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Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

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Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A

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Speaker 1: production of I Heart Radio Happy St. Patrick's Day. It's

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Speaker 1: not today, it's when we're recording this. My name is Matt,

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Speaker 1: my name is Nol and my audio wave Farmers Green.

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Speaker 1: They called me Ben and we're joined as always with

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Speaker 1: our super producer Paul Mission Control decond. Most importantly, you

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Speaker 1: are you, You are here, and that makes this stuff

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Speaker 1: they don't want you to know. UM important announcement before

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Speaker 1: we go into this week's listener mail segment. We are

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Speaker 1: recording after a horrific series of events that took place

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Speaker 1: in Atlanta, Georgia. A domestic terrorists took the lives of

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Speaker 1: eight people. Is currently claiming this was somehow not racially motivated,

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Speaker 1: most likely in an attempt to dodge the additional federal

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Speaker 1: crimes that these sorts of murderers can and should be

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Speaker 1: charged with. UM. I we haven't talked about whether or

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Speaker 1: not to remark on this on air, but I do

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Speaker 1: I do feel it should take precedent here for everyone

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Speaker 1: listening who is of the Asian American Pacific Islander community.

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Speaker 1: We are with you. This is a another tragic, heartbreaking,

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Speaker 1: another iteration of the continued rise in violence across the

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Speaker 1: nation against people for no other reason than hatred and racism.

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Speaker 1: As we said before, racism no, most importantly, a severe

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Speaker 1: lack of critical thinking, and it has no space in

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Speaker 1: any public form. What what do you guys think about that?

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Speaker 1: I know I'm paying a lot of you. I mean, good,

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Speaker 1: good lord, Ben, you you nailed it. It's It's completely true,

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Speaker 1: and it's something that I think people were emboldened to

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Speaker 1: do more openly because of a lot of availability of

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Speaker 1: certain forums, uh, and a lot of really charged rhetoric

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Speaker 1: around things like that, and the idea of feeling comfortable

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Speaker 1: lashing out at folks who look differently, who represent a

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Speaker 1: certain set um and you know, the gentleman and what

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Speaker 1: I'm not gonna call him a gentleman, the absolute monster

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Speaker 1: in question that the last thing he posted on social

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Speaker 1: media was a screed about how China is the enemy

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Speaker 1: and you know, how we're being too soft on China

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Speaker 1: and all of that stuff. And it's just an absolute

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Speaker 1: conflation of like geopolitics with people humans on the ground,

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Speaker 1: they don't represent with what what's happening in China, and

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Speaker 1: if if they did, that's just you know, I don't know.

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Speaker 1: It's very disheartening. It has no place, And the narratives

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Speaker 1: that are coming out from the regional media initially as

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Speaker 1: we record this are incredibly distressing. Local law enforcement has

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Speaker 1: been saying some just buffoonish things, and we know, or

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Speaker 1: at least I know, UM, I'm very well aware of

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Speaker 1: what the perception of the American South is in the

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Speaker 1: US and abroad. And our show, our team of five

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Speaker 1: or so folks and one plastic skeleton and a muppet

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Speaker 1: that is somehow also an n S A intern named Steve,

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Speaker 1: our team wholeheartedly. We are we are located in Atlanta,

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Speaker 1: and we stand against anything like this. UM to do

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Speaker 1: otherwise is unconscionable, and I know it sounds like a

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Speaker 1: little bit of a lecture. We are absolutely not the

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Speaker 1: voices that would should be reporting in depth on this,

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Speaker 1: because the people who will have the most impactful reporting

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Speaker 1: are the people whose voices have historically been ignored for

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Speaker 1: far too long. I just have to agree with you, guys.

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Speaker 1: I don't have a lot to say on this, just

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Speaker 1: it's horrific, and you know, we're reading about it today

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Speaker 1: and we're I'm very close in proximity to where some

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Speaker 1: of these events occurred, and right along this area there's

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Speaker 1: there's a large community of people that are in fear

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Speaker 1: right now because of the actions taken by one person.

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Speaker 1: The one thing I am thankful for is that the

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Speaker 1: person suspected of these crimes was caught on camera pretty

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Speaker 1: clearly at the locations. So this person who has been apprehended,

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Speaker 1: it does appear like there's enough evidence to put this

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Speaker 1: person away for a long time if they are found guilty,

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Speaker 1: and hopefully they will be, and I'm just thankful that

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Speaker 1: that has already occurred or is occurring right now. I

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Speaker 1: would also voice to anyone out there who is if

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Speaker 1: you're listening to this and you're feeling some type of

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Speaker 1: way because of something you've read or something you've been told,

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Speaker 1: I would just say, do your best to read some

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Speaker 1: other things, talk to some other people, and see what

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Speaker 1: you can do to change your outlook, because this is

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Speaker 1: this is this is horrible and and nobody should have

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Speaker 1: to go through this. If you have experience firsthand with

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Speaker 1: horrific events like this, please as always feel free to

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Speaker 1: reach out to us directly. We will give you many

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Speaker 1: ways to contact us at the end of the show,

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Speaker 1: or you can always simply pause and give us a

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Speaker 1: call now on three three st d w y t K,

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Speaker 1: or send us an email conspiracy at I heart radio

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Speaker 1: dot com. Thank you very much for your time with

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Speaker 1: our show, and as always, we look forward to hearing

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Speaker 1: from you. And so speaking of the most important part

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Speaker 1: of the show you specifically you listening today tonight wherever

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Speaker 1: you're at. Uh We like to take some time every

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Speaker 1: week to share some of your stories, your feedback, your suggestions,

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Speaker 1: your experiences, because they are crucial to the show. We've

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Speaker 1: got some We've got some pretty crazy stuff here. We

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Speaker 1: don't always do this. We all we all went with emails.

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Speaker 1: We've got some scary stuff about big data. We've got

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Speaker 1: some scary We've got some scary future stuff. Actually this

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Speaker 1: is a scary future stuff listener mail. We're talking about

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Speaker 1: conspiracies too, to mess with your guts in a very

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Speaker 1: literal way that seems seems fun and poopoo humor at

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Speaker 1: first but quickly could become dystopian. We're also talking about

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Speaker 1: uh no kidding robots and who doesn't love a good

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Speaker 1: terrifying robots story. So big data, robots and the guts.

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Speaker 1: Where shall we begin, gentlemen, I kind of want to

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Speaker 1: start inside? Can we Can we start deep deep inside

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Speaker 1: of us? Yes? Please? Yes, like that movie Innerspace. Let's

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Speaker 1: hop on board very well. Then we go travel with us,

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Speaker 1: fellow conspiracy realist, into these guts, Yes, up in them.

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Speaker 1: In fact, our first letter today comes from Heather, and

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Speaker 1: this is This is pretty brief, but it's succinct and

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Speaker 1: it uh. It opens the floor for an increasingly important

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Speaker 1: exploration things that are going to matter to you later

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Speaker 1: in your life and will definitely matter to anyone who

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Speaker 1: comes after you. Here's what you said, Heather. Hey, guys,

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Speaker 1: listening to your listener mail episode and heard you talking

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Speaker 1: about microbiome testing. There was a company years ago called

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Speaker 1: you Biome that I had test my gut microbiome. It

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Speaker 1: was really neat to see the makeup of bacteria living

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Speaker 1: in your gut. There must be other companies now, since

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Speaker 1: this seems to be a growing industry. Keep doing what

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Speaker 1: you do best, Heather. Thank you so much. Heather. Uh,

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Speaker 1: this is one of those things that I've been like

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Speaker 1: increasingly referring to as a phantom topic. Phantom topic because uh,

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Speaker 1: we'll have we'll have like our our get together brainstorm

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Speaker 1: meetings or shooting each other ideas, and then we'll think,

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Speaker 1: did we already cover this or we just sort of

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Speaker 1: always been talking about it because he keeps coming up,

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Speaker 1: um microbiomes stuff. Public interest began in this a number

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Speaker 1: of ors after the science really hit some breakthroughs, and

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Speaker 1: the the essential thing is this, uh, like we talked

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Speaker 1: about in this Breen stuff video called how farting works?

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Speaker 1: Or who's farting inside you? Or something? Your body? Are you?

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Speaker 1: What are you farting inside of? Or something like that, right,

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Speaker 1: farting inside of? Yes? Uh, your body, if you are

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Speaker 1: a human being, is composed of an astonishing number of

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Speaker 1: cells that aren't really you, like biologically technically. They're kind

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Speaker 1: of like contractors. There's subsidiaries, if you want to be

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Speaker 1: really classist about it. They're renting space from you, right,

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Speaker 1: and you're you're at best their landlord. That's so right,

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Speaker 1: and you know the own The best way that I've

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Speaker 1: thought about it, Ben is all there are so many

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Speaker 1: cells in you that don't share your DNA. That's a

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Speaker 1: great way to put it, Matt, Yes, in fact, do

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Speaker 1: have more actual bacterial cells in your body than you

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Speaker 1: do human cells. It's just those bacterial cells are much

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Speaker 1: much smaller, and then they're valuable members of the universe,

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Speaker 1: that is you, They do stuff. You need them in

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Speaker 1: some ways. You could say maybe you need them more

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Speaker 1: than they need you, because bacteria are everywhere. A single

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Speaker 1: human is not necessary to the life of a of

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Speaker 1: an entire you know, line of bacteria. Right, And so

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Speaker 1: when we look at the guts, the microbio all those

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Speaker 1: different types of what's that star Wars Cantina is mos Eisley, Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah,

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Speaker 1: It's like that's a good I think comparison for your innerts.

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Speaker 1: There there are a lot of different folks in the

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Speaker 1: mix hanging out and your your body, then that part

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Speaker 1: of your body is now they're most easily. A microbiome

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Speaker 1: is the collection of these microbes and their genetic material,

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Speaker 1: and it lives in and on your body. Uh, your

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Speaker 1: body doesn't. You're probably not going to notice them directly

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Speaker 1: because your your body is a very crowded place. It's

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Speaker 1: packed so full of bacteria, viruses, fungi. And the weird

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Speaker 1: thing is with all this stuff in you and on

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Speaker 1: you as you're listening to this. Now, like when if

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Speaker 1: you're listening and you're not driving or something, just like

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Speaker 1: put a hand across your face, just crash your face

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Speaker 1: real quick. Millions of things are jumping on your hand,

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Speaker 1: off your face. There face mites of plenty. There's some

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Speaker 1: that evolved just living your eyelashes, your eyebrows, and they're

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Speaker 1: especially jumping from your hand. Yes, yeah, uh. And the

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Speaker 1: mites I'm talking about are actually they're they're larger than

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Speaker 1: what we're talking about, only sing microbes. But but the

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Speaker 1: thing is, how mysterious is this? We have as a

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Speaker 1: species spends a lot of time exploring space, exploring remote

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Speaker 1: terrestrial areas, exploring the depths of the seed to the

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Speaker 1: best of our ability, but we know very We know

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Speaker 1: comparatively little about our own microbial uh societies right or

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Speaker 1: best civilizations if we want to anthropomorphize, And that's where

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Speaker 1: things like the human microbiome projects come in. It's trying

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Speaker 1: to identify everything that lives on a given human being

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Speaker 1: and perhaps more importantly, take that knowledge to figure out

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Speaker 1: what your microbiome or what changes in your microbiome may

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Speaker 1: mean for you, the city, the universe that is you.

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Speaker 1: It turns out quite a bit, quite a bit, heather. Uh.

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Speaker 1: Imbalances to your gut microbiome can make you susceptible to

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Speaker 1: harmful bacteria and viruses like the bacteria you have now theoretically,

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Speaker 1: which want to have is the goods stuff, the stuff

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Speaker 1: that's like, hey, I like living in Paul Mission controlled

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Speaker 1: decond or Noel Brown or Matt Frederick. I like living here,

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Speaker 1: and I want to do my bit to help keep

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Speaker 1: this crazy contraption going. Uh. And then there's other It

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Speaker 1: also can protect you to a degree against what we'd

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Speaker 1: see as bad or antagonistic bacteria who's like fresh unspoiled

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Speaker 1: land that shall be mine. They're like the bad guys

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Speaker 1: in water world, you know what I mean. They want

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Speaker 1: to like damn your rivers, knocked down the trees, lots

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Speaker 1: of eye patches, you know, all around. Now, it's true,

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Speaker 1: it's true, it is. Yeah, this can. So these imbalances

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Speaker 1: can lead to things like they can affect your immune system.

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Speaker 1: They can, of course, not to get to poopoo coca

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Speaker 1: about it. They can affect your bowel movements, diarrhea, constipation

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Speaker 1: ibs uh. They can give you unhealthy skin. Even things

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Speaker 1: like faster aging, reduced cog into function, wild mood fluctuations.

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Speaker 1: This is important stuff, which means then it's an important

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Speaker 1: test and I can't just be the only one thinking

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Speaker 1: about other tests that will tell you more about yourself,

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Speaker 1: like on the genetic level three of me right ancestry

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Speaker 1: dot com. It's weird like this. This stuff provides information

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Speaker 1: that is different, but we could arguably be um just

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Speaker 1: as impactful in its own way. Impactful when you're talking

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Speaker 1: about your gut, all the words here just feels like

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Speaker 1: innuendo or or referring to something that we're not. I

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Speaker 1: love this topic. Sorry, Oh no, you're You're absolutely right.

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Speaker 1: I'm trying not to not to overthink it. But we

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Speaker 1: have seen studies that tell us there is a link

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Speaker 1: between certain aspects of the microbiome and death and disease.

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Speaker 1: But people are still asking themselves um as recently as

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Speaker 1: like people are asking themselves what is the mechanism? How,

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Speaker 1: why does this work? Why are fecal transplants a real

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Speaker 1: thing that our actual medicine? How can the microbes, those

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Speaker 1: little things inside you, how can they be linked to

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Speaker 1: everything from like arthritis too? You know, decreased cognitive function,

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Speaker 1: Like how can they have effects across so many different

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Speaker 1: bodily systems don't have those answers yet, Heather. But just

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Speaker 1: like an earlier example where we were talking about the

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Speaker 1: early days of genetic testing, where would be kind of anticlimactic.

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Speaker 1: You would get a test, you'd spitting the thing, and

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Speaker 1: you get a test back, and it's like you're from

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Speaker 1: probably maybe Europe or South America, or you're you're from

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Speaker 1: your How ridiculous is this. You're from somewhere on the

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Speaker 1: continent of Africa by far the most genetically diverse concentration

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Speaker 1: of human population in the world, right, just because it's

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Speaker 1: the oldest um. But then that that genetic stuff became

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Speaker 1: became more became increasingly sophisticated, such that now the test

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Speaker 1: results you've got our our world away, and those test

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Speaker 1: results are being sold to third parties. That is absolutely

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Speaker 1: if it if it hasn't happened yet, that's what's going

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Speaker 1: to happen with your your gut, by your microbiome. People

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Speaker 1: are gonna say like, hey, yeah, they want to People

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Speaker 1: want to know everything about themselves. They're like, yes, tell

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Speaker 1: me about my poop, tell me more about my poop,

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Speaker 1: but it could. But like what happens if if an

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Speaker 1: insurance company right manages to have what they feel is

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Speaker 1: a proven correlation between something in a in a microbiome

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Speaker 1: and like a higher incident or higher likelihood of some

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Speaker 1: sort of cancer, right, or some sort of chronic disease. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: if anybody you know, if that ever happens in the future,

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Speaker 1: and they try and make me cut back on my

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Speaker 1: hobbit arrow intake, I'm gonna be really upset and we

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Speaker 1: have to move on. But there's one last thing here. First.

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Speaker 1: I believe that this is a full episode because it's

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Speaker 1: we're looking at emergent science, which always has the potential

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Speaker 1: for amazing or disastrous uh knock on effects, And we

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Speaker 1: see you know again, we see startups you bio and

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Speaker 1: being one that are getting into this game early. Their goal,

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Speaker 1: I can only assume, as long as their private organizations

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Speaker 1: is to somehow monetize, to modify or sell the data

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Speaker 1: and the research that they get. And there's a whole

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Speaker 1: story on you biom about them doing all kinds of

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Speaker 1: shady stuff early on and then collapsing completely. So I

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Speaker 1: think this I think this is a full episode. I

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Speaker 1: think that we are returning to this in the future.

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Speaker 1: In the meantime, Heather, I hope this isn't something that

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Speaker 1: makes you feel like there's some kind of like poop

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Speaker 1: pirates out there, just non consensually trading traces of your microbiome. UM,

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Speaker 1: but that may very well be the case in a

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Speaker 1: few years, so everybody, don't be scared yet, but you

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Speaker 1: cant get ready get ready to be frightened. And uh.

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Speaker 1: The really cool thing about this, to end on a

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Speaker 1: less dystopian note, is that it is possible to change

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Speaker 1: your microbiome, not just through a fecal transplant, but through

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Speaker 1: the things that you eat, through your diet, through your exercise.

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Speaker 1: So if you get a if you get a result

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Speaker 1: you don't like at some point, then it is possible

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Speaker 1: that you can unlike your genetic code, uh, easily change

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Speaker 1: it on your own. So there we are. It's a

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Speaker 1: brave new poop. Just think that every time go to

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Speaker 1: the commote, will pause for a word from our sponsor,

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Speaker 1: will be back with more from you, and we're back.

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Speaker 1: Hopefully you have finished up in the bathroom there. If

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Speaker 1: you're still going, that's fine, Um, I don't mind talking

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Speaker 1: to you. And here it's cool. Narrating made it so that,

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Speaker 1: you know, the best entertainment pretty cell phone was the

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Speaker 1: stuff that people would read while they were in the restroom,

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Speaker 1: right like Uncle John's bathroom readers. Do you guys ever,

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Speaker 1: class you know that news app gets lots of play

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Speaker 1: while I'm on the throne. Oh lord, So we talked

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Speaker 1: theoretically about, you know, future policing of our guts by

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Speaker 1: these companies and possibly third parties. Well, now let's discuss

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Speaker 1: the macro policing I don't know, regular regular old policing

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Speaker 1: in law and for smith and what's happening right now

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Speaker 1: in the world of robotics and policing. Who you guys,

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Speaker 1: you guys what? Okay? So it's not good news. Oh well,

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Speaker 1: I mean, you know, and I rewatched RoboCop recently and

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Speaker 1: it holds up. It's quite a good satire because it's

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Speaker 1: very much I think it's it's got a reputation for

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Speaker 1: folks that maybe haven't actually seen it as just being

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Speaker 1: kind of like a brutish kind of you know, action flick,

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Speaker 1: but it has a lot of subtext to it, and

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Speaker 1: it is about the dangers of automated policing. Well, that's

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Speaker 1: what we're going to talk about dangers on all sides here, guys.

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Speaker 1: I did have a RoboCop toy, so I don't want

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Speaker 1: to sound like I'm super anti RoboCop. And I had

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Speaker 1: the big one, the big figure. He would go, drop

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Speaker 1: drop it, drop it. I just remember him saying, drop it.

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Speaker 1: Did the thigh open up and we're talking. Yeah, I

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Speaker 1: had the action figure with I think with a car

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Speaker 1: are cool? Now? Those are really cool toys. And I remember, uh,

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Speaker 1: saving up or doing chores. I had like a chore

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Speaker 1: wheel of some kind or like a progress report, and

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Speaker 1: if I did well, I would get a toy of

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Speaker 1: my choosing that I would, you know. And one of

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Speaker 1: them was the not the Mama plush baby from the

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Speaker 1: show Dinosaurs. You'd pull a string and you'd say a

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Speaker 1: various cute things. And another one was the Murphy kind

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Speaker 1: of large format action figure. Like the karmic nature of

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Speaker 1: the wheel there, it's philosophical. But yeah, okay, yes, we're

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Speaker 1: gonna read something from James c here. It's very short

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Speaker 1: and succinctin I love it. But man, he sent us

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Speaker 1: on a journey. Uh. For this segment, guys, I'm gonna

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Speaker 1: request that you go to a website called night Scope

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Speaker 1: dot com k N I, G H T S c

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Speaker 1: O PE dot com. Uh, so you go there. Hey,

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Speaker 1: if you're listening to this on the toilet, a great

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Speaker 1: time to go to night Scope dot com. So once

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Speaker 1: you're there, I'm gonna read what James sent us. That's

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Speaker 1: what we mean by a modification. Sorry, oh lord, So

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Speaker 1: we're there. We're there. So Jim says, I was just

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Speaker 1: wondering if any of you have seen or heard about

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Speaker 1: night Scope Incorporated. I just saw a commercial about this

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Speaker 1: company promoting its security robots. Is this just a flash

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Speaker 1: in the pan company or something we as a society

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Speaker 1: should be worried about. Well, we'll tell you so. First

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Speaker 1: of all, if you go to night Scope dot com,

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Speaker 1: a pretty slick website, it's looking good. Do you guys

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Speaker 1: see that first image on on the screen. There a

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Speaker 1: little four wheeler. But where's the seat for the driver? Matt,

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Speaker 1: there's no seat for the driver because that baby is autonomous.

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Speaker 1: It looks like, I don't know, across between the night

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Speaker 1: Rider car and something Batman would drive and and a

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Speaker 1: Tron motorcycle, but with four wheels. Um, it looks pretty incredible.

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Speaker 1: And it's a real thing. That's not a c g

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Speaker 1: I rendering. That is a real world probably a prototype

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Speaker 1: at that time, maybe not, maybe that's an actual rollout

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Speaker 1: version of this robot, but it is a robot meant

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Speaker 1: to be a law enforcement officer of one form or another.

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Speaker 1: And night Scope produces all different kinds of robotic law

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Speaker 1: enforcement things. They're there. Hey, look they they may gain

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Speaker 1: sentience at some point, so let's call them like early

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Speaker 1: version robocops teammates. There we go. So if you if

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Speaker 1: you click on a couple of these different versions, you

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Speaker 1: can see that they've got model that is called the

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Speaker 1: K one, the K three, the K five, the CASE seven,

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Speaker 1: and then something called a K S O C. And

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Speaker 1: we just want to go over these really quickly just

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Speaker 1: so you have an understanding what this is and you

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Speaker 1: can explore along with us. The first one, it's called

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Speaker 1: a K one, and I think the K three is

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Speaker 1: very No, it's just the K one. The K one.

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Speaker 1: It's basically a standalone machine that sits in an office

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Speaker 1: or you know, in an entryway for an office building

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Speaker 1: or something like that, and it's designed to scan people

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Speaker 1: that are moving past it or that walk up to

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Speaker 1: it and it's really interesting. You can do like security

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Speaker 1: credentials through the thing. You can do coronavirus testing and

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Speaker 1: like temperature checks and all kinds of diagnostics for the

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Speaker 1: humans that walk up to the thing. Um it has

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Speaker 1: a bunch of cameras and sensors on it that can

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Speaker 1: do all kinds of things, and you can actually if

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Speaker 1: you go through the website, you can look at all

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Speaker 1: of its capabilities, all of like the facial recognition on

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Speaker 1: it is pretty crazy. Apparently it also has physical deterrence.

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Speaker 1: So this is I'm gonna read this part. Uh. It

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Speaker 1: has a highly visible physical presence. That's what the website says. Uh.

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Speaker 1: It does eye level video streaming and recording, and it

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Speaker 1: can provide entry and exit point monitoring. So really a

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Speaker 1: fancy security monitoring system. Really it's a century. It's a century,

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Speaker 1: but it doesn't really do much. It's it's not like

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Speaker 1: it's got lasers on it or arms that come out

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Speaker 1: and grab you or something. Uh. It will take images

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Speaker 1: of you doing something you're not supposed to do, so

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Speaker 1: I won't light up a boardroom full of executives like

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Speaker 1: the thing in RoboCop at this point. The K one

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Speaker 1: will not do that. I guarantee it. That's that's what

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Speaker 1: It's a small comfort. But if that's what you're looking for, wait,

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Speaker 1: it only goes gets more sophisticated from there. So the

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Speaker 1: next thing called the Kith three, This is a quote

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Speaker 1: fully autonomous security robot for indoor use. This thing has

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Speaker 1: all kinds of interesting things. It has autonomous detection stuff.

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Speaker 1: It's got, according to them, robust communication, remote monitoring, and

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Speaker 1: it can broadcast messages. So and it looks like a

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Speaker 1: Dale Daily it does. It looks like, which is for

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Speaker 1: for any non nerds out there, it's sort of like

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Speaker 1: a trash can with like some kind of probe looking

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Speaker 1: things sticking out of that. Right, yeah, yeah, is somewhere between.

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Speaker 1: It's like, um, if are two D two and a

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Speaker 1: Daily get together for their sci fi family reunion, then

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Speaker 1: this is a cousin that shows up from like the

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Speaker 1: swankier part of town. Yes, um, it's only for indoor use,

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Speaker 1: that's important. And you know again it's really it's not

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Speaker 1: doing anything. It doesn't at least according to their site.

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Speaker 1: And right now, it doesn't have any kind of crime

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Speaker 1: stopping you know. Abilities. It's it's all about monitoring and

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Speaker 1: recording and alerting. That's what it does. Now if you

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Speaker 1: jump to the K five and I think it's the Yeah.

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Speaker 1: K five is the one that has been spotted in

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Speaker 1: a lot of cities around the world because this thing

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Speaker 1: is in use on the exterior of buildings. It is

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Speaker 1: like a slightly larger version of the K three. The

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Speaker 1: very very similar build looks kind of like a cone. Really,

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Speaker 1: That's that's the way I would describe it. It's got

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Speaker 1: a bunch of cameras and sensors on it. It rolls around,

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Speaker 1: it gives messages out. It will publicly say things like

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Speaker 1: make sure the park is clean, don't don't liter please

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Speaker 1: uh with a strong implication of or else kind of

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Speaker 1: but but you know, but it has the ability to

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Speaker 1: essentially be a recon drone or or a monitoring drone

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Speaker 1: essentially for a human security force. And what it does

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Speaker 1: is again it really it just kind of has a patrol,

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Speaker 1: but it has an actual patrol. It's autonomous. It goes around,

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Speaker 1: You set up the patrol and it does its thing.

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Speaker 1: And what it what it does is connects with the

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Speaker 1: law enforcement or security you know group inside a building,

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Speaker 1: generally using that K s OC. It's the night scope

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Speaker 1: security operations center software and sometimes hardware that they provide,

426
00:28:39,080 --> 00:28:41,720
Speaker 1: so it's just got a direct calm link essentially to that.

427
00:28:42,120 --> 00:28:45,920
Speaker 1: Usually that is then that the communications office or the

428
00:28:45,960 --> 00:28:49,200
Speaker 1: operations centers connected directly to a local law enforcement agency

429
00:28:49,320 --> 00:28:52,000
Speaker 1: or something. So it's almost like a home security system

430
00:28:52,040 --> 00:28:55,160
Speaker 1: at your house. If somebody, you know, tries to break

431
00:28:55,160 --> 00:28:59,200
Speaker 1: into my home, like right now, if it was occurring, uh,

432
00:29:00,200 --> 00:29:03,000
Speaker 1: my security alarm would be triggered, which would then go

433
00:29:03,080 --> 00:29:06,360
Speaker 1: directly to the local police department in this right here,

434
00:29:06,960 --> 00:29:10,920
Speaker 1: same deal, But it doesn't always work that way in practice,

435
00:29:11,120 --> 00:29:12,960
Speaker 1: And we're going to talk about that really quickly in

436
00:29:13,040 --> 00:29:15,240
Speaker 1: a moment. But I have to tell you about the

437
00:29:15,280 --> 00:29:19,560
Speaker 1: case seven. This thing, it's just ridiculously cool looking. There's

438
00:29:19,680 --> 00:29:23,560
Speaker 1: not as much information on it on the website, which

439
00:29:23,640 --> 00:29:27,080
Speaker 1: is a little sad. But the thing has four wheels.

440
00:29:27,920 --> 00:29:30,720
Speaker 1: It looks like tron as you said, and the wheels

441
00:29:30,880 --> 00:29:35,680
Speaker 1: all turn separately, so the thing can like just rotate

442
00:29:35,760 --> 00:29:39,760
Speaker 1: itself in a circle. It can strafe like move to

443
00:29:39,920 --> 00:29:41,640
Speaker 1: the left or to the right, it can go forward

444
00:29:41,720 --> 00:29:44,800
Speaker 1: or backwards, and it can turn just in these beautiful ways,

445
00:29:45,280 --> 00:29:47,840
Speaker 1: and apparently it can go pretty fast. They're not saying

446
00:29:47,920 --> 00:29:50,960
Speaker 1: how fast it can go yet the maximum speed, but

447
00:29:51,360 --> 00:29:53,800
Speaker 1: they are saying it has it's multiple train, it can

448
00:29:53,840 --> 00:29:58,320
Speaker 1: go over a bunch of different places. Uh. It just

449
00:29:58,680 --> 00:30:02,400
Speaker 1: it seems super dope, and it's also large enough that

450
00:30:02,520 --> 00:30:05,400
Speaker 1: I think eventually this would be the model or one

451
00:30:05,480 --> 00:30:09,200
Speaker 1: similar to this could have some kind of actual munitions,

452
00:30:09,240 --> 00:30:13,400
Speaker 1: whether that's you know, some kind of non lethal thing

453
00:30:13,680 --> 00:30:17,520
Speaker 1: or even eventually lethal stuff at some point in the future.

454
00:30:17,840 --> 00:30:20,080
Speaker 1: I do I do want to point out, no matter

455
00:30:20,200 --> 00:30:24,080
Speaker 1: what its speed is the way that it's designed to

456
00:30:24,200 --> 00:30:29,560
Speaker 1: be more like an automobile, maybe maybe something for urban conflict,

457
00:30:29,640 --> 00:30:33,240
Speaker 1: but something that could also potentially, you know, you could

458
00:30:33,360 --> 00:30:39,400
Speaker 1: rig it to navigate off road terrain. UM. I also

459
00:30:39,480 --> 00:30:42,320
Speaker 1: thought about the platform thing here. Uh, they would have

460
00:30:42,400 --> 00:30:44,600
Speaker 1: to sacrifice speed for that, but they're still going to

461
00:30:44,680 --> 00:30:48,800
Speaker 1: be faster than the K five's uh and below because

462
00:30:49,320 --> 00:30:52,440
Speaker 1: the the R two details here their top speed is

463
00:30:52,560 --> 00:30:56,040
Speaker 1: three miles an hour, so they're very slowly doing that.

464
00:30:56,160 --> 00:31:00,160
Speaker 1: Autonomous patrol. If they're telling like if you are out

465
00:31:00,160 --> 00:31:03,960
Speaker 1: there stealing um whatever people steal water. If you're out

466
00:31:03,960 --> 00:31:07,400
Speaker 1: there stealing water, then they will tell you like you

467
00:31:07,520 --> 00:31:12,240
Speaker 1: are being apprehended. Your photo is being uploaded and you

468
00:31:12,360 --> 00:31:15,120
Speaker 1: can just walk away. You don't have to run. You

469
00:31:15,240 --> 00:31:19,320
Speaker 1: can fast walk or give it a swift kick. These things,

470
00:31:19,880 --> 00:31:22,160
Speaker 1: these things look like they will topple right over, and

471
00:31:22,280 --> 00:31:24,920
Speaker 1: they are there. It's not like they're light. They're pretty heavy,

472
00:31:25,320 --> 00:31:28,360
Speaker 1: but they're they're cone shaped and they've got wheels on

473
00:31:28,440 --> 00:31:32,400
Speaker 1: the bottom, so like, if you're good at kicks, you

474
00:31:32,440 --> 00:31:35,560
Speaker 1: can knock one over pretty easily. I'm assuming I haven't.

475
00:31:35,680 --> 00:31:38,320
Speaker 1: I haven't run a demo. I haven't run any testing

476
00:31:38,400 --> 00:31:40,800
Speaker 1: with this, which you can run a demo. By the way,

477
00:31:40,880 --> 00:31:44,280
Speaker 1: if you're if you're a company that is really looking

478
00:31:44,480 --> 00:31:48,200
Speaker 1: to up your security or at least go change it

479
00:31:48,840 --> 00:31:51,240
Speaker 1: in a revolutionary way, you can get a demo. You

480
00:31:51,280 --> 00:31:54,720
Speaker 1: can request one and they will bring someone from the

481
00:31:55,080 --> 00:31:57,480
Speaker 1: team will bring you some of these robots to show

482
00:31:57,560 --> 00:32:00,160
Speaker 1: you what they can do. I'm just picturing us in

483
00:32:00,360 --> 00:32:04,680
Speaker 1: some future protests scenario where they're like, oh no, the

484
00:32:04,800 --> 00:32:07,520
Speaker 1: robots you're run and then Matt jumps out, he goes,

485
00:32:07,720 --> 00:32:13,960
Speaker 1: calm down everyone, I'm good at kicks, front kick a little,

486
00:32:14,840 --> 00:32:16,560
Speaker 1: you know, and they just like topple, right. I mean,

487
00:32:16,600 --> 00:32:20,800
Speaker 1: those dolleks Man, they were notoriously flimsy you know. Yeah,

488
00:32:20,920 --> 00:32:23,040
Speaker 1: well here's the thing. You may not have to kick them.

489
00:32:23,600 --> 00:32:28,400
Speaker 1: I'm going to read you a story from Gizmoto from October.

490
00:32:29,640 --> 00:32:32,960
Speaker 1: Here's the headline, useless police robot fails to call for

491
00:32:33,080 --> 00:32:37,280
Speaker 1: help when need it. So it's a story about a

492
00:32:37,360 --> 00:32:40,360
Speaker 1: woman who observed a fight that was going on in

493
00:32:40,480 --> 00:32:45,240
Speaker 1: a local area, um in California. I'm just really quickly

494
00:32:45,320 --> 00:32:47,120
Speaker 1: running through this. I don't even know exactly where it

495
00:32:47,200 --> 00:32:50,560
Speaker 1: was in California, but uh, she ran up to the

496
00:32:50,640 --> 00:32:55,280
Speaker 1: robot like okay, here's an officer. Essentially, hey, well there's

497
00:32:55,320 --> 00:32:56,840
Speaker 1: something go on, Wena need help, and like hitting a

498
00:32:56,920 --> 00:33:00,760
Speaker 1: button that essentially is alert the local police. Nothing happened.

499
00:33:01,040 --> 00:33:05,200
Speaker 1: It didn't do anything. Uh. It continued to tell everyone

500
00:33:05,280 --> 00:33:07,880
Speaker 1: to keep the park clean, and it told her to

501
00:33:07,920 --> 00:33:10,720
Speaker 1: get out of the way. It's like, please please move

502
00:33:10,760 --> 00:33:13,880
Speaker 1: out of the lake. It's like I'm doing my rounds,

503
00:33:13,960 --> 00:33:16,760
Speaker 1: get out of here. Um. So they ended up having

504
00:33:16,840 --> 00:33:20,200
Speaker 1: to call in order to get a police presence. There

505
00:33:21,280 --> 00:33:26,120
Speaker 1: didn't one attempt what could be anthropomorphized as suicide. Yes,

506
00:33:26,560 --> 00:33:30,960
Speaker 1: there's a CNBC article from I think it's from the

507
00:33:31,080 --> 00:33:33,320
Speaker 1: Verge as well. I don't know if it's maybe it

508
00:33:33,440 --> 00:33:37,280
Speaker 1: is from The Verge, originally by net Garun. It was

509
00:33:37,960 --> 00:33:42,440
Speaker 1: published in seventeen and it says d C Security robot

510
00:33:42,520 --> 00:33:46,920
Speaker 1: quits job by drowning itself in a fountain. Is a

511
00:33:47,040 --> 00:33:52,160
Speaker 1: depressed robot? Yeah, And you can actually see a tweet

512
00:33:52,560 --> 00:33:56,520
Speaker 1: from from high above there near the offices where if

513
00:33:56,560 --> 00:33:59,480
Speaker 1: there's a fountain that this thing just went right into

514
00:33:59,760 --> 00:34:05,480
Speaker 1: and that was it. Um. But again, these these things

515
00:34:05,560 --> 00:34:10,000
Speaker 1: in their current form are pretty susceptible to physical manipulation.

516
00:34:10,120 --> 00:34:13,439
Speaker 1: If if you're into it, but be aware, you will

517
00:34:13,480 --> 00:34:16,279
Speaker 1: be on camera, your audio will be recorded, you will

518
00:34:16,360 --> 00:34:17,920
Speaker 1: be seen if you try and mess with one of

519
00:34:18,000 --> 00:34:24,440
Speaker 1: these things. Also, facial technical facial recognition technology is inherently,

520
00:34:24,920 --> 00:34:28,399
Speaker 1: uh fraught with problems that people are trying to work

521
00:34:28,480 --> 00:34:32,359
Speaker 1: on now. But keep in mind that depending upon um,

522
00:34:32,719 --> 00:34:35,320
Speaker 1: how you look or how that camera believes that you appear,

523
00:34:35,640 --> 00:34:38,719
Speaker 1: you may be endangering other people that law enforcement just

524
00:34:38,840 --> 00:34:43,399
Speaker 1: assumes look like you. This has happened. I I hate

525
00:34:43,440 --> 00:34:46,799
Speaker 1: to say it, but facial recognition still, as we talked

526
00:34:47,080 --> 00:34:50,160
Speaker 1: we talked a little bit about in our episode on

527
00:34:50,239 --> 00:34:55,920
Speaker 1: clear View, and facial recognition still has some some problems

528
00:34:56,000 --> 00:34:59,640
Speaker 1: that rightly lead many critics to call it racist. Yeah,

529
00:34:59,719 --> 00:35:02,000
Speaker 1: that's all. Look before we get out of here, guys,

530
00:35:02,160 --> 00:35:04,600
Speaker 1: I'm gonna give you some stats. This is coming from

531
00:35:04,880 --> 00:35:10,480
Speaker 1: Business Insider January. Uh. This is information on night Scope.

532
00:35:10,800 --> 00:35:13,560
Speaker 1: At that time, they had about fifty robots that were

533
00:35:13,719 --> 00:35:18,040
Speaker 1: deployed across the United States and it costs, well, it

534
00:35:18,239 --> 00:35:21,400
Speaker 1: depends on on the model. They're saying it costs somewhere

535
00:35:21,440 --> 00:35:24,840
Speaker 1: between sixty to seventy thousand dollars to lease a single

536
00:35:25,040 --> 00:35:28,640
Speaker 1: robot for a year a year term. That's a lot

537
00:35:28,719 --> 00:35:32,440
Speaker 1: of money. That's like a salary, right, sixty to seventy

538
00:35:32,800 --> 00:35:35,799
Speaker 1: dollars is up, was a really good salary for maybe

539
00:35:35,840 --> 00:35:39,200
Speaker 1: a security officer. Um, I don't know what the running

540
00:35:39,200 --> 00:35:42,279
Speaker 1: salaries are for a human to be working a job

541
00:35:42,400 --> 00:35:46,040
Speaker 1: like that. But they're saying that night Scope has raised

542
00:35:46,080 --> 00:35:49,200
Speaker 1: over forty six million dollars in funding at least as

543
00:35:49,239 --> 00:35:53,200
Speaker 1: of that time last year. And there's all kinds of

544
00:35:53,280 --> 00:35:57,320
Speaker 1: interesting stuff. Essentially, they're talking about about what the future

545
00:35:57,360 --> 00:36:01,920
Speaker 1: could hold, but there are problems, like all fountains. One

546
00:36:01,960 --> 00:36:04,320
Speaker 1: of these robots ran into a toddler because of the

547
00:36:04,640 --> 00:36:07,799
Speaker 1: I guess it couldn't see it or something was malfunctioning.

548
00:36:08,640 --> 00:36:11,479
Speaker 1: Get out of the way, kid. This is like free

549
00:36:11,600 --> 00:36:15,840
Speaker 1: Christmas Day, Scrooge. So I would say night Scope in

550
00:36:15,960 --> 00:36:18,799
Speaker 1: general has a lot of growing to do, but they've

551
00:36:18,800 --> 00:36:21,719
Speaker 1: been doing it since. Guys. That company was founded in

552
00:36:22,760 --> 00:36:26,080
Speaker 1: as a response to terrible things that happened around that time.

553
00:36:27,160 --> 00:36:29,120
Speaker 1: I believe it was on their website they say it

554
00:36:29,160 --> 00:36:33,480
Speaker 1: was the Sandy Hook shootings and the Boston Marathon bombing.

555
00:36:34,200 --> 00:36:36,640
Speaker 1: Those were the two events that caused this group of

556
00:36:36,680 --> 00:36:38,480
Speaker 1: people to decide, Hey, well, let's do some kind of

557
00:36:38,560 --> 00:36:41,680
Speaker 1: autonomous thing where we can take humans out of that

558
00:36:42,640 --> 00:36:46,320
Speaker 1: immediate danger role of trying to interest, you know, to

559
00:36:46,480 --> 00:36:49,880
Speaker 1: interact with a suspector or someone you know, suspected of

560
00:36:50,280 --> 00:36:53,640
Speaker 1: of committing a crime. I think it could be good

561
00:36:54,400 --> 00:36:58,160
Speaker 1: in the future, but for me, it's really terrifying. If

562
00:36:58,239 --> 00:37:00,640
Speaker 1: you're if you're at night Scope, hit us up, tell

563
00:37:00,719 --> 00:37:03,000
Speaker 1: us about the cool things. Hey, maybe run us a

564
00:37:03,080 --> 00:37:05,520
Speaker 1: demo of that Case seven. I want to see the

565
00:37:05,600 --> 00:37:07,919
Speaker 1: Case seven in action. If you got one of those,

566
00:37:08,760 --> 00:37:10,440
Speaker 1: bring it down here to Atlanta or let me know

567
00:37:10,480 --> 00:37:11,960
Speaker 1: where I can watch it for a while and just

568
00:37:12,280 --> 00:37:15,600
Speaker 1: check it out. Careful what you wish for, I mean, basically,

569
00:37:15,880 --> 00:37:18,080
Speaker 1: is the takeaway here This is not like I mean,

570
00:37:18,120 --> 00:37:19,680
Speaker 1: I know that some of the videos of the Boston

571
00:37:19,800 --> 00:37:22,120
Speaker 1: Dynamics robots get kind of ragged on because they're sort

572
00:37:22,120 --> 00:37:25,440
Speaker 1: of dumb looking, but they're also cool looking and they

573
00:37:25,520 --> 00:37:28,440
Speaker 1: were incredibly good at moving. That's what I'm saying. This

574
00:37:28,640 --> 00:37:31,959
Speaker 1: is not that this is like some like step down

575
00:37:32,239 --> 00:37:34,680
Speaker 1: kind of bargain basement version of that kind of tap.

576
00:37:35,320 --> 00:37:37,280
Speaker 1: This is not doo. I'm telling you, it's not bargain basement.

577
00:37:37,320 --> 00:37:41,680
Speaker 1: It's really sophisticated interesting, but it's stuff as cool as that.

578
00:37:41,960 --> 00:37:44,280
Speaker 1: It's not as sophisticated as that that's like the top tier.

579
00:37:44,560 --> 00:37:47,000
Speaker 1: This is maybe middle tier, let's say. But if they

580
00:37:47,080 --> 00:37:50,319
Speaker 1: had if they if night Scope in Boston Dynamics had

581
00:37:50,640 --> 00:37:55,000
Speaker 1: a baby and created a thing that was like one

582
00:37:55,000 --> 00:37:58,800
Speaker 1: of those little panther creatures that Boston Dynamics is creating,

583
00:37:58,880 --> 00:38:01,279
Speaker 1: and had the capability is of one of these things

584
00:38:01,440 --> 00:38:04,160
Speaker 1: the Knight's Code is creating, you would have a legitimate,

585
00:38:05,080 --> 00:38:11,200
Speaker 1: terrifying and probably crazy effective law enforcement robot, something capable

586
00:38:11,360 --> 00:38:14,879
Speaker 1: of doing a little fortnight dance after an extra judicial killing,

587
00:38:15,040 --> 00:38:18,359
Speaker 1: right or justice you're saying, or just a brutal takedown. Well,

588
00:38:18,440 --> 00:38:22,200
Speaker 1: the thing is that research into this technology has to exist. Like,

589
00:38:22,440 --> 00:38:25,399
Speaker 1: that's that's the you know, that's what people can see

590
00:38:25,400 --> 00:38:29,600
Speaker 1: as a dilemma. Even the critics. Uh, the human species

591
00:38:29,760 --> 00:38:34,000
Speaker 1: is very very bad at saying, oh, we can see

592
00:38:34,040 --> 00:38:37,800
Speaker 1: the potential problems with this research, let's agree not to

593
00:38:37,880 --> 00:38:41,239
Speaker 1: do it. I mean, keeping we're still making nuclear weapons, right,

594
00:38:41,520 --> 00:38:45,719
Speaker 1: people are still working on that, and everybody knows what

595
00:38:46,120 --> 00:38:49,759
Speaker 1: those things are designed to do. Um, I would say,

596
00:38:51,000 --> 00:38:57,400
Speaker 1: you know, there this it contains so many exciting, arguably

597
00:38:57,560 --> 00:39:02,240
Speaker 1: vital fields of research. The question is the same question

598
00:39:02,280 --> 00:39:05,360
Speaker 1: early humans ran into with fire. Are we going to

599
00:39:05,560 --> 00:39:10,040
Speaker 1: use this to help ourselves or to harror mothers or

600
00:39:10,120 --> 00:39:14,520
Speaker 1: to annihilate ourselves, burn ourselves to the ground. That's certainly

601
00:39:14,560 --> 00:39:17,680
Speaker 1: an option. Uh. We seem to be inching closer and

602
00:39:17,760 --> 00:39:22,560
Speaker 1: closer towards Yeah. And hey, they're not the only company,

603
00:39:22,760 --> 00:39:25,440
Speaker 1: nights Scope, by the way, that's creating these kinds of robots.

604
00:39:25,719 --> 00:39:29,480
Speaker 1: Sin Is it such a sinister name, Matt, What night Scope?

605
00:39:29,480 --> 00:39:32,799
Speaker 1: Are you kidding me? That sounds like a creepy cop

606
00:39:32,960 --> 00:39:35,480
Speaker 1: character in a Mortal Kombat game, Dude, Like, I mean,

607
00:39:36,239 --> 00:39:38,800
Speaker 1: or like some kind of prowler like in a in

608
00:39:38,920 --> 00:39:42,560
Speaker 1: a that's not that's not it's not good branding. I

609
00:39:42,640 --> 00:39:44,759
Speaker 1: think it's a badass. If you go down to the

610
00:39:44,920 --> 00:39:47,600
Speaker 1: very bottom of their website, you can see, at least

611
00:39:47,719 --> 00:39:50,080
Speaker 1: right now as we're recording this, you can see a

612
00:39:50,200 --> 00:39:54,120
Speaker 1: little thing that says, is that night Scope K and

613
00:39:54,200 --> 00:39:56,640
Speaker 1: I g h T scope or n I g h

614
00:39:56,760 --> 00:40:00,400
Speaker 1: T scope. It's K with night Scope. But they've an

615
00:40:00,480 --> 00:40:04,640
Speaker 1: image of several of their robots around a table and

616
00:40:04,760 --> 00:40:08,440
Speaker 1: it looks like Knights of the Round Table. There was

617
00:40:08,480 --> 00:40:11,759
Speaker 1: a cartoon about the Knights of the Round Table a

618
00:40:11,840 --> 00:40:14,600
Speaker 1: long time ago. I don't know. I can't remember the name.

619
00:40:14,960 --> 00:40:16,600
Speaker 1: Just someone tell me what it is because I I

620
00:40:17,040 --> 00:40:20,680
Speaker 1: can't remember. But to your point, guys, to me, either

621
00:40:21,080 --> 00:40:23,840
Speaker 1: the K in night Scope or just the regular in

622
00:40:24,200 --> 00:40:27,160
Speaker 1: night Scope, they both sound like they would be a

623
00:40:27,280 --> 00:40:31,680
Speaker 1: character in in Suicide Squad who dies really early because

624
00:40:31,840 --> 00:40:34,799
Speaker 1: like dead scope or something says there's only room for one.

625
00:40:34,960 --> 00:40:37,840
Speaker 1: Night Scope is just a guy in full like in

626
00:40:38,000 --> 00:40:42,040
Speaker 1: medieval times armor, but then he also has a scope

627
00:40:42,440 --> 00:40:45,080
Speaker 1: and it's both of his eyes and they're like, what's

628
00:40:45,080 --> 00:40:47,399
Speaker 1: your power? And he's like, I can see slightly better

629
00:40:47,520 --> 00:40:50,360
Speaker 1: than I would ordinarily be able to see in a

630
00:40:50,480 --> 00:40:53,040
Speaker 1: suit of medieval armor. Uh. And then I don't know

631
00:40:53,160 --> 00:40:55,920
Speaker 1: what night scope. I guess they see in the dark. Anyway,

632
00:40:55,960 --> 00:40:57,640
Speaker 1: those folks are not going to make it through the

633
00:40:57,680 --> 00:41:01,200
Speaker 1: whole comic book or film. Pretty wild a, Matt, sorry

634
00:41:01,200 --> 00:41:03,120
Speaker 1: if you mentioned this, but I just pulled up there's

635
00:41:03,160 --> 00:41:07,440
Speaker 1: a page. It's like a startup like investment page called

636
00:41:07,560 --> 00:41:10,759
Speaker 1: start engine UM and night Scope is on there and

637
00:41:10,880 --> 00:41:13,719
Speaker 1: they have raised ten million, one and ten thousand, two

638
00:41:13,800 --> 00:41:17,360
Speaker 1: hundred and thirty three dollars in this cycle that's happening

639
00:41:17,480 --> 00:41:20,960
Speaker 1: right now. And it says previously crowdfunded forty three million,

640
00:41:21,040 --> 00:41:25,839
Speaker 1: five d six dollars. So this is obviously like you know, uh,

641
00:41:26,440 --> 00:41:29,880
Speaker 1: go fund me on steroids specifically for startups UM. And

642
00:41:30,040 --> 00:41:32,920
Speaker 1: on the page it does show it's a video with

643
00:41:33,000 --> 00:41:35,960
Speaker 1: the steel frame of it. Is that car you talked about, Matt?

644
00:41:36,000 --> 00:41:39,240
Speaker 1: And I will say it immediately looks like a giant

645
00:41:39,360 --> 00:41:43,200
Speaker 1: roller skate, a giant futuristic, like the kind of roller

646
00:41:43,239 --> 00:41:47,239
Speaker 1: skate that Prints maybe would wear, or Arthur and the

647
00:41:47,360 --> 00:41:50,879
Speaker 1: Knights of the Roundtable would have used. If you say something, well,

648
00:41:51,239 --> 00:41:55,040
Speaker 1: you know I didn't. I didn't stay awake the entire

649
00:41:55,480 --> 00:42:00,120
Speaker 1: history class fair that day. Uh. Interesting stuff, man, mean,

650
00:42:00,200 --> 00:42:03,399
Speaker 1: what's your takeaway though, Matt like terrifying. Let's be real

651
00:42:03,480 --> 00:42:05,239
Speaker 1: for a second, and I know there's some cheeks and

652
00:42:05,480 --> 00:42:10,560
Speaker 1: tongues here, tongues and cheeks here, but terrifying, cool, effective, potentially,

653
00:42:10,560 --> 00:42:11,719
Speaker 1: I mean, I don't know. It just seems like a

654
00:42:11,800 --> 00:42:14,560
Speaker 1: real slippery slope. I just want to be on the

655
00:42:14,640 --> 00:42:16,920
Speaker 1: side of night Scope. So I think it's the coolest

656
00:42:17,000 --> 00:42:22,319
Speaker 1: thing man ever. It's you're a real monster. Well they're dude,

657
00:42:22,360 --> 00:42:25,440
Speaker 1: They're real and they're coming, so like they're in they're listening, right.

658
00:42:25,480 --> 00:42:29,600
Speaker 1: They also really we're in the infancy of this. I mean,

659
00:42:29,760 --> 00:42:31,440
Speaker 1: it feels like there's a lot of progress and a

660
00:42:31,520 --> 00:42:35,520
Speaker 1: lot of terrifying things. But the closer technology, the more

661
00:42:35,640 --> 00:42:40,040
Speaker 1: sophisticated this kind of technology becomes, more closely it engages

662
00:42:40,080 --> 00:42:43,200
Speaker 1: in biomemicry, right, So I'm keeping an eye out for

663
00:42:43,600 --> 00:42:46,320
Speaker 1: the spiders. The things that can move the way a

664
00:42:46,400 --> 00:42:49,320
Speaker 1: spider would move. Uh, that is going to be I

665
00:42:49,400 --> 00:42:53,040
Speaker 1: think a little more difficult than an automobile that's limited

666
00:42:53,120 --> 00:42:56,120
Speaker 1: somewhat in its direction, even with a very clever design

667
00:42:56,160 --> 00:43:00,399
Speaker 1: of these wheels or the rolling tones. So key, keep

668
00:43:00,440 --> 00:43:05,000
Speaker 1: an eye out. Spiders had real quick on this this

669
00:43:05,080 --> 00:43:08,160
Speaker 1: crowdfunding page. They make some pretty interesting arguments. They've got

670
00:43:08,239 --> 00:43:10,520
Speaker 1: a tagline heres his humans can only see so much,

671
00:43:10,800 --> 00:43:14,080
Speaker 1: but robots can see much more. And then there's a

672
00:43:14,120 --> 00:43:18,080
Speaker 1: whole section called the problem innovation in the security industry

673
00:43:18,120 --> 00:43:20,120
Speaker 1: has been stagging it for decades. Guess for the picture

674
00:43:20,160 --> 00:43:24,440
Speaker 1: as guys, a security guard asleep at his desk with

675
00:43:24,800 --> 00:43:27,440
Speaker 1: an open box of Chinese food in front of him

676
00:43:27,640 --> 00:43:36,480
Speaker 1: and a tipped over soda cup. Um jobs, guys, medieval history,

677
00:43:36,840 --> 00:43:38,920
Speaker 1: it's possible. I feel like I was. I was in

678
00:43:39,000 --> 00:43:41,480
Speaker 1: that same position. I think they should let you eat

679
00:43:41,520 --> 00:43:44,400
Speaker 1: in college classes. This has nothing to do with anything,

680
00:43:44,960 --> 00:43:47,920
Speaker 1: but I think it helps people learn. Would they stop

681
00:43:48,000 --> 00:43:52,640
Speaker 1: you with with the professor? Be like Mr Bolan, kindly

682
00:43:52,760 --> 00:43:55,480
Speaker 1: put down the ramen I think you me In case

683
00:43:57,719 --> 00:44:01,320
Speaker 1: I did, I did, in fact, get stopped and threatened

684
00:44:01,440 --> 00:44:03,920
Speaker 1: with the thing that is not real, which is contempt

685
00:44:04,000 --> 00:44:07,480
Speaker 1: of class. But this guy was so hardcore I thought

686
00:44:07,560 --> 00:44:10,279
Speaker 1: maybe it was a real thing. He didn't whip out

687
00:44:10,280 --> 00:44:16,800
Speaker 1: your permanent record. Guy robots, Yes, we've gone on this

688
00:44:16,920 --> 00:44:18,919
Speaker 1: way too long. We need to take a break. It's

689
00:44:19,000 --> 00:44:22,239
Speaker 1: we're way over time. I'm sorry, Paul, cut any of

690
00:44:22,320 --> 00:44:24,719
Speaker 1: this that you can, all right, take a break. We'll

691
00:44:24,760 --> 00:44:32,879
Speaker 1: be right back with more a listener mail. And we're

692
00:44:32,920 --> 00:44:36,440
Speaker 1: back with more listener mail. That's mail from you, Yes,

693
00:44:36,560 --> 00:44:39,839
Speaker 1: you right right there, sitting there at this very moment um.

694
00:44:40,000 --> 00:44:43,839
Speaker 1: And and that person that I'm referring to is Louise Superstar.

695
00:44:44,120 --> 00:44:46,600
Speaker 1: You know who you are. That's right. You asked to

696
00:44:46,640 --> 00:44:51,120
Speaker 1: be referred to as Louise Superstar. And I'm gonna read

697
00:44:51,160 --> 00:44:54,800
Speaker 1: this email because it's a doozy. It involves, uh, some

698
00:44:55,120 --> 00:44:56,960
Speaker 1: questions that I think every a lot of people have

699
00:44:57,800 --> 00:45:00,080
Speaker 1: or at least some um, let's just say, suspicions that

700
00:45:00,080 --> 00:45:03,080
Speaker 1: a lot of people have about how often and how

701
00:45:03,280 --> 00:45:09,040
Speaker 1: much uh do these home assistant devices actually here? Uh?

702
00:45:09,160 --> 00:45:12,719
Speaker 1: Do they only listen when you say that magical wake word? Um?

703
00:45:13,080 --> 00:45:15,919
Speaker 1: Or are they listening all the time? And and where

704
00:45:15,920 --> 00:45:19,200
Speaker 1: does this information Goes it just disappear into oblivion or

705
00:45:19,320 --> 00:45:21,120
Speaker 1: is it stored somewhere? And I think we know some

706
00:45:21,239 --> 00:45:23,960
Speaker 1: of these answers, but it's interesting to hear from the

707
00:45:24,120 --> 00:45:28,200
Speaker 1: inside perspective, uh, from someone who was actually there. So

708
00:45:28,320 --> 00:45:31,120
Speaker 1: this comes from Louise Superstar who asked to be referred

709
00:45:31,120 --> 00:45:33,560
Speaker 1: to as such. And I'm gonna bridge it here a

710
00:45:33,600 --> 00:45:35,720
Speaker 1: little bit. I live in the UK. When I finished

711
00:45:35,760 --> 00:45:37,600
Speaker 1: university in twenty nineteen, I got a job as a

712
00:45:37,640 --> 00:45:41,080
Speaker 1: data analyst for a company called Globe Tech. If there

713
00:45:41,200 --> 00:45:42,719
Speaker 1: was just a Globo at the end of that, it

714
00:45:42,719 --> 00:45:46,240
Speaker 1: would sound like a made up, like jokey conglomerate company

715
00:45:46,320 --> 00:45:49,919
Speaker 1: like Globo Kim, which I think is from Mr Show. Maybe.

716
00:45:50,280 --> 00:45:52,399
Speaker 1: The interviewer was very vague about what the job would

717
00:45:52,400 --> 00:45:54,680
Speaker 1: be about, but it paid very well and I had

718
00:45:54,719 --> 00:45:57,359
Speaker 1: nothing else lined up, so I accepted the position. UM.

719
00:45:57,560 --> 00:45:59,680
Speaker 1: When I started on the project, I was surprised by

720
00:45:59,719 --> 00:46:02,200
Speaker 1: how easy the job was going to be. The idea

721
00:46:02,280 --> 00:46:05,480
Speaker 1: behind the job was to help Apple improve uh it's

722
00:46:05,600 --> 00:46:10,880
Speaker 1: Virtual Assistant serie by doing basically spot checks of some

723
00:46:11,160 --> 00:46:15,520
Speaker 1: recordings that purportedly took place when the wakeward was was

724
00:46:15,640 --> 00:46:19,360
Speaker 1: spoken being Hey Siri, Sorry everyone out there with a

725
00:46:19,440 --> 00:46:22,279
Speaker 1: serie that I just you know triggered UM so sorry

726
00:46:22,280 --> 00:46:24,880
Speaker 1: again back to the email. UM. All I had to

727
00:46:24,920 --> 00:46:27,080
Speaker 1: do is listen to serie recordings and answer questions about

728
00:46:27,080 --> 00:46:29,600
Speaker 1: how clear the audio was, did the user have a

729
00:46:29,680 --> 00:46:33,160
Speaker 1: clear intention, did Siri complete the right action? And then

730
00:46:33,760 --> 00:46:36,360
Speaker 1: grade how well I thought the interaction was. Overall, I

731
00:46:36,480 --> 00:46:40,239
Speaker 1: was expected to listen and grade over a thousand recordings

732
00:46:40,280 --> 00:46:42,520
Speaker 1: a day, So just to sum up a few things

733
00:46:42,640 --> 00:46:46,560
Speaker 1: there was there. There aren't personal details like UH, the

734
00:46:46,880 --> 00:46:49,640
Speaker 1: name of the Apple idea associated with the clips, or

735
00:46:49,719 --> 00:46:53,279
Speaker 1: any kind of personally identifying information about the individual. But

736
00:46:53,480 --> 00:46:58,120
Speaker 1: what was deemed necessary for data analysts to see were

737
00:46:58,480 --> 00:47:02,279
Speaker 1: the exact location ends where the audio clips were recorded, UM,

738
00:47:02,600 --> 00:47:06,000
Speaker 1: names in the contact lists of the users devices, and

739
00:47:06,120 --> 00:47:09,000
Speaker 1: occasionally we could even see the playlists and apps on

740
00:47:09,120 --> 00:47:14,000
Speaker 1: their phones. Only was I freaked out about how much

741
00:47:14,040 --> 00:47:17,000
Speaker 1: information was being shared, but also how often Siri is

742
00:47:17,040 --> 00:47:20,920
Speaker 1: accidentally triggered and saves these recording and sends them along.

743
00:47:21,400 --> 00:47:23,080
Speaker 1: During the two months I worked on the project, I

744
00:47:23,200 --> 00:47:27,440
Speaker 1: heard people having sex through the home pod. I'm the same, UM,

745
00:47:27,680 --> 00:47:31,720
Speaker 1: I don't have a home pouh okay, long audio clips

746
00:47:31,760 --> 00:47:34,480
Speaker 1: that sounded like they were recorded during therapy sessions through

747
00:47:34,560 --> 00:47:38,480
Speaker 1: the Apple Watch UH, and a lot of people arranging affairs.

748
00:47:39,040 --> 00:47:41,320
Speaker 1: Bear in mind that we can see the exact locations

749
00:47:41,360 --> 00:47:43,799
Speaker 1: of the recordings, so it could have been very incriminating

750
00:47:43,840 --> 00:47:46,520
Speaker 1: if someone on the project was to recognize the address

751
00:47:47,280 --> 00:47:49,800
Speaker 1: UH and more drug deals than I can count. This

752
00:47:49,920 --> 00:47:52,000
Speaker 1: seemed to be because the noise of a zipper on

753
00:47:52,120 --> 00:47:57,920
Speaker 1: a bag opening and closing set Siri off. Wow Um.

754
00:47:58,000 --> 00:48:00,000
Speaker 1: I was only on the project for two months before

755
00:48:00,000 --> 00:48:02,280
Speaker 1: were there was a whistleblower working on a similar Apple

756
00:48:02,360 --> 00:48:05,240
Speaker 1: project for the same company in the Netherlands, which resulted

757
00:48:05,239 --> 00:48:07,920
Speaker 1: in the UK and Ireland projects getting shut down as well.

758
00:48:09,000 --> 00:48:12,320
Speaker 1: I will include an article below great article which I

759
00:48:12,360 --> 00:48:14,640
Speaker 1: will link to or mentioned in a second so you

760
00:48:14,680 --> 00:48:16,319
Speaker 1: can look into it a bit more. But I would

761
00:48:16,360 --> 00:48:17,920
Speaker 1: like to point out that as this took place in

762
00:48:17,960 --> 00:48:21,080
Speaker 1: twenty nine, it was before Apple gave users the options

763
00:48:21,120 --> 00:48:24,640
Speaker 1: to not share their data uh and there was nowhere

764
00:48:24,960 --> 00:48:27,480
Speaker 1: users could even see which aspects of their data were

765
00:48:27,520 --> 00:48:30,640
Speaker 1: being held and shared across the globe. The other important

766
00:48:30,680 --> 00:48:32,600
Speaker 1: thing to note is that there was no vetting for

767
00:48:32,680 --> 00:48:35,240
Speaker 1: this position, and there was such a high turnover of staff.

768
00:48:35,480 --> 00:48:37,279
Speaker 1: If you failed to meet your targets a few days

769
00:48:37,320 --> 00:48:39,759
Speaker 1: in a row, you would get fired, and there were

770
00:48:40,200 --> 00:48:44,759
Speaker 1: inductions for new staff members every single week. I think

771
00:48:44,800 --> 00:48:47,000
Speaker 1: this is a fine place to stop. One thing that's

772
00:48:47,040 --> 00:48:50,920
Speaker 1: important is that it's prevented her, after doing this job,

773
00:48:51,080 --> 00:48:55,680
Speaker 1: from purchasing Apple products, specifically an Apple watch, because she's

774
00:48:55,719 --> 00:49:00,279
Speaker 1: aware of how active SERI can be in hearing things

775
00:49:00,440 --> 00:49:04,239
Speaker 1: and recording them and sending them. Sure, like if you

776
00:49:04,400 --> 00:49:07,400
Speaker 1: work at a if you work at a slaughterhouse, how

777
00:49:07,440 --> 00:49:09,800
Speaker 1: many hot dogs do we eat on a on a

778
00:49:09,880 --> 00:49:13,040
Speaker 1: giving day? You see how it's made. I mean, well,

779
00:49:13,160 --> 00:49:15,200
Speaker 1: they're free hot dogs. Ben, I would assume all the

780
00:49:15,280 --> 00:49:17,600
Speaker 1: hot dogs, but that's true. I'm not applying this room

781
00:49:17,680 --> 00:49:23,800
Speaker 1: to myself. I'm as as as am I. Um And

782
00:49:23,960 --> 00:49:27,919
Speaker 1: look I say this as a person with a smart home.

783
00:49:28,000 --> 00:49:31,000
Speaker 1: I have Alexa uh and I have that. Sorry again

784
00:49:31,040 --> 00:49:34,200
Speaker 1: for triggering everyone's device there, Um, but I have that

785
00:49:34,520 --> 00:49:38,360
Speaker 1: controlling a see a son no situation. I have smart lights,

786
00:49:38,520 --> 00:49:40,840
Speaker 1: you know, connected up to that system. I have it

787
00:49:40,920 --> 00:49:43,320
Speaker 1: in my bedroom. Um, I have I have one in

788
00:49:43,400 --> 00:49:46,600
Speaker 1: my kid's room. Um. It is something that handful of

789
00:49:46,680 --> 00:49:49,279
Speaker 1: you know, friends of mine, my girlfriend included, they're kind

790
00:49:49,280 --> 00:49:51,840
Speaker 1: of freaked out by. Um. I love the convenience of it,

791
00:49:52,000 --> 00:49:54,080
Speaker 1: and I'm a nerd for tech stuff like this, and

792
00:49:54,160 --> 00:49:57,960
Speaker 1: I'm fully aware that this is a possible thing. Um.

793
00:49:59,040 --> 00:50:02,040
Speaker 1: Do I feel like I'm gonna have an FBI agent

794
00:50:02,160 --> 00:50:04,879
Speaker 1: knocking on my door because Siri hear's me smoking a ball?

795
00:50:05,560 --> 00:50:09,160
Speaker 1: I kind of doubt it, kind of doubt it. Um,

796
00:50:09,760 --> 00:50:12,960
Speaker 1: well now they're they're lining up now. Well, but I'm

797
00:50:13,040 --> 00:50:14,960
Speaker 1: just saying, man like I, I choose to live my

798
00:50:15,120 --> 00:50:18,160
Speaker 1: life somewhat blissfully ignorant about this stuff, even though I'm

799
00:50:18,200 --> 00:50:21,400
Speaker 1: not ignorant do it at all. But it's fascinating when

800
00:50:21,440 --> 00:50:24,520
Speaker 1: you think about. And this article from The Guardian it

801
00:50:24,640 --> 00:50:27,279
Speaker 1: confirms this stuff is the case for for us uh

802
00:50:27,600 --> 00:50:31,160
Speaker 1: alexa as well, and that there are similar whistleblower situations

803
00:50:31,239 --> 00:50:35,960
Speaker 1: in projects like this. Uh counter yeah, exactly all of them.

804
00:50:36,000 --> 00:50:40,000
Speaker 1: A company called Counterpoint Research indicated that Apple has the

805
00:50:40,000 --> 00:50:43,960
Speaker 1: smart watch market and more than three times its nearest competitor, Samsung,

806
00:50:44,280 --> 00:50:47,400
Speaker 1: and more than its next six biggest competitors combined. And

807
00:50:47,480 --> 00:50:49,319
Speaker 1: the smart watch is the thing that follows you around

808
00:50:49,320 --> 00:50:53,000
Speaker 1: everywhere you go. So that's probably the biggest creep factor

809
00:50:53,120 --> 00:50:56,120
Speaker 1: in this right. Um, they're here in stuff, you know,

810
00:50:56,239 --> 00:51:00,600
Speaker 1: happening in all locations. Drug deals, pinpoint that stuff. Let's

811
00:51:00,640 --> 00:51:03,520
Speaker 1: say you're maybe not just buying a dime bag of weed,

812
00:51:03,640 --> 00:51:05,960
Speaker 1: but you're moving some serious weight or something. I mean,

813
00:51:06,040 --> 00:51:08,680
Speaker 1: surely people that are doing that are being more thoughtful,

814
00:51:09,080 --> 00:51:12,960
Speaker 1: but I would definitely bode tread lightly. You know, if

815
00:51:13,040 --> 00:51:18,040
Speaker 1: you're you're rocking an Apple watch data, biomedical data. That's

816
00:51:18,160 --> 00:51:20,240
Speaker 1: that's for sale, you know. Yeah, there was a study

817
00:51:20,320 --> 00:51:24,480
Speaker 1: I saw recently that said, uh, more than one thousand

818
00:51:24,680 --> 00:51:30,640
Speaker 1: phrases will quote unquote accidentally awaken Alexis Sirian Google assistant.

819
00:51:31,800 --> 00:51:35,040
Speaker 1: More than one thousand. That is insane. You have to

820
00:51:35,080 --> 00:51:37,919
Speaker 1: wonder what they are right. Well, you can usually tell

821
00:51:38,160 --> 00:51:40,480
Speaker 1: because the thing goes boom, you know, And and a

822
00:51:40,560 --> 00:51:42,319
Speaker 1: lot of times it will be dialogue in a movie

823
00:51:42,600 --> 00:51:45,120
Speaker 1: that I'm watching that'll that'll trigger it, and then it'll

824
00:51:45,280 --> 00:51:48,200
Speaker 1: duck the volume down, which is annoying. Um, but absolutely

825
00:51:48,239 --> 00:51:50,600
Speaker 1: the idea of the sound of a zipper is fascinating.

826
00:51:50,600 --> 00:51:53,239
Speaker 1: No wonder there's so much sex being recorded in the

827
00:51:53,320 --> 00:51:56,040
Speaker 1: moment you here, probably a lot of people urinating to

828
00:51:56,120 --> 00:51:57,800
Speaker 1: I would imagine being a record. That's gotta be a

829
00:51:57,840 --> 00:52:01,359
Speaker 1: fun one to hear. But um, yeah, man, it's it's.

830
00:52:01,600 --> 00:52:05,560
Speaker 1: It also said a lot of therapy sessions, extended recordings

831
00:52:05,640 --> 00:52:11,399
Speaker 1: of therapy sessions very personal and potentially identifying information. It's

832
00:52:11,480 --> 00:52:13,560
Speaker 1: something that everyone should be well aware of and either

833
00:52:13,920 --> 00:52:17,480
Speaker 1: you know, go forward with open eyes or you know,

834
00:52:18,920 --> 00:52:22,000
Speaker 1: throughout all your personal assistance. If if it freaks you out. Well,

835
00:52:22,160 --> 00:52:26,200
Speaker 1: it's it's funny because one thing that you'll notice with

836
00:52:26,320 --> 00:52:30,400
Speaker 1: a lot of engineers, especially engineers who work in these fields,

837
00:52:30,880 --> 00:52:32,960
Speaker 1: is that their homes are going to be much more

838
00:52:33,080 --> 00:52:38,320
Speaker 1: analog and mechanical than the average hold. Like, I don't know,

839
00:52:39,280 --> 00:52:41,840
Speaker 1: I know, I know you're out there, folks, but I

840
00:52:41,880 --> 00:52:45,600
Speaker 1: don't know a single engineer who is who likes uh

841
00:52:45,800 --> 00:52:51,640
Speaker 1: surveillance cameras for security uh or would have uh any

842
00:52:51,719 --> 00:52:55,640
Speaker 1: of these uh personal assistance devices in their hole. The

843
00:52:55,800 --> 00:52:58,759
Speaker 1: laws just aren't there yet. Like I think, I think

844
00:52:58,960 --> 00:53:02,400
Speaker 1: just now, I can't remember his Florida or the entirety

845
00:53:02,440 --> 00:53:05,719
Speaker 1: of the US. There is finally a bill that will

846
00:53:06,239 --> 00:53:12,880
Speaker 1: attempt to make your stuff actually private, uh with at

847
00:53:12,960 --> 00:53:15,640
Speaker 1: least with Alexa. Yeah, here it is. Actually it's just

848
00:53:15,719 --> 00:53:19,440
Speaker 1: a few days ago, March nine. Uh, there's a Senate

849
00:53:19,520 --> 00:53:24,680
Speaker 1: committee that just cleared a proposal to ban warrantless searches

850
00:53:24,719 --> 00:53:28,719
Speaker 1: of cell phones and warrantless searches of voice activated devices

851
00:53:29,080 --> 00:53:32,240
Speaker 1: like Alexa, Google, Nest. But that's just clearing the search

852
00:53:32,400 --> 00:53:35,440
Speaker 1: that has nothing to do with these things capturing this

853
00:53:35,640 --> 00:53:42,640
Speaker 1: information and Noel Louise Superstar, to your point, that's a there.

854
00:53:43,960 --> 00:53:47,080
Speaker 1: The tough tough part here is that it's very easy

855
00:53:47,200 --> 00:53:49,440
Speaker 1: for companies to do this on purpose and say that

856
00:53:49,560 --> 00:53:53,160
Speaker 1: it occurred by accident, Like how would you how would

857
00:53:53,160 --> 00:53:56,640
Speaker 1: you prove that it is a bug and not a feature?

858
00:53:57,040 --> 00:54:00,400
Speaker 1: You know what I mean? Like I, I don't know,

859
00:54:00,680 --> 00:54:04,160
Speaker 1: and I also have some like everybody who It's so

860
00:54:04,280 --> 00:54:08,160
Speaker 1: funny when we talk about how the passage of your

861
00:54:08,400 --> 00:54:13,000
Speaker 1: automobile is monitored, how your Internet usage is constantly monitored

862
00:54:13,080 --> 00:54:15,080
Speaker 1: by someone, even if it's just an I s P.

863
00:54:15,800 --> 00:54:18,239
Speaker 1: The age of privacy is very as we understand, it

864
00:54:18,360 --> 00:54:21,239
Speaker 1: was very short lived and it's over. We're in the

865
00:54:21,360 --> 00:54:27,000
Speaker 1: post privacy era. Privacy is like a luxury of the

866
00:54:27,120 --> 00:54:29,920
Speaker 1: elite at this point. That's why you don't hear a

867
00:54:30,000 --> 00:54:33,839
Speaker 1: lot about the world's very important, wealthy and powerful people.

868
00:54:33,920 --> 00:54:36,960
Speaker 1: That's why their images are carefully managed. And when whenever

869
00:54:37,040 --> 00:54:40,840
Speaker 1: we talk about surveillance, as as Matt Nolan I have

870
00:54:40,960 --> 00:54:43,239
Speaker 1: all said, at one point or another, you got one

871
00:54:43,280 --> 00:54:46,000
Speaker 1: of these, you know, in these light ups, not just

872
00:54:46,160 --> 00:54:52,680
Speaker 1: for waving at concerts. Uh. For a long time I've

873
00:54:52,719 --> 00:54:56,960
Speaker 1: operated with my phones location services off, like no permissions

874
00:54:57,120 --> 00:54:59,719
Speaker 1: allowed to any of these apps for my for my

875
00:55:00,280 --> 00:55:04,520
Speaker 1: or my camera. I decided to give in recently, I

876
00:55:05,000 --> 00:55:08,759
Speaker 1: put on my location services, put on my significant locations,

877
00:55:08,920 --> 00:55:12,560
Speaker 1: did all that stuff just in case something happens to me. Uh,

878
00:55:13,000 --> 00:55:16,120
Speaker 1: you guys could find me or at least locate my phone,

879
00:55:16,840 --> 00:55:20,160
Speaker 1: sign my phone on there. I mean, like I said,

880
00:55:20,239 --> 00:55:22,920
Speaker 1: it's it's a thing you have to weigh. How does

881
00:55:22,920 --> 00:55:25,399
Speaker 1: the convenience of this stuff benefit me in my life

882
00:55:25,640 --> 00:55:27,840
Speaker 1: and my and and and maybe the lives of my

883
00:55:28,120 --> 00:55:30,680
Speaker 1: my family members and the convenience or the peace of

884
00:55:30,760 --> 00:55:34,960
Speaker 1: mind or what have you? Or am I so freaked

885
00:55:34,960 --> 00:55:36,680
Speaker 1: out by it that I just would rather just opt

886
00:55:36,719 --> 00:55:38,640
Speaker 1: out of something like that entirely? I mean to me,

887
00:55:38,880 --> 00:55:42,200
Speaker 1: I'm fully aware of of the of the trade off,

888
00:55:42,680 --> 00:55:45,160
Speaker 1: and I make I choose to to choose the convenience

889
00:55:45,200 --> 00:55:47,879
Speaker 1: and the and the peace of mind. Um. Also, I'm

890
00:55:47,920 --> 00:55:53,080
Speaker 1: not doing anything so uh egregiously illegal or immoral that

891
00:55:53,200 --> 00:55:56,200
Speaker 1: I would be concerned that anything that I'm doing could

892
00:55:56,239 --> 00:55:59,040
Speaker 1: be like in some way used against me or whatever.

893
00:55:59,120 --> 00:56:03,640
Speaker 1: Again and again, given the you know, long enough timeline, Um,

894
00:56:03,920 --> 00:56:07,880
Speaker 1: let's say this stuff becomes commodified by the government. Then

895
00:56:07,960 --> 00:56:09,880
Speaker 1: next thing you know, you're getting black bag because you

896
00:56:10,000 --> 00:56:12,520
Speaker 1: say the name of the wrong country or something like that,

897
00:56:13,000 --> 00:56:15,200
Speaker 1: you know, or you get like think about McCarthy ism,

898
00:56:15,239 --> 00:56:18,320
Speaker 1: where people were getting hauled in for having certain leanings

899
00:56:18,440 --> 00:56:21,359
Speaker 1: and having certain attitudes. You know, that's a different world

900
00:56:21,400 --> 00:56:24,800
Speaker 1: and and that's not tech currently the world we live in.

901
00:56:24,920 --> 00:56:28,400
Speaker 1: But given a big old sea change, that could certainly happen.

902
00:56:28,560 --> 00:56:32,359
Speaker 1: So so things to think about. Yeah, I mean, let's

903
00:56:32,400 --> 00:56:35,040
Speaker 1: continue thinking about them. These are these are important points.

904
00:56:35,400 --> 00:56:38,719
Speaker 1: I think I brought this up God maybe a few

905
00:56:38,800 --> 00:56:41,279
Speaker 1: years ago. We're talking about big data and you or

906
00:56:41,440 --> 00:56:47,560
Speaker 1: something like that. The problem that you're outlining is crucial,

907
00:56:48,000 --> 00:56:51,000
Speaker 1: and I think we can't say it enough. If you

908
00:56:51,520 --> 00:56:55,919
Speaker 1: have these devices and you were or if you think

909
00:56:56,040 --> 00:56:59,120
Speaker 1: any concerns about privacy and surveillance or kind of I

910
00:56:59,200 --> 00:57:05,439
Speaker 1: don't know, paarnoid or self absorbed or etcetera. The act

911
00:57:05,520 --> 00:57:08,960
Speaker 1: of hypochondriac and the conspiracy ward of a hospital, and

912
00:57:09,080 --> 00:57:13,320
Speaker 1: we need to realize is it's not one of the

913
00:57:13,400 --> 00:57:17,480
Speaker 1: big concerns. Is not that you are saying something that

914
00:57:17,520 --> 00:57:20,920
Speaker 1: will be immediately used against you, or that you are

915
00:57:21,000 --> 00:57:24,240
Speaker 1: doing something so egregiously wrong. The idea is that the

916
00:57:24,440 --> 00:57:29,280
Speaker 1: laws might change later and then you will be suddenly

917
00:57:29,440 --> 00:57:33,840
Speaker 1: retroactively a criminal, because the thing about certain sedition laws

918
00:57:34,120 --> 00:57:38,160
Speaker 1: when governments change, right or when coups occur, is that

919
00:57:38,360 --> 00:57:43,720
Speaker 1: sedition tends to be applied retroactively right when um you know.

920
00:57:43,840 --> 00:57:47,360
Speaker 1: For very horrific example of this, you know, recall when

921
00:57:48,160 --> 00:57:55,080
Speaker 1: pol pot Uh instituted their bloody regime in Cambodia. Hulpot's

922
00:57:55,120 --> 00:57:58,840
Speaker 1: original name, by the way was salath Sar, which just

923
00:57:58,960 --> 00:58:04,600
Speaker 1: sounds even more villainous somehow. But people were like exactly, yeah,

924
00:58:04,640 --> 00:58:11,600
Speaker 1: people were being um tortured, brutalized and murdered, uh not

925
00:58:12,440 --> 00:58:17,520
Speaker 1: like for a number a wide number of horrifically arbitrary reasons.

926
00:58:17,960 --> 00:58:21,280
Speaker 1: And often it wasn't something that they had done recently,

927
00:58:21,680 --> 00:58:22,920
Speaker 1: you know what I mean, Like they had had a

928
00:58:23,000 --> 00:58:25,560
Speaker 1: job back in the day, or they had gone to

929
00:58:25,800 --> 00:58:29,160
Speaker 1: the wrong school back in the day, and those activities

930
00:58:29,280 --> 00:58:33,080
Speaker 1: were used as evidence of stuff because the laws of

931
00:58:33,160 --> 00:58:35,640
Speaker 1: that regime, that new regime had new laws. So I

932
00:58:35,720 --> 00:58:37,880
Speaker 1: think that's the theory. Like what if you're what if

933
00:58:37,920 --> 00:58:42,080
Speaker 1: you're in a situation where you know, uh, your p A,

934
00:58:42,480 --> 00:58:45,680
Speaker 1: your personal assistants recording something, You're hanging out with your friends,

935
00:58:46,200 --> 00:58:49,400
Speaker 1: and you're talking about like how there's a certain I

936
00:58:49,480 --> 00:58:51,600
Speaker 1: don't know, like a drug law you don't like, or

937
00:58:51,680 --> 00:58:54,400
Speaker 1: there's something like there's a war going on and you

938
00:58:54,680 --> 00:58:58,280
Speaker 1: think that war is something that shouldn't be supported. And

939
00:58:58,400 --> 00:59:02,760
Speaker 1: then later, maybe years later, there's a new law pass

940
00:59:02,920 --> 00:59:05,840
Speaker 1: that says it's it's bad business. It's the equivalent of

941
00:59:05,880 --> 00:59:09,360
Speaker 1: a felony or sedition to say anything bad about any

942
00:59:09,480 --> 00:59:12,680
Speaker 1: wars that the new US government conducts. And then you

943
00:59:12,760 --> 00:59:16,560
Speaker 1: get that knock knock from one of those nights scope. Uh,

944
00:59:16,800 --> 00:59:19,040
Speaker 1: one of those night scope are two D twos, and

945
00:59:19,200 --> 00:59:21,760
Speaker 1: it doesn't even spookier. It just snaps a picture of

946
00:59:21,840 --> 00:59:24,560
Speaker 1: your face and then tells you to report somewhere and

947
00:59:24,640 --> 00:59:28,360
Speaker 1: you don't know why. God, I'm scaring myself. I'm sorry. Yes,

948
00:59:30,120 --> 00:59:34,480
Speaker 1: all right, so there you go. Um yeah, yeah, I

949
00:59:34,600 --> 00:59:36,840
Speaker 1: want to say one more thing. You need to counter

950
00:59:36,960 --> 00:59:39,560
Speaker 1: that M and I completely were completely on the same page.

951
00:59:39,880 --> 00:59:42,439
Speaker 1: You know, do we believe these companies and they say

952
00:59:42,480 --> 00:59:48,240
Speaker 1: they don't attach any signifying information to this right, and

953
00:59:48,480 --> 00:59:51,960
Speaker 1: but then again, what is logistically reasonable for them to

954
00:59:52,160 --> 00:59:56,840
Speaker 1: store this data? How long is logistically reasonable? You know?

955
00:59:57,040 --> 00:59:59,680
Speaker 1: I mean, are they really just holding onto people's information

956
00:59:59,840 --> 01:00:03,320
Speaker 1: and the you know, for the future purposes of blackmailing them,

957
01:00:03,440 --> 01:00:05,840
Speaker 1: or for the future prices of coop cooperating with some

958
01:00:06,000 --> 01:00:09,880
Speaker 1: new totalitarian regime. I think no. I think this stuff

959
01:00:09,920 --> 01:00:14,160
Speaker 1: probably is largely designed for what they're saying, to improve

960
01:00:14,480 --> 01:00:18,840
Speaker 1: the accuracy of these assistants. I don't think there's necessarily

961
01:00:18,920 --> 01:00:22,080
Speaker 1: nefarious motives in in storing this and in some way

962
01:00:22,600 --> 01:00:24,439
Speaker 1: using it against you. And it just doesn't make sense

963
01:00:24,520 --> 01:00:26,960
Speaker 1: considering how many people have these devices to just store

964
01:00:27,040 --> 01:00:29,520
Speaker 1: all the stuff forever, you know, and be able to

965
01:00:29,600 --> 01:00:32,120
Speaker 1: recall it and pin it to a person. Yeah, well,

966
01:00:32,240 --> 01:00:35,200
Speaker 1: there's nothing to counter because again what I said at

967
01:00:35,240 --> 01:00:38,280
Speaker 1: the beginning was that if you are a more if

968
01:00:38,320 --> 01:00:41,640
Speaker 1: you was the phrase, if you are like the hypochondriac

969
01:00:41,720 --> 01:00:44,440
Speaker 1: and some kind of conspiracy ward, You're right, that is

970
01:00:44,520 --> 01:00:47,560
Speaker 1: a very it's a very extreme thing. In the extremity

971
01:00:48,120 --> 01:00:51,760
Speaker 1: of the potential does have to be taken weight in

972
01:00:51,920 --> 01:00:56,320
Speaker 1: context with the practical nature, like how how cheap is

973
01:00:56,360 --> 01:00:59,800
Speaker 1: this to store forever? A profit motive makes much more

974
01:01:00,040 --> 01:01:05,000
Speaker 1: sense than like saving up for uh at this fictional government,

975
01:01:05,240 --> 01:01:07,480
Speaker 1: Like as long as there is more money to be

976
01:01:07,640 --> 01:01:11,840
Speaker 1: made storying or selling the data than there is expense

977
01:01:13,320 --> 01:01:16,479
Speaker 1: accrued by you know, maintaining in story. And then also

978
01:01:16,640 --> 01:01:21,440
Speaker 1: there has to be some like identifiable data is a

979
01:01:21,520 --> 01:01:24,640
Speaker 1: tough one too, because as we know, you can learn

980
01:01:24,760 --> 01:01:27,360
Speaker 1: a ton of stuff just from what would be considered

981
01:01:27,400 --> 01:01:32,040
Speaker 1: allowable non identifiable metadata. You just have like, right, combine

982
01:01:32,120 --> 01:01:36,720
Speaker 1: the different topics of the pieces together. Please, I'm hungry

983
01:01:36,760 --> 01:01:40,320
Speaker 1: to just follow the follow the bread crumbs, right, the

984
01:01:40,360 --> 01:01:43,520
Speaker 1: bread crumbs don't necessarily have a face, but they were

985
01:01:43,640 --> 01:01:46,800
Speaker 1: put there by a face, I'm sorry, or a pair

986
01:01:46,840 --> 01:01:49,320
Speaker 1: of hands attached to a face. Uh. And you can

987
01:01:49,480 --> 01:01:53,120
Speaker 1: learn a lot about this person's intentions, uh, their associations

988
01:01:53,160 --> 01:01:55,360
Speaker 1: by just following those things, um. And that that could

989
01:01:55,400 --> 01:01:58,400
Speaker 1: apply here too. But but again it's an opportunity cost, right,

990
01:01:58,640 --> 01:02:00,840
Speaker 1: like how long do we store that? Like, if you

991
01:02:00,960 --> 01:02:05,720
Speaker 1: store something, uh, then you're not able to store something

992
01:02:05,800 --> 01:02:09,320
Speaker 1: else unless you're just indefinitely increasing your server space, which

993
01:02:09,440 --> 01:02:12,960
Speaker 1: just obviously a company like Apple or Google it's capable

994
01:02:13,040 --> 01:02:15,320
Speaker 1: of doing they can afford me. But there's also not

995
01:02:15,440 --> 01:02:18,480
Speaker 1: unlimited infrastructure um to do this. So it is an

996
01:02:18,480 --> 01:02:20,680
Speaker 1: opportunity cost. So they have to weigh like how how

997
01:02:20,760 --> 01:02:22,640
Speaker 1: worth it is it to hold onto this versus what

998
01:02:22,960 --> 01:02:25,440
Speaker 1: else could we store? And I think they probably have

999
01:02:25,600 --> 01:02:28,200
Speaker 1: a period like a security camera where it starts to

1000
01:02:28,240 --> 01:02:32,040
Speaker 1: override itself, or maybe it's maybe there's something you know,

1001
01:02:32,120 --> 01:02:34,160
Speaker 1: I don't know the laws on this, but be interested

1002
01:02:34,240 --> 01:02:37,080
Speaker 1: to hear. Maybe depend on your country or state, there's

1003
01:02:37,120 --> 01:02:40,920
Speaker 1: a law that treats it like accounting data or something.

1004
01:02:41,000 --> 01:02:44,400
Speaker 1: You know, how like corporations have to hold certain business

1005
01:02:44,520 --> 01:02:47,440
Speaker 1: records for X amount of years, and that's like they

1006
01:02:47,480 --> 01:02:49,800
Speaker 1: ship them off to Iron Mountain or whatever so that

1007
01:02:49,920 --> 01:02:53,120
Speaker 1: they don't take up office space. Maybe there's maybe there's

1008
01:02:53,200 --> 01:02:56,960
Speaker 1: some something like that, because I don't know the full

1009
01:02:57,080 --> 01:02:59,919
Speaker 1: extent of what they have in the EU. You guys

1010
01:03:00,120 --> 01:03:03,680
Speaker 1: heard about that the right to be forgotten, um, right,

1011
01:03:03,800 --> 01:03:06,360
Speaker 1: which which I I don't know. Is that an age

1012
01:03:06,440 --> 01:03:09,080
Speaker 1: cut off where you just say, like all the dumb

1013
01:03:09,200 --> 01:03:12,280
Speaker 1: stuff I did on YouTube before I was eighteen, forget

1014
01:03:12,360 --> 01:03:14,400
Speaker 1: about it? Yeah? But but how how does that work?

1015
01:03:14,440 --> 01:03:16,439
Speaker 1: And I know we've talked about this, and I'm sorry

1016
01:03:16,440 --> 01:03:21,360
Speaker 1: if I'm misremembering, but is that does that involve being

1017
01:03:21,400 --> 01:03:23,320
Speaker 1: able to say I want this thing taken off the

1018
01:03:23,400 --> 01:03:30,280
Speaker 1: internet and to have an expect full effectiveness of that request.

1019
01:03:30,680 --> 01:03:34,240
Speaker 1: I you know, I think that's an excellent question because

1020
01:03:34,280 --> 01:03:37,680
Speaker 1: I'm not sure how enforceable that is. I think the

1021
01:03:37,960 --> 01:03:41,080
Speaker 1: the I think the nature of enforcement is that they

1022
01:03:41,120 --> 01:03:47,520
Speaker 1: can ask the company that gathered the data to delete it.

1023
01:03:47,800 --> 01:03:51,200
Speaker 1: But it's like the strisand effect, right like once once

1024
01:03:51,280 --> 01:03:53,800
Speaker 1: the signals out there. I just don't know how you

1025
01:03:53,880 --> 01:03:57,200
Speaker 1: can make something a percent go away. I'm sure it's possible,

1026
01:03:57,920 --> 01:04:00,280
Speaker 1: but it's I I also to your point, I don't

1027
01:04:00,320 --> 01:04:04,720
Speaker 1: know if it's something a normal person could do, right, Like,

1028
01:04:04,920 --> 01:04:09,760
Speaker 1: that's just exactly and I found a thing. There was

1029
01:04:09,840 --> 01:04:12,240
Speaker 1: a case. Um the e U s Top Court is

1030
01:04:12,320 --> 01:04:14,560
Speaker 1: ruled that Google does not have to apply the right

1031
01:04:14,600 --> 01:04:19,600
Speaker 1: to be forgotten globally, meaning that the clarification was Currently

1032
01:04:19,640 --> 01:04:21,800
Speaker 1: there is no obligation under EU law for a search

1033
01:04:21,880 --> 01:04:24,960
Speaker 1: engine operator who grants the request for de referencing made

1034
01:04:25,000 --> 01:04:27,160
Speaker 1: by a data subject to carry out such a de

1035
01:04:27,240 --> 01:04:30,720
Speaker 1: referencing on all the versions of its search engine. So

1036
01:04:30,840 --> 01:04:32,600
Speaker 1: you might not be able to find this information about

1037
01:04:32,600 --> 01:04:35,400
Speaker 1: the person in the EU, but you could still in

1038
01:04:35,560 --> 01:04:40,760
Speaker 1: the States. That's a five eyes level loophole, right, no doubt. Wow.

1039
01:04:41,240 --> 01:04:43,280
Speaker 1: So just assume what you do on the Internet is

1040
01:04:43,360 --> 01:04:47,400
Speaker 1: public record to someone, or what you do in your

1041
01:04:47,440 --> 01:04:49,680
Speaker 1: bedroom or in the bathroom. Because we know you're still

1042
01:04:49,760 --> 01:04:52,400
Speaker 1: sitting on the pot. Look it's okay, your legs are

1043
01:04:52,440 --> 01:04:55,840
Speaker 1: probably going numb at this point. That mind do if

1044
01:04:55,880 --> 01:04:58,920
Speaker 1: I'm in there for an hour and ten minutes. This

1045
01:04:59,120 --> 01:05:01,840
Speaker 1: is our is this? This is like our bootleg version

1046
01:05:01,920 --> 01:05:04,120
Speaker 1: of what they call the MPR moment. Do you hear

1047
01:05:04,120 --> 01:05:07,120
Speaker 1: about that on the driveway moment? Driveway moment, that's what

1048
01:05:07,240 --> 01:05:11,800
Speaker 1: it is. We have a commode moment. That's true because

1049
01:05:11,840 --> 01:05:14,800
Speaker 1: we're classy like that. Um, but yeah, I mean it's

1050
01:05:14,800 --> 01:05:17,200
Speaker 1: something to think about. Um and uh, I don't It's

1051
01:05:17,320 --> 01:05:19,640
Speaker 1: for me personally, not something for me to lose sleepover

1052
01:05:19,760 --> 01:05:21,840
Speaker 1: or be terrified. I'm certainly not going to go unplug

1053
01:05:21,880 --> 01:05:24,000
Speaker 1: all my devices, but I just I think, you know,

1054
01:05:24,120 --> 01:05:26,400
Speaker 1: it's something that people should should be aware of. And

1055
01:05:26,480 --> 01:05:29,400
Speaker 1: thank you so much to Louise Superstar for sending in

1056
01:05:29,600 --> 01:05:32,480
Speaker 1: that firsthand account of exactly what goes on and some

1057
01:05:32,640 --> 01:05:35,080
Speaker 1: of these UH studies. But again also to point out

1058
01:05:35,240 --> 01:05:39,160
Speaker 1: this is from and now new versions of the operating

1059
01:05:39,200 --> 01:05:43,560
Speaker 1: system do have more specific opt in options. And thanks

1060
01:05:43,640 --> 01:05:47,000
Speaker 1: to James for writing in about the robots and night Scope,

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01:05:47,240 --> 01:05:50,320
Speaker 1: and thanks to you Heather for giving us the opportunity

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01:05:50,520 --> 01:05:55,880
Speaker 1: to UH talk about the strange, fascinating science of gut biomas.

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01:05:56,120 --> 01:05:59,320
Speaker 1: Thank you to everyone in fact who has spent this

1064
01:05:59,400 --> 01:06:02,520
Speaker 1: time with us today. Thanks to everyone who has listened

1065
01:06:02,720 --> 01:06:05,120
Speaker 1: to the show, who has written in, who has given

1066
01:06:05,240 --> 01:06:08,040
Speaker 1: us a call. We can't wait to hear from you.

1067
01:06:08,440 --> 01:06:12,720
Speaker 1: What do you think is the future of automated law enforcement?

1068
01:06:12,880 --> 01:06:15,640
Speaker 1: What do you think is the future of the world

1069
01:06:15,800 --> 01:06:19,000
Speaker 1: within your gut? And what do you think we're gonna

1070
01:06:19,160 --> 01:06:24,840
Speaker 1: learn about? What these devices and their companies know about us?

1071
01:06:25,200 --> 01:06:27,800
Speaker 1: Tell us all about it. Give us a suggestion for

1072
01:06:27,880 --> 01:06:30,280
Speaker 1: an upcoming episode. Do you think your fellow listeners should

1073
01:06:30,320 --> 01:06:33,560
Speaker 1: either enjoy or need to know more about and we'll

1074
01:06:33,800 --> 01:06:35,760
Speaker 1: we'll tell you how to find us as what you know,

1075
01:06:35,960 --> 01:06:37,440
Speaker 1: it's the end of the show. We'll just do it now.

1076
01:06:37,680 --> 01:06:39,400
Speaker 1: We're all over the internet, that's right. You can find

1077
01:06:39,440 --> 01:06:42,040
Speaker 1: us on Facebook and Twitter we are Conspiracy Stuff and

1078
01:06:42,160 --> 01:06:45,120
Speaker 1: Instagram we are Conspiracy Stuff show. Yes, and you can

1079
01:06:45,200 --> 01:06:48,200
Speaker 1: call us. Our number is one eight three three st

1080
01:06:48,520 --> 01:06:52,720
Speaker 1: d w y t K. Please call us, leave a message,

1081
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Speaker 1: tell us exactly what you want us to call you.

1082
01:06:55,040 --> 01:06:56,480
Speaker 1: Doesn't have to be your real name. It can be

1083
01:06:56,520 --> 01:06:59,520
Speaker 1: an awesome super spy like name. Just tell us what

1084
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1085
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Speaker 1: we can use your voice on air. Then leave your message.

1086
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Speaker 1: Try and keep it as short as possible. And if

1087
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Speaker 1: you want to say anything personally to us or two

1088
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Speaker 1: doc or too Paul, go ahead and do that right

1089
01:07:11,320 --> 01:07:13,760
Speaker 1: at the end of the message. You've got three minutes.

1090
01:07:14,200 --> 01:07:16,680
Speaker 1: Do what you can. Try not to leave multiple messages too.

1091
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Speaker 1: That would really help us. If you've got a longer

1092
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Speaker 1: message that you want to tell us about or give

1093
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Speaker 1: us links or something, the best way to do that

1094
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Speaker 1: is to send us a good old fashioned email. You

1095
01:07:26,160 --> 01:07:29,600
Speaker 1: can find us where we are conspiracy at i heeart

1096
01:07:29,680 --> 01:07:51,000
Speaker 1: radio dot com. Stuff they Don't Want You to Know

1097
01:07:51,320 --> 01:07:54,280
Speaker 1: is a production of I Heart Radio. For more podcasts

1098
01:07:54,320 --> 01:07:56,520
Speaker 1: from my heart Radio, visit the i heart Radio app,

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Speaker 1: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.