1 00:00:02,720 --> 00:00:16,439 Speaker 1: Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News. 2 00:00:18,200 --> 00:00:20,960 Speaker 2: Hello and welcome to another episode of the Odd Loots podcast. 3 00:00:21,000 --> 00:00:24,200 Speaker 2: I'm Tracy Alloway and I'm Joe Whysenthal. Joe, we're still 4 00:00:24,200 --> 00:00:27,520 Speaker 2: in celebratory mode. Yes, tenure anniversary. 5 00:00:27,600 --> 00:00:30,520 Speaker 3: It's ten your anniversary month, really yeah, and even next 6 00:00:30,520 --> 00:00:32,519 Speaker 3: month kind of ten year anniversary month. So we can 7 00:00:32,600 --> 00:00:33,800 Speaker 3: just extend this for a long time. 8 00:00:33,840 --> 00:00:35,639 Speaker 2: We could just make this. Well, we should have made 9 00:00:35,720 --> 00:00:39,440 Speaker 2: twenty twenty five the Odd Lots ten year anniversary years. Yeah, 10 00:00:39,440 --> 00:00:40,839 Speaker 2: but we're almost at the end of the year, so 11 00:00:41,200 --> 00:00:44,360 Speaker 2: we failed in that respect. But obviously we're sort of 12 00:00:44,360 --> 00:00:47,680 Speaker 2: reflecting on the past decade or so at Odd Lots 13 00:00:47,720 --> 00:00:51,040 Speaker 2: and things that have or haven't changed in markets. And 14 00:00:51,120 --> 00:00:53,680 Speaker 2: one thing I've been thinking about a lot is what's 15 00:00:53,720 --> 00:00:54,880 Speaker 2: been going on in the bond market. 16 00:00:55,000 --> 00:00:57,720 Speaker 3: Yeah, you can't, well, I think, look, there is nothing 17 00:00:57,800 --> 00:01:01,240 Speaker 3: that's more different in twenty twenty five versus twenty fifteen 18 00:01:01,560 --> 00:01:04,240 Speaker 3: than what's going on in fixed in right, So you. 19 00:01:04,160 --> 00:01:07,080 Speaker 2: Say that, and it is true, Okay, you know, if 20 00:01:07,080 --> 00:01:08,840 Speaker 2: you look at if you look at the benchmark ten 21 00:01:08,920 --> 00:01:11,600 Speaker 2: year yield, Okay, sure, we're at four percent now above 22 00:01:11,640 --> 00:01:13,960 Speaker 2: four percent, and in twenty fifteen, we were at like 23 00:01:14,040 --> 00:01:17,120 Speaker 2: two percent. Right, that's changed, and we went through inflation, 24 00:01:17,200 --> 00:01:19,600 Speaker 2: which is something we hadn't experienced for a pretty long 25 00:01:19,640 --> 00:01:24,160 Speaker 2: time in you know, previous years. But I also feel 26 00:01:24,200 --> 00:01:26,720 Speaker 2: like it's changed, but a lot of it hasn't a 27 00:01:26,720 --> 00:01:29,640 Speaker 2: lot of the discussions haven't changed. If I think about 28 00:01:29,680 --> 00:01:33,399 Speaker 2: what we were discussing back in twenty fifteen, it was 29 00:01:33,440 --> 00:01:36,680 Speaker 2: stuff like who's going to buy US treasuries, who's going 30 00:01:36,720 --> 00:01:39,959 Speaker 2: to fund the US deficit? Bond vigilantes. I mean, how 31 00:01:39,959 --> 00:01:42,480 Speaker 2: many years have we been talking about bond vigilantes. Now 32 00:01:42,920 --> 00:01:46,080 Speaker 2: the credit market, it was whether or not investors are 33 00:01:46,120 --> 00:01:49,920 Speaker 2: being adequately compensated for the risk they're taking on. And 34 00:01:49,960 --> 00:01:51,800 Speaker 2: the funny thing is now, you know, if you look 35 00:01:51,800 --> 00:01:55,080 Speaker 2: at spreads on junk raated bonds, if you didn't think 36 00:01:55,080 --> 00:01:58,400 Speaker 2: they were being adequately compensated at like seven point two 37 00:01:58,480 --> 00:02:01,400 Speaker 2: percent in twenty fifteen, I wonder what you think when 38 00:02:01,400 --> 00:02:03,600 Speaker 2: you look at spreads of six point four percent in 39 00:02:03,640 --> 00:02:04,480 Speaker 2: twenty twenty five. 40 00:02:04,720 --> 00:02:07,760 Speaker 3: This is a really good point, actually, because especially lately, 41 00:02:07,840 --> 00:02:10,640 Speaker 3: obviously we've had all of these, you know, we've had 42 00:02:10,639 --> 00:02:13,520 Speaker 3: a number of credit events, these little blow ups. Jamie 43 00:02:13,560 --> 00:02:16,520 Speaker 3: Diamond used the term cockroaches, et cetera. But by and 44 00:02:16,639 --> 00:02:20,880 Speaker 3: large spreads, which were sort of infinitously narrow last decade, 45 00:02:20,960 --> 00:02:23,399 Speaker 3: remained quite narrow by historical terms. 46 00:02:23,560 --> 00:02:25,320 Speaker 2: I feel like we should just mention here we are 47 00:02:25,360 --> 00:02:28,280 Speaker 2: recording on November tenth. Oh yeah, things are changing fast 48 00:02:28,360 --> 00:02:31,080 Speaker 2: in the credit market. There's a little bit of nervousness 49 00:02:31,080 --> 00:02:33,840 Speaker 2: creeping in, but you're you're absolutely right, By and large 50 00:02:33,880 --> 00:02:37,639 Speaker 2: spreads are at you know, pretty very pretty low levels, 51 00:02:37,680 --> 00:02:39,639 Speaker 2: and people have been complaining about it for a long 52 00:02:39,639 --> 00:02:41,880 Speaker 2: time now. Well, speaking of credit, you also have the 53 00:02:42,000 --> 00:02:45,000 Speaker 2: rise of private credit, which is something we were talking 54 00:02:45,040 --> 00:02:47,200 Speaker 2: about even back in twenty fifteen. But back in the 55 00:02:47,200 --> 00:02:49,680 Speaker 2: way you were, well, no, it both were, but we 56 00:02:49,760 --> 00:02:52,080 Speaker 2: called it something different. We called it you know, shadow 57 00:02:52,160 --> 00:02:53,880 Speaker 2: banks and agencies and. 58 00:02:53,880 --> 00:02:54,320 Speaker 4: All of that. 59 00:02:55,280 --> 00:02:58,720 Speaker 3: But that is a space that's much bigger, much more interest, 60 00:02:58,880 --> 00:03:02,280 Speaker 3: much more scrutiny. I mean, just a whole you know, 61 00:03:02,400 --> 00:03:05,840 Speaker 3: orders of magnitude bigger. Since twenty fifteen, I don't think 62 00:03:05,880 --> 00:03:09,519 Speaker 3: people have any real handle on like what risk scenarios 63 00:03:09,560 --> 00:03:12,359 Speaker 3: look like, the quality of the underwriting, et cetera. So 64 00:03:12,639 --> 00:03:14,760 Speaker 3: this is definitely something and it's you know, we've been 65 00:03:14,760 --> 00:03:16,679 Speaker 3: talking about it for years but it continues to grow 66 00:03:16,680 --> 00:03:19,960 Speaker 3: in with some of these coote cockroaches, et cetera, more 67 00:03:20,040 --> 00:03:21,440 Speaker 3: interest in what's really going on. 68 00:03:21,720 --> 00:03:24,280 Speaker 2: Right, So things have changed, but things have also kind 69 00:03:24,320 --> 00:03:26,919 Speaker 2: of stayed the same in some respects. But I'm very 70 00:03:26,919 --> 00:03:29,280 Speaker 2: happy to say we do, in fact have the perfect 71 00:03:29,280 --> 00:03:32,320 Speaker 2: guest to talk about all of this, someone who has, 72 00:03:32,480 --> 00:03:36,040 Speaker 2: you know, been writing and conversing and going on TV 73 00:03:36,120 --> 00:03:38,120 Speaker 2: and talking about a lot of these themes. 74 00:03:37,760 --> 00:03:41,200 Speaker 3: For us and making a great career directly these. 75 00:03:41,080 --> 00:03:44,040 Speaker 2: Actually investing based off some of these ideas. We're going 76 00:03:44,120 --> 00:03:45,960 Speaker 2: to be speaking with. Jeff gun Lacky is of course, 77 00:03:45,960 --> 00:03:49,440 Speaker 2: the founder and CEO of Double Line Capital, someone we've 78 00:03:49,440 --> 00:03:51,240 Speaker 2: wanted to get on the show for a long time. 79 00:03:51,520 --> 00:03:53,480 Speaker 2: So Jeff, thank you so much for coming on. 80 00:03:53,520 --> 00:03:56,960 Speaker 4: All thoughts, well, thanks for having me. I'm looking forward 81 00:03:57,000 --> 00:03:58,000 Speaker 4: to our discussion today. 82 00:03:58,520 --> 00:04:01,320 Speaker 2: So let's start big picture because I actually we can 83 00:04:01,360 --> 00:04:03,720 Speaker 2: take this in you know, a bunch of different directions. 84 00:04:03,760 --> 00:04:05,720 Speaker 2: But when you look at the treasury market and when 85 00:04:05,760 --> 00:04:09,120 Speaker 2: you look at the credit market, which are you more 86 00:04:09,640 --> 00:04:12,640 Speaker 2: concerned about at the moment, because I know you've voiced 87 00:04:12,720 --> 00:04:15,800 Speaker 2: some worries about both of these things. 88 00:04:15,920 --> 00:04:20,560 Speaker 5: Yeah, I'm concerned about the financing of long term treasuries, 89 00:04:21,200 --> 00:04:26,599 Speaker 5: primarily because we're issuing a lot of them, and there's 90 00:04:26,640 --> 00:04:31,279 Speaker 5: inflationary policies that are being run and probably likely to 91 00:04:31,320 --> 00:04:35,400 Speaker 5: be further doubled down upon when Jerome Paul leaves as 92 00:04:35,440 --> 00:04:38,760 Speaker 5: Fed Sherman, I mean, we've got Scott Bessant as the 93 00:04:38,839 --> 00:04:44,000 Speaker 5: Treasury Secretary, and he's talking about well, he's basically mimicking 94 00:04:44,080 --> 00:04:47,000 Speaker 5: what the President says. He basically says rate should be 95 00:04:47,279 --> 00:04:50,440 Speaker 5: a point lower, two points lower. I've heard different numbers 96 00:04:50,440 --> 00:04:52,599 Speaker 5: out of President Trump. He wants rates at two percent 97 00:04:52,680 --> 00:04:56,960 Speaker 5: three percent, but inflation is running above three percent on 98 00:04:57,040 --> 00:04:59,840 Speaker 5: the headline CPI, and it's not likely to come down 99 00:05:00,320 --> 00:05:04,080 Speaker 5: to the Fed's two percent target. And so there's a 100 00:05:04,080 --> 00:05:08,520 Speaker 5: lot of interest in artificially lowering interest rates and perhaps 101 00:05:08,920 --> 00:05:13,680 Speaker 5: taking the maturities of treasuries ever increasingly to under one 102 00:05:13,760 --> 00:05:16,000 Speaker 5: year in maturity. A lot of investors aren't aware of 103 00:05:16,000 --> 00:05:21,080 Speaker 5: the fact that something like eighty percent of all treasuries 104 00:05:21,120 --> 00:05:22,880 Speaker 5: issued in the last twelve months, and this has been 105 00:05:22,880 --> 00:05:25,200 Speaker 5: the case for the last few years, are less than 106 00:05:25,240 --> 00:05:25,680 Speaker 5: one year. 107 00:05:26,440 --> 00:05:28,280 Speaker 4: The treasuries that are issued. 108 00:05:28,040 --> 00:05:30,279 Speaker 5: Longer than twenty years, so twenty years out to thirty 109 00:05:30,360 --> 00:05:34,480 Speaker 5: years is only one point seven percent of the treasurations 110 00:05:34,480 --> 00:05:36,479 Speaker 5: of the last twelve months. And what's interesting about that 111 00:05:37,279 --> 00:05:39,840 Speaker 5: is the Fed has been cutting interest rates over the 112 00:05:39,920 --> 00:05:44,440 Speaker 5: last thirteen months, and historically, when the Fed cuts interest rates, 113 00:05:44,800 --> 00:05:48,560 Speaker 5: of course, short term interest rates decline definitionally at the 114 00:05:48,600 --> 00:05:51,680 Speaker 5: Fed funds level, but also two year treasury rates decline, 115 00:05:51,720 --> 00:05:54,280 Speaker 5: five year treasure rates decline. In fact, long term treasure 116 00:05:54,320 --> 00:05:59,120 Speaker 5: rates have always declined subsequent to the first cut by 117 00:05:59,120 --> 00:06:03,080 Speaker 5: the Fell Reserve, particularly when you're in a sequence of 118 00:06:03,080 --> 00:06:05,839 Speaker 5: the Federal Reserve cuts, and that's certainly been the case 119 00:06:06,240 --> 00:06:08,640 Speaker 5: with now one hundred and fifty basis points. But this 120 00:06:08,839 --> 00:06:12,480 Speaker 5: time all interest rates outside of the two year are 121 00:06:12,680 --> 00:06:15,800 Speaker 5: higher than they were before the Fed's first rate cut. 122 00:06:16,320 --> 00:06:20,760 Speaker 5: That just never happens historically. Another interesting thing that has 123 00:06:20,960 --> 00:06:24,840 Speaker 5: never happened historically is earlier this year, during the tariff 124 00:06:24,880 --> 00:06:27,880 Speaker 5: tantrum of late March and early April, stock market had 125 00:06:27,880 --> 00:06:32,000 Speaker 5: a pretty significant correction, and it was going back back 126 00:06:32,040 --> 00:06:35,200 Speaker 5: to pround two thousand. It was the thirteenth correction in 127 00:06:35,240 --> 00:06:37,279 Speaker 5: the s and P five hundred defined by a drop 128 00:06:37,279 --> 00:06:41,440 Speaker 5: of ten percent at least ten percent in the twelve 129 00:06:42,000 --> 00:06:45,599 Speaker 5: corrections before the one here. In twenty twenty five, the 130 00:06:45,680 --> 00:06:49,480 Speaker 5: dollar went up when the stock market went down as 131 00:06:49,480 --> 00:06:52,320 Speaker 5: a flight to quality asset. That didn't happen this time. 132 00:06:52,560 --> 00:06:54,839 Speaker 5: When we went into that correction earlier this year, the 133 00:06:54,880 --> 00:06:57,640 Speaker 5: dollar went down. It usually goes up by around eight percent, 134 00:06:58,240 --> 00:07:00,360 Speaker 5: and in the first quarter of early second quarter of 135 00:07:00,400 --> 00:07:03,720 Speaker 5: this year it went down by around ten percent. So 136 00:07:03,839 --> 00:07:08,479 Speaker 5: what is happening here seems to be that the pattern 137 00:07:09,240 --> 00:07:13,640 Speaker 5: of interest rate movements and currency movements and what's the 138 00:07:13,720 --> 00:07:16,720 Speaker 5: flight to quality asset and what isn't seems to have 139 00:07:16,880 --> 00:07:20,640 Speaker 5: changed because interest rates have bottomed at the long end 140 00:07:20,760 --> 00:07:23,040 Speaker 5: of the yel curve. And I've been saying this for 141 00:07:23,080 --> 00:07:26,280 Speaker 5: five years now that the secular decline in interest rates 142 00:07:26,520 --> 00:07:31,320 Speaker 5: at the long term maturities is over and in fact, 143 00:07:31,520 --> 00:07:34,440 Speaker 5: in the next session long term interstrates are likely to 144 00:07:34,440 --> 00:07:37,880 Speaker 5: go higher, not lower. And what's happened since the Fed 145 00:07:37,920 --> 00:07:42,240 Speaker 5: started cutting corroborates this somewhat radical idea of mine. When 146 00:07:42,240 --> 00:07:45,520 Speaker 5: it comes to credit, spreads are tight, although you correctly 147 00:07:45,600 --> 00:07:48,800 Speaker 5: noted that they're not on the tights of the year anymore, 148 00:07:48,840 --> 00:07:49,800 Speaker 5: they're starting to widen. 149 00:07:50,280 --> 00:07:51,080 Speaker 4: I think junk. 150 00:07:50,920 --> 00:07:53,840 Speaker 5: Bond spreads are up by about thirty or forty basis points, 151 00:07:54,240 --> 00:07:56,640 Speaker 5: and yes, spreads have remained tight for a long time. 152 00:07:57,240 --> 00:07:58,640 Speaker 4: But one thing that you also. 153 00:08:00,000 --> 00:08:03,000 Speaker 5: For its a little bit is the quality of the 154 00:08:03,080 --> 00:08:08,240 Speaker 5: public corporate credit market is better than it's been historically. 155 00:08:08,280 --> 00:08:10,680 Speaker 4: It's way better than it was prior. 156 00:08:10,400 --> 00:08:12,800 Speaker 5: To the global financial crisis, where you've had all kinds 157 00:08:12,800 --> 00:08:16,080 Speaker 5: of garbage lending going on. But in recent years, the 158 00:08:16,160 --> 00:08:19,200 Speaker 5: garbage lending has not gone to the public markets. The 159 00:08:19,240 --> 00:08:24,040 Speaker 5: garbage lending has gone to these private markets, and private 160 00:08:24,080 --> 00:08:28,720 Speaker 5: credit has been very popular and is now increasingly been 161 00:08:28,720 --> 00:08:31,600 Speaker 5: over allocated to by large asset pools. 162 00:08:32,000 --> 00:08:34,240 Speaker 4: I remember Harvard University, for example. 163 00:08:34,240 --> 00:08:37,640 Speaker 5: They've got like a fifty odd billion dollar endowment, and 164 00:08:38,000 --> 00:08:41,480 Speaker 5: their donors pulled back when they had uprisings on campus, 165 00:08:41,559 --> 00:08:43,800 Speaker 5: and the donors didn't like what was going on, so 166 00:08:43,880 --> 00:08:47,480 Speaker 5: they stopped donating for a while. And Harvard had no 167 00:08:47,559 --> 00:08:50,720 Speaker 5: money a fifty odd billion dollar endowment, and they couldn't 168 00:08:50,760 --> 00:08:54,120 Speaker 5: pay salaries, they couldn't pay the light bills, they couldn't 169 00:08:54,160 --> 00:08:56,559 Speaker 5: pay basic maintenance. They had to go to the bond 170 00:08:56,600 --> 00:08:59,280 Speaker 5: market to borrow. They tried to borrow about fourth a 171 00:08:59,400 --> 00:09:01,560 Speaker 5: billion dollars. I think I think they got away with 172 00:09:01,559 --> 00:09:04,400 Speaker 5: about two and a half billion dollars. But it's fascinating 173 00:09:04,480 --> 00:09:07,520 Speaker 5: that you have a huge asset pool that doesn't have 174 00:09:07,640 --> 00:09:10,560 Speaker 5: liquidity to pay the bills. And I've also heard that 175 00:09:10,760 --> 00:09:13,480 Speaker 5: another large endowment. I think it's Yale University. I might 176 00:09:13,520 --> 00:09:15,679 Speaker 5: be wrong there, but I think it's Yale. They're talking 177 00:09:15,679 --> 00:09:18,600 Speaker 5: about selling some of their private equity stakes because they 178 00:09:18,600 --> 00:09:21,480 Speaker 5: don't have any liquidity either. And this is bled over 179 00:09:21,640 --> 00:09:25,640 Speaker 5: into the private credit market. And I was at a 180 00:09:25,679 --> 00:09:29,679 Speaker 5: Bloomberg broadcasted event in Hollywood at Paramount Studios I think 181 00:09:29,679 --> 00:09:31,920 Speaker 5: it was, and I got there early and there was 182 00:09:31,920 --> 00:09:36,360 Speaker 5: a panel before my fireside chat where the members of 183 00:09:36,400 --> 00:09:40,160 Speaker 5: the panel were all significant executives at some of the 184 00:09:40,280 --> 00:09:43,520 Speaker 5: largest private credit firms. And it was really interesting to 185 00:09:43,520 --> 00:09:47,000 Speaker 5: hear them talk because the tone of the message they 186 00:09:47,000 --> 00:09:49,520 Speaker 5: were giving was far from bullish. 187 00:09:49,720 --> 00:09:49,880 Speaker 4: You know. 188 00:09:49,880 --> 00:09:51,560 Speaker 5: It's kind of like when you talk to a jump 189 00:09:51,640 --> 00:09:54,760 Speaker 5: bond manager, say what's the outlook for twenty twenty six, 190 00:09:55,200 --> 00:09:57,960 Speaker 5: and the most bearish thing they're going to say is, 191 00:09:58,040 --> 00:10:00,320 Speaker 5: we don't think spreads can get it a tighter. We 192 00:10:00,360 --> 00:10:04,040 Speaker 5: think that's the most sparrashing we're going to say, you're 193 00:10:04,040 --> 00:10:07,040 Speaker 5: going to earn the coupon. Well, these private credit people 194 00:10:07,400 --> 00:10:12,239 Speaker 5: were using words like tension and a lack of runway. 195 00:10:12,480 --> 00:10:15,280 Speaker 5: These are all euphemisms for bad things happening. 196 00:10:16,000 --> 00:10:19,080 Speaker 4: And I think that, you know, we've started to see defaults. 197 00:10:19,640 --> 00:10:22,199 Speaker 5: And there's something on the Bloomberg news wire today, it's 198 00:10:22,720 --> 00:10:29,160 Speaker 5: on top Go that speaks of a home renovation business 199 00:10:29,679 --> 00:10:32,360 Speaker 5: that was private credit, like one hundred and fifty million 200 00:10:32,440 --> 00:10:36,360 Speaker 5: dollar issuemance of private credit and it went to zero. 201 00:10:37,440 --> 00:10:38,360 Speaker 4: There's called rent. 202 00:10:38,679 --> 00:10:41,240 Speaker 5: Apparently there are firms that had it at one hundred 203 00:10:41,679 --> 00:10:45,240 Speaker 5: a few weeks ago and it went to zero and 204 00:10:48,080 --> 00:10:51,480 Speaker 5: a month ago. But anyway, it's called Renovo or something 205 00:10:51,559 --> 00:10:55,480 Speaker 5: like this. And the funny thing is the argument for 206 00:10:55,559 --> 00:10:59,480 Speaker 5: private credit has always been a sharp ratio argument. At 207 00:10:59,520 --> 00:11:01,880 Speaker 5: the center of it is that you know, you get 208 00:11:01,880 --> 00:11:04,120 Speaker 5: the same return or maybe a little better return than 209 00:11:04,160 --> 00:11:05,719 Speaker 5: the public markets, but you. 210 00:11:05,679 --> 00:11:07,040 Speaker 4: Have much lower volatility. 211 00:11:07,480 --> 00:11:10,120 Speaker 5: Well that's like saying that you have no risk in 212 00:11:10,160 --> 00:11:12,319 Speaker 5: a CD. You don't have any interest rate risk in 213 00:11:12,360 --> 00:11:15,040 Speaker 5: a CD. If you buy a five year CD, the 214 00:11:15,080 --> 00:11:17,600 Speaker 5: price never changes. Well, that's just because you don't market 215 00:11:17,679 --> 00:11:20,960 Speaker 5: to market. You know, of course, a CD that you 216 00:11:21,080 --> 00:11:24,240 Speaker 5: bought five years ago at one and a half percent 217 00:11:24,720 --> 00:11:29,959 Speaker 5: is not worth you couldn't sell it at. 218 00:11:28,440 --> 00:11:29,240 Speaker 4: A power value. 219 00:11:29,320 --> 00:11:30,920 Speaker 5: You're going to have to take a discount on it. 220 00:11:31,440 --> 00:11:34,760 Speaker 5: But that's the private credit argument. What really happens, and 221 00:11:34,800 --> 00:11:37,679 Speaker 5: this was really borrowed from private equity, which they use 222 00:11:37,720 --> 00:11:40,400 Speaker 5: the sharp ratio argument there too. They say, well, you'll 223 00:11:40,400 --> 00:11:42,400 Speaker 5: get the same return, or maybe a little better return 224 00:11:42,800 --> 00:11:44,520 Speaker 5: out of private equity than you will out of the 225 00:11:44,559 --> 00:11:46,360 Speaker 5: S and P five hundred, but. 226 00:11:46,520 --> 00:11:47,960 Speaker 4: It's much lower volatility. 227 00:11:48,320 --> 00:11:50,520 Speaker 5: So what happens is when the S and P five 228 00:11:50,559 --> 00:11:53,320 Speaker 5: hundred goes from one hundred to fifty, the private equity 229 00:11:53,320 --> 00:11:55,760 Speaker 5: firms mark their positions down from one hundred to eighty. 230 00:11:56,240 --> 00:11:58,720 Speaker 5: Now they're not worth eighty, you couldn't sell at eighty, 231 00:11:58,800 --> 00:11:59,200 Speaker 5: but that's. 232 00:11:59,120 --> 00:11:59,880 Speaker 4: Where they get marked. 233 00:11:59,880 --> 00:12:02,080 Speaker 5: And when the market recovers back to one hundred on 234 00:12:02,080 --> 00:12:04,240 Speaker 5: the S and P five hundred, they mark their private 235 00:12:04,280 --> 00:12:05,520 Speaker 5: equity up to one hundred. 236 00:12:05,800 --> 00:12:07,880 Speaker 4: So lo and behold. Both the S and P five 237 00:12:07,960 --> 00:12:09,640 Speaker 4: hundred and the private equity have. 238 00:12:09,640 --> 00:12:13,599 Speaker 5: A return of zero, but the volatility of the S 239 00:12:13,679 --> 00:12:16,720 Speaker 5: and P five hundred it's more than double the private equity. 240 00:12:16,800 --> 00:12:20,000 Speaker 5: So it's basically a sharper issue argument based upon the 241 00:12:20,080 --> 00:12:23,520 Speaker 5: volatility being under reported, and that's that goes on in 242 00:12:23,559 --> 00:12:26,840 Speaker 5: all of these these so called private markets. And now 243 00:12:27,040 --> 00:12:30,720 Speaker 5: it's very fascinating that this Rinovo in the article today, 244 00:12:31,320 --> 00:12:34,520 Speaker 5: it basically said that they had a Chapter seven filing 245 00:12:35,120 --> 00:12:40,440 Speaker 5: and bankruptcy filing and their assets, their liabilities were shown 246 00:12:40,440 --> 00:12:43,920 Speaker 5: listed as being between one hundred and five hundred million dollars. 247 00:12:44,240 --> 00:12:47,360 Speaker 4: You check a box, you can give a specific. 248 00:12:46,960 --> 00:12:49,520 Speaker 5: Number, so there's ranges, and there were range that their 249 00:12:49,520 --> 00:12:53,160 Speaker 5: aliabilities were in between one hundred and five hundred million dollars. 250 00:12:53,440 --> 00:12:58,600 Speaker 5: Their assets were listed as less than fifty thousand dollars, 251 00:12:59,120 --> 00:13:02,280 Speaker 5: just thousand dollars. Are you trying to tell me that 252 00:13:02,320 --> 00:13:05,920 Speaker 5: these big private equity firms and private credit firms with 253 00:13:06,000 --> 00:13:09,679 Speaker 5: all of their resources aren't aware of that type of 254 00:13:09,800 --> 00:13:15,440 Speaker 5: debt to equity ratio that's obviously far into a bankrupt situation. 255 00:13:16,200 --> 00:13:17,440 Speaker 4: So what's going on here? 256 00:13:17,559 --> 00:13:20,000 Speaker 5: That private equity firms had this marked a few weeks 257 00:13:20,000 --> 00:13:23,760 Speaker 5: ago at one hundred, when it was obvious that their 258 00:13:23,800 --> 00:13:29,199 Speaker 5: liabilities were vastly, vastly higher than their equity that should 259 00:13:29,200 --> 00:13:33,880 Speaker 5: have been marked down to I don't know, fifty twenty 260 00:13:33,920 --> 00:13:38,079 Speaker 5: five one, but at one hundred. What's going on it's 261 00:13:38,080 --> 00:13:40,280 Speaker 5: like there's only one price for private there's only two 262 00:13:40,320 --> 00:13:41,480 Speaker 5: prices for private credits. 263 00:13:41,520 --> 00:13:44,679 Speaker 4: Aperis yeah, one hundred, that's it. 264 00:13:45,000 --> 00:13:48,040 Speaker 5: And I heard an announcement made from these private equity 265 00:13:48,040 --> 00:13:50,800 Speaker 5: people at that Bloomberger event, but they're sort of like, 266 00:13:50,840 --> 00:13:53,000 Speaker 5: as long as we believe that we're going to get 267 00:13:53,000 --> 00:13:55,000 Speaker 5: paid back, we leave it at one hundred. 268 00:13:55,640 --> 00:13:57,600 Speaker 4: Well, okay, but. 269 00:13:57,520 --> 00:14:01,120 Speaker 5: Once once you have one hundred fift million plus dollars 270 00:14:01,480 --> 00:14:04,200 Speaker 5: of liabilities and less than fifty thousand dollars of assets, 271 00:14:04,400 --> 00:14:07,240 Speaker 5: it's pretty unlikely you're going to get paid back. The 272 00:14:07,320 --> 00:14:09,200 Speaker 5: price should not be at one hundred. But that's what's 273 00:14:09,240 --> 00:14:11,680 Speaker 5: going on, And so you have that sharp ratio argument. 274 00:14:11,880 --> 00:14:14,400 Speaker 5: Then you have another argument for private credit, which had 275 00:14:14,520 --> 00:14:18,720 Speaker 5: been somewhat valid was just recent history, I mean performance. 276 00:14:19,040 --> 00:14:22,000 Speaker 5: The five year performance of private credit a couple of 277 00:14:22,040 --> 00:14:25,360 Speaker 5: years ago was definitely better than the five year performance 278 00:14:25,360 --> 00:14:29,200 Speaker 5: at least reported performance of public credit. 279 00:14:29,280 --> 00:14:30,920 Speaker 4: Private credit did better than public credits. 280 00:14:30,920 --> 00:14:35,240 Speaker 5: We had a trailing performance argument, which, of course trailing 281 00:14:35,280 --> 00:14:38,360 Speaker 5: performance is no guarantee of future results, which has stated 282 00:14:38,400 --> 00:14:44,320 Speaker 5: on every single perspectus. But recently private credit is not outperforming. Obviously, 283 00:14:44,360 --> 00:14:46,520 Speaker 5: with bonds going from one hundred to zero in a 284 00:14:46,560 --> 00:14:49,880 Speaker 5: matter of weeks. The public market has been performing better 285 00:14:50,240 --> 00:14:52,680 Speaker 5: than the private market. And then the most ridiculous argument 286 00:14:52,680 --> 00:14:56,000 Speaker 5: of all for private credit has been private credit belongs 287 00:14:56,000 --> 00:14:59,200 Speaker 5: in every portfolio because it lets you sleep at night, 288 00:14:59,680 --> 00:15:02,280 Speaker 5: because it helps you ride out the volatility of your 289 00:15:02,320 --> 00:15:07,080 Speaker 5: public credit. Again, that's just a repackaging of the volatility. 290 00:15:07,160 --> 00:15:09,840 Speaker 5: If you don't market to market, there's no volatility. But 291 00:15:10,040 --> 00:15:12,080 Speaker 5: if the price goes from one hundred to zero in 292 00:15:12,120 --> 00:15:16,800 Speaker 5: a matter of a few weeks, there's something untoward is 293 00:15:16,840 --> 00:15:20,600 Speaker 5: going on. And so I'm very, very negative on those 294 00:15:20,640 --> 00:15:25,040 Speaker 5: types of non transparent markets. It reminds me I've been 295 00:15:25,080 --> 00:15:28,280 Speaker 5: saying this for probably two years now that the next 296 00:15:28,320 --> 00:15:32,040 Speaker 5: big crisis in the financial markets is going to be 297 00:15:32,120 --> 00:15:37,800 Speaker 5: private credit. It has the same trappings as subprime mortgage 298 00:15:38,040 --> 00:15:42,680 Speaker 5: package repackaging had back in twenty twenty oh six. Now 299 00:15:42,680 --> 00:15:45,200 Speaker 5: it took a couple of years for its to totally unravel. 300 00:15:45,480 --> 00:15:47,680 Speaker 5: So this stuff doesn't happen in a week or a 301 00:15:47,760 --> 00:15:51,200 Speaker 5: year even, But I'm very negative on that. And so 302 00:15:51,640 --> 00:15:54,720 Speaker 5: where we stand on fixed income is we don't like 303 00:15:54,760 --> 00:15:58,480 Speaker 5: long term treasury bonds at all because we don't think 304 00:15:58,640 --> 00:15:59,160 Speaker 5: people are. 305 00:15:59,080 --> 00:16:02,080 Speaker 4: Going to want them. During the next recession, the deficit 306 00:16:02,160 --> 00:16:02,640 Speaker 4: is going to. 307 00:16:02,600 --> 00:16:05,160 Speaker 5: Go up, because it always goes up during a recession. 308 00:16:05,240 --> 00:16:09,480 Speaker 5: The deficit, the official deficit is about six percent of GDP. 309 00:16:09,720 --> 00:16:13,320 Speaker 5: That's a level that was associated historically with the depths 310 00:16:13,360 --> 00:16:17,400 Speaker 5: of recessions, because of course it goes up during recessions. Well, 311 00:16:17,520 --> 00:16:20,240 Speaker 5: when you go to recession, the deficit goes up on 312 00:16:20,320 --> 00:16:23,880 Speaker 5: average by well it depends long how long a time 313 00:16:23,920 --> 00:16:26,000 Speaker 5: series you use, but if you go back for about 314 00:16:26,040 --> 00:16:28,720 Speaker 5: fifty years, it goes up by about four or five 315 00:16:28,760 --> 00:16:31,920 Speaker 5: percent of GDP. And more recent recessions it's been a 316 00:16:31,960 --> 00:16:34,400 Speaker 5: lot worse than that. We could argue, you could make 317 00:16:34,440 --> 00:16:37,920 Speaker 5: the case somewhat plausibly that the goal of financial crisis 318 00:16:38,240 --> 00:16:40,880 Speaker 5: it was kind of weird, and that the COVID lockdown 319 00:16:41,360 --> 00:16:44,560 Speaker 5: recession was kind of weird. But during those the deficit 320 00:16:44,600 --> 00:16:47,479 Speaker 5: went up by about eight percent of GDP on average. 321 00:16:47,640 --> 00:16:50,480 Speaker 5: So what happens if the deficit goes from six percent 322 00:16:50,480 --> 00:16:53,840 Speaker 5: of GDP to ten percent of GDP or twelve percent 323 00:16:53,880 --> 00:16:57,360 Speaker 5: of GDP or fourteen percent of GDP, all of those 324 00:16:57,400 --> 00:17:01,280 Speaker 5: are possible. What happens is that you have to blow 325 00:17:01,360 --> 00:17:04,159 Speaker 5: up the entire system because all the tax. 326 00:17:03,960 --> 00:17:05,640 Speaker 4: Receipts would go to interest expence. 327 00:17:06,640 --> 00:17:10,320 Speaker 5: We're already at a large percentage, about one point four 328 00:17:10,280 --> 00:17:13,360 Speaker 5: to one point five trillion dollars of the seven trillion 329 00:17:13,400 --> 00:17:15,640 Speaker 5: dollar budget is now interest expense. 330 00:17:15,960 --> 00:17:17,399 Speaker 4: Of course, we have a two trillion. 331 00:17:17,160 --> 00:17:20,879 Speaker 5: Dollar budget deficit, so there's only five trillion dollars of taxes, 332 00:17:21,240 --> 00:17:24,000 Speaker 5: and you know, thirty percent of that is going to 333 00:17:24,040 --> 00:17:26,600 Speaker 5: interest expense, and that is going to go higher. And 334 00:17:26,680 --> 00:17:30,520 Speaker 5: as interest rates are still elevated from levels of six 335 00:17:30,720 --> 00:17:34,520 Speaker 5: or five to seven to twelve years ago, the bonds 336 00:17:34,560 --> 00:17:36,960 Speaker 5: that are rolling off have an average coupon for the 337 00:17:36,960 --> 00:17:40,040 Speaker 5: next few years of a little bit below three percent, 338 00:17:40,320 --> 00:17:42,800 Speaker 5: let's just call it three percent. That means that with 339 00:17:42,880 --> 00:17:45,679 Speaker 5: FED funds at three and seven eighths and treasuries at 340 00:17:45,720 --> 00:17:48,000 Speaker 5: four up to four and a half, that means that 341 00:17:48,080 --> 00:17:51,119 Speaker 5: on average, you're going to have higher interest expense on 342 00:17:51,320 --> 00:17:54,160 Speaker 5: just rolling over the existing debt. And of course you're 343 00:17:54,280 --> 00:17:57,879 Speaker 5: labeling on a couple trillion dollars in non recessionary period. 344 00:17:58,080 --> 00:18:01,240 Speaker 5: And so I did a thing at Grants conference. Jim 345 00:18:01,320 --> 00:18:05,159 Speaker 5: Grant had his fortieth anniversary conference and a couple of 346 00:18:05,200 --> 00:18:09,240 Speaker 5: years ago, and I did the simplest, most discinct presentation 347 00:18:09,320 --> 00:18:10,600 Speaker 5: I've ever given in my career. 348 00:18:11,000 --> 00:18:12,680 Speaker 4: I just went through the interesting. 349 00:18:12,600 --> 00:18:16,879 Speaker 5: Fence problem using plausible assumptions on where the deficit's going. 350 00:18:17,920 --> 00:18:20,000 Speaker 5: But the conclusion is, and this is an art and 351 00:18:20,040 --> 00:18:22,399 Speaker 5: not a science, so there's a lot of assumptions that 352 00:18:22,440 --> 00:18:26,760 Speaker 5: can be challenged, but putting it in a rather pessimistic light. 353 00:18:26,880 --> 00:18:29,280 Speaker 5: So I don't say this is the base case, but 354 00:18:29,359 --> 00:18:32,440 Speaker 5: by the year twenty thirty, so five years from now, 355 00:18:32,720 --> 00:18:36,159 Speaker 5: it's quite plausible that under the current tax system and 356 00:18:36,200 --> 00:18:40,639 Speaker 5: the current borrowing regime, that we have sixty percent of 357 00:18:40,680 --> 00:18:44,120 Speaker 5: all tax receipts going to interest expense. You can make 358 00:18:44,160 --> 00:18:47,600 Speaker 5: it really, really draconian and say, what if interest rates 359 00:18:47,640 --> 00:18:50,280 Speaker 5: go up to nine percent on treasuries, and what if 360 00:18:50,280 --> 00:18:53,159 Speaker 5: the budget deficit goes to twelve percent of GDP and 361 00:18:53,200 --> 00:18:58,359 Speaker 5: you make these kinds of pessimistic assumptions, well, by around 362 00:18:58,440 --> 00:19:00,879 Speaker 5: twenty thirty, you would have one one hundred and twenty 363 00:19:00,920 --> 00:19:04,199 Speaker 5: percent of tax receipts going to interest expense, which of 364 00:19:04,200 --> 00:19:07,800 Speaker 5: course is impossible. So that means that something has to happen, 365 00:19:07,880 --> 00:19:10,240 Speaker 5: and we're not talking about you know, early in my 366 00:19:10,320 --> 00:19:13,480 Speaker 5: career people were saying, we can't keep borrowing this money 367 00:19:13,600 --> 00:19:16,320 Speaker 5: that was under Reaganomics, which people thought was a bad 368 00:19:16,359 --> 00:19:19,400 Speaker 5: idea because it was deficit spending, and they said. 369 00:19:19,240 --> 00:19:21,959 Speaker 4: You know where we're going. We're going to be broken. 370 00:19:22,080 --> 00:19:24,119 Speaker 5: We'll be out of money in Social Security and other 371 00:19:24,240 --> 00:19:27,679 Speaker 5: entitlement programs by twenty fifty. And then ten years later, 372 00:19:28,119 --> 00:19:31,000 Speaker 5: you know, they moved it forward to twenty forty. So 373 00:19:31,200 --> 00:19:33,920 Speaker 5: it was initially supposed to be like a sixty year problem, 374 00:19:34,160 --> 00:19:36,720 Speaker 5: and then ten years later it was a forty year problem, 375 00:19:36,920 --> 00:19:39,040 Speaker 5: and then it was a twenty year problem, and now 376 00:19:39,080 --> 00:19:42,159 Speaker 5: it's like a five year problem, which means it's a 377 00:19:42,200 --> 00:19:44,920 Speaker 5: problem in real time and something has to be done 378 00:19:44,920 --> 00:19:48,280 Speaker 5: about this. So long term treasuries look vulnerable to me. 379 00:19:48,720 --> 00:19:51,040 Speaker 5: I still like short term treasuries because I think the 380 00:19:51,080 --> 00:19:55,120 Speaker 5: Fed is likely to cut interest rates, and that definitionally 381 00:19:55,400 --> 00:19:58,920 Speaker 5: leads to lower interest rates on say five years and immaturities. 382 00:20:00,040 --> 00:20:02,600 Speaker 2: First of all, I hesitate to ask a question here 383 00:20:02,680 --> 00:20:04,399 Speaker 2: because you know, we could just let you go on 384 00:20:05,240 --> 00:20:09,520 Speaker 2: and hear you tear particularly private credit to shreds. That 385 00:20:09,640 --> 00:20:12,439 Speaker 2: was great, and thank you also for the plug for 386 00:20:12,600 --> 00:20:16,960 Speaker 2: both Bloomberg journalism and the Bloomberg Hollywood event that's called 387 00:20:17,000 --> 00:20:19,640 Speaker 2: screen Time. That's our conference there. And then secondly, Joe 388 00:20:19,640 --> 00:20:22,840 Speaker 2: I was going to make a drake joke about private credit. 389 00:20:22,880 --> 00:20:25,280 Speaker 2: I was going to say, going from one hundred to 390 00:20:25,359 --> 00:20:27,920 Speaker 2: zero real quick in private credit could be a really 391 00:20:28,000 --> 00:20:31,600 Speaker 2: terrible Drake song, like most of them are. But that 392 00:20:31,680 --> 00:20:33,280 Speaker 2: was five minutes ago, so I don't think my joke 393 00:20:33,359 --> 00:20:34,320 Speaker 2: is relevant anymore. 394 00:20:50,240 --> 00:20:52,719 Speaker 3: You know, in the twenty tens, when we started this 395 00:20:52,800 --> 00:20:57,600 Speaker 3: podcast ten years ago, an investor could have a really 396 00:20:57,720 --> 00:21:01,200 Speaker 3: nice you know, sixty forty ish, and there are all 397 00:21:01,200 --> 00:21:03,879 Speaker 3: sorts of beautiful things with that, particularly that sort of 398 00:21:03,960 --> 00:21:09,600 Speaker 3: inverse correlation that that exhibited between treasuries and stocks, so that, 399 00:21:09,920 --> 00:21:12,119 Speaker 3: as you mentioned, typically in a downturn, you get a 400 00:21:12,119 --> 00:21:14,919 Speaker 3: stock market swoon. Well at least the slug of fixed 401 00:21:14,920 --> 00:21:17,320 Speaker 3: income that you owned. Maybe it outperforms, then gets a 402 00:21:17,359 --> 00:21:19,960 Speaker 3: little smoothing, but maybe you get some positive real rates. 403 00:21:19,960 --> 00:21:22,760 Speaker 3: It all works out really well. I understand. Okay, maybe 404 00:21:22,760 --> 00:21:26,080 Speaker 3: there's still some opportunities in the short end because rates 405 00:21:26,119 --> 00:21:28,359 Speaker 3: are going to go lower, et cetera. Maybe private maybe 406 00:21:28,400 --> 00:21:31,400 Speaker 3: public credit has better standards than private credit. Will get 407 00:21:31,400 --> 00:21:34,240 Speaker 3: into that, but like, do we have to go back 408 00:21:34,240 --> 00:21:37,800 Speaker 3: and revisit just the case or the for even having 409 00:21:38,119 --> 00:21:40,280 Speaker 3: fixed income in a diversified portfolio. 410 00:21:40,440 --> 00:21:41,080 Speaker 1: And I know that. 411 00:21:41,119 --> 00:21:44,240 Speaker 3: Look, you had your fixed income portfolio manager, So I 412 00:21:44,320 --> 00:21:47,240 Speaker 3: understand this is an existential question for you. So I 413 00:21:47,320 --> 00:21:50,320 Speaker 3: know there's but you know, like you know, how should 414 00:21:50,359 --> 00:21:52,440 Speaker 3: how would you sell the case for even having it? 415 00:21:52,440 --> 00:21:55,400 Speaker 5: It would be an existential question for somebody that's spent 416 00:21:55,520 --> 00:21:58,240 Speaker 5: five to eight years in the business and it's just 417 00:21:58,280 --> 00:22:02,119 Speaker 5: getting going. Yeah, because you know, I've been I've been 418 00:22:02,119 --> 00:22:04,920 Speaker 5: at this for well over forty years, and I really 419 00:22:04,920 --> 00:22:08,280 Speaker 5: don't need to make money by managing other people's money 420 00:22:08,440 --> 00:22:08,880 Speaker 5: at all. 421 00:22:09,600 --> 00:22:11,240 Speaker 4: So I'm very honest. 422 00:22:11,280 --> 00:22:13,280 Speaker 5: What people like about me is they say I get 423 00:22:13,440 --> 00:22:15,720 Speaker 5: I get stopped on the street, and people say, I see. 424 00:22:15,600 --> 00:22:16,440 Speaker 4: You on TV. 425 00:22:16,560 --> 00:22:18,600 Speaker 5: I really love I'm really a fan of yours because 426 00:22:18,800 --> 00:22:21,000 Speaker 5: you're a straight shooter, you know, don't. 427 00:22:21,160 --> 00:22:23,359 Speaker 4: I don't talk any kind of book whatsoever. 428 00:22:23,440 --> 00:22:28,240 Speaker 5: But I think that right now, I think financial assets 429 00:22:28,280 --> 00:22:31,919 Speaker 5: broadly should be lower allocated, have a lower allocation than typical. 430 00:22:32,000 --> 00:22:34,040 Speaker 5: You talk about sixty forty, that means you have one 431 00:22:34,119 --> 00:22:39,840 Speaker 5: hundred perption financial assets. I think inequities today investors should 432 00:22:39,840 --> 00:22:45,400 Speaker 5: have maximum forty percent, and most of that in non 433 00:22:45,520 --> 00:22:48,639 Speaker 5: US equities, particularly if you're a dollar based investor, like 434 00:22:48,960 --> 00:22:53,119 Speaker 5: any American who would normally typically be I think you 435 00:22:53,160 --> 00:22:55,760 Speaker 5: want the dollar is going to fall, and so you're 436 00:22:55,800 --> 00:22:58,440 Speaker 5: not going to be making money on the currency. Translation, 437 00:22:58,480 --> 00:23:00,800 Speaker 5: you're to be losing money. And that's been the case 438 00:23:01,080 --> 00:23:04,440 Speaker 5: so far this year. Again, things are acting differently now 439 00:23:04,440 --> 00:23:06,280 Speaker 5: that we're in a rising rate regime and not a 440 00:23:06,600 --> 00:23:09,760 Speaker 5: falling rate regime. You're doing much better as a dollar 441 00:23:09,800 --> 00:23:13,600 Speaker 5: based investor in local currency emerging market stocks. I mean, 442 00:23:13,600 --> 00:23:16,160 Speaker 5: they're up something like twenty five percent y're to date 443 00:23:16,200 --> 00:23:18,439 Speaker 5: for a dollar based investor. You're even better off in 444 00:23:18,440 --> 00:23:22,120 Speaker 5: European stocks because the dollars down versus versus the Euro. 445 00:23:22,640 --> 00:23:25,399 Speaker 5: So I think the amount of people should haven't fixed 446 00:23:25,440 --> 00:23:29,520 Speaker 5: income should probably be about twenty five percent, not forty percent, 447 00:23:29,880 --> 00:23:32,800 Speaker 5: maybe twenty five percent, and I think that it should 448 00:23:32,840 --> 00:23:36,120 Speaker 5: be some of it in non dollar fixed income again, 449 00:23:36,240 --> 00:23:39,080 Speaker 5: emerging market fixed income, which is by far the highest 450 00:23:39,119 --> 00:23:42,119 Speaker 5: performing sector for dollar based investors in the fixed income 451 00:23:42,160 --> 00:23:45,480 Speaker 5: market this year. And so that leads to forty percent 452 00:23:46,000 --> 00:23:48,479 Speaker 5: that you're not. If you're at forty percent in stocks 453 00:23:48,800 --> 00:23:51,360 Speaker 5: and twenty percent or twenty five percent in bonds, you've 454 00:23:51,359 --> 00:23:54,280 Speaker 5: got another you know, thirty five forty percent to allocate, 455 00:23:54,880 --> 00:23:58,399 Speaker 5: and I've been very, very bullish on gold. We do 456 00:23:58,720 --> 00:24:03,119 Speaker 5: a podcast that gets up on our website. It's in 457 00:24:03,200 --> 00:24:07,399 Speaker 5: early January every year. It's called Roundtable Prime, Double ne 458 00:24:07,480 --> 00:24:11,439 Speaker 5: Roundtable Prime, and we have a bunch of thought leaders there. 459 00:24:11,640 --> 00:24:13,920 Speaker 5: It's the same group every year, and we go through. 460 00:24:13,960 --> 00:24:16,200 Speaker 5: One of the segments is you know, what are your 461 00:24:16,200 --> 00:24:19,199 Speaker 5: best ideas? And my number one best idea for this 462 00:24:19,320 --> 00:24:23,439 Speaker 5: year was gold because I think gold is now a 463 00:24:23,640 --> 00:24:26,520 Speaker 5: real asset class. I think people are allocating to gold, 464 00:24:26,680 --> 00:24:30,400 Speaker 5: not just the survivalists, you know, and the crazy speculators, 465 00:24:30,680 --> 00:24:34,879 Speaker 5: people who are allocating real money, because it's real value. 466 00:24:34,920 --> 00:24:38,439 Speaker 5: And of course gold's been the top performing asset for 467 00:24:38,560 --> 00:24:41,040 Speaker 5: the year and certainly for the last twelve months, and 468 00:24:41,119 --> 00:24:44,679 Speaker 5: so I think investors I was at one point advocating 469 00:24:44,720 --> 00:24:48,679 Speaker 5: twenty five percent of a portfolio in gold like things 470 00:24:48,800 --> 00:24:53,640 Speaker 5: real assets, high quality land, gold, you know, high value assets. 471 00:24:54,040 --> 00:24:56,400 Speaker 5: I think that's too high right now because I think 472 00:24:56,800 --> 00:24:59,200 Speaker 5: that trade has played out so very well, and gold 473 00:24:59,520 --> 00:25:02,000 Speaker 5: seems to stalled out in the last month or so 474 00:25:02,240 --> 00:25:04,960 Speaker 5: at a very high level, so it's consolidating scains. I 475 00:25:05,000 --> 00:25:07,120 Speaker 5: think it goes higher, but for the time being I'd 476 00:25:07,160 --> 00:25:10,760 Speaker 5: probably be more like at fifteen percent or something like that. 477 00:25:10,800 --> 00:25:13,120 Speaker 5: And the rest I think I would be in cash 478 00:25:13,400 --> 00:25:17,240 Speaker 5: because I think valuations are just incredibly high, and the 479 00:25:17,960 --> 00:25:22,200 Speaker 5: health of the equity market in the United States is 480 00:25:22,560 --> 00:25:26,040 Speaker 5: it's among the least healthy in my entire career in 481 00:25:26,160 --> 00:25:29,280 Speaker 5: terms of the PDE ratio, the cape ratio, all the 482 00:25:29,280 --> 00:25:32,439 Speaker 5: classic valuation metrics are off the charts. And of course 483 00:25:32,560 --> 00:25:37,959 Speaker 5: the market is incredibly speculative, and speculative markets always go 484 00:25:38,080 --> 00:25:41,439 Speaker 5: to insanely high levels. It happens every time. This is 485 00:25:41,480 --> 00:25:43,639 Speaker 5: not you know, obviously, it happened in the dot COM's, 486 00:25:43,640 --> 00:25:46,280 Speaker 5: it happened in the financials part of the GFC, it's 487 00:25:46,320 --> 00:25:49,199 Speaker 5: happening now in the AI and the data centers and 488 00:25:49,200 --> 00:25:52,119 Speaker 5: all that stuff, And you know, it's interesting. Probably the 489 00:25:52,400 --> 00:25:56,760 Speaker 5: biggest thing that changed the economy and the world in 490 00:25:56,800 --> 00:25:59,320 Speaker 5: the last I don't know, one hundred and fifty years 491 00:25:59,560 --> 00:26:04,720 Speaker 5: was electricity. Electricity being put into people's homes was probably 492 00:26:04,720 --> 00:26:08,240 Speaker 5: one of the biggest changes of all time. And of course, 493 00:26:08,280 --> 00:26:12,600 Speaker 5: around nineteen hundred people realized that electricity to homes was coming, 494 00:26:13,000 --> 00:26:16,239 Speaker 5: and so electricity stocks were in a huge manium and 495 00:26:16,280 --> 00:26:20,359 Speaker 5: they did it incredibly well, but the relative performance of 496 00:26:20,400 --> 00:26:24,399 Speaker 5: electricity relative to the entire stock market in the US 497 00:26:24,880 --> 00:26:29,400 Speaker 5: excluding electricity, so everything else but electricity. The electricity outperformance 498 00:26:29,480 --> 00:26:35,800 Speaker 5: peaked in nineteen eleven. Houses weren't even broadly electrified by 499 00:26:35,920 --> 00:26:37,720 Speaker 5: You had to be a very rich person to have 500 00:26:37,800 --> 00:26:43,960 Speaker 5: electricity in nineteen eleven, but yet that was the outperformance. 501 00:26:44,480 --> 00:26:47,840 Speaker 5: And so it all gets priced in very quickly and 502 00:26:48,359 --> 00:26:52,600 Speaker 5: excessively because people love to look at the benefits of 503 00:26:52,680 --> 00:26:56,320 Speaker 5: these transformative technologies, and they are transformative. I mean, look 504 00:26:56,359 --> 00:26:58,240 Speaker 5: at what happened to some of the internet stocks. They 505 00:26:58,359 --> 00:27:02,240 Speaker 5: dropped eighty ninety percent in the early os but there 506 00:27:02,240 --> 00:27:05,280 Speaker 5: are many, many multiples of what their peak was at 507 00:27:05,280 --> 00:27:05,840 Speaker 5: that time. 508 00:27:06,240 --> 00:27:09,679 Speaker 4: But it gets priced in very, very early. 509 00:27:10,160 --> 00:27:13,160 Speaker 5: So I think that one has to be very careful 510 00:27:13,280 --> 00:27:15,120 Speaker 5: about momentum investing during. 511 00:27:16,480 --> 00:27:17,360 Speaker 4: Mania periods. 512 00:27:17,359 --> 00:27:19,120 Speaker 5: And I feel like that's where we are right now. 513 00:27:19,720 --> 00:27:22,440 Speaker 5: I just don't think there's any arguments against the fact 514 00:27:22,440 --> 00:27:22,840 Speaker 5: that we're. 515 00:27:22,680 --> 00:27:23,240 Speaker 4: In a menium. 516 00:27:23,800 --> 00:27:25,679 Speaker 2: I want to go back to something you said just 517 00:27:25,720 --> 00:27:29,240 Speaker 2: then about how investors should be reducing their dollar exposure. 518 00:27:29,359 --> 00:27:32,160 Speaker 2: So this is, you know, the sell America thesis that 519 00:27:32,760 --> 00:27:35,119 Speaker 2: was very popular at the beginning of the year, and 520 00:27:35,359 --> 00:27:38,119 Speaker 2: per year comments is still very popular with some people. 521 00:27:38,160 --> 00:27:40,840 Speaker 2: But we have seen in general, you know, a little 522 00:27:40,880 --> 00:27:43,760 Speaker 2: bit of a strengthening in the dollar. Ten year treasury 523 00:27:43,840 --> 00:27:47,640 Speaker 2: yields have been going down compared to where they were earlier. 524 00:27:48,160 --> 00:27:52,080 Speaker 2: What accounts for, I guess the stickiness of US assets 525 00:27:52,440 --> 00:27:56,920 Speaker 2: in the global financial system and in investors' portfolios. Even 526 00:27:56,960 --> 00:27:59,040 Speaker 2: when I think we can all agree that there are 527 00:27:59,200 --> 00:28:02,679 Speaker 2: challenges head for US government debt and assets in the 528 00:28:02,720 --> 00:28:07,160 Speaker 2: form of high deficits and spending, and maybe political stasis 529 00:28:07,200 --> 00:28:07,879 Speaker 2: and things. 530 00:28:07,640 --> 00:28:14,720 Speaker 5: Like that, have it, people are reluctant to make changes 531 00:28:15,160 --> 00:28:19,280 Speaker 5: to longstanding paradigms. One of the hardest things to do 532 00:28:19,320 --> 00:28:23,240 Speaker 5: in the investment business is to significantly change your allocations 533 00:28:23,560 --> 00:28:28,520 Speaker 5: after you've been right. That's counterintuitive to a lot of people, 534 00:28:28,560 --> 00:28:30,640 Speaker 5: but trust me, someone that's done this for a very 535 00:28:30,640 --> 00:28:34,120 Speaker 5: long time. That's the hardest thing to do. Because when 536 00:28:34,119 --> 00:28:37,520 Speaker 5: you do something and it works really well, it makes you. 537 00:28:38,280 --> 00:28:41,080 Speaker 5: It gives you satisfaction on every level, an economic level, 538 00:28:41,120 --> 00:28:45,840 Speaker 5: an emotional level, psychological level. It helps you to have 539 00:28:46,000 --> 00:28:48,640 Speaker 5: happy meetings with your clients. Just imagine if you bought 540 00:28:48,680 --> 00:28:52,320 Speaker 5: Apple at I don't know, five dollars a year and 541 00:28:52,360 --> 00:28:54,880 Speaker 5: it went up to I don't know, seven hundred, and 542 00:28:54,960 --> 00:28:57,160 Speaker 5: so you get to go to your review with your 543 00:28:57,160 --> 00:29:00,000 Speaker 5: client and you say, let's take a look at your portfolio. 544 00:29:00,000 --> 00:29:05,520 Speaker 5: Oh yeah, this cost five last price seven hundred. I 545 00:29:05,560 --> 00:29:08,360 Speaker 5: am working for you. You know I've done a good 546 00:29:08,440 --> 00:29:11,920 Speaker 5: job for you. Well, when you sell Apple at seven hundred, 547 00:29:12,240 --> 00:29:14,840 Speaker 5: you no longer have that line item, and so you 548 00:29:14,880 --> 00:29:16,920 Speaker 5: can't point to this great thing that you did for 549 00:29:17,000 --> 00:29:20,840 Speaker 5: that client. And so people like to project the past. 550 00:29:21,400 --> 00:29:23,880 Speaker 5: Successes of the past, they like to hang on to 551 00:29:24,000 --> 00:29:27,080 Speaker 5: them or even project them into the future. And that's 552 00:29:27,120 --> 00:29:29,520 Speaker 5: a dangerous thing to do. But when you chack, I was, 553 00:29:29,680 --> 00:29:34,160 Speaker 5: I was one hundred dollar. I owned no foreign currencies 554 00:29:34,480 --> 00:29:39,840 Speaker 5: for decades, and then starting about eighteen months ago, I 555 00:29:39,880 --> 00:29:41,720 Speaker 5: had to pull the trigger. I had to say, you 556 00:29:41,760 --> 00:29:45,960 Speaker 5: know what, I I don't think this paradigm is intact 557 00:29:46,000 --> 00:29:48,800 Speaker 5: any longer. And I think you're going to lose money 558 00:29:49,320 --> 00:29:53,240 Speaker 5: by betting on the dollar as a dominant asset. And 559 00:29:53,320 --> 00:29:56,640 Speaker 5: it's a scary thing to do because you're you. You 560 00:29:56,800 --> 00:29:58,400 Speaker 5: wake up in the morning and you look in the 561 00:29:58,400 --> 00:30:00,120 Speaker 5: mirror and say, I'm looking at a at a a 562 00:30:00,160 --> 00:30:02,440 Speaker 5: strong dollar guy, and then all of a sudden the 563 00:30:02,480 --> 00:30:04,680 Speaker 5: next day, you're saying, I'm looking at a guy that's 564 00:30:04,920 --> 00:30:08,280 Speaker 5: no longer confident in a strong dollar mirror. 565 00:30:08,840 --> 00:30:10,560 Speaker 2: Who am I know? 566 00:30:10,680 --> 00:30:12,920 Speaker 4: Like you know, I wonder why I have to have 567 00:30:12,960 --> 00:30:13,640 Speaker 4: to pay taxes. 568 00:30:13,680 --> 00:30:15,600 Speaker 5: Quite frankly, when I look in the mirror, I don't 569 00:30:15,640 --> 00:30:19,320 Speaker 5: identify as a billionaire. I identify as a homeless, eighty 570 00:30:19,360 --> 00:30:20,000 Speaker 5: year old guy. 571 00:30:21,040 --> 00:30:21,800 Speaker 4: Why should I have to. 572 00:30:21,800 --> 00:30:25,440 Speaker 5: Pay taxes what I identify as a as a destitute 573 00:30:25,680 --> 00:30:28,160 Speaker 5: elderly man, I don't understand. 574 00:30:29,120 --> 00:30:32,480 Speaker 3: So yeah, I think other people. Other people might identify 575 00:30:32,520 --> 00:30:35,400 Speaker 3: you differently. I want to go back to the rates 576 00:30:35,920 --> 00:30:41,080 Speaker 3: question as self identification. As you mentioned, it's sort of 577 00:30:41,120 --> 00:30:45,760 Speaker 3: an historically unusual that we've seen this period of the 578 00:30:45,800 --> 00:30:48,400 Speaker 3: FED cutting rates for the last thirteen months and very 579 00:30:48,480 --> 00:30:51,840 Speaker 3: little downward action. And the long end of the curve, 580 00:30:52,440 --> 00:30:55,040 Speaker 3: we know everyone could sort of look at the same 581 00:30:55,320 --> 00:30:58,360 Speaker 3: math that you look at in terms of interest expends. 582 00:30:58,480 --> 00:31:00,520 Speaker 3: We know that the long end of curve is very 583 00:31:00,560 --> 00:31:03,280 Speaker 3: sensitive for housing, and that's something that's very important to 584 00:31:03,280 --> 00:31:05,400 Speaker 3: these economy. We know that President Trump would like to 585 00:31:05,400 --> 00:31:08,080 Speaker 3: see the long end of the curve go down, perhaps 586 00:31:08,160 --> 00:31:11,040 Speaker 3: because he has deep familiarity with it from his real 587 00:31:11,160 --> 00:31:13,600 Speaker 3: estate days. Do you think at some point in the 588 00:31:13,640 --> 00:31:17,160 Speaker 3: sort of medium term future we're going to see the 589 00:31:17,240 --> 00:31:19,920 Speaker 3: return of proper yield curve control, that we're going to 590 00:31:19,920 --> 00:31:23,480 Speaker 3: see the Fed cut rates and not get the response 591 00:31:23,600 --> 00:31:26,240 Speaker 3: desired at the long end, and then more drastic action 592 00:31:26,400 --> 00:31:29,280 Speaker 3: is going to come such that actual steps are taken 593 00:31:29,360 --> 00:31:30,520 Speaker 3: to suppress that long end. 594 00:31:32,520 --> 00:31:36,040 Speaker 4: That's my base case, and I've been talking about this. 595 00:31:35,960 --> 00:31:41,120 Speaker 5: Now for nearly two years, that we cannot afford the 596 00:31:41,160 --> 00:31:45,480 Speaker 5: market to set interest rates if the deficit spending continues, 597 00:31:46,720 --> 00:31:50,040 Speaker 5: it won't be tenable. So what has to happen is 598 00:31:50,120 --> 00:31:54,640 Speaker 5: going to be some sort of drastic measures. And I'm 599 00:31:54,680 --> 00:31:57,040 Speaker 5: not exactly sure what those drastic measures are going to be. 600 00:31:57,040 --> 00:31:59,360 Speaker 5: There's a number of candidates for them. We could do 601 00:31:59,440 --> 00:32:02,000 Speaker 5: what we did from after World War Two until the 602 00:32:02,000 --> 00:32:06,120 Speaker 5: mid fifties when inflation was rising and we had significantly 603 00:32:06,160 --> 00:32:09,400 Speaker 5: negative real yields and we had inflation go up to 604 00:32:09,440 --> 00:32:12,920 Speaker 5: around eight percent, and the yell curve was kept at 605 00:32:12,960 --> 00:32:15,360 Speaker 5: the long lines were kept at two and a half percent. 606 00:32:16,280 --> 00:32:17,800 Speaker 4: So you can. 607 00:32:17,720 --> 00:32:21,920 Speaker 5: Absolutely manipulate the ill curve. Japan has did that for decades. 608 00:32:22,120 --> 00:32:25,680 Speaker 5: For decades, they kept rates at zero even though there 609 00:32:25,680 --> 00:32:28,560 Speaker 5: was no demand I actually had a meeting with the 610 00:32:28,560 --> 00:32:30,480 Speaker 5: guy that ran the biggest pension plan in the world. 611 00:32:30,520 --> 00:32:33,080 Speaker 5: It was one of the Japanese public pension plans, and 612 00:32:33,120 --> 00:32:35,320 Speaker 5: I was really anxious to sit down with him, and 613 00:32:35,360 --> 00:32:37,680 Speaker 5: I said, I really want to ask you this question. 614 00:32:37,920 --> 00:32:41,880 Speaker 5: Do you actually own these negative yielding jgb's And he 615 00:32:42,240 --> 00:32:44,680 Speaker 5: actually laughed out loud when I asked him that question. 616 00:32:45,080 --> 00:32:48,480 Speaker 4: He said, of course not nobody owns them except the. 617 00:32:48,440 --> 00:32:51,440 Speaker 5: Bank of Japan and the institutions that are forced to 618 00:32:51,440 --> 00:32:52,680 Speaker 5: buy them by the back of Japan. 619 00:32:53,400 --> 00:32:54,840 Speaker 4: So it's a real thing. 620 00:32:54,880 --> 00:32:56,880 Speaker 5: We did the United States for a decade, they did 621 00:32:56,880 --> 00:33:01,240 Speaker 5: in Japan for decades, and Secretary Vestan has alluded to 622 00:33:01,280 --> 00:33:04,080 Speaker 5: the fact that maybe that's on the table, some sort 623 00:33:04,160 --> 00:33:07,480 Speaker 5: of interest rate manipulation. So what this leads to is 624 00:33:07,480 --> 00:33:10,920 Speaker 5: a really interesting dilemma because what I think is my 625 00:33:12,800 --> 00:33:16,000 Speaker 5: roadmap for the future. And of course there's many variations 626 00:33:16,000 --> 00:33:18,760 Speaker 5: that one could use, but the starting point for me 627 00:33:19,320 --> 00:33:22,000 Speaker 5: is that interest rates will rise until such time as 628 00:33:22,000 --> 00:33:26,120 Speaker 5: they're uncomfortably high. For the Treasury Department, what is that? 629 00:33:26,200 --> 00:33:27,520 Speaker 5: Where is that five percent? 630 00:33:27,720 --> 00:33:28,400 Speaker 4: Six percent? 631 00:33:28,600 --> 00:33:33,000 Speaker 5: My guess is six is the highest that it would 632 00:33:33,040 --> 00:33:37,880 Speaker 5: be full on uncomfortable full on at six percent on 633 00:33:37,920 --> 00:33:40,360 Speaker 5: the long end. So what happens is you'd want to 634 00:33:40,400 --> 00:33:45,040 Speaker 5: avoid long bonds while the market forces are in play. 635 00:33:45,600 --> 00:33:50,080 Speaker 5: And Julie, you said that long rates aren't down very 636 00:33:50,120 --> 00:33:52,240 Speaker 5: much since the Fed started cutting. No, no, they're up 637 00:33:52,320 --> 00:33:54,880 Speaker 5: a lot. Long rates are a lot since the Fed 638 00:33:54,960 --> 00:33:57,720 Speaker 5: start cutting. This is the first time it's ever happened. 639 00:33:57,760 --> 00:34:00,480 Speaker 5: They're up by almost one hundred basis points with the 640 00:34:00,480 --> 00:34:04,840 Speaker 5: Fed cutting, It's never happened before. But with interest rates 641 00:34:04,960 --> 00:34:07,920 Speaker 5: rising as the Fed is cutting at the long end, 642 00:34:07,920 --> 00:34:09,760 Speaker 5: what's going to happen is they'll get to a point 643 00:34:09,920 --> 00:34:12,799 Speaker 5: where all of a sudden it's too uncomfortable and then 644 00:34:12,960 --> 00:34:14,440 Speaker 5: something dramatic will happen. 645 00:34:15,200 --> 00:34:17,760 Speaker 4: Something dramatic. Could that simply be the government. 646 00:34:17,760 --> 00:34:20,600 Speaker 5: The Treasury Department buys the treasuries, and if they announce 647 00:34:20,640 --> 00:34:23,239 Speaker 5: that they're going to buy treasuries and to control long 648 00:34:23,320 --> 00:34:26,520 Speaker 5: term interest rates, you would have a thirty point rally 649 00:34:26,560 --> 00:34:29,520 Speaker 5: in the long bond in a week. So there's a 650 00:34:29,680 --> 00:34:34,000 Speaker 5: very very sensitive strategy here where you have to be 651 00:34:34,640 --> 00:34:39,040 Speaker 5: very negative over the normal course of things, and then 652 00:34:39,080 --> 00:34:41,759 Speaker 5: once the intervention comes in, there's going to be a 653 00:34:41,800 --> 00:34:45,319 Speaker 5: step funk, a significant step function lower in yields, and 654 00:34:45,400 --> 00:34:47,480 Speaker 5: so you have to try to figure out how you're 655 00:34:47,480 --> 00:34:50,399 Speaker 5: going to do that pivot. That's what I spend most 656 00:34:50,400 --> 00:34:52,160 Speaker 5: of my time thinking about when it comes to the 657 00:34:52,160 --> 00:34:56,200 Speaker 5: treasury market these days. Although for now it's way too 658 00:34:56,280 --> 00:34:59,040 Speaker 5: earlier for them to panic and start manipulating the race. 659 00:34:59,080 --> 00:35:03,040 Speaker 5: What they might manipulate our mortgage rates. They could absolutely 660 00:35:03,239 --> 00:35:07,720 Speaker 5: buy Jimmy May's, Fanny Mays, Freddie Max the government guaranteed 661 00:35:07,760 --> 00:35:11,480 Speaker 5: mortgages and drive those yields down much closer to where 662 00:35:11,520 --> 00:35:14,360 Speaker 5: treasury yields are. And there's no rule that says they 663 00:35:14,440 --> 00:35:18,239 Speaker 5: can't go through treasury yields. I mean, there are instances 664 00:35:18,440 --> 00:35:21,480 Speaker 5: where non treasury yields are lower than treasure yields of 665 00:35:21,520 --> 00:35:24,520 Speaker 5: the same maturity. Just earlier this year, there was a 666 00:35:24,560 --> 00:35:27,400 Speaker 5: corporate bond that was lower yielding than the same maturity 667 00:35:27,400 --> 00:35:31,120 Speaker 5: treasury bond. That also happened in the early eighties when 668 00:35:31,160 --> 00:35:33,920 Speaker 5: IBM bonds traded a lower yield than treasury bonds of 669 00:35:34,000 --> 00:35:38,160 Speaker 5: the same maturity because investors had greater confidence in the 670 00:35:38,160 --> 00:35:41,280 Speaker 5: payback of IBM than they did in what they thought 671 00:35:41,440 --> 00:35:44,800 Speaker 5: was a bad strategy under Reaganomics. And that has begun 672 00:35:44,840 --> 00:35:47,560 Speaker 5: to enter the picture here in twenty twenty five with 673 00:35:47,640 --> 00:35:51,160 Speaker 5: corporate bonds periodically, not only the very best ones, of course, 674 00:35:51,760 --> 00:35:54,800 Speaker 5: but like Microsoft or something like that, trading through treasures, 675 00:35:55,200 --> 00:35:57,640 Speaker 5: and so that's a tell that something is up here. 676 00:35:57,680 --> 00:35:59,400 Speaker 5: The other thing that they might do, and there was 677 00:35:59,440 --> 00:36:02,239 Speaker 5: a white paper written about this just about a year 678 00:36:02,239 --> 00:36:07,080 Speaker 5: ago now that said maybe we should restructure the treasuries 679 00:36:07,400 --> 00:36:11,479 Speaker 5: held by foreigners, which is a very strange thing to say. 680 00:36:11,600 --> 00:36:16,120 Speaker 2: This is accord, right, Yeah, yes it is. 681 00:36:16,280 --> 00:36:18,880 Speaker 5: I don't know how you define what a foreigners. Foreigners 682 00:36:19,120 --> 00:36:22,319 Speaker 5: can hide behind entities and so it looks like they're 683 00:36:22,360 --> 00:36:23,240 Speaker 5: not owned by foreigners. 684 00:36:23,280 --> 00:36:25,760 Speaker 4: So I'm not excitedly sure what foreigners mean. But why 685 00:36:26,120 --> 00:36:27,600 Speaker 4: put the word foreigners in there? 686 00:36:27,640 --> 00:36:30,320 Speaker 5: Why not just say we're going to restructure the treasury 687 00:36:30,400 --> 00:36:31,600 Speaker 5: debt full stop. 688 00:36:32,400 --> 00:36:33,120 Speaker 4: What does that mean? 689 00:36:33,480 --> 00:36:36,640 Speaker 5: Well, one way to save on interest expense, to get 690 00:36:36,640 --> 00:36:39,040 Speaker 5: it back down from one point five trillion to the 691 00:36:39,040 --> 00:36:40,160 Speaker 5: three hundred billion it. 692 00:36:40,280 --> 00:36:41,759 Speaker 4: Was a couple of years ago. 693 00:36:42,000 --> 00:36:44,960 Speaker 5: Why don't you just say, all the treasuries that exist today, 694 00:36:45,560 --> 00:36:48,400 Speaker 5: we're changing their coupons. The ones that have a coupon 695 00:36:48,560 --> 00:36:51,880 Speaker 5: above one, the coupon is now one. The ones that 696 00:36:51,920 --> 00:36:54,479 Speaker 5: have a coupon less than one the coupon stays the same. 697 00:36:55,040 --> 00:36:57,880 Speaker 5: That would save a tremendous amount of interest expense. Of course, 698 00:36:57,920 --> 00:37:03,160 Speaker 5: it would cause a disastrous, tumultuous time in the government 699 00:37:03,160 --> 00:37:06,120 Speaker 5: bomb market. But people say to me, you're always talking 700 00:37:06,160 --> 00:37:09,400 Speaker 5: about this debt problem. What's the solution. The solution is 701 00:37:09,440 --> 00:37:12,280 Speaker 5: get to a point where people won't lend the government 702 00:37:12,360 --> 00:37:16,479 Speaker 5: money anymore, that the government can't borrow any money, so 703 00:37:16,600 --> 00:37:19,440 Speaker 5: that if you structure treasures that way, there'll be a 704 00:37:19,440 --> 00:37:21,680 Speaker 5: couple of generations the government won't be able to borrow 705 00:37:21,719 --> 00:37:24,120 Speaker 5: any money anymore, and that would actually put us in 706 00:37:24,160 --> 00:37:39,600 Speaker 5: a better place than where we are today. 707 00:37:41,520 --> 00:37:43,680 Speaker 2: I want to ask another question about private credit, but 708 00:37:43,719 --> 00:37:45,640 Speaker 2: just before I do, I'm curious, do you ever talk 709 00:37:45,680 --> 00:37:49,360 Speaker 2: to Besant about your ideas for how to fix the 710 00:37:49,440 --> 00:37:52,040 Speaker 2: US treasury market basically, or voice your concerns? 711 00:37:53,920 --> 00:37:56,600 Speaker 4: I think he watches my CMBC. 712 00:37:58,320 --> 00:38:02,000 Speaker 2: All right, all right, let's go back to private credit 713 00:38:02,040 --> 00:38:04,640 Speaker 2: for a second, because that's obviously the topic DuJour, and 714 00:38:04,719 --> 00:38:06,799 Speaker 2: as Joe pointed out, one of the things that has 715 00:38:06,880 --> 00:38:10,880 Speaker 2: really grown exponentially over the past ten years. You've said, 716 00:38:11,000 --> 00:38:12,879 Speaker 2: you said on the podcast just now, and you've said 717 00:38:12,880 --> 00:38:15,719 Speaker 2: it before that you think private credit is the candidate 718 00:38:15,920 --> 00:38:21,520 Speaker 2: for another financial crisis. And I understand the marking issue, 719 00:38:22,120 --> 00:38:25,319 Speaker 2: I understand the liquidity mismatch. But when I look at 720 00:38:25,320 --> 00:38:29,279 Speaker 2: private credit, maybe what's missing in terms of some of 721 00:38:29,320 --> 00:38:32,960 Speaker 2: our more recent financial crises is that leverage built on 722 00:38:33,040 --> 00:38:35,000 Speaker 2: top of leverage aspect. 723 00:38:35,640 --> 00:38:37,360 Speaker 5: Can you give it credit? 724 00:38:37,680 --> 00:38:41,120 Speaker 4: Well, that is credit, This is leverage leverage. 725 00:38:41,160 --> 00:38:43,759 Speaker 2: Yeah, okay, explain that. Explain that because as far as 726 00:38:43,840 --> 00:38:46,880 Speaker 2: I know, we're not seeing the scale of stuff getting 727 00:38:46,880 --> 00:38:50,560 Speaker 2: rebundled as we saw, for instance, in the financial crisis. 728 00:38:51,120 --> 00:38:54,080 Speaker 5: Well, that's true, you're not getting to rebundling, but you 729 00:38:54,200 --> 00:38:56,560 Speaker 5: are having there's a lot of leverage. 730 00:38:56,600 --> 00:39:01,520 Speaker 4: And the firms that they leverage, they're they're they're. 731 00:39:01,440 --> 00:39:04,120 Speaker 5: Raising money and then they're borrowing money to buy more 732 00:39:04,160 --> 00:39:04,760 Speaker 5: private credit. 733 00:39:05,040 --> 00:39:06,600 Speaker 4: It's absolutely leverage upon. 734 00:39:06,560 --> 00:39:11,440 Speaker 5: Leverage and the other thing while they're not bundling, like putting. 735 00:39:11,840 --> 00:39:13,239 Speaker 4: You know, the thing. 736 00:39:13,200 --> 00:39:15,960 Speaker 5: About the goal of financial crisis is you took triple 737 00:39:16,000 --> 00:39:19,440 Speaker 5: B rated and it's questionable what they even deserved a 738 00:39:19,480 --> 00:39:22,680 Speaker 5: triple B rated thing, and creating triple A rated securities 739 00:39:22,680 --> 00:39:23,200 Speaker 5: out of them. 740 00:39:23,440 --> 00:39:25,239 Speaker 4: I mean, just just that. 741 00:39:24,920 --> 00:39:28,759 Speaker 5: That alone should make you just just you know, just 742 00:39:29,000 --> 00:39:33,040 Speaker 5: stop even thinking about investing in its. Suddenly a triple 743 00:39:33,080 --> 00:39:35,399 Speaker 5: A is turned into a triple triple B is turned 744 00:39:35,440 --> 00:39:36,080 Speaker 5: into triple A. 745 00:39:36,320 --> 00:39:37,480 Speaker 4: But one thing they are. 746 00:39:37,280 --> 00:39:44,160 Speaker 5: Doing is issuing public traded vehicles daily NAV vehicles to 747 00:39:44,200 --> 00:39:49,880 Speaker 5: allow main street America mom and pop investors to avail 748 00:39:49,920 --> 00:39:54,600 Speaker 5: themselves of this wonderful, fantastic opportunity of private credit, which 749 00:39:54,640 --> 00:39:58,520 Speaker 5: is totally a liquidit and mismatch. You've got daily nav 750 00:39:58,680 --> 00:40:02,239 Speaker 5: funds investing in things that don't trade at all. And 751 00:40:02,320 --> 00:40:05,800 Speaker 5: so once there's a run on those on those vehicles, 752 00:40:05,840 --> 00:40:08,160 Speaker 5: and I don't know how popular they've been, but there's 753 00:40:08,160 --> 00:40:12,200 Speaker 5: certainly been touted. But if they become it popular in 754 00:40:12,239 --> 00:40:15,440 Speaker 5: any way, you're going to have the catalyst for a 755 00:40:15,480 --> 00:40:22,520 Speaker 5: tremendous selling deluge because there is no people want to redeem, 756 00:40:22,880 --> 00:40:24,920 Speaker 5: and they won't be able to get their money out. 757 00:40:25,200 --> 00:40:29,440 Speaker 5: And once you get that, once people Where the trouble 758 00:40:29,520 --> 00:40:32,480 Speaker 5: always comes in financial markets is when people buy something 759 00:40:32,600 --> 00:40:36,480 Speaker 5: they think is safe. It's sold to them as safe, 760 00:40:36,880 --> 00:40:39,760 Speaker 5: but it's not safe. You buy a triple A rated 761 00:40:39,760 --> 00:40:42,880 Speaker 5: subprime mortgage pool. You think it's safe because it's triple 762 00:40:42,880 --> 00:40:46,200 Speaker 5: A rated, but it's not safe. It's extremely dangerous. You 763 00:40:46,239 --> 00:40:50,160 Speaker 5: buy CDO equity, you buy CDO squared equity back before 764 00:40:50,200 --> 00:40:53,200 Speaker 5: the goal of financial crisis, and there isn't any real equity. 765 00:40:53,239 --> 00:40:56,120 Speaker 5: It's I buy your equity, you buy my equity. 766 00:40:56,560 --> 00:40:56,880 Speaker 4: We're all. 767 00:40:57,440 --> 00:40:59,600 Speaker 5: It's just a game that's being played to make an 768 00:40:59,640 --> 00:41:03,080 Speaker 5: illusi of liquidity. That's where private credit is right now. 769 00:41:03,080 --> 00:41:06,080 Speaker 5: It's an illusion. They don't even claim it's liquidity. But 770 00:41:06,120 --> 00:41:09,520 Speaker 5: if you package it into a publicly traded vehicle that 771 00:41:09,719 --> 00:41:13,440 Speaker 5: trades on a daily basis, you have the perfect mismatch 772 00:41:13,760 --> 00:41:18,120 Speaker 5: of no liquidity with a vehicle that promises liquidity. It 773 00:41:18,320 --> 00:41:20,839 Speaker 5: looks like it's safe because you could sell it any day, 774 00:41:21,040 --> 00:41:23,480 Speaker 5: but it's not safe because the price at which you 775 00:41:23,560 --> 00:41:28,160 Speaker 5: sell it will be gapping lower, gapping lower, island gapping lower, 776 00:41:28,320 --> 00:41:30,920 Speaker 5: day after day after day, and so that's where the 777 00:41:31,040 --> 00:41:32,840 Speaker 5: risk rides. But these things go on forever. One of 778 00:41:32,880 --> 00:41:36,279 Speaker 5: the things about the investment business is it's hard. It's 779 00:41:36,640 --> 00:41:39,760 Speaker 5: difficult enough to be so called right about the direction 780 00:41:39,840 --> 00:41:42,640 Speaker 5: of things we're going, but it's impossible to be both 781 00:41:42,840 --> 00:41:47,120 Speaker 5: right on the direction and correct on the timing things. 782 00:41:47,920 --> 00:41:50,200 Speaker 5: Even if you're right on the direction, it's going to 783 00:41:50,239 --> 00:41:53,760 Speaker 5: take a lot longer than you think. I turn negative 784 00:41:54,080 --> 00:41:57,640 Speaker 5: on the package mortgage non guaranteed mortgage market in two 785 00:41:57,760 --> 00:42:01,640 Speaker 5: thousand and four. It took three years or to even 786 00:42:01,760 --> 00:42:05,440 Speaker 5: start to decay. So these things take forever, and it 787 00:42:05,440 --> 00:42:07,200 Speaker 5: goes on much longer than you think. 788 00:42:07,640 --> 00:42:07,879 Speaker 4: You know. 789 00:42:08,160 --> 00:42:12,400 Speaker 5: Remember I turned negative on the Nasdaq maximum negative September 790 00:42:12,440 --> 00:42:16,240 Speaker 5: thirtieth of nineteen ninety nine. I looked like a moron 791 00:42:16,520 --> 00:42:20,440 Speaker 5: three months later, because the Nasdaq went up eighty percent 792 00:42:20,800 --> 00:42:22,040 Speaker 5: in the fourth quarter of. 793 00:42:22,080 --> 00:42:23,000 Speaker 4: Nineteen ninety nine. 794 00:42:23,200 --> 00:42:26,200 Speaker 5: But if you had gone short the Nasdaq September thirtieth 795 00:42:26,239 --> 00:42:29,719 Speaker 5: of nineteen ninety nine, eighteen months later, you had a 796 00:42:29,760 --> 00:42:33,160 Speaker 5: profit of sixty four percent. Even though it went up 797 00:42:33,200 --> 00:42:36,040 Speaker 5: eighty percent in the first three months, it dropped so 798 00:42:36,239 --> 00:42:40,000 Speaker 5: much in the ensuing of fifteen months that the short 799 00:42:40,040 --> 00:42:43,400 Speaker 5: would have made you a profit, of a very handsome 800 00:42:43,440 --> 00:42:45,040 Speaker 5: profit in a very difficult market. 801 00:42:45,239 --> 00:42:47,759 Speaker 4: Of course, we've been out of business. Sorry, I'm out 802 00:42:47,760 --> 00:42:49,680 Speaker 4: of business. You were mentioning people's money. 803 00:42:51,000 --> 00:42:53,719 Speaker 2: Yes, slight problem there, But just very quickly, are you 804 00:42:53,719 --> 00:42:54,920 Speaker 2: betting against private credit? 805 00:42:55,000 --> 00:43:00,719 Speaker 4: Now? I have no way to do that. Yeah, I don't. 806 00:43:00,760 --> 00:43:05,239 Speaker 5: I don't really short bonds, shorting high yielding bonds is 807 00:43:05,280 --> 00:43:07,799 Speaker 5: a really difficult thing because the cost. 808 00:43:07,560 --> 00:43:09,360 Speaker 4: Of carry is just brutal. 809 00:43:10,360 --> 00:43:13,840 Speaker 5: Every day that it doesn't it doesn't decline, you're paying 810 00:43:13,880 --> 00:43:17,520 Speaker 5: out a very high uh, you know rate, and so 811 00:43:17,640 --> 00:43:18,440 Speaker 5: you're losing. 812 00:43:18,200 --> 00:43:20,160 Speaker 4: Money all the time. So I don't really do that. 813 00:43:20,200 --> 00:43:22,520 Speaker 5: What I do is I just don't allocate to it. 814 00:43:22,760 --> 00:43:25,960 Speaker 5: I allocate to things that will do better, you know, 815 00:43:26,040 --> 00:43:30,040 Speaker 5: that will be immune, relatively immune or fully immune from 816 00:43:30,160 --> 00:43:34,759 Speaker 5: the knock on effects of deterioration in private credit. So 817 00:43:35,040 --> 00:43:37,960 Speaker 5: that would that would mean higher you know, higher credit 818 00:43:38,040 --> 00:43:42,360 Speaker 5: things you know, using foreign currencies more than more than typically. 819 00:43:42,920 --> 00:43:45,880 Speaker 4: But no, I don't think you can really short private credit. 820 00:43:46,600 --> 00:43:51,480 Speaker 3: What have you learned in your career about longevity and 821 00:43:51,760 --> 00:43:55,239 Speaker 3: drawdowns or underperformance, Because as you mentioned, you can be 822 00:43:55,400 --> 00:43:58,040 Speaker 3: right or you could be You can correctly identify a 823 00:43:58,120 --> 00:44:00,440 Speaker 3: medium or long term trend, but it's some times takes 824 00:44:00,440 --> 00:44:02,680 Speaker 3: a while to play out, whether it's the case from 825 00:44:02,719 --> 00:44:05,799 Speaker 3: September ninety nine to the peak that's not actually that long, 826 00:44:05,880 --> 00:44:09,040 Speaker 3: that was closer to six months, or being bearish on 827 00:44:09,160 --> 00:44:11,560 Speaker 3: some of the housing assets starting in two thousand and 828 00:44:11,560 --> 00:44:15,120 Speaker 3: five that took a little bit longer. How do you 829 00:44:15,200 --> 00:44:19,879 Speaker 3: survive as a portfolio manager and be willing to take 830 00:44:19,920 --> 00:44:21,600 Speaker 3: time where you're just in accept that you're going to 831 00:44:21,680 --> 00:44:22,600 Speaker 3: underperform for a while. 832 00:44:25,239 --> 00:44:26,400 Speaker 4: Well, you have to have. 833 00:44:27,960 --> 00:44:31,720 Speaker 5: Think very carefully about your time horizon. When I started 834 00:44:31,840 --> 00:44:33,840 Speaker 5: in this industry, one of the first things I was 835 00:44:33,880 --> 00:44:37,480 Speaker 5: tasked to do was to do a study on what 836 00:44:37,520 --> 00:44:42,720 Speaker 5: would happen if you had perfect foresight in financial markets? 837 00:44:42,760 --> 00:44:43,520 Speaker 4: Perfect foresight. 838 00:44:43,560 --> 00:44:45,759 Speaker 5: And of course you can do a study like that 839 00:44:45,800 --> 00:44:50,160 Speaker 5: by using historical data. So you take stocks, bonds, real estate, commodities, 840 00:44:50,280 --> 00:44:53,760 Speaker 5: every asset class and you just look at the historical 841 00:44:53,840 --> 00:44:57,320 Speaker 5: returns and you can say, let's say at the beginning 842 00:44:57,320 --> 00:45:00,440 Speaker 5: of every year, I invest with a five year horizon, 843 00:45:00,880 --> 00:45:03,680 Speaker 5: and I pick the asset class that I know with 844 00:45:03,840 --> 00:45:06,880 Speaker 5: metaphysical certitude is going to have the highest return for 845 00:45:06,920 --> 00:45:07,600 Speaker 5: those five years. 846 00:45:07,680 --> 00:45:08,759 Speaker 4: Because I'm looking. 847 00:45:08,480 --> 00:45:12,239 Speaker 5: At historical data, I came to the conclusion that if 848 00:45:12,239 --> 00:45:14,399 Speaker 5: you had a five year horizon, you would go out 849 00:45:14,440 --> 00:45:18,640 Speaker 5: of business, even if though with physical certitude would have 850 00:45:18,680 --> 00:45:22,680 Speaker 5: the highest performing asset class. And that's because so often 851 00:45:23,120 --> 00:45:26,640 Speaker 5: the first two years of the five years, that best 852 00:45:26,640 --> 00:45:29,600 Speaker 5: performing asset class was not a good performer at all. 853 00:45:29,920 --> 00:45:33,000 Speaker 5: It was very frequently back end loaded. So I said, 854 00:45:33,160 --> 00:45:36,240 Speaker 5: we cannot invest other people's money with a five year horizon. 855 00:45:37,320 --> 00:45:40,160 Speaker 5: I think that most people that invest other people's money 856 00:45:40,480 --> 00:45:44,200 Speaker 5: use too short of a horizon. However, a lot of 857 00:45:44,239 --> 00:45:48,359 Speaker 5: investment managers talk about they have they're constantly reallocating, they're 858 00:45:48,360 --> 00:45:51,520 Speaker 5: constantly read. You know, they have one week horizon at 859 00:45:51,560 --> 00:45:53,799 Speaker 5: a weekly meeting, and the change of that's not going 860 00:45:53,880 --> 00:45:56,680 Speaker 5: to work. It's not going to work because the chance 861 00:45:56,719 --> 00:45:59,719 Speaker 5: of you being right in a week is very low. 862 00:46:00,840 --> 00:46:03,000 Speaker 5: Even if you're going to be right for over a 863 00:46:03,000 --> 00:46:04,880 Speaker 5: two year period, your chance of being right in a 864 00:46:04,880 --> 00:46:08,280 Speaker 5: week is very low. So I kept modulating time horizon, 865 00:46:08,360 --> 00:46:11,480 Speaker 5: and I came to conclusion that the sweet spot was 866 00:46:11,600 --> 00:46:13,120 Speaker 5: between eighteen months and two. 867 00:46:13,120 --> 00:46:17,120 Speaker 4: Years for a time horizon. And what I've learned is. 868 00:46:17,000 --> 00:46:20,640 Speaker 5: That having done that, I've have a seventy percent hit rate. 869 00:46:21,040 --> 00:46:24,480 Speaker 5: I've had a long enough career in enough strategies where 870 00:46:24,480 --> 00:46:27,799 Speaker 5: it's statistically significant, and i have a seventy percent hit rate, 871 00:46:27,840 --> 00:46:30,080 Speaker 5: which means I'm right seventy percent of the time, which 872 00:46:30,120 --> 00:46:33,120 Speaker 5: means I'm wrong thirty percent of the time. So I've 873 00:46:33,120 --> 00:46:35,000 Speaker 5: been at this for over forty years. So I've been 874 00:46:35,040 --> 00:46:39,200 Speaker 5: wrong for more than twelve years right, But thank god 875 00:46:39,239 --> 00:46:42,040 Speaker 5: they haven't been in a row. Because what you can't 876 00:46:42,080 --> 00:46:46,200 Speaker 5: do is really three years is wheneverone pulls the plug 877 00:46:46,600 --> 00:46:49,919 Speaker 5: if you're wrong, if you are to perform year one, 878 00:46:50,080 --> 00:46:53,320 Speaker 5: year two, and year three, you're gone. You know, if 879 00:46:53,360 --> 00:46:55,719 Speaker 5: you're wrong five years in a row, they shut your 880 00:46:55,800 --> 00:46:59,880 Speaker 5: janus on constrained bond fund because you can't have sequentially 881 00:47:00,080 --> 00:47:01,800 Speaker 5: years about performance. 882 00:47:01,400 --> 00:47:04,080 Speaker 2: Like a very specific example, Jeff, I wonder where that 883 00:47:04,120 --> 00:47:04,560 Speaker 2: came from. 884 00:47:04,719 --> 00:47:09,640 Speaker 5: Well, yeah, so, but the the so really it comes 885 00:47:09,680 --> 00:47:12,600 Speaker 5: down to about having. 886 00:47:13,960 --> 00:47:14,720 Speaker 4: The sweet spot. 887 00:47:14,920 --> 00:47:20,440 Speaker 5: I'm not being overly overly active and not being overly 888 00:47:20,719 --> 00:47:24,480 Speaker 5: you know, fixated on your long term idea. And I've 889 00:47:24,520 --> 00:47:26,560 Speaker 5: managed I've managed to do that. I've never I've never 890 00:47:26,600 --> 00:47:29,839 Speaker 5: really had three years in a row of under performance. So, uh, 891 00:47:29,960 --> 00:47:32,160 Speaker 5: that's that's been a good thing. And that's probably I 892 00:47:32,680 --> 00:47:35,640 Speaker 5: call myself. Is it uncas or Chinnich Cook who is 893 00:47:35,640 --> 00:47:38,120 Speaker 5: the last of the Mohicans? And John Van Moore Cooper. 894 00:47:38,280 --> 00:47:41,000 Speaker 5: I'm the last one. I'm the last man standing when 895 00:47:41,040 --> 00:47:44,200 Speaker 5: I started in this every single person of significance that's 896 00:47:44,200 --> 00:47:46,160 Speaker 5: been in the business since I started my career, they're 897 00:47:46,200 --> 00:47:47,680 Speaker 5: all retired or gone. 898 00:47:48,280 --> 00:47:49,360 Speaker 4: I'm the last one standing. 899 00:47:49,600 --> 00:47:51,920 Speaker 5: Dana Emery was the only one left and she was 900 00:47:51,920 --> 00:47:55,680 Speaker 5: at Dodging Cox, but she retired at the end of June. 901 00:47:55,880 --> 00:47:58,880 Speaker 4: So I'm I'm uncas last of the Mohicans. 902 00:47:59,320 --> 00:48:05,960 Speaker 2: Jeff, does that work? Jeff gun Kiss kind of very quickly. 903 00:48:06,440 --> 00:48:08,960 Speaker 2: You know, again, we're sort of we're very we're being 904 00:48:09,040 --> 00:48:11,880 Speaker 2: very introspective and retrospective on the show. But over the 905 00:48:11,920 --> 00:48:15,840 Speaker 2: past ten years, what's been the thing that surprised you most, 906 00:48:16,040 --> 00:48:20,160 Speaker 2: either in terms of the markets or the financial industry itself. 907 00:48:24,200 --> 00:48:24,960 Speaker 4: I think the. 908 00:48:26,320 --> 00:48:32,400 Speaker 5: Thing that's surprising, and as he believed, distressing is surprising 909 00:48:33,160 --> 00:48:38,479 Speaker 5: is the magnitude of money printing that occurred in twenty 910 00:48:38,560 --> 00:48:44,800 Speaker 5: twenty two. I just the fact that the Federal Reserve 911 00:48:45,640 --> 00:48:50,040 Speaker 5: broke the law and bought corporate bonds surprised me. It 912 00:48:50,040 --> 00:48:52,560 Speaker 5: probably shouldn't have surprised me because they broke They broke 913 00:48:52,600 --> 00:48:58,400 Speaker 5: the law when they modified mortgages during the global financial crisis. 914 00:48:58,640 --> 00:49:02,920 Speaker 5: Was that was not allowed for the perspectuses of trillions 915 00:49:02,960 --> 00:49:05,719 Speaker 5: of dollars of securities, but they did it anyway. And 916 00:49:05,760 --> 00:49:09,680 Speaker 5: so what I've learned is that the rules can be 917 00:49:09,840 --> 00:49:13,040 Speaker 5: changed in spite of the fact that they seem to 918 00:49:13,080 --> 00:49:15,879 Speaker 5: be set in Stone. And that's why I say and 919 00:49:15,920 --> 00:49:21,200 Speaker 5: when I say this, people really act very in a 920 00:49:21,280 --> 00:49:24,080 Speaker 5: shocked type of reaction. They don't believe that they can 921 00:49:24,120 --> 00:49:27,439 Speaker 5: restructure the treasury debt. But yes they can. They can 922 00:49:27,520 --> 00:49:32,320 Speaker 5: restructure the treasury debt. And I think that that sort 923 00:49:32,320 --> 00:49:35,279 Speaker 5: of has to happen in some fashion, whether it's the 924 00:49:35,360 --> 00:49:38,160 Speaker 5: coupon adjustment that I talked about, whether it's whether it's 925 00:49:38,320 --> 00:49:41,440 Speaker 5: doing the ueal care of control that Joel brought up earlier. 926 00:49:41,920 --> 00:49:44,640 Speaker 5: I think something like that has got to happen. Because 927 00:49:45,000 --> 00:49:49,759 Speaker 5: when something is impossible and paying our interest back in 928 00:49:49,800 --> 00:49:54,080 Speaker 5: today's buying power dollar is impossible, to pay off our debt, 929 00:49:54,120 --> 00:49:57,560 Speaker 5: it's impossible, then you have to open up your mind 930 00:49:57,840 --> 00:50:01,160 Speaker 5: to a radical change in the rules system. And of 931 00:50:01,160 --> 00:50:04,160 Speaker 5: course that is happening on every level. I mean, you 932 00:50:04,200 --> 00:50:06,200 Speaker 5: talk to you look at surveys of people that are 933 00:50:06,280 --> 00:50:09,799 Speaker 5: say thirty five and younger. They don't believe in the 934 00:50:09,800 --> 00:50:12,640 Speaker 5: institutions of this country at all. They don't believe in 935 00:50:12,680 --> 00:50:16,839 Speaker 5: the constitution, they don't believe in religion, they don't believe they. 936 00:50:16,719 --> 00:50:17,720 Speaker 4: Don't believe in anything. 937 00:50:18,360 --> 00:50:20,600 Speaker 5: And if they need, people need something to believe in, 938 00:50:20,920 --> 00:50:23,360 Speaker 5: and that's what has to replace the system, a system 939 00:50:23,440 --> 00:50:24,759 Speaker 5: that people can believe in. 940 00:50:25,239 --> 00:50:28,719 Speaker 4: And what's being floated now just blows my mind, and. 941 00:50:28,640 --> 00:50:31,680 Speaker 5: That is that we're going to because we have tariffs 942 00:50:31,719 --> 00:50:34,359 Speaker 5: that are raising a few hundred billion dollars a year 943 00:50:34,400 --> 00:50:36,920 Speaker 5: if they stay in place, well, that means that we 944 00:50:36,920 --> 00:50:40,440 Speaker 5: should give two thousand dollars to everybody as a tariff dividend. 945 00:50:41,120 --> 00:50:44,960 Speaker 5: We don't have any money. We're borrowing two trillion dollars. 946 00:50:45,000 --> 00:50:46,799 Speaker 5: We don't have two thousand dollars. 947 00:50:46,600 --> 00:50:47,640 Speaker 4: To throw away at people. 948 00:50:47,680 --> 00:50:50,880 Speaker 5: Again, didn't we learn that in twenty twenty to twenty 949 00:50:50,920 --> 00:50:53,840 Speaker 5: twenty two that giving money to people causes inflation? 950 00:50:54,400 --> 00:50:58,080 Speaker 4: Remember people talking about modern monetary theory? What a joke? 951 00:50:58,560 --> 00:51:00,680 Speaker 5: You know, you never had anybody talk about that anymore 952 00:51:00,760 --> 00:51:02,720 Speaker 5: because by modern military theory? 953 00:51:03,719 --> 00:51:04,839 Speaker 2: How can no one talks about that. 954 00:51:06,320 --> 00:51:08,640 Speaker 4: Because of inflation? What's a nine point one person? 955 00:51:09,080 --> 00:51:12,279 Speaker 3: Can I ask one last question? Are you like it 956 00:51:12,400 --> 00:51:15,080 Speaker 3: seemed like, you know, you mentioned Trump floating the idea 957 00:51:15,080 --> 00:51:18,000 Speaker 3: of a two thousand dollars tariff dividend to the public, 958 00:51:19,120 --> 00:51:21,759 Speaker 3: But do you like are you was there an opportunity 959 00:51:21,880 --> 00:51:24,600 Speaker 3: in your view for Trump to have changed the status? 960 00:51:24,719 --> 00:51:28,160 Speaker 3: Quote like, are you disappointed that someone with sort of 961 00:51:28,440 --> 00:51:33,480 Speaker 3: Trump's persona energy, sort of perceived outsider status, did not 962 00:51:33,800 --> 00:51:37,080 Speaker 3: do has not done anything that actually changes some of 963 00:51:37,200 --> 00:51:42,279 Speaker 3: whether the fiscal or economic trajectory. 964 00:51:42,480 --> 00:51:47,480 Speaker 4: He can't. The problem is, look at look at this 965 00:51:47,560 --> 00:51:50,839 Speaker 4: government shutdown. You know what is going on here? 966 00:51:51,840 --> 00:51:54,560 Speaker 5: Why why do we have to pay taxes if the 967 00:51:54,600 --> 00:52:00,600 Speaker 5: government is shut should taxes not be charged for one days? 968 00:52:00,880 --> 00:52:04,800 Speaker 5: Shouldn't you have life an eleven percent tax rebate? Because 969 00:52:04,920 --> 00:52:07,960 Speaker 5: what's going on? Well, it's just because there's this massive 970 00:52:08,200 --> 00:52:13,280 Speaker 5: entrenched interest that is the kind of the uniparty government 971 00:52:13,800 --> 00:52:17,319 Speaker 5: that will fight tooth and nail. Just look at all 972 00:52:17,360 --> 00:52:20,480 Speaker 5: the lawfare at look at all the indictments, all the stuff. 973 00:52:20,840 --> 00:52:23,160 Speaker 5: I mean, they'll do anything they can to hold on 974 00:52:23,239 --> 00:52:28,560 Speaker 5: to power until such time as the people that vote 975 00:52:28,680 --> 00:52:32,239 Speaker 5: these people in say no, mass, no more of this. 976 00:52:32,520 --> 00:52:36,960 Speaker 5: And that began with Trump. It's been furthered just this 977 00:52:37,080 --> 00:52:41,440 Speaker 5: month with Mam Donnie Man. Donnie won because people do 978 00:52:41,520 --> 00:52:43,720 Speaker 5: not believe it's a little bit different. 979 00:52:43,800 --> 00:52:47,279 Speaker 4: Well, Trump was more like the lower middle class. They 980 00:52:47,280 --> 00:52:49,040 Speaker 4: felt that nobody was listening to them. 981 00:52:49,280 --> 00:52:52,920 Speaker 5: Now it's just young people, just broadly, people under I 982 00:52:52,960 --> 00:52:55,719 Speaker 5: don't know, thirty five years old, people that lost three 983 00:52:55,800 --> 00:53:01,480 Speaker 5: years of education with lockdowns and all these policies. They 984 00:53:01,640 --> 00:53:05,440 Speaker 5: feel like they have no chance of ever having the 985 00:53:05,520 --> 00:53:09,239 Speaker 5: life experience that the baby boomers had. Home prices are 986 00:53:09,239 --> 00:53:13,640 Speaker 5: more affordable, less affordable than they've ever been. People have 987 00:53:14,160 --> 00:53:18,320 Speaker 5: educations that aren't worth anything, jobs aren't available, nobody's hiring. 988 00:53:18,760 --> 00:53:21,800 Speaker 5: They feel like there's no future for them that looks 989 00:53:21,840 --> 00:53:25,040 Speaker 5: anything like what they look at Nancy Pelosi and Chuck 990 00:53:25,040 --> 00:53:27,759 Speaker 5: Schumer and Mitch McConnell and all these other people had. 991 00:53:28,040 --> 00:53:30,680 Speaker 5: They don't have it, and so they are not going 992 00:53:30,719 --> 00:53:33,080 Speaker 5: to go along with this. And so that's why Mount 993 00:53:33,120 --> 00:53:35,880 Speaker 5: Dombi one. It's just like, I don't have a shot 994 00:53:35,920 --> 00:53:38,719 Speaker 5: here in New York City as a young person, and 995 00:53:38,960 --> 00:53:43,160 Speaker 5: that's what's taking over, and so Trump can't do it himself. 996 00:53:43,520 --> 00:53:48,520 Speaker 5: He's caught on to something that was obviously kind of 997 00:53:49,239 --> 00:53:53,080 Speaker 5: hibernating within the psyche of part of the population, but 998 00:53:53,239 --> 00:53:56,120 Speaker 5: it's now become a generational thing. I wouldn't be surprised 999 00:53:56,120 --> 00:53:59,200 Speaker 5: talk about another crazy gunlock idea. I wouldn't be surprised 1000 00:53:59,239 --> 00:54:03,319 Speaker 5: if are putting in place an age tax, not a 1001 00:54:03,360 --> 00:54:06,160 Speaker 5: wealth tax, which they're doing to a certain extent through 1002 00:54:06,200 --> 00:54:09,440 Speaker 5: electricity bills and stuff like that these days already, but 1003 00:54:09,520 --> 00:54:11,839 Speaker 5: you could put it together an age tax that if 1004 00:54:11,880 --> 00:54:15,680 Speaker 5: you're over age fifty five, you have a cer tax 1005 00:54:16,040 --> 00:54:20,720 Speaker 5: based upon you had a better environment to accumulate wealth 1006 00:54:20,800 --> 00:54:25,160 Speaker 5: than the subsequent generations have, and so you should give 1007 00:54:25,200 --> 00:54:25,880 Speaker 5: some of that back. 1008 00:54:26,440 --> 00:54:27,760 Speaker 4: I think that might actually happen. 1009 00:54:27,880 --> 00:54:32,480 Speaker 2: That would be a popular platform with certainly a specific demographic. 1010 00:54:32,520 --> 00:54:35,440 Speaker 5: Are you going to run, Jeff positively? 1011 00:54:35,520 --> 00:54:39,080 Speaker 4: No? No chance? All right, absolutely no chance. 1012 00:54:39,440 --> 00:54:39,839 Speaker 1: All right. 1013 00:54:39,920 --> 00:54:41,839 Speaker 2: We shall leave it there, Jeff, thank you so much 1014 00:54:41,880 --> 00:54:42,400 Speaker 2: for coming on. 1015 00:54:42,440 --> 00:54:42,880 Speaker 1: All thoughts. 1016 00:54:42,920 --> 00:54:43,839 Speaker 2: Really appreciate it. 1017 00:54:44,080 --> 00:54:46,239 Speaker 4: Well, thanks for having me on. I'm you're kind of 1018 00:54:46,280 --> 00:54:48,919 Speaker 4: all over the map today, but I hope your audience. 1019 00:54:48,600 --> 00:55:03,719 Speaker 2: Insurator clearly a lot to unpack their Joe one of 1020 00:55:03,760 --> 00:55:06,319 Speaker 2: the things. Actually this was towards the end, so that's 1021 00:55:06,320 --> 00:55:08,080 Speaker 2: why it's in my mind. But you know, when he 1022 00:55:08,120 --> 00:55:11,360 Speaker 2: was talking about the FED buying corporate bonds in twenty twenty, 1023 00:55:11,440 --> 00:55:15,040 Speaker 2: I really think that was an underappreciated moment in financial 1024 00:55:15,080 --> 00:55:18,640 Speaker 2: markets because I remember, again we're being very introspective here. 1025 00:55:19,080 --> 00:55:22,439 Speaker 2: I remember writing pieces about the corporate bond market being 1026 00:55:22,480 --> 00:55:26,200 Speaker 2: problematic in like circa twenty fifteen. Yeah, and I used 1027 00:55:26,239 --> 00:55:28,360 Speaker 2: to have commenters who were like, Okay, so what's the 1028 00:55:28,400 --> 00:55:31,880 Speaker 2: worst case scenario. And the most extreme scenario that we 1029 00:55:32,000 --> 00:55:33,920 Speaker 2: used to talk about was, well, what if the FED 1030 00:55:34,000 --> 00:55:36,759 Speaker 2: has to come in and buy corporate bonds? That was 1031 00:55:36,840 --> 00:55:40,560 Speaker 2: the extreme scenario, and that's what happened in twenty twenty. 1032 00:55:40,680 --> 00:55:42,920 Speaker 2: So I kind of I take his point about how 1033 00:55:43,040 --> 00:55:46,000 Speaker 2: quickly these things can change and you can deviate from 1034 00:55:46,040 --> 00:55:46,880 Speaker 2: norms totally. 1035 00:55:48,200 --> 00:55:50,719 Speaker 3: Remember we interviewed Bill Gross on the Beach a couple 1036 00:55:50,760 --> 00:55:52,640 Speaker 3: of years ago and he called out Jeff for like 1037 00:55:52,680 --> 00:55:56,480 Speaker 3: being the pretend bond king. Anyway, I liked Jeff returning 1038 00:55:56,560 --> 00:56:00,960 Speaker 3: the favor by pointing out the short lived, the short 1039 00:56:00,960 --> 00:56:04,399 Speaker 3: lived Janis on Constrained fund that Bill ran after having 1040 00:56:04,480 --> 00:56:07,520 Speaker 3: left Kim KOs So, I see that the rivalry. 1041 00:56:07,760 --> 00:56:10,840 Speaker 2: The rivalry continues. Yeah, we should have them both on 1042 00:56:11,000 --> 00:56:12,400 Speaker 2: and just let them do get. 1043 00:56:12,239 --> 00:56:15,560 Speaker 3: Just let them seriously, it's like, just do it. Yeah, 1044 00:56:15,719 --> 00:56:17,759 Speaker 3: just both come on. People would love that. 1045 00:56:17,960 --> 00:56:19,960 Speaker 2: Oh I'm sure, I'm sure that would raise. 1046 00:56:19,880 --> 00:56:21,760 Speaker 3: Some money for charity or something. 1047 00:56:22,160 --> 00:56:25,400 Speaker 2: Okay, Jeff, if you are still listening, and Bill, if 1048 00:56:25,880 --> 00:56:28,840 Speaker 2: you are listening, we should put pretend bond King in 1049 00:56:28,880 --> 00:56:33,120 Speaker 2: the headline and maybe lure him on open invitation to 1050 00:56:33,200 --> 00:56:37,080 Speaker 2: come on all bots and debate, but on a serious note, 1051 00:56:37,239 --> 00:56:39,640 Speaker 2: more serious note. The other thing I was thinking about 1052 00:56:39,760 --> 00:56:42,479 Speaker 2: was when it comes to private credit. Yeah, I thought 1053 00:56:42,480 --> 00:56:45,560 Speaker 2: the point about how everyone's been piling into private credit 1054 00:56:45,600 --> 00:56:49,319 Speaker 2: because it's outperformed public credit. That is changing now, you 1055 00:56:49,320 --> 00:56:52,040 Speaker 2: know empirically that has changed this year. But then secondly, 1056 00:56:52,080 --> 00:56:55,000 Speaker 2: everyone's been piling into private credit because of that low 1057 00:56:55,120 --> 00:56:58,680 Speaker 2: volatility pitch, which is one that we've heard a number 1058 00:56:58,680 --> 00:57:01,120 Speaker 2: of times on the podcast. Now, this idea that well, 1059 00:57:01,160 --> 00:57:03,440 Speaker 2: you don't have to market to market, and that's actually 1060 00:57:03,680 --> 00:57:06,759 Speaker 2: a big strength that sales pitch starts to lose a 1061 00:57:06,800 --> 00:57:10,279 Speaker 2: lot of power and conviction when you're going from one 1062 00:57:10,320 --> 00:57:12,200 Speaker 2: hundred to zero in the space of a month. 1063 00:57:12,640 --> 00:57:15,520 Speaker 3: I don't like how there are new ones like every day. Yeah, 1064 00:57:15,640 --> 00:57:18,560 Speaker 3: I'm saying it's like each one of these little credit 1065 00:57:18,600 --> 00:57:21,920 Speaker 3: cockroaches are pretty small in the grand scheme of things. 1066 00:57:21,920 --> 00:57:22,479 Speaker 4: But two things. 1067 00:57:22,520 --> 00:57:24,600 Speaker 3: A they're small, and yet they seem to be touching 1068 00:57:24,640 --> 00:57:28,040 Speaker 3: a wide number. And I don't like how they keep popping. 1069 00:57:28,240 --> 00:57:28,400 Speaker 5: Right. 1070 00:57:28,480 --> 00:57:30,320 Speaker 3: I'm a little I'm a little ancient. 1071 00:57:30,160 --> 00:57:32,400 Speaker 2: Right, because you think the scale is small, but then 1072 00:57:32,440 --> 00:57:36,240 Speaker 2: it just keeps well. This is also why why the 1073 00:57:36,240 --> 00:57:39,040 Speaker 2: cockroach analogy is so perfect, right, because if you see one, 1074 00:57:39,400 --> 00:57:40,640 Speaker 2: you know you have more than one. 1075 00:57:40,880 --> 00:57:41,120 Speaker 4: Yeah. 1076 00:57:41,240 --> 00:57:44,280 Speaker 2: I once read an entire book about cockroaches just because 1077 00:57:44,280 --> 00:57:47,240 Speaker 2: I figured, like, know your enemy in New York, and 1078 00:57:47,280 --> 00:57:50,880 Speaker 2: it was actually really interesting. Shall we leave it there, 1079 00:57:51,040 --> 00:57:53,960 Speaker 2: Let's leave it there. Okay, this has been another episode 1080 00:57:54,000 --> 00:57:56,720 Speaker 2: of the Authoughts podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow 1081 00:57:56,760 --> 00:57:58,160 Speaker 2: me at Tracy Alloway and. 1082 00:57:58,120 --> 00:58:00,360 Speaker 3: I'm Jill Why isnt Thal? You can follow me at 1083 00:58:00,360 --> 00:58:04,200 Speaker 3: the Stalwart. Follow our guest Jeffrey Gunlock. He's at Truth Gunlock. 1084 00:58:04,320 --> 00:58:08,080 Speaker 3: Follow our producers Kerman Rodriguez at Kerman Ermann, Dashel Bennett 1085 00:58:08,120 --> 00:58:11,000 Speaker 3: at Dashbot, and Keil Brooks at Keil Brooks. For more 1086 00:58:11,040 --> 00:58:13,880 Speaker 3: Oddlows content, go to Bloomberg dot com slash od Lots 1087 00:58:13,920 --> 00:58:16,560 Speaker 3: with the daily newsletter and all of our episodes, and 1088 00:58:16,600 --> 00:58:18,720 Speaker 3: you can chat about all of these topics twenty four 1089 00:58:18,760 --> 00:58:23,600 Speaker 3: to seven in our discord Discord dot gg slash od lots. 1090 00:58:23,240 --> 00:58:25,760 Speaker 2: And if you enjoy odd Lots, if you want Jeff 1091 00:58:25,800 --> 00:58:28,480 Speaker 2: Gunlock and Bill Groves to duke it out on the podcast, 1092 00:58:28,520 --> 00:58:32,240 Speaker 2: then I should say proverbially, not literally, then please leave 1093 00:58:32,320 --> 00:58:35,720 Speaker 2: us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform. And remember, 1094 00:58:35,800 --> 00:58:38,360 Speaker 2: if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, you can listen to 1095 00:58:38,400 --> 00:58:41,040 Speaker 2: all of our episodes absolutely ad free. All you need 1096 00:58:41,080 --> 00:58:43,480 Speaker 2: to do is find the Bloomberg channel on Apple Podcasts 1097 00:58:43,520 --> 00:59:03,360 Speaker 2: and follow the instructions there. Thanks for listening in