1 00:00:02,400 --> 00:00:05,320 Speaker 1: Welcome to the Bloomberg Law Show. I'm June Grosso. The 2 00:00:05,400 --> 00:00:08,920 Speaker 1: focus is on Supreme Court decisions. This week, the Court 3 00:00:09,039 --> 00:00:13,200 Speaker 1: curbed federal agency power, striking down a forty year old precedent. 4 00:00:13,640 --> 00:00:19,279 Speaker 1: It limited obstruction charges against January sixth defendants, including Donald Trump, 5 00:00:19,680 --> 00:00:23,680 Speaker 1: and the Court allowed emergency abortions in Idaho for now. 6 00:00:27,000 --> 00:00:31,240 Speaker 1: In a blockbuster ruling that will constrain environmental, consumer and 7 00:00:31,320 --> 00:00:36,400 Speaker 1: financial watchdog agencies, A divided Supreme Court upended a forty 8 00:00:36,479 --> 00:00:40,800 Speaker 1: year old legal doctrine that empowered federal regulators to interpret 9 00:00:41,040 --> 00:00:46,159 Speaker 1: unclear laws. Conservatives have long targeted the Chevron doctrine in 10 00:00:46,240 --> 00:00:49,519 Speaker 1: the so called War on the Administrative State, and the 11 00:00:49,560 --> 00:00:55,320 Speaker 1: court's conservative justices reverse Chevron this week, effectively taking power 12 00:00:55,360 --> 00:00:59,480 Speaker 1: away from executive branch agencies and shifting it to the courts. 13 00:00:59,840 --> 00:01:03,000 Speaker 1: The Court has been chipping away at Chevron for years. 14 00:01:03,280 --> 00:01:07,680 Speaker 1: As Chief Justice John Roberts pointed out in the oral arguments, how. 15 00:01:08,640 --> 00:01:12,520 Speaker 2: Much of an actual question on the ground is this. 16 00:01:13,640 --> 00:01:15,920 Speaker 1: I saw some study that said we haven't relied on 17 00:01:16,040 --> 00:01:21,720 Speaker 1: Chevron for fourteen years. The three liberal justices dissented. Justice 18 00:01:21,760 --> 00:01:25,679 Speaker 1: Elaina Kagan wrote that in One Fell Swoop, the majority 19 00:01:25,680 --> 00:01:30,600 Speaker 1: today gives itself exclusive power over every open issue, no 20 00:01:30,680 --> 00:01:35,800 Speaker 1: matter how expertise driven or policy laden. Kagan had emphasized 21 00:01:35,840 --> 00:01:39,000 Speaker 1: the importance of the Chevron doctrine during the arguments. 22 00:01:39,319 --> 00:01:42,720 Speaker 3: You know, the best option is to listen carefully and 23 00:01:42,920 --> 00:01:47,280 Speaker 3: to defer if it's reasonable and if it's consistent with 24 00:01:47,360 --> 00:01:50,120 Speaker 3: everything that we know that Congress has said. To defer 25 00:01:50,160 --> 00:01:53,160 Speaker 3: to people who actually know things about these things, but 26 00:01:53,640 --> 00:01:57,240 Speaker 3: you know, to people who understand the way particular questions 27 00:01:57,600 --> 00:02:01,080 Speaker 3: fit within a broader statutory and regular time skiam. 28 00:02:00,960 --> 00:02:03,960 Speaker 1: Joining me is Michael Darff, a professor of constitutional law 29 00:02:04,040 --> 00:02:07,160 Speaker 1: at Cornell Law School. Mike tell us about the Chevron 30 00:02:07,320 --> 00:02:10,640 Speaker 1: doctrine and its importance for federal regulation. 31 00:02:11,160 --> 00:02:16,840 Speaker 4: Sure, so, as listeners probably know, the federal government includes 32 00:02:17,080 --> 00:02:21,839 Speaker 4: not only Congress, the President, and the courts, but an 33 00:02:21,880 --> 00:02:28,040 Speaker 4: alphabet soup of administrative agencies. The Federal Aviation Administration, the 34 00:02:28,440 --> 00:02:34,280 Speaker 4: Environmental Protection Agency, Homeland Security, the Justice Department, Education Department. 35 00:02:34,360 --> 00:02:39,120 Speaker 4: All of these various departments each staff by a political 36 00:02:39,200 --> 00:02:42,800 Speaker 4: appointee at the head, unless it's the so called independent agency, 37 00:02:42,840 --> 00:02:44,919 Speaker 4: in which case it's somebody who's appointed but then has 38 00:02:45,000 --> 00:02:49,880 Speaker 4: various protections. And then with lots of experts, people who 39 00:02:49,919 --> 00:02:53,400 Speaker 4: have expertise in the particular field, so scientists at the 40 00:02:53,560 --> 00:02:59,360 Speaker 4: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Congress right statutes that are hundreds of 41 00:02:59,400 --> 00:03:05,280 Speaker 4: pages law, giving power to the agencies to regulate. So 42 00:03:05,680 --> 00:03:10,200 Speaker 4: the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, which is lies within 43 00:03:10,840 --> 00:03:16,720 Speaker 4: the Department of Transportation, writes rules governing safety mechanisms for 44 00:03:16,800 --> 00:03:22,480 Speaker 4: new automobiles. These statutes are often pretty detailed, but it 45 00:03:22,520 --> 00:03:25,920 Speaker 4: is in the nature of the complexity of life and 46 00:03:25,960 --> 00:03:30,960 Speaker 4: the limitations of human language that invariably situations arise in 47 00:03:31,000 --> 00:03:34,440 Speaker 4: which it's not entirely clear what some term in a 48 00:03:34,639 --> 00:03:39,800 Speaker 4: statute meant. The Chevron case announced the principle which it said, 49 00:03:39,840 --> 00:03:42,800 Speaker 4: and I think persuasively was not new in that case, 50 00:03:42,840 --> 00:03:46,360 Speaker 4: but it became the canonical citation. Announced the principle that 51 00:03:46,480 --> 00:03:52,000 Speaker 4: said that when Congress uses an ambiguous term or leaves 52 00:03:52,040 --> 00:03:55,760 Speaker 4: a gap in a statute, and it could be interpreted 53 00:03:55,800 --> 00:04:00,320 Speaker 4: in a range of possible ways, when an agency acts 54 00:04:00,440 --> 00:04:04,800 Speaker 4: to fill that gap or to resolve the ambiguity, so 55 00:04:05,040 --> 00:04:09,080 Speaker 4: long as it does so reasonably, the courts will not 56 00:04:09,320 --> 00:04:13,560 Speaker 4: invalidate what the agency has done. This was known as 57 00:04:13,600 --> 00:04:20,000 Speaker 4: the Chevron deference. Doctrine deference because agencies got deference, that is, 58 00:04:20,040 --> 00:04:26,320 Speaker 4: a court's deferred to their reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes. 59 00:04:26,839 --> 00:04:31,479 Speaker 1: Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the majority opinion for the court, 60 00:04:31,960 --> 00:04:35,839 Speaker 1: saying Chevron was a judicial invention that required judges to 61 00:04:35,960 --> 00:04:40,359 Speaker 1: disregard their statutory duties. Explain his reasoning and why the 62 00:04:40,400 --> 00:04:44,200 Speaker 1: Conservative supermajority finally reverse Chevron. 63 00:04:44,640 --> 00:04:50,359 Speaker 4: So the Chief Justice points to two main principles. First, 64 00:04:50,760 --> 00:04:55,320 Speaker 4: he says that going back to Marborie against Madison in 65 00:04:55,360 --> 00:04:58,640 Speaker 4: eighteen oh three, famous case that establishes the principle of 66 00:04:58,880 --> 00:05:03,720 Speaker 4: judicial review of federal statute, Chief Justice John Marshall in 67 00:05:03,720 --> 00:05:07,160 Speaker 4: that case said that it is quote emphatically the province 68 00:05:07,200 --> 00:05:11,120 Speaker 4: and duty of the judiciary to say what the law is. 69 00:05:11,279 --> 00:05:18,160 Speaker 4: And so Roberts says that by deferring to agencies construction 70 00:05:18,600 --> 00:05:25,000 Speaker 4: of ambiguous statutes, the judiciary was advocating its responsibility to 71 00:05:25,000 --> 00:05:27,560 Speaker 4: say what the law is. It was giving that power 72 00:05:27,760 --> 00:05:31,120 Speaker 4: over to the administrative agencies, which are either housed in 73 00:05:31,160 --> 00:05:35,120 Speaker 4: the executive branch or quasi independent of the executive branch, 74 00:05:35,360 --> 00:05:39,120 Speaker 4: suggesting that there is a problem there in terms of 75 00:05:39,200 --> 00:05:43,080 Speaker 4: the checks and balances or the separation of powers set 76 00:05:43,160 --> 00:05:46,000 Speaker 4: up by the Constitution. But that's the first basic idea, 77 00:05:46,360 --> 00:05:49,839 Speaker 4: that it's the judiciary's function to say what the law is, 78 00:05:50,160 --> 00:05:54,839 Speaker 4: not that of administrative agencies. The second claim he makes 79 00:05:54,960 --> 00:05:58,280 Speaker 4: is he says that the Administrative Procedure Act, which is 80 00:05:58,320 --> 00:06:04,400 Speaker 4: a federal statute that governs basically judicial review of agency action, 81 00:06:04,920 --> 00:06:10,160 Speaker 4: says that courts are supposed to review decisions of agencies 82 00:06:10,240 --> 00:06:13,839 Speaker 4: with respect to the law. And that means he says 83 00:06:13,960 --> 00:06:17,200 Speaker 4: that it's up to the court, not the agency, to 84 00:06:17,279 --> 00:06:19,719 Speaker 4: say what the law is. That is to say, he 85 00:06:19,880 --> 00:06:25,400 Speaker 4: interprets this provision of the APA to give effect to 86 00:06:25,440 --> 00:06:28,360 Speaker 4: what he says is this principle from Marbarie against Madison, 87 00:06:28,560 --> 00:06:32,719 Speaker 4: And therefore he concludes, for the last forty years, the 88 00:06:32,920 --> 00:06:35,800 Speaker 4: courts have not been living up to their obligation. They've 89 00:06:35,839 --> 00:06:39,839 Speaker 4: been giving away authority that is properly invested in the 90 00:06:39,880 --> 00:06:42,239 Speaker 4: judiciary to administrative agents. 91 00:06:42,800 --> 00:06:47,240 Speaker 1: The three liberal justices in Descent, Justice Elena Kagan wrote, 92 00:06:47,520 --> 00:06:53,120 Speaker 1: the majority disdains restraint and grasps for power is. She 93 00:06:53,240 --> 00:06:56,960 Speaker 1: write that with this case the descent the three liberal 94 00:06:57,240 --> 00:07:02,680 Speaker 1: justices in Descent, Justice Elena Kagan wrote, the majority disdains 95 00:07:02,800 --> 00:07:07,120 Speaker 1: restraint and grasps for power. Is she right that with 96 00:07:07,279 --> 00:07:10,520 Speaker 1: this case the Supreme Court is giving more power to 97 00:07:10,680 --> 00:07:12,680 Speaker 1: itself and to federal courts. 98 00:07:13,280 --> 00:07:16,000 Speaker 4: Yeah, I think she has a pretty good point right. 99 00:07:16,200 --> 00:07:23,440 Speaker 4: The theory behind Chevron was never that agencies should be 100 00:07:23,600 --> 00:07:27,760 Speaker 4: saying what the law is. It was always that when 101 00:07:27,920 --> 00:07:32,360 Speaker 4: Congress says what the law is, it doesn't have perfect 102 00:07:32,480 --> 00:07:36,920 Speaker 4: foresight and so it leaves open certain questions. And then 103 00:07:36,960 --> 00:07:42,240 Speaker 4: the question is when Congress has done that, either through inadvertence, incompetence, 104 00:07:42,400 --> 00:07:46,560 Speaker 4: sometimes deliberately because there was a compromise, sometimes deliberately because 105 00:07:46,560 --> 00:07:50,400 Speaker 4: they didn't trust themselves. Whenever it's done that, who should 106 00:07:50,400 --> 00:07:53,800 Speaker 4: it be assumed, was meant to be the recipient of 107 00:07:53,920 --> 00:07:58,880 Speaker 4: the discretion to fill in the statutory gaps and ambiguity. 108 00:07:59,000 --> 00:08:01,960 Speaker 4: And what Justice Kagan says and what Chevron had been 109 00:08:02,000 --> 00:08:04,560 Speaker 4: based on for the last forty some MyDD years, was 110 00:08:04,600 --> 00:08:09,160 Speaker 4: that we should assume Congress would prefer that an expert 111 00:08:09,280 --> 00:08:16,320 Speaker 4: agency decide what these often technical terms mean using their expertise, 112 00:08:16,680 --> 00:08:21,360 Speaker 4: and in some circumstances, insofar as these ambiguities implicate policy questions, 113 00:08:21,560 --> 00:08:26,360 Speaker 4: because the agency is ultimately accountable through the secretary of 114 00:08:26,400 --> 00:08:28,840 Speaker 4: the agency and then to the president, there'd be a 115 00:08:28,920 --> 00:08:33,560 Speaker 4: political input as opposed to judges who typically don't know 116 00:08:33,800 --> 00:08:39,479 Speaker 4: much about the underlying regulatory issue and who are not accountable. 117 00:08:39,480 --> 00:08:42,480 Speaker 4: And just to give you a kind of poignant example 118 00:08:42,800 --> 00:08:46,240 Speaker 4: of this issue, the Supreme Court just issued an opinion 119 00:08:46,280 --> 00:08:51,280 Speaker 4: in a case called Ohio against EPA, in which Justice Gorsuch, 120 00:08:51,720 --> 00:08:57,400 Speaker 4: in his majority opinion, incorrectly referred to one of the 121 00:08:57,720 --> 00:09:03,440 Speaker 4: key chemicals as nikes oxide, which is laughing gas, rather 122 00:09:03,640 --> 00:09:08,880 Speaker 4: than the correct chemical name, showing that judges are not 123 00:09:09,160 --> 00:09:13,520 Speaker 4: experts in all of the scientific and technical questions that 124 00:09:13,679 --> 00:09:16,640 Speaker 4: regulators are experts in how could they be, and that 125 00:09:16,800 --> 00:09:21,320 Speaker 4: therefore it's not surprising that sometimes the judges will get 126 00:09:21,320 --> 00:09:23,920 Speaker 4: it wrong, and we are better off when they are 127 00:09:23,960 --> 00:09:28,880 Speaker 4: these ambiguities having the experts at the agency's fill them out, 128 00:09:29,240 --> 00:09:33,160 Speaker 4: and if they get it wrong in some sense or objectionable, 129 00:09:33,200 --> 00:09:35,479 Speaker 4: Congress can always amend the statue. 130 00:09:36,000 --> 00:09:41,520 Speaker 1: Chevron was initially applauded by conservatives like the late Justice 131 00:09:41,559 --> 00:09:47,080 Speaker 1: antonin Scalia. Why did conservatives come to loathe it so much? 132 00:09:47,600 --> 00:09:47,680 Speaker 2: So? 133 00:09:47,760 --> 00:09:52,160 Speaker 4: I think there are three things worth saying about that. First, 134 00:09:52,480 --> 00:10:00,840 Speaker 4: the original Chevron case upheld a deregulatory environmental program by 135 00:10:01,480 --> 00:10:05,800 Speaker 4: the Environmental Protection Agency under the Reagan administration. That is 136 00:10:05,800 --> 00:10:09,960 Speaker 4: to say, there was a rule by the Reagan EPA 137 00:10:10,760 --> 00:10:15,360 Speaker 4: construing the statutory term stationary source in a way that 138 00:10:15,440 --> 00:10:19,120 Speaker 4: allowed more pollution than had been allowed under the previous 139 00:10:19,200 --> 00:10:23,080 Speaker 4: Parter administration, and what the Chevron case did was to 140 00:10:23,120 --> 00:10:27,280 Speaker 4: say that rule was okay. So you're right that as 141 00:10:27,320 --> 00:10:31,400 Speaker 4: a basic matter, there is nothing inherent in the Chevron 142 00:10:31,480 --> 00:10:35,920 Speaker 4: doctrine that conservatives would dislike. There are cases in which 143 00:10:35,920 --> 00:10:38,640 Speaker 4: it actually helps them get to the results they want, 144 00:10:38,679 --> 00:10:42,199 Speaker 4: which is if we assume generally conservatives are more skeptical 145 00:10:42,240 --> 00:10:45,760 Speaker 4: of regulation than liberals. The second thing I'll say, though, 146 00:10:45,880 --> 00:10:48,840 Speaker 4: is that over the long run, if you sort of 147 00:10:49,400 --> 00:10:55,199 Speaker 4: average out over all cases, it's probably true that Chevron 148 00:10:55,400 --> 00:11:01,800 Speaker 4: leads to more liberal results than conservative results. Because most 149 00:11:01,880 --> 00:11:04,960 Speaker 4: of the cases that end up going to court coming 150 00:11:05,000 --> 00:11:09,720 Speaker 4: from agencies are cases in which somebody from industry is 151 00:11:10,040 --> 00:11:14,480 Speaker 4: challenging a regulation of them, and then the question is 152 00:11:14,840 --> 00:11:18,599 Speaker 4: do you defer as a court to the agency's regulation. 153 00:11:18,800 --> 00:11:21,720 Speaker 4: That is to say, Chevron was an unusual case in 154 00:11:21,760 --> 00:11:26,359 Speaker 4: which there was deference to a deregulatory action. In most cases, 155 00:11:26,559 --> 00:11:30,880 Speaker 4: it's a matter of deferring to regulation. And so conservatives, 156 00:11:30,920 --> 00:11:35,200 Speaker 4: insofar as they have an objection to regulation in general, 157 00:11:35,440 --> 00:11:39,480 Speaker 4: came to dislike Chevron because they saw it as building 158 00:11:39,559 --> 00:11:42,960 Speaker 4: up the administrative state. Think about, you know, Steve Bannon's 159 00:11:43,000 --> 00:11:45,920 Speaker 4: attacks on the administrative state or even the so called 160 00:11:46,000 --> 00:11:49,960 Speaker 4: deep states from Donald Trump by this idea that we 161 00:11:50,040 --> 00:11:53,400 Speaker 4: are being regulated by bureaucrats. So in so far as 162 00:11:53,480 --> 00:11:58,560 Speaker 4: Chevron gave some additional power to bureaucrats, to experts, to 163 00:11:58,640 --> 00:12:04,040 Speaker 4: the agencies who are not necessarily directly controlled by politics 164 00:12:04,040 --> 00:12:06,600 Speaker 4: and who are going to be regulating, they didn't like that. 165 00:12:06,720 --> 00:12:10,200 Speaker 4: Third thing I'll say is I don't think it is 166 00:12:10,679 --> 00:12:14,680 Speaker 4: from the perspective of the conservatives who support this move 167 00:12:15,040 --> 00:12:17,920 Speaker 4: I don't think it is a bug so much as 168 00:12:17,920 --> 00:12:21,720 Speaker 4: it is a feature. That it gives more power to judges, 169 00:12:22,360 --> 00:12:27,480 Speaker 4: because if they look around, they will observe that conservatives 170 00:12:27,720 --> 00:12:32,400 Speaker 4: dominate the federal judiciary in a way that they certainly 171 00:12:32,440 --> 00:12:38,280 Speaker 4: don't dominate the executive branch. During a democratic administration, and 172 00:12:38,520 --> 00:12:43,120 Speaker 4: even during Republican administrations, agencies can take actions at lower 173 00:12:43,200 --> 00:12:47,679 Speaker 4: levels that are regulatory. So all of that suggests that 174 00:12:47,800 --> 00:12:52,920 Speaker 4: a tightly disciplined conservative movement that is opposed to regulation 175 00:12:53,520 --> 00:12:55,720 Speaker 4: would want to get rid of Chevron. And you saw 176 00:12:55,800 --> 00:13:00,400 Speaker 4: that even before this decision in efforts by Republicans in 177 00:13:00,520 --> 00:13:03,880 Speaker 4: Congress to introduce bills to elimination Chevron deference. 178 00:13:04,559 --> 00:13:08,760 Speaker 1: I've heard a lot of doomsday scenarios about the end 179 00:13:08,800 --> 00:13:13,199 Speaker 1: of the Chevron doctrine. That it will paralyze federal agencies, 180 00:13:13,760 --> 00:13:18,240 Speaker 1: that will undermine important protections for the public, from the 181 00:13:18,400 --> 00:13:23,040 Speaker 1: environment to workplace, that will open the floodgates of litigation. 182 00:13:23,640 --> 00:13:25,600 Speaker 1: And that's just to name a few of the warnings. 183 00:13:26,080 --> 00:13:27,560 Speaker 1: What do you think the effects will be? 184 00:13:28,840 --> 00:13:28,920 Speaker 5: So? 185 00:13:29,080 --> 00:13:33,280 Speaker 4: I think the concern is a little bit overblown, but 186 00:13:33,559 --> 00:13:39,800 Speaker 4: mostly because the Supreme Court at least was already raining 187 00:13:39,880 --> 00:13:43,880 Speaker 4: in the agencies using other tools, the most powerful of 188 00:13:43,920 --> 00:13:47,280 Speaker 4: which was created a while back but has been transformed 189 00:13:47,280 --> 00:13:51,160 Speaker 4: in recent years, and that's the so called Major Questions doctrine, 190 00:13:51,240 --> 00:13:55,720 Speaker 4: which was used, for example, to strike down the Biden 191 00:13:55,760 --> 00:14:02,240 Speaker 4: administration OSHA mandate or vaccinations in the administration. They used 192 00:14:02,240 --> 00:14:04,040 Speaker 4: the Major Questions to do that. They've used it to 193 00:14:04,080 --> 00:14:08,080 Speaker 4: strike down environmental regulations, and that basically says that if 194 00:14:08,240 --> 00:14:13,320 Speaker 4: Congress doesn't give an agency specific marching orders and the 195 00:14:13,360 --> 00:14:16,959 Speaker 4: agency tries to do something quote major, then the courts 196 00:14:16,960 --> 00:14:19,760 Speaker 4: will assume that's beyond the power of the agency, and 197 00:14:19,760 --> 00:14:24,800 Speaker 4: that was already in place without overruling Chevron. Moreover, as 198 00:14:24,920 --> 00:14:27,960 Speaker 4: to Justice Roberts says in his opinion, the Supreme Court 199 00:14:28,040 --> 00:14:32,840 Speaker 4: itself hasn't applied Chevron deference in several years anyway, so 200 00:14:32,920 --> 00:14:36,480 Speaker 4: they were already in effect not deferring to the agency. 201 00:14:36,800 --> 00:14:37,040 Speaker 5: Now. 202 00:14:37,160 --> 00:14:40,360 Speaker 4: That is not to say that this decision won't have 203 00:14:40,480 --> 00:14:46,720 Speaker 4: any impact. After all, not every regulation that gets reviewed 204 00:14:46,840 --> 00:14:50,040 Speaker 4: by the court goes up to the Supreme Court. And 205 00:14:50,120 --> 00:14:53,760 Speaker 4: even though the US Supreme Court hasn't used Chevron to 206 00:14:54,000 --> 00:14:57,960 Speaker 4: defer to agencies in several years, lower courts have. So 207 00:14:58,120 --> 00:15:01,440 Speaker 4: I do think that this is going to have two effects. 208 00:15:01,600 --> 00:15:06,120 Speaker 4: One is it will license lower court to invalidate agency 209 00:15:06,160 --> 00:15:09,280 Speaker 4: actions a bit more frequently, and the other is it 210 00:15:09,320 --> 00:15:11,960 Speaker 4: will have some kind of a chilling effect on the 211 00:15:12,120 --> 00:15:16,160 Speaker 4: issuance of regulations by federal agents. I'll just say one 212 00:15:16,320 --> 00:15:19,680 Speaker 4: further thing about it, which listeners que interesting that can 213 00:15:19,720 --> 00:15:21,760 Speaker 4: find my write up of this point on my blog 214 00:15:21,800 --> 00:15:24,960 Speaker 4: that's Scorf on law, and that is that there is 215 00:15:25,000 --> 00:15:29,720 Speaker 4: some ambiguity in the majority opinion as to what the 216 00:15:29,760 --> 00:15:32,840 Speaker 4: basis for the ruling is, as I said earlier, it's 217 00:15:32,880 --> 00:15:35,840 Speaker 4: at least clear that Chief Justice Roberts and the Majority 218 00:15:35,920 --> 00:15:39,800 Speaker 4: think that Chevron was inconsistent with the text of the 219 00:15:39,800 --> 00:15:43,920 Speaker 4: Administrative Procedure Act. But Justice Thomas writes a concurrence in 220 00:15:43,960 --> 00:15:47,640 Speaker 4: which he says not only that Chevron was unconstitutional. The 221 00:15:47,760 --> 00:15:50,120 Speaker 4: Majority doesn't reject that, but they don't endorse it either. 222 00:15:50,160 --> 00:15:54,280 Speaker 4: And the reason why it matters is if Chevron is unconstitutional, 223 00:15:54,800 --> 00:15:58,200 Speaker 4: then that's it. There can never be deference to agencies 224 00:15:58,400 --> 00:16:02,760 Speaker 4: under general principle. Again, however, if the Majority was only 225 00:16:02,800 --> 00:16:06,440 Speaker 4: relying on this inconsistency with the statute and throwing in 226 00:16:06,520 --> 00:16:10,200 Speaker 4: the constitutional points about Marbury against Madison merely as rhetoric, 227 00:16:10,480 --> 00:16:13,680 Speaker 4: then there's a possibility that in the future a Congress 228 00:16:14,080 --> 00:16:19,840 Speaker 4: could pass a law reinstating Chevron. That's extremely unlucky to 229 00:16:19,880 --> 00:16:23,560 Speaker 4: happen with either House of Congress controlled by Republicans or 230 00:16:23,600 --> 00:16:27,000 Speaker 4: with the Republican president, but you could imagine a future 231 00:16:27,000 --> 00:16:31,200 Speaker 4: Democratic Congress and Democratic president wanting more robust power pre 232 00:16:31,240 --> 00:16:34,280 Speaker 4: agencies and enacting such a statute. And we don't know 233 00:16:34,760 --> 00:16:39,800 Speaker 4: after this decision whether a statutory requirement of deference would 234 00:16:39,840 --> 00:16:40,560 Speaker 4: be upheld or not. 235 00:16:41,040 --> 00:16:43,080 Speaker 1: Stay with me, Mike. Coming up next, I'm going to 236 00:16:43,080 --> 00:16:47,600 Speaker 1: continue this conversation with Professor Michael Dorff of Cornell Law School. 237 00:16:47,960 --> 00:16:53,280 Speaker 1: We'll discuss the court limiting obstruction charges against January sixth defendants. 238 00:16:53,440 --> 00:16:57,640 Speaker 1: I'm June Grosso and you're listening to Bloomberg. The Supreme 239 00:16:57,680 --> 00:17:01,440 Speaker 1: Court sided with a January sixth in a decision that 240 00:17:01,480 --> 00:17:06,440 Speaker 1: will likely upend many capital riot prosecutions and perhaps even 241 00:17:06,480 --> 00:17:10,399 Speaker 1: the DC criminal case against former President Donald Trump. The 242 00:17:10,680 --> 00:17:13,840 Speaker 1: justices ruled six to three that the charge of obstructing 243 00:17:13,880 --> 00:17:18,000 Speaker 1: an official proceeding enacted in response to the Enron collapse 244 00:17:18,400 --> 00:17:21,760 Speaker 1: must include proof that defendants tried to tamper with or 245 00:17:21,840 --> 00:17:26,480 Speaker 1: destroy documents During the oral argument. Several conservative justices like 246 00:17:26,600 --> 00:17:30,240 Speaker 1: Neil Gorsuch had expressed skepticism about the scope of the 247 00:17:30,280 --> 00:17:34,160 Speaker 1: obstruction charge and the kinds of conduct it could criminalize. 248 00:17:34,320 --> 00:17:38,880 Speaker 2: Would a sit in that disrupts a trial for access 249 00:17:38,920 --> 00:17:42,880 Speaker 2: to a federal courthouse qualify? Would a heckler in today's 250 00:17:42,920 --> 00:17:46,400 Speaker 2: audience qualify? Or at the State of the Union address? 251 00:17:47,280 --> 00:17:53,639 Speaker 2: Would pulling a fire alarm before a vote qualify? For 252 00:17:53,680 --> 00:17:55,080 Speaker 2: twenty years in federal prison. 253 00:17:55,240 --> 00:17:59,160 Speaker 1: The case divided the court along unusual lines, with liberal 254 00:17:59,359 --> 00:18:03,719 Speaker 1: Justice Aie Brown Jackson joining the conservatives in the majority 255 00:18:04,240 --> 00:18:08,200 Speaker 1: and conservative Justice Amy Cony Barrett joined the two other 256 00:18:08,280 --> 00:18:12,000 Speaker 1: liberals in descent. I've been talking to constitutional law expert 257 00:18:12,040 --> 00:18:15,680 Speaker 1: Michael Dorf, a professor at Cornell Law School, Mike tell 258 00:18:15,760 --> 00:18:17,359 Speaker 1: us about the main issue in the case. 259 00:18:17,760 --> 00:18:21,000 Speaker 4: So this is a case called Fisher against the United States. 260 00:18:21,160 --> 00:18:28,240 Speaker 4: So Fisher was charged with participating in the January sixth insurrection, 261 00:18:28,960 --> 00:18:32,640 Speaker 4: and he was charged under a number of statues, one 262 00:18:32,720 --> 00:18:35,280 Speaker 4: of which is at issue in this case, and that 263 00:18:35,560 --> 00:18:40,600 Speaker 4: is a provision that says that he was obstructing from 264 00:18:40,600 --> 00:18:44,600 Speaker 4: an official proceeding. I'll read you the exact text. It says, 265 00:18:44,880 --> 00:18:50,000 Speaker 4: whoever corruptly and then it has a bunch of examples alters, destroys, mutilates, 266 00:18:50,080 --> 00:18:52,920 Speaker 4: or can feels a record, document or other objects, etc. 267 00:18:53,160 --> 00:18:53,320 Speaker 5: Etc. 268 00:18:53,920 --> 00:18:59,480 Speaker 4: Or quote otherwise obstruct, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, 269 00:18:59,680 --> 00:19:03,000 Speaker 4: shall guilty of the crime. Fisher was charged under the 270 00:19:03,119 --> 00:19:08,280 Speaker 4: second part, which says somebody who otherwise obstruct and official proceeding. 271 00:19:08,480 --> 00:19:12,840 Speaker 4: And the question in the case was whether what Fisher did, 272 00:19:13,280 --> 00:19:17,280 Speaker 4: which was basically to participate in mob violence, including against 273 00:19:17,320 --> 00:19:23,520 Speaker 4: Capitol police, whether that counts as otherwise obstructing and official proceeding. Now, 274 00:19:23,680 --> 00:19:28,000 Speaker 4: everybody in the case acknowledges that if you just take 275 00:19:28,040 --> 00:19:33,600 Speaker 4: that language in isolation otherwise obstruct. Well, sure Fisher obstructed 276 00:19:34,040 --> 00:19:38,000 Speaker 4: an official proceeding because he participated in this mob action, 277 00:19:38,440 --> 00:19:42,520 Speaker 4: and the mob action delayed the certification of the electoral 278 00:19:42,600 --> 00:19:45,840 Speaker 4: votes on January sixth, twenty twenty one. But Chief just 279 00:19:45,920 --> 00:19:49,400 Speaker 4: As Roberts writes for a six to three majority that 280 00:19:49,760 --> 00:19:55,320 Speaker 4: you can't read that term obstructs and official proceeding in isolation. 281 00:19:55,840 --> 00:19:59,920 Speaker 4: You have to read it in conjunction with the previous 282 00:20:00,200 --> 00:20:06,960 Speaker 4: sub paragraph part one, which is all about destroying records, documents, 283 00:20:07,160 --> 00:20:10,760 Speaker 4: other physical items that are going to be used in 284 00:20:10,760 --> 00:20:15,640 Speaker 4: an official proceeding, and not generally about obstructing. Now, one 285 00:20:15,640 --> 00:20:17,119 Speaker 4: thing I should say is when I say it was 286 00:20:17,160 --> 00:20:19,800 Speaker 4: six to three, listeners might assume that that was the 287 00:20:19,960 --> 00:20:23,880 Speaker 4: usual six to three. It wasn't quite. Justice Katanji Brown 288 00:20:23,960 --> 00:20:29,280 Speaker 4: Jackson joined in the majority, whereas Justice amy Cony Barrett 289 00:20:29,600 --> 00:20:33,359 Speaker 4: wrote the descent for herself and Justices Soto, Mayor and Kagan. 290 00:20:33,600 --> 00:20:37,679 Speaker 4: So in that sense, two justices sort of flipped from 291 00:20:37,680 --> 00:20:41,280 Speaker 4: what you might think of as their usual ideological or 292 00:20:41,400 --> 00:20:44,960 Speaker 4: partisan alignment. But it basically comes down to a case 293 00:20:44,960 --> 00:20:48,600 Speaker 4: decided on ideological lines, and in. 294 00:20:48,560 --> 00:20:53,680 Speaker 1: The dissent, Justice Barrett wrote, the majority simply cannot believe 295 00:20:53,720 --> 00:20:57,640 Speaker 1: that Congress meant what it said when writing this statute. 296 00:20:57,880 --> 00:21:00,320 Speaker 1: So who do you think makes the better argument, meant 297 00:21:00,680 --> 00:21:02,000 Speaker 1: the Chief or Barrett. 298 00:21:02,240 --> 00:21:04,840 Speaker 4: I think it's actually a hard case. So if you 299 00:21:05,000 --> 00:21:09,520 Speaker 4: put aside that this case involves January sixth, and just 300 00:21:10,000 --> 00:21:14,440 Speaker 4: think about the statute, there's I think a decent argument 301 00:21:14,560 --> 00:21:19,280 Speaker 4: on either side. Chief. Just as Robert invokes two Latin 302 00:21:19,400 --> 00:21:24,000 Speaker 4: maxims which I won't try to pronounce, that basically say 303 00:21:24,400 --> 00:21:26,600 Speaker 4: that if you have a list of things and then 304 00:21:26,640 --> 00:21:31,000 Speaker 4: you have a catch all, the catch lol is limited 305 00:21:31,400 --> 00:21:36,879 Speaker 4: by the idea behind what the specifics are. And he 306 00:21:36,960 --> 00:21:41,359 Speaker 4: gives a couple of sort of amusing examples. One involves football, 307 00:21:41,720 --> 00:21:46,920 Speaker 4: another involves sign at a zoo about not disturbing the animals, 308 00:21:46,960 --> 00:21:50,760 Speaker 4: and he says that you take the specifics and then 309 00:21:50,800 --> 00:21:54,439 Speaker 4: the catch lol means other things that are like the 310 00:21:54,520 --> 00:21:59,320 Speaker 4: specifics but not too far distant. Now, what Justice Barrett 311 00:21:59,359 --> 00:22:02,000 Speaker 4: does in it does not to deny the general principle, 312 00:22:02,400 --> 00:22:07,800 Speaker 4: but to deny that the structure of the statutory provision 313 00:22:08,359 --> 00:22:12,879 Speaker 4: parallels the examples that Chief Justice Roberts gives, and she 314 00:22:13,040 --> 00:22:17,760 Speaker 4: says that language of otherwise obstruct really does stand more 315 00:22:17,880 --> 00:22:22,040 Speaker 4: alone than he acknowledges that they're in two separate sub 316 00:22:22,160 --> 00:22:25,000 Speaker 4: paragraphs that if you parse the language, are a little different. 317 00:22:25,160 --> 00:22:29,840 Speaker 4: So I think she's right that, taken at face value, 318 00:22:30,280 --> 00:22:34,920 Speaker 4: the language does cover what Fisher and other people did 319 00:22:34,960 --> 00:22:38,640 Speaker 4: on January sixth, But I think the majority is also 320 00:22:38,920 --> 00:22:42,359 Speaker 4: right that you can't take it just at face value. 321 00:22:42,480 --> 00:22:44,760 Speaker 4: And so the hard question is on that sort of 322 00:22:44,840 --> 00:22:49,680 Speaker 4: second level of disagreement, which is, to what extent does 323 00:22:49,760 --> 00:22:54,480 Speaker 4: this statute fit the paradigm that the Chief Justice adopt 324 00:22:54,760 --> 00:22:57,960 Speaker 4: where it's a casual at the end of a specific list. 325 00:22:58,000 --> 00:23:01,280 Speaker 4: Because it doesn't fit it exactly, but it's kind of 326 00:23:01,440 --> 00:23:04,320 Speaker 4: like that, And so I think reasonable minds could differ 327 00:23:04,520 --> 00:23:05,080 Speaker 4: on that. 328 00:23:05,080 --> 00:23:08,960 Speaker 1: Question, reasonable minds that are textualists. I mean, is this 329 00:23:09,040 --> 00:23:14,240 Speaker 1: a showdown between textualist interpretations. Barrett wrote that the majority 330 00:23:14,680 --> 00:23:19,040 Speaker 1: does textual backflips to find some way anyway to narrow 331 00:23:19,040 --> 00:23:22,120 Speaker 1: the reach of the obstruction law, and Barrett has also 332 00:23:22,320 --> 00:23:27,760 Speaker 1: recently disagreed with the way Justice Clarence Thomas has analyzed 333 00:23:27,760 --> 00:23:28,200 Speaker 1: a case. 334 00:23:28,880 --> 00:23:31,800 Speaker 4: I think it's fair to say that there is a 335 00:23:32,000 --> 00:23:39,440 Speaker 4: developing risk between Justice Barrett and the other conservatives. She's 336 00:23:39,480 --> 00:23:43,440 Speaker 4: still quite conservative overall, but there's a developing rerip over methodology. 337 00:23:44,000 --> 00:23:48,000 Speaker 4: And you see this not only here where she says, 338 00:23:48,280 --> 00:23:51,280 Speaker 4: you know, you're not really doing textualism, You're relying an 339 00:23:51,320 --> 00:23:55,680 Speaker 4: awful lot on these Latin maxims rather than looking closely 340 00:23:55,760 --> 00:23:58,359 Speaker 4: at the structure of the statue. But you also see 341 00:23:58,400 --> 00:24:03,760 Speaker 4: this in her current in last week's Raheemi case. This 342 00:24:03,840 --> 00:24:07,439 Speaker 4: is the case where the court upheld, as against a 343 00:24:07,520 --> 00:24:13,360 Speaker 4: Second Amendment challenge, the federal statute that forbids people who 344 00:24:13,400 --> 00:24:18,520 Speaker 4: are under domestic violence protection orders from obtaining firearms, and 345 00:24:18,560 --> 00:24:21,399 Speaker 4: the Court upheld that eight to one. But there's a 346 00:24:21,440 --> 00:24:25,080 Speaker 4: series of concurrences. And one of the things that Justice 347 00:24:25,119 --> 00:24:30,000 Speaker 4: Barrett says in her concurrence is she distances herself from 348 00:24:30,280 --> 00:24:34,280 Speaker 4: the so called tradition approach, which I think is more 349 00:24:34,280 --> 00:24:37,520 Speaker 4: closely associated certainly with Justice Thomas and to some extent 350 00:24:37,560 --> 00:24:40,960 Speaker 4: with Justice Kavanaugh. And she wants to say that no, no, 351 00:24:40,960 --> 00:24:45,879 Speaker 4: we really as originalist textualists, want to focus on the 352 00:24:46,000 --> 00:24:50,920 Speaker 4: meaning of the word and you know what laws were 353 00:24:50,960 --> 00:24:55,600 Speaker 4: around at the time, what people's subjective intentions and expectations 354 00:24:55,600 --> 00:24:59,200 Speaker 4: that might have been might be relevant in figuring out 355 00:24:59,200 --> 00:25:01,200 Speaker 4: what the words mean, but they're not relevant in and 356 00:25:01,280 --> 00:25:04,200 Speaker 4: of themselves in the way that some of the other 357 00:25:04,680 --> 00:25:08,520 Speaker 4: more history and tradition focused conservatives seem to think. Now, 358 00:25:08,680 --> 00:25:14,080 Speaker 4: I should say that that disagreement doesn't necessarily make her 359 00:25:14,800 --> 00:25:19,440 Speaker 4: likely to be less conservative overall, but I do think 360 00:25:19,480 --> 00:25:23,399 Speaker 4: it shows her to be somewhat more principled than some 361 00:25:23,480 --> 00:25:27,560 Speaker 4: of the other conservatives, and really thinking through the consequences 362 00:25:27,560 --> 00:25:35,240 Speaker 4: of her jurisprudential methodological commitment, and that in so being principled, 363 00:25:35,320 --> 00:25:39,199 Speaker 4: she's likely more often to reach results that might be 364 00:25:39,240 --> 00:25:43,760 Speaker 4: surprising ideologically. So I do think there is some prospect 365 00:25:44,160 --> 00:25:48,360 Speaker 4: that we are going to see her be less reliably 366 00:25:48,480 --> 00:25:52,520 Speaker 4: conservative over the coming years, not so much because she's 367 00:25:52,520 --> 00:25:56,320 Speaker 4: becoming a liberal, but because she's sort of really sticking 368 00:25:56,400 --> 00:26:01,800 Speaker 4: by the implications of her methodology, which will sometimes few liberal. 369 00:26:01,800 --> 00:26:04,880 Speaker 1: In particular case, this case got a lot of attention 370 00:26:05,160 --> 00:26:09,360 Speaker 1: because the charge has been used against Trump, but Special 371 00:26:09,400 --> 00:26:12,960 Speaker 1: counsel Jack Smith has said that Trump's conduct would still 372 00:26:13,000 --> 00:26:18,159 Speaker 1: be covered even under a narrower interpretation of the statute because, 373 00:26:18,200 --> 00:26:22,280 Speaker 1: for example, it involved efforts to interfere with the electoral 374 00:26:22,320 --> 00:26:25,400 Speaker 1: college certificates arriving at the desk to be counted. 375 00:26:25,600 --> 00:26:28,560 Speaker 4: Yeah, I think there's something to that. The court sends 376 00:26:28,720 --> 00:26:31,680 Speaker 4: even Fisher's case back to the lower courts to figure 377 00:26:31,720 --> 00:26:36,040 Speaker 4: out whether he can be charged under the narrower reading, 378 00:26:36,160 --> 00:26:41,040 Speaker 4: because you know, you could say that all of the 379 00:26:41,160 --> 00:26:47,480 Speaker 4: January sixth rioters were interfering with the arrival or counting 380 00:26:47,640 --> 00:26:51,200 Speaker 4: or something to do with the physical certificates. In that case, 381 00:26:51,359 --> 00:26:53,960 Speaker 4: then this case would be a bit of a sport right, 382 00:26:54,040 --> 00:26:57,040 Speaker 4: having no real bearing on the January sixth prosecutions, but 383 00:26:57,119 --> 00:27:01,120 Speaker 4: potentially having bearing on other cases rise under this statute 384 00:27:01,119 --> 00:27:04,840 Speaker 4: in totally different setting. I think Smith has a stronger 385 00:27:05,040 --> 00:27:10,320 Speaker 4: argument that Trump himself was obstructing with respect to the 386 00:27:10,320 --> 00:27:14,399 Speaker 4: particular certificates in light of the allegations about the so 387 00:27:14,520 --> 00:27:19,280 Speaker 4: called fake electors scheme, because there the goal was to 388 00:27:19,480 --> 00:27:26,080 Speaker 4: get before Congress certificates from people purporting to be electors 389 00:27:26,200 --> 00:27:29,320 Speaker 4: who really weren't, and you could say that then what 390 00:27:29,359 --> 00:27:34,119 Speaker 4: they were doing was obstructing the official proceeding with respect 391 00:27:34,359 --> 00:27:38,200 Speaker 4: to the availability for use of the real certificates. I 392 00:27:38,240 --> 00:27:39,840 Speaker 4: don't think it's a slam dunk, but I think it's 393 00:27:39,840 --> 00:27:43,040 Speaker 4: Smith has a pretty good case that even after the 394 00:27:43,080 --> 00:27:47,040 Speaker 4: Fisher decision, the allegations against Trump's stand. And it's important 395 00:27:47,080 --> 00:27:51,680 Speaker 4: to remember that Smith has charged Trump under other statutes 396 00:27:51,760 --> 00:27:54,520 Speaker 4: as well, So it's not just that even if under 397 00:27:54,560 --> 00:27:58,720 Speaker 4: this narrower view those counts against Trump are thrown out, 398 00:27:58,920 --> 00:28:01,280 Speaker 4: there's still a case. Again. Of course, all of that 399 00:28:01,359 --> 00:28:04,800 Speaker 4: would depend on the outcome that's coming down on Monday 400 00:28:04,960 --> 00:28:06,560 Speaker 4: in the immunity case, the. 401 00:28:06,560 --> 00:28:10,120 Speaker 1: Last day of the term, and the decision we've all 402 00:28:10,119 --> 00:28:13,880 Speaker 1: been waiting for on whether or not Trump will win 403 00:28:13,920 --> 00:28:18,200 Speaker 1: any part of his claim of presidential immunity. Now, as 404 00:28:18,200 --> 00:28:22,160 Speaker 1: far as the hundreds of January sixth defendants who were prosecuted, 405 00:28:22,520 --> 00:28:26,840 Speaker 1: the US Attorney's Office says this decision will most significantly 406 00:28:26,880 --> 00:28:30,280 Speaker 1: affect about fifty two people convicted of obstruction and no 407 00:28:30,359 --> 00:28:34,200 Speaker 1: other felony, with twenty seven of those defendants now serving 408 00:28:34,280 --> 00:28:38,120 Speaker 1: a prison sentence. So will their lawyers now go to 409 00:28:38,200 --> 00:28:40,400 Speaker 1: court and try to get the charges dismissed? 410 00:28:40,760 --> 00:28:44,480 Speaker 4: Undoubtedly? Right, that is, you know, it would be incompetence 411 00:28:44,560 --> 00:28:47,800 Speaker 4: not to that is to say, anybody serving any time 412 00:28:48,000 --> 00:28:52,600 Speaker 4: for a conviction arising out of the January sixth events 413 00:28:53,000 --> 00:28:56,720 Speaker 4: under this statute, their lawyer, would you know, now make 414 00:28:56,760 --> 00:29:01,040 Speaker 4: a motion to have the conviction in sentence. They now 415 00:29:01,320 --> 00:29:04,800 Speaker 4: at that point it would be open to the Justice 416 00:29:04,800 --> 00:29:09,800 Speaker 4: Department to seek a new indictment, either under some other 417 00:29:09,960 --> 00:29:13,760 Speaker 4: statute there are lesser offenses that can be charged, or 418 00:29:13,920 --> 00:29:18,920 Speaker 4: potentially to ask to retry the defendants under this particular statute. 419 00:29:19,200 --> 00:29:22,680 Speaker 4: But trying to meet the narrower definition given. 420 00:29:22,400 --> 00:29:24,720 Speaker 1: In the Fisher case, this decision is certainly going to 421 00:29:24,760 --> 00:29:28,440 Speaker 1: make a lot more work for the prosecutors. Thanks so much, 422 00:29:28,480 --> 00:29:31,600 Speaker 1: Mike for taking us through these two major decisions this week. 423 00:29:31,880 --> 00:29:35,800 Speaker 1: That's Professor Michael Dorf of Cornell Law School coming up next. 424 00:29:36,080 --> 00:29:40,280 Speaker 1: The Supreme Court allows emergency abortions in Idaho for now. 425 00:29:40,640 --> 00:29:46,040 Speaker 1: I'm June Grosso and you're listening to Bloomberg. The Supreme 426 00:29:46,080 --> 00:29:50,400 Speaker 1: Court will allow Idaho hospitals to provide abortions in medical 427 00:29:50,400 --> 00:29:54,560 Speaker 1: emergencies for the time being. Over three descents, the Court 428 00:29:54,680 --> 00:29:59,240 Speaker 1: reinstated a trial court order that insures Idaho hospitals can 429 00:29:59,360 --> 00:30:02,880 Speaker 1: perform a urgency abortions to protect the health of the mother. 430 00:30:03,240 --> 00:30:06,920 Speaker 1: Despite the state's ban on abortions unless the mother's life 431 00:30:06,960 --> 00:30:10,600 Speaker 1: is in danger. During the oral arguments, Justice Elena Kaigan 432 00:30:10,680 --> 00:30:15,280 Speaker 1: explain the clash between Idaho's strict abortion law and federal 433 00:30:15,360 --> 00:30:19,880 Speaker 1: law the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act known as MTELLA. 434 00:30:19,880 --> 00:30:22,800 Speaker 3: Where the woman is her life is not imperiled, but 435 00:30:22,840 --> 00:30:25,719 Speaker 3: she's going to lose her reproductive organs, she's going to 436 00:30:25,760 --> 00:30:29,120 Speaker 3: lose the ability to have children in the future unless 437 00:30:29,520 --> 00:30:33,400 Speaker 3: an abortion takes place. Now, that's the category of cases 438 00:30:33,680 --> 00:30:37,680 Speaker 3: in which I'm talis, says, my gosh. Of course the 439 00:30:37,760 --> 00:30:41,880 Speaker 3: abortion is necessary to assure that no material deterioration occurs, 440 00:30:42,520 --> 00:30:46,320 Speaker 3: and yet Idaho says, sorry, no abortion here. 441 00:30:46,920 --> 00:30:51,200 Speaker 1: The justices dismissed the case as improvidently granted, meaning they 442 00:30:51,240 --> 00:30:53,840 Speaker 1: shouldn't have taken it in the first place. But this 443 00:30:53,920 --> 00:30:58,520 Speaker 1: procedural order leaves key questions unanswered and likely means the 444 00:30:58,640 --> 00:31:01,760 Speaker 1: issue will come back to the court again. Joining me 445 00:31:01,800 --> 00:31:05,320 Speaker 1: is reproductive rights expert Mary Ziegler, a professor at UC 446 00:31:05,520 --> 00:31:09,200 Speaker 1: Davis Law School. Mary, this is just a temporary victory 447 00:31:09,280 --> 00:31:12,920 Speaker 1: for abortion rights. What's the importance of this decision. 448 00:31:13,440 --> 00:31:17,800 Speaker 5: It's short term significance is that it allows emergency procedures 449 00:31:17,800 --> 00:31:20,680 Speaker 5: in Idaho to continue pursu into an injunction that the 450 00:31:20,720 --> 00:31:23,840 Speaker 5: district court issued, other than that it primarily takes the 451 00:31:23,880 --> 00:31:26,560 Speaker 5: can down the road. So questions about emergency access are 452 00:31:26,560 --> 00:31:29,000 Speaker 5: going to continue to unfold in courts across the country, 453 00:31:29,000 --> 00:31:31,480 Speaker 5: and they may eventually return to the US Supreme Court. 454 00:31:31,920 --> 00:31:34,960 Speaker 1: So this case fractured the court three three and three, 455 00:31:35,520 --> 00:31:38,800 Speaker 1: sort of illustrating the three wings of the court. The 456 00:31:38,800 --> 00:31:43,160 Speaker 1: three liberal justices joined the three moderates in supporting the 457 00:31:43,240 --> 00:31:47,360 Speaker 1: decision to allow emergency abortions, and the three most conservative 458 00:31:47,560 --> 00:31:51,240 Speaker 1: justices dissented. And the Court as a whole didn't explain 459 00:31:51,360 --> 00:31:54,400 Speaker 1: its decision. So what can we glean from this split? 460 00:31:54,840 --> 00:31:56,760 Speaker 5: Well, I mean, I think that we have the best 461 00:31:56,800 --> 00:32:00,440 Speaker 5: clues from the the opinion offered by Justice Barrett that 462 00:32:00,920 --> 00:32:04,560 Speaker 5: the three kind of swing conservative justices believed that the 463 00:32:04,640 --> 00:32:07,120 Speaker 5: terms of the litigation had changed in what they saw 464 00:32:07,160 --> 00:32:10,080 Speaker 5: as consequential ways since the Court agreed to hear the case. 465 00:32:10,520 --> 00:32:13,160 Speaker 5: And I think the three were interested in this spending 466 00:32:13,200 --> 00:32:15,880 Speaker 5: clause theory that Idaho had raised, but believed that it 467 00:32:15,960 --> 00:32:18,640 Speaker 5: had never been heard by the lower courts. So I 468 00:32:18,640 --> 00:32:22,160 Speaker 5: think it stands through the proposition that maybe those justices 469 00:32:22,200 --> 00:32:24,840 Speaker 5: are willing to side with Idaho, maybe they're also interested 470 00:32:24,880 --> 00:32:26,880 Speaker 5: in some kind of what they would view as a 471 00:32:26,920 --> 00:32:30,080 Speaker 5: compromise ruling, but that in either case they weren't ready 472 00:32:30,120 --> 00:32:32,320 Speaker 5: to reach a final conclusion before the election. 473 00:32:33,000 --> 00:32:37,800 Speaker 1: The opinion by the three liberals talked about what's happening 474 00:32:37,880 --> 00:32:41,960 Speaker 1: to women in Idaho who need abortions and didn't get them, 475 00:32:42,000 --> 00:32:46,720 Speaker 1: sort of echoing what Justice Kagan said during the oral arguments. 476 00:32:47,040 --> 00:32:49,640 Speaker 5: From what I've gathered, there's evidence that there have been 477 00:32:49,680 --> 00:32:52,880 Speaker 5: significant harms in Idaho, that patients have been, you know, 478 00:32:52,960 --> 00:32:57,360 Speaker 5: airlifted to other states in a handful of circumstances. We 479 00:32:57,520 --> 00:32:59,960 Speaker 5: know that there have been knock on effects in terms 480 00:33:00,160 --> 00:33:03,200 Speaker 5: of people not choosing Idaho for their medical residencies, that 481 00:33:03,360 --> 00:33:07,200 Speaker 5: having further effects on access to care for pregnantatients across 482 00:33:07,200 --> 00:33:10,640 Speaker 5: the state. I think, obviously, in terms of scholarly documentation 483 00:33:10,720 --> 00:33:13,600 Speaker 5: of that were just at the beginning. But there is data, 484 00:33:13,640 --> 00:33:17,200 Speaker 5: I think, including data cited by Justice Jackson in her opinion, 485 00:33:17,640 --> 00:33:20,200 Speaker 5: to the effect that even allowing the law to goat 486 00:33:20,280 --> 00:33:23,000 Speaker 5: into effect when it did has had real world effects. 487 00:33:23,360 --> 00:33:26,920 Speaker 1: And so it was only the three liberals who said 488 00:33:26,920 --> 00:33:33,080 Speaker 1: that Imtala requires hospitals to provide abortions that Idaho's law prohibits. 489 00:33:33,160 --> 00:33:36,120 Speaker 1: That you know, Idaho's laws preempted by the federal law. 490 00:33:36,680 --> 00:33:39,560 Speaker 5: Yeah, I mean, I think Justice Jackson clearly wanted to 491 00:33:39,600 --> 00:33:42,520 Speaker 5: reach that conclusion. The other two liberals were willing to 492 00:33:42,960 --> 00:33:45,440 Speaker 5: go along with the idea that it was okay to 493 00:33:45,480 --> 00:33:49,480 Speaker 5: defer a decision essentially that the petition had been improvidently Granted, 494 00:33:49,880 --> 00:33:52,320 Speaker 5: it's probably fair to assume that that was, you know, 495 00:33:52,360 --> 00:33:54,800 Speaker 5: a compromise on the part of those liberal justices. But 496 00:33:55,040 --> 00:33:58,680 Speaker 5: Justice Kagan did take it upon herself to respond to 497 00:33:59,000 --> 00:34:02,320 Speaker 5: some of the conservative usice's points on preemption, and we 498 00:34:02,400 --> 00:34:04,960 Speaker 5: can certainly gather from that that she doesn't think that 499 00:34:05,120 --> 00:34:09,040 Speaker 5: the preemption arguments that Idaho had raised were very good. 500 00:34:09,600 --> 00:34:13,640 Speaker 1: Just as Samuel Alito wrote the Descent in part, echoing 501 00:34:13,680 --> 00:34:16,400 Speaker 1: his questioning during the oral arguments. 502 00:34:16,680 --> 00:34:21,280 Speaker 6: How can you impose restrictions on what Idaho can criminalize 503 00:34:21,719 --> 00:34:26,040 Speaker 6: simply because hospitals in Idaho have chosen to participate in Medicare. 504 00:34:26,080 --> 00:34:28,360 Speaker 6: I don't understand how this swears with the whole theory 505 00:34:28,760 --> 00:34:29,800 Speaker 6: of the spending clause. 506 00:34:30,080 --> 00:34:31,320 Speaker 1: So tell us about his descent. 507 00:34:31,600 --> 00:34:34,040 Speaker 5: Well, there was a lot there, and the justice Alito 508 00:34:34,200 --> 00:34:37,480 Speaker 5: wrote about the spending clause argument, he also spent a 509 00:34:37,480 --> 00:34:39,600 Speaker 5: lot of time on the fact that Antala uses the 510 00:34:39,719 --> 00:34:44,560 Speaker 5: language unborn child, which Alito suggested created express protection for 511 00:34:44,719 --> 00:34:46,960 Speaker 5: the unborn child, as he put it, and would by 512 00:34:46,960 --> 00:34:51,439 Speaker 5: definition need no emergency access to abortion for patients. That's 513 00:34:51,520 --> 00:34:55,880 Speaker 5: obviously an interesting and significant conclusion because the statue just 514 00:34:56,000 --> 00:34:59,000 Speaker 5: used the word on warnchet didn't say anything more about 515 00:34:59,160 --> 00:35:02,719 Speaker 5: unborn children than that. So Alito's conclusion seems to be 516 00:35:02,719 --> 00:35:05,840 Speaker 5: if a statute uses language like that, it suggests a 517 00:35:05,880 --> 00:35:08,760 Speaker 5: belief that an unborn child is an equal rights holding 518 00:35:08,880 --> 00:35:12,400 Speaker 5: person or patient, at least for statutory purposes. So that's 519 00:35:12,520 --> 00:35:16,480 Speaker 5: a pretty revealing reading of the statute again, even though 520 00:35:16,560 --> 00:35:19,160 Speaker 5: that isn't going to be the legal upshot, at least 521 00:35:19,160 --> 00:35:19,560 Speaker 5: for now. 522 00:35:19,880 --> 00:35:24,080 Speaker 1: Well, Alito has suggested in oral arguments and elsewhere this 523 00:35:24,320 --> 00:35:27,960 Speaker 1: concept of fetal personhood before, hasn't he Yeah, I. 524 00:35:27,960 --> 00:35:31,239 Speaker 5: Mean he's used personhood adjacent language in Dobbs, so we 525 00:35:31,360 --> 00:35:33,759 Speaker 5: know that he's been at least open to this kind 526 00:35:33,800 --> 00:35:37,040 Speaker 5: of question. He hasn't, of course, addressed constitutional questions of 527 00:35:37,040 --> 00:35:40,719 Speaker 5: personhood in the sense of the conclusion that fetuses have 528 00:35:40,840 --> 00:35:43,799 Speaker 5: Fourteenth Amendment rights clearly in any of these cases, but 529 00:35:44,120 --> 00:35:47,040 Speaker 5: the way he's approaching the question certainly suggests that he 530 00:35:47,080 --> 00:35:48,760 Speaker 5: may be open to that kind of argument. 531 00:35:49,280 --> 00:35:52,759 Speaker 1: He also chided the court. He said, the Court has 532 00:35:52,800 --> 00:35:56,400 Speaker 1: simply lost the will to decide the easy, but emotional, 533 00:35:56,440 --> 00:36:01,080 Speaker 1: and highly politicized question that the case present. And on 534 00:36:01,120 --> 00:36:04,840 Speaker 1: the other side, Justice Katanji Brown Jackson said the Court 535 00:36:05,000 --> 00:36:08,600 Speaker 1: was punting on the issue. Quote, while this court dawdles 536 00:36:08,600 --> 00:36:13,160 Speaker 1: and the country weights, pregnant people experiencing emergency medical conditions 537 00:36:13,480 --> 00:36:16,959 Speaker 1: remain in a precarious position as their doctors are kept 538 00:36:16,960 --> 00:36:19,319 Speaker 1: in the dark about what the law requires. 539 00:36:20,320 --> 00:36:23,200 Speaker 5: Right. I mean, you do see that coming from both 540 00:36:23,320 --> 00:36:26,920 Speaker 5: Jackson and the conservatives, essentially that the Court took this 541 00:36:27,080 --> 00:36:31,399 Speaker 5: case and should have had the courage to definitively resolve it. 542 00:36:31,680 --> 00:36:34,640 Speaker 5: Of course, you know, neither of those wings of the 543 00:36:34,640 --> 00:36:37,600 Speaker 5: Court has the power to make that call. Though it's 544 00:36:37,600 --> 00:36:40,120 Speaker 5: a reminder of kind of where the power in the 545 00:36:40,160 --> 00:36:41,560 Speaker 5: Court lies at the moment. 546 00:36:41,960 --> 00:36:45,880 Speaker 1: The Justices took two abortion cases this term, and in 547 00:36:45,960 --> 00:36:48,480 Speaker 1: neither did they reach the merits. In the mif of 548 00:36:48,520 --> 00:36:52,200 Speaker 1: pristone abortion pill case, they went off on procedural grounds. 549 00:36:52,520 --> 00:36:56,000 Speaker 1: So I mean, why take the cases, especially this case 550 00:36:56,000 --> 00:36:59,280 Speaker 1: where they made an unusual move bypassing the Ninth Circuit. 551 00:36:59,760 --> 00:37:01,799 Speaker 5: It's it's hard to know why the Court took the case. 552 00:37:01,840 --> 00:37:05,080 Speaker 5: I imagine that at least at some point the conservative 553 00:37:05,200 --> 00:37:07,720 Speaker 5: justices thought they had the votes to side with Idaho 554 00:37:08,080 --> 00:37:11,680 Speaker 5: and then realized that they didn't, potentially because the oral 555 00:37:11,760 --> 00:37:14,120 Speaker 5: argument in the case was such a disaster for the 556 00:37:14,160 --> 00:37:17,879 Speaker 5: state of Idaho. I think obviously Chief Justice Roberts has 557 00:37:17,960 --> 00:37:21,239 Speaker 5: been concerned with the Court's reputation and the damage to 558 00:37:21,280 --> 00:37:23,840 Speaker 5: it in the years since Dobbs, and may have argued 559 00:37:23,880 --> 00:37:27,200 Speaker 5: that the time was not right given the procedural problems 560 00:37:27,239 --> 00:37:30,440 Speaker 5: and complexities of both cases, And he may have found 561 00:37:30,840 --> 00:37:34,560 Speaker 5: a more receptive audience in Justices Barrett and Kavanaugh than 562 00:37:34,560 --> 00:37:37,279 Speaker 5: he had previously. Not only that because this is an 563 00:37:37,280 --> 00:37:41,360 Speaker 5: election year, but also because there were procedural and strategic 564 00:37:41,480 --> 00:37:45,000 Speaker 5: mistakes made by the conservative attorneys in both of these cases. 565 00:37:45,440 --> 00:37:49,040 Speaker 1: So explain what happens now what this decision actually does. 566 00:37:49,440 --> 00:37:52,040 Speaker 5: Well, in the short term, this decision has the effect 567 00:37:52,080 --> 00:37:54,960 Speaker 5: of reinstating an injunction that a district judge put in 568 00:37:55,000 --> 00:37:58,880 Speaker 5: place in Idaho permitting emergency access. That litigation will continued 569 00:37:58,960 --> 00:38:01,879 Speaker 5: through the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The decision does 570 00:38:01,920 --> 00:38:04,560 Speaker 5: nothing to disturb a ruling by the Fifth Circuit Court 571 00:38:04,600 --> 00:38:08,239 Speaker 5: of Appeals upholding an injunction against the Biden administration and 572 00:38:08,480 --> 00:38:12,719 Speaker 5: allowing Texas's law to be enforced as written with its 573 00:38:12,800 --> 00:38:15,719 Speaker 5: very narrow abortion exceptions, and it doesn't do anything to 574 00:38:15,840 --> 00:38:18,080 Speaker 5: change the situation on the ground in other states with 575 00:38:18,200 --> 00:38:21,520 Speaker 5: very narrow exceptions, although there is some in Pala related 576 00:38:21,560 --> 00:38:26,200 Speaker 5: litigation potentially proceeding in some other states, like Oklahoma, So 577 00:38:26,320 --> 00:38:28,600 Speaker 5: essentially all of that will continue as if none of 578 00:38:28,600 --> 00:38:31,080 Speaker 5: this ever happened. The Supreme Court may come back into 579 00:38:31,080 --> 00:38:33,440 Speaker 5: the picture. Then again, it may not, because if polls 580 00:38:33,480 --> 00:38:35,719 Speaker 5: are correct and Donald Trump wins the twenty twenty four 581 00:38:35,800 --> 00:38:39,440 Speaker 5: presidential election, a Trump administration would almost certainly withdraw the 582 00:38:39,520 --> 00:38:42,600 Speaker 5: Santala guidance and not really try to intervene on behalf 583 00:38:42,600 --> 00:38:44,719 Speaker 5: of patients facing life threatening emergencies. 584 00:38:45,120 --> 00:38:48,680 Speaker 1: In fact, in her opinion, Justice Jackson says that the 585 00:38:48,800 --> 00:38:51,960 Speaker 1: United States has already petitioned for CIRT in the Fifth 586 00:38:51,960 --> 00:38:52,680 Speaker 1: Circuit case. 587 00:38:53,080 --> 00:38:54,920 Speaker 5: Yeah, and I think that will be going up to 588 00:38:54,960 --> 00:38:57,120 Speaker 5: the court, and I think the case from the Ninth 589 00:38:57,120 --> 00:39:00,840 Speaker 5: Circuit may too again unless Biden lose the twenty twenty 590 00:39:00,840 --> 00:39:04,080 Speaker 5: four election and Trump stops interpreting in Tala in this 591 00:39:04,120 --> 00:39:05,560 Speaker 5: way and the case becomes moot. 592 00:39:05,920 --> 00:39:09,200 Speaker 1: Do you surmise that in these cases the justices or 593 00:39:09,280 --> 00:39:12,400 Speaker 1: some of the justices are considering that there's an election 594 00:39:12,600 --> 00:39:14,480 Speaker 1: coming up and they don't want to rock the vote 595 00:39:14,560 --> 00:39:16,760 Speaker 1: At this point, it's hard. 596 00:39:16,600 --> 00:39:21,880 Speaker 5: To say certainly that's a reasonable assumption, given that John Roberts, 597 00:39:22,000 --> 00:39:25,160 Speaker 5: the Chief Justice who is in all of these coalitions, 598 00:39:25,760 --> 00:39:28,680 Speaker 5: is a well known institutionalist to spend concerned about the 599 00:39:28,800 --> 00:39:31,800 Speaker 5: hit the Court's reputation has taken since the Dobbs decision. 600 00:39:32,080 --> 00:39:34,640 Speaker 5: At the same time, there were actual flaws in all 601 00:39:34,719 --> 00:39:38,040 Speaker 5: of these cases that gave the Court an out. There 602 00:39:38,080 --> 00:39:42,120 Speaker 5: were actual grave standing problems in the Alliance for Hipocratic 603 00:39:42,200 --> 00:39:47,360 Speaker 5: Medicine case. There were reasons that this litigation was unsettled 604 00:39:47,480 --> 00:39:50,799 Speaker 5: enough for the Court to refrain from intervening early. So 605 00:39:50,840 --> 00:39:52,839 Speaker 5: I think this is a scenario where the Court had 606 00:39:52,880 --> 00:39:55,920 Speaker 5: plausible deniability, although it's reasonable to assume that the election 607 00:39:56,040 --> 00:39:57,560 Speaker 5: definitely played a part. 608 00:39:57,880 --> 00:40:01,759 Speaker 1: What conclusions can we draw from this term where the 609 00:40:01,800 --> 00:40:06,200 Speaker 1: Court took two abortion cases and decided neither on the merits. 610 00:40:06,920 --> 00:40:09,319 Speaker 5: Well, we can't conclude a lot about what's going to 611 00:40:09,320 --> 00:40:12,640 Speaker 5: come from the Supreme Court. You know, we know that 612 00:40:12,680 --> 00:40:15,960 Speaker 5: there are some divides within the court about abortion, but 613 00:40:16,040 --> 00:40:18,759 Speaker 5: they concern primarily how much further to the right to 614 00:40:18,840 --> 00:40:22,520 Speaker 5: move the court and how much federal intervention to limit voters' 615 00:40:22,560 --> 00:40:25,879 Speaker 5: ability to decide for themselves which abortion rights protections they want. 616 00:40:25,960 --> 00:40:28,600 Speaker 5: How much in that direction the court is going to head. 617 00:40:28,880 --> 00:40:31,279 Speaker 5: We know that that's on the table. We don't know 618 00:40:31,400 --> 00:40:34,520 Speaker 5: which way the court ultimately is going to go, because again, 619 00:40:34,640 --> 00:40:38,000 Speaker 5: so many of these substantive questions were deferred. We can 620 00:40:38,200 --> 00:40:41,880 Speaker 5: conclude obviously that the federal courts are not going to 621 00:40:42,400 --> 00:40:45,600 Speaker 5: remove themselves from the equation. This is not a question 622 00:40:45,640 --> 00:40:47,560 Speaker 5: that is going to be returned to the states. It's 623 00:40:47,600 --> 00:40:49,879 Speaker 5: a question that the federal courts and the executive branch 624 00:40:49,920 --> 00:40:52,640 Speaker 5: are very much going to have a say in. And 625 00:40:52,680 --> 00:40:55,439 Speaker 5: beyond that, I think much remains to be seen. 626 00:40:56,360 --> 00:41:00,080 Speaker 1: So as far as looking back at this term, what 627 00:41:00,120 --> 00:41:03,600 Speaker 1: conclusions can we make about abortions. 628 00:41:03,360 --> 00:41:05,839 Speaker 5: Well, I think we can conclude. You know, we know 629 00:41:06,000 --> 00:41:09,000 Speaker 5: that there are some divides within the court about abortion, 630 00:41:09,560 --> 00:41:12,239 Speaker 5: but they concern primarily how much further to the right 631 00:41:12,320 --> 00:41:15,080 Speaker 5: to move the court and how much federal intervention to 632 00:41:15,160 --> 00:41:19,080 Speaker 5: limit voters' ability to decide for themselves which abortion rights 633 00:41:19,120 --> 00:41:21,959 Speaker 5: protections they want. How much in that direction the court 634 00:41:22,040 --> 00:41:24,440 Speaker 5: is going to head. We know that that's on the table. 635 00:41:24,880 --> 00:41:27,319 Speaker 5: We don't know which way the court ultimately is going 636 00:41:27,360 --> 00:41:30,480 Speaker 5: to go, because again, so many of these substantive questions 637 00:41:30,520 --> 00:41:31,160 Speaker 5: were deferred. 638 00:41:31,960 --> 00:41:36,719 Speaker 1: Speaking about voting, which states have abortion measures on the 639 00:41:36,800 --> 00:41:38,480 Speaker 1: ballot for November? 640 00:41:38,920 --> 00:41:46,120 Speaker 5: There I think are four states that have confirmed ballot initiatives. Colorado, Florida, Maryland, 641 00:41:46,400 --> 00:41:49,760 Speaker 5: and South Dakota are all guaranteed to be on the ballot, 642 00:41:50,000 --> 00:41:53,440 Speaker 5: and there are several others where they have submitted signatures 643 00:41:53,480 --> 00:41:56,880 Speaker 5: to get on the ballot and where they're further signatures 644 00:41:56,920 --> 00:42:07,600 Speaker 5: being gathered. So several other possible, including Arizona, Arkansas, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, 645 00:42:07,640 --> 00:42:08,920 Speaker 5: and Pennsylvania. 646 00:42:09,080 --> 00:42:12,120 Speaker 1: And voters have sided with abortion rights every time the 647 00:42:12,200 --> 00:42:15,680 Speaker 1: issue has been directly on the ballot. Thanks so much, Mary. 648 00:42:15,960 --> 00:42:19,600 Speaker 1: That's Professor Mary Ziegler of UC Davis Law School. And 649 00:42:19,640 --> 00:42:21,800 Speaker 1: that's it for this edition of the Bloomberg Law Show. 650 00:42:22,120 --> 00:42:24,480 Speaker 1: Remember you can always get the latest legal news on 651 00:42:24,520 --> 00:42:28,799 Speaker 1: our Bloomberg Law Podcast. You can find them on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, 652 00:42:29,000 --> 00:42:34,040 Speaker 1: and at www dot bloomberg dot com, slash podcast slash Law, 653 00:42:34,440 --> 00:42:37,000 Speaker 1: and remember to tune into The Bloomberg Law Show every 654 00:42:37,080 --> 00:42:40,960 Speaker 1: weeknight at ten pm Wall Street Time. I'm June Grosso 655 00:42:41,120 --> 00:42:42,719 Speaker 1: and you're listening to Bloomberg