Speaker 1: Pushkin. I'm Mave Higgins, and this is solvable Interviews with
Speaker 1: the world's most innovative thinkers working to solve the world's
Speaker 1: biggest problems. I think a solvable is preventing conflict between
Speaker 1: China and the United States. That is Kevin Rudd, the
Speaker 1: former Prime Minister of Australia. He's now the president of
Speaker 1: the Asia Society Policy Institute. Okay so. As of this year,
Speaker 1: the United States has the world's largest economy and China
Speaker 1: has the second largest, but most economists estimate that China
Speaker 1: will overtake the United States as the largest economy in
Speaker 1: around ten to fifteen years. As China grows. The increasing
Speaker 1: rivalry between the two countries has led to an increasingly
Speaker 1: rocky relationship. While President Trump has said that he and
Speaker 1: the Chinese leader, shi Jing Ping will always be friends,
Speaker 1: the US administer stration has been expressing serious concerns about China.
Speaker 1: In June, the Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said to
Speaker 1: a news conference, China wants to be the dominant economic
Speaker 1: and military power of the world, spreading its authoritarian vision
Speaker 1: for society and its corrupt practices worldwide. The tensions between
Speaker 1: the two countries are playing out through the economy and
Speaker 1: through national security. In the United States, there are concerns
Speaker 1: about Chinese ownership of US infrastructure and the potential for
Speaker 1: Chinese made products to be used to spy on or
Speaker 1: damage the US, and the two countries remain in dispute
Speaker 1: over territorial issues in the South China Sea. Looking at
Speaker 1: the economy, last year, the US imposed three rounds of
Speaker 1: tariffs on more than two hundred and fifty billion dollars
Speaker 1: worth of Chinese goods, on everything from handbags to railway equipment.
Speaker 1: China hit back by imposing tariffs on US products including chemicals, coal,
Speaker 1: and medical equipment. But while officially Washington and Beijing have
Speaker 1: agreed to a truce in their escalating trade war, experts
Speaker 1: including Kevin Rudd, who spent much of his career as
Speaker 1: a diplomat and China expert, are really concerned about the
Speaker 1: potential for this relationship, which has the power to affect
Speaker 1: basically everyone in the world, and to become an armed conflict.
Speaker 1: The Asia Society Policy Institute, which Kevin Rudd leads, is
Speaker 1: a think tank with a problem solving mandate. Kevin Rudd's
Speaker 1: job is to tackle policy challenges confronting the Asia Pacific insecurity,
Speaker 1: prosperity and sustainability, basically working to avoid war between the
Speaker 1: world's two biggest powers. He's so calm and steady as
Speaker 1: he discusses this job with Jacob Weissberg, You'd be forgiven
Speaker 1: for thinking this huge task is an easy one. As
Speaker 1: you'll hear, it's not. But he has a solvable What
Speaker 1: is the problem of potential or conflict between China and
Speaker 1: the United States? That is why are we worried about it?
Speaker 1: If you spend enough time in Beijing and Washington these days,
Speaker 1: you know that both countries war plans are alive and
Speaker 1: well and are being modernized and modernized around two sets
Speaker 1: of scenarios, a collision between military assets and the South
Speaker 1: China Sea or over future political and military contingencies on
Speaker 1: the future of Taiwan. These have now become sharper, much sharper,
Speaker 1: because of the fundamental deterioration in the political relationship between
Speaker 1: the two countries, which right now is in its worst
Speaker 1: condition really since the end of tenement. Yeavin, why is
Speaker 1: it europe problem? Why is this the problem you've dealt on?
Speaker 1: Because there's no such thing as a bilateral armed conflict
Speaker 1: between China and the United States. It automatically involves America's
Speaker 1: friends and allies around the region, by which I mean
Speaker 1: the Asia Pacific region and the world meaning the Europeans
Speaker 1: as well, whether they like it or not. And for
Speaker 1: those of us in the world who also believe that
Speaker 1: we can walk and chew gum at the same time,
Speaker 1: which has had a productive relationship with China while still
Speaker 1: being a friend and ally of the United States, this
Speaker 1: is more than a passing academic interest. So there is
Speaker 1: this idea of the inevitability of conflict military conflict between
Speaker 1: US and China, this notion of the facilities trap, that
Speaker 1: great powers end up in conflict with each other. Like
Speaker 1: it or not, you why is that? Why is that
Speaker 1: theory wrong in this case? I don't believe the theory
Speaker 1: is of itself wrong in terms of it being predictive
Speaker 1: of certain forms of political and ultimate armed conflict. However,
Speaker 1: I do not think it's determinist That is, history also
Speaker 1: tells us that there are ways out of facidities trap.
Speaker 1: For me, the most alive set of precedents we're looking
Speaker 1: at in the current environment are those not of the
Speaker 1: Second World War, but the first in the First World War,
Speaker 1: we saw two sets of fundamental dynamics underway. Britain concerned
Speaker 1: about the rise of Germany and Germany surpassing Britain in
Speaker 1: terms of naval power and aggregate economic power. And simultaneously,
Speaker 1: Germany concerned about the industrialization of Russia and what therefore
Speaker 1: a future Russian Empire could look like given its larger population,
Speaker 1: as a strategic threat to Germany. And then we had
Speaker 1: the incendiary event, which was an assassination in obscure place
Speaker 1: in Serbia of Archduke Ferdinand, who nobody had ever heard of,
Speaker 1: but it was capable of igniting a much more fundamental
Speaker 1: geopolitical and geostrategic conflict. Was war inevitable? No, it was
Speaker 1: the most avoidable war in history, a comprehensive failure of diplomacy. Therefore,
Speaker 1: when we apply that logic to the events of US
Speaker 1: China relations in the twenty first century, many of these
Speaker 1: dynamics remain alive. A rising power, an established power triggering
Speaker 1: events in the South China Sea and or Taiwan. But
Speaker 1: my judgment is diplomacy always is capable of finding a
Speaker 1: way through. We simply need to be focused on the
Speaker 1: seriousness of the threat and the credible nature of the
Speaker 1: alternative off ramps. We're in at least the early stage
Speaker 1: as if not the fourth rittled version of a US
Speaker 1: China trade war. Is the scenario you worry most about,
Speaker 1: a trade war or economic conflict escalating into military conflict,
Speaker 1: or do you think it will come. If it comes,
Speaker 1: that the risk comes from something else Entirely. In the
Speaker 1: history of political relationships and diplomatic relationships, it is never
Speaker 1: a neat binary of one thing or the other. It's
Speaker 1: a multiplicity of contributing factors. What we see with the
Speaker 1: trade war, however, is one articular elation of a much
Speaker 1: broader American strategic rethink against China, which began frankly with
Speaker 1: the election of the Trump administration, but was in part
Speaker 1: in train before that as well. And how do we
Speaker 1: characterize that. The Trump administration in December of twenty seventeen
Speaker 1: announced a new national security strategy where it proclaimed the
Speaker 1: end formally of forty years of strategic engagement with China
Speaker 1: and the commencement of a new period of strategic competition
Speaker 1: against China. At the same time, China, since the election
Speaker 1: of Shijinping as president and party secretary in twenty twelve
Speaker 1: thirteen has embarked upon a consciously more assertive Chinese strategy
Speaker 1: in the economy and foreign policy and security policy. And
Speaker 1: so we now have these two new dynamic forces interacting
Speaker 1: with each other, for which the current as it were, flashpoint,
Speaker 1: as the trade war, it is, if you like, simply
Speaker 1: the icing on the cake of a much broader, unfolding
Speaker 1: American strategy involving rolling back against China on the rest
Speaker 1: of the economy, investment, capital markets, technology markets, talent markets,
Speaker 1: as well as classical foreign policy and security policy, as
Speaker 1: well as the continuing unresolved dilemma of human rights between China,
Speaker 1: the US, and the rest. So what we don't know
Speaker 1: is if and when the trade war is resolved or
Speaker 1: at least brought to an uneasy piece, whether the rest
Speaker 1: of the American roll back against Chinese power will then unfold.
Speaker 1: The administration remains divided on that, just as the Chinese
Speaker 1: administration remains divided about how now to proceed. That's why
Speaker 1: we are currently in a dangerous environment. So you see
Speaker 1: signs that there is military build up, more preparation for
Speaker 1: a potential war. It's in the last couple of years.
Speaker 1: But what points that towards conflict as opposed to a
Speaker 1: balance of power and detroits. Well. Again, if we look
Speaker 1: at the precedence of the First World War, the operating
Speaker 1: principle applying in the minds and the chanceriies of Europe
Speaker 1: prior to the guns of August of nineteen fourteen was
Speaker 1: a balance of power central alliance of German in the
Speaker 1: Austro Hungarian Empire versus Britain, France and Russia in those
Speaker 1: days the Russian Empire. Unfortunately, balances of power, because they
Speaker 1: are balancers, are inherently unstable and they can be triggered
Speaker 1: by underlying incendury political events. So while balances of power
Speaker 1: are one thing, the bottom line is much of the
Speaker 1: reaction in Washington is being generated by a political conclusion
Speaker 1: and a national security policy conclusion, and that the balance
Speaker 1: is moving more decisively in China's direction. We see that
Speaker 1: already manifest in the classical instruments of economic power. China
Speaker 1: is already the largest economic partner of practically every country
Speaker 1: in Asia. That was not the case ten or twenty
Speaker 1: years ago. And if you look at the force modernization,
Speaker 1: the PLA and it's naval assets, it's air assets, but
Speaker 1: in particular it's capacity to use its onshore rocket forces
Speaker 1: to create a much more effective airc denial strategy against
Speaker 1: US armed forces in the West Pacific. These are new,
Speaker 1: These were not there ten years ago. That's why we
Speaker 1: are in a volatile environment. I think the assumption has
Speaker 1: been the most likely triggering a vent to military conflict
Speaker 1: would be over Taiwan, that China would act take power
Speaker 1: in Taiwan, and that the United States would react might react. Now,
Speaker 1: the American policy historically been strategic ambiguity, so it's not
Speaker 1: we don't have a stated policy about whether we would
Speaker 1: defend Taiwan or not. How has that changed you think
Speaker 1: the risk there has increased or the risk has simply
Speaker 1: shifted to other potential theaters of military coamflet The classical
Speaker 1: scenario concerning Taiwan still remains the most incendiary because there
Speaker 1: are three moving parts within it. Now Chinese nationalism under
Speaker 1: Shi Jinping, where his statements over the last five years
Speaker 1: have become progressively sharper on the future of Taiwan and
Speaker 1: the point at which China would wish to see Taiwan
Speaker 1: returned by peaceful or non peaceful means to the Motherland's
Speaker 1: tender embrace. Secondly, in Taiwan itself, a DPP administration in
Speaker 1: this rambunctious Taiwanese democracy which is fun to watch but
Speaker 1: it's sometimes scary to analyze, and the predisposition of the
Speaker 1: Democratic Progress Party not just under Taiying one but the
Speaker 1: rest of her party supporters to resist any form of
Speaker 1: embrace from the motherland, to move more decisively in an
Speaker 1: independentist direction, which is China's internal redline. And Thirdly, under
Speaker 1: the Trump administration, let's say less strategic ambiguity than we've
Speaker 1: seen on the part of previous American administrations. For example,
Speaker 1: not just the most recent American Taiwanese arms deal, but
Speaker 1: the fact that you now have open meetings between Taiwanese
Speaker 1: national security officials and the National Security Adviser of the
Speaker 1: United States in the White House. These are new and
Speaker 1: different instruments of US policy, backed up by a new
Speaker 1: and fresh congressional level of support for Taiwan as well.
Speaker 1: How does this admixture produce a future Taiwan crisis? I
Speaker 1: can't predict, but the possibilities are no longer remote and
Speaker 1: they don't become probable, but they are still becoming increasingly quantifiable.
Speaker 1: We've recently seen China back down something I wouldn't have expected,
Speaker 1: in the faith of massive public protests, and Hong Kong
Speaker 1: over an extradition law that was one of a number
Speaker 1: of incremental steps limiting some of the democratic prerogatives of
Speaker 1: Hong Kong. That surprised you, not entirely because if we
Speaker 1: look at the history of Hong Kong since to handover
Speaker 1: in nineteen ninety seven, and I'm old enough and ugly
Speaker 1: enough to have been around for the handover and in
Speaker 1: fact began my diplomatic career at the time when Thatcher
Speaker 1: signed a joint declaration with Dungsaping back in nineteen eighty four.
Speaker 1: The dynamics of Hong Kong PRC politics have always been
Speaker 1: on the volatile side. There are massive public protests, for
Speaker 1: example by the Hong Kong As in two thousand and two,
Speaker 1: which also brought about a u turn in Chinese policy
Speaker 1: on a proposed set of changes. Back then, they failed.
Speaker 1: In twenty fourteen, that is, public protests in twenty nineteen,
Speaker 1: they've succeeded the PARC leadership while always seeking incrementally to
Speaker 1: reduce Hong Kong's aggregate political autonomy within the framework of
Speaker 1: one country two systems has never been shall I say
Speaker 1: so doctrinaire that it can't accept political reality when it
Speaker 1: sees it. I think the parallel resolve, however, will be
Speaker 1: in China itself, where it fears Chinese protests could emulate
Speaker 1: those undertaken in Hong Kong, will be an even a
Speaker 1: more vicious crackdown against any evidence of descent within the
Speaker 1: PRC proper. So let's talk about the salvable aspect of this.
Speaker 1: You point to the escalating consions, you point to some
Speaker 1: of the potential flashpoints. Yeah, you think the war is
Speaker 1: avoidable and the risk can be reduced. How are we
Speaker 1: going to do that? Well, the degree of difficulty, given
Speaker 1: what we face at present in US China relations is hard.
Speaker 1: And I say that as a preliminary comment because both
Speaker 1: in Washington and Beijing at the moment, standing up and
Speaker 1: giving a speech and holding an olive branch is a
Speaker 1: good way to get shot down. At the moment, in Washington,
Speaker 1: increasing the question which has asked if people like me
Speaker 1: is well, Kevin, who side are you on? There's are ours?
Speaker 1: And the question I get asked in Beijing increasingly is
Speaker 1: much the same Kevin Old, friend of China, speaker of
Speaker 1: Chinese language, person who's visited our country for one hundred
Speaker 1: and fifty times over at last thirty five years. Are
Speaker 1: you with the Americans? Are you with us? And the
Speaker 1: bottom line is my response to both those questions is
Speaker 1: not as some unpeace envoy. It's simply saying, from a
Speaker 1: perspective of constructive realism, how do we navigate a way
Speaker 1: through this unless either of you actually want to go
Speaker 1: to war? And when I ask that question there's usually
Speaker 1: a long pause. But on the practical question of how
Speaker 1: then to proceed, my argument would be this that a
Speaker 1: rational analysis by both countries of their fundamental national interests
Speaker 1: and their fundamental national values which are at play here,
Speaker 1: leads to you to kind of three conclusions. Category one
Speaker 1: is those questions of national interest to national values where
Speaker 1: there is no solution, for example Taiwan, for example, over
Speaker 1: the country's fundamentally different political systems. One's authoritarian capitalist system China,
Speaker 1: and the other is America, which is there's rolling rambunctious
Speaker 1: some would say two rambunctious political democracy and equally rambunctious
Speaker 1: capitalist system which from time to time through is out
Speaker 1: to the rest of US things like the global financial crisis,
Speaker 1: but we forgive you for that. It was going to
Speaker 1: thank eving the one country has an authoritarian capitalist system
Speaker 1: and the other has a president who wants an authoritarian
Speaker 1: capitalist world. You could say that I couldn't possibly comment
Speaker 1: because you're an American and I'm not, so I'm just
Speaker 1: a guess. You've always had impactable manners the diplomat. It's
Speaker 1: never been said at we Australians. We've often said we
Speaker 1: have no manners at all. We try so I think
Speaker 1: you know, can't agree. One here is what's the stuff
Speaker 1: you can never agree on? And being very blunt about that.
Speaker 1: And there's precedence for this in the relationship between Breshn
Speaker 1: of Soviet Union and the United States. There came a
Speaker 1: point after the Cuban missile crisis where detante was seen
Speaker 1: as not a dirty word, but something which could actually
Speaker 1: be done managing the fundamental differences between the two countries,
Speaker 1: differences which could not be reconciled, but which in the
Speaker 1: inclusion of both countries, do not warrant an underlying view
Speaker 1: that war was inevitable. Category two in the US China
Speaker 1: relations is what stuff between the two countries is hard,
Speaker 1: really hard, but nonetheless manageable and capable of producing mutually
Speaker 1: acceptable solutions which don't violate each country's fundamental interest. Now there,
Speaker 1: I'd just give you two examples. One is North Korean
Speaker 1: nuclear denuclearization, where the differences between Beijing and Washington are
Speaker 1: significant but ultimately not irreconcilable, given that both Beijing and
Speaker 1: Washington would arguably want a more stable Korean peninsula. Another
Speaker 1: example would be China changing it's global economic practices, both
Speaker 1: on trade and investment questions, to open the Chinese economy
Speaker 1: in a much more fundamental way than Chinese decision makers
Speaker 1: have been prepared to allow in the last decade or so,
Speaker 1: so that the underlying nature of the American current critique
Speaker 1: of Chinese economic policy is dealt with by changes in Beijing.
Speaker 1: Are both those things really hard? Yes? Are they doable? Yeah,
Speaker 1: but with absolute diplomatic and political determination. And finally, in
Speaker 1: the way in which I argue this principle of constructive realism,
Speaker 1: there's a category of policy engagement between Beijing and Washington
Speaker 1: which should be easier and doable on a daily basis,
Speaker 1: for example on challenges of global climate change action, and
Speaker 1: for example on challenges of financial and economic governance, through
Speaker 1: institutions such as the G twenty, and frankly, through common
Speaker 1: endeavor in dealing with global or regional humanitarian crises. The
Speaker 1: reason I argue for this way of viewing the relationship
Speaker 1: is that when we get locked into what the Chinese
Speaker 1: would describe as a silly a way of thinking about
Speaker 1: each other, in this case China the United States, which
Speaker 1: heavy loads category one, which is it's all doom, gloom
Speaker 1: and despair without regard to category two and category three,
Speaker 1: then we can end up in self fulfilling prophecies about
Speaker 1: the way in which this relationship evolves. By contrast, if
Speaker 1: you adopt what I have argued as being a framework
Speaker 1: of constructive realism, which is being realist about the stuff
Speaker 1: you can never agree upon and constructive about the rest
Speaker 1: of it, and if you are constructive about the rest
Speaker 1: of it incrementally building greater strategic trust over time, then
Speaker 1: you can navigate these changing fundamental geopolitical dynamics between the
Speaker 1: two and the balance of power between the two over
Speaker 1: time in a peaceful way. We've only seen glimpses so
Speaker 1: far of Chinese nationalism rallying against the United States, as
Speaker 1: an enemy. It hasn't. Really, It seems that Si Jinping
Speaker 1: hasn't pulled out that weapon yet. He hasn't brought people.
Speaker 1: We haven't seen people in the streets in China burning
Speaker 1: the US flag. Is there a risk that happens over
Speaker 1: the trade war or that something else unleashes this public
Speaker 1: demand for more of a reaction against the United States. Well,
Speaker 1: his studios China relationships kind of an interesting beast, and
Speaker 1: those of us who've studied this over the years still
Speaker 1: find it interesting and not just interesting, but troubling without
Speaker 1: boring your listeners. The sixty second Summaries a bit like this.
Speaker 1: Twenty years plus of strategic animosity forty nine to seventy two,
Speaker 1: not just the Korean War where you killed each other
Speaker 1: in large numbers, but the Taiwan Straits crises of that period,
Speaker 1: which almost brought you to war on multiple occasions. President
Speaker 1: Eisenhower threatening nuclear obliteration of China on a number of occasions,
Speaker 1: then Nixon and Kissinger and day tomed Mao and Joe
Speaker 1: and Lye taking us from seventy two really until the
Speaker 1: collapse of the Soviet Union in ninety one. But the
Speaker 1: organizing principle there was a common strategic enemy, namely the
Speaker 1: Soviet Union. Period three was really from ninety one through
Speaker 1: until I would say the rise of Shijinping in two
Speaker 1: thousand and twelve thirteen, with a common mission statement between
Speaker 1: the two countries. No longer strategic collaboration, the common enemy
Speaker 1: had gone. It was common economic engagement and how can
Speaker 1: we each benefit each other's economies With an implied American
Speaker 1: assumption the Chinese would fully open their economy and in
Speaker 1: America's utopian dreams, China ultimately transforming itself into a democracy
Speaker 1: of Singaporean type characteristics. Then we come to the present,
Speaker 1: a more assertive China since twenty twelve thirteen under shi Jingping,
Speaker 1: Belton Road Initiative of South China see Island Reclamation China
Speaker 1: twenty twenty five, high technology strategies, as well as she
Speaker 1: Jingping abolishing term limits. And we now are where we
Speaker 1: are with Trump taking us perhaps into this current period
Speaker 1: of a strategic competitive doubling down against China. In the
Speaker 1: period since seventeen, so against all of that, you've had
Speaker 1: vastly evolving Chinese sentiments towards the United States. I spent
Speaker 1: the three of the last six weeks in China, and
Speaker 1: I've seen something of a turn to some of the
Speaker 1: nationalist rhetoric against the United States that we haven't seen
Speaker 1: for at least thirty years, reruns of old Korean War movies,
Speaker 1: revisiting of the spirit of the Long March of thirty four.
Speaker 1: We Chinese can be resilient despite the American bully. This
Speaker 1: language I really haven't seen since the pos Postaleman period.
Speaker 1: It can be turned on and it can be turned off.
Speaker 1: So I think the jury is still out. Did that
Speaker 1: trip Kevin leave you more concerned or more optimestic about
Speaker 1: the possibility for a day time and you were before
Speaker 1: he went. It left me frankly, modestly schizophrenic on the question,
Speaker 1: which is, on the one hand, the economic needs of
Speaker 1: China and the United States. When you strip back all
Speaker 1: the political rhetoric for a trade deal to be done
Speaker 1: in order to restore business confidence in both economies going
Speaker 1: into twenty, in fact becomes clearer that is the economic
Speaker 1: rationale for the two leaders to do a deal and
Speaker 1: to resolve the trade war and get that off the
Speaker 1: political agenda, but also the agenda of markets is as
Speaker 1: strong and as real as it's ever been. At the
Speaker 1: same time, there has been a strategic conclusion I believe
Speaker 1: in China that President Trump cannot be trusted, and more fundamentally,
Speaker 1: a view in China that whether it's Republicans and Democrats
Speaker 1: that the new American resolved doubled down against a rising
Speaker 1: China is now bipartisan, and that therefore the fundamental strategic
Speaker 1: assumptions which have governed the US China relationship since the
Speaker 1: beginning of strategic engagement under Nixon and Kissinger are now
Speaker 1: fundamentally changing. And my conclusion coming out of Beijing and
Speaker 1: speaking to multiple Chinese political leaders and those who advise them,
Speaker 1: as well as Chinese entrepreneurs and others only peripherally engage
Speaker 1: in Chinese politics, is that we have now embarked upon
Speaker 1: a period of deep strategic review in Beijing about what
Speaker 1: its response to the new American strategy should be, and
Speaker 1: the jury in Beijing is still out on where that
Speaker 1: will go. The US China relationship plays itself out at
Speaker 1: the commanding heights of military relations, economic relations, diplomatic relations.
Speaker 1: People like you have access to it, but listeners to
Speaker 1: this show, I think, want to know if they think
Speaker 1: this situation is as dangerous and high stakes as you say,
Speaker 1: what can they do? Are there things that ordinary people
Speaker 1: can do to reduce tensions reduce the risk of conflict
Speaker 1: with China? Well, if the audience of this program is
Speaker 1: sort of a wider public opinion the United States and
Speaker 1: let's call it friends and Allies of America, as I'm
Speaker 1: assuming this may not achieve a wide broadcast reach into
Speaker 1: China itself, then I suppose my thoughts would be as follows.
Speaker 1: And what I say to American policy leaders, whether they
Speaker 1: are Republican or a Democrat, is much the same. Number
Speaker 1: one is, think through very carefully what actual political or
Speaker 1: policy change you want to see broad about in China,
Speaker 1: as opposed to what just sounds good in terms of
Speaker 1: American domestic political sound bites for either a primary in
Speaker 1: the Democrats case or President Trump's rolling reelect on the other.
Speaker 1: In other words, what's going to work, what's going to
Speaker 1: be effective in changing concrete Chinese economic practices? And therefore,
Speaker 1: to think through very carefully what can deliver those outcomes
Speaker 1: as opposed to that which actually compounds the problem in
Speaker 1: Chinese actual behaviors. What do I mean by that? I
Speaker 1: think there is always a danger with an American rhetorical
Speaker 1: overreach in response to China, that you create circumstances within
Speaker 1: Beijing itself which enable political leaders to simply circle the wagons,
Speaker 1: haul up the nationalist flag, and unite the country against
Speaker 1: the American threat, as opposed to a dynamic which actually
Speaker 1: does exist or has existed most recently in China, which
Speaker 1: actually itself internally asks the question have our political leaders
Speaker 1: in China begun to overreach? Have we gone too far
Speaker 1: with ireland reclamation in the South China Sea? Have we
Speaker 1: gone far too far with bri Is it affordable? Is
Speaker 1: it in fact sustainable? Can we Chinese do this without
Speaker 1: attracting massive foreign policy reaction? Is China twenty twenty five
Speaker 1: as a high technology strategy which declares that we will
Speaker 1: overtake every other Western country in high tech and AI
Speaker 1: in the next decade? Is that vastly too provocative? Is
Speaker 1: it realizable? And was it smart to abolish term limits
Speaker 1: for the presidency of our country? These are the sorts
Speaker 1: of shall I say, doubts and anxieties within the Chinese
Speaker 1: domestic politic which American policy leaders should be mindful of
Speaker 1: in how they deploy their policy. In other words, to
Speaker 1: be more granular in their response to China, rather than
Speaker 1: simply taking the grand political sledge hammer, which can induce
Speaker 1: instead a much cruder nationalist response. You're talking in a
Speaker 1: way about trying to win over a Chinese people as
Speaker 1: opposed to affecting government policy directly. But can that work
Speaker 1: in a country without democratic accountability, where the opinion of
Speaker 1: the public, first of all, if it's based on information
Speaker 1: and genuine information at all, doesn't have any obvious impact.
Speaker 1: I think the beginning of the analysis of what makes
Speaker 1: Chinese politics tick is along these lines. First of all,
Speaker 1: there are eighty six million members of the Chinese Communist Party,
Speaker 1: and there are one point four billion Chinese people, and
Speaker 1: both the members of the party and the wider public now,
Speaker 1: whether we like it or not, and with the Beijing
Speaker 1: likes it a lot, have multiple sources of information. Despite
Speaker 1: the firewall. For example, these Hong Kong protests have spread
Speaker 1: like wildfire within China itself because there's just a limit
Speaker 1: to how much you can shut down within a two
Speaker 1: hour period. It's like playing whack a mole in Chinese
Speaker 1: social media. You shut down one here and bombed bumps
Speaker 1: up there. That's the first piece. I think the second
Speaker 1: piece in the analysis is this Within the Chinese Communist Party,
Speaker 1: It's not monolithic eighty six million members. There are a
Speaker 1: bunch of different views, as there are within a twenty
Speaker 1: five member polyp Ero and even a seven member committee,
Speaker 1: the Politburo, which functions effectively as the Chinese cabinet. They
Speaker 1: all have multiple sources of information. The danger for American
Speaker 1: strategy is this has reflected in a conversation I had
Speaker 1: recently with a friend of mine in b Junior I've
Speaker 1: known for twenty five years and is someone who's quite
Speaker 1: politically literate. He said, you know President Trump's strategy towards China,
Speaker 1: there's doubling down against China, and the way in which
Speaker 1: he has conducted the trade war as an expression of
Speaker 1: US national interests only has fundamentally eroded the pro American
Speaker 1: constituency within China itself. Why because in the past, American
Speaker 1: presidents have acted almost as a representative of two forces
Speaker 1: in the world. City on the Hill that is representing
Speaker 1: a much wider universal set of values as well as
Speaker 1: obviously being president of the national interests of the United
Speaker 1: States itself. But previous American presidents have sought to, as
Speaker 1: it were, represent both. Now we see an American nationalist
Speaker 1: president who, frankly, in China's domestic view, is no more
Speaker 1: principled than Vladimir Putin or any other leader. And bringing
Speaker 1: up well, if you look carefully at what President Trump
Speaker 1: has said since he became president, he doesn't talk about
Speaker 1: democracy in the world. It doesn't talk about human rights
Speaker 1: in the world. In fact, he often begrudgingly speaks about
Speaker 1: allied interests in the world when he says, maga, make
Speaker 1: America great again, and let's put America first. And if
Speaker 1: you looked at his most recent presidential political rally on
Speaker 1: launching formerly his reelect about the first interest of every
Speaker 1: American president being to look after American citizens, but to
Speaker 1: the exclusion of the interests and values which unite the
Speaker 1: family of Nations, which have by and large supported American
Speaker 1: global leadership since Narting forty one, not forty five forty one,
Speaker 1: then the critique are here in Beijing on the part
Speaker 1: of those who are more objective observers of these things
Speaker 1: in the Chinese domestic politic, I think has some foundation.
Speaker 1: In other words, is President Trump trashing the global democratic brand?
Speaker 1: That is global democracy brand? And is he trashing also
Speaker 1: at the same time, the American brand within China. More broadly,
Speaker 1: hence my question about the way in which American strategy
Speaker 1: towards China is pursued. I'm not arguing for some sort
Speaker 1: of Namby Pamby kind of hand holding. Isn't China great?
Speaker 1: It's a wonderful civilization that never does anything wrong. Approach.
Speaker 1: That's never been my approach. If you look at my
Speaker 1: own period as Prime Minister of Australia, we had many, many,
Speaker 1: many fundamental disagreements with the Chinese, but without fundamentally imploding
Speaker 1: the Australia China relationship. It's that sort of granularity which
Speaker 1: I would recommend to our American friends, while recognizing the
Speaker 1: fact that Americas are superpower. Australia obviously is not. But
Speaker 1: there's a way in which you conduct your strategy towards
Speaker 1: the Chinese which should be mindful of the breadth of
Speaker 1: opinions within China itself, rather than simply assuming it's one
Speaker 1: monolithic block determined to, as it were, destroy the United States.
Speaker 1: Well that and Kevin Rod, thank you for joining us. Unsolvable.
Speaker 1: Good to be with you and maybe solve more things together.
Speaker 1: I can already hear me self repeating some of what
Speaker 1: Kevin Rudd said at party. So I sound like smart
Speaker 1: and informed, Like, guys, listen up. We need to be
Speaker 1: mindful of the breath of opinions within China itself, rather
Speaker 1: than simply assuming it's one monolithic block. Everyone would be like, yeah,
Speaker 1: maybe that's so true. But seriously, when tensions appear to
Speaker 1: be rising inexorably, it's easy to lose sight of the
Speaker 1: diversity of opinions within all sides of a dispute, and
Speaker 1: to remember that this means there can be room to
Speaker 1: find common ground when things heat up between the US
Speaker 1: and Iran or the US and North Korea. It's good
Speaker 1: to know that in the background there are diplomats with
Speaker 1: experience and goodwill in countries like China and Australia and
Speaker 1: the UK working to resolve issues with China before they
Speaker 1: get as dangerous as that. As we've heard in other
Speaker 1: episodes of Solvable, peace between nations is fragile and takes
Speaker 1: work and courage, arguably even more courage than war. Solvable
Speaker 1: is a collaboration between Pushkin Industries and the Rockefeller Foundation,
Speaker 1: with production by Laura Hyde, Hester Kant, Laura Sheeter, and
Speaker 1: Ruth Barnes. From Chalk and Blade. Pushkin's executive producer is
Speaker 1: Neil LaBelle. Research by sher Vincent, Engineering by Jason Gambrel
Speaker 1: and the great folks at GSI Studios. Original music composed
Speaker 1: by Pascal Wise and special thanks to Maggie Taylor, Heather Fine,
Speaker 1: Julia Barton, Carli Mgliori, Jacob Weisberg, and Malcolm Gladwell. You
Speaker 1: can learn more about solving today's biggest problems at Rockefeller
Speaker 1: Foundation dot org slash solvable. I'm Mave Higgins. Now go
Speaker 1: solve it six