1 00:00:15,076 --> 00:00:22,036 Speaker 1: Pushkin. I'm Mave Higgins, and this is solvable Interviews with 2 00:00:22,116 --> 00:00:25,756 Speaker 1: the world's most innovative thinkers working to solve the world's 3 00:00:25,756 --> 00:00:30,236 Speaker 1: biggest problems. I think a solvable is preventing conflict between 4 00:00:30,316 --> 00:00:33,316 Speaker 1: China and the United States. That is Kevin Rudd, the 5 00:00:33,396 --> 00:00:36,716 Speaker 1: former Prime Minister of Australia. He's now the president of 6 00:00:36,756 --> 00:00:42,116 Speaker 1: the Asia Society Policy Institute. Okay so. As of this year, 7 00:00:42,236 --> 00:00:45,636 Speaker 1: the United States has the world's largest economy and China 8 00:00:45,756 --> 00:00:49,316 Speaker 1: has the second largest, but most economists estimate that China 9 00:00:49,356 --> 00:00:52,596 Speaker 1: will overtake the United States as the largest economy in 10 00:00:52,636 --> 00:00:57,196 Speaker 1: around ten to fifteen years. As China grows. The increasing 11 00:00:57,316 --> 00:01:00,716 Speaker 1: rivalry between the two countries has led to an increasingly 12 00:01:00,876 --> 00:01:04,556 Speaker 1: rocky relationship. While President Trump has said that he and 13 00:01:04,596 --> 00:01:07,716 Speaker 1: the Chinese leader, shi Jing Ping will always be friends, 14 00:01:08,196 --> 00:01:13,156 Speaker 1: the US administer stration has been expressing serious concerns about China. 15 00:01:13,276 --> 00:01:15,756 Speaker 1: In June, the Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said to 16 00:01:15,796 --> 00:01:19,476 Speaker 1: a news conference, China wants to be the dominant economic 17 00:01:19,516 --> 00:01:23,396 Speaker 1: and military power of the world, spreading its authoritarian vision 18 00:01:23,436 --> 00:01:28,156 Speaker 1: for society and its corrupt practices worldwide. The tensions between 19 00:01:28,156 --> 00:01:31,076 Speaker 1: the two countries are playing out through the economy and 20 00:01:31,236 --> 00:01:35,076 Speaker 1: through national security. In the United States, there are concerns 21 00:01:35,116 --> 00:01:39,116 Speaker 1: about Chinese ownership of US infrastructure and the potential for 22 00:01:39,276 --> 00:01:42,516 Speaker 1: Chinese made products to be used to spy on or 23 00:01:42,596 --> 00:01:46,276 Speaker 1: damage the US, and the two countries remain in dispute 24 00:01:46,316 --> 00:01:50,356 Speaker 1: over territorial issues in the South China Sea. Looking at 25 00:01:50,396 --> 00:01:53,316 Speaker 1: the economy, last year, the US imposed three rounds of 26 00:01:53,356 --> 00:01:56,396 Speaker 1: tariffs on more than two hundred and fifty billion dollars 27 00:01:56,436 --> 00:02:01,476 Speaker 1: worth of Chinese goods, on everything from handbags to railway equipment. 28 00:02:02,316 --> 00:02:07,476 Speaker 1: China hit back by imposing tariffs on US products including chemicals, coal, 29 00:02:07,596 --> 00:02:12,516 Speaker 1: and medical equipment. But while officially Washington and Beijing have 30 00:02:12,636 --> 00:02:16,476 Speaker 1: agreed to a truce in their escalating trade war, experts 31 00:02:16,556 --> 00:02:19,796 Speaker 1: including Kevin Rudd, who spent much of his career as 32 00:02:19,876 --> 00:02:24,076 Speaker 1: a diplomat and China expert, are really concerned about the 33 00:02:24,156 --> 00:02:27,956 Speaker 1: potential for this relationship, which has the power to affect 34 00:02:27,996 --> 00:02:32,036 Speaker 1: basically everyone in the world, and to become an armed conflict. 35 00:02:33,756 --> 00:02:37,916 Speaker 1: The Asia Society Policy Institute, which Kevin Rudd leads, is 36 00:02:37,956 --> 00:02:41,836 Speaker 1: a think tank with a problem solving mandate. Kevin Rudd's 37 00:02:41,916 --> 00:02:47,236 Speaker 1: job is to tackle policy challenges confronting the Asia Pacific insecurity, 38 00:02:47,436 --> 00:02:52,556 Speaker 1: prosperity and sustainability, basically working to avoid war between the 39 00:02:52,556 --> 00:02:56,076 Speaker 1: world's two biggest powers. He's so calm and steady as 40 00:02:56,116 --> 00:02:59,756 Speaker 1: he discusses this job with Jacob Weissberg, You'd be forgiven 41 00:02:59,796 --> 00:03:03,436 Speaker 1: for thinking this huge task is an easy one. As 42 00:03:03,436 --> 00:03:07,476 Speaker 1: you'll hear, it's not. But he has a solvable What 43 00:03:07,836 --> 00:03:11,876 Speaker 1: is the problem of potential or conflict between China and 44 00:03:11,876 --> 00:03:14,236 Speaker 1: the United States? That is why are we worried about it? 45 00:03:14,476 --> 00:03:18,076 Speaker 1: If you spend enough time in Beijing and Washington these days, 46 00:03:18,876 --> 00:03:22,116 Speaker 1: you know that both countries war plans are alive and 47 00:03:22,196 --> 00:03:26,796 Speaker 1: well and are being modernized and modernized around two sets 48 00:03:26,796 --> 00:03:31,356 Speaker 1: of scenarios, a collision between military assets and the South 49 00:03:31,476 --> 00:03:36,356 Speaker 1: China Sea or over future political and military contingencies on 50 00:03:36,396 --> 00:03:41,036 Speaker 1: the future of Taiwan. These have now become sharper, much sharper, 51 00:03:41,116 --> 00:03:45,476 Speaker 1: because of the fundamental deterioration in the political relationship between 52 00:03:45,516 --> 00:03:48,636 Speaker 1: the two countries, which right now is in its worst 53 00:03:48,716 --> 00:03:51,996 Speaker 1: condition really since the end of tenement. Yeavin, why is 54 00:03:51,996 --> 00:03:55,236 Speaker 1: it europe problem? Why is this the problem you've dealt on? 55 00:03:55,556 --> 00:03:58,516 Speaker 1: Because there's no such thing as a bilateral armed conflict 56 00:03:58,596 --> 00:04:02,356 Speaker 1: between China and the United States. It automatically involves America's 57 00:04:02,396 --> 00:04:04,916 Speaker 1: friends and allies around the region, by which I mean 58 00:04:04,996 --> 00:04:08,716 Speaker 1: the Asia Pacific region and the world meaning the Europeans 59 00:04:08,716 --> 00:04:11,276 Speaker 1: as well, whether they like it or not. And for 60 00:04:11,316 --> 00:04:13,716 Speaker 1: those of us in the world who also believe that 61 00:04:14,036 --> 00:04:16,116 Speaker 1: we can walk and chew gum at the same time, 62 00:04:16,596 --> 00:04:19,916 Speaker 1: which has had a productive relationship with China while still 63 00:04:19,956 --> 00:04:22,356 Speaker 1: being a friend and ally of the United States, this 64 00:04:22,476 --> 00:04:25,636 Speaker 1: is more than a passing academic interest. So there is 65 00:04:25,676 --> 00:04:30,876 Speaker 1: this idea of the inevitability of conflict military conflict between 66 00:04:31,156 --> 00:04:34,516 Speaker 1: US and China, this notion of the facilities trap, that 67 00:04:34,716 --> 00:04:40,116 Speaker 1: great powers end up in conflict with each other. Like 68 00:04:40,276 --> 00:04:43,076 Speaker 1: it or not, you why is that? Why is that 69 00:04:44,076 --> 00:04:47,076 Speaker 1: theory wrong in this case? I don't believe the theory 70 00:04:47,196 --> 00:04:51,236 Speaker 1: is of itself wrong in terms of it being predictive 71 00:04:52,076 --> 00:04:56,756 Speaker 1: of certain forms of political and ultimate armed conflict. However, 72 00:04:56,996 --> 00:05:00,596 Speaker 1: I do not think it's determinist That is, history also 73 00:05:00,716 --> 00:05:03,716 Speaker 1: tells us that there are ways out of facidities trap. 74 00:05:03,956 --> 00:05:07,636 Speaker 1: For me, the most alive set of precedents we're looking 75 00:05:07,676 --> 00:05:10,396 Speaker 1: at in the current environment are those not of the 76 00:05:10,436 --> 00:05:14,076 Speaker 1: Second World War, but the first in the First World War, 77 00:05:14,196 --> 00:05:19,076 Speaker 1: we saw two sets of fundamental dynamics underway. Britain concerned 78 00:05:19,116 --> 00:05:24,316 Speaker 1: about the rise of Germany and Germany surpassing Britain in 79 00:05:24,476 --> 00:05:29,636 Speaker 1: terms of naval power and aggregate economic power. And simultaneously, 80 00:05:29,836 --> 00:05:34,516 Speaker 1: Germany concerned about the industrialization of Russia and what therefore 81 00:05:34,756 --> 00:05:39,076 Speaker 1: a future Russian Empire could look like given its larger population, 82 00:05:39,156 --> 00:05:42,036 Speaker 1: as a strategic threat to Germany. And then we had 83 00:05:42,476 --> 00:05:46,476 Speaker 1: the incendiary event, which was an assassination in obscure place 84 00:05:46,796 --> 00:05:50,996 Speaker 1: in Serbia of Archduke Ferdinand, who nobody had ever heard of, 85 00:05:51,716 --> 00:05:54,756 Speaker 1: but it was capable of igniting a much more fundamental 86 00:05:55,276 --> 00:06:00,916 Speaker 1: geopolitical and geostrategic conflict. Was war inevitable? No, it was 87 00:06:00,956 --> 00:06:06,196 Speaker 1: the most avoidable war in history, a comprehensive failure of diplomacy. Therefore, 88 00:06:06,236 --> 00:06:09,356 Speaker 1: when we apply that logic to the events of US 89 00:06:09,436 --> 00:06:12,316 Speaker 1: China relations in the twenty first century, many of these 90 00:06:12,396 --> 00:06:17,876 Speaker 1: dynamics remain alive. A rising power, an established power triggering 91 00:06:17,876 --> 00:06:21,236 Speaker 1: events in the South China Sea and or Taiwan. But 92 00:06:21,276 --> 00:06:25,596 Speaker 1: my judgment is diplomacy always is capable of finding a 93 00:06:25,636 --> 00:06:28,116 Speaker 1: way through. We simply need to be focused on the 94 00:06:28,236 --> 00:06:31,196 Speaker 1: seriousness of the threat and the credible nature of the 95 00:06:31,236 --> 00:06:36,356 Speaker 1: alternative off ramps. We're in at least the early stage 96 00:06:36,356 --> 00:06:38,916 Speaker 1: as if not the fourth rittled version of a US 97 00:06:39,036 --> 00:06:43,756 Speaker 1: China trade war. Is the scenario you worry most about, 98 00:06:44,116 --> 00:06:49,076 Speaker 1: a trade war or economic conflict escalating into military conflict, 99 00:06:49,196 --> 00:06:51,116 Speaker 1: or do you think it will come. If it comes, 100 00:06:51,476 --> 00:06:54,556 Speaker 1: that the risk comes from something else Entirely. In the 101 00:06:54,716 --> 00:07:00,076 Speaker 1: history of political relationships and diplomatic relationships, it is never 102 00:07:00,156 --> 00:07:02,596 Speaker 1: a neat binary of one thing or the other. It's 103 00:07:02,596 --> 00:07:06,196 Speaker 1: a multiplicity of contributing factors. What we see with the 104 00:07:06,236 --> 00:07:10,676 Speaker 1: trade war, however, is one articular elation of a much 105 00:07:10,836 --> 00:07:17,236 Speaker 1: broader American strategic rethink against China, which began frankly with 106 00:07:17,436 --> 00:07:21,236 Speaker 1: the election of the Trump administration, but was in part 107 00:07:21,316 --> 00:07:25,076 Speaker 1: in train before that as well. And how do we 108 00:07:25,276 --> 00:07:30,316 Speaker 1: characterize that. The Trump administration in December of twenty seventeen 109 00:07:30,356 --> 00:07:34,436 Speaker 1: announced a new national security strategy where it proclaimed the 110 00:07:34,596 --> 00:07:38,516 Speaker 1: end formally of forty years of strategic engagement with China 111 00:07:38,556 --> 00:07:41,396 Speaker 1: and the commencement of a new period of strategic competition 112 00:07:41,516 --> 00:07:44,956 Speaker 1: against China. At the same time, China, since the election 113 00:07:45,036 --> 00:07:49,396 Speaker 1: of Shijinping as president and party secretary in twenty twelve 114 00:07:49,516 --> 00:07:54,956 Speaker 1: thirteen has embarked upon a consciously more assertive Chinese strategy 115 00:07:55,036 --> 00:07:58,876 Speaker 1: in the economy and foreign policy and security policy. And 116 00:07:58,916 --> 00:08:03,316 Speaker 1: so we now have these two new dynamic forces interacting 117 00:08:03,356 --> 00:08:06,756 Speaker 1: with each other, for which the current as it were, flashpoint, 118 00:08:06,756 --> 00:08:11,316 Speaker 1: as the trade war, it is, if you like, simply 119 00:08:11,436 --> 00:08:16,076 Speaker 1: the icing on the cake of a much broader, unfolding 120 00:08:16,076 --> 00:08:21,316 Speaker 1: American strategy involving rolling back against China on the rest 121 00:08:21,356 --> 00:08:26,956 Speaker 1: of the economy, investment, capital markets, technology markets, talent markets, 122 00:08:27,556 --> 00:08:31,196 Speaker 1: as well as classical foreign policy and security policy, as 123 00:08:31,236 --> 00:08:36,516 Speaker 1: well as the continuing unresolved dilemma of human rights between China, 124 00:08:36,716 --> 00:08:39,636 Speaker 1: the US, and the rest. So what we don't know 125 00:08:40,116 --> 00:08:43,236 Speaker 1: is if and when the trade war is resolved or 126 00:08:43,276 --> 00:08:46,636 Speaker 1: at least brought to an uneasy piece, whether the rest 127 00:08:46,716 --> 00:08:50,716 Speaker 1: of the American roll back against Chinese power will then unfold. 128 00:08:51,116 --> 00:08:54,916 Speaker 1: The administration remains divided on that, just as the Chinese 129 00:08:54,916 --> 00:08:58,876 Speaker 1: administration remains divided about how now to proceed. That's why 130 00:08:58,916 --> 00:09:03,116 Speaker 1: we are currently in a dangerous environment. So you see 131 00:09:03,156 --> 00:09:06,996 Speaker 1: signs that there is military build up, more preparation for 132 00:09:07,076 --> 00:09:11,396 Speaker 1: a potential war. It's in the last couple of years. 133 00:09:11,876 --> 00:09:15,996 Speaker 1: But what points that towards conflict as opposed to a 134 00:09:16,036 --> 00:09:19,116 Speaker 1: balance of power and detroits. Well. Again, if we look 135 00:09:19,116 --> 00:09:21,996 Speaker 1: at the precedence of the First World War, the operating 136 00:09:22,156 --> 00:09:25,916 Speaker 1: principle applying in the minds and the chanceriies of Europe 137 00:09:26,116 --> 00:09:29,356 Speaker 1: prior to the guns of August of nineteen fourteen was 138 00:09:29,396 --> 00:09:34,676 Speaker 1: a balance of power central alliance of German in the 139 00:09:34,676 --> 00:09:40,396 Speaker 1: Austro Hungarian Empire versus Britain, France and Russia in those 140 00:09:40,476 --> 00:09:44,596 Speaker 1: days the Russian Empire. Unfortunately, balances of power, because they 141 00:09:44,596 --> 00:09:50,196 Speaker 1: are balancers, are inherently unstable and they can be triggered 142 00:09:50,236 --> 00:09:57,756 Speaker 1: by underlying incendury political events. So while balances of power 143 00:09:57,796 --> 00:10:00,996 Speaker 1: are one thing, the bottom line is much of the 144 00:10:01,076 --> 00:10:05,356 Speaker 1: reaction in Washington is being generated by a political conclusion 145 00:10:06,636 --> 00:10:10,116 Speaker 1: and a national security policy conclusion, and that the balance 146 00:10:10,276 --> 00:10:14,076 Speaker 1: is moving more decisively in China's direction. We see that 147 00:10:14,156 --> 00:10:18,116 Speaker 1: already manifest in the classical instruments of economic power. China 148 00:10:18,196 --> 00:10:21,676 Speaker 1: is already the largest economic partner of practically every country 149 00:10:21,676 --> 00:10:24,916 Speaker 1: in Asia. That was not the case ten or twenty 150 00:10:24,996 --> 00:10:28,396 Speaker 1: years ago. And if you look at the force modernization, 151 00:10:28,556 --> 00:10:32,916 Speaker 1: the PLA and it's naval assets, it's air assets, but 152 00:10:33,036 --> 00:10:37,636 Speaker 1: in particular it's capacity to use its onshore rocket forces 153 00:10:38,276 --> 00:10:43,156 Speaker 1: to create a much more effective airc denial strategy against 154 00:10:43,276 --> 00:10:46,276 Speaker 1: US armed forces in the West Pacific. These are new, 155 00:10:46,796 --> 00:10:49,596 Speaker 1: These were not there ten years ago. That's why we 156 00:10:49,636 --> 00:10:53,076 Speaker 1: are in a volatile environment. I think the assumption has 157 00:10:53,156 --> 00:10:57,716 Speaker 1: been the most likely triggering a vent to military conflict 158 00:10:57,756 --> 00:11:02,076 Speaker 1: would be over Taiwan, that China would act take power 159 00:11:02,476 --> 00:11:07,436 Speaker 1: in Taiwan, and that the United States would react might react. Now, 160 00:11:07,596 --> 00:11:13,916 Speaker 1: the American policy historically been strategic ambiguity, so it's not 161 00:11:14,276 --> 00:11:17,556 Speaker 1: we don't have a stated policy about whether we would 162 00:11:17,556 --> 00:11:20,996 Speaker 1: defend Taiwan or not. How has that changed you think 163 00:11:20,996 --> 00:11:23,436 Speaker 1: the risk there has increased or the risk has simply 164 00:11:23,476 --> 00:11:28,116 Speaker 1: shifted to other potential theaters of military coamflet The classical 165 00:11:28,156 --> 00:11:33,196 Speaker 1: scenario concerning Taiwan still remains the most incendiary because there 166 00:11:33,196 --> 00:11:38,356 Speaker 1: are three moving parts within it. Now Chinese nationalism under 167 00:11:38,356 --> 00:11:42,756 Speaker 1: Shi Jinping, where his statements over the last five years 168 00:11:42,756 --> 00:11:47,716 Speaker 1: have become progressively sharper on the future of Taiwan and 169 00:11:47,916 --> 00:11:52,076 Speaker 1: the point at which China would wish to see Taiwan 170 00:11:52,196 --> 00:11:56,316 Speaker 1: returned by peaceful or non peaceful means to the Motherland's 171 00:11:56,356 --> 00:12:03,596 Speaker 1: tender embrace. Secondly, in Taiwan itself, a DPP administration in 172 00:12:03,676 --> 00:12:07,916 Speaker 1: this rambunctious Taiwanese democracy which is fun to watch but 173 00:12:07,956 --> 00:12:13,196 Speaker 1: it's sometimes scary to analyze, and the predisposition of the 174 00:12:13,236 --> 00:12:16,596 Speaker 1: Democratic Progress Party not just under Taiying one but the 175 00:12:16,636 --> 00:12:21,836 Speaker 1: rest of her party supporters to resist any form of 176 00:12:22,036 --> 00:12:25,596 Speaker 1: embrace from the motherland, to move more decisively in an 177 00:12:25,676 --> 00:12:30,796 Speaker 1: independentist direction, which is China's internal redline. And Thirdly, under 178 00:12:30,796 --> 00:12:36,316 Speaker 1: the Trump administration, let's say less strategic ambiguity than we've 179 00:12:36,316 --> 00:12:40,196 Speaker 1: seen on the part of previous American administrations. For example, 180 00:12:40,756 --> 00:12:44,036 Speaker 1: not just the most recent American Taiwanese arms deal, but 181 00:12:44,076 --> 00:12:47,716 Speaker 1: the fact that you now have open meetings between Taiwanese 182 00:12:47,836 --> 00:12:52,436 Speaker 1: national security officials and the National Security Adviser of the 183 00:12:52,476 --> 00:12:55,956 Speaker 1: United States in the White House. These are new and 184 00:12:56,156 --> 00:12:59,796 Speaker 1: different instruments of US policy, backed up by a new 185 00:12:59,836 --> 00:13:03,156 Speaker 1: and fresh congressional level of support for Taiwan as well. 186 00:13:03,556 --> 00:13:07,036 Speaker 1: How does this admixture produce a future Taiwan crisis? I 187 00:13:07,116 --> 00:13:11,996 Speaker 1: can't predict, but the possibilities are no longer remote and 188 00:13:12,116 --> 00:13:17,196 Speaker 1: they don't become probable, but they are still becoming increasingly quantifiable. 189 00:13:17,476 --> 00:13:22,196 Speaker 1: We've recently seen China back down something I wouldn't have expected, 190 00:13:22,516 --> 00:13:26,516 Speaker 1: in the faith of massive public protests, and Hong Kong 191 00:13:26,636 --> 00:13:29,916 Speaker 1: over an extradition law that was one of a number 192 00:13:29,956 --> 00:13:35,556 Speaker 1: of incremental steps limiting some of the democratic prerogatives of 193 00:13:35,676 --> 00:13:39,076 Speaker 1: Hong Kong. That surprised you, not entirely because if we 194 00:13:39,076 --> 00:13:42,356 Speaker 1: look at the history of Hong Kong since to handover 195 00:13:42,396 --> 00:13:45,196 Speaker 1: in nineteen ninety seven, and I'm old enough and ugly 196 00:13:45,316 --> 00:13:48,596 Speaker 1: enough to have been around for the handover and in 197 00:13:48,676 --> 00:13:53,236 Speaker 1: fact began my diplomatic career at the time when Thatcher 198 00:13:53,356 --> 00:13:57,116 Speaker 1: signed a joint declaration with Dungsaping back in nineteen eighty four. 199 00:13:58,356 --> 00:14:02,956 Speaker 1: The dynamics of Hong Kong PRC politics have always been 200 00:14:03,036 --> 00:14:06,396 Speaker 1: on the volatile side. There are massive public protests, for 201 00:14:06,436 --> 00:14:09,276 Speaker 1: example by the Hong Kong As in two thousand and two, 202 00:14:09,796 --> 00:14:13,876 Speaker 1: which also brought about a u turn in Chinese policy 203 00:14:14,476 --> 00:14:18,236 Speaker 1: on a proposed set of changes. Back then, they failed. 204 00:14:18,276 --> 00:14:22,356 Speaker 1: In twenty fourteen, that is, public protests in twenty nineteen, 205 00:14:22,356 --> 00:14:30,196 Speaker 1: they've succeeded the PARC leadership while always seeking incrementally to 206 00:14:30,396 --> 00:14:35,396 Speaker 1: reduce Hong Kong's aggregate political autonomy within the framework of 207 00:14:35,396 --> 00:14:39,356 Speaker 1: one country two systems has never been shall I say 208 00:14:41,156 --> 00:14:45,316 Speaker 1: so doctrinaire that it can't accept political reality when it 209 00:14:45,396 --> 00:14:50,196 Speaker 1: sees it. I think the parallel resolve, however, will be 210 00:14:50,956 --> 00:14:54,996 Speaker 1: in China itself, where it fears Chinese protests could emulate 211 00:14:55,036 --> 00:14:58,076 Speaker 1: those undertaken in Hong Kong, will be an even a 212 00:14:58,076 --> 00:15:01,116 Speaker 1: more vicious crackdown against any evidence of descent within the 213 00:15:01,196 --> 00:15:05,356 Speaker 1: PRC proper. So let's talk about the salvable aspect of this. 214 00:15:05,516 --> 00:15:08,756 Speaker 1: You point to the escalating consions, you point to some 215 00:15:08,836 --> 00:15:12,956 Speaker 1: of the potential flashpoints. Yeah, you think the war is 216 00:15:12,996 --> 00:15:15,716 Speaker 1: avoidable and the risk can be reduced. How are we 217 00:15:15,756 --> 00:15:19,116 Speaker 1: going to do that? Well, the degree of difficulty, given 218 00:15:19,196 --> 00:15:22,716 Speaker 1: what we face at present in US China relations is hard. 219 00:15:23,556 --> 00:15:27,316 Speaker 1: And I say that as a preliminary comment because both 220 00:15:27,356 --> 00:15:31,476 Speaker 1: in Washington and Beijing at the moment, standing up and 221 00:15:31,476 --> 00:15:33,836 Speaker 1: giving a speech and holding an olive branch is a 222 00:15:33,876 --> 00:15:36,876 Speaker 1: good way to get shot down. At the moment, in Washington, 223 00:15:36,996 --> 00:15:39,556 Speaker 1: increasing the question which has asked if people like me 224 00:15:39,756 --> 00:15:42,876 Speaker 1: is well, Kevin, who side are you on? There's are ours? 225 00:15:43,956 --> 00:15:46,476 Speaker 1: And the question I get asked in Beijing increasingly is 226 00:15:46,556 --> 00:15:50,156 Speaker 1: much the same Kevin Old, friend of China, speaker of 227 00:15:50,236 --> 00:15:53,396 Speaker 1: Chinese language, person who's visited our country for one hundred 228 00:15:53,396 --> 00:15:55,996 Speaker 1: and fifty times over at last thirty five years. Are 229 00:15:55,996 --> 00:15:58,676 Speaker 1: you with the Americans? Are you with us? And the 230 00:15:58,716 --> 00:16:01,596 Speaker 1: bottom line is my response to both those questions is 231 00:16:01,636 --> 00:16:05,676 Speaker 1: not as some unpeace envoy. It's simply saying, from a 232 00:16:05,716 --> 00:16:10,196 Speaker 1: perspective of constructive realism, how do we navigate a way 233 00:16:10,236 --> 00:16:12,916 Speaker 1: through this unless either of you actually want to go 234 00:16:12,996 --> 00:16:15,476 Speaker 1: to war? And when I ask that question there's usually 235 00:16:15,476 --> 00:16:19,396 Speaker 1: a long pause. But on the practical question of how 236 00:16:19,436 --> 00:16:22,996 Speaker 1: then to proceed, my argument would be this that a 237 00:16:23,156 --> 00:16:27,716 Speaker 1: rational analysis by both countries of their fundamental national interests 238 00:16:27,716 --> 00:16:31,396 Speaker 1: and their fundamental national values which are at play here, 239 00:16:32,076 --> 00:16:36,956 Speaker 1: leads to you to kind of three conclusions. Category one 240 00:16:37,276 --> 00:16:41,516 Speaker 1: is those questions of national interest to national values where 241 00:16:41,516 --> 00:16:47,556 Speaker 1: there is no solution, for example Taiwan, for example, over 242 00:16:47,676 --> 00:16:55,876 Speaker 1: the country's fundamentally different political systems. One's authoritarian capitalist system China, 243 00:16:56,036 --> 00:17:01,196 Speaker 1: and the other is America, which is there's rolling rambunctious 244 00:17:01,196 --> 00:17:06,316 Speaker 1: some would say two rambunctious political democracy and equally rambunctious 245 00:17:06,716 --> 00:17:09,396 Speaker 1: capitalist system which from time to time through is out 246 00:17:09,436 --> 00:17:11,996 Speaker 1: to the rest of US things like the global financial crisis, 247 00:17:12,236 --> 00:17:13,636 Speaker 1: but we forgive you for that. It was going to 248 00:17:13,676 --> 00:17:16,716 Speaker 1: thank eving the one country has an authoritarian capitalist system 249 00:17:16,836 --> 00:17:19,396 Speaker 1: and the other has a president who wants an authoritarian 250 00:17:19,436 --> 00:17:22,196 Speaker 1: capitalist world. You could say that I couldn't possibly comment 251 00:17:22,276 --> 00:17:25,676 Speaker 1: because you're an American and I'm not, so I'm just 252 00:17:25,756 --> 00:17:29,916 Speaker 1: a guess. You've always had impactable manners the diplomat. It's 253 00:17:29,956 --> 00:17:32,076 Speaker 1: never been said at we Australians. We've often said we 254 00:17:32,116 --> 00:17:35,076 Speaker 1: have no manners at all. We try so I think 255 00:17:35,196 --> 00:17:38,636 Speaker 1: you know, can't agree. One here is what's the stuff 256 00:17:38,676 --> 00:17:42,316 Speaker 1: you can never agree on? And being very blunt about that. 257 00:17:42,716 --> 00:17:47,236 Speaker 1: And there's precedence for this in the relationship between Breshn 258 00:17:47,316 --> 00:17:53,356 Speaker 1: of Soviet Union and the United States. There came a 259 00:17:53,476 --> 00:17:57,436 Speaker 1: point after the Cuban missile crisis where detante was seen 260 00:17:57,596 --> 00:18:00,236 Speaker 1: as not a dirty word, but something which could actually 261 00:18:00,276 --> 00:18:05,596 Speaker 1: be done managing the fundamental differences between the two countries, 262 00:18:05,676 --> 00:18:08,876 Speaker 1: differences which could not be reconciled, but which in the 263 00:18:09,116 --> 00:18:15,596 Speaker 1: inclusion of both countries, do not warrant an underlying view 264 00:18:15,876 --> 00:18:20,996 Speaker 1: that war was inevitable. Category two in the US China 265 00:18:21,036 --> 00:18:25,356 Speaker 1: relations is what stuff between the two countries is hard, 266 00:18:25,956 --> 00:18:34,036 Speaker 1: really hard, but nonetheless manageable and capable of producing mutually 267 00:18:34,076 --> 00:18:39,876 Speaker 1: acceptable solutions which don't violate each country's fundamental interest. Now there, 268 00:18:39,876 --> 00:18:43,236 Speaker 1: I'd just give you two examples. One is North Korean 269 00:18:43,316 --> 00:18:49,276 Speaker 1: nuclear denuclearization, where the differences between Beijing and Washington are 270 00:18:49,516 --> 00:18:56,676 Speaker 1: significant but ultimately not irreconcilable, given that both Beijing and 271 00:18:56,756 --> 00:19:02,076 Speaker 1: Washington would arguably want a more stable Korean peninsula. Another 272 00:19:02,156 --> 00:19:09,036 Speaker 1: example would be China changing it's global economic practices, both 273 00:19:09,196 --> 00:19:13,676 Speaker 1: on trade and investment questions, to open the Chinese economy 274 00:19:13,796 --> 00:19:17,076 Speaker 1: in a much more fundamental way than Chinese decision makers 275 00:19:17,116 --> 00:19:21,716 Speaker 1: have been prepared to allow in the last decade or so, 276 00:19:21,716 --> 00:19:25,956 Speaker 1: so that the underlying nature of the American current critique 277 00:19:25,956 --> 00:19:30,356 Speaker 1: of Chinese economic policy is dealt with by changes in Beijing. 278 00:19:31,356 --> 00:19:35,676 Speaker 1: Are both those things really hard? Yes? Are they doable? Yeah, 279 00:19:36,276 --> 00:19:42,076 Speaker 1: but with absolute diplomatic and political determination. And finally, in 280 00:19:43,516 --> 00:19:47,076 Speaker 1: the way in which I argue this principle of constructive realism, 281 00:19:47,716 --> 00:19:52,516 Speaker 1: there's a category of policy engagement between Beijing and Washington 282 00:19:52,956 --> 00:19:56,756 Speaker 1: which should be easier and doable on a daily basis, 283 00:19:57,996 --> 00:20:01,396 Speaker 1: for example on challenges of global climate change action, and 284 00:20:01,476 --> 00:20:06,516 Speaker 1: for example on challenges of financial and economic governance, through 285 00:20:06,716 --> 00:20:11,276 Speaker 1: institutions such as the G twenty, and frankly, through common 286 00:20:11,396 --> 00:20:16,236 Speaker 1: endeavor in dealing with global or regional humanitarian crises. The 287 00:20:16,276 --> 00:20:19,516 Speaker 1: reason I argue for this way of viewing the relationship 288 00:20:20,276 --> 00:20:22,796 Speaker 1: is that when we get locked into what the Chinese 289 00:20:22,836 --> 00:20:27,436 Speaker 1: would describe as a silly a way of thinking about 290 00:20:27,476 --> 00:20:31,276 Speaker 1: each other, in this case China the United States, which 291 00:20:31,316 --> 00:20:34,876 Speaker 1: heavy loads category one, which is it's all doom, gloom 292 00:20:34,916 --> 00:20:40,716 Speaker 1: and despair without regard to category two and category three, 293 00:20:41,356 --> 00:20:44,636 Speaker 1: then we can end up in self fulfilling prophecies about 294 00:20:44,676 --> 00:20:48,916 Speaker 1: the way in which this relationship evolves. By contrast, if 295 00:20:48,956 --> 00:20:51,676 Speaker 1: you adopt what I have argued as being a framework 296 00:20:51,716 --> 00:20:55,756 Speaker 1: of constructive realism, which is being realist about the stuff 297 00:20:55,796 --> 00:21:00,036 Speaker 1: you can never agree upon and constructive about the rest 298 00:21:00,036 --> 00:21:02,716 Speaker 1: of it, and if you are constructive about the rest 299 00:21:02,716 --> 00:21:07,676 Speaker 1: of it incrementally building greater strategic trust over time, then 300 00:21:07,716 --> 00:21:13,156 Speaker 1: you can navigate these changing fundamental geopolitical dynamics between the 301 00:21:13,196 --> 00:21:15,836 Speaker 1: two and the balance of power between the two over 302 00:21:15,916 --> 00:21:20,476 Speaker 1: time in a peaceful way. We've only seen glimpses so 303 00:21:20,676 --> 00:21:26,236 Speaker 1: far of Chinese nationalism rallying against the United States, as 304 00:21:26,276 --> 00:21:31,036 Speaker 1: an enemy. It hasn't. Really, It seems that Si Jinping 305 00:21:31,196 --> 00:21:36,156 Speaker 1: hasn't pulled out that weapon yet. He hasn't brought people. 306 00:21:36,356 --> 00:21:39,676 Speaker 1: We haven't seen people in the streets in China burning 307 00:21:39,716 --> 00:21:42,916 Speaker 1: the US flag. Is there a risk that happens over 308 00:21:42,996 --> 00:21:48,796 Speaker 1: the trade war or that something else unleashes this public 309 00:21:48,916 --> 00:21:53,396 Speaker 1: demand for more of a reaction against the United States. Well, 310 00:21:53,476 --> 00:21:56,836 Speaker 1: his studios China relationships kind of an interesting beast, and 311 00:21:57,036 --> 00:22:00,236 Speaker 1: those of us who've studied this over the years still 312 00:22:00,276 --> 00:22:05,556 Speaker 1: find it interesting and not just interesting, but troubling without 313 00:22:05,596 --> 00:22:09,396 Speaker 1: boring your listeners. The sixty second Summaries a bit like this. 314 00:22:11,876 --> 00:22:16,796 Speaker 1: Twenty years plus of strategic animosity forty nine to seventy two, 315 00:22:17,396 --> 00:22:19,876 Speaker 1: not just the Korean War where you killed each other 316 00:22:20,796 --> 00:22:24,756 Speaker 1: in large numbers, but the Taiwan Straits crises of that period, 317 00:22:24,756 --> 00:22:28,476 Speaker 1: which almost brought you to war on multiple occasions. President 318 00:22:28,516 --> 00:22:32,396 Speaker 1: Eisenhower threatening nuclear obliteration of China on a number of occasions, 319 00:22:33,276 --> 00:22:36,276 Speaker 1: then Nixon and Kissinger and day tomed Mao and Joe 320 00:22:36,316 --> 00:22:40,436 Speaker 1: and Lye taking us from seventy two really until the 321 00:22:40,556 --> 00:22:44,276 Speaker 1: collapse of the Soviet Union in ninety one. But the 322 00:22:44,396 --> 00:22:48,476 Speaker 1: organizing principle there was a common strategic enemy, namely the 323 00:22:48,516 --> 00:22:53,796 Speaker 1: Soviet Union. Period three was really from ninety one through 324 00:22:53,916 --> 00:22:58,676 Speaker 1: until I would say the rise of Shijinping in two 325 00:22:58,556 --> 00:23:03,556 Speaker 1: thousand and twelve thirteen, with a common mission statement between 326 00:23:03,596 --> 00:23:07,996 Speaker 1: the two countries. No longer strategic collaboration, the common enemy 327 00:23:07,996 --> 00:23:11,556 Speaker 1: had gone. It was common economic engagement and how can 328 00:23:11,596 --> 00:23:15,316 Speaker 1: we each benefit each other's economies With an implied American 329 00:23:15,356 --> 00:23:19,316 Speaker 1: assumption the Chinese would fully open their economy and in 330 00:23:19,516 --> 00:23:24,836 Speaker 1: America's utopian dreams, China ultimately transforming itself into a democracy 331 00:23:24,916 --> 00:23:29,076 Speaker 1: of Singaporean type characteristics. Then we come to the present, 332 00:23:29,356 --> 00:23:32,996 Speaker 1: a more assertive China since twenty twelve thirteen under shi Jingping, 333 00:23:33,596 --> 00:23:37,796 Speaker 1: Belton Road Initiative of South China see Island Reclamation China 334 00:23:37,836 --> 00:23:41,036 Speaker 1: twenty twenty five, high technology strategies, as well as she 335 00:23:41,236 --> 00:23:44,636 Speaker 1: Jingping abolishing term limits. And we now are where we 336 00:23:44,676 --> 00:23:48,796 Speaker 1: are with Trump taking us perhaps into this current period 337 00:23:49,236 --> 00:23:55,116 Speaker 1: of a strategic competitive doubling down against China. In the 338 00:23:55,196 --> 00:23:59,396 Speaker 1: period since seventeen, so against all of that, you've had 339 00:23:59,796 --> 00:24:05,076 Speaker 1: vastly evolving Chinese sentiments towards the United States. I spent 340 00:24:05,156 --> 00:24:07,396 Speaker 1: the three of the last six weeks in China, and 341 00:24:07,476 --> 00:24:10,916 Speaker 1: I've seen something of a turn to some of the 342 00:24:10,996 --> 00:24:14,436 Speaker 1: nationalist rhetoric against the United States that we haven't seen 343 00:24:14,516 --> 00:24:18,276 Speaker 1: for at least thirty years, reruns of old Korean War movies, 344 00:24:19,396 --> 00:24:22,436 Speaker 1: revisiting of the spirit of the Long March of thirty four. 345 00:24:23,676 --> 00:24:27,916 Speaker 1: We Chinese can be resilient despite the American bully. This 346 00:24:27,996 --> 00:24:31,476 Speaker 1: language I really haven't seen since the pos Postaleman period. 347 00:24:31,756 --> 00:24:34,116 Speaker 1: It can be turned on and it can be turned off. 348 00:24:34,596 --> 00:24:37,076 Speaker 1: So I think the jury is still out. Did that 349 00:24:37,116 --> 00:24:41,156 Speaker 1: trip Kevin leave you more concerned or more optimestic about 350 00:24:41,196 --> 00:24:43,916 Speaker 1: the possibility for a day time and you were before 351 00:24:43,956 --> 00:24:50,996 Speaker 1: he went. It left me frankly, modestly schizophrenic on the question, 352 00:24:51,636 --> 00:24:55,356 Speaker 1: which is, on the one hand, the economic needs of 353 00:24:55,436 --> 00:24:58,396 Speaker 1: China and the United States. When you strip back all 354 00:24:58,396 --> 00:25:02,476 Speaker 1: the political rhetoric for a trade deal to be done 355 00:25:02,596 --> 00:25:06,876 Speaker 1: in order to restore business confidence in both economies going 356 00:25:06,916 --> 00:25:14,556 Speaker 1: into twenty, in fact becomes clearer that is the economic 357 00:25:14,676 --> 00:25:17,236 Speaker 1: rationale for the two leaders to do a deal and 358 00:25:17,276 --> 00:25:19,276 Speaker 1: to resolve the trade war and get that off the 359 00:25:19,916 --> 00:25:24,316 Speaker 1: political agenda, but also the agenda of markets is as 360 00:25:24,396 --> 00:25:27,876 Speaker 1: strong and as real as it's ever been. At the 361 00:25:27,996 --> 00:25:32,396 Speaker 1: same time, there has been a strategic conclusion I believe 362 00:25:32,556 --> 00:25:37,396 Speaker 1: in China that President Trump cannot be trusted, and more fundamentally, 363 00:25:37,396 --> 00:25:41,316 Speaker 1: a view in China that whether it's Republicans and Democrats 364 00:25:42,036 --> 00:25:46,756 Speaker 1: that the new American resolved doubled down against a rising 365 00:25:46,916 --> 00:25:51,436 Speaker 1: China is now bipartisan, and that therefore the fundamental strategic 366 00:25:51,476 --> 00:25:54,756 Speaker 1: assumptions which have governed the US China relationship since the 367 00:25:54,796 --> 00:25:59,036 Speaker 1: beginning of strategic engagement under Nixon and Kissinger are now 368 00:25:59,156 --> 00:26:03,396 Speaker 1: fundamentally changing. And my conclusion coming out of Beijing and 369 00:26:03,476 --> 00:26:09,516 Speaker 1: speaking to multiple Chinese political leaders and those who advise them, 370 00:26:10,676 --> 00:26:16,236 Speaker 1: as well as Chinese entrepreneurs and others only peripherally engage 371 00:26:16,276 --> 00:26:19,756 Speaker 1: in Chinese politics, is that we have now embarked upon 372 00:26:19,756 --> 00:26:23,316 Speaker 1: a period of deep strategic review in Beijing about what 373 00:26:23,556 --> 00:26:28,796 Speaker 1: its response to the new American strategy should be, and 374 00:26:28,916 --> 00:26:31,796 Speaker 1: the jury in Beijing is still out on where that 375 00:26:31,876 --> 00:26:35,516 Speaker 1: will go. The US China relationship plays itself out at 376 00:26:35,556 --> 00:26:40,836 Speaker 1: the commanding heights of military relations, economic relations, diplomatic relations. 377 00:26:41,236 --> 00:26:44,956 Speaker 1: People like you have access to it, but listeners to 378 00:26:45,036 --> 00:26:49,956 Speaker 1: this show, I think, want to know if they think 379 00:26:49,996 --> 00:26:53,796 Speaker 1: this situation is as dangerous and high stakes as you say, 380 00:26:54,596 --> 00:26:58,276 Speaker 1: what can they do? Are there things that ordinary people 381 00:26:58,356 --> 00:27:02,596 Speaker 1: can do to reduce tensions reduce the risk of conflict 382 00:27:02,956 --> 00:27:06,196 Speaker 1: with China? Well, if the audience of this program is 383 00:27:06,196 --> 00:27:09,876 Speaker 1: sort of a wider public opinion the United States and 384 00:27:10,196 --> 00:27:13,156 Speaker 1: let's call it friends and Allies of America, as I'm 385 00:27:13,196 --> 00:27:16,316 Speaker 1: assuming this may not achieve a wide broadcast reach into 386 00:27:16,396 --> 00:27:21,156 Speaker 1: China itself, then I suppose my thoughts would be as follows. 387 00:27:22,036 --> 00:27:24,756 Speaker 1: And what I say to American policy leaders, whether they 388 00:27:24,756 --> 00:27:28,356 Speaker 1: are Republican or a Democrat, is much the same. Number 389 00:27:28,396 --> 00:27:33,556 Speaker 1: one is, think through very carefully what actual political or 390 00:27:33,596 --> 00:27:36,796 Speaker 1: policy change you want to see broad about in China, 391 00:27:38,276 --> 00:27:41,076 Speaker 1: as opposed to what just sounds good in terms of 392 00:27:41,076 --> 00:27:45,356 Speaker 1: American domestic political sound bites for either a primary in 393 00:27:45,356 --> 00:27:50,756 Speaker 1: the Democrats case or President Trump's rolling reelect on the other. 394 00:27:51,036 --> 00:27:53,716 Speaker 1: In other words, what's going to work, what's going to 395 00:27:53,756 --> 00:27:59,836 Speaker 1: be effective in changing concrete Chinese economic practices? And therefore, 396 00:27:59,956 --> 00:28:04,476 Speaker 1: to think through very carefully what can deliver those outcomes 397 00:28:05,276 --> 00:28:09,516 Speaker 1: as opposed to that which actually compounds the problem in 398 00:28:09,636 --> 00:28:14,436 Speaker 1: Chinese actual behaviors. What do I mean by that? I 399 00:28:14,476 --> 00:28:17,716 Speaker 1: think there is always a danger with an American rhetorical 400 00:28:17,836 --> 00:28:21,996 Speaker 1: overreach in response to China, that you create circumstances within 401 00:28:22,156 --> 00:28:28,476 Speaker 1: Beijing itself which enable political leaders to simply circle the wagons, 402 00:28:28,556 --> 00:28:32,756 Speaker 1: haul up the nationalist flag, and unite the country against 403 00:28:32,956 --> 00:28:37,436 Speaker 1: the American threat, as opposed to a dynamic which actually 404 00:28:37,476 --> 00:28:41,676 Speaker 1: does exist or has existed most recently in China, which 405 00:28:41,716 --> 00:28:46,316 Speaker 1: actually itself internally asks the question have our political leaders 406 00:28:46,316 --> 00:28:49,956 Speaker 1: in China begun to overreach? Have we gone too far 407 00:28:50,516 --> 00:28:53,316 Speaker 1: with ireland reclamation in the South China Sea? Have we 408 00:28:53,396 --> 00:28:57,556 Speaker 1: gone far too far with bri Is it affordable? Is 409 00:28:57,556 --> 00:29:01,276 Speaker 1: it in fact sustainable? Can we Chinese do this without 410 00:29:01,316 --> 00:29:06,116 Speaker 1: attracting massive foreign policy reaction? Is China twenty twenty five 411 00:29:06,196 --> 00:29:09,236 Speaker 1: as a high technology strategy which declares that we will 412 00:29:09,276 --> 00:29:13,236 Speaker 1: overtake every other Western country in high tech and AI 413 00:29:13,436 --> 00:29:17,036 Speaker 1: in the next decade? Is that vastly too provocative? Is 414 00:29:17,036 --> 00:29:20,196 Speaker 1: it realizable? And was it smart to abolish term limits 415 00:29:20,236 --> 00:29:23,796 Speaker 1: for the presidency of our country? These are the sorts 416 00:29:23,836 --> 00:29:27,396 Speaker 1: of shall I say, doubts and anxieties within the Chinese 417 00:29:27,396 --> 00:29:32,436 Speaker 1: domestic politic which American policy leaders should be mindful of 418 00:29:33,116 --> 00:29:36,996 Speaker 1: in how they deploy their policy. In other words, to 419 00:29:37,076 --> 00:29:41,236 Speaker 1: be more granular in their response to China, rather than 420 00:29:41,276 --> 00:29:45,636 Speaker 1: simply taking the grand political sledge hammer, which can induce 421 00:29:45,916 --> 00:29:49,076 Speaker 1: instead a much cruder nationalist response. You're talking in a 422 00:29:49,116 --> 00:29:52,436 Speaker 1: way about trying to win over a Chinese people as 423 00:29:52,436 --> 00:29:57,116 Speaker 1: opposed to affecting government policy directly. But can that work 424 00:29:57,556 --> 00:30:01,276 Speaker 1: in a country without democratic accountability, where the opinion of 425 00:30:01,316 --> 00:30:05,116 Speaker 1: the public, first of all, if it's based on information 426 00:30:05,116 --> 00:30:08,996 Speaker 1: and genuine information at all, doesn't have any obvious impact. 427 00:30:09,396 --> 00:30:12,236 Speaker 1: I think the beginning of the analysis of what makes 428 00:30:12,316 --> 00:30:17,636 Speaker 1: Chinese politics tick is along these lines. First of all, 429 00:30:18,516 --> 00:30:21,356 Speaker 1: there are eighty six million members of the Chinese Communist Party, 430 00:30:21,356 --> 00:30:25,956 Speaker 1: and there are one point four billion Chinese people, and 431 00:30:26,996 --> 00:30:29,996 Speaker 1: both the members of the party and the wider public now, 432 00:30:30,036 --> 00:30:32,276 Speaker 1: whether we like it or not, and with the Beijing 433 00:30:32,396 --> 00:30:37,116 Speaker 1: likes it a lot, have multiple sources of information. Despite 434 00:30:37,116 --> 00:30:40,916 Speaker 1: the firewall. For example, these Hong Kong protests have spread 435 00:30:40,956 --> 00:30:44,556 Speaker 1: like wildfire within China itself because there's just a limit 436 00:30:44,596 --> 00:30:46,876 Speaker 1: to how much you can shut down within a two 437 00:30:46,876 --> 00:30:51,156 Speaker 1: hour period. It's like playing whack a mole in Chinese 438 00:30:51,516 --> 00:30:54,596 Speaker 1: social media. You shut down one here and bombed bumps 439 00:30:54,676 --> 00:30:57,036 Speaker 1: up there. That's the first piece. I think the second 440 00:30:57,076 --> 00:31:00,156 Speaker 1: piece in the analysis is this Within the Chinese Communist Party, 441 00:31:00,156 --> 00:31:03,636 Speaker 1: It's not monolithic eighty six million members. There are a 442 00:31:03,676 --> 00:31:06,076 Speaker 1: bunch of different views, as there are within a twenty 443 00:31:06,076 --> 00:31:09,756 Speaker 1: five member polyp Ero and even a seven member committee, 444 00:31:09,756 --> 00:31:15,156 Speaker 1: the Politburo, which functions effectively as the Chinese cabinet. They 445 00:31:15,196 --> 00:31:19,916 Speaker 1: all have multiple sources of information. The danger for American 446 00:31:20,076 --> 00:31:24,036 Speaker 1: strategy is this has reflected in a conversation I had 447 00:31:24,156 --> 00:31:26,356 Speaker 1: recently with a friend of mine in b Junior I've 448 00:31:26,396 --> 00:31:30,196 Speaker 1: known for twenty five years and is someone who's quite 449 00:31:30,196 --> 00:31:38,636 Speaker 1: politically literate. He said, you know President Trump's strategy towards China, 450 00:31:39,996 --> 00:31:44,396 Speaker 1: there's doubling down against China, and the way in which 451 00:31:44,396 --> 00:31:48,196 Speaker 1: he has conducted the trade war as an expression of 452 00:31:48,396 --> 00:31:55,076 Speaker 1: US national interests only has fundamentally eroded the pro American 453 00:31:55,276 --> 00:32:01,516 Speaker 1: constituency within China itself. Why because in the past, American 454 00:32:01,636 --> 00:32:06,876 Speaker 1: presidents have acted almost as a representative of two forces 455 00:32:06,916 --> 00:32:11,876 Speaker 1: in the world. City on the Hill that is representing 456 00:32:11,956 --> 00:32:15,716 Speaker 1: a much wider universal set of values as well as 457 00:32:15,756 --> 00:32:18,796 Speaker 1: obviously being president of the national interests of the United 458 00:32:18,836 --> 00:32:23,436 Speaker 1: States itself. But previous American presidents have sought to, as 459 00:32:23,436 --> 00:32:28,036 Speaker 1: it were, represent both. Now we see an American nationalist 460 00:32:28,076 --> 00:32:33,596 Speaker 1: president who, frankly, in China's domestic view, is no more 461 00:32:33,636 --> 00:32:38,076 Speaker 1: principled than Vladimir Putin or any other leader. And bringing 462 00:32:38,156 --> 00:32:41,876 Speaker 1: up well, if you look carefully at what President Trump 463 00:32:41,876 --> 00:32:45,116 Speaker 1: has said since he became president, he doesn't talk about 464 00:32:45,196 --> 00:32:48,436 Speaker 1: democracy in the world. It doesn't talk about human rights 465 00:32:48,436 --> 00:32:53,436 Speaker 1: in the world. In fact, he often begrudgingly speaks about 466 00:32:53,476 --> 00:32:58,916 Speaker 1: allied interests in the world when he says, maga, make 467 00:32:58,996 --> 00:33:02,716 Speaker 1: America great again, and let's put America first. And if 468 00:33:02,756 --> 00:33:06,796 Speaker 1: you looked at his most recent presidential political rally on 469 00:33:07,236 --> 00:33:11,156 Speaker 1: launching formerly his reelect about the first interest of every 470 00:33:11,316 --> 00:33:15,956 Speaker 1: American president being to look after American citizens, but to 471 00:33:15,996 --> 00:33:21,076 Speaker 1: the exclusion of the interests and values which unite the 472 00:33:21,236 --> 00:33:25,356 Speaker 1: family of Nations, which have by and large supported American 473 00:33:25,356 --> 00:33:29,916 Speaker 1: global leadership since Narting forty one, not forty five forty one, 474 00:33:32,116 --> 00:33:35,956 Speaker 1: then the critique are here in Beijing on the part 475 00:33:35,996 --> 00:33:38,956 Speaker 1: of those who are more objective observers of these things 476 00:33:38,956 --> 00:33:42,396 Speaker 1: in the Chinese domestic politic, I think has some foundation. 477 00:33:42,436 --> 00:33:48,276 Speaker 1: In other words, is President Trump trashing the global democratic brand? 478 00:33:49,476 --> 00:33:53,716 Speaker 1: That is global democracy brand? And is he trashing also 479 00:33:53,796 --> 00:33:59,916 Speaker 1: at the same time, the American brand within China. More broadly, 480 00:34:00,596 --> 00:34:04,356 Speaker 1: hence my question about the way in which American strategy 481 00:34:04,396 --> 00:34:08,276 Speaker 1: towards China is pursued. I'm not arguing for some sort 482 00:34:08,316 --> 00:34:13,996 Speaker 1: of Namby Pamby kind of hand holding. Isn't China great? 483 00:34:14,636 --> 00:34:17,956 Speaker 1: It's a wonderful civilization that never does anything wrong. Approach. 484 00:34:18,316 --> 00:34:20,756 Speaker 1: That's never been my approach. If you look at my 485 00:34:20,756 --> 00:34:24,076 Speaker 1: own period as Prime Minister of Australia, we had many, many, 486 00:34:24,316 --> 00:34:30,356 Speaker 1: many fundamental disagreements with the Chinese, but without fundamentally imploding 487 00:34:30,396 --> 00:34:34,996 Speaker 1: the Australia China relationship. It's that sort of granularity which 488 00:34:34,996 --> 00:34:38,036 Speaker 1: I would recommend to our American friends, while recognizing the 489 00:34:38,116 --> 00:34:42,476 Speaker 1: fact that Americas are superpower. Australia obviously is not. But 490 00:34:42,516 --> 00:34:45,036 Speaker 1: there's a way in which you conduct your strategy towards 491 00:34:45,076 --> 00:34:49,796 Speaker 1: the Chinese which should be mindful of the breadth of 492 00:34:49,836 --> 00:34:54,036 Speaker 1: opinions within China itself, rather than simply assuming it's one 493 00:34:54,156 --> 00:35:00,196 Speaker 1: monolithic block determined to, as it were, destroy the United States. 494 00:35:00,636 --> 00:35:03,676 Speaker 1: Well that and Kevin Rod, thank you for joining us. Unsolvable. 495 00:35:03,836 --> 00:35:06,636 Speaker 1: Good to be with you and maybe solve more things together. 496 00:35:08,036 --> 00:35:10,596 Speaker 1: I can already hear me self repeating some of what 497 00:35:10,676 --> 00:35:13,356 Speaker 1: Kevin Rudd said at party. So I sound like smart 498 00:35:13,436 --> 00:35:16,356 Speaker 1: and informed, Like, guys, listen up. We need to be 499 00:35:16,436 --> 00:35:19,876 Speaker 1: mindful of the breath of opinions within China itself, rather 500 00:35:19,916 --> 00:35:24,796 Speaker 1: than simply assuming it's one monolithic block. Everyone would be like, yeah, 501 00:35:24,916 --> 00:35:29,676 Speaker 1: maybe that's so true. But seriously, when tensions appear to 502 00:35:29,756 --> 00:35:33,676 Speaker 1: be rising inexorably, it's easy to lose sight of the 503 00:35:33,756 --> 00:35:37,476 Speaker 1: diversity of opinions within all sides of a dispute, and 504 00:35:37,956 --> 00:35:40,676 Speaker 1: to remember that this means there can be room to 505 00:35:40,796 --> 00:35:44,316 Speaker 1: find common ground when things heat up between the US 506 00:35:44,396 --> 00:35:47,756 Speaker 1: and Iran or the US and North Korea. It's good 507 00:35:47,796 --> 00:35:49,796 Speaker 1: to know that in the background there are diplomats with 508 00:35:49,876 --> 00:35:54,436 Speaker 1: experience and goodwill in countries like China and Australia and 509 00:35:54,476 --> 00:35:58,796 Speaker 1: the UK working to resolve issues with China before they 510 00:35:58,916 --> 00:36:03,076 Speaker 1: get as dangerous as that. As we've heard in other 511 00:36:03,116 --> 00:36:07,476 Speaker 1: episodes of Solvable, peace between nations is fragile and takes 512 00:36:07,516 --> 00:36:13,756 Speaker 1: work and courage, arguably even more courage than war. Solvable 513 00:36:13,956 --> 00:36:17,916 Speaker 1: is a collaboration between Pushkin Industries and the Rockefeller Foundation, 514 00:36:18,036 --> 00:36:22,036 Speaker 1: with production by Laura Hyde, Hester Kant, Laura Sheeter, and 515 00:36:22,156 --> 00:36:26,036 Speaker 1: Ruth Barnes. From Chalk and Blade. Pushkin's executive producer is 516 00:36:26,116 --> 00:36:31,076 Speaker 1: Neil LaBelle. Research by sher Vincent, Engineering by Jason Gambrel 517 00:36:31,156 --> 00:36:35,556 Speaker 1: and the great folks at GSI Studios. Original music composed 518 00:36:35,596 --> 00:36:39,756 Speaker 1: by Pascal Wise and special thanks to Maggie Taylor, Heather Fine, 519 00:36:39,916 --> 00:36:44,756 Speaker 1: Julia Barton, Carli Mgliori, Jacob Weisberg, and Malcolm Gladwell. You 520 00:36:44,756 --> 00:36:48,876 Speaker 1: can learn more about solving today's biggest problems at Rockefeller 521 00:36:48,916 --> 00:36:53,676 Speaker 1: Foundation dot org slash solvable. I'm Mave Higgins. Now go 522 00:36:53,916 --> 00:37:10,276 Speaker 1: solve it six