WEBVTT - US-China Conflict is Solvable 0:00:15.076 --> 0:00:22.036 Pushkin. I'm Mave Higgins, and this is solvable Interviews with 0:00:22.116 --> 0:00:25.756 the world's most innovative thinkers working to solve the world's 0:00:25.756 --> 0:00:30.236 biggest problems. I think a solvable is preventing conflict between 0:00:30.316 --> 0:00:33.316 China and the United States. That is Kevin Rudd, the 0:00:33.396 --> 0:00:36.716 former Prime Minister of Australia. He's now the president of 0:00:36.756 --> 0:00:42.116 the Asia Society Policy Institute. Okay so. As of this year, 0:00:42.236 --> 0:00:45.636 the United States has the world's largest economy and China 0:00:45.756 --> 0:00:49.316 has the second largest, but most economists estimate that China 0:00:49.356 --> 0:00:52.596 will overtake the United States as the largest economy in 0:00:52.636 --> 0:00:57.196 around ten to fifteen years. As China grows. The increasing 0:00:57.316 --> 0:01:00.716 rivalry between the two countries has led to an increasingly 0:01:00.876 --> 0:01:04.556 rocky relationship. While President Trump has said that he and 0:01:04.596 --> 0:01:07.716 the Chinese leader, shi Jing Ping will always be friends, 0:01:08.196 --> 0:01:13.156 the US administer stration has been expressing serious concerns about China. 0:01:13.276 --> 0:01:15.756 In June, the Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said to 0:01:15.796 --> 0:01:19.476 a news conference, China wants to be the dominant economic 0:01:19.516 --> 0:01:23.396 and military power of the world, spreading its authoritarian vision 0:01:23.436 --> 0:01:28.156 for society and its corrupt practices worldwide. The tensions between 0:01:28.156 --> 0:01:31.076 the two countries are playing out through the economy and 0:01:31.236 --> 0:01:35.076 through national security. In the United States, there are concerns 0:01:35.116 --> 0:01:39.116 about Chinese ownership of US infrastructure and the potential for 0:01:39.276 --> 0:01:42.516 Chinese made products to be used to spy on or 0:01:42.596 --> 0:01:46.276 damage the US, and the two countries remain in dispute 0:01:46.316 --> 0:01:50.356 over territorial issues in the South China Sea. Looking at 0:01:50.396 --> 0:01:53.316 the economy, last year, the US imposed three rounds of 0:01:53.356 --> 0:01:56.396 tariffs on more than two hundred and fifty billion dollars 0:01:56.436 --> 0:02:01.476 worth of Chinese goods, on everything from handbags to railway equipment. 0:02:02.316 --> 0:02:07.476 China hit back by imposing tariffs on US products including chemicals, coal, 0:02:07.596 --> 0:02:12.516 and medical equipment. But while officially Washington and Beijing have 0:02:12.636 --> 0:02:16.476 agreed to a truce in their escalating trade war, experts 0:02:16.556 --> 0:02:19.796 including Kevin Rudd, who spent much of his career as 0:02:19.876 --> 0:02:24.076 a diplomat and China expert, are really concerned about the 0:02:24.156 --> 0:02:27.956 potential for this relationship, which has the power to affect 0:02:27.996 --> 0:02:32.036 basically everyone in the world, and to become an armed conflict. 0:02:33.756 --> 0:02:37.916 The Asia Society Policy Institute, which Kevin Rudd leads, is 0:02:37.956 --> 0:02:41.836 a think tank with a problem solving mandate. Kevin Rudd's 0:02:41.916 --> 0:02:47.236 job is to tackle policy challenges confronting the Asia Pacific insecurity, 0:02:47.436 --> 0:02:52.556 prosperity and sustainability, basically working to avoid war between the 0:02:52.556 --> 0:02:56.076 world's two biggest powers. He's so calm and steady as 0:02:56.116 --> 0:02:59.756 he discusses this job with Jacob Weissberg, You'd be forgiven 0:02:59.796 --> 0:03:03.436 for thinking this huge task is an easy one. As 0:03:03.436 --> 0:03:07.476 you'll hear, it's not. But he has a solvable What 0:03:07.836 --> 0:03:11.876 is the problem of potential or conflict between China and 0:03:11.876 --> 0:03:14.236 the United States? That is why are we worried about it? 0:03:14.476 --> 0:03:18.076 If you spend enough time in Beijing and Washington these days, 0:03:18.876 --> 0:03:22.116 you know that both countries war plans are alive and 0:03:22.196 --> 0:03:26.796 well and are being modernized and modernized around two sets 0:03:26.796 --> 0:03:31.356 of scenarios, a collision between military assets and the South 0:03:31.476 --> 0:03:36.356 China Sea or over future political and military contingencies on 0:03:36.396 --> 0:03:41.036 the future of Taiwan. These have now become sharper, much sharper, 0:03:41.116 --> 0:03:45.476 because of the fundamental deterioration in the political relationship between 0:03:45.516 --> 0:03:48.636 the two countries, which right now is in its worst 0:03:48.716 --> 0:03:51.996 condition really since the end of tenement. Yeavin, why is 0:03:51.996 --> 0:03:55.236 it europe problem? Why is this the problem you've dealt on? 0:03:55.556 --> 0:03:58.516 Because there's no such thing as a bilateral armed conflict 0:03:58.596 --> 0:04:02.356 between China and the United States. It automatically involves America's 0:04:02.396 --> 0:04:04.916 friends and allies around the region, by which I mean 0:04:04.996 --> 0:04:08.716 the Asia Pacific region and the world meaning the Europeans 0:04:08.716 --> 0:04:11.276 as well, whether they like it or not. And for 0:04:11.316 --> 0:04:13.716 those of us in the world who also believe that 0:04:14.036 --> 0:04:16.116 we can walk and chew gum at the same time, 0:04:16.596 --> 0:04:19.916 which has had a productive relationship with China while still 0:04:19.956 --> 0:04:22.356 being a friend and ally of the United States, this 0:04:22.476 --> 0:04:25.636 is more than a passing academic interest. So there is 0:04:25.676 --> 0:04:30.876 this idea of the inevitability of conflict military conflict between 0:04:31.156 --> 0:04:34.516 US and China, this notion of the facilities trap, that 0:04:34.716 --> 0:04:40.116 great powers end up in conflict with each other. Like 0:04:40.276 --> 0:04:43.076 it or not, you why is that? Why is that 0:04:44.076 --> 0:04:47.076 theory wrong in this case? I don't believe the theory 0:04:47.196 --> 0:04:51.236 is of itself wrong in terms of it being predictive 0:04:52.076 --> 0:04:56.756 of certain forms of political and ultimate armed conflict. However, 0:04:56.996 --> 0:05:00.596 I do not think it's determinist That is, history also 0:05:00.716 --> 0:05:03.716 tells us that there are ways out of facidities trap. 0:05:03.956 --> 0:05:07.636 For me, the most alive set of precedents we're looking 0:05:07.676 --> 0:05:10.396 at in the current environment are those not of the 0:05:10.436 --> 0:05:14.076 Second World War, but the first in the First World War, 0:05:14.196 --> 0:05:19.076 we saw two sets of fundamental dynamics underway. Britain concerned 0:05:19.116 --> 0:05:24.316 about the rise of Germany and Germany surpassing Britain in 0:05:24.476 --> 0:05:29.636 terms of naval power and aggregate economic power. And simultaneously, 0:05:29.836 --> 0:05:34.516 Germany concerned about the industrialization of Russia and what therefore 0:05:34.756 --> 0:05:39.076 a future Russian Empire could look like given its larger population, 0:05:39.156 --> 0:05:42.036 as a strategic threat to Germany. And then we had 0:05:42.476 --> 0:05:46.476 the incendiary event, which was an assassination in obscure place 0:05:46.796 --> 0:05:50.996 in Serbia of Archduke Ferdinand, who nobody had ever heard of, 0:05:51.716 --> 0:05:54.756 but it was capable of igniting a much more fundamental 0:05:55.276 --> 0:06:00.916 geopolitical and geostrategic conflict. Was war inevitable? No, it was 0:06:00.956 --> 0:06:06.196 the most avoidable war in history, a comprehensive failure of diplomacy. Therefore, 0:06:06.236 --> 0:06:09.356 when we apply that logic to the events of US 0:06:09.436 --> 0:06:12.316 China relations in the twenty first century, many of these 0:06:12.396 --> 0:06:17.876 dynamics remain alive. A rising power, an established power triggering 0:06:17.876 --> 0:06:21.236 events in the South China Sea and or Taiwan. But 0:06:21.276 --> 0:06:25.596 my judgment is diplomacy always is capable of finding a 0:06:25.636 --> 0:06:28.116 way through. We simply need to be focused on the 0:06:28.236 --> 0:06:31.196 seriousness of the threat and the credible nature of the 0:06:31.236 --> 0:06:36.356 alternative off ramps. We're in at least the early stage 0:06:36.356 --> 0:06:38.916 as if not the fourth rittled version of a US 0:06:39.036 --> 0:06:43.756 China trade war. Is the scenario you worry most about, 0:06:44.116 --> 0:06:49.076 a trade war or economic conflict escalating into military conflict, 0:06:49.196 --> 0:06:51.116 or do you think it will come. If it comes, 0:06:51.476 --> 0:06:54.556 that the risk comes from something else Entirely. In the 0:06:54.716 --> 0:07:00.076 history of political relationships and diplomatic relationships, it is never 0:07:00.156 --> 0:07:02.596 a neat binary of one thing or the other. It's 0:07:02.596 --> 0:07:06.196 a multiplicity of contributing factors. What we see with the 0:07:06.236 --> 0:07:10.676 trade war, however, is one articular elation of a much 0:07:10.836 --> 0:07:17.236 broader American strategic rethink against China, which began frankly with 0:07:17.436 --> 0:07:21.236 the election of the Trump administration, but was in part 0:07:21.316 --> 0:07:25.076 in train before that as well. And how do we 0:07:25.276 --> 0:07:30.316 characterize that. The Trump administration in December of twenty seventeen 0:07:30.356 --> 0:07:34.436 announced a new national security strategy where it proclaimed the 0:07:34.596 --> 0:07:38.516 end formally of forty years of strategic engagement with China 0:07:38.556 --> 0:07:41.396 and the commencement of a new period of strategic competition 0:07:41.516 --> 0:07:44.956 against China. At the same time, China, since the election 0:07:45.036 --> 0:07:49.396 of Shijinping as president and party secretary in twenty twelve 0:07:49.516 --> 0:07:54.956 thirteen has embarked upon a consciously more assertive Chinese strategy 0:07:55.036 --> 0:07:58.876 in the economy and foreign policy and security policy. And 0:07:58.916 --> 0:08:03.316 so we now have these two new dynamic forces interacting 0:08:03.356 --> 0:08:06.756 with each other, for which the current as it were, flashpoint, 0:08:06.756 --> 0:08:11.316 as the trade war, it is, if you like, simply 0:08:11.436 --> 0:08:16.076 the icing on the cake of a much broader, unfolding 0:08:16.076 --> 0:08:21.316 American strategy involving rolling back against China on the rest 0:08:21.356 --> 0:08:26.956 of the economy, investment, capital markets, technology markets, talent markets, 0:08:27.556 --> 0:08:31.196 as well as classical foreign policy and security policy, as 0:08:31.236 --> 0:08:36.516 well as the continuing unresolved dilemma of human rights between China, 0:08:36.716 --> 0:08:39.636 the US, and the rest. So what we don't know 0:08:40.116 --> 0:08:43.236 is if and when the trade war is resolved or 0:08:43.276 --> 0:08:46.636 at least brought to an uneasy piece, whether the rest 0:08:46.716 --> 0:08:50.716 of the American roll back against Chinese power will then unfold. 0:08:51.116 --> 0:08:54.916 The administration remains divided on that, just as the Chinese 0:08:54.916 --> 0:08:58.876 administration remains divided about how now to proceed. That's why 0:08:58.916 --> 0:09:03.116 we are currently in a dangerous environment. So you see 0:09:03.156 --> 0:09:06.996 signs that there is military build up, more preparation for 0:09:07.076 --> 0:09:11.396 a potential war. It's in the last couple of years. 0:09:11.876 --> 0:09:15.996 But what points that towards conflict as opposed to a 0:09:16.036 --> 0:09:19.116 balance of power and detroits. Well. Again, if we look 0:09:19.116 --> 0:09:21.996 at the precedence of the First World War, the operating 0:09:22.156 --> 0:09:25.916 principle applying in the minds and the chanceriies of Europe 0:09:26.116 --> 0:09:29.356 prior to the guns of August of nineteen fourteen was 0:09:29.396 --> 0:09:34.676 a balance of power central alliance of German in the 0:09:34.676 --> 0:09:40.396 Austro Hungarian Empire versus Britain, France and Russia in those 0:09:40.476 --> 0:09:44.596 days the Russian Empire. Unfortunately, balances of power, because they 0:09:44.596 --> 0:09:50.196 are balancers, are inherently unstable and they can be triggered 0:09:50.236 --> 0:09:57.756 by underlying incendury political events. So while balances of power 0:09:57.796 --> 0:10:00.996 are one thing, the bottom line is much of the 0:10:01.076 --> 0:10:05.356 reaction in Washington is being generated by a political conclusion 0:10:06.636 --> 0:10:10.116 and a national security policy conclusion, and that the balance 0:10:10.276 --> 0:10:14.076 is moving more decisively in China's direction. We see that 0:10:14.156 --> 0:10:18.116 already manifest in the classical instruments of economic power. China 0:10:18.196 --> 0:10:21.676 is already the largest economic partner of practically every country 0:10:21.676 --> 0:10:24.916 in Asia. That was not the case ten or twenty 0:10:24.996 --> 0:10:28.396 years ago. And if you look at the force modernization, 0:10:28.556 --> 0:10:32.916 the PLA and it's naval assets, it's air assets, but 0:10:33.036 --> 0:10:37.636 in particular it's capacity to use its onshore rocket forces 0:10:38.276 --> 0:10:43.156 to create a much more effective airc denial strategy against 0:10:43.276 --> 0:10:46.276 US armed forces in the West Pacific. These are new, 0:10:46.796 --> 0:10:49.596 These were not there ten years ago. That's why we 0:10:49.636 --> 0:10:53.076 are in a volatile environment. I think the assumption has 0:10:53.156 --> 0:10:57.716 been the most likely triggering a vent to military conflict 0:10:57.756 --> 0:11:02.076 would be over Taiwan, that China would act take power 0:11:02.476 --> 0:11:07.436 in Taiwan, and that the United States would react might react. Now, 0:11:07.596 --> 0:11:13.916 the American policy historically been strategic ambiguity, so it's not 0:11:14.276 --> 0:11:17.556 we don't have a stated policy about whether we would 0:11:17.556 --> 0:11:20.996 defend Taiwan or not. How has that changed you think 0:11:20.996 --> 0:11:23.436 the risk there has increased or the risk has simply 0:11:23.476 --> 0:11:28.116 shifted to other potential theaters of military coamflet The classical 0:11:28.156 --> 0:11:33.196 scenario concerning Taiwan still remains the most incendiary because there 0:11:33.196 --> 0:11:38.356 are three moving parts within it. Now Chinese nationalism under 0:11:38.356 --> 0:11:42.756 Shi Jinping, where his statements over the last five years 0:11:42.756 --> 0:11:47.716 have become progressively sharper on the future of Taiwan and 0:11:47.916 --> 0:11:52.076 the point at which China would wish to see Taiwan 0:11:52.196 --> 0:11:56.316 returned by peaceful or non peaceful means to the Motherland's 0:11:56.356 --> 0:12:03.596 tender embrace. Secondly, in Taiwan itself, a DPP administration in 0:12:03.676 --> 0:12:07.916 this rambunctious Taiwanese democracy which is fun to watch but 0:12:07.956 --> 0:12:13.196 it's sometimes scary to analyze, and the predisposition of the 0:12:13.236 --> 0:12:16.596 Democratic Progress Party not just under Taiying one but the 0:12:16.636 --> 0:12:21.836 rest of her party supporters to resist any form of 0:12:22.036 --> 0:12:25.596 embrace from the motherland, to move more decisively in an 0:12:25.676 --> 0:12:30.796 independentist direction, which is China's internal redline. And Thirdly, under 0:12:30.796 --> 0:12:36.316 the Trump administration, let's say less strategic ambiguity than we've 0:12:36.316 --> 0:12:40.196 seen on the part of previous American administrations. For example, 0:12:40.756 --> 0:12:44.036 not just the most recent American Taiwanese arms deal, but 0:12:44.076 --> 0:12:47.716 the fact that you now have open meetings between Taiwanese 0:12:47.836 --> 0:12:52.436 national security officials and the National Security Adviser of the 0:12:52.476 --> 0:12:55.956 United States in the White House. These are new and 0:12:56.156 --> 0:12:59.796 different instruments of US policy, backed up by a new 0:12:59.836 --> 0:13:03.156 and fresh congressional level of support for Taiwan as well. 0:13:03.556 --> 0:13:07.036 How does this admixture produce a future Taiwan crisis? I 0:13:07.116 --> 0:13:11.996 can't predict, but the possibilities are no longer remote and 0:13:12.116 --> 0:13:17.196 they don't become probable, but they are still becoming increasingly quantifiable. 0:13:17.476 --> 0:13:22.196 We've recently seen China back down something I wouldn't have expected, 0:13:22.516 --> 0:13:26.516 in the faith of massive public protests, and Hong Kong 0:13:26.636 --> 0:13:29.916 over an extradition law that was one of a number 0:13:29.956 --> 0:13:35.556 of incremental steps limiting some of the democratic prerogatives of 0:13:35.676 --> 0:13:39.076 Hong Kong. That surprised you, not entirely because if we 0:13:39.076 --> 0:13:42.356 look at the history of Hong Kong since to handover 0:13:42.396 --> 0:13:45.196 in nineteen ninety seven, and I'm old enough and ugly 0:13:45.316 --> 0:13:48.596 enough to have been around for the handover and in 0:13:48.676 --> 0:13:53.236 fact began my diplomatic career at the time when Thatcher 0:13:53.356 --> 0:13:57.116 signed a joint declaration with Dungsaping back in nineteen eighty four. 0:13:58.356 --> 0:14:02.956 The dynamics of Hong Kong PRC politics have always been 0:14:03.036 --> 0:14:06.396 on the volatile side. There are massive public protests, for 0:14:06.436 --> 0:14:09.276 example by the Hong Kong As in two thousand and two, 0:14:09.796 --> 0:14:13.876 which also brought about a u turn in Chinese policy 0:14:14.476 --> 0:14:18.236 on a proposed set of changes. Back then, they failed. 0:14:18.276 --> 0:14:22.356 In twenty fourteen, that is, public protests in twenty nineteen, 0:14:22.356 --> 0:14:30.196 they've succeeded the PARC leadership while always seeking incrementally to 0:14:30.396 --> 0:14:35.396 reduce Hong Kong's aggregate political autonomy within the framework of 0:14:35.396 --> 0:14:39.356 one country two systems has never been shall I say 0:14:41.156 --> 0:14:45.316 so doctrinaire that it can't accept political reality when it 0:14:45.396 --> 0:14:50.196 sees it. I think the parallel resolve, however, will be 0:14:50.956 --> 0:14:54.996 in China itself, where it fears Chinese protests could emulate 0:14:55.036 --> 0:14:58.076 those undertaken in Hong Kong, will be an even a 0:14:58.076 --> 0:15:01.116 more vicious crackdown against any evidence of descent within the 0:15:01.196 --> 0:15:05.356 PRC proper. So let's talk about the salvable aspect of this. 0:15:05.516 --> 0:15:08.756 You point to the escalating consions, you point to some 0:15:08.836 --> 0:15:12.956 of the potential flashpoints. Yeah, you think the war is 0:15:12.996 --> 0:15:15.716 avoidable and the risk can be reduced. How are we 0:15:15.756 --> 0:15:19.116 going to do that? Well, the degree of difficulty, given 0:15:19.196 --> 0:15:22.716 what we face at present in US China relations is hard. 0:15:23.556 --> 0:15:27.316 And I say that as a preliminary comment because both 0:15:27.356 --> 0:15:31.476 in Washington and Beijing at the moment, standing up and 0:15:31.476 --> 0:15:33.836 giving a speech and holding an olive branch is a 0:15:33.876 --> 0:15:36.876 good way to get shot down. At the moment, in Washington, 0:15:36.996 --> 0:15:39.556 increasing the question which has asked if people like me 0:15:39.756 --> 0:15:42.876 is well, Kevin, who side are you on? There's are ours? 0:15:43.956 --> 0:15:46.476 And the question I get asked in Beijing increasingly is 0:15:46.556 --> 0:15:50.156 much the same Kevin Old, friend of China, speaker of 0:15:50.236 --> 0:15:53.396 Chinese language, person who's visited our country for one hundred 0:15:53.396 --> 0:15:55.996 and fifty times over at last thirty five years. Are 0:15:55.996 --> 0:15:58.676 you with the Americans? Are you with us? And the 0:15:58.716 --> 0:16:01.596 bottom line is my response to both those questions is 0:16:01.636 --> 0:16:05.676 not as some unpeace envoy. It's simply saying, from a 0:16:05.716 --> 0:16:10.196 perspective of constructive realism, how do we navigate a way 0:16:10.236 --> 0:16:12.916 through this unless either of you actually want to go 0:16:12.996 --> 0:16:15.476 to war? And when I ask that question there's usually 0:16:15.476 --> 0:16:19.396 a long pause. But on the practical question of how 0:16:19.436 --> 0:16:22.996 then to proceed, my argument would be this that a 0:16:23.156 --> 0:16:27.716 rational analysis by both countries of their fundamental national interests 0:16:27.716 --> 0:16:31.396 and their fundamental national values which are at play here, 0:16:32.076 --> 0:16:36.956 leads to you to kind of three conclusions. Category one 0:16:37.276 --> 0:16:41.516 is those questions of national interest to national values where 0:16:41.516 --> 0:16:47.556 there is no solution, for example Taiwan, for example, over 0:16:47.676 --> 0:16:55.876 the country's fundamentally different political systems. One's authoritarian capitalist system China, 0:16:56.036 --> 0:17:01.196 and the other is America, which is there's rolling rambunctious 0:17:01.196 --> 0:17:06.316 some would say two rambunctious political democracy and equally rambunctious 0:17:06.716 --> 0:17:09.396 capitalist system which from time to time through is out 0:17:09.436 --> 0:17:11.996 to the rest of US things like the global financial crisis, 0:17:12.236 --> 0:17:13.636 but we forgive you for that. It was going to 0:17:13.676 --> 0:17:16.716 thank eving the one country has an authoritarian capitalist system 0:17:16.836 --> 0:17:19.396 and the other has a president who wants an authoritarian 0:17:19.436 --> 0:17:22.196 capitalist world. You could say that I couldn't possibly comment 0:17:22.276 --> 0:17:25.676 because you're an American and I'm not, so I'm just 0:17:25.756 --> 0:17:29.916 a guess. You've always had impactable manners the diplomat. It's 0:17:29.956 --> 0:17:32.076 never been said at we Australians. We've often said we 0:17:32.116 --> 0:17:35.076 have no manners at all. We try so I think 0:17:35.196 --> 0:17:38.636 you know, can't agree. One here is what's the stuff 0:17:38.676 --> 0:17:42.316 you can never agree on? And being very blunt about that. 0:17:42.716 --> 0:17:47.236 And there's precedence for this in the relationship between Breshn 0:17:47.316 --> 0:17:53.356 of Soviet Union and the United States. There came a 0:17:53.476 --> 0:17:57.436 point after the Cuban missile crisis where detante was seen 0:17:57.596 --> 0:18:00.236 as not a dirty word, but something which could actually 0:18:00.276 --> 0:18:05.596 be done managing the fundamental differences between the two countries, 0:18:05.676 --> 0:18:08.876 differences which could not be reconciled, but which in the 0:18:09.116 --> 0:18:15.596 inclusion of both countries, do not warrant an underlying view 0:18:15.876 --> 0:18:20.996 that war was inevitable. Category two in the US China 0:18:21.036 --> 0:18:25.356 relations is what stuff between the two countries is hard, 0:18:25.956 --> 0:18:34.036 really hard, but nonetheless manageable and capable of producing mutually 0:18:34.076 --> 0:18:39.876 acceptable solutions which don't violate each country's fundamental interest. Now there, 0:18:39.876 --> 0:18:43.236 I'd just give you two examples. One is North Korean 0:18:43.316 --> 0:18:49.276 nuclear denuclearization, where the differences between Beijing and Washington are 0:18:49.516 --> 0:18:56.676 significant but ultimately not irreconcilable, given that both Beijing and 0:18:56.756 --> 0:19:02.076 Washington would arguably want a more stable Korean peninsula. Another 0:19:02.156 --> 0:19:09.036 example would be China changing it's global economic practices, both 0:19:09.196 --> 0:19:13.676 on trade and investment questions, to open the Chinese economy 0:19:13.796 --> 0:19:17.076 in a much more fundamental way than Chinese decision makers 0:19:17.116 --> 0:19:21.716 have been prepared to allow in the last decade or so, 0:19:21.716 --> 0:19:25.956 so that the underlying nature of the American current critique 0:19:25.956 --> 0:19:30.356 of Chinese economic policy is dealt with by changes in Beijing. 0:19:31.356 --> 0:19:35.676 Are both those things really hard? Yes? Are they doable? Yeah, 0:19:36.276 --> 0:19:42.076 but with absolute diplomatic and political determination. And finally, in 0:19:43.516 --> 0:19:47.076 the way in which I argue this principle of constructive realism, 0:19:47.716 --> 0:19:52.516 there's a category of policy engagement between Beijing and Washington 0:19:52.956 --> 0:19:56.756 which should be easier and doable on a daily basis, 0:19:57.996 --> 0:20:01.396 for example on challenges of global climate change action, and 0:20:01.476 --> 0:20:06.516 for example on challenges of financial and economic governance, through 0:20:06.716 --> 0:20:11.276 institutions such as the G twenty, and frankly, through common 0:20:11.396 --> 0:20:16.236 endeavor in dealing with global or regional humanitarian crises. The 0:20:16.276 --> 0:20:19.516 reason I argue for this way of viewing the relationship 0:20:20.276 --> 0:20:22.796 is that when we get locked into what the Chinese 0:20:22.836 --> 0:20:27.436 would describe as a silly a way of thinking about 0:20:27.476 --> 0:20:31.276 each other, in this case China the United States, which 0:20:31.316 --> 0:20:34.876 heavy loads category one, which is it's all doom, gloom 0:20:34.916 --> 0:20:40.716 and despair without regard to category two and category three, 0:20:41.356 --> 0:20:44.636 then we can end up in self fulfilling prophecies about 0:20:44.676 --> 0:20:48.916 the way in which this relationship evolves. By contrast, if 0:20:48.956 --> 0:20:51.676 you adopt what I have argued as being a framework 0:20:51.716 --> 0:20:55.756 of constructive realism, which is being realist about the stuff 0:20:55.796 --> 0:21:00.036 you can never agree upon and constructive about the rest 0:21:00.036 --> 0:21:02.716 of it, and if you are constructive about the rest 0:21:02.716 --> 0:21:07.676 of it incrementally building greater strategic trust over time, then 0:21:07.716 --> 0:21:13.156 you can navigate these changing fundamental geopolitical dynamics between the 0:21:13.196 --> 0:21:15.836 two and the balance of power between the two over 0:21:15.916 --> 0:21:20.476 time in a peaceful way. We've only seen glimpses so 0:21:20.676 --> 0:21:26.236 far of Chinese nationalism rallying against the United States, as 0:21:26.276 --> 0:21:31.036 an enemy. It hasn't. Really, It seems that Si Jinping 0:21:31.196 --> 0:21:36.156 hasn't pulled out that weapon yet. He hasn't brought people. 0:21:36.356 --> 0:21:39.676 We haven't seen people in the streets in China burning 0:21:39.716 --> 0:21:42.916 the US flag. Is there a risk that happens over 0:21:42.996 --> 0:21:48.796 the trade war or that something else unleashes this public 0:21:48.916 --> 0:21:53.396 demand for more of a reaction against the United States. Well, 0:21:53.476 --> 0:21:56.836 his studios China relationships kind of an interesting beast, and 0:21:57.036 --> 0:22:00.236 those of us who've studied this over the years still 0:22:00.276 --> 0:22:05.556 find it interesting and not just interesting, but troubling without 0:22:05.596 --> 0:22:09.396 boring your listeners. The sixty second Summaries a bit like this. 0:22:11.876 --> 0:22:16.796 Twenty years plus of strategic animosity forty nine to seventy two, 0:22:17.396 --> 0:22:19.876 not just the Korean War where you killed each other 0:22:20.796 --> 0:22:24.756 in large numbers, but the Taiwan Straits crises of that period, 0:22:24.756 --> 0:22:28.476 which almost brought you to war on multiple occasions. President 0:22:28.516 --> 0:22:32.396 Eisenhower threatening nuclear obliteration of China on a number of occasions, 0:22:33.276 --> 0:22:36.276 then Nixon and Kissinger and day tomed Mao and Joe 0:22:36.316 --> 0:22:40.436 and Lye taking us from seventy two really until the 0:22:40.556 --> 0:22:44.276 collapse of the Soviet Union in ninety one. But the 0:22:44.396 --> 0:22:48.476 organizing principle there was a common strategic enemy, namely the 0:22:48.516 --> 0:22:53.796 Soviet Union. Period three was really from ninety one through 0:22:53.916 --> 0:22:58.676 until I would say the rise of Shijinping in two 0:22:58.556 --> 0:23:03.556 thousand and twelve thirteen, with a common mission statement between 0:23:03.596 --> 0:23:07.996 the two countries. No longer strategic collaboration, the common enemy 0:23:07.996 --> 0:23:11.556 had gone. It was common economic engagement and how can 0:23:11.596 --> 0:23:15.316 we each benefit each other's economies With an implied American 0:23:15.356 --> 0:23:19.316 assumption the Chinese would fully open their economy and in 0:23:19.516 --> 0:23:24.836 America's utopian dreams, China ultimately transforming itself into a democracy 0:23:24.916 --> 0:23:29.076 of Singaporean type characteristics. Then we come to the present, 0:23:29.356 --> 0:23:32.996 a more assertive China since twenty twelve thirteen under shi Jingping, 0:23:33.596 --> 0:23:37.796 Belton Road Initiative of South China see Island Reclamation China 0:23:37.836 --> 0:23:41.036 twenty twenty five, high technology strategies, as well as she 0:23:41.236 --> 0:23:44.636 Jingping abolishing term limits. And we now are where we 0:23:44.676 --> 0:23:48.796 are with Trump taking us perhaps into this current period 0:23:49.236 --> 0:23:55.116 of a strategic competitive doubling down against China. In the 0:23:55.196 --> 0:23:59.396 period since seventeen, so against all of that, you've had 0:23:59.796 --> 0:24:05.076 vastly evolving Chinese sentiments towards the United States. I spent 0:24:05.156 --> 0:24:07.396 the three of the last six weeks in China, and 0:24:07.476 --> 0:24:10.916 I've seen something of a turn to some of the 0:24:10.996 --> 0:24:14.436 nationalist rhetoric against the United States that we haven't seen 0:24:14.516 --> 0:24:18.276 for at least thirty years, reruns of old Korean War movies, 0:24:19.396 --> 0:24:22.436 revisiting of the spirit of the Long March of thirty four. 0:24:23.676 --> 0:24:27.916 We Chinese can be resilient despite the American bully. This 0:24:27.996 --> 0:24:31.476 language I really haven't seen since the pos Postaleman period. 0:24:31.756 --> 0:24:34.116 It can be turned on and it can be turned off. 0:24:34.596 --> 0:24:37.076 So I think the jury is still out. Did that 0:24:37.116 --> 0:24:41.156 trip Kevin leave you more concerned or more optimestic about 0:24:41.196 --> 0:24:43.916 the possibility for a day time and you were before 0:24:43.956 --> 0:24:50.996 he went. It left me frankly, modestly schizophrenic on the question, 0:24:51.636 --> 0:24:55.356 which is, on the one hand, the economic needs of 0:24:55.436 --> 0:24:58.396 China and the United States. When you strip back all 0:24:58.396 --> 0:25:02.476 the political rhetoric for a trade deal to be done 0:25:02.596 --> 0:25:06.876 in order to restore business confidence in both economies going 0:25:06.916 --> 0:25:14.556 into twenty, in fact becomes clearer that is the economic 0:25:14.676 --> 0:25:17.236 rationale for the two leaders to do a deal and 0:25:17.276 --> 0:25:19.276 to resolve the trade war and get that off the 0:25:19.916 --> 0:25:24.316 political agenda, but also the agenda of markets is as 0:25:24.396 --> 0:25:27.876 strong and as real as it's ever been. At the 0:25:27.996 --> 0:25:32.396 same time, there has been a strategic conclusion I believe 0:25:32.556 --> 0:25:37.396 in China that President Trump cannot be trusted, and more fundamentally, 0:25:37.396 --> 0:25:41.316 a view in China that whether it's Republicans and Democrats 0:25:42.036 --> 0:25:46.756 that the new American resolved doubled down against a rising 0:25:46.916 --> 0:25:51.436 China is now bipartisan, and that therefore the fundamental strategic 0:25:51.476 --> 0:25:54.756 assumptions which have governed the US China relationship since the 0:25:54.796 --> 0:25:59.036 beginning of strategic engagement under Nixon and Kissinger are now 0:25:59.156 --> 0:26:03.396 fundamentally changing. And my conclusion coming out of Beijing and 0:26:03.476 --> 0:26:09.516 speaking to multiple Chinese political leaders and those who advise them, 0:26:10.676 --> 0:26:16.236 as well as Chinese entrepreneurs and others only peripherally engage 0:26:16.276 --> 0:26:19.756 in Chinese politics, is that we have now embarked upon 0:26:19.756 --> 0:26:23.316 a period of deep strategic review in Beijing about what 0:26:23.556 --> 0:26:28.796 its response to the new American strategy should be, and 0:26:28.916 --> 0:26:31.796 the jury in Beijing is still out on where that 0:26:31.876 --> 0:26:35.516 will go. The US China relationship plays itself out at 0:26:35.556 --> 0:26:40.836 the commanding heights of military relations, economic relations, diplomatic relations. 0:26:41.236 --> 0:26:44.956 People like you have access to it, but listeners to 0:26:45.036 --> 0:26:49.956 this show, I think, want to know if they think 0:26:49.996 --> 0:26:53.796 this situation is as dangerous and high stakes as you say, 0:26:54.596 --> 0:26:58.276 what can they do? Are there things that ordinary people 0:26:58.356 --> 0:27:02.596 can do to reduce tensions reduce the risk of conflict 0:27:02.956 --> 0:27:06.196 with China? Well, if the audience of this program is 0:27:06.196 --> 0:27:09.876 sort of a wider public opinion the United States and 0:27:10.196 --> 0:27:13.156 let's call it friends and Allies of America, as I'm 0:27:13.196 --> 0:27:16.316 assuming this may not achieve a wide broadcast reach into 0:27:16.396 --> 0:27:21.156 China itself, then I suppose my thoughts would be as follows. 0:27:22.036 --> 0:27:24.756 And what I say to American policy leaders, whether they 0:27:24.756 --> 0:27:28.356 are Republican or a Democrat, is much the same. Number 0:27:28.396 --> 0:27:33.556 one is, think through very carefully what actual political or 0:27:33.596 --> 0:27:36.796 policy change you want to see broad about in China, 0:27:38.276 --> 0:27:41.076 as opposed to what just sounds good in terms of 0:27:41.076 --> 0:27:45.356 American domestic political sound bites for either a primary in 0:27:45.356 --> 0:27:50.756 the Democrats case or President Trump's rolling reelect on the other. 0:27:51.036 --> 0:27:53.716 In other words, what's going to work, what's going to 0:27:53.756 --> 0:27:59.836 be effective in changing concrete Chinese economic practices? And therefore, 0:27:59.956 --> 0:28:04.476 to think through very carefully what can deliver those outcomes 0:28:05.276 --> 0:28:09.516 as opposed to that which actually compounds the problem in 0:28:09.636 --> 0:28:14.436 Chinese actual behaviors. What do I mean by that? I 0:28:14.476 --> 0:28:17.716 think there is always a danger with an American rhetorical 0:28:17.836 --> 0:28:21.996 overreach in response to China, that you create circumstances within 0:28:22.156 --> 0:28:28.476