1 00:00:00,040 --> 00:00:03,720 Speaker 1: Hey, they're Odd Lots listeners. We have a very special announcement. 2 00:00:04,080 --> 00:00:07,200 Speaker 1: Joe and I are hosting our annual Front Lots Pub 3 00:00:07,320 --> 00:00:11,319 Speaker 1: Quiz on Thursday, February thirteenth in New York City, and 4 00:00:11,440 --> 00:00:15,360 Speaker 1: it's gonna feature some very special guests and prizes. So 5 00:00:15,440 --> 00:00:18,959 Speaker 1: come test your wits in finance, markets and economics for 6 00:00:19,120 --> 00:00:23,159 Speaker 1: a chance to win the ultimate Odd Lots glory and 7 00:00:23,280 --> 00:00:26,360 Speaker 1: hang out with your fellow listeners. Tickets are on sale 8 00:00:26,440 --> 00:00:30,480 Speaker 1: now at events dot Bloomberg Live dot com, slash Odlots 9 00:00:30,640 --> 00:00:33,600 Speaker 1: Pub Trivia. You can also find links on our Twitter 10 00:00:33,640 --> 00:00:36,199 Speaker 1: feeds or in the newsletter, and you can find the 11 00:00:36,240 --> 00:00:38,680 Speaker 1: link also on our show notes. We hope to see 12 00:00:38,720 --> 00:00:39,080 Speaker 1: you there. 13 00:00:42,320 --> 00:00:57,520 Speaker 2: Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News. 14 00:00:58,000 --> 00:01:01,360 Speaker 1: Hello and welcome to another episode of the All Thoughts Podcast. 15 00:01:01,520 --> 00:01:02,920 Speaker 1: I'm Tracy Alloway. 16 00:01:02,640 --> 00:01:03,840 Speaker 3: And I'm Joe Wisenthal. 17 00:01:04,319 --> 00:01:06,759 Speaker 1: Joe, do you remember when you first heard the term 18 00:01:07,160 --> 00:01:07,959 Speaker 1: mag seven? 19 00:01:08,319 --> 00:01:11,319 Speaker 3: You know, I don't if I'm being honest, but you 20 00:01:11,400 --> 00:01:15,240 Speaker 3: know these achronyms that for big tech stocks, like they 21 00:01:15,319 --> 00:01:17,800 Speaker 3: kind of you know, people used to talk about Fang, right. 22 00:01:17,920 --> 00:01:20,080 Speaker 1: I know, I was just thinking that, like, when did 23 00:01:20,319 --> 00:01:24,560 Speaker 1: the handoff from Fang to mag seven actually happen. 24 00:01:24,440 --> 00:01:26,560 Speaker 3: We need to do one of those like Google trends 25 00:01:26,720 --> 00:01:29,840 Speaker 3: and gram things. That's a good question because and then 26 00:01:29,880 --> 00:01:33,920 Speaker 3: there was like fang plus and then fam and but 27 00:01:34,000 --> 00:01:35,600 Speaker 3: they're all kind of the same thing. It's just big 28 00:01:35,640 --> 00:01:36,760 Speaker 3: tech stocks, right. 29 00:01:37,160 --> 00:01:41,400 Speaker 1: So the terminology the acronyms might change, but I think 30 00:01:42,040 --> 00:01:44,360 Speaker 1: the subject is always kind of the same and the 31 00:01:44,440 --> 00:01:47,200 Speaker 1: concern is always the same. It's this idea that there 32 00:01:47,319 --> 00:01:51,320 Speaker 1: is like a handful of big companies, usually tech stocks, 33 00:01:51,640 --> 00:01:53,920 Speaker 1: that are driving the entire market. 34 00:01:54,680 --> 00:01:58,000 Speaker 3: Yeah, and it drives people crazy, right, they're so big, 35 00:01:58,600 --> 00:02:01,240 Speaker 3: and they've grown so much, stocks have done so well 36 00:02:01,280 --> 00:02:04,240 Speaker 3: over the years, and all these old strategies of like 37 00:02:04,360 --> 00:02:06,920 Speaker 3: oh we're gonna like buy cheap or buy cheap low 38 00:02:06,920 --> 00:02:09,600 Speaker 3: book value, you know, price to book and all these 39 00:02:09,960 --> 00:02:14,519 Speaker 3: traditional investing patterns. It never mean reverts for years and 40 00:02:14,600 --> 00:02:17,239 Speaker 3: years and years, except for like five minutes in twenty 41 00:02:17,280 --> 00:02:20,560 Speaker 3: twenty two. They just go straight up. And the only 42 00:02:20,680 --> 00:02:22,600 Speaker 3: test of whether you're a good investor or not is 43 00:02:22,639 --> 00:02:24,560 Speaker 3: whether you're over whether you bought ten Yeah. 44 00:02:24,440 --> 00:02:25,040 Speaker 4: That's it, is it? 45 00:02:25,480 --> 00:02:29,280 Speaker 1: Really? That really is the alpha now is But you know, 46 00:02:29,360 --> 00:02:32,200 Speaker 1: you see these numbers thrown around like I think Goldman 47 00:02:32,320 --> 00:02:36,000 Speaker 1: Sachs said that the top ten stocks now account for 48 00:02:36,120 --> 00:02:38,720 Speaker 1: something like thirty eight percent of the S and P 49 00:02:38,840 --> 00:02:41,919 Speaker 1: five hundred, which is a record, yeah, and seems quite 50 00:02:41,919 --> 00:02:43,919 Speaker 1: a lot on the face of it. And I saw 51 00:02:43,919 --> 00:02:47,600 Speaker 1: another number out there saying twenty six stocks now account 52 00:02:47,639 --> 00:02:50,080 Speaker 1: for half of the entire value of the S and 53 00:02:50,080 --> 00:02:53,080 Speaker 1: P five hundred. So I think it brings up a 54 00:02:53,120 --> 00:02:58,520 Speaker 1: bunch of interesting questions. How bad is the concentration? Is 55 00:02:58,560 --> 00:03:02,120 Speaker 1: it intrinsically bad in and of itself? Is it actually 56 00:03:02,160 --> 00:03:02,840 Speaker 1: that risky? 57 00:03:03,080 --> 00:03:03,640 Speaker 3: Yeah? 58 00:03:03,680 --> 00:03:08,359 Speaker 1: And also how are financial professionals and the market itself 59 00:03:08,480 --> 00:03:11,720 Speaker 1: actually reacting to this concentration risk? 60 00:03:12,040 --> 00:03:13,600 Speaker 4: So I think we should talk about it totally. 61 00:03:13,600 --> 00:03:15,880 Speaker 3: You know, I look at myself in the mirror, and 62 00:03:16,200 --> 00:03:17,960 Speaker 3: I say to myself. 63 00:03:17,600 --> 00:03:19,600 Speaker 1: Do you point at yourself like that meme? 64 00:03:19,919 --> 00:03:22,080 Speaker 3: I And some days I point and say you're a 65 00:03:22,120 --> 00:03:24,640 Speaker 3: good because you know, I'm just like a boring index 66 00:03:24,680 --> 00:03:27,480 Speaker 3: fund investor for my retirement, you know, So I point say, oh, 67 00:03:27,520 --> 00:03:29,920 Speaker 3: you're a good investor because you've been really long tech. 68 00:03:30,000 --> 00:03:32,240 Speaker 3: And then I and then on other days they wake 69 00:03:32,320 --> 00:03:34,760 Speaker 3: up and say, oh, you are really heavily exposed to 70 00:03:34,840 --> 00:03:37,840 Speaker 3: twenty six stocks, And so you know, it's like to 71 00:03:38,080 --> 00:03:40,400 Speaker 3: you know, glass half full. It's like good, but also 72 00:03:40,480 --> 00:03:41,520 Speaker 3: makes me a little anxious. 73 00:03:41,560 --> 00:03:43,920 Speaker 1: You shouldn't take credit. You should give that credit to 74 00:03:44,440 --> 00:03:47,320 Speaker 1: SMP and thank you, and then when the market collapses 75 00:03:47,360 --> 00:03:48,200 Speaker 1: you should blame them. 76 00:03:48,400 --> 00:03:48,720 Speaker 4: I do. 77 00:03:48,880 --> 00:03:52,240 Speaker 3: I say thank you to the wonderful fund managers at SMP. 78 00:03:52,920 --> 00:03:56,240 Speaker 3: I only wish you hadn't. You know, every once in 79 00:03:56,280 --> 00:03:57,760 Speaker 3: a while they have a dud. It's like why did 80 00:03:57,760 --> 00:03:58,800 Speaker 3: you pick that one anyway? 81 00:03:58,880 --> 00:03:59,920 Speaker 1: Or why didn't you include? 82 00:04:00,560 --> 00:04:00,760 Speaker 2: Yeah? 83 00:04:00,960 --> 00:04:03,680 Speaker 1: Kay, exactly, all right, Well, without further ado, we do, 84 00:04:03,760 --> 00:04:06,840 Speaker 1: in fact have the perfect guest for this topic, someone 85 00:04:06,840 --> 00:04:09,120 Speaker 1: that I've wanted to speak to for a long time 86 00:04:09,280 --> 00:04:11,240 Speaker 1: and I can't believe we haven't had him on the 87 00:04:11,280 --> 00:04:15,200 Speaker 1: podcast before major oversight on our part. We're going to 88 00:04:15,280 --> 00:04:17,800 Speaker 1: be speaking with Kevin Muhror. He is, of course the 89 00:04:18,120 --> 00:04:22,799 Speaker 1: Macro tourist and a long time voice on finn Twit 90 00:04:23,200 --> 00:04:26,320 Speaker 1: and writing on his blog as well. So Kevin, thank 91 00:04:26,320 --> 00:04:28,159 Speaker 1: you so much for coming on all thoughts. 92 00:04:28,080 --> 00:04:29,800 Speaker 4: It's great to be here. Thanks Joe and Tracy. 93 00:04:30,520 --> 00:04:33,480 Speaker 1: Maybe just to begin with, it's the first time you're 94 00:04:33,520 --> 00:04:36,200 Speaker 1: on the show. I've always sort of known you as 95 00:04:36,320 --> 00:04:40,000 Speaker 1: this voice that's hanging around in the finance BLOGI sphere. 96 00:04:40,360 --> 00:04:42,799 Speaker 1: But what's your background? 97 00:04:42,880 --> 00:04:47,480 Speaker 5: So I was the equity derivative institutional equity derivtive trader 98 00:04:47,520 --> 00:04:50,840 Speaker 5: at RBC Dominion Securities in the nineties. I was kind 99 00:04:50,839 --> 00:04:55,039 Speaker 5: of at the forefront of the technological boom and the 100 00:04:55,160 --> 00:04:58,120 Speaker 5: automated trading and the index trading and the taking off 101 00:04:58,160 --> 00:05:01,680 Speaker 5: of all these index products. And then in two thousand 102 00:05:01,800 --> 00:05:03,720 Speaker 5: I actually went off on my own and I thought, maybe, 103 00:05:03,760 --> 00:05:05,200 Speaker 5: you know, I'll go work for a hedge fund. And 104 00:05:05,520 --> 00:05:08,040 Speaker 5: I thought, well, at the same time, I could go 105 00:05:08,080 --> 00:05:10,200 Speaker 5: and trade for myself for a little bit and see 106 00:05:10,240 --> 00:05:12,839 Speaker 5: how that goes. And that's kind of twenty five years 107 00:05:12,920 --> 00:05:14,320 Speaker 5: later and I'm still doing it. 108 00:05:14,440 --> 00:05:16,640 Speaker 3: You write the macro Tourist, what's your goal? What do 109 00:05:16,720 --> 00:05:20,640 Speaker 3: you for those I we're both big fans of your writing, 110 00:05:20,760 --> 00:05:23,560 Speaker 3: But what do you what do you like to write about? 111 00:05:23,839 --> 00:05:25,880 Speaker 3: What's your sort of goal with your writing? 112 00:05:26,040 --> 00:05:29,160 Speaker 5: Well, Joe, it originally started off as a diary, and 113 00:05:29,600 --> 00:05:31,440 Speaker 5: I just kind of good traders, you're supposed to keep 114 00:05:31,440 --> 00:05:33,480 Speaker 5: a diary, and and I would start writing things and 115 00:05:33,520 --> 00:05:35,120 Speaker 5: then people would pull me up and ask me what 116 00:05:35,160 --> 00:05:37,120 Speaker 5: I thought of the market, and I would send it 117 00:05:37,160 --> 00:05:39,240 Speaker 5: off into the mot just so well, here's what I 118 00:05:39,240 --> 00:05:42,159 Speaker 5: wrote my diary. Eventually they started to ask often enough 119 00:05:42,160 --> 00:05:44,280 Speaker 5: that we just started to put it up on the net, 120 00:05:44,360 --> 00:05:47,839 Speaker 5: and then it took off from there, and from there 121 00:05:48,040 --> 00:05:50,640 Speaker 5: I ended up going and actually started my podcast and 122 00:05:50,680 --> 00:05:53,560 Speaker 5: meeting all sorts of people. And one of the kind 123 00:05:53,600 --> 00:05:57,760 Speaker 5: of just great parts about being on the podcast is 124 00:05:57,760 --> 00:05:59,880 Speaker 5: the fabulous people I got to meet along the way. 125 00:05:59,880 --> 00:06:02,200 Speaker 5: I meet people like Jim Lightner and I've had Mike 126 00:06:02,279 --> 00:06:05,640 Speaker 5: Masters on the podcast, and those people are market wizards. 127 00:06:05,680 --> 00:06:07,760 Speaker 5: They're terrific, and I get to share ideas with them, 128 00:06:07,800 --> 00:06:09,880 Speaker 5: and it's just that considers myself one of the luckiest 129 00:06:09,880 --> 00:06:10,599 Speaker 5: guys in the world. 130 00:06:10,720 --> 00:06:14,039 Speaker 1: So let's get to the topic at hand. Then give 131 00:06:14,120 --> 00:06:18,760 Speaker 1: us some context around concentration risk in something like the 132 00:06:18,800 --> 00:06:20,680 Speaker 1: S and P five hundred right now. I threw out 133 00:06:20,720 --> 00:06:26,800 Speaker 1: some numbers earlier, But how extensive is this concentration and 134 00:06:27,000 --> 00:06:28,360 Speaker 1: should we be worried about it? 135 00:06:29,480 --> 00:06:32,200 Speaker 5: Well, Tracy, one of the things that people will kind 136 00:06:32,200 --> 00:06:34,120 Speaker 5: of push back on when you say that the US 137 00:06:34,200 --> 00:06:37,159 Speaker 5: has become more concentrated is they'll say things like, oh, 138 00:06:37,200 --> 00:06:39,919 Speaker 5: but if you go look at other indexes around the world, 139 00:06:39,920 --> 00:06:43,680 Speaker 5: they're also very concentrated. And that's absolutely correct, There's no 140 00:06:43,720 --> 00:06:47,920 Speaker 5: doubt about it. This is something that is experienced in Canada. 141 00:06:48,640 --> 00:06:50,920 Speaker 5: As I mentioned, I'm a Canadian and I was on 142 00:06:50,960 --> 00:06:54,280 Speaker 5: the index desk at a time when Noortel was actually 143 00:06:54,400 --> 00:06:56,920 Speaker 5: thirty five percent of the entire index. 144 00:06:57,000 --> 00:06:57,279 Speaker 1: Wow. 145 00:06:57,680 --> 00:06:59,320 Speaker 5: So if you think that you guys are we're having 146 00:06:59,400 --> 00:07:02,599 Speaker 5: troubled dealer with this, now, just imagine having thirty five 147 00:07:02,640 --> 00:07:05,680 Speaker 5: percent of the index being one stock. It was actually 148 00:07:05,680 --> 00:07:07,680 Speaker 5: even worse than that because we had kind of a 149 00:07:07,760 --> 00:07:11,920 Speaker 5: palm at triple M situation where Bell Canada was one 150 00:07:11,960 --> 00:07:14,600 Speaker 5: of our next biggest stocks and it main holding with 151 00:07:14,680 --> 00:07:17,480 Speaker 5: all of its Nortel holding. So it ended up being 152 00:07:17,480 --> 00:07:20,840 Speaker 5: that the index managers were stuck because if you think 153 00:07:20,880 --> 00:07:23,760 Speaker 5: about it from a fiduciary point of view, it doesn't 154 00:07:23,800 --> 00:07:28,000 Speaker 5: make sense to have fifty percent of your portfolio, you know, 155 00:07:28,200 --> 00:07:31,680 Speaker 5: exposed to one stock. It's risky. And so one of 156 00:07:31,680 --> 00:07:33,600 Speaker 5: the things that I well that I'm hearing now when 157 00:07:33,640 --> 00:07:36,680 Speaker 5: you bring up the problems about concentration risk in the 158 00:07:36,760 --> 00:07:39,200 Speaker 5: US is they'll say, oh, no, but don't worry. It's 159 00:07:39,240 --> 00:07:41,360 Speaker 5: actually much better than the rest of the world. And 160 00:07:41,400 --> 00:07:43,920 Speaker 5: I won't deny that for a second. But isn't that 161 00:07:44,040 --> 00:07:47,880 Speaker 5: kind of like saying, you know, my Mercedes is now 162 00:07:47,960 --> 00:07:51,520 Speaker 5: using plastic knobs, but don't worry, the Honda uses plastic 163 00:07:51,600 --> 00:07:54,560 Speaker 5: knobs too. Part of the reason that we've been that 164 00:07:54,600 --> 00:07:57,400 Speaker 5: investors have been attracted to the US is that it 165 00:07:57,480 --> 00:08:02,480 Speaker 5: is a diversified basket of many stocks. And just think 166 00:08:02,520 --> 00:08:05,480 Speaker 5: about you know, Warren Buffett, Warren Buffett tells you can 167 00:08:05,480 --> 00:08:07,160 Speaker 5: buy the S and P five hundred, you can sleep 168 00:08:07,200 --> 00:08:09,600 Speaker 5: at night. But if you go and talk to investment 169 00:08:09,600 --> 00:08:12,880 Speaker 5: advisors around the world and you ask them, do you 170 00:08:12,880 --> 00:08:17,200 Speaker 5: think your clients really truly know what's underlying that basket? 171 00:08:17,520 --> 00:08:19,280 Speaker 5: I think they most of them would say they would 172 00:08:19,320 --> 00:08:22,640 Speaker 5: assume that it's it's roughly equal weight, and they would 173 00:08:22,680 --> 00:08:25,320 Speaker 5: be shocked to learn that, you know, Microsoft and Navidia 174 00:08:25,400 --> 00:08:28,400 Speaker 5: Apple are each almost seven percent of their basket for 175 00:08:28,440 --> 00:08:31,280 Speaker 5: a total of twenty one percent. And so it's ends 176 00:08:31,360 --> 00:08:35,040 Speaker 5: up being it's a worrisome kind of new development in 177 00:08:35,080 --> 00:08:38,080 Speaker 5: the US. And I don't buy the argument that just 178 00:08:38,120 --> 00:08:41,480 Speaker 5: because other countries are more, you know, it's concentrated, that 179 00:08:41,520 --> 00:08:42,600 Speaker 5: we shouldn't worry about. 180 00:08:42,440 --> 00:08:44,840 Speaker 4: It in the US. And all you have to do 181 00:08:44,920 --> 00:08:45,760 Speaker 4: is look you, Teresa. 182 00:08:45,800 --> 00:08:49,240 Speaker 5: You mentioned that Goldman Sachs stat and they have another 183 00:08:49,320 --> 00:08:51,400 Speaker 5: one that they published and they went back, they looked 184 00:08:51,400 --> 00:08:56,000 Speaker 5: at concentration risk throughout the last century, and if you 185 00:08:56,080 --> 00:08:59,000 Speaker 5: look at it, we are now just as concentrated as 186 00:08:59,000 --> 00:09:01,560 Speaker 5: we were right in front of the Great Depression in 187 00:09:01,640 --> 00:09:05,280 Speaker 5: nineteen twenty nine, in the nifty to fifty in the 188 00:09:05,320 --> 00:09:09,520 Speaker 5: early seventies, and the dot com bubble in the late nineties. Well, 189 00:09:09,559 --> 00:09:12,160 Speaker 5: all those times were not good times to buy stocks 190 00:09:12,200 --> 00:09:16,679 Speaker 5: for forward returns. So increasingly I think that we need 191 00:09:16,720 --> 00:09:19,880 Speaker 5: to be aware that this is a risk, and there's 192 00:09:19,960 --> 00:09:22,160 Speaker 5: more and more conversation happening around that. 193 00:09:37,720 --> 00:09:41,840 Speaker 3: I'm happy that in Nvidia has been seven percent or 194 00:09:41,880 --> 00:09:45,240 Speaker 3: somewhere south of that. In my portfolio, I didn't even 195 00:09:45,280 --> 00:09:47,880 Speaker 3: have to do anything, and I made a big allocation 196 00:09:48,160 --> 00:09:51,440 Speaker 3: to one of the best performing stocks in the world. 197 00:09:51,600 --> 00:09:54,360 Speaker 3: And not only that, I mean, I take your point 198 00:09:54,360 --> 00:10:00,200 Speaker 3: about concentration and et cetera, and obviously very alarming. These 199 00:10:00,200 --> 00:10:03,160 Speaker 3: are also account for a huge share of the actual 200 00:10:03,400 --> 00:10:05,880 Speaker 3: earnings too, So I mean, you know, there was a 201 00:10:05,880 --> 00:10:09,880 Speaker 3: lot of concentration in ninety nine, two thousandth tech, but 202 00:10:09,960 --> 00:10:12,440 Speaker 3: a lot of those companies weren't really making that much money. 203 00:10:12,960 --> 00:10:14,800 Speaker 3: These companies are earnings juggernauts. 204 00:10:15,800 --> 00:10:18,320 Speaker 5: Well, no doubt, you're absolutely correct, Joe. And that's kind 205 00:10:18,360 --> 00:10:21,679 Speaker 5: of the pushback to this argument that we're concentrated world. 206 00:10:21,679 --> 00:10:24,959 Speaker 5: They'll say, oh, it's bang seven. It's a wide variety 207 00:10:25,000 --> 00:10:28,480 Speaker 5: of different companies that do with different things. It's not 208 00:10:28,520 --> 00:10:31,240 Speaker 5: like it's all one industry. And not only that, the 209 00:10:31,320 --> 00:10:35,200 Speaker 5: valuations aren't as crazy as they might seem, no doubt 210 00:10:35,240 --> 00:10:38,040 Speaker 5: about it. You can make that argument. But let's just 211 00:10:38,160 --> 00:10:41,920 Speaker 5: imagine tomorrow that the AI bubble doesn't live up to 212 00:10:42,000 --> 00:10:44,680 Speaker 5: its hype. Let's imagine that all of a sudden we 213 00:10:44,800 --> 00:10:49,839 Speaker 5: have some sort of earning surprise and these stocks get had. 214 00:10:50,240 --> 00:10:51,920 Speaker 5: It's not that hard to imagine. We went through it 215 00:10:51,920 --> 00:10:56,160 Speaker 5: in twenty twenty two. So if that occurs, I think 216 00:10:56,160 --> 00:10:59,920 Speaker 5: that people will be quite shocked at how they're supposedly 217 00:11:00,120 --> 00:11:06,560 Speaker 5: diversified basket of stocks performs. And more importantly than that 218 00:11:07,000 --> 00:11:09,120 Speaker 5: is that we can sit around and we can debate 219 00:11:09,320 --> 00:11:13,079 Speaker 5: whether you should own this or whether this is prudent. 220 00:11:13,679 --> 00:11:17,800 Speaker 5: But more and more fiduciaries, more and more risk managers, 221 00:11:17,840 --> 00:11:20,920 Speaker 5: more and more institutional portfolio managers are looking at it. 222 00:11:20,920 --> 00:11:24,079 Speaker 5: And saying this is dangerous and they're looking for ways 223 00:11:24,120 --> 00:11:27,240 Speaker 5: around it. And one of the things that many of 224 00:11:27,240 --> 00:11:30,840 Speaker 5: these managers are bumping up against is that although the 225 00:11:31,000 --> 00:11:34,840 Speaker 5: S and P five hundred is actually in line with 226 00:11:34,920 --> 00:11:37,680 Speaker 5: this following rule of this thing called the twenty five 227 00:11:38,040 --> 00:11:41,160 Speaker 5: five point fifty, which means that no one stock can 228 00:11:41,200 --> 00:11:44,680 Speaker 5: have more than twenty five percent and the five stock 229 00:11:44,840 --> 00:11:47,559 Speaker 5: the biggest stocks that are over five percent can't add 230 00:11:47,640 --> 00:11:50,840 Speaker 5: up to more than fifty percent of your portfolio. That's 231 00:11:50,880 --> 00:11:53,560 Speaker 5: an IRS rule that is called the twenty five five 232 00:11:53,600 --> 00:11:56,600 Speaker 5: to fifty rule. There's no problem with the SMP five 233 00:11:56,720 --> 00:12:00,120 Speaker 5: hundred currently with that rule, but there is some thing 234 00:12:00,200 --> 00:12:04,800 Speaker 5: called the Russell one thousand growth index, and increasingly more 235 00:12:04,840 --> 00:12:10,000 Speaker 5: and more institutional managers are benched to that index. And 236 00:12:10,040 --> 00:12:13,800 Speaker 5: what we're seeing is within that index, we're bumping up 237 00:12:13,800 --> 00:12:18,319 Speaker 5: against that. And what's happened now is that Russell's realized 238 00:12:18,360 --> 00:12:21,280 Speaker 5: that this isn't just kind of a fiduciary point of view, 239 00:12:21,320 --> 00:12:24,240 Speaker 5: this is actually an IRS issue in terms of that 240 00:12:24,280 --> 00:12:27,040 Speaker 5: they cannot go over those things. So what we're seeing 241 00:12:27,120 --> 00:12:30,959 Speaker 5: is there's changes in the rules coming to make sure 242 00:12:31,000 --> 00:12:32,959 Speaker 5: that these indexes capped. 243 00:12:34,400 --> 00:12:39,720 Speaker 3: By the way Tracy Kevin mentioning how exposed everyone is 244 00:12:39,760 --> 00:12:42,760 Speaker 3: to AI beta, so to speak, And I just want 245 00:12:42,800 --> 00:12:45,880 Speaker 3: to give a plug. We had a really good contribution 246 00:12:45,960 --> 00:12:49,400 Speaker 3: in the odd Lot's Newsletter from a Skanda recently on 247 00:12:49,640 --> 00:12:52,679 Speaker 3: this whole thing. There's just both in stocks and the 248 00:12:52,800 --> 00:12:56,600 Speaker 3: economy and the real economy. There's just this like we 249 00:12:56,679 --> 00:12:58,679 Speaker 3: get they better get this AI thing right. 250 00:12:59,200 --> 00:13:03,840 Speaker 1: Yeah, seems kind of important. Kevin. You mentioned finance professionals 251 00:13:04,000 --> 00:13:08,280 Speaker 1: reacting to this concentration risk. So okay, maybe your average 252 00:13:08,480 --> 00:13:11,680 Speaker 1: mom and pop retail investor doesn't realize that the S 253 00:13:11,720 --> 00:13:14,760 Speaker 1: and P five hundred is not you know, five hundred 254 00:13:14,840 --> 00:13:18,680 Speaker 1: equal weighted stocks, but certainly finance professionals do, and they're 255 00:13:18,880 --> 00:13:23,439 Speaker 1: aware of both the risk involved in having a large 256 00:13:23,440 --> 00:13:26,960 Speaker 1: concentration in just a handful of stocks and also some 257 00:13:27,080 --> 00:13:31,320 Speaker 1: of the requirements around diversification, so legal requirements that you 258 00:13:31,400 --> 00:13:34,840 Speaker 1: just mentioned. Before we get into some of those changes, 259 00:13:34,960 --> 00:13:37,160 Speaker 1: can you maybe just give us a little bit of 260 00:13:37,240 --> 00:13:43,560 Speaker 1: background on the importance of the index providers to the 261 00:13:43,600 --> 00:13:46,840 Speaker 1: finance industry itself. This is sort of a pet topic 262 00:13:46,880 --> 00:13:50,560 Speaker 1: of mine that I've written about occasionally, But how big 263 00:13:50,600 --> 00:13:52,440 Speaker 1: a deal are the index providers now? 264 00:13:53,600 --> 00:13:57,000 Speaker 5: Well, You're absolutely right to highlight that, Tracy, and I'm 265 00:13:57,000 --> 00:14:00,440 Speaker 5: glad to see you have such a an enthusiastic come 266 00:14:00,760 --> 00:14:03,079 Speaker 5: attraction to index providers. 267 00:14:03,760 --> 00:14:06,439 Speaker 4: One of the you're the only one that gets excited 268 00:14:06,440 --> 00:14:08,480 Speaker 4: about it. But it is a big story. 269 00:14:08,720 --> 00:14:11,959 Speaker 5: And one of the issues is that as indexing has 270 00:14:12,000 --> 00:14:15,439 Speaker 5: become more popular, some of the kind of traditional the 271 00:14:16,000 --> 00:14:19,560 Speaker 5: first of the indexers have started charging more, which has 272 00:14:19,720 --> 00:14:23,760 Speaker 5: created an opportunity for other index providers to jump into 273 00:14:23,800 --> 00:14:26,440 Speaker 5: the loop. So obviously we all know the S and 274 00:14:26,480 --> 00:14:29,080 Speaker 5: P five hundred, but then there's the foot seat, which 275 00:14:29,120 --> 00:14:33,280 Speaker 5: is rustle, but there's also things like morning Star and 276 00:14:33,400 --> 00:14:35,800 Speaker 5: even you guys at Bloomberg have a lot of great 277 00:14:35,800 --> 00:14:38,280 Speaker 5: indexes and you're competing on a lot of these things 278 00:14:38,320 --> 00:14:43,000 Speaker 5: as well. So what's driving that is kind of two factors. 279 00:14:43,120 --> 00:14:46,600 Speaker 5: One of them is that there is the cost associated 280 00:14:46,640 --> 00:14:49,440 Speaker 5: with the big ones, so they're just trying to clients 281 00:14:49,440 --> 00:14:52,600 Speaker 5: that have to pay tens and hundreds of thousand dollars 282 00:14:52,640 --> 00:14:55,880 Speaker 5: for this index data. Is our changing the providers trying 283 00:14:55,880 --> 00:14:58,240 Speaker 5: to get something cheaper. And then the other thing is 284 00:14:58,360 --> 00:15:01,960 Speaker 5: is a little more kind of nefair. There's some indexes 285 00:15:02,040 --> 00:15:04,720 Speaker 5: that are easier to beat, so if you have an 286 00:15:04,760 --> 00:15:08,080 Speaker 5: index that you know the rules, you can actually front 287 00:15:08,120 --> 00:15:11,520 Speaker 5: run them. The When I was researching this and learning 288 00:15:11,520 --> 00:15:14,320 Speaker 5: about this, someone told me that it's important that you 289 00:15:14,480 --> 00:15:18,800 Speaker 5: buy the products of the index of the indexes that 290 00:15:18,800 --> 00:15:21,560 Speaker 5: are difficult to beat, and then from a kind of 291 00:15:21,680 --> 00:15:25,480 Speaker 5: client perspective, you choose. If you are a portfolio manager, 292 00:15:25,520 --> 00:15:29,360 Speaker 5: you choose the indexes that are easier to beat, because 293 00:15:29,360 --> 00:15:32,480 Speaker 5: if you're using, you know, for example, the S and 294 00:15:32,520 --> 00:15:35,040 Speaker 5: P five hundred as your benchmark, that's a lot more 295 00:15:35,040 --> 00:15:38,160 Speaker 5: difficult than to beat than another index that might have 296 00:15:38,440 --> 00:15:42,760 Speaker 5: one annual revision that is easy to kind of forecast 297 00:15:42,880 --> 00:15:43,560 Speaker 5: and run ahead of. 298 00:15:45,080 --> 00:15:45,400 Speaker 4: Joe. 299 00:15:45,480 --> 00:15:49,120 Speaker 1: I should just mention Kevin was kind enough just then, 300 00:15:49,240 --> 00:15:53,160 Speaker 1: because he's a very polite Canadian, to basically do our 301 00:15:53,280 --> 00:15:57,520 Speaker 1: disclaim for us, which is that Bloomberg LP, the parent 302 00:15:57,560 --> 00:16:01,560 Speaker 1: company of Bloomberg News, does own a bunch of different indices, 303 00:16:01,600 --> 00:16:06,520 Speaker 1: but probably most prominent among them are the Bloomberg bond indices, 304 00:16:06,800 --> 00:16:09,840 Speaker 1: and those were the Barclays indices before. So I should 305 00:16:09,920 --> 00:16:10,520 Speaker 1: just mention. 306 00:16:10,360 --> 00:16:13,000 Speaker 3: That there you go, Thank you, Kevin, and thank you. 307 00:16:13,120 --> 00:16:16,120 Speaker 5: Can I jump in with you a little since a 308 00:16:16,120 --> 00:16:18,080 Speaker 5: lot of people are getting Bloomberg users. One of the 309 00:16:18,120 --> 00:16:19,920 Speaker 5: things is if you go when you want to see, 310 00:16:19,960 --> 00:16:22,080 Speaker 5: for example, the index move and the S and P 311 00:16:22,200 --> 00:16:26,680 Speaker 5: five hundred, and you to type in hmov, you'll see 312 00:16:26,680 --> 00:16:29,240 Speaker 5: that they actually unless you pay for that data, you 313 00:16:29,320 --> 00:16:33,560 Speaker 5: don't get the index point changes. But Bloomberg has the 314 00:16:33,600 --> 00:16:37,040 Speaker 5: B five hundred, which is very similar, and you can 315 00:16:37,040 --> 00:16:39,880 Speaker 5: plot it in and then all that functionality that you 316 00:16:39,880 --> 00:16:41,880 Speaker 5: have to pay for on the other things, it actually 317 00:16:41,880 --> 00:16:44,280 Speaker 5: works quite well on the Bloomberg indyssees. 318 00:16:44,560 --> 00:16:47,400 Speaker 3: There you go. So if you have a Bloomberg terminal 319 00:16:47,480 --> 00:16:49,680 Speaker 3: but don't feel like paying for the S and P 320 00:16:50,360 --> 00:16:53,280 Speaker 3: data specifically, Kevin just gave you a little bit of 321 00:16:53,320 --> 00:16:55,040 Speaker 3: a little bit of alpha there. 322 00:16:55,520 --> 00:16:56,120 Speaker 2: But you know it. 323 00:16:56,160 --> 00:17:00,320 Speaker 3: Actually you talked about foot running index changes. Why said 324 00:17:00,320 --> 00:17:00,920 Speaker 3: it easier? 325 00:17:01,080 --> 00:17:01,240 Speaker 1: Right? 326 00:17:01,360 --> 00:17:04,560 Speaker 3: Like S and P they announced, oh, some new company 327 00:17:04,680 --> 00:17:08,639 Speaker 3: is joining an index. How can you make money from 328 00:17:08,680 --> 00:17:09,480 Speaker 3: those announcements? 329 00:17:10,240 --> 00:17:11,240 Speaker 4: Well, you used to be able to. 330 00:17:11,400 --> 00:17:14,400 Speaker 5: There's a huge opportunities before, and there was hedge funds 331 00:17:14,440 --> 00:17:17,359 Speaker 5: that devoted themselves to doing it. But now everyone knows 332 00:17:17,400 --> 00:17:19,840 Speaker 5: the ones that are due to go in. And then 333 00:17:19,880 --> 00:17:22,000 Speaker 5: there's hedge funds who actually have portfolios of all the 334 00:17:22,000 --> 00:17:23,880 Speaker 5: stocks that are due to go in and even not 335 00:17:23,960 --> 00:17:26,600 Speaker 5: just hedge funds, even pension funds will quote and front 336 00:17:26,640 --> 00:17:28,880 Speaker 5: run them because they realize that there's some malfa there. 337 00:17:29,000 --> 00:17:31,080 Speaker 5: So at the end of the day, Joe, the problem 338 00:17:31,280 --> 00:17:33,320 Speaker 5: is that the more people look at it, the less 339 00:17:33,359 --> 00:17:35,320 Speaker 5: money there is to be made. Yeah, and kind of 340 00:17:35,800 --> 00:17:37,320 Speaker 5: trying to guess those things. 341 00:17:37,160 --> 00:17:40,159 Speaker 1: All right, So let's get into how not just the 342 00:17:40,160 --> 00:17:44,879 Speaker 1: benchmark index providers are reacting to increased concentration, but also 343 00:17:44,880 --> 00:17:49,240 Speaker 1: how finance professionals are. You mentioned the Russell one thousand, 344 00:17:49,920 --> 00:17:52,399 Speaker 1: so give us a little bit more detail on what's 345 00:17:52,600 --> 00:17:56,920 Speaker 1: happening there. So Russell one thousand is aware that there's 346 00:17:57,119 --> 00:17:59,040 Speaker 1: intense concentration risk. 347 00:17:59,240 --> 00:18:02,879 Speaker 5: Right, so they're jumping so they are actually getting ahead 348 00:18:02,920 --> 00:18:06,520 Speaker 5: of their problems of potentially going and bumping up against 349 00:18:06,560 --> 00:18:08,880 Speaker 5: this twenty five to five fifty rule. And for those 350 00:18:08,880 --> 00:18:12,080 Speaker 5: who don't aren't aware of it, this isn't a new phenomenon. 351 00:18:12,119 --> 00:18:15,119 Speaker 5: We actually had this in the summer of twenty twenty 352 00:18:15,160 --> 00:18:19,800 Speaker 5: three when Microsoft became too large of a position within 353 00:18:19,880 --> 00:18:24,160 Speaker 5: the QQQS and there needed to be an emergency rebalance 354 00:18:24,480 --> 00:18:28,159 Speaker 5: where they reduced the size of Microsoft. And then we 355 00:18:28,240 --> 00:18:34,159 Speaker 5: also saw this in the sector select XLK spider where 356 00:18:34,600 --> 00:18:38,119 Speaker 5: Navidia ran up and it actually ended up again we 357 00:18:38,160 --> 00:18:40,080 Speaker 5: bumped up against that twenty five to five to fifty 358 00:18:40,160 --> 00:18:43,679 Speaker 5: rule and they needed to be an emergency rebalancing there. 359 00:18:44,000 --> 00:18:46,760 Speaker 5: And that was the situation where there was the way 360 00:18:46,840 --> 00:18:49,680 Speaker 5: that their capping worked. It was this kind of very 361 00:18:49,800 --> 00:18:53,840 Speaker 5: violent shift from selling Apple and buying Navidia, and then 362 00:18:53,920 --> 00:18:56,199 Speaker 5: kind of the next quarter it flipped the other way 363 00:18:56,280 --> 00:18:58,440 Speaker 5: because of the way that the stock price has moved 364 00:18:58,600 --> 00:19:01,600 Speaker 5: and they had to do this rebalance again the other way. 365 00:19:02,040 --> 00:19:04,720 Speaker 5: And so this is the problem with that many of 366 00:19:04,760 --> 00:19:07,480 Speaker 5: these index providers are are kind of bumping up against 367 00:19:07,480 --> 00:19:10,080 Speaker 5: it in terms of they don't want to be too 368 00:19:11,240 --> 00:19:14,239 Speaker 5: violent with their shifts. They don't want to go and 369 00:19:14,920 --> 00:19:18,520 Speaker 5: get into situations where they're rebalancing all the time, trying 370 00:19:18,520 --> 00:19:21,320 Speaker 5: to keep within this limits. And that is why the 371 00:19:21,520 --> 00:19:24,360 Speaker 5: Russell in this R one thousand growth which is one 372 00:19:24,359 --> 00:19:27,840 Speaker 5: of the most popular growth indexes out there, they chose 373 00:19:27,880 --> 00:19:31,280 Speaker 5: instead of using the five and the fifty rule, they 374 00:19:31,400 --> 00:19:34,560 Speaker 5: used four and a half and forty five, meaning that 375 00:19:34,680 --> 00:19:37,440 Speaker 5: any stock above four and a half, if all those 376 00:19:37,480 --> 00:19:40,000 Speaker 5: stocks add up to forty five percent, then they do 377 00:19:40,080 --> 00:19:43,760 Speaker 5: this rebalance. So they've kind of given themselves a little 378 00:19:43,760 --> 00:19:47,200 Speaker 5: bit of extra, you know, room there in terms of 379 00:19:47,240 --> 00:19:50,720 Speaker 5: the rebounce. What's interesting is that they had announced this 380 00:19:51,400 --> 00:19:53,440 Speaker 5: I don't know what's a year ago because they saw 381 00:19:53,480 --> 00:19:56,600 Speaker 5: this problem coming. Nobody was talking about it. 382 00:19:56,720 --> 00:19:59,200 Speaker 1: Oh yeah. I actually went back to try to find 383 00:19:59,280 --> 00:20:01,600 Speaker 1: articles on this. I couldn't find any. 384 00:20:01,800 --> 00:20:02,159 Speaker 4: Yeah. 385 00:20:02,240 --> 00:20:05,280 Speaker 5: The way that I came upon this idea and this 386 00:20:05,800 --> 00:20:08,520 Speaker 5: kind of revelation about that this is coming up was 387 00:20:08,560 --> 00:20:10,840 Speaker 5: actually one of my subscribers and a buddy sent me 388 00:20:10,920 --> 00:20:15,520 Speaker 5: something from Kevin Ja from Discipline Alpha, and he'd written 389 00:20:15,520 --> 00:20:18,080 Speaker 5: this whole piece about it and just highlighting it. One 390 00:20:18,080 --> 00:20:21,560 Speaker 5: of the reasons that he highlighted is he was a 391 00:20:21,760 --> 00:20:25,600 Speaker 5: mid cap manager during the two thousands and he distinctly 392 00:20:25,640 --> 00:20:30,199 Speaker 5: remembers Sebel Systems and another one. I can't remember the 393 00:20:30,200 --> 00:20:32,159 Speaker 5: other one, but there was two big stocks in the 394 00:20:32,200 --> 00:20:35,600 Speaker 5: S and P four hundred that were due to go 395 00:20:35,640 --> 00:20:38,720 Speaker 5: into the S and P five hundred, and when they 396 00:20:38,720 --> 00:20:42,160 Speaker 5: did it, the trouble was that the guys that all 397 00:20:42,240 --> 00:20:44,879 Speaker 5: bought it for the S and P five hundred, and 398 00:20:44,920 --> 00:20:47,600 Speaker 5: then when the SNB four hundred guys went to sell it, 399 00:20:48,119 --> 00:20:51,280 Speaker 5: there was no bids. And then coincided with the top 400 00:20:51,359 --> 00:20:54,879 Speaker 5: of the Nasdaq market, and he's very kind of adamant 401 00:20:54,920 --> 00:20:58,879 Speaker 5: that this is could be another situation where we have 402 00:20:58,960 --> 00:21:02,720 Speaker 5: a situation where the MAG seven has to go down 403 00:21:02,920 --> 00:21:07,120 Speaker 5: in waiting in one of the biggest indexes out there 404 00:21:07,160 --> 00:21:09,440 Speaker 5: in terms of after the S and P five hundred, 405 00:21:09,520 --> 00:21:12,640 Speaker 5: this is probably the next biggest growth index out there. 406 00:21:13,320 --> 00:21:17,359 Speaker 5: And when this rebalance occurs, which again is in March, ironically, 407 00:21:17,400 --> 00:21:19,840 Speaker 5: it's the same deal. There's going to be millions and 408 00:21:19,880 --> 00:21:26,320 Speaker 5: millions of shares of these mag sevens for sale. And 409 00:21:26,400 --> 00:21:28,359 Speaker 5: so for me, when I was trying to learn about it, 410 00:21:28,400 --> 00:21:30,240 Speaker 5: I went and said, okay, I went to an old 411 00:21:30,280 --> 00:21:32,480 Speaker 5: buddy at TD and they were one of the few, 412 00:21:32,560 --> 00:21:34,960 Speaker 5: and I think he said he was the first cell 413 00:21:35,080 --> 00:21:39,240 Speaker 5: side dealer to actually start talking about this. But increasingly 414 00:21:39,359 --> 00:21:42,960 Speaker 5: over the last month there's been more and more folks 415 00:21:43,040 --> 00:21:45,360 Speaker 5: paying attention and realizing that this is a bigger deal 416 00:21:45,440 --> 00:21:46,080 Speaker 5: than they really. 417 00:22:00,760 --> 00:22:03,760 Speaker 3: By the way, as tracing those I love dot com 418 00:22:03,880 --> 00:22:07,159 Speaker 3: you're trivia and talking about that, and so like you 419 00:22:07,160 --> 00:22:12,560 Speaker 3: talk about Sebel and you talking about the three comm 420 00:22:12,640 --> 00:22:16,240 Speaker 3: Palm situation and all the these are like these are 421 00:22:16,280 --> 00:22:19,240 Speaker 3: some of my CATNP for Yeah, this is a total cat. 422 00:22:19,800 --> 00:22:19,960 Speaker 2: You know. 423 00:22:20,080 --> 00:22:23,359 Speaker 3: It occurs to me like the sort of the very 424 00:22:23,560 --> 00:22:28,760 Speaker 3: strict Chicago school. There's no such thing. Everyone people love 425 00:22:28,800 --> 00:22:30,320 Speaker 3: to say, there's no such thing as that you can't 426 00:22:30,480 --> 00:22:33,359 Speaker 3: as passive investing. You can sort of get close to it, 427 00:22:33,720 --> 00:22:37,040 Speaker 3: you know, the strict Chicago school people is like, you know, 428 00:22:37,080 --> 00:22:41,120 Speaker 3: you buy the global market portfolio at their market value, 429 00:22:41,520 --> 00:22:46,160 Speaker 3: every investable asset in the world. These rules essentially make 430 00:22:46,240 --> 00:22:49,480 Speaker 3: it impossible, right because if you had some stock that 431 00:22:49,680 --> 00:22:51,720 Speaker 3: was I don't know, got so big it was twenty 432 00:22:51,720 --> 00:22:54,040 Speaker 3: five percent of the index or whatever, but you're not 433 00:22:54,200 --> 00:22:57,680 Speaker 3: allowed to do it technically, like you really couldn't buy 434 00:22:58,400 --> 00:23:01,480 Speaker 3: the true market portfolio given some of these constraints. 435 00:23:02,440 --> 00:23:05,480 Speaker 5: That's correct, and that's an IRS constraint. And then not 436 00:23:05,560 --> 00:23:07,560 Speaker 5: only that, just stop and think about if you go 437 00:23:07,720 --> 00:23:11,160 Speaker 5: and you try to recreate these portfolios at a broker. 438 00:23:11,680 --> 00:23:13,919 Speaker 5: I spoke to one investment advisor. He said, if I 439 00:23:14,000 --> 00:23:17,600 Speaker 5: went and made a portfolio of the qqqs, like if 440 00:23:17,600 --> 00:23:20,360 Speaker 5: I just made it from scratch and did all those things, 441 00:23:20,800 --> 00:23:24,120 Speaker 5: that compliance would tell me that I'm too concentrated in 442 00:23:24,280 --> 00:23:27,040 Speaker 5: tech stocks. So he says, I'm not allowed to buy 443 00:23:27,080 --> 00:23:30,280 Speaker 5: this from a compliance point of view, but I'm allowed 444 00:23:30,280 --> 00:23:33,359 Speaker 5: to buy the client's qqqs. And that's back to my 445 00:23:33,520 --> 00:23:35,920 Speaker 5: point is that we all just kind of been lulled 446 00:23:35,960 --> 00:23:39,919 Speaker 5: into this feeling that everything's okay. It's a it's a 447 00:23:39,960 --> 00:23:44,280 Speaker 5: broad index, and it's no longer as broad. And ironically, 448 00:23:44,320 --> 00:23:49,119 Speaker 5: you're talking about this idea about the mart the indexing, 449 00:23:49,359 --> 00:23:51,959 Speaker 5: and if you remember Mike Green and his theory that 450 00:23:53,240 --> 00:23:56,360 Speaker 5: the big will get bigger because of indexing, and more 451 00:23:56,440 --> 00:23:58,960 Speaker 5: and more people will just continue and this will create 452 00:23:59,000 --> 00:24:01,480 Speaker 5: a situation where the biggest stocks will continue to just 453 00:24:01,520 --> 00:24:04,760 Speaker 5: get bigger and bigger and bigger. Well, we're here, this 454 00:24:04,800 --> 00:24:08,800 Speaker 5: is happening. And my pushback to that argument has always 455 00:24:08,880 --> 00:24:13,640 Speaker 5: been that he's assuming the market doesn't work. He's assuming 456 00:24:13,680 --> 00:24:17,440 Speaker 5: nobody goes and says, hey, wait, those stocks are too big. 457 00:24:17,840 --> 00:24:20,080 Speaker 5: I'm going to go and no longer be benched to 458 00:24:20,080 --> 00:24:22,199 Speaker 5: the S and P five hundred. I'm going to be 459 00:24:22,200 --> 00:24:26,560 Speaker 5: benched to Russell one thousand or maybe three thousand. I'll 460 00:24:26,680 --> 00:24:29,720 Speaker 5: change it and see. This is the problem is that 461 00:24:30,240 --> 00:24:34,080 Speaker 5: many clients have kind of career risk, So if they're 462 00:24:34,160 --> 00:24:38,160 Speaker 5: bench to the S and P five hundred, they can't 463 00:24:38,200 --> 00:24:41,400 Speaker 5: go and put this huge bet where they don't own 464 00:24:41,440 --> 00:24:44,000 Speaker 5: the mag seven or they just say no, I can't 465 00:24:44,000 --> 00:24:46,879 Speaker 5: own it, it's too expensive. They need to go and 466 00:24:46,920 --> 00:24:49,439 Speaker 5: they need to own those stocks. But if you're a 467 00:24:49,440 --> 00:24:52,920 Speaker 5: fiduciary that's managing money for someone, and you go and 468 00:24:52,960 --> 00:24:55,280 Speaker 5: you say, listen, this doesn't make any sense. 469 00:24:55,880 --> 00:24:57,320 Speaker 4: We're buying this s and P. 470 00:24:57,440 --> 00:24:59,479 Speaker 5: Five hundred And the original reason what we did it 471 00:24:59,560 --> 00:25:01,360 Speaker 5: was because it it was supposed to be this diversified 472 00:25:01,359 --> 00:25:04,680 Speaker 5: basket of the whole market. This no longer makes sense. 473 00:25:04,760 --> 00:25:07,560 Speaker 5: Let's go try to find something else so you can 474 00:25:07,680 --> 00:25:12,520 Speaker 5: change your benchmark. Now, ironically, that actually takes a lot 475 00:25:12,560 --> 00:25:14,600 Speaker 5: of hassle and it's difficult. 476 00:25:14,680 --> 00:25:17,679 Speaker 4: You have to go and you have to convince all. 477 00:25:17,640 --> 00:25:20,920 Speaker 5: The users of your product or the or the end 478 00:25:20,920 --> 00:25:24,520 Speaker 5: clients to switch it. And that is why in this 479 00:25:24,600 --> 00:25:28,160 Speaker 5: situation with the Russell one thousand growth, instead of making 480 00:25:28,200 --> 00:25:32,240 Speaker 5: a new benchmark that is capped, they said, no, we're 481 00:25:32,280 --> 00:25:35,720 Speaker 5: just going to change the existing rules of the existing index. 482 00:25:36,280 --> 00:25:39,960 Speaker 5: So if you want an unconstrained Russell one thousand growth, 483 00:25:40,480 --> 00:25:43,800 Speaker 5: there is a new index that Russell has created, But 484 00:25:44,280 --> 00:25:46,840 Speaker 5: in this case it's going to be everyone that is 485 00:25:46,920 --> 00:25:49,160 Speaker 5: the Russell one thousand growth, and it's a lot of them. 486 00:25:49,200 --> 00:25:51,800 Speaker 5: Like you go, you pull it up, you'll see twenty billion, 487 00:25:52,400 --> 00:25:55,879 Speaker 5: forty billion, lots of people with big, big accounts that 488 00:25:55,920 --> 00:25:58,600 Speaker 5: are benched to this. They're gonna all of a sudden 489 00:25:58,760 --> 00:26:03,600 Speaker 5: find themselves overweight mag seven because there's a shift that's 490 00:26:03,600 --> 00:26:07,399 Speaker 5: occurring on the March expiry March twenty first. 491 00:26:08,000 --> 00:26:11,560 Speaker 1: So, Kevin, you mentioned Russell making this decision to change 492 00:26:11,600 --> 00:26:14,639 Speaker 1: the existing index rather than create a new one, And 493 00:26:14,680 --> 00:26:16,639 Speaker 1: this is exactly what I wanted to ask you about, 494 00:26:16,680 --> 00:26:19,840 Speaker 1: which is, you know, when we talk about benchmark index providers, 495 00:26:20,200 --> 00:26:24,359 Speaker 1: we talk about them as being passive, right. They always 496 00:26:24,400 --> 00:26:28,680 Speaker 1: say they create these indices that are basically holding up 497 00:26:29,000 --> 00:26:32,800 Speaker 1: a mirror to markets and trying to reflect them as 498 00:26:32,880 --> 00:26:36,680 Speaker 1: they exist right now, and that kind of I'm a 499 00:26:36,720 --> 00:26:39,960 Speaker 1: little skeptical of that approach because I do think index 500 00:26:40,040 --> 00:26:43,560 Speaker 1: construction affects things like flows. It's kind of reflexive, and 501 00:26:43,600 --> 00:26:45,479 Speaker 1: I do think there are a lot of you know, 502 00:26:46,080 --> 00:26:49,760 Speaker 1: judgment calls that are embedded when you're deciding what to 503 00:26:49,800 --> 00:26:53,359 Speaker 1: include and what to exclude. But if they're making an 504 00:26:53,400 --> 00:26:57,760 Speaker 1: active decision to change the weighting on something like tech, 505 00:26:58,119 --> 00:27:01,320 Speaker 1: does that perhaps open them up to more or scrutiny 506 00:27:01,800 --> 00:27:03,120 Speaker 1: perhaps from regulators. 507 00:27:04,560 --> 00:27:08,200 Speaker 5: Well, I wouldn't say from regulators. It's more scrutiny from 508 00:27:08,200 --> 00:27:11,840 Speaker 5: the clients. But in this case, they're not actually saying 509 00:27:11,880 --> 00:27:14,679 Speaker 5: they don't want more tech. They're saying, we need to 510 00:27:14,680 --> 00:27:17,400 Speaker 5: comply with this twenty five to five point fifty rule, 511 00:27:18,040 --> 00:27:21,639 Speaker 5: which is an IRS rule. It has nothing to do with, 512 00:27:22,800 --> 00:27:24,840 Speaker 5: you know, a decision that they think that the mag 513 00:27:24,960 --> 00:27:26,240 Speaker 5: seven's gotten too risky. 514 00:27:27,240 --> 00:27:27,440 Speaker 4: Right. 515 00:27:27,480 --> 00:27:31,880 Speaker 5: The index providers are there to provide whatever index they 516 00:27:31,880 --> 00:27:35,160 Speaker 5: think they can sell to their clients. If their clients 517 00:27:35,240 --> 00:27:38,000 Speaker 5: want something, they're going to do it and by that token. 518 00:27:38,480 --> 00:27:41,719 Speaker 5: Interestingly enough, we see the S and P five hundred 519 00:27:41,800 --> 00:27:45,560 Speaker 5: Earlier this spring introduced a capped version of the S 520 00:27:45,640 --> 00:27:49,800 Speaker 5: and P five hundred, which has individual stocks capped to 521 00:27:49,880 --> 00:27:54,080 Speaker 5: three percent. Now Here in Canada, we've actually already listed 522 00:27:54,080 --> 00:27:58,000 Speaker 5: an ETF based upon this index. But the reason that 523 00:27:58,560 --> 00:28:01,560 Speaker 5: SMP has created in nexus because there's a demand for 524 00:28:01,640 --> 00:28:06,879 Speaker 5: it and ultimately the clients will drive it. What I 525 00:28:07,040 --> 00:28:10,600 Speaker 5: thought was so interesting about this whole development is that 526 00:28:10,640 --> 00:28:15,639 Speaker 5: we're seeing index providers having to change their rules because 527 00:28:15,640 --> 00:28:18,200 Speaker 5: of this twenty five five point fifty. Then we're also 528 00:28:18,320 --> 00:28:24,200 Speaker 5: seeing institutional pension funds endowments starting to question whether they 529 00:28:24,359 --> 00:28:28,720 Speaker 5: want to continue with benchmarks that have such a large concentration. 530 00:28:29,560 --> 00:28:33,120 Speaker 5: And this is combined with the fact that many retail 531 00:28:33,200 --> 00:28:37,000 Speaker 5: don't really understand what they're buying when they buy the 532 00:28:37,080 --> 00:28:39,840 Speaker 5: S and P five hundred. So when I look at 533 00:28:39,920 --> 00:28:42,160 Speaker 5: this situation and think about how this is going to 534 00:28:42,200 --> 00:28:46,920 Speaker 5: play out going forward, I can make the argument that 535 00:28:47,040 --> 00:28:50,480 Speaker 5: we're kind of at the peak of concentration here and 536 00:28:50,520 --> 00:28:55,000 Speaker 5: that this is the market correcting what has become too 537 00:28:55,080 --> 00:28:56,480 Speaker 5: concentrated of a market. 538 00:28:58,360 --> 00:29:01,280 Speaker 3: You know, going back to this idea that the big 539 00:29:01,560 --> 00:29:05,240 Speaker 3: just keep getting bigger, and you mentioned some of Mike 540 00:29:05,240 --> 00:29:08,000 Speaker 3: Green's theories, and you know, there is this view that 541 00:29:08,080 --> 00:29:12,120 Speaker 3: some have that like the funds themselves, the ETFs, the 542 00:29:12,160 --> 00:29:15,600 Speaker 3: index funds like create this mechanical flows and that flows 543 00:29:15,640 --> 00:29:18,000 Speaker 3: to the biggest stocks and they keep going up and 544 00:29:18,080 --> 00:29:18,520 Speaker 3: et cetera. 545 00:29:18,640 --> 00:29:19,880 Speaker 1: Flows before pros. 546 00:29:19,920 --> 00:29:22,800 Speaker 3: As Tracy has coined it, Do you still have that 547 00:29:22,840 --> 00:29:24,240 Speaker 3: in your message, Nim Tracy? 548 00:29:24,280 --> 00:29:26,120 Speaker 1: I think I do, but only because I'm lazy and 549 00:29:26,360 --> 00:29:27,760 Speaker 1: haven't been bothered to replace it. 550 00:29:28,120 --> 00:29:31,240 Speaker 3: But on the other hand, we're recording this January twenty 551 00:29:31,320 --> 00:29:34,840 Speaker 3: second and one of the biggest stocks in the market. 552 00:29:34,920 --> 00:29:39,800 Speaker 3: Apple has significantly underperformed all year. So the QQQ the 553 00:29:39,800 --> 00:29:43,480 Speaker 3: indices are up, but Apple's actually significantly down this year 554 00:29:43,520 --> 00:29:47,920 Speaker 3: concerns about iPhone sales. It still looks to me that 555 00:29:48,880 --> 00:29:51,880 Speaker 3: maybe there's some mechanical flows going on, but there is 556 00:29:52,920 --> 00:29:57,920 Speaker 3: individual security selection and marginal price setting still happening, so 557 00:29:58,000 --> 00:30:01,120 Speaker 3: that despite like all these the flows that on some 558 00:30:01,320 --> 00:30:03,680 Speaker 3: level you know that they're you know, if a company 559 00:30:03,840 --> 00:30:07,360 Speaker 3: is if they're concerns about a company's performance, it doesn't 560 00:30:07,360 --> 00:30:08,600 Speaker 3: just mechanically go higher. 561 00:30:08,640 --> 00:30:10,920 Speaker 5: You're right, Joe, But I would push back and say 562 00:30:10,960 --> 00:30:13,840 Speaker 5: that I'm cliff as in Camp that it's become a 563 00:30:13,880 --> 00:30:19,680 Speaker 5: lot less efficient. There's less and less fundamental investors going 564 00:30:19,680 --> 00:30:24,000 Speaker 5: out and actually buying and selling stocks based upon fundamentals. 565 00:30:24,440 --> 00:30:27,920 Speaker 5: And not only that, Cliff won't tell you this, but 566 00:30:28,080 --> 00:30:30,440 Speaker 5: if you think about it, part of the reason the 567 00:30:30,480 --> 00:30:35,240 Speaker 5: market has become less efficient is because of quants themselves. 568 00:30:36,000 --> 00:30:39,920 Speaker 5: They become a larger and larger portion of the trading 569 00:30:40,080 --> 00:30:43,160 Speaker 5: in the market. These pod shops, and I have nothing 570 00:30:43,160 --> 00:30:47,640 Speaker 5: against them, they're producing some absolutely stellar returns risk adjusted. 571 00:30:47,680 --> 00:30:48,560 Speaker 4: They're out of the world. 572 00:30:48,640 --> 00:30:51,520 Speaker 5: They're terrific but a lot of it is based upon 573 00:30:52,120 --> 00:30:56,840 Speaker 5: following momentum and doing things like earnings revisions and other 574 00:30:57,000 --> 00:31:02,400 Speaker 5: kind of pro like short term pro cyclical movements, so 575 00:31:02,440 --> 00:31:05,760 Speaker 5: there's very little of the kind of dual David Einhorn, 576 00:31:05,880 --> 00:31:08,720 Speaker 5: I'm buying a stock because it's for you know, a 577 00:31:08,840 --> 00:31:12,400 Speaker 5: four pe, and I'm planning on selling it at seven pe. 578 00:31:12,600 --> 00:31:14,640 Speaker 5: When everyone figures out that earnings are going to be 579 00:31:14,640 --> 00:31:19,880 Speaker 5: better than expected, now it's much more. Next quarters, EPs 580 00:31:19,960 --> 00:31:21,960 Speaker 5: is going to be slightly higher. That means the earnings 581 00:31:22,000 --> 00:31:25,080 Speaker 5: revisions ticked up, and therefore all of our models mean 582 00:31:25,120 --> 00:31:27,040 Speaker 5: that you need to buy, and everyone rushes into it, 583 00:31:27,080 --> 00:31:29,280 Speaker 5: and then the CTAs follow and it just ends. 584 00:31:29,120 --> 00:31:30,400 Speaker 4: Up feeding upon itself. 585 00:31:31,160 --> 00:31:34,880 Speaker 5: So I'm not quite sure I completely agree with you, Joe, 586 00:31:34,920 --> 00:31:38,240 Speaker 5: that that everything is great with the markets. It really 587 00:31:38,280 --> 00:31:41,200 Speaker 5: does feel to me like it's become less efficient, not more. 588 00:31:41,400 --> 00:31:43,760 Speaker 1: All Right, Kevin Muir, I am so glad that we 589 00:31:43,920 --> 00:31:45,719 Speaker 1: finally got you on the show and we have to 590 00:31:45,720 --> 00:31:47,040 Speaker 1: do it again. Thank you so. 591 00:31:47,080 --> 00:31:50,200 Speaker 4: Much, my pleasure, Thank you for having me on. 592 00:31:50,480 --> 00:32:06,560 Speaker 1: Thanks that's great, Joe, that was so much fun. I'm 593 00:32:06,600 --> 00:32:08,640 Speaker 1: so glad we finally had Kevin on the show and 594 00:32:08,680 --> 00:32:11,480 Speaker 1: he even brought you, you know, dot com era of femine. 595 00:32:11,480 --> 00:32:13,400 Speaker 3: I know, I love it. I love this topic. I 596 00:32:13,400 --> 00:32:15,760 Speaker 3: mean I just think about it all the time. I 597 00:32:16,120 --> 00:32:19,080 Speaker 3: even wrote about it in the newsletter this week. Every 598 00:32:20,440 --> 00:32:23,720 Speaker 3: month Bank of America does their hedge fund or their 599 00:32:23,760 --> 00:32:25,960 Speaker 3: fund manager survey, and one of the questions they ask 600 00:32:26,120 --> 00:32:28,640 Speaker 3: is what do you perceive as the most crowded trade? 601 00:32:29,320 --> 00:32:33,600 Speaker 3: And basically, like almost every month for years now, it's 602 00:32:33,600 --> 00:32:38,760 Speaker 3: been some it's some version of big tech. And you know, 603 00:32:38,920 --> 00:32:40,760 Speaker 3: like you're like, typically you think, oh, this is a 604 00:32:40,800 --> 00:32:43,280 Speaker 3: crowded trade, it can't go on. But the move has 605 00:32:43,320 --> 00:32:45,200 Speaker 3: been to play the crowded trade. 606 00:32:45,440 --> 00:32:49,000 Speaker 1: Yeah. Absolutely, and you're right to some extent that's been 607 00:32:49,320 --> 00:32:53,000 Speaker 1: justified by earnings. But I think I think there is 608 00:32:53,160 --> 00:32:56,479 Speaker 1: like this reflexivity that I mentioned at play in the market, 609 00:32:56,560 --> 00:32:59,600 Speaker 1: where you know, the big attract more inflows, they get 610 00:32:59,600 --> 00:33:03,160 Speaker 1: more capital, they get bigger, maybe they get more pricing power, 611 00:33:03,200 --> 00:33:05,280 Speaker 1: and then that leads to more earnings. So you have 612 00:33:05,360 --> 00:33:07,200 Speaker 1: this sort of cycle going on. 613 00:33:07,320 --> 00:33:11,600 Speaker 3: I mean, well, for whatever reason, we're in an era 614 00:33:12,240 --> 00:33:14,600 Speaker 3: and I would say there is a winner take all 615 00:33:14,720 --> 00:33:18,160 Speaker 3: this across the economy. Yeah, that you see for sure, 616 00:33:18,240 --> 00:33:21,400 Speaker 3: And how much of that is financial flows, how much 617 00:33:21,600 --> 00:33:26,440 Speaker 3: of it is real economic outcomes. I guess my inclination 618 00:33:26,560 --> 00:33:28,920 Speaker 3: is still to look and say, you know, the earnings 619 00:33:29,000 --> 00:33:33,200 Speaker 3: growth of these names are unbelievable, but whatever the reason, 620 00:33:34,000 --> 00:33:37,080 Speaker 3: everyone is now all in on the same bet. And 621 00:33:37,200 --> 00:33:40,480 Speaker 3: Kevin made the point about career risk, which is really key, 622 00:33:40,520 --> 00:33:43,160 Speaker 3: which is that even if you think you've identified something 623 00:33:43,160 --> 00:33:45,880 Speaker 3: else or maybe a better way to diversify, et cetera, 624 00:33:46,400 --> 00:33:49,400 Speaker 3: do you really want to be the one person who like, oh, 625 00:33:49,440 --> 00:33:52,680 Speaker 3: I'm gonna like shave down my Nvidia exposure or do 626 00:33:52,680 --> 00:33:54,480 Speaker 3: you just want to ride with everyone else at the 627 00:33:54,480 --> 00:33:54,960 Speaker 3: same time. 628 00:33:55,680 --> 00:33:59,280 Speaker 1: You know, one of my favorite benchmark controversies is there's 629 00:33:59,320 --> 00:34:01,120 Speaker 1: actually a lot of if you think about, you know, 630 00:34:01,200 --> 00:34:04,880 Speaker 1: like including Chinese bonds, including Chinese shares and things like that. 631 00:34:05,000 --> 00:34:09,759 Speaker 1: But there there was this big kerfuffle among frontier and 632 00:34:09,960 --> 00:34:12,080 Speaker 1: em investors. 633 00:34:11,440 --> 00:34:13,480 Speaker 4: About Kuwait huh. 634 00:34:13,560 --> 00:34:17,480 Speaker 1: Kuwait was included in the MSCI Frontier Index for the 635 00:34:17,520 --> 00:34:20,480 Speaker 1: longest time, and a lot of people didn't like that 636 00:34:20,680 --> 00:34:24,600 Speaker 1: because Kuwait is this like fairly small country with only 637 00:34:24,640 --> 00:34:28,719 Speaker 1: four million people and like a pretty small GDP, and 638 00:34:28,840 --> 00:34:33,040 Speaker 1: everyone was like, why can't we have more Vietnam or 639 00:34:33,120 --> 00:34:36,759 Speaker 1: something like that. So eventually they kicked Kuwait out of 640 00:34:36,800 --> 00:34:39,960 Speaker 1: the Frontier Index and sent it to em and everyone 641 00:34:40,080 --> 00:34:43,399 Speaker 1: was happy, that's a good story starting Kuwait. Presumably it's 642 00:34:43,440 --> 00:34:47,279 Speaker 1: a good story. Yeah, thanks. Shall we leave it there? 643 00:34:47,320 --> 00:34:48,399 Speaker 3: Let's leave it there, all right. 644 00:34:48,520 --> 00:34:51,080 Speaker 1: This has been another episode of the Odd Lots podcast. 645 00:34:51,200 --> 00:34:54,240 Speaker 1: I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway. 646 00:34:54,400 --> 00:34:56,719 Speaker 3: And I'm Jill Wisenthal. You can follow me at the 647 00:34:56,760 --> 00:35:00,880 Speaker 3: Stalwart Follow or guest Kevin Muir. He's at Kevin Follow. 648 00:35:00,920 --> 00:35:04,440 Speaker 3: Our producers Kerman Rodriguez at Kerman ermann Dashel Bennett at 649 00:35:04,480 --> 00:35:08,360 Speaker 3: dashbot and kill Brooks at Kilbrooks. For more Oddlots content, 650 00:35:08,400 --> 00:35:10,600 Speaker 3: go to Bloomberg dot com slash odd Lots. We have 651 00:35:10,680 --> 00:35:13,359 Speaker 3: transcripts a blog in the newsletter, and you can shout 652 00:35:13,400 --> 00:35:17,480 Speaker 3: about all of these topics, including index concentration and markets 653 00:35:17,480 --> 00:35:21,280 Speaker 3: and investing in our discord discord dot gg slash odlog. 654 00:35:21,800 --> 00:35:24,120 Speaker 1: And if you enjoy all lots, if you like it 655 00:35:24,160 --> 00:35:27,640 Speaker 1: when we talk about benchmark index providers, then please leave 656 00:35:27,719 --> 00:35:31,760 Speaker 1: us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform. And remember, 657 00:35:31,840 --> 00:35:34,520 Speaker 1: if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, you can listen to 658 00:35:34,719 --> 00:35:38,000 Speaker 1: all of our episodes absolutely ad free. All you need 659 00:35:38,040 --> 00:35:40,839 Speaker 1: to do is find the Bloomberg channel on Apple Podcasts 660 00:35:40,880 --> 00:36:13,200 Speaker 1: and follow the instructions there. Thanks for listening behind it