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Speaker 1: Pushkin. Audiences have always loved a spy story, be it

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Speaker 1: The Third Man, the Bourne Identity, or of course, James Bond.

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Speaker 1: Espionage is a recipe for a box office hit, and

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Speaker 1: I've recently been enjoying an excellent spy thriller. But unlike

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Speaker 1: those examples, this one is completely true and the spy

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Speaker 1: at the center of the story is certainly known James Bond.

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Speaker 1: My Financial Times colleague Sam Jones, has been on the

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Speaker 1: trail of an Austrian financial fraudster who ran intelligence networks

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Speaker 1: across Europe for Russia. The result is the fantastic podcast

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Speaker 1: Hot Money, Agent of Chaos. I have loved listening to it.

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Speaker 1: I think you will too. But before we play you

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Speaker 1: the very first episode on the Cautionary Tales feed, I've

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Speaker 1: got Sam Jones himself with me to whet your appetite.

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Speaker 2: Sam, Hey, Tim, nice to be here.

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Speaker 1: It's great to have you, and we should start by

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Speaker 1: covering your role at the Financial Times. I can't remember

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Speaker 1: the actual job title, and basically the spy correspondent on you.

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Speaker 2: I mean that's a fair description. Let's say the cover

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Speaker 2: description is European security correspondent. But yeah, ah, yes, covering

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Speaker 2: intelligence and espionage.

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Speaker 1: I on any spy stories you can briefly share that

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Speaker 1: did not involve the subject of agents of chaos.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, a few. I mean I properly used to cover

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Speaker 2: security and defense for the ft sort of two thousand

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Speaker 2: and thirteen to eighteen, which was an interesting period. Obviously,

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Speaker 2: that's when Russia first invaded Ukraine and also when the

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Speaker 2: crisis in the Middle East with the civil war in

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Speaker 2: Syria blew up. So there was a lot going on,

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Speaker 2: especially with Ukraine that felt like the moment where, you know,

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Speaker 2: the whole kind of geopolitical saga we're now right in

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Speaker 2: the kind of center of began to first play out,

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Speaker 2: began to first unschool.

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Speaker 1: I suppose this this idea of mentioning James Bond or

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Speaker 1: the old James Bond stories often involved the Soviet Union

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Speaker 1: and watching some of the films and the sixties, the seventies,

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Speaker 1: the eighties, you think, oh, well, you know, it's not

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Speaker 1: like that now, and then you think, well, actually, maybe

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Speaker 1: it is like that now because Russia is the adversary,

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Speaker 1: and I guess that's back.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, there was a sort of return to history and

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Speaker 2: suddenly that's when I think the beginning of the interest

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Speaker 2: in kind of spying and espionage began to tick up,

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Speaker 2: and of course there were the Scripple poisonings in the UK,

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Speaker 2: for the attempted assassination of and Sogo Scripple by the

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Speaker 2: Russian state, and so suddenly there was this oh my gosh,

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Speaker 2: what is going on in the shadows. And one of

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Speaker 2: the striking things was just discovering the extent to which

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Speaker 2: actually Russian intelligence, aggressive Russian intelligence operations in Europe had

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Speaker 2: never ended. They were ongoing, and really they were only

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Speaker 2: just coming to the kind of four in terms of

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Speaker 2: the headlines, because they'd got so so kind of you know,

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Speaker 2: far down a road that they got to a point

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Speaker 2: where they were very happy for are these kind of

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Speaker 2: aggressive actions to come into the open. So there was,

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Speaker 2: for example, an ammunition factory in the Czech Republic blown up.

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Speaker 2: The Russians were willing to do that in Europe, you know.

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Speaker 2: In Danger Lives, one story we did, which will harken

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Speaker 2: back to a very classic English spy tale, was we

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Speaker 2: uncovered an attempt by Russian intelligence to kind of infiltrate

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Speaker 2: something called the Cambridge Intelligence Seminar, which was basically an

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Speaker 2: academic group in Cambridge staffed largely by ex spies, but

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Speaker 2: also students have postgrads mostly who were studying you know,

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Speaker 2: intelligence or security study, and the Russians had sort of

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Speaker 2: very subtly worked out that this might be a good

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Speaker 2: recruiting ground, you know, that they could possibly infiltrate this

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Speaker 2: find people who are interested in intelligence and possibly may

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Speaker 2: go on to work for Western intelligence, and so they

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Speaker 2: could potentially find recruits there. So it really sort of

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Speaker 2: harked back to this kim Philby kind of idea of

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Speaker 2: agent recruitment going on on the kind of college lawns

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Speaker 2: of Cambridge University in the UK. Kim philb of course

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Speaker 2: being the most notorious British traitor of the twentieth century,

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Speaker 2: who worked his way right to the top of the

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Speaker 2: secret intelligence service in Britain and who all the while

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Speaker 2: was a Russian mole. It was a sort of really

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Speaker 2: striking a rhyme, a historical rhyme if you like. But yes,

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Speaker 2: being a real kind of rollercoaster in the last ten

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Speaker 2: years of working out that Russians really, whatever you think

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Speaker 2: they might be doing, they quite possibly are.

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Speaker 1: Speaking of roller coasters, we should talk about the series

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Speaker 1: Hot Money, Agent of Chaos, But first the cautionary Tales theme.

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Speaker 1: Sam at the center of your series Hot Money, Agent

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Speaker 1: of Chaos is a character called jan Marcelek, who, on

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Speaker 1: the face of it seems like a conventional subject for

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Speaker 1: an FT story. So tell us how you first encountered him.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, that's that's right. So Yan Marsilek was the COO

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Speaker 2: this big German fintech called Wirecard German financial technology company,

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Speaker 2: a sort of up and coming web based digital payments company,

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Speaker 2: but big, you know, really processing millions and millions and

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Speaker 2: millions of transactions online every day, and so big in

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Speaker 2: fact that it was actually considering at one point a

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Speaker 2: takeover of Deutsche Bank, Germany's biggest bank. So this really

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Speaker 2: was an up and coming company. And my colleague Dan

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Speaker 2: McCrumb here at the FT had essentially discovered or worked

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Speaker 2: out this company was a huge fraud and he had

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Speaker 2: spent months years digging into them, trying to work out

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Speaker 2: what the nature the fraud was. I think he had

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Speaker 2: a very strong intuition that something was up, and so

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Speaker 2: he was investigating them for that, and he sort of

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Speaker 2: came to this conclusion that really the spider in the

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Speaker 2: center of the web, if you like, was the chief

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Speaker 2: operating officer was this guy Jan Marcelett, who was very

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Speaker 2: young relative to other kind of chief operating officers, but

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Speaker 2: supremely confident and so on.

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Speaker 1: And we should say this is a this is a

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Speaker 1: huge story for the Financial Times. It was an amazing,

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Speaker 1: epic piece of investigative reporting. It absolutely, you know, the

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Speaker 1: Ft kind of went toe to toe with the German

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Speaker 1: regulators who who were basically trying to shut the investigation

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Speaker 1: down because I felt it was a British newspaper trying

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Speaker 1: to do Germany down and this was kind of the

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Speaker 1: enron of the day. It was enormous, Absolutely, but it

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Speaker 1: turns out there's more to it than even than met

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Speaker 1: the eye.

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Speaker 2: Yes, that's ultimately really how I kind of got entangled

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Speaker 2: in it was because Dan and his editor Paul Murphy,

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Speaker 2: the FT's head of investigations, they were reporting this story,

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Speaker 2: but they also then found themselves essentially under attack. They

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Speaker 2: were under surveillance, they were being hacked, they were under

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Speaker 2: constant physical surveillance, and they were the subject of a

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Speaker 2: very widespread, very expensive dirty tricks campaign. So it stank.

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Speaker 2: Everything about the company's stank that it made Paul in particular,

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Speaker 2: I think, begin to wonder whether this was more than

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Speaker 2: just a fraud. There was something here that was peculiar

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Speaker 2: and the real You know, the best example of that

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Speaker 2: was Marcelec himself basically coming to Paul Murphy and offering

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Speaker 2: him a huge bribe, which is sort of insane because

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Speaker 2: it's a gamble on Marcelec's part because if Paul says no,

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Speaker 2: then you've effectively confirmed that the company you're running is

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Speaker 2: a criminal enterprise. Yeah, and you know, why take that

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Speaker 2: risk kind of thing? And Paul came to me and

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Speaker 2: told me about that, And I was working covering intelligence

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Speaker 2: at the time, and he said, look, I know they

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Speaker 2: work with a lot of former intelligence people. Maybe you

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Speaker 2: can ask around, maybe you can work out what's going

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Speaker 2: on here. Who are the people Marcelect No, what do

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Speaker 2: we at the FT need to be doing to protect

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Speaker 2: our own security? So that was the start of it. Yeah,

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Speaker 2: and it then kind of went in an insane direction

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Speaker 2: and just continue to get weirder and more surreal.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, it's an enormous risk that Marcelect took in offering

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Speaker 1: that bribe, but he was very much a risk taker,

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Speaker 1: and that's something that your series covers over and over again.

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Speaker 1: I don't want to reveal too much of the series,

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Speaker 1: but I wanted to ask you about something that you

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Speaker 1: say which made me think. You say at one point

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Speaker 1: that spies tell us a lot about our own societies.

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Speaker 1: So tell us a bit more about that thought.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, I very strongly feel that that spies stories, good

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Speaker 2: spies stories, good spy fiction, is successful and enduring, kind

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Speaker 2: of in the same way that good crime fiction might be.

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Speaker 2: I think, not because there is obviously the palpable interest

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Speaker 2: and excitement in the adventure, but also because I think

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Speaker 2: it tells us about flaws in our own societies, or

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Speaker 2: gaps or weaknesses, vulnerability, and really, you know, spy's stories

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Speaker 2: are about Okay, yes, they're about betrayal, and they're about

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Speaker 2: those intense kind of personal relationships, but they also show

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Speaker 2: how we are vulnerable, how we are exploitable, how people

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Speaker 2: in our society can undermine us through their own betrayals,

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Speaker 2: and why they do that. You know, And someone like

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Speaker 2: Jan Marselex, somebody who was able to reach the kind

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Speaker 2: of pinnacle of the German corporate world, who developed this

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Speaker 2: fantastic network of contact all across Europe and beyond, in

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Speaker 2: government and elsewhere, how is he able to do that,

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Speaker 2: particularly as somebody who was pretty volatile and risk taking figure.

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Speaker 2: But that I think illustrates something about our society. You

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Speaker 2: could look at this and say, look how kind of

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Speaker 2: aggressive and pernicious Russian influence and agent recruitment activities are.

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Speaker 2: Or you could say, oh, my gosh, look how vulnerable

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Speaker 2: we are and how easily people in positions of authority

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Speaker 2: in our society are swayed by money or the promise

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Speaker 2: of power, or you know, I'll scratch your about you

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Speaker 2: scratch mind. Really. I think a lot of modern spying

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Speaker 2: as well is often a story about corruption, particularly where

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Speaker 2: it comes to Russia, and that I think is something

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Speaker 2: that you know, we don't need to blame on Russia.

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Speaker 2: That's something that's our own to.

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Speaker 1: Tackle reporting on Russian intelligence. I mean, these guys don't

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Speaker 1: mess around. Actually that's not quite true. They love to

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Speaker 1: mess around. They mess around in all kinds of ways.

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Speaker 1: But the dangerous people and they're unpredictable people. So I'm

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Speaker 1: just curious about what precautions you have to take as

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Speaker 1: a reporter traveling around and covering these kinds of stories.

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Speaker 2: Certainly one is careful online digital security. I suppose where

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Speaker 2: it spills over is when you become aware that you know, okay,

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Speaker 2: there's there maybe a physical surveillance element to this too,

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Speaker 2: So it does affect you personally in that regard. You know,

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Speaker 2: we know that Marcelek has his agent networks in Europe

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Speaker 2: have deliberately targeted journalists who have reported on him or

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Speaker 2: or negatively on the Kremlin. I mean, the most prominent

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Speaker 2: examples being Christo Grozev and Roman Debrokotov, two journalists who

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Speaker 2: formerly worked for Belencat and an outpit called The Insider

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Speaker 2: and reported actually on the Salisbury poisonings and exposed the

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Speaker 2: Russian agents responsible for those attempted poisoning, and as a result,

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Speaker 2: Marcelek was one of the people tasked with potentially finding

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Speaker 2: ways to kill them and kill them quite horrifically as well.

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Speaker 2: And Marcelek and his network they had these people under

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Speaker 2: close surveillance, and they were talking about doing quite nasty

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Speaker 2: things to them, like cutting their heads off in the street,

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Speaker 2: burning them alive, quite grotesque things as a sort of

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Speaker 2: sign of retribution. Those elements of it do give one

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Speaker 2: pause for thought. At the same time, Russian intelligence agencies

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Speaker 2: and their proxies are prone to misreporting, if you like.

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Speaker 2: And that's one of the features of authoritarian regimes on

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Speaker 2: authoritarian intelligence agencies everywhere, is you kind of want to

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Speaker 2: tell the boss what he wants to hear. And so

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Speaker 2: there is a natural tendency in Russian intelligence agencies where

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Speaker 2: I think they overstate their capabilities and ambitions. And with

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Speaker 2: Marcelek as well, there's this weird element of game playing

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Speaker 2: and risk taking and venture. And he's a sort of

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Speaker 2: schroding as spy. You know, he's a very good spy

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Speaker 2: and he's also simultaneously a terrible spy.

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Speaker 1: In what way is he a terrible spy?

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Speaker 2: You know, who goes around trying to bribe journalists? Really,

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Speaker 2: I think if you're successful, you don't exist right, No

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Speaker 2: one will ever know who you are, and so on

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Speaker 2: and so forth. Whereas I think Marcelek was driven by

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Speaker 2: psychology that made him fascinated with spying and willing to

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Speaker 2: do the bidding of people, you know, in the Kremlin

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Speaker 2: and elsewhere, and conscious of things like security and surveillance

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Speaker 2: and stuff like that. But at the same time flamboyant.

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Speaker 1: He really liked to live the high life, couldn't they.

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Speaker 2: Absolutely, he'd fly down to Monaco and Nie all along

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Speaker 2: the code as who can on team for the week,

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Speaker 2: n get a little private jet, you know, sometimes take

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Speaker 2: his girlfriend from Munich there. Sometimes go and meet his

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Speaker 2: other girlfriend from Russia down there, a woman called Natalia's Labina,

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Speaker 2: who was actually a former sort of softcore porn actress

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Speaker 2: who now it is believed as close connections to Russian intelligence.

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Speaker 2: And you know, he'd just be partying down there on yachts.

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Speaker 2: There's videos of him sabering champagne in restaurants. He really

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Speaker 2: loved the kind of ostentation and the glamour of that

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Speaker 2: kind of lifestyle, which made him all the more peculiar.

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Speaker 2: I suppose as a.

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Speaker 1: Spy, champagne saboring should be done in the privacy of

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Speaker 1: one's own home. But there Ago and he lived across

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Speaker 1: the road from the Russian consequent which feels like a

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Speaker 1: bit of a hint.

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Speaker 2: Right in Munich and sort of you know, make had

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Speaker 2: people you know, invited into his kind of palatial villa

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Speaker 2: in Munich and there was like, you know, an air

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Speaker 2: gapped room and stuff like that. He almost had a

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Speaker 2: compulsion that people should know. He was entangled with odd things,

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Speaker 2: you know, in his office in in Munich, for example,

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Speaker 2: did anyone stop to ask why he had a row

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Speaker 2: of Russian officers caps on his mantle piece. You know,

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Speaker 2: it's sort of odd things like that that I think

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Speaker 2: he wanted the world to know in a way, which

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Speaker 2: of course is terrible to be a spy.

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Speaker 1: Well, that feels more like a sort of Hollywood version

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Speaker 1: of a spy. I mean, James Bond. He'll walk into

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Speaker 1: some luxury hotel in Monte Carlo and he'll say, the

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Speaker 1: name's Bond, James Bond. I think, do not maybe use

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Speaker 1: an alias. I mean, this is extraordinary behavior, but mars

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Speaker 1: Lek sometimes seemed more like that than a real spy.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, And I think that's this due to observation, because

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Speaker 2: I think Marslek was kind of cost playing being a

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Speaker 2: spy in some way and borrowing from the conventions of

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Speaker 2: spy fiction as much as reality. Not to downplay what

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Speaker 2: he was doing, because I think this is the important

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Speaker 2: thing to understand, is that you know, Russia has basically

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Speaker 2: three spy agencies, and the one that Marslek was most

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Speaker 2: closely associated with, the gru They don't seek to stay secret.

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Speaker 2: In fact, a lot of their operation. It's quite good

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Speaker 2: if they become semi public and listeners might recall, certainly

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Speaker 2: in the UK with the Salisbury poisonings, when the two

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Speaker 2: GRU agents who had undertaken that were exposed, you know,

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Speaker 2: the Russians put them on TV back in Russia saying

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Speaker 2: they were going to go and look at the cathedral

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Speaker 2: spire in Salisbury. So they were sort of deliberately taking

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Speaker 2: the mickey, and they don't mind that. That's okay. They're

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Speaker 2: kind of active measures, and a proxy like Marslek was

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Speaker 2: kind of an ideal for them in that regard. He

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Speaker 2: was arm's length enough but also willing.

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Speaker 1: Yes, and extremely effective in some ways. But another aspect

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Speaker 1: of his personality that I wanted to ask you about

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Speaker 1: was his likability. So quite a lot of the people

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Speaker 1: that you interview, even people who who basically lost everything,

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Speaker 1: lost all their life savings as a result of trusting Marslek,

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Speaker 1: they still liked him. I was curious as to whether

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Speaker 1: you liked him.

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Speaker 2: Yes, definitely. The moral ambiguities are kind of what attracts

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Speaker 2: me to it. Marcelect has done some terrible things. You know,

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Speaker 2: he was fascinating as somebody that was so charismatic, so charming,

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Speaker 2: so to many people, likable and dynamic. How did he

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Speaker 2: end up going down this path when a large number

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Speaker 2: of people in Europe were beginning to see Russia as

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Speaker 2: this kind of destabilizing, aggressive, dangerous threat on their doorstep,

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Speaker 2: murderous country that Marcelect, highly educated, charismatic Austrian man, went

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Speaker 2: entirely the other way and decided to kind of essentially

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Speaker 2: stake everything on Russia. That's fascinating, and I think his

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Speaker 2: charisma and his dynamism the world were very compelling because

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Speaker 2: there was that mystery, but also because it wasn't like

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Speaker 2: you were spending time in the company of a monster.

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Speaker 2: And you know my colleague Paul, who met him three

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Speaker 2: or four times, even knowing him to be a fraudster

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Speaker 2: responsible for the wild card fraud. Assuming that they couldn't

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Speaker 2: get that story off the ground, Paul would have stayed

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Speaker 2: in touch with Marcelect because he found him compelling and

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Speaker 2: interesting more than James Bonds. There's a sort of something

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Speaker 2: of the Lacare about that perfect spy. You know, characters

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Speaker 2: like Magnus Pim who are these kind of a moral criminal.

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Speaker 2: It's a kind of roguishness that's not entirely unlikable. There's

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Speaker 2: a sort of intro an element of it that's gripping,

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Speaker 2: an element of that personality that's intriguing and feels kind

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Speaker 2: of quite human.

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Speaker 1: Listening to it. One of the things that I learned

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Speaker 1: was just Wow, the Russians are kind of they'll go

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Speaker 1: anywhere and they'll try anything. It may or may not work.

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Speaker 1: I'm wondering what other lessons I should be drawing about Russia.

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Speaker 2: They gather information through reconnaissance more than they do through

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Speaker 2: strict intelligence. Don't get me wrong. They do have the SVR,

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Speaker 2: a Foreign Intelligence Services, you know, sleeper agents who are

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Speaker 2: down behind enemy lines for ten twenty years kind of thing.

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Speaker 2: But the intelligence through reconnaissance is more about pushing, pushing,

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Speaker 2: and wherever you go, wherever you break through, wherever you

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Speaker 2: find an advantage, just pouring resources there, Keep pushing, keep pushing,

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Speaker 2: keep pushing. You need to sort of be testing all

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Speaker 2: the time, seeing what works, seeing what fails. That's the

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Speaker 2: sort of reconnaissance element of it, and is much more

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Speaker 2: about engaging with your objective. You know, things like the

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Speaker 2: troll farms and all of their online campaigning. You know,

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Speaker 2: initially I think that was just a sort of let's

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Speaker 2: see what we can do here, and then it worked,

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Speaker 2: and then they kept you know, more resources went into it.

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Speaker 2: And I think that that's the kind of thing that

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Speaker 2: they do. And I also think that some you know,

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Speaker 2: another lesson is that we tend to have discrete outcomes

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Speaker 2: in intelligence operations. Here's what we want to achieve. Is

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Speaker 2: it achieved, tick, let's do it. Whereas the Russians, by virtue,

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Speaker 2: I think quite a lot of Soviet thinking. But even

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Speaker 2: before that, I think it's deeply ingrained just in the

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Speaker 2: whole strategic thinking of the country. Being a country that's

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Speaker 2: so big and dominated by such a tiny ruling cast,

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Speaker 2: they don't think of conflict, for example, as something that

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Speaker 2: is on or off. We are at war, we are

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Speaker 2: at peace. They think of everything more as a sort

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Speaker 2: of constant competition. People that worked in Russian intelligence services,

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Speaker 2: that was the sort of milk that they imbibed when

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Speaker 2: they were younger, and that's exemplified in Putin. You know,

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Speaker 2: his entire kind of intellectual worldview was honed within the KGB.

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Speaker 2: So yeah, I think that's the other key thing to

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Speaker 2: think about the Russians is they will never go away.

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Speaker 2: For example, if we have cease far in Ukraine. That

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Speaker 2: is not the end of the conflict with the West.

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Speaker 2: You know, it's not just a small localized issue for Putin.

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Speaker 2: It's about a whole broader range of issues to do

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Speaker 2: with NATO, to do with Russia's role in Europe, to

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Speaker 2: do with his belief that you know, there's him, there's China,

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Speaker 2: and there's America, and everyone else is just zones of

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Speaker 2: influence for those three. So I think you know that

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Speaker 2: he won't. You know, we should definitely have in mind

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Speaker 2: that the Russians won't be seeing a cease far as

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Speaker 2: the end of anything. It will be the beginning of

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Speaker 2: a new phase of conflict with Europe, which might move

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Speaker 2: back towards you know, other other kind of non violent means.

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Speaker 2: It might be economic, it might be political pressure, it

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Speaker 2: might be more espionage, more online misinformation, that kind of thing.

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Speaker 2: But it will not stop. There will be no kind

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Speaker 2: of enduring, you know, period of concord between Europe and Russia.

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Speaker 2: I don't think, which is a pretty bleak outlook, but

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Speaker 2: that would definitely be my my perspective.

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Speaker 1: Sam, I'm curious, is there anything that you couldn't quite

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Speaker 1: squeeze into the podcast that you wished you could.

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Speaker 2: I think what we reported on with Marcelek and what

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Speaker 2: he is up to, we covered, you know, the tip

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Speaker 2: of the iceberg. There was some fantastic little anecdotes that

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Speaker 2: I was sad didn't get in. I mean, one of

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Speaker 2: my favorite moments really was this point where Paul Murphy,

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Speaker 2: the FT's investigation editor, discovered that there was this huge

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Speaker 2: physical surveillance operation against him and Dan McCrumb in London,

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Speaker 2: that they were being tailed, and that also a lot

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Speaker 2: of his contacts, a lot of his sources were being

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Speaker 2: tailed by people in London. Anyway, one of the kind

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Speaker 2: of more more roguish sort, shall we say, of these

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Speaker 2: sources confronted one of his trails and basically pushed this

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Speaker 2: guy up against the wall and said, you know, tell

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Speaker 2: me who you're working for kind of thing. And found

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Speaker 2: out that this guy was working for the former head

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Speaker 2: of Libyan intelligence, who was this chap called Ramiella Baby.

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Speaker 2: So Paul thought, okay, well I'll just get in contact

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Speaker 2: with mister Obaby, and he did and discovered that this

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Speaker 2: guy was quite the sort of playboy really and often

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Speaker 2: to be found in Mayfair hotels. So the next thing

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Speaker 2: Paul knows is that he sat at his desk in

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Speaker 2: the ft and he gets a call from reception saying,

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Speaker 2: mister Murphy, we've got a huge bunch of flowers down

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Speaker 2: here for you. And Paul's Baffle doesn't know what on

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Speaker 2: earth this is to do with. And he comes down

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Speaker 2: to reception and he finds dozens and dozens of red

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Speaker 2: roses and a little note and it says, dear mister Murphy,

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Speaker 2: I'm so sorry for the inconvenience we've caused you. I'm

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Speaker 2: a big fan of your work. Your sincerely, Rammy Elbaedy.

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Speaker 2: And it kind of illustrates this weird, kind of semi

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Speaker 2: playful world in which everything's taken a little bit lightly.

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Speaker 2: You know, yeah, we spied on you, but you know,

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Speaker 2: here have some red roses. Yea.

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Speaker 1: So it's the head of Libyan intelligence, just to be clear.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, And by these roses came along with a

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Speaker 2: card for like a gift voucher at the Dorchester Spa

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Speaker 2: and for like hundreds hundreds of pounds.

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Speaker 1: Were they sort of a playful apology or a kind

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Speaker 1: of reveiled.

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Speaker 2: Threat, Well exactly so. And this is the best bit, right,

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Speaker 2: So these roses and the spa voucher had actually been

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Speaker 2: sent from the Dorchester's concierge service because mister Obedy likes

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Speaker 2: to stay there, and inadvertently or maybe not, they had included,

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Speaker 2: by accident as well, the sort of the email, the

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Speaker 2: original email from mister Baedy to the Dorchester concierge team

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Speaker 2: with the instructions, you know, please send to the Financial

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Speaker 2: Times six dozen red roses. And in this email, which

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Speaker 2: has sort of scrumpled up in the bottom of the package,

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Speaker 2: it also said please make sure that they are extra

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Speaker 2: thorny roses, which I thought was like a particularly piquant

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Speaker 2: little touch. I mean, it is a bit of a

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Speaker 2: veiled threat. But I think the kind of game playing

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Speaker 2: element to it, that sort of that sense in which

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Speaker 2: everything is a bit of a game and everything's up

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Speaker 2: for grabs and who cares about, you know, the seriousness

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Speaker 2: of things. That's definitely a thread that kind of runs

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Speaker 2: all the way through. And it was true of Marcelek

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Speaker 2: as well. I think he loved to play games.

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Speaker 1: Well, there you go. If that story wasn't even good

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Speaker 1: enough to make it into the podcast, you know how

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Speaker 1: good the podcast must be. It's called Hot Money, Agent

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Speaker 1: of Chaos, and you can find it wherever you get

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Speaker 1: your podcasts. I've been talking to Sam Jones. Thank you Sam,

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Speaker 1: Thank you sim And you don't need to go anywhere

429
00:24:03,330 --> 00:24:06,010
Speaker 1: to hear the first episode, because we are going to

430
00:24:06,010 --> 00:24:07,850
Speaker 1: play it for you after this break.

431
00:24:14,050 --> 00:24:18,130
Speaker 2: It's a winter's day in twenty eighteen. Paul Murphy is

432
00:24:18,170 --> 00:24:20,610
Speaker 2: standing in front of the mirror of the gents lavatory

433
00:24:20,610 --> 00:24:23,210
Speaker 2: at work. He's changing for lunch.

434
00:24:23,930 --> 00:24:26,450
Speaker 3: I kind of stopped wearing ties, but I think I

435
00:24:26,490 --> 00:24:27,850
Speaker 3: put a tie on for that occasion.

436
00:24:28,610 --> 00:24:31,370
Speaker 2: Paul is in his mid fifties. He's got a slightly

437
00:24:31,410 --> 00:24:33,970
Speaker 2: grizzled look about him. You wouldn't pick him out in

438
00:24:34,010 --> 00:24:36,690
Speaker 2: a crowd, but that's an advantage in his line of work.

439
00:24:39,210 --> 00:24:42,330
Speaker 2: In his hands, Paul is holding a small silver disc

440
00:24:42,410 --> 00:24:45,570
Speaker 2: about the size of a penny. He takes his shirt off,

441
00:24:46,090 --> 00:24:49,130
Speaker 2: grabs a piece of medical tape and fixes this disc

442
00:24:49,650 --> 00:24:54,290
Speaker 2: onto his shoulder because this disc is a tiny microphone.

443
00:24:55,490 --> 00:24:58,250
Speaker 2: He slips his white shirt back on, puts a jacket

444
00:24:58,290 --> 00:25:00,930
Speaker 2: on top, and with one last glance in the mirror,

445
00:25:01,530 --> 00:25:05,930
Speaker 2: he's ready for lunch. Paul is the head of investigations

446
00:25:06,170 --> 00:25:10,530
Speaker 2: at the Financial Times in London. He takes a cab

447
00:25:10,690 --> 00:25:15,450
Speaker 2: across Town to Mayfair, to a venue called forty five

448
00:25:15,610 --> 00:25:16,250
Speaker 2: Park Lane.

449
00:25:17,490 --> 00:25:19,730
Speaker 3: It's it's you know, it's one of those places that

450
00:25:19,810 --> 00:25:23,450
Speaker 3: is priced to keep out to ordinary people. You know.

451
00:25:23,530 --> 00:25:28,810
Speaker 3: It's all glass windows and bling and mirrored interiors and

452
00:25:29,050 --> 00:25:34,690
Speaker 3: very few customers, very few. It's Dubai style essentially. As

453
00:25:34,730 --> 00:25:38,290
Speaker 3: Paul walks in, he tries to keep his cool. Despite

454
00:25:38,370 --> 00:25:42,170
Speaker 3: four decades in journalism, this is a first for him.

455
00:25:42,210 --> 00:25:45,370
Speaker 3: He's never actually worn a wire himself. It's very, very

456
00:25:45,410 --> 00:25:47,810
Speaker 3: nerve wrecking. You know, I've got a bug on me.

457
00:25:48,050 --> 00:25:51,410
Speaker 3: You know, I didn't want our undercover team to get discovered.

458
00:25:51,410 --> 00:25:54,370
Speaker 3: That would be hugely embarrassing, so I was, you know,

459
00:25:54,410 --> 00:25:55,050
Speaker 3: it's nervous.

460
00:25:55,970 --> 00:25:58,930
Speaker 2: The Maitre d Escot's Paul across the room, and there,

461
00:25:59,290 --> 00:26:02,610
Speaker 2: rising from his chair, smiling courteously and greeting Paul with

462
00:26:02,650 --> 00:26:07,090
Speaker 2: a handshake, is the man he's come to meet, jan Marcelek.

463
00:26:07,330 --> 00:26:12,210
Speaker 3: Very slim, athletic, razor, sharp blue suit.

464
00:26:13,610 --> 00:26:16,370
Speaker 2: Paul came here to set a trap to get this

465
00:26:16,450 --> 00:26:19,810
Speaker 2: successful businessman on tape, But by the time they finished

466
00:26:19,850 --> 00:26:23,010
Speaker 2: their meal, he wonders if he's the one who has

467
00:26:23,050 --> 00:26:23,970
Speaker 2: walked into a trap.

468
00:26:24,690 --> 00:26:28,050
Speaker 3: If I'm honest, I felt a bit amateurish. You know,

469
00:26:29,050 --> 00:26:32,170
Speaker 3: we were out of our depth. This guy was very

470
00:26:32,290 --> 00:26:41,250
Speaker 3: very slick, controlled, careful, polished, and you know I'm not.

471
00:26:49,850 --> 00:26:52,170
Speaker 2: My name is Sam Jones, and I'm a journalist with

472
00:26:52,210 --> 00:26:56,730
Speaker 2: the Financial Times. I'm a foreign correspondent based in Central Europe.

473
00:26:57,690 --> 00:27:01,690
Speaker 2: This lunch you've just heard about. It's the unexpected beginning

474
00:27:02,090 --> 00:27:04,810
Speaker 2: of an investigation that has, in one way or another,

475
00:27:05,250 --> 00:27:09,330
Speaker 2: preoccupied me for the past five years. But at the

476
00:27:09,410 --> 00:27:12,210
Speaker 2: center of it is the man in the sharp blue suit,

477
00:27:13,210 --> 00:27:18,490
Speaker 2: Yan Marceilek, a man who I discovered is so fascinated

478
00:27:18,530 --> 00:27:23,490
Speaker 2: by risk and deceit that one identity, one life wasn't

479
00:27:23,570 --> 00:27:27,570
Speaker 2: enough for him. I find it's often people like this,

480
00:27:28,290 --> 00:27:33,650
Speaker 2: the most unusual people who reveal universal truths, the fact

481
00:27:33,810 --> 00:27:37,570
Speaker 2: that we're all inventors of our own personal narratives, how

482
00:27:37,690 --> 00:27:43,850
Speaker 2: fictions can be stitched together to create realities. This tale

483
00:27:43,970 --> 00:27:47,810
Speaker 2: begins in London and Munich, but leaps across the globe,

484
00:27:48,170 --> 00:27:52,770
Speaker 2: from Libya to Austria, from Bulgaria to Afghanistan, from the

485
00:27:52,810 --> 00:27:58,610
Speaker 2: Courdazure to Moscow. Yan Marcelex's life is a window into

486
00:27:58,650 --> 00:28:02,970
Speaker 2: a hidden world of geopolitical power games, games which in

487
00:28:03,050 --> 00:28:06,810
Speaker 2: ways big and small govern our lives, games which have

488
00:28:06,890 --> 00:28:11,090
Speaker 2: never felt more relevant or the players of them harder

489
00:28:11,090 --> 00:28:16,850
Speaker 2: to fathom. This is a story about espionage, about Europe,

490
00:28:17,410 --> 00:28:23,650
Speaker 2: about Russia, and ultimately America. From the Financial Times and

491
00:28:23,690 --> 00:28:29,050
Speaker 2: Pushkin Industries. This is Hot Money, Season three, Agent of Chaos,

492
00:28:30,290 --> 00:28:46,370
Speaker 2: Episode one, The Bride. Paul Murphy hired me to work

493
00:28:46,410 --> 00:28:49,930
Speaker 2: for the Ft seventeen years ago. It's been a long

494
00:28:49,970 --> 00:28:53,210
Speaker 2: time since Paul's my actual boss, but he was and

495
00:28:53,250 --> 00:28:56,690
Speaker 2: still is a mentor to me. All of my best

496
00:28:56,690 --> 00:29:00,130
Speaker 2: habits in journalism and some of my worst ones I've

497
00:29:00,130 --> 00:29:03,970
Speaker 2: picked up from Paul pretty much since starting my career.

498
00:29:04,290 --> 00:29:06,450
Speaker 2: Every couple of months or so I end up at

499
00:29:06,490 --> 00:29:11,130
Speaker 2: lunch with him in Sweetings. It's a noisy, crowded fish

500
00:29:11,170 --> 00:29:16,090
Speaker 2: restaurant deep in the city, London's Financial district. It's distinctly

501
00:29:16,130 --> 00:29:19,210
Speaker 2: old school. Even a bowler hat wouldn't look out of place,

502
00:29:20,290 --> 00:29:23,410
Speaker 2: and coming here it underscores less than number one in

503
00:29:23,450 --> 00:29:25,170
Speaker 2: the Paul Murphy school of journalism.

504
00:29:25,810 --> 00:29:27,450
Speaker 3: You have to get out of the bloody office. Get

505
00:29:27,450 --> 00:29:30,890
Speaker 3: out of the bloody office. Young reporters in particular think

506
00:29:30,890 --> 00:29:35,090
Speaker 3: that you can do everything digitally, but actually you get

507
00:29:35,090 --> 00:29:38,970
Speaker 3: a lot more information of somebody. Face to face, you

508
00:29:39,090 --> 00:29:41,770
Speaker 3: have to win people's trust, and one way of doing

509
00:29:41,810 --> 00:29:44,530
Speaker 3: that is have lunch with people. It's a great social

510
00:29:44,610 --> 00:29:50,290
Speaker 3: setting to develop a relationship with somebody.

511
00:29:50,050 --> 00:29:54,210
Speaker 2: Who you need them to trust you. I want to

512
00:29:54,250 --> 00:29:56,170
Speaker 2: paint a bit of a picture for you about Paul,

513
00:29:56,290 --> 00:29:58,690
Speaker 2: because it pays in this story to try and get

514
00:29:58,690 --> 00:30:01,930
Speaker 2: the measure of people's character, or at least to try

515
00:30:01,930 --> 00:30:05,370
Speaker 2: and understand the version of themselves people present to the world,

516
00:30:05,610 --> 00:30:08,850
Speaker 2: and why although Paul spends a lot of time at lunch,

517
00:30:09,130 --> 00:30:12,690
Speaker 2: he's definitely not just another city soak. Most people tend

518
00:30:12,690 --> 00:30:15,610
Speaker 2: to miss the little silver ring he's wearing, a skull

519
00:30:15,770 --> 00:30:19,330
Speaker 2: designed by his daughter. People miss a lot about Paul,

520
00:30:19,450 --> 00:30:22,290
Speaker 2: but that's part of the trick. He's very good at

521
00:30:22,330 --> 00:30:26,250
Speaker 2: being underestimated, and because of that, he's also very good

522
00:30:26,410 --> 00:30:30,410
Speaker 2: at getting people to trust him, to talk to him,

523
00:30:30,490 --> 00:30:35,330
Speaker 2: and to give him information. To understand why I was

524
00:30:35,410 --> 00:30:37,490
Speaker 2: drawn into this story, you need to know a bit

525
00:30:37,570 --> 00:30:40,530
Speaker 2: about the reporting that was dominating Paul's life. Back in

526
00:30:40,570 --> 00:30:44,530
Speaker 2: twenty eighteen, he and his star reporter Dan McCrumb were

527
00:30:44,570 --> 00:30:49,330
Speaker 2: neck deep investigating a German company called Wirecard, a company

528
00:30:49,330 --> 00:30:51,570
Speaker 2: that was run by the man in the razor sharp

529
00:30:51,610 --> 00:30:55,010
Speaker 2: blue suit, the man whom Paul would eventually meet for

530
00:30:55,090 --> 00:31:00,370
Speaker 2: lunch in Mayfair, jan Marcelek Wacard ran the financial plumbing

531
00:31:00,410 --> 00:31:05,010
Speaker 2: behind billions of online transactions. It was so successful at

532
00:31:05,010 --> 00:31:08,170
Speaker 2: that point it was even secretly plotting a takeover of

533
00:31:08,250 --> 00:31:12,730
Speaker 2: Germany's biggest bank. So to the world, Warkard was a

534
00:31:12,770 --> 00:31:16,730
Speaker 2: booming digital payments company. To Paul and his reporter Dan,

535
00:31:17,210 --> 00:31:19,850
Speaker 2: Warkard was a huge fraud, and they were well on

536
00:31:19,890 --> 00:31:23,090
Speaker 2: the way to proving it. But it was no normal

537
00:31:23,130 --> 00:31:30,090
Speaker 2: fraud because for months Paul and Dan they suspected they'd

538
00:31:30,090 --> 00:31:34,650
Speaker 2: been under intense surveillance, all directed by someone at Warkard

539
00:31:35,090 --> 00:31:36,810
Speaker 2: from its base in southern Germany.

540
00:31:37,290 --> 00:31:39,810
Speaker 3: I mean, it's kind of like, almost sounds silly to

541
00:31:39,890 --> 00:31:42,930
Speaker 3: recount it, but you know, we were paranoid about being

542
00:31:43,530 --> 00:31:47,050
Speaker 3: followed around London. We would get on and off tube

543
00:31:47,050 --> 00:31:50,730
Speaker 3: trains quickly, just in case somebody was getting on the

544
00:31:50,730 --> 00:31:54,210
Speaker 3: same tube trainer as us. We would turn off our

545
00:31:54,290 --> 00:31:57,450
Speaker 3: phones so that a location couldn't be tracked.

546
00:31:58,130 --> 00:32:00,650
Speaker 2: Dan had already had his emails hacked and some of

547
00:32:00,650 --> 00:32:03,610
Speaker 2: them leaked online. It was an attempt to embarrass and

548
00:32:03,650 --> 00:32:07,370
Speaker 2: discredit him. There had been a mounting and seemingly coordinated

549
00:32:07,410 --> 00:32:11,010
Speaker 2: attack on his reputation on social media. When Paul told

550
00:32:11,050 --> 00:32:13,810
Speaker 2: me all of this over a series of lunches at Sweetings,

551
00:32:14,290 --> 00:32:16,450
Speaker 2: I guess he was doing so because he wanted to

552
00:32:16,490 --> 00:32:19,490
Speaker 2: know if I had any contact in private intelligence or

553
00:32:19,530 --> 00:32:23,090
Speaker 2: even in the actual intelligence services people who might be

554
00:32:23,130 --> 00:32:26,930
Speaker 2: able to help, because the subject I really write about,

555
00:32:27,370 --> 00:32:29,690
Speaker 2: the subject that has become my specialism at the FT

556
00:32:30,610 --> 00:32:35,290
Speaker 2: is spying. Paul was probably also telling me out of

557
00:32:35,290 --> 00:32:38,730
Speaker 2: frustration because back then he and Dan had hit a

558
00:32:38,770 --> 00:32:41,770
Speaker 2: bit of a wall in their reporting. They'd published all

559
00:32:41,770 --> 00:32:43,970
Speaker 2: they could about Warkard based on the evidence they had

560
00:32:43,970 --> 00:32:47,170
Speaker 2: gathered so far, but they still didn't have a smoking gun,

561
00:32:47,850 --> 00:32:52,090
Speaker 2: and Wakard's aggressive lawyer's shillings had meanwhile come down hard

562
00:32:52,130 --> 00:32:55,330
Speaker 2: on them. Dan had only just avoided a ruinous lawsuit.

563
00:32:55,930 --> 00:32:58,930
Speaker 2: It wasn't a great time. It was this sense that

564
00:33:00,290 --> 00:33:03,810
Speaker 2: what have we got ourselves into? That was like a

565
00:33:03,850 --> 00:33:07,970
Speaker 2: real low moment. Maybe I've got myself into a bit

566
00:33:08,010 --> 00:33:09,090
Speaker 2: too much hot water here.

567
00:33:10,730 --> 00:33:12,730
Speaker 4: You do start to worry what you've sort of brought

568
00:33:12,810 --> 00:33:16,610
Speaker 4: down on your family. It was quite oppressive. There was

569
00:33:16,650 --> 00:33:19,570
Speaker 4: this turning point for Dan. One of his sources rang

570
00:33:19,610 --> 00:33:21,610
Speaker 4: him up to tell him he'd been roughed up on

571
00:33:21,650 --> 00:33:24,810
Speaker 4: the street by two thugs right outside his children's school.

572
00:33:25,450 --> 00:33:27,650
Speaker 4: They demanded to know if this source had passed on

573
00:33:27,810 --> 00:33:32,250
Speaker 4: confidential information about Wirecard. Hearing this sent Dan into a

574
00:33:32,250 --> 00:33:35,170
Speaker 4: bit of a tailspin, because suddenly he was worrying about

575
00:33:35,210 --> 00:33:38,050
Speaker 4: the safety of his own family. My first thing was

576
00:33:38,130 --> 00:33:41,610
Speaker 4: I sort of go home and obsessively change every single

577
00:33:41,610 --> 00:33:45,970
Speaker 4: one of my passwords, start checking all the security on

578
00:33:46,930 --> 00:33:50,730
Speaker 4: my house. I mean, the worst moment is we had

579
00:33:50,770 --> 00:33:54,890
Speaker 4: just moved into this rented house and I suddenly realized

580
00:33:54,930 --> 00:33:57,770
Speaker 4: I haven't checked the lock on this patio door at

581
00:33:57,770 --> 00:34:00,610
Speaker 4: the back of the house, which we'd never used, and

582
00:34:00,650 --> 00:34:03,490
Speaker 4: it just slides straight open, like our house had essentially

583
00:34:03,530 --> 00:34:07,610
Speaker 4: been unlocked for the last couple of months. And at

584
00:34:07,610 --> 00:34:11,490
Speaker 4: that point I really did start freeing out about security

585
00:34:11,810 --> 00:34:15,610
Speaker 4: who might be after us, and I basically became really paranoid.

586
00:34:16,730 --> 00:34:19,050
Speaker 2: It was right at the peak of this paranoia that

587
00:34:19,210 --> 00:34:23,530
Speaker 2: something even stranger happened, something that led to that lunch

588
00:34:23,570 --> 00:34:26,970
Speaker 2: at forty five Park Lane, Paul was talking to one

589
00:34:26,970 --> 00:34:29,370
Speaker 2: of his oldest sources.

590
00:34:28,730 --> 00:34:32,570
Speaker 3: And we got onto the subject of wire Card. Just

591
00:34:32,610 --> 00:34:37,530
Speaker 3: a completely you know, innocent, relaxed conversation, and this guy

592
00:34:37,930 --> 00:34:41,410
Speaker 3: just suddenly said, you know that they'll pay you a

593
00:34:41,450 --> 00:34:44,650
Speaker 3: lot of money to stop writing about them. And I

594
00:34:44,850 --> 00:34:47,890
Speaker 3: kind of laughed, and he stopped me and said, no,

595
00:34:49,570 --> 00:34:53,610
Speaker 3: they will pay you ten million dollars to stop writing

596
00:34:53,690 --> 00:34:55,250
Speaker 3: about them.

597
00:34:55,450 --> 00:34:56,890
Speaker 2: I don't know if you work in the kind of

598
00:34:57,010 --> 00:34:59,090
Speaker 2: job or live the kind of life where you've ever

599
00:34:59,130 --> 00:35:01,930
Speaker 2: been bribed, but even as a journalist for the ft,

600
00:35:02,530 --> 00:35:05,770
Speaker 2: this doesn't really happen, let alone for such a ridiculous

601
00:35:05,850 --> 00:35:08,730
Speaker 2: sum of money. I mean, for ten million dollars, what

602
00:35:08,770 --> 00:35:12,690
Speaker 2: would you do? And as such, it takes Paul a

603
00:35:12,730 --> 00:35:16,290
Speaker 2: while to realize that this is a serious offer. How

604
00:35:16,290 --> 00:35:18,770
Speaker 2: do you know this? He asks? Through my son, his

605
00:35:18,850 --> 00:35:21,410
Speaker 2: source tells him he's got to know someone at Warkard

606
00:35:21,450 --> 00:35:24,570
Speaker 2: pretty well. They've been out together a few times carousing.

607
00:35:25,010 --> 00:35:29,610
Speaker 2: He's called Jan Marceilek, and then Paul's source he says

608
00:35:29,610 --> 00:35:32,010
Speaker 2: something which makes Paul clock that this offer is real.

609
00:35:32,730 --> 00:35:35,810
Speaker 2: Marcilek is paying this guy more than two hundred thousand

610
00:35:35,890 --> 00:35:40,050
Speaker 2: dollars just to convey the message. You should meet him

611
00:35:40,050 --> 00:35:44,650
Speaker 2: for lunch, he suggests. So what does Paul say, Tell

612
00:35:44,690 --> 00:35:48,570
Speaker 2: me when? And tell me where Paul has no intention

613
00:35:48,650 --> 00:35:51,930
Speaker 2: of taking the bribe, but this back channel offer it

614
00:35:52,010 --> 00:35:57,170
Speaker 2: seems to confirm everything they suspect about Warcard. Absolutely confirmed

615
00:35:57,490 --> 00:36:01,290
Speaker 2: all our suspicions, such word that the company is a

616
00:36:01,290 --> 00:36:02,090
Speaker 2: criminal enterprise.

617
00:36:02,210 --> 00:36:04,970
Speaker 3: Absolutely, this was kind of tangible evidence.

618
00:36:06,050 --> 00:36:08,010
Speaker 2: All they need now is for mar Select to offer

619
00:36:08,050 --> 00:36:11,890
Speaker 2: the bribe himself and to get that on tape. It's

620
00:36:11,930 --> 00:36:14,650
Speaker 2: time for the FT to mount its own surveillance operation.

621
00:36:17,610 --> 00:36:20,250
Speaker 2: So that day at forty five Park Lane, the formal

622
00:36:20,250 --> 00:36:26,090
Speaker 2: introduction's over, it's time to order stakes, the overpriced speciality

623
00:36:26,130 --> 00:36:29,290
Speaker 2: of this place around one hundred and seventy pounds for

624
00:36:29,370 --> 00:36:32,650
Speaker 2: a six ounce filet mignon. Right from the start, though,

625
00:36:33,170 --> 00:36:35,970
Speaker 2: Paul begins to feel that Marcelek isn't quite what he

626
00:36:36,090 --> 00:36:40,050
Speaker 2: was expecting. Paul is on edge, but he's not alone.

627
00:36:40,850 --> 00:36:43,290
Speaker 2: To his relief, it's not long before he spots his

628
00:36:43,370 --> 00:36:48,490
Speaker 2: undercover support team, three FT colleagues who pose as wealthy ladies,

629
00:36:48,810 --> 00:36:52,370
Speaker 2: catching up over lunch. They snag a table just next

630
00:36:52,370 --> 00:36:56,610
Speaker 2: to him, and they look pretty convincing. One of the

631
00:36:56,650 --> 00:36:59,210
Speaker 2: reporters places her handbag on the back of a chair.

632
00:37:00,170 --> 00:37:03,490
Speaker 2: Hidden inside, a camera films the lunch at an angle

633
00:37:04,050 --> 00:37:10,010
Speaker 2: catching Yan Marcelek. In profile, you can hear the tenor

634
00:37:10,050 --> 00:37:13,370
Speaker 2: of his voice, but the background noise means it's impossible

635
00:37:13,410 --> 00:37:19,250
Speaker 2: to make out his words. To me. Watching this footage back,

636
00:37:19,610 --> 00:37:23,010
Speaker 2: it's striking how animated he is. He turns from side

637
00:37:23,010 --> 00:37:25,610
Speaker 2: to side, addressing everyone at the table. As he talks.

638
00:37:26,050 --> 00:37:30,410
Speaker 2: His face lights up. He's sort of holding court, emphasizing

639
00:37:30,450 --> 00:37:34,010
Speaker 2: his words with expansive hand gestures. He almost looks like

640
00:37:34,050 --> 00:37:37,890
Speaker 2: a politician. The longer the conversation goes on like this,

641
00:37:38,410 --> 00:37:41,370
Speaker 2: the more clear it becomes to Paul that Marcelek is

642
00:37:41,410 --> 00:37:47,810
Speaker 2: the one in control. This guy is expansive and engaging, charming,

643
00:37:48,290 --> 00:37:51,970
Speaker 2: but not at all defensive. There's no trace of anger

644
00:37:52,410 --> 00:37:57,250
Speaker 2: or guilt or care. He gently protests about the FT's

645
00:37:57,330 --> 00:38:00,850
Speaker 2: unfair coverage of Wakade, as if it's been an inconvenience,

646
00:38:01,450 --> 00:38:04,450
Speaker 2: but his whole tone seems to be saying, let's put

647
00:38:04,490 --> 00:38:08,410
Speaker 2: this behind us. As they settle into the meal, Paul

648
00:38:08,530 --> 00:38:13,050
Speaker 2: nudges the conversation into more dubious terrain. You get to

649
00:38:13,050 --> 00:38:15,770
Speaker 2: get something incriminating, even if it's just a hint of

650
00:38:15,810 --> 00:38:18,090
Speaker 2: something on tape and on camera.

651
00:38:19,650 --> 00:38:22,810
Speaker 3: I certainly talked about the kind of the aggression that

652
00:38:22,850 --> 00:38:25,930
Speaker 3: the business had shown us. And we also talked about

653
00:38:26,330 --> 00:38:31,530
Speaker 3: where the journalists were corrupt, and he absolutely assured me

654
00:38:31,610 --> 00:38:36,730
Speaker 3: that he knew that journalists could be bought. I remember saying,

655
00:38:36,970 --> 00:38:40,330
Speaker 3: we don't take bribes. And I remember him very specifically saying,

656
00:38:40,810 --> 00:38:41,130
Speaker 3: I know.

657
00:38:41,170 --> 00:38:41,650
Speaker 2: That, Paul.

658
00:38:41,850 --> 00:38:44,250
Speaker 3: I know you don't have seen evidence that you don't

659
00:38:44,530 --> 00:38:49,690
Speaker 3: take bribes. And I thought, Hugh, you've seen my bank account.

660
00:38:50,450 --> 00:38:54,450
Speaker 3: I remember the kind of jolting that he was kind

661
00:38:54,450 --> 00:38:56,490
Speaker 3: of like stating this so openly.

662
00:38:57,450 --> 00:39:01,690
Speaker 2: But the conversation continues in this vein nothing concrete. The

663
00:39:01,770 --> 00:39:05,170
Speaker 2: killer offer of a bribe Paul had been hoping for, Well,

664
00:39:05,370 --> 00:39:08,010
Speaker 2: it's clear that marthill K is far too savvy an

665
00:39:08,010 --> 00:39:11,730
Speaker 2: operator to make it. Here and now at their first meeting.

666
00:39:12,330 --> 00:39:15,730
Speaker 3: Pretty quickly, you know, came to the conclusion that I

667
00:39:15,890 --> 00:39:18,530
Speaker 3: wasn't going to be offered a bribe in front of

668
00:39:18,570 --> 00:39:19,170
Speaker 3: these people.

669
00:39:19,330 --> 00:39:21,530
Speaker 2: A bit of a damp squip in a way, yes,

670
00:39:21,810 --> 00:39:26,170
Speaker 2: it was. So Paul is now left wondering, what does

671
00:39:26,290 --> 00:39:29,490
Speaker 2: Marcelek want from him? Why has this meeting happened if

672
00:39:29,530 --> 00:39:31,730
Speaker 2: he's not actually going to make him some kind of offer.

673
00:39:32,650 --> 00:39:35,970
Speaker 2: The lunch lasted about ninety minutes, and at the end,

674
00:39:36,410 --> 00:39:38,850
Speaker 2: Marcelek insisted on paying and.

675
00:39:38,770 --> 00:39:43,210
Speaker 3: Pulled out a gold credit card, a novelty credit card

676
00:39:43,450 --> 00:39:45,210
Speaker 3: of solid gold.

677
00:39:45,370 --> 00:39:46,490
Speaker 2: Was he a bit of a show off?

678
00:39:48,050 --> 00:39:50,410
Speaker 3: Well? Yes, you know, we're in one of the most

679
00:39:50,530 --> 00:39:54,410
Speaker 3: expensive restaurants in London eating kind of two hundred quid

680
00:39:54,450 --> 00:39:57,650
Speaker 3: steak and he was paying for the bill with a

681
00:39:58,930 --> 00:40:02,370
Speaker 3: gold credit card. So yeah.

682
00:40:02,810 --> 00:40:05,570
Speaker 2: As Paul leaves the restaurant, he almost laughs at himself,

683
00:40:05,690 --> 00:40:09,130
Speaker 2: having thought he'd be heading back with something explosive. He

684
00:40:09,130 --> 00:40:13,090
Speaker 2: also realizes that this experience actually hasn't been a busted flush.

685
00:40:13,410 --> 00:40:17,410
Speaker 2: Far from it. Meeting Yan mars Lek has only intrigued

686
00:40:17,450 --> 00:40:21,330
Speaker 2: Paul Moore. It's put him into three D. There's something

687
00:40:21,330 --> 00:40:23,970
Speaker 2: about mass Lec he can't quite put his finger on.

688
00:40:24,690 --> 00:40:30,050
Speaker 3: I felt, admit, somebody who was very controlled and confident,

689
00:40:30,250 --> 00:40:34,530
Speaker 3: who was almost certainly corrupt. I basically said, can we

690
00:40:34,570 --> 00:40:35,170
Speaker 3: do that again?

691
00:40:37,690 --> 00:40:42,250
Speaker 2: And indeed Paul does meet with him again. That's coming

692
00:40:42,330 --> 00:40:56,050
Speaker 2: up after the break. When Paul first started telling me

693
00:40:56,090 --> 00:40:59,450
Speaker 2: about Wacard, I think I treated it all as entertaining

694
00:40:59,530 --> 00:41:02,970
Speaker 2: table talk. Paul is a great teller of stories and

695
00:41:03,050 --> 00:41:06,130
Speaker 2: I always enjoyed hearing the gossip about what his investigations

696
00:41:06,170 --> 00:41:09,930
Speaker 2: team was up to. After he told me about meeting Martlek, though,

697
00:41:10,530 --> 00:41:13,850
Speaker 2: something began to needle at me, just a feeling about

698
00:41:13,850 --> 00:41:17,130
Speaker 2: what kind of person Marslek was, A feeling I couldn't

699
00:41:17,130 --> 00:41:22,370
Speaker 2: pin down until I heard about the second lunch. One

700
00:41:22,410 --> 00:41:25,850
Speaker 2: month after that lunch at Park Lane, Paul met Marcelek again,

701
00:41:26,330 --> 00:41:30,650
Speaker 2: this time without undercover colleagues or secret cameras. It was

702
00:41:30,770 --> 00:41:33,930
Speaker 2: just the two of them. They met at the Lanesborough,

703
00:41:34,290 --> 00:41:36,170
Speaker 2: another high end hotel in London.

704
00:41:36,930 --> 00:41:42,410
Speaker 3: We talked about geopolitics, We talked about technology, we talked

705
00:41:42,450 --> 00:41:45,130
Speaker 3: about finance, you know, we talked about the state of

706
00:41:45,170 --> 00:41:50,130
Speaker 3: the world. He had interesting opinions and information on all

707
00:41:50,170 --> 00:41:55,850
Speaker 3: these things. If I'm honest, at this stage, I I'd

708
00:41:55,850 --> 00:41:58,450
Speaker 3: become fascinated by this character because he seemed to know

709
00:41:58,570 --> 00:42:02,330
Speaker 3: so many people, and I kind of I was thinking, well,

710
00:42:02,450 --> 00:42:05,690
Speaker 3: you know, he's probably not going to offer me a bribe.

711
00:42:06,010 --> 00:42:10,050
Speaker 3: We're not going to just catch him. He's not that stupid.

712
00:42:11,090 --> 00:42:13,810
Speaker 3: This guy is smart and he knows people and he

713
00:42:13,850 --> 00:42:14,570
Speaker 3: has information.

714
00:42:15,530 --> 00:42:17,970
Speaker 2: At this point, did it occur to you that he'd

715
00:42:18,050 --> 00:42:19,250
Speaker 2: charmed you in any way?

716
00:42:20,210 --> 00:42:24,050
Speaker 3: Yes, it did, But he was a charming man.

717
00:42:24,530 --> 00:42:25,370
Speaker 2: Did you like him?

718
00:42:26,490 --> 00:42:29,210
Speaker 3: Yeah, yes, I liked him.

719
00:42:29,290 --> 00:42:31,370
Speaker 2: If Wire Card, if you hadn't have known it to

720
00:42:31,410 --> 00:42:33,970
Speaker 2: be a fraud, do you think you would have sought

721
00:42:34,050 --> 00:42:34,970
Speaker 2: to stay in touch with him?

722
00:42:35,170 --> 00:42:38,730
Speaker 3: I absolutely absolutely. I mean, in actual fact, you know

723
00:42:38,850 --> 00:42:43,930
Speaker 3: my thinking after that second lunch I did. I actually thought,

724
00:42:43,970 --> 00:42:47,330
Speaker 3: I'm going to, you know, develop this guy as a source.

725
00:42:47,650 --> 00:42:52,050
Speaker 2: What did you think he was hoping to get out

726
00:42:52,130 --> 00:42:53,490
Speaker 2: of a relationship with you?

727
00:42:54,570 --> 00:42:57,930
Speaker 3: Actually, it was very clear we posed an existential risk

728
00:42:58,330 --> 00:43:03,570
Speaker 3: to wire Card. He knew that by you know, building

729
00:43:03,570 --> 00:43:09,890
Speaker 3: a relationship directly with me, that he could potentially stop

730
00:43:11,290 --> 00:43:14,730
Speaker 3: as writing about them, or at least did get the

731
00:43:14,810 --> 00:43:18,410
Speaker 3: kind of intel in advance about what we were thinking.

732
00:43:21,410 --> 00:43:23,850
Speaker 2: So, as Paul tells me about all of this, the

733
00:43:23,930 --> 00:43:27,410
Speaker 2: feeling I get most is that a game is afoot,

734
00:43:28,650 --> 00:43:33,730
Speaker 2: and both Paul and Marcelek are enjoying playing it. They've

735
00:43:33,730 --> 00:43:37,810
Speaker 2: both established rapport, they're both working to build trust, but

736
00:43:37,850 --> 00:43:42,690
Speaker 2: they also test each other, push try to implicate each

737
00:43:42,690 --> 00:43:45,890
Speaker 2: other in this polite conversation. And all of this grips

738
00:43:45,930 --> 00:43:47,450
Speaker 2: me because in it I see so much of the

739
00:43:47,530 --> 00:43:51,410
Speaker 2: kind of psychology that I've spotted, glimpses of covering intelligence

740
00:43:51,410 --> 00:43:55,570
Speaker 2: and espionage. I recognize the shape of this kind of interaction,

741
00:43:56,610 --> 00:44:00,210
Speaker 2: a certain amused, matter of fact detachment from things despite

742
00:44:00,250 --> 00:44:04,450
Speaker 2: the stakes. Think about it. Marcelek is launching happily with

743
00:44:04,490 --> 00:44:07,010
Speaker 2: a man who is trying to destroy the company he

744
00:44:07,050 --> 00:44:10,810
Speaker 2: works for and put him in jail. And Paul, well,

745
00:44:10,850 --> 00:44:13,330
Speaker 2: in a funny way, Paul is being encouraged into a

746
00:44:13,370 --> 00:44:16,850
Speaker 2: minor transgression, something that almost felt to me like a

747
00:44:16,890 --> 00:44:21,210
Speaker 2: textbook trick from an intelligence recruitment manual, an indiscretion that

748
00:44:21,290 --> 00:44:26,210
Speaker 2: might later make you vulnerable. Because Paul does all of

749
00:44:26,250 --> 00:44:30,490
Speaker 2: this works marcilect behind the back of the lead reporter

750
00:44:30,610 --> 00:44:36,170
Speaker 2: on the Wirecard Project, Dan McCrum. Why were you dealing

751
00:44:36,170 --> 00:44:37,690
Speaker 2: with Marcilec and not Dan.

752
00:44:37,930 --> 00:44:40,050
Speaker 3: Dan and I are different characters. Dan is a guy.

753
00:44:40,250 --> 00:44:42,810
Speaker 3: You know, he's tall, and he has all his features

754
00:44:42,810 --> 00:44:45,090
Speaker 3: in the right place, and if your daughter brought him

755
00:44:45,090 --> 00:44:48,450
Speaker 3: home as a boyfriend, he'd be really happy. He's a

756
00:44:48,490 --> 00:44:52,970
Speaker 3: good guy. He's intelligence, he's articulate, he's well educated. But

757
00:44:53,130 --> 00:44:58,810
Speaker 3: actually actually, but actually, Dan is lethal. Dan's like kind

758
00:44:58,810 --> 00:45:01,050
Speaker 3: of smiling axe man. He's dangerous.

759
00:45:01,090 --> 00:45:01,730
Speaker 2: He's friends.

760
00:45:02,010 --> 00:45:05,130
Speaker 3: Yes, he's absolute forensic and he won't let it lie.

761
00:45:05,810 --> 00:45:08,530
Speaker 3: And you know, I have a different style, all right.

762
00:45:08,610 --> 00:45:11,530
Speaker 3: I'm much after and you know, chat people up, and

763
00:45:11,770 --> 00:45:14,810
Speaker 3: you know, I present myself as being very kind of clubbable.

764
00:45:15,570 --> 00:45:17,690
Speaker 3: Do you know all journalists have different styles.

765
00:45:17,770 --> 00:45:21,130
Speaker 2: I mean, I think you're probably more comfortable playing a

766
00:45:21,210 --> 00:45:27,890
Speaker 2: role as well. No, possibly, yes, reading between the lines,

767
00:45:28,130 --> 00:45:30,130
Speaker 2: I think probably. A doubting part of him was also

768
00:45:30,210 --> 00:45:32,810
Speaker 2: wondering whether the Waquard investigation was at a dead end.

769
00:45:33,690 --> 00:45:36,810
Speaker 2: The threat of a lawsuit from Shillings meant their reporting

770
00:45:36,850 --> 00:45:39,410
Speaker 2: had stalled, and if that was the case, it might

771
00:45:39,450 --> 00:45:41,850
Speaker 2: be worth Paul pursuing Marcelek as a source of his own,

772
00:45:42,450 --> 00:45:47,130
Speaker 2: someone who could help him with other stories. Then, around

773
00:45:47,170 --> 00:45:50,210
Speaker 2: six months after that second meeting, Paul gets a call

774
00:45:50,250 --> 00:45:54,570
Speaker 2: from an intermediary. Marcelect conveys that he has something very

775
00:45:54,570 --> 00:45:59,490
Speaker 2: interesting to offer documents. He hints at what they're about,

776
00:46:00,050 --> 00:46:04,290
Speaker 2: and it sounds outlandish, but it's enough of a hint

777
00:46:04,530 --> 00:46:07,930
Speaker 2: that Paul agrees to Marcelect's suggestion that he fly out

778
00:46:07,930 --> 00:46:11,530
Speaker 2: to Munich, where my select lives, in order to get them.

779
00:46:11,930 --> 00:46:15,090
Speaker 3: I kept it completely private. Only just the managing editor

780
00:46:15,210 --> 00:46:17,250
Speaker 3: that THEFT knew what I was doing.

781
00:46:18,570 --> 00:46:22,290
Speaker 2: They meet at the Kiefer Schenka it's a Munich institution,

782
00:46:22,690 --> 00:46:27,490
Speaker 2: patrician reassuringly expensive white tablecloths, paneled rooms, but warm and

783
00:46:27,530 --> 00:46:31,330
Speaker 2: efficient service, and it's practically marce Lek's house. Restaurant.

784
00:46:32,050 --> 00:46:35,170
Speaker 3: Yan was waiting for me outside. We went in. We

785
00:46:35,250 --> 00:46:39,450
Speaker 3: had a little private room. I remember having salmon with Caviat.

786
00:46:39,970 --> 00:46:42,970
Speaker 2: And as they talked, marce Lek pushed a brown folder

787
00:46:43,010 --> 00:46:45,490
Speaker 2: full of papers across the table towards Paul.

788
00:46:46,490 --> 00:46:49,930
Speaker 3: Because it's in the restaurants, I couldn't pull them out

789
00:46:49,970 --> 00:46:52,170
Speaker 3: and start reading through them. I just had to kind

790
00:46:52,170 --> 00:46:53,850
Speaker 3: of politely say, thank you very much, I'll have a

791
00:46:53,850 --> 00:46:56,050
Speaker 3: read of those. And then we just had a kind

792
00:46:56,090 --> 00:47:01,250
Speaker 3: of stilted, awkward lunch conversation. We talked about his bad back.

793
00:47:02,050 --> 00:47:03,770
Speaker 3: If I'm honest, I was trying to get out of

794
00:47:03,810 --> 00:47:05,850
Speaker 3: the lunch as quickly as possible because I wanted to

795
00:47:05,890 --> 00:47:06,970
Speaker 3: see what was in the folder.

796
00:47:08,050 --> 00:47:10,690
Speaker 2: They finished lunch, marcele X said he had to go

797
00:47:10,770 --> 00:47:11,690
Speaker 2: back to the office.

798
00:47:12,250 --> 00:47:16,450
Speaker 3: The restaurant has lots of kind of separate bars and rooms,

799
00:47:17,050 --> 00:47:19,730
Speaker 3: and so I literally went down some stairs and found

800
00:47:19,730 --> 00:47:24,370
Speaker 3: myself a little corner and sat down and opened the folder.

801
00:47:27,210 --> 00:47:30,570
Speaker 2: These documents they related to something that happened in the

802
00:47:30,650 --> 00:47:35,930
Speaker 2: UK that spring, something awful which had shocked the whole country.

803
00:47:36,890 --> 00:47:41,690
Speaker 4: Yesterday afternoon, passers by noticed two people apparently unconscious on

804
00:47:41,730 --> 00:47:45,610
Speaker 4: a bench in Salisbury, the area of the Salisbury poisonings.

805
00:47:45,770 --> 00:47:48,330
Speaker 4: As a police presence remains here in the city whilst

806
00:47:48,370 --> 00:47:51,650
Speaker 4: they investigate. Residents and visitors to the city have been

807
00:47:51,690 --> 00:47:52,850
Speaker 4: reacting to the news.

808
00:47:53,930 --> 00:47:58,530
Speaker 5: Yeah, just completely surprised and shocked that something can happen

809
00:47:58,690 --> 00:47:59,850
Speaker 5: like this in Salisbury.

810
00:48:00,810 --> 00:48:04,690
Speaker 2: An assassination attempt against a former spy using one of

811
00:48:04,730 --> 00:48:08,650
Speaker 2: the deadliest nerve agents ever created a chemical that only

812
00:48:08,730 --> 00:48:12,730
Speaker 2: a hand full of government specialists knew about, Novichok two

813
00:48:12,770 --> 00:48:16,810
Speaker 2: thirty four. The spy was found half dead alongside his

814
00:48:16,930 --> 00:48:20,810
Speaker 2: unconscious daughter, but thanks to some remarkable medical work, they

815
00:48:20,810 --> 00:48:25,730
Speaker 2: both survived. Another local resident, a mother of three, did not.

816
00:48:26,970 --> 00:48:30,610
Speaker 2: She died after coming into contact with the novichok. It

817
00:48:30,650 --> 00:48:33,290
Speaker 2: had been hidden by the assassins in a perfume bottle.

818
00:48:34,250 --> 00:48:37,690
Speaker 2: The intended target was soon identified as a Russian intelligence

819
00:48:37,730 --> 00:48:42,090
Speaker 2: officer who had fled to Britain. In twenty ten, Prime

820
00:48:42,090 --> 00:48:46,250
Speaker 2: Minister Theresa May announced to a shocked parliament that Moscow

821
00:48:46,570 --> 00:48:47,130
Speaker 2: was to blame.

822
00:48:48,450 --> 00:48:52,290
Speaker 5: The government has concluded that the two individuals named by

823
00:48:52,330 --> 00:48:56,930
Speaker 5: the police and CPS are officers from the Russian Military

824
00:48:57,010 --> 00:49:01,650
Speaker 5: Intelligence Service, also known as the GRU.

825
00:49:03,050 --> 00:49:09,010
Speaker 2: The GRU the main directorate Russia's fearsome military intelligence agency,

826
00:49:09,530 --> 00:49:12,570
Speaker 2: an organization with goals that should have consigned it to

827
00:49:12,650 --> 00:49:20,010
Speaker 2: Cold War history misinformation, civil disorder, violence, assassinations. Under Vladimir

828
00:49:20,010 --> 00:49:23,930
Speaker 2: Putin's long watch, the GIU has quietly grown in power

829
00:49:24,050 --> 00:49:28,370
Speaker 2: and influence. In the weeks that followed the poisoning, Russia

830
00:49:28,490 --> 00:49:32,610
Speaker 2: aggressively denied its involvement. The Organization for the Prohibition of

831
00:49:32,650 --> 00:49:37,970
Speaker 2: Chemical Weapons meanwhile launched its own investigation, sending its experts

832
00:49:38,010 --> 00:49:42,530
Speaker 2: to Salisbury to pour over the evidence. They produced a

833
00:49:42,610 --> 00:49:47,370
Speaker 2: highly classified dossier based on shared intelligence and chemical analysis

834
00:49:47,410 --> 00:49:51,730
Speaker 2: from the site. The dossier also included Russia's own version

835
00:49:51,730 --> 00:49:55,770
Speaker 2: of events. These were the documents Paul now had in

836
00:49:55,850 --> 00:49:56,490
Speaker 2: his hands.

837
00:49:57,290 --> 00:50:01,090
Speaker 3: It was fascinating to read all this kind of close detail,

838
00:50:01,450 --> 00:50:05,610
Speaker 3: you know, the Russian version of the story. And then

839
00:50:05,690 --> 00:50:09,690
Speaker 3: the other very interesting part of the documents was the

840
00:50:09,770 --> 00:50:11,770
Speaker 3: actual formula for Novi.

841
00:50:11,730 --> 00:50:17,690
Speaker 2: Chok, the chemical diagram for the poison, a technical outline

842
00:50:17,730 --> 00:50:19,730
Speaker 2: for something that had been kept hidden from the world

843
00:50:19,810 --> 00:50:38,610
Speaker 2: for decades. A weapon of mass destruction. So what have

844
00:50:38,690 --> 00:50:41,770
Speaker 2: we got Part one, two, three for five sort of

845
00:50:41,850 --> 00:50:45,970
Speaker 2: staple chiefs of paper. Those documents that Marcelett handed over

846
00:50:46,010 --> 00:50:48,610
Speaker 2: that day at the Kiefashenka. Paul showed them to me

847
00:50:49,410 --> 00:50:53,210
Speaker 2: and well, they're internal documents from the Organization for the

848
00:50:53,250 --> 00:50:55,930
Speaker 2: Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. And these have been sort of

849
00:50:55,930 --> 00:50:58,810
Speaker 2: illegally photocopied, right also, I think their photocopies anyway.

850
00:50:59,330 --> 00:51:03,410
Speaker 3: Yeah, they're all photocopies, except that one is a PowerPoint presentation.

851
00:51:04,410 --> 00:51:06,690
Speaker 3: They've all got barcodes on them.

852
00:51:06,810 --> 00:51:09,090
Speaker 2: And this sort of big stamped watermark which.

853
00:51:09,810 --> 00:51:16,010
Speaker 3: This print out may contain OPCW confidential information warning. Yeah,

854
00:51:16,130 --> 00:51:18,450
Speaker 3: they're all different copy numbers though as well, aren't they.

855
00:51:18,810 --> 00:51:23,570
Speaker 3: That's one of serious deine. This one's twenty one.

856
00:51:23,610 --> 00:51:26,370
Speaker 2: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is an

857
00:51:26,410 --> 00:51:30,090
Speaker 2: international body based in the Hague. Almost all of the

858
00:51:30,090 --> 00:51:34,210
Speaker 2: world's big military powers are signatories. Its job is to

859
00:51:34,250 --> 00:51:37,530
Speaker 2: police and monitor weapons like nove chok, to ensure they

860
00:51:37,530 --> 00:51:41,370
Speaker 2: are never ever used. What was going through your head

861
00:51:41,370 --> 00:51:43,410
Speaker 2: when you kind of first pulled this out of the

862
00:51:43,650 --> 00:51:45,730
Speaker 2: manila envelope that they were all in.

863
00:51:47,010 --> 00:51:49,090
Speaker 3: Well, I was looking for a story you know, the

864
00:51:49,210 --> 00:51:55,490
Speaker 3: Salisbury poisoning had been headline news for weeks on end.

865
00:51:56,010 --> 00:51:59,450
Speaker 3: Suddenly I had, you know, what clearly were kind of

866
00:51:59,450 --> 00:52:05,570
Speaker 3: classified documents pertaining specifically to that event. There had to

867
00:52:05,610 --> 00:52:07,610
Speaker 3: be a story in it, you know, That's what I

868
00:52:07,690 --> 00:52:13,170
Speaker 3: was after, And I was struck at how detailed and

869
00:52:13,290 --> 00:52:21,850
Speaker 3: careful and yet completely fanciful the Russian version of events was.

870
00:52:23,570 --> 00:52:26,090
Speaker 2: In the documents. The Russians made the case that the

871
00:52:26,130 --> 00:52:30,090
Speaker 2: British had manufactured novichok because Solibury is just down the

872
00:52:30,130 --> 00:52:33,890
Speaker 2: road from Port and down a highly secure military research base,

873
00:52:34,490 --> 00:52:37,770
Speaker 2: and the Russians, they argued that the British government had

874
00:52:37,810 --> 00:52:41,410
Speaker 2: somehow leaked the navichoc from its own chemical research lab.

875
00:52:41,970 --> 00:52:44,250
Speaker 3: You know, I asked him, you know, point blank, where

876
00:52:44,250 --> 00:52:45,290
Speaker 3: did he get this information?

877
00:52:45,530 --> 00:52:46,210
Speaker 2: What did he say?

878
00:52:46,290 --> 00:52:49,290
Speaker 3: He said he got it from a friend. And he

879
00:52:49,370 --> 00:52:53,410
Speaker 3: did actually say that, you know, if I wanted further information,

880
00:52:54,530 --> 00:52:56,690
Speaker 3: I should try him in future, that I'd be quite

881
00:52:56,730 --> 00:53:00,370
Speaker 3: surprised at the sort of information he could access.

882
00:53:00,970 --> 00:53:03,610
Speaker 2: So this was sort of like a little bit of

883
00:53:03,650 --> 00:53:06,650
Speaker 2: an opening, kind of showing his wares, you know that

884
00:53:06,810 --> 00:53:08,970
Speaker 2: if you wanted to keep him on side, and he

885
00:53:09,170 --> 00:53:11,810
Speaker 2: could push other material your way.

886
00:53:11,890 --> 00:53:15,210
Speaker 3: Yeah, absolutely that He was basically saying, look, I have

887
00:53:15,610 --> 00:53:19,610
Speaker 3: friends in interesting places. I can help you in the future.

888
00:53:20,290 --> 00:53:23,250
Speaker 3: We were building a relationship on both sides.

889
00:53:27,090 --> 00:53:30,730
Speaker 2: While all of this unfolded. Dan McCrumb, the lead reporter

890
00:53:30,810 --> 00:53:34,610
Speaker 2: on the Warcard investigation, hadn't been sitting still. In fact,

891
00:53:35,090 --> 00:53:38,370
Speaker 2: he'd just found his very own treasure trove of documents,

892
00:53:38,850 --> 00:53:42,890
Speaker 2: and these documents they would change everything because they finally

893
00:53:42,890 --> 00:53:46,250
Speaker 2: gave Dan the ammunition he needed to prove that Wirecard

894
00:53:46,370 --> 00:53:49,290
Speaker 2: was a fraud and that Marcelek was at the center

895
00:53:49,330 --> 00:53:52,850
Speaker 2: of it. So when Paul got back to London and

896
00:53:52,930 --> 00:53:55,410
Speaker 2: Dan told him all of this, Paul knew it was

897
00:53:55,450 --> 00:53:58,290
Speaker 2: time to go back on the offensive against Wacard directly,

898
00:53:59,050 --> 00:54:01,690
Speaker 2: and also therefore that it was time to fess up

899
00:54:01,730 --> 00:54:05,490
Speaker 2: to Dan and to tell him he'd been secretly lunching

900
00:54:05,610 --> 00:54:09,970
Speaker 2: with Marcelek over the past few months. All you know,

901
00:54:10,210 --> 00:54:12,850
Speaker 2: he'd gone to meet Marcelect for lunch and he was

902
00:54:12,930 --> 00:54:17,570
Speaker 2: kind of cultivating this parallel kind of you know, relationship

903
00:54:17,570 --> 00:54:20,410
Speaker 2: with Marcelek. When did you find out about that and

904
00:54:20,450 --> 00:54:21,650
Speaker 2: what was your first thought?

905
00:54:22,330 --> 00:54:28,570
Speaker 4: Oh man, there are moments in life when you were

906
00:54:28,610 --> 00:54:34,330
Speaker 4: taken by surprise. I basically think he hadn't wanted to

907
00:54:34,490 --> 00:54:37,610
Speaker 4: like blow my mind whilst I was focused on getting

908
00:54:37,650 --> 00:54:39,610
Speaker 4: the story, because the important thing was to get the

909
00:54:39,690 --> 00:54:42,410
Speaker 4: story out. But it had reached the point where it

910
00:54:42,450 --> 00:54:45,170
Speaker 4: was sort of becoming embarrassing that he hadn't mentioned that

911
00:54:45,370 --> 00:54:50,650
Speaker 4: he had quietly been dining with Yan Marslek. I'm like, sorry, what,

912
00:54:51,770 --> 00:54:55,810
Speaker 4: But then he goes he's been flashing around top secret

913
00:54:55,890 --> 00:55:01,370
Speaker 4: documents with a recipe for Navichok on them. I think

914
00:55:01,370 --> 00:55:03,290
Speaker 4: my reaction was if he had just tried to tell

915
00:55:03,330 --> 00:55:09,730
Speaker 4: me that Marcelek had faked the moon landings. It was

916
00:55:10,210 --> 00:55:16,970
Speaker 4: so completely out of left field that you're like, sorry,

917
00:55:17,290 --> 00:55:18,930
Speaker 4: what did you just say?

918
00:55:24,290 --> 00:55:27,730
Speaker 2: To be clear, we had no evidence that Marcelect actually

919
00:55:27,730 --> 00:55:31,650
Speaker 2: had anything to do with carrying out the poisonings, but

920
00:55:31,730 --> 00:55:34,570
Speaker 2: the fact that he even had these documents was a bombshell,

921
00:55:35,690 --> 00:55:38,290
Speaker 2: not only because the documents made it clear that Marcelek

922
00:55:38,410 --> 00:55:41,850
Speaker 2: was entangled with something besides just a huge corporate fraud,

923
00:55:42,570 --> 00:55:46,130
Speaker 2: but also because Marcelect had effectively chosen to disclose this.

924
00:55:47,090 --> 00:55:50,650
Speaker 2: Marcelek pulled the spotlight onto himself, and it made us

925
00:55:50,690 --> 00:55:55,050
Speaker 2: realize how little we knew about him at all at

926
00:55:55,050 --> 00:55:55,490
Speaker 2: that point.

927
00:55:55,570 --> 00:55:58,010
Speaker 3: We just kind of had this sense that marcell it

928
00:55:58,290 --> 00:56:03,210
Speaker 3: was this kind of man of action and was mixed

929
00:56:03,290 --> 00:56:05,650
Speaker 3: up somehow in Viennese politics.

930
00:56:06,850 --> 00:56:11,370
Speaker 2: Wikard's aggressive surveillance of Paul and Dan intensified, and they

931
00:56:11,410 --> 00:56:14,330
Speaker 2: managed to trace it back to a private security company

932
00:56:14,370 --> 00:56:18,290
Speaker 2: in Vienna, the capital of Austria and Marcelec's home city.

933
00:56:19,450 --> 00:56:21,050
Speaker 2: Paul and Dan were now going to spend the next

934
00:56:21,050 --> 00:56:23,810
Speaker 2: few months battling to prove the fraud with the new

935
00:56:23,850 --> 00:56:27,770
Speaker 2: documents Dan had received for me, I was about to

936
00:56:27,810 --> 00:56:32,810
Speaker 2: start a foreign posting in Switzerland and in Austria. If

937
00:56:32,850 --> 00:56:34,850
Speaker 2: I was going to be on the ground, Paul thought,

938
00:56:35,410 --> 00:56:38,090
Speaker 2: then I could surely make some inquiries.

939
00:56:39,130 --> 00:56:43,650
Speaker 3: We already knew that there was a big Vienna angle

940
00:56:43,730 --> 00:56:45,970
Speaker 3: to all this. We just didn't know what the angle was.

941
00:56:46,690 --> 00:56:49,210
Speaker 3: We just didn't know which doors you had to not gone.

942
00:56:49,330 --> 00:56:52,010
Speaker 3: We didn't know who you needed to get to.

943
00:56:52,450 --> 00:56:56,010
Speaker 2: Yeah, well it worked. I remember thinking you were mad.

944
00:56:56,330 --> 00:56:58,330
Speaker 2: I just thought, okay, all right, I'm just going to

945
00:56:58,690 --> 00:57:02,370
Speaker 2: go to Austria and start talking to people about Mars

946
00:57:02,370 --> 00:57:07,530
Speaker 2: slect But you know, you were right. Sometimes it's the smallest,

947
00:57:07,730 --> 00:57:11,810
Speaker 2: most unpromising, unexpected little thread that you pull on that

948
00:57:11,890 --> 00:57:15,930
Speaker 2: suddenly unravels something. Sometimes that thread is just an intuition,

949
00:57:16,530 --> 00:57:20,090
Speaker 2: a feeling about someone, a sense that there's definitely something

950
00:57:20,130 --> 00:57:23,050
Speaker 2: more here I don't know about, but that I recognized

951
00:57:23,090 --> 00:57:27,890
Speaker 2: the shadow of. As it turned out, this particular trace, well,

952
00:57:28,090 --> 00:57:30,490
Speaker 2: it would slowly unravel into a story that wasn't just

953
00:57:30,530 --> 00:57:34,650
Speaker 2: the sordid tale of one well connected fraudster, but instead

954
00:57:35,210 --> 00:57:37,730
Speaker 2: the tale of one of the biggest spice scandals to

955
00:57:37,770 --> 00:57:39,810
Speaker 2: have hit Europe since the Cold War.

956
00:57:41,010 --> 00:57:44,330
Speaker 3: To this day, I remember that first note coming back

957
00:57:44,330 --> 00:57:47,890
Speaker 3: from you, just saying that you needed a secure channel

958
00:57:47,970 --> 00:57:51,690
Speaker 3: to communicate. The detail you put in that first note

959
00:57:52,010 --> 00:57:57,050
Speaker 3: was just mind boggling, absolutely shocking. It was like a

960
00:57:57,130 --> 00:58:00,410
Speaker 3: whole world just opened up. You know, this was no

961
00:58:00,490 --> 00:58:05,210
Speaker 3: longer just about some weird German corporate There was this

962
00:58:05,450 --> 00:58:09,690
Speaker 3: kind of huge, geopolitical kind of side to the story

963
00:58:10,330 --> 00:58:11,970
Speaker 3: that was only just coming into view.

964
00:58:14,850 --> 00:58:17,210
Speaker 2: Maybe you've felt in recent years that the world is

965
00:58:17,250 --> 00:58:21,410
Speaker 2: a less certain place, that from the background there are

966
00:58:21,450 --> 00:58:23,970
Speaker 2: threats or worries you'd never had to think about before

967
00:58:24,050 --> 00:58:27,290
Speaker 2: that are suddenly present, Wars that look like they might

968
00:58:27,290 --> 00:58:30,850
Speaker 2: tip out of control, radical politicians tearing at the threads

969
00:58:30,850 --> 00:58:35,290
Speaker 2: of civil society, lies turned into truth by money. Well,

970
00:58:35,290 --> 00:58:37,970
Speaker 2: this story is, in some senses an accounting of that,

971
00:58:38,890 --> 00:58:41,370
Speaker 2: a story that can sometimes make you realize how tissue

972
00:58:41,410 --> 00:58:44,890
Speaker 2: thin the idea of a stable, law abiding society can

973
00:58:44,930 --> 00:58:48,410
Speaker 2: be one that's governed by economic, political, and moral rules

974
00:58:48,410 --> 00:58:51,170
Speaker 2: we've all agreed on. It's a story about what kind

975
00:58:51,170 --> 00:58:53,130
Speaker 2: of people get drawn into the world on the other

976
00:58:53,250 --> 00:58:55,850
Speaker 2: side of that, and what kind of world that is

977
00:58:56,690 --> 00:59:00,610
Speaker 2: a space carved out by crime and corruption, where money

978
00:59:00,610 --> 00:59:04,530
Speaker 2: and power are unchecked by laws or borders or markets.

979
00:59:06,290 --> 00:59:09,930
Speaker 2: That kind of world might sound terrifying, but to some

980
00:59:09,970 --> 00:59:14,130
Speaker 2: people it's irresistible. To some people. It's not an alternative

981
00:59:14,170 --> 00:59:21,490
Speaker 2: world at all. It's the real world coming up this

982
00:59:21,570 --> 00:59:22,610
Speaker 2: season on Hot Money.

983
00:59:23,210 --> 00:59:25,650
Speaker 4: I know politics is corrupt, I know everything and all

984
00:59:25,650 --> 00:59:27,250
Speaker 4: that and all that I believe to know that.

985
00:59:27,330 --> 00:59:30,290
Speaker 3: But this is too much, I thought. I hope that

986
00:59:30,690 --> 00:59:32,810
Speaker 3: he will talk to you and you will be able

987
00:59:32,810 --> 00:59:38,290
Speaker 3: to investigate on it, and perhaps misdeeds and misbehavior stopped

988
00:59:39,050 --> 00:59:43,450
Speaker 3: very fast. Actually started then talking about his experience in Syria.

989
00:59:44,410 --> 00:59:48,610
Speaker 2: He definitely has a view that he's operating with complete

990
00:59:48,650 --> 00:59:50,610
Speaker 2: freedom to do whatever he likes.

991
00:59:50,970 --> 00:59:53,530
Speaker 1: I don't know if they followed me to my home.

992
00:59:54,090 --> 00:59:55,570
Speaker 2: The decision was very simple.

993
00:59:55,690 --> 00:59:59,450
Speaker 5: It was a choice between being killed or in prison,

994
00:59:59,570 --> 01:00:03,330
Speaker 5: and the other option was just to try to get

995
01:00:03,530 --> 01:00:04,170
Speaker 5: real freedom.

996
01:00:04,890 --> 01:00:07,530
Speaker 2: How much of it was an act? How much was genius,

997
01:00:07,610 --> 01:00:09,850
Speaker 2: how much was learned, how much was instinctive?

998
01:00:10,490 --> 01:00:15,010
Speaker 3: I often ask myself now, did I know the true

999
01:00:15,090 --> 01:00:15,730
Speaker 3: jan at all?

1000
01:00:20,810 --> 01:00:23,530
Speaker 2: Hot Money is a production of The Financial Times and

1001
01:00:23,610 --> 01:00:28,810
Speaker 2: Pushkin Industries. It was written and reported by me Sam Jones.

1002
01:00:29,410 --> 01:00:33,010
Speaker 2: The senior producer and co writer is Peggy Sutton. Our

1003
01:00:33,050 --> 01:00:38,010
Speaker 2: producer is Izzy Carter. Our researcher is Marine Saint. Our

1004
01:00:38,010 --> 01:00:42,650
Speaker 2: show is edited by Karen Shakergi, fact checking by Kira Levigne.

1005
01:00:43,450 --> 01:00:47,810
Speaker 2: Sound design and mastering by Jake Gorsky and Marcelo de Olivia,

1006
01:00:48,250 --> 01:00:53,090
Speaker 2: with additional sound design by Izzy Carter. Original music from

1007
01:00:53,090 --> 01:00:57,650
Speaker 2: Matthias Bossi and John Evans of Stellwagen Symphonet. Our show

1008
01:00:57,770 --> 01:01:02,570
Speaker 2: art is by Sean Carney. Our executive producers are Cheryl Brumley,

1009
01:01:02,970 --> 01:01:08,490
Speaker 2: Amy Gains McQuaid and Matthew Garahan. Additional editing by Paul Murphy.

1010
01:01:09,610 --> 01:01:14,770
Speaker 2: Special thanks to Ruler Klaffe, Dan McCrumb, Laura Clark, Alistair Mackey,

1011
01:01:15,170 --> 01:01:21,370
Speaker 2: Manuela Saragosa, Nigel Hanson, Vicki Merrick, Eric Sandler, Morgan Ratner,

1012
01:01:21,850 --> 01:01:27,490
Speaker 2: Jake Flanagan, Jacob Goldstein, Sarah Nix and Greta Cohane. I'm

1013
01:01:27,490 --> 01:01:28,170
Speaker 2: Sam Jones.