3: Now consider the same game, except you get to pick 392 00:22:52,520 --> 00:22:55,720 Speaker 3: your ticket numbers. Maybe you can use your lucky number, 393 00:22:55,760 --> 00:22:58,680 Speaker 3: which of course is the ISBN for the novelization of 394 00:22:58,720 --> 00:23:01,159 Speaker 3: Halloween three Season of the World, which by Jack Martin. 395 00:23:01,400 --> 00:23:02,800 Speaker 2: To your number, that's the one you play. 396 00:23:03,040 --> 00:23:06,439 Speaker 3: It's got to be what could be a luckier number? 397 00:23:06,600 --> 00:23:09,679 Speaker 3: Happy Happy Halloween. Now, of course, in a fair lottery like, 398 00:23:09,800 --> 00:23:12,359 Speaker 3: whatever the number is, it makes no difference whatsoever to 399 00:23:12,400 --> 00:23:15,720 Speaker 3: your chance of winning. Winning numbers are selected randomly. No 400 00:23:15,840 --> 00:23:18,160 Speaker 3: number has a higher chance of victory than any other. 401 00:23:18,760 --> 00:23:21,159 Speaker 3: And yet the fact that you get to choose your 402 00:23:21,240 --> 00:23:23,760 Speaker 3: number might make it seem like there's some element of 403 00:23:23,800 --> 00:23:27,160 Speaker 3: skill involved in this game, and thus increases your illution 404 00:23:27,320 --> 00:23:30,879 Speaker 3: of control. Langer did find this kind of result in 405 00:23:30,880 --> 00:23:35,639 Speaker 3: the nineteen seventy five paper. However, Thompson mentions that this 406 00:23:35,720 --> 00:23:40,840 Speaker 3: particular metric of choice specifically has been contradicted by recent research, 407 00:23:40,960 --> 00:23:43,880 Speaker 3: a paper by Klousowski at all in twenty twenty one, 408 00:23:44,400 --> 00:23:47,520 Speaker 3: which found that choice did not reliably cause an illusion 409 00:23:47,520 --> 00:23:48,160 Speaker 3: of control. 410 00:23:48,480 --> 00:23:51,240 Speaker 2: Okay, Like the scenario I'm instantly thinking of would be 411 00:23:51,480 --> 00:23:55,040 Speaker 2: the classic magician game of Like, Okay, draw a card 412 00:23:55,040 --> 00:23:56,879 Speaker 2: from this deck, and now I'm going to guess it, 413 00:23:58,240 --> 00:24:01,240 Speaker 2: assuming in this case that you were the magician, but 414 00:24:01,320 --> 00:24:04,119 Speaker 2: you have actually absolutely no magic up your sleeve, no trick. 415 00:24:04,400 --> 00:24:07,399 Speaker 2: You're just going completely off of chance. You know you 416 00:24:07,480 --> 00:24:10,280 Speaker 2: have a certain percentage chance of guessing it right because 417 00:24:10,280 --> 00:24:13,919 Speaker 2: there are only so many cards in that deck. Versus, Okay, 418 00:24:13,960 --> 00:24:15,840 Speaker 2: you draw a card at random from this deck. I'll 419 00:24:15,920 --> 00:24:18,520 Speaker 2: draw a card at random from this deck. Do you 420 00:24:18,560 --> 00:24:23,360 Speaker 2: think we're going to have the same card like by 421 00:24:23,480 --> 00:24:27,000 Speaker 2: being able to pick a card by saying I believe 422 00:24:27,040 --> 00:24:29,160 Speaker 2: you have the Ace of Spades in your hand when 423 00:24:29,200 --> 00:24:32,119 Speaker 2: it's just completely random, would you feel confident in making 424 00:24:32,119 --> 00:24:33,800 Speaker 2: that choice now? I feel like you would be more 425 00:24:33,800 --> 00:24:36,800 Speaker 2: confident in making that choice if the other person picked 426 00:24:36,840 --> 00:24:40,960 Speaker 2: their card, because then you can potentially overestimate your ability 427 00:24:41,000 --> 00:24:44,000 Speaker 2: to guess the mind of the individual. Okay, this is 428 00:24:44,080 --> 00:24:45,480 Speaker 2: the kind of person who's going to choose a king 429 00:24:45,560 --> 00:24:47,160 Speaker 2: or a queen, or they going to try and outsmart 430 00:24:47,200 --> 00:24:49,720 Speaker 2: me by, you know, choosing a two or a three 431 00:24:49,840 --> 00:24:51,920 Speaker 2: something that isn't superficially interesting. 432 00:24:52,359 --> 00:24:56,159 Speaker 3: I guess that would introduce other elements because it would introduce, like, 433 00:24:56,640 --> 00:24:58,760 Speaker 3: I don't know if the other person picking a card 434 00:24:58,760 --> 00:25:01,160 Speaker 3: in the scenario is technically a competitor. But we did 435 00:25:01,160 --> 00:25:04,640 Speaker 3: talk last time about how like competition in some experiments 436 00:25:04,680 --> 00:25:09,520 Speaker 3: seem to increase the illusion of control, and I don't 437 00:25:09,560 --> 00:25:13,200 Speaker 3: know it. That's an interesting scenario because it adds these 438 00:25:13,200 --> 00:25:18,880 Speaker 3: other variables too. My intuition is that that would increase 439 00:25:18,920 --> 00:25:21,439 Speaker 3: illusions of control. It feels like it would for me. 440 00:25:21,640 --> 00:25:25,280 Speaker 3: It would it would falsely increase my belief that I 441 00:25:25,320 --> 00:25:29,080 Speaker 3: could control the outcome even though I can't. And just 442 00:25:29,119 --> 00:25:31,639 Speaker 3: to go again on my intuitions, it would seem to 443 00:25:31,680 --> 00:25:36,159 Speaker 3: me that the choices could increase illusions of control, Like 444 00:25:36,200 --> 00:25:38,120 Speaker 3: if I get to pick the lottery numbers, it would 445 00:25:38,160 --> 00:25:40,760 Speaker 3: feel more likely like I had a better chance of winning, 446 00:25:41,720 --> 00:25:43,960 Speaker 3: But again. This twenty twenty one study found that in 447 00:25:44,000 --> 00:25:47,160 Speaker 3: some circumstances, no, that's not the case. So it might 448 00:25:47,200 --> 00:25:49,200 Speaker 3: It might have to do with just like how people 449 00:25:49,280 --> 00:25:52,160 Speaker 3: are primed to think about the task they're they're about 450 00:25:52,200 --> 00:25:54,560 Speaker 3: to do, you know, like, are you say, as we 451 00:25:54,600 --> 00:25:57,560 Speaker 3: talked about earlier, like, are you given some kind of 452 00:25:57,720 --> 00:26:01,560 Speaker 3: hint of remembering how probable these actually work as you're 453 00:26:01,560 --> 00:26:02,639 Speaker 3: engaging in the task. 454 00:26:03,080 --> 00:26:04,560 Speaker 2: Yeah, okay, I don't know. 455 00:26:05,000 --> 00:26:07,280 Speaker 3: But anyway, So to come back to more factors that 456 00:26:07,800 --> 00:26:11,480 Speaker 3: can apparently influence it, according to experiments, one factor is 457 00:26:11,760 --> 00:26:16,040 Speaker 3: success or failure emphasis. This is the second thing Thompson lists. 458 00:26:16,480 --> 00:26:20,720 Speaker 3: So does the task or the context highlight the idea 459 00:26:20,840 --> 00:26:25,760 Speaker 3: of success or failure? One example here would be early 460 00:26:26,040 --> 00:26:29,520 Speaker 3: streaks in a game where you, you know, repeatedly guess 461 00:26:29,640 --> 00:26:33,479 Speaker 3: or draw something. So experiments have found if you let 462 00:26:33,560 --> 00:26:37,639 Speaker 3: somebody gamble on calling coin tosses. Again, coin tosses something 463 00:26:37,640 --> 00:26:41,720 Speaker 3: that in reality might not be truly perfectly random, it 464 00:26:41,800 --> 00:26:45,159 Speaker 3: is close enough to random. It's basically random, So you 465 00:26:45,160 --> 00:26:47,960 Speaker 3: should not have any skill at calling a coin toss. 466 00:26:48,080 --> 00:26:51,400 Speaker 3: But if people are gambling on coin tosses and they 467 00:26:51,440 --> 00:26:55,720 Speaker 3: have an early string of successes, at making the right call. 468 00:26:56,200 --> 00:27:00,119 Speaker 3: This will apparently increase the illusion of control relative to 469 00:27:00,200 --> 00:27:03,880 Speaker 3: subjects who have an early string of failures. So if 470 00:27:03,920 --> 00:27:07,160 Speaker 3: you lose a lot at the beginning, outcomes feel random. 471 00:27:07,480 --> 00:27:09,880 Speaker 3: If you win a lot at the beginning, you think 472 00:27:10,160 --> 00:27:14,679 Speaker 3: I'm doing this. In reality, it's equally random either way. 473 00:27:14,760 --> 00:27:18,119 Speaker 3: But we can get tricked into thinking that we have 474 00:27:18,240 --> 00:27:21,080 Speaker 3: control because we've been winning and it just seems like 475 00:27:21,160 --> 00:27:24,919 Speaker 3: winning is happening, so somehow I must be making it happen. 476 00:27:25,520 --> 00:27:28,959 Speaker 2: See. I feel rather opposite in Dungeons and Dragons. If 477 00:27:29,040 --> 00:27:30,960 Speaker 2: like the first couple of D twenty rolls of the 478 00:27:31,040 --> 00:27:34,720 Speaker 2: night are really high for me, or or heaven forbid 479 00:27:34,760 --> 00:27:38,359 Speaker 2: their natural twenties on things that don't matter, I have 480 00:27:38,440 --> 00:27:40,760 Speaker 2: this sinking suspicion that I'm just doomed when we get 481 00:27:40,760 --> 00:27:42,840 Speaker 2: to actual combat, because that's when the ones are going 482 00:27:42,880 --> 00:27:43,320 Speaker 2: to come out. 483 00:27:43,400 --> 00:27:46,439 Speaker 3: That is really funny. I've had the same feeling before. 484 00:27:46,600 --> 00:27:50,399 Speaker 3: It's almost as bad as like rolling a critical fail 485 00:27:50,520 --> 00:27:54,240 Speaker 3: on something important. Is rolling a critical success on something 486 00:27:54,280 --> 00:27:57,280 Speaker 3: that doesn't matter at all? Feel like I've wasted it? 487 00:27:59,640 --> 00:28:01,719 Speaker 2: Yeah, X, check to see if you can pick up 488 00:28:01,720 --> 00:28:04,000 Speaker 2: a stick and it's a natural twenty it's like, all right, 489 00:28:04,200 --> 00:28:07,680 Speaker 2: I needed to get like a three on that probably. Yeah. 490 00:28:07,880 --> 00:28:10,520 Speaker 3: So on the other hand, though, in this success failure thing, 491 00:28:11,520 --> 00:28:17,679 Speaker 3: failure apparently sometimes neutralizes illusory beliefs of control. So in 492 00:28:17,720 --> 00:28:21,120 Speaker 3: some studies they have found this is only true if 493 00:28:21,359 --> 00:28:25,840 Speaker 3: failure is clear and explicit. If there's like ambiguity in 494 00:28:25,880 --> 00:28:29,480 Speaker 3: the feedback and it's not one hundred percent clear whether 495 00:28:29,600 --> 00:28:32,440 Speaker 3: you have failed or not, the illusion of control can persist. 496 00:28:32,960 --> 00:28:36,639 Speaker 2: All right, yeah, a natural one on your D twenty row. Definitely. 497 00:28:36,680 --> 00:28:39,640 Speaker 2: I think we'll knock that illusion out of place. 498 00:28:39,720 --> 00:28:43,560 Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, okay. Third factor that seems to influence it 499 00:28:44,000 --> 00:28:48,760 Speaker 3: need or desire for outcome. So evidence shows that how 500 00:28:48,840 --> 00:28:52,440 Speaker 3: much you want an outcome can increase the illusion of 501 00:28:52,480 --> 00:28:56,720 Speaker 3: control over the process of getting it. So an example 502 00:28:56,760 --> 00:28:59,880 Speaker 3: would be in a computer screen on set task we 503 00:29:00,080 --> 00:29:01,920 Speaker 3: talked about that earlier. That's the one with the green 504 00:29:02,000 --> 00:29:04,640 Speaker 3: exes and the red o's where people are pressing a 505 00:29:04,640 --> 00:29:07,440 Speaker 3: button trying to figure out if they can control making 506 00:29:07,480 --> 00:29:09,880 Speaker 3: the green exes appear on the screen. In this kind 507 00:29:09,880 --> 00:29:13,400 Speaker 3: of experiment, people believed that they had more they had 508 00:29:13,440 --> 00:29:18,480 Speaker 3: significantly more control if they received cash payments proportional to 509 00:29:18,520 --> 00:29:21,640 Speaker 3: the number of greenexes that appeared compared to people who 510 00:29:21,640 --> 00:29:24,400 Speaker 3: did the same task but did not get a cash reward. 511 00:29:24,440 --> 00:29:27,440 Speaker 3: There was no cash involved. And remember in this experiment 512 00:29:27,560 --> 00:29:31,959 Speaker 3: either way, subjects have zero control at all. A study 513 00:29:31,960 --> 00:29:35,160 Speaker 3: by Biner at All in nineteen ninety five found a 514 00:29:35,200 --> 00:29:38,200 Speaker 3: similar kind of thing, that the illusion of control was 515 00:29:38,320 --> 00:29:42,520 Speaker 3: increased for a random lottery with a food reward if 516 00:29:42,520 --> 00:29:46,720 Speaker 3: people getting a hamburger if the subject was hungry, compared 517 00:29:46,720 --> 00:29:49,800 Speaker 3: to subjects who were not hungry. So like, if the 518 00:29:49,880 --> 00:29:53,719 Speaker 3: reward is food and you are currently hungry, you have 519 00:29:53,880 --> 00:29:57,320 Speaker 3: more illusions of control over a chance outcome than if 520 00:29:57,320 --> 00:29:58,080 Speaker 3: you're not hungry. 521 00:29:58,600 --> 00:30:01,360 Speaker 2: All right, well that makes sense. I mean the scenario, 522 00:30:01,600 --> 00:30:04,240 Speaker 2: I mean the outcome, not so much the hamburger lottery. 523 00:30:04,240 --> 00:30:06,480 Speaker 2: I don't think I've encountered one of those in real life. 524 00:30:06,560 --> 00:30:09,480 Speaker 2: But yeah, the more desirable the outcome, the more acceptable 525 00:30:09,480 --> 00:30:12,440 Speaker 2: the gambling risk becomes, the more confident you are that 526 00:30:12,480 --> 00:30:14,800 Speaker 2: you can pull it off. I think I've felt this 527 00:30:14,840 --> 00:30:17,720 Speaker 2: way in the past, regarding things like DVD giveaways and 528 00:30:17,840 --> 00:30:20,440 Speaker 2: all you know, where it's like, oh, I'd like to 529 00:30:20,480 --> 00:30:23,800 Speaker 2: win that, Sure, it's worth my worth my time to 530 00:30:23,840 --> 00:30:27,400 Speaker 2: go ahead and and enter because yeah, I can imagine 531 00:30:27,440 --> 00:30:28,200 Speaker 2: that on my shelf. 532 00:30:28,280 --> 00:30:30,040 Speaker 3: Do you have a specific disc in mind here? 533 00:30:30,800 --> 00:30:34,720 Speaker 2: Yeah? Yeah, I ages ago I entered a contest and 534 00:30:34,760 --> 00:30:37,520 Speaker 2: won DVD copies of The Fly and The Fly Too, 535 00:30:38,200 --> 00:30:41,320 Speaker 2: and it was and it was it was like magic, 536 00:30:41,360 --> 00:30:43,400 Speaker 2: you know, because I'm like, yeah, I would mind winning that, 537 00:30:43,480 --> 00:30:46,440 Speaker 2: and bam I won it. And in a way, it 538 00:30:46,520 --> 00:30:48,920 Speaker 2: kind of like ruined it. It ruined things for me 539 00:30:49,040 --> 00:30:51,440 Speaker 2: moving forward because then anytime there's like a DVD giveaway, 540 00:30:51,480 --> 00:30:53,960 Speaker 2: I'm like, well, I won this. I won this once 541 00:30:54,040 --> 00:30:56,600 Speaker 2: before it could happen again. I'm good at this. Apparently. 542 00:30:57,120 --> 00:31:01,120 Speaker 3: Oh so you apparently had an early success that increased 543 00:31:01,120 --> 00:31:03,640 Speaker 3: the success salience of that kind of lottery for you. 544 00:31:03,760 --> 00:31:07,000 Speaker 2: Yeah. I had a similar scenario happened with my son. 545 00:31:07,400 --> 00:31:09,880 Speaker 2: I took him to a local bowling alleys for years 546 00:31:09,880 --> 00:31:11,960 Speaker 2: and years ago when he was much younger. And you know, 547 00:31:12,000 --> 00:31:14,520 Speaker 2: the claw machines. We've talked about claw machines before. Oh yeah, 548 00:31:14,560 --> 00:31:16,880 Speaker 2: got on the show. You know, they're they're they're tricky 549 00:31:17,040 --> 00:31:20,880 Speaker 2: if you're predatory, if you want to describe them as such. 550 00:31:20,920 --> 00:31:23,080 Speaker 2: You know, it seems like an easy thing. You just 551 00:31:23,080 --> 00:31:24,800 Speaker 2: put in a quarter of claw grabs, a toy, you 552 00:31:24,840 --> 00:31:28,120 Speaker 2: get the toy, but there are a number of additional 553 00:31:28,120 --> 00:31:32,320 Speaker 2: tricks in play that that enable the house to win. 554 00:31:33,240 --> 00:31:35,480 Speaker 2: And uh, you know, of course he was interested in 555 00:31:35,480 --> 00:31:37,840 Speaker 2: trying out his claw machine, and I was like, well, 556 00:31:37,880 --> 00:31:41,360 Speaker 2: this is a teaching moment. I'd say it. Tell him, 557 00:31:41,360 --> 00:31:43,160 Speaker 2: all right, I'm going to give you, give you one 558 00:31:43,240 --> 00:31:46,760 Speaker 2: quarter or whatever it took to use the machine, and 559 00:31:47,200 --> 00:31:49,080 Speaker 2: but I want you to know that this. These machines 560 00:31:49,080 --> 00:31:51,840 Speaker 2: are tricky. They are made to trick you. You're not 561 00:31:51,880 --> 00:31:53,719 Speaker 2: going to win anything. And then then I'm like, go 562 00:31:53,800 --> 00:31:57,560 Speaker 2: forth and lose, you know, learn this lesson immediate jackpot. 563 00:31:57,600 --> 00:31:59,880 Speaker 2: He got some stuffy out of that, and I think 564 00:31:59,880 --> 00:32:02,360 Speaker 2: he still has that stuffy that I occasionally see in 565 00:32:02,360 --> 00:32:04,400 Speaker 2: his room. And it mocks me because I'm like, you 566 00:32:04,520 --> 00:32:07,160 Speaker 2: were never supposed to come out of that machine, and 567 00:32:07,240 --> 00:32:09,920 Speaker 2: you gave him too much confidence in these claw machines. 568 00:32:10,280 --> 00:32:12,760 Speaker 3: Oh that's terrible. Though, I would say at least the 569 00:32:12,800 --> 00:32:15,360 Speaker 3: claw machine is not a slot machine, because there is 570 00:32:15,560 --> 00:32:17,800 Speaker 3: some minor amount of skill involved. 571 00:32:17,960 --> 00:32:22,200 Speaker 2: Minor yes, and if memory serves like we'd have to 572 00:32:22,200 --> 00:32:26,640 Speaker 2: go deeper in. But I believe there's some additional shenanigans 573 00:32:26,680 --> 00:32:30,400 Speaker 2: going on. With those machines that enable occasional win because 574 00:32:30,440 --> 00:32:32,800 Speaker 2: that's the thing. People need to occasionally win those toys 575 00:32:32,800 --> 00:32:36,440 Speaker 2: out of those machines. Otherwise people will realized that, Okay, 576 00:32:36,480 --> 00:32:39,080 Speaker 2: there's just a bunch of dust covered stuff. He's in there. 577 00:32:39,160 --> 00:32:40,680 Speaker 2: Nobody's getting anything out of there. 578 00:32:41,400 --> 00:32:44,360 Speaker 3: I'm very sorry your son had an early success emphasis 579 00:32:44,400 --> 00:32:47,280 Speaker 3: on claw machines. That is an unfortunate fate. 580 00:32:47,880 --> 00:32:51,040 Speaker 2: Well, I let him have a number of failures after 581 00:32:51,080 --> 00:32:53,920 Speaker 2: that and on other visits, so I think the lesson 582 00:32:54,000 --> 00:32:56,000 Speaker 2: finally hammer him. 583 00:33:05,840 --> 00:33:08,640 Speaker 3: Oh but the flip side of the success failure emphasis 584 00:33:08,720 --> 00:33:12,640 Speaker 3: is that research has also found that there are increased 585 00:33:12,720 --> 00:33:15,920 Speaker 3: illusions of control in a situation where somebody is trying 586 00:33:15,920 --> 00:33:20,680 Speaker 3: to avoid an outcome they find extremely undesirable. Don't worry, 587 00:33:20,720 --> 00:33:24,080 Speaker 3: these experiments didn't have actual torture or anything. The really 588 00:33:24,160 --> 00:33:27,360 Speaker 3: undesirable conditions were things like having to speak in front 589 00:33:27,400 --> 00:33:31,560 Speaker 3: of a group, which is is a very terrifying prospect 590 00:33:31,560 --> 00:33:35,480 Speaker 3: to many of us, including myself, even though I speak 591 00:33:35,520 --> 00:33:37,880 Speaker 3: into a microphone for a living. So let that be 592 00:33:37,920 --> 00:33:39,960 Speaker 3: a comfort to you out there who have this same fear. 593 00:33:40,520 --> 00:33:42,800 Speaker 2: Yeah, I mean it's a different scenario, to be sure. 594 00:33:43,240 --> 00:33:45,000 Speaker 3: Another one was like having to put your hand in 595 00:33:45,080 --> 00:33:49,000 Speaker 3: cold water. That's another common thing tested here. So people 596 00:33:49,000 --> 00:33:53,000 Speaker 3: who strongly wanted to avoid these outcomes mistakenly believed they 597 00:33:53,040 --> 00:33:56,560 Speaker 3: had more agency in the task that determined whether they 598 00:33:56,600 --> 00:33:58,680 Speaker 3: would have to do them or not. So it's just 599 00:33:58,720 --> 00:34:00,720 Speaker 3: a flip side of the thing, like, if you really 600 00:34:00,720 --> 00:34:03,520 Speaker 3: want that hamburger, you have more illusion of control over 601 00:34:03,960 --> 00:34:07,040 Speaker 3: the chance process of getting it. If you really want 602 00:34:07,080 --> 00:34:09,360 Speaker 3: to avoid speaking in front of a group, apparently you 603 00:34:09,440 --> 00:34:14,720 Speaker 3: have more illusions of control in avoiding that fade. Another 604 00:34:14,840 --> 00:34:17,440 Speaker 3: interesting thing noted here is that some studies have found 605 00:34:17,560 --> 00:34:22,480 Speaker 3: a greater illusion of control when people are experiencing heightened stress. 606 00:34:22,800 --> 00:34:27,480 Speaker 3: I thought that was interesting. Fourth factor is mood. This 607 00:34:27,520 --> 00:34:31,200 Speaker 3: is pretty straightforward, but studies have found on average, people 608 00:34:31,280 --> 00:34:35,000 Speaker 3: experience more illusory control when they're in a better mood, 609 00:34:35,880 --> 00:34:39,279 Speaker 3: and people with a negative mood showed less illusions of 610 00:34:39,320 --> 00:34:42,359 Speaker 3: control on average. Of course, this is probably not a 611 00:34:42,440 --> 00:34:45,319 Speaker 3: reason to try to be in a bad mood, but 612 00:34:45,480 --> 00:34:49,640 Speaker 3: you know, one advantage if you're currently feeling down is 613 00:34:49,680 --> 00:34:51,760 Speaker 3: that in this state of being in a bad mood, 614 00:34:52,480 --> 00:34:54,720 Speaker 3: you might be less likely to think you can control 615 00:34:54,800 --> 00:34:55,399 Speaker 3: things you can. 616 00:34:56,120 --> 00:34:58,560 Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, though, of course, like we've been saying it's 617 00:34:58,640 --> 00:35:03,480 Speaker 2: complex anything human psyche's doing. So on the flip side, 618 00:35:03,480 --> 00:35:05,520 Speaker 2: you might find yourself more inclined to go after a 619 00:35:05,560 --> 00:35:08,880 Speaker 2: quick dopamine hit of initiating a gamble if you're in 620 00:35:08,920 --> 00:35:11,920 Speaker 2: a bad mood. So you know, a lot going on there. 621 00:35:12,160 --> 00:35:15,120 Speaker 3: Okay, fifth factor. We sort of already alluded to this one, 622 00:35:15,200 --> 00:35:18,920 Speaker 3: but this is what Thompson calls the intrusion of reality. 623 00:35:19,400 --> 00:35:23,000 Speaker 3: This basically means giving people a reality check. Illusion of 624 00:35:23,040 --> 00:35:26,360 Speaker 3: control is one type of cognitive illusion that seems pretty 625 00:35:26,400 --> 00:35:29,840 Speaker 3: easy to overcome in the moment by simply reminding people 626 00:35:30,280 --> 00:35:33,880 Speaker 3: what the probabilities actually are. So if you remind people 627 00:35:33,920 --> 00:35:37,319 Speaker 3: of the objective probability of winning a gambling task before 628 00:35:37,360 --> 00:35:40,080 Speaker 3: they place their bets, the illusion of control can be 629 00:35:40,160 --> 00:35:42,799 Speaker 3: significantly reduced or neutralized completely. 630 00:35:43,560 --> 00:35:45,560 Speaker 2: Yeah, and you see this a lot with coverage of 631 00:35:45,760 --> 00:35:50,319 Speaker 2: lottery odds, you know, the advertisements for the lottery and 632 00:35:50,400 --> 00:35:52,480 Speaker 2: like general buzz for the lottery make it seem like 633 00:35:52,520 --> 00:35:55,879 Speaker 2: anything as possible. You know, the winning ticket might be, 634 00:35:56,320 --> 00:35:57,560 Speaker 2: you know, it might have been sold to the gas 635 00:35:57,600 --> 00:36:02,440 Speaker 2: station down the street. But then oftentimes news reporting on 636 00:36:02,520 --> 00:36:05,080 Speaker 2: these situations will often drive home like no, you have 637 00:36:05,239 --> 00:36:08,480 Speaker 2: like this astronomically small chance of winning if you enter. 638 00:36:08,800 --> 00:36:11,239 Speaker 3: Yeah, here's your reality check. And it seems like with 639 00:36:11,280 --> 00:36:14,880 Speaker 3: illusions of control, a simple reality check is quite useful 640 00:36:14,880 --> 00:36:19,680 Speaker 3: to people. Next factor I thought was quite interesting. Thompson 641 00:36:19,760 --> 00:36:25,239 Speaker 3: mentions power. Apparently, people in positions of power and authority. 642 00:36:26,000 --> 00:36:30,080 Speaker 3: Of course, they do have more actual control over many situations, 643 00:36:30,080 --> 00:36:34,279 Speaker 3: that's what power means. But it seems power also correlates 644 00:36:34,360 --> 00:36:38,759 Speaker 3: with increased illusions of control. So if you like do 645 00:36:38,800 --> 00:36:42,320 Speaker 3: an experiment where you assign someone a position of power 646 00:36:42,400 --> 00:36:45,600 Speaker 3: over others in the experiment, or you prime them to 647 00:36:45,680 --> 00:36:47,759 Speaker 3: remember times in their life when they were in a 648 00:36:47,800 --> 00:36:51,360 Speaker 3: position of power, this seems to come with an increased 649 00:36:51,400 --> 00:36:55,640 Speaker 3: tendency toward the illusion of control. And that seemed very 650 00:36:55,680 --> 00:36:58,359 Speaker 3: interesting to me because you might imagine that it would 651 00:36:58,360 --> 00:37:00,359 Speaker 3: work the opposite way that you know, it's when you 652 00:37:00,400 --> 00:37:03,960 Speaker 3: feel disempowered that you dream of having more control. Maybe, 653 00:37:04,239 --> 00:37:06,680 Speaker 3: But the way this is framed actually does gel with 654 00:37:06,719 --> 00:37:09,719 Speaker 3: my experience. Like the people who get to be the 655 00:37:09,760 --> 00:37:12,399 Speaker 3: boss or get to be the leader in some way 656 00:37:13,120 --> 00:37:17,160 Speaker 3: seem more susceptible than regular people to thinking they can 657 00:37:17,280 --> 00:37:19,520 Speaker 3: like magically will a dice roll to come out the 658 00:37:19,520 --> 00:37:20,239 Speaker 3: way they want it. 659 00:37:21,600 --> 00:37:24,279 Speaker 2: Yeah. Yeah, it's easy to apply this to various like 660 00:37:25,280 --> 00:37:29,160 Speaker 2: well known scenarios contemporary and historic. You know, you look 661 00:37:29,200 --> 00:37:31,680 Speaker 2: to some person in a position of power who ends 662 00:37:31,760 --> 00:37:34,480 Speaker 2: up in a situation where like, clearly the odds are 663 00:37:34,480 --> 00:37:38,960 Speaker 2: stacked against them, but they they continue on with like 664 00:37:39,000 --> 00:37:42,600 Speaker 2: a seeming overconfidence that we often just attribute to you 665 00:37:42,680 --> 00:37:46,480 Speaker 2: just to pure ego and so forth. But yeah, the 666 00:37:46,480 --> 00:37:49,160 Speaker 2: illusion of control could also play a huge part in it. 667 00:37:49,960 --> 00:37:52,800 Speaker 3: I wonder if there's actually some overlap with the idea 668 00:37:52,840 --> 00:37:55,279 Speaker 3: of success emphasis here, because like, if you are in 669 00:37:55,320 --> 00:37:59,160 Speaker 3: a position of power, you've had some reinforcement already of 670 00:37:59,239 --> 00:38:02,040 Speaker 3: like in some scenario where you didn't know what the 671 00:38:02,080 --> 00:38:04,200 Speaker 3: outcome was, like you got what you wanted, like you 672 00:38:04,320 --> 00:38:08,040 Speaker 3: got you know, promotion or increased status or whatever, and 673 00:38:08,080 --> 00:38:10,040 Speaker 3: you're in this position of power now, so you've sort 674 00:38:10,040 --> 00:38:12,319 Speaker 3: of been trained to think like, oh, yeah, I can 675 00:38:12,360 --> 00:38:14,640 Speaker 3: make things happen for me, and that could be that 676 00:38:14,680 --> 00:38:17,640 Speaker 3: could lead to illusions that you can do that in 677 00:38:17,680 --> 00:38:19,080 Speaker 3: scenarios when you can't. 678 00:38:19,280 --> 00:38:20,480 Speaker 2: Yeah, Okay. 679 00:38:20,480 --> 00:38:23,279 Speaker 3: Another thing Thompson mentions that can affect it is what 680 00:38:23,600 --> 00:38:28,200 Speaker 3: she calls regulatory focus. This basically hinges on a theory 681 00:38:28,239 --> 00:38:32,120 Speaker 3: of motivation that distinguishes between situations where you have a 682 00:38:32,160 --> 00:38:36,279 Speaker 3: focus on getting an outcome you do want, versus situations 683 00:38:36,280 --> 00:38:38,920 Speaker 3: where you have a focus on avoiding an outcome you 684 00:38:39,000 --> 00:38:43,759 Speaker 3: don't want. And research by Langan's in two thousand and 685 00:38:43,800 --> 00:38:47,080 Speaker 3: seven found that when you're in the mindset of getting 686 00:38:47,120 --> 00:38:50,719 Speaker 3: an outcome you do want, that was more associated with 687 00:38:50,760 --> 00:38:52,920 Speaker 3: illusions of control than the other mindset. 688 00:38:53,960 --> 00:38:56,319 Speaker 2: That's interesting, But I guess, on the other hand, like 689 00:38:56,360 --> 00:38:59,840 Speaker 2: we shouldn't then desire a life where we're just focusing 690 00:38:59,880 --> 00:39:03,960 Speaker 2: on avoiding negative outcomes, because right that sounds pretty dreadful. 691 00:39:03,960 --> 00:39:07,080 Speaker 2: I guess in reality, you'd want some sort of healthy 692 00:39:07,120 --> 00:39:10,160 Speaker 2: balance of the two without you know, too much tendency 693 00:39:10,200 --> 00:39:12,880 Speaker 2: towards either illusion exactly. 694 00:39:13,000 --> 00:39:15,080 Speaker 3: I mean in the same way that you might be 695 00:39:15,160 --> 00:39:17,400 Speaker 3: less prone to illusions of control if you're in a 696 00:39:17,440 --> 00:39:20,080 Speaker 3: negative mood, but that probably shouldn't make you want to 697 00:39:20,120 --> 00:39:23,600 Speaker 3: be in a negative mood. Another one I just happened 698 00:39:23,600 --> 00:39:26,000 Speaker 3: to come across. This is not on Thompson's list, but 699 00:39:26,480 --> 00:39:29,280 Speaker 3: another paper mentioned it, so I thought i'd take a look. 700 00:39:29,719 --> 00:39:34,320 Speaker 3: Is the idea of what's called deliberative versus implemental mindset. 701 00:39:34,600 --> 00:39:38,160 Speaker 3: So this is the effect of what kind of frame 702 00:39:38,200 --> 00:39:41,719 Speaker 3: of mind you're in when approaching a control judgment. So 703 00:39:41,840 --> 00:39:46,280 Speaker 3: this was a paper by Galwitzer and Kinney in nineteen 704 00:39:46,360 --> 00:39:50,080 Speaker 3: eighty nine called Effects of Deliberative and implemental mindsets on 705 00:39:50,080 --> 00:39:54,080 Speaker 3: the Illusion of control. This is a paper that used 706 00:39:54,120 --> 00:39:56,840 Speaker 3: a light onset experiment like the kinds we've talked about before, 707 00:39:56,880 --> 00:39:58,640 Speaker 3: where you know, you're trying to turn on a light 708 00:39:58,719 --> 00:40:01,200 Speaker 3: by figuring out, you know, if pressing a button turns 709 00:40:01,239 --> 00:40:04,920 Speaker 3: it on or not. And this experiment had two different 710 00:40:05,000 --> 00:40:08,319 Speaker 3: experimental groups doing the same task, but they were separated 711 00:40:08,360 --> 00:40:12,640 Speaker 3: by the independent variable of a mental exercise. Before making 712 00:40:12,680 --> 00:40:17,319 Speaker 3: their judgments, one group was asked to quote deliberate on 713 00:40:17,360 --> 00:40:20,880 Speaker 3: an unresolved personal problem, so you know, thinking about a 714 00:40:20,920 --> 00:40:25,400 Speaker 3: problem considering various solutions. The other group was asked to 715 00:40:25,800 --> 00:40:30,080 Speaker 3: plan the implementation of a personal goal, so you know, 716 00:40:30,120 --> 00:40:31,879 Speaker 3: come up with a plan of action to get what 717 00:40:31,920 --> 00:40:36,960 Speaker 3: you want. And this study found that the deliberation group 718 00:40:37,320 --> 00:40:42,200 Speaker 3: experienced less illusory control on the unrelated light onset task, 719 00:40:42,719 --> 00:40:46,120 Speaker 3: so quote. Overall finding suggests that people who are trying 720 00:40:46,160 --> 00:40:49,840 Speaker 3: to make decisions develop a deliberative mindset that allows for 721 00:40:49,920 --> 00:40:54,200 Speaker 3: a realistic view of action outcome expectancies, whereas people who 722 00:40:54,239 --> 00:40:58,440 Speaker 3: try to act on a decision develop an implemental mindset 723 00:40:58,480 --> 00:41:03,080 Speaker 3: that promotes illusory optimism. And that was to the extent 724 00:41:03,120 --> 00:41:06,719 Speaker 3: that this is a valid finding that that was illuminating 725 00:41:06,760 --> 00:41:09,120 Speaker 3: to me because it's like, Okay, if you're more just 726 00:41:09,440 --> 00:41:14,319 Speaker 3: sort of exploring ideas, thinking about different contingencies and all that, 727 00:41:15,320 --> 00:41:18,720 Speaker 3: you apparently might be more realistic about how much control 728 00:41:18,760 --> 00:41:21,800 Speaker 3: you have. But once you get into thinking about how 729 00:41:21,840 --> 00:41:25,920 Speaker 3: to get something done, then you're more prone to illusions 730 00:41:25,960 --> 00:41:29,239 Speaker 3: of control, which might actually be useful even though it's 731 00:41:29,280 --> 00:41:31,640 Speaker 3: just as we said last time, the illusion of control 732 00:41:31,719 --> 00:41:35,640 Speaker 3: could be useful even though it generates false beliefs, because 733 00:41:35,719 --> 00:41:39,800 Speaker 3: maybe it maybe those false beliefs could be motivating, could 734 00:41:39,840 --> 00:41:42,000 Speaker 3: help you, you know, spur you to action. 735 00:41:43,040 --> 00:41:45,560 Speaker 2: Yeah yeah, I mean, you're working on something that's going 736 00:41:45,600 --> 00:41:47,440 Speaker 2: to be entered in a contest. Let's say you know, 737 00:41:48,120 --> 00:41:50,920 Speaker 2: your chances of actually winning that contest may be to 738 00:41:51,040 --> 00:41:54,279 Speaker 2: small due to you know, various various factors that have 739 00:41:54,280 --> 00:41:56,000 Speaker 2: nothing to do with the quality of the work, but 740 00:41:56,120 --> 00:41:58,920 Speaker 2: you may be inspired to put more work into that, 741 00:41:59,080 --> 00:42:02,520 Speaker 2: into into the quality, you know, to put more effort 742 00:42:02,560 --> 00:42:05,160 Speaker 2: into the creation of whatever it is you're making. And 743 00:42:05,360 --> 00:42:08,560 Speaker 2: you know, you know, we knew that first prize ribbon, 744 00:42:09,320 --> 00:42:11,960 Speaker 2: but it could result in a better product overall. 745 00:42:12,520 --> 00:42:14,680 Speaker 3: Okay, So the last thing I want to talk about 746 00:42:14,680 --> 00:42:17,040 Speaker 3: in this part of our series is I've mentioned there 747 00:42:17,080 --> 00:42:22,120 Speaker 3: are some criticisms of the concept of the illusion of control. 748 00:42:23,160 --> 00:42:27,840 Speaker 3: There is one really interesting, complicating result I found concerning 749 00:42:27,960 --> 00:42:30,440 Speaker 3: when the illusion of control manifests, and that was in 750 00:42:30,480 --> 00:42:34,400 Speaker 3: a paper by Francesca Gino, Zachariah Sharik, and don A. 751 00:42:34,640 --> 00:42:39,359 Speaker 3: Moore published in Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes in 752 00:42:39,360 --> 00:42:43,080 Speaker 3: twenty eleven. Paper was called keeping the Illusion of Control 753 00:42:43,200 --> 00:42:49,120 Speaker 3: under Control, Ceilings, floors, and imperfect calibration. And so this 754 00:42:49,239 --> 00:42:53,399 Speaker 3: paper offers a critique of illusion of control research by 755 00:42:53,400 --> 00:42:57,839 Speaker 3: suggesting that maybe it's better to think about this as 756 00:42:57,880 --> 00:43:03,520 Speaker 3: a general tendency to make incorrect estimates of our level 757 00:43:03,560 --> 00:43:08,640 Speaker 3: of control over things. And this would include both overestimating 758 00:43:08,920 --> 00:43:13,560 Speaker 3: and underestimating our level of control in situations where the 759 00:43:13,600 --> 00:43:18,040 Speaker 3: evidence is somewhat ambiguous. So, according to these authors, the 760 00:43:18,080 --> 00:43:24,160 Speaker 3: literature appears to support a general overestimation of control merely 761 00:43:24,280 --> 00:43:28,400 Speaker 3: because so many of these studies focus on games of chance, 762 00:43:28,840 --> 00:43:32,360 Speaker 3: and other purely random outcomes, things that we have zero 763 00:43:32,480 --> 00:43:36,320 Speaker 3: control over, and thus belief in any amount of control 764 00:43:36,400 --> 00:43:40,680 Speaker 3: in these experiments will be factually mistaken. But the authors 765 00:43:40,680 --> 00:43:44,440 Speaker 3: of this paper basically they accept that pattern is valid. 766 00:43:44,560 --> 00:43:47,719 Speaker 3: But they also say, if you give people tasks where 767 00:43:47,719 --> 00:43:51,280 Speaker 3: they have a high level of control, sometimes you should 768 00:43:51,280 --> 00:43:55,759 Speaker 3: expect to see subjects systematically underestimate how much control they 769 00:43:55,760 --> 00:43:59,440 Speaker 3: have on those things. So the authors perform several experiments 770 00:43:59,480 --> 00:44:03,400 Speaker 3: to test them, and they found that across three experiments, 771 00:44:04,040 --> 00:44:08,960 Speaker 3: indeed there is a corresponding illusory lack of control in 772 00:44:09,040 --> 00:44:12,000 Speaker 3: some cases where people have a high degree of control 773 00:44:12,040 --> 00:44:15,640 Speaker 3: over outcomes. So I wanted to describe just one example 774 00:44:15,680 --> 00:44:18,960 Speaker 3: of the kinds of experiments they did. Subjects would be 775 00:44:19,000 --> 00:44:21,799 Speaker 3: asked to do a kind of word search puzzle on 776 00:44:21,840 --> 00:44:25,240 Speaker 3: computer screens. They're looking for like patterns of repeating letters 777 00:44:25,280 --> 00:44:30,080 Speaker 3: and a jumble of letters, and occasionally, at random time intervals, 778 00:44:30,280 --> 00:44:33,920 Speaker 3: the background of the screens they're looking at would change color, 779 00:44:34,480 --> 00:44:36,680 Speaker 3: maybe making it harder to pick out the letters and 780 00:44:36,719 --> 00:44:40,160 Speaker 3: solve the puzzle. Participants could press a button to make 781 00:44:40,239 --> 00:44:43,520 Speaker 3: the background revert to its original color and make the 782 00:44:43,520 --> 00:44:47,600 Speaker 3: game easier again. And so the independent variable here was 783 00:44:47,840 --> 00:44:51,800 Speaker 3: how responsive the background was to presses of the button. 784 00:44:52,280 --> 00:44:56,320 Speaker 3: The button could be set to zero percent control, fifteen percent, 785 00:44:56,800 --> 00:45:00,960 Speaker 3: fifty percent, and eighty five percent. And after this puzzle 786 00:45:00,960 --> 00:45:04,400 Speaker 3: search game was over, subjects were asked what level of 787 00:45:04,440 --> 00:45:08,040 Speaker 3: control they thought they had over the background color with 788 00:45:08,120 --> 00:45:12,160 Speaker 3: the button, and as predicted in this experiment, the authors 789 00:45:12,239 --> 00:45:15,759 Speaker 3: found in the low control conditions, like if you have 790 00:45:16,080 --> 00:45:19,839 Speaker 3: zero percent or fifteen percent of control over the background, 791 00:45:20,200 --> 00:45:22,440 Speaker 3: there was an illusion of control, same kind of thing 792 00:45:22,440 --> 00:45:25,440 Speaker 3: you would expect based on these previous experiments, But in 793 00:45:25,520 --> 00:45:29,200 Speaker 3: the high control conditions, where players had like eighty five 794 00:45:29,280 --> 00:45:32,719 Speaker 3: percent control over the background, they thought they had less 795 00:45:32,840 --> 00:45:36,480 Speaker 3: control than they actually did. So they did three experiments 796 00:45:36,480 --> 00:45:38,839 Speaker 3: in total, and in the end, the authors here say 797 00:45:38,920 --> 00:45:43,799 Speaker 3: that this raises doubts about whether people actually do systematically 798 00:45:44,000 --> 00:45:48,400 Speaker 3: overestimate their control, and instead, what might be more accurate 799 00:45:48,440 --> 00:45:51,560 Speaker 3: to say is that people overestimate their control when they 800 00:45:51,600 --> 00:45:55,600 Speaker 3: have little and underestimate their control when they have much. 801 00:45:56,000 --> 00:45:58,279 Speaker 3: And so they they offer this as a critique of 802 00:45:58,400 --> 00:46:01,560 Speaker 3: the sort of theoretical frame work of the illusion of control, 803 00:46:02,080 --> 00:46:04,920 Speaker 3: because they say, really, that's only half of the picture, 804 00:46:05,080 --> 00:46:07,920 Speaker 3: and that it's more accurate probably to say that we 805 00:46:08,040 --> 00:46:12,080 Speaker 3: have a general tendency to make mistaken judgments about the 806 00:46:12,200 --> 00:46:14,839 Speaker 3: level of control we have over events, and that goes 807 00:46:14,880 --> 00:46:15,560 Speaker 3: both ways. 808 00:46:16,080 --> 00:46:18,440 Speaker 2: Interesting, Yeah, I mean it reminds me of various discussions 809 00:46:18,440 --> 00:46:22,840 Speaker 2: we've had about occasional, occasionally beneficial errors and cognition. You know, 810 00:46:22,920 --> 00:46:26,759 Speaker 2: sometimes overconfidence pays off, like we were just saying, sometimes 811 00:46:26,800 --> 00:46:30,720 Speaker 2: overconfidence just gives you confidence you need to do something, 812 00:46:31,840 --> 00:46:35,080 Speaker 2: and sometimes an abundance of caution pays off. And then, 813 00:46:35,160 --> 00:46:37,560 Speaker 2: of course, in either case, sometimes it doesn't work out 814 00:46:38,239 --> 00:46:41,920 Speaker 2: well for the individual. Either. Overconfidence can screw you up, 815 00:46:41,960 --> 00:46:45,080 Speaker 2: and so can being too cautious, and I guess you 816 00:46:45,160 --> 00:46:46,640 Speaker 2: need to some degree a little bit of both to 817 00:46:46,680 --> 00:46:50,080 Speaker 2: sort of balance out these illusions. 818 00:46:50,600 --> 00:46:52,920 Speaker 3: Yeah, is it all right to have one type of 819 00:46:53,280 --> 00:46:57,080 Speaker 3: illusion pretty consistently if you have like a compensating illusion 820 00:46:57,200 --> 00:46:59,279 Speaker 3: that sort of like steers you toward the middle. 821 00:46:59,640 --> 00:47:01,120 Speaker 2: I don't know. Maybe. I mean I feel like a 822 00:47:01,160 --> 00:47:04,279 Speaker 2: lot of our worldviews are kind of arranged like this. 823 00:47:04,360 --> 00:47:07,560 Speaker 2: There are the things that we are unreasonably anxious about 824 00:47:08,080 --> 00:47:11,759 Speaker 2: and unreasonably cautious about perhaps or at least have a 825 00:47:11,800 --> 00:47:13,960 Speaker 2: heightened level of caution, And then there are other areas 826 00:47:13,960 --> 00:47:16,160 Speaker 2: where we may kind of have blinders on and we're 827 00:47:16,160 --> 00:47:18,160 Speaker 2: just kind of like babes in the woods with those 828 00:47:18,200 --> 00:47:21,600 Speaker 2: particular threats. And yeah, at the end of the day, 829 00:47:21,640 --> 00:47:25,640 Speaker 2: like you can't be over confident about everything. You're going 830 00:47:25,680 --> 00:47:27,799 Speaker 2: to get plowed over on the but you've got to 831 00:47:27,880 --> 00:47:31,360 Speaker 2: do things like leave the house, so you have to 832 00:47:31,800 --> 00:47:34,800 Speaker 2: have like some level of confidence, even in cases where 833 00:47:35,160 --> 00:47:42,040 Speaker 2: the confidence is outpacing the actual chances a little bit. 834 00:47:42,520 --> 00:47:44,480 Speaker 3: All right, well, I think maybe we should call it 835 00:47:44,520 --> 00:47:46,960 Speaker 3: there for part two on the illusion of control. 836 00:47:47,560 --> 00:47:49,960 Speaker 2: Yeah, obviously we'd love to hear from everyone out there 837 00:47:50,000 --> 00:47:53,440 Speaker 2: if you have feedback personal experience on anything we discussed here. 838 00:47:54,040 --> 00:47:56,680 Speaker 2: As usual, remind everybody that stuft to Blew Your Mind 839 00:47:56,719 --> 00:47:59,400 Speaker 2: is primarily a science podcast with core episodes on Tuesdays 840 00:47:59,400 --> 00:48:03,160 Speaker 2: and Thursday, we have listener mail. On Mondays, we have 841 00:48:03,360 --> 00:48:06,719 Speaker 2: one of about three different varieties of short form episodes 842 00:48:06,760 --> 00:48:09,400 Speaker 2: on Wednesday, and then on Friday, we set aside most 843 00:48:09,440 --> 00:48:11,719 Speaker 2: serious concerns to just talk about a weird movie on 844 00:48:12,000 --> 00:48:13,480 Speaker 2: Weird House Cinema. 845 00:48:13,760 --> 00:48:17,440 Speaker 3: Huge thanks as always to our excellent audio producer JJ Posway. 846 00:48:17,520 --> 00:48:19,120 Speaker 3: If you would like to get in touch with us 847 00:48:19,120 --> 00:48:21,920 Speaker 3: with feedback on this episode or any other, to suggest 848 00:48:21,920 --> 00:48:23,959 Speaker 3: a topic for the future, or just to say hello. 849 00:48:24,080 --> 00:48:26,720 Speaker 3: You can email us at contact at stuff to Blow 850 00:48:26,719 --> 00:48:35,520 Speaker 3: your Mind dot com. 851 00:48:35,560 --> 00:48:38,520 Speaker 1: Stuff to Blow Your Mind is production of iHeartRadio. 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