1 00:00:00,040 --> 00:00:01,960 Speaker 1: We want to take a look at the bond market now. 2 00:00:02,000 --> 00:00:04,640 Speaker 1: After the Bank of England cut its key rate, there 3 00:00:04,680 --> 00:00:08,160 Speaker 1: was a big rally in UK guilts those are tenure 4 00:00:08,440 --> 00:00:11,440 Speaker 1: US Treasury bonds in the United Kingdom. In fact, there 5 00:00:11,480 --> 00:00:13,720 Speaker 1: was a global bond market rally. We want to bring 6 00:00:13,760 --> 00:00:16,280 Speaker 1: back to our show now Marvin Low. He's senior global 7 00:00:16,320 --> 00:00:20,479 Speaker 1: market strategist at d N Y Melon. So Marvin, isn't 8 00:00:20,560 --> 00:00:21,959 Speaker 1: so funny. Earlier in the week it was all the 9 00:00:22,040 --> 00:00:25,400 Speaker 1: Japanese bond market route was you know, maybe it was 10 00:00:25,440 --> 00:00:27,640 Speaker 1: the end of the global bond market rally. Huh, looks 11 00:00:27,640 --> 00:00:30,319 Speaker 1: like today maybe it's not over yet. Every day brings 12 00:00:30,320 --> 00:00:33,000 Speaker 1: a different surprise, doesn't it. It sure does. What do 13 00:00:33,040 --> 00:00:38,000 Speaker 1: you think? Um, you know, we did get, um, the 14 00:00:38,000 --> 00:00:40,560 Speaker 1: amount of stimulus that we had expected. What the Bank 15 00:00:40,640 --> 00:00:43,479 Speaker 1: Japan didn't do earlier this week was delivered. What the 16 00:00:43,520 --> 00:00:46,320 Speaker 1: market had thought. In this case, there was you know, 17 00:00:46,360 --> 00:00:49,680 Speaker 1: really pretty much odds that, um, the Bank of England 18 00:00:49,760 --> 00:00:51,800 Speaker 1: was going to cut their interest rates. They did, um, 19 00:00:51,840 --> 00:00:55,640 Speaker 1: but they also reintroduced bond buying, which included corporate bonds 20 00:00:55,680 --> 00:00:58,120 Speaker 1: for the first time for the b o E. So 21 00:00:58,600 --> 00:01:00,960 Speaker 1: it did kind of almost over deliver and you know, 22 00:01:01,000 --> 00:01:03,720 Speaker 1: like you said, we had a pretty nice rally in 23 00:01:03,920 --> 00:01:07,160 Speaker 1: UM in guilts, but that did carry over into mostly 24 00:01:07,200 --> 00:01:10,720 Speaker 1: all the sovereign bond markets, Japan being an exception to that. 25 00:01:11,240 --> 00:01:13,720 Speaker 1: UM and for the US, you know, we continue to 26 00:01:13,720 --> 00:01:16,039 Speaker 1: push yields kind of the middle point of this range, 27 00:01:16,040 --> 00:01:19,399 Speaker 1: but you know, definitely lower again, Marvin, should we read 28 00:01:19,440 --> 00:01:23,600 Speaker 1: anything beneath the surface? Is the global economy really that 29 00:01:23,720 --> 00:01:26,200 Speaker 1: bad that we've got the Bank of England lowering rates 30 00:01:26,240 --> 00:01:30,560 Speaker 1: twenty five basis points? Is it really that terrible that 31 00:01:30,680 --> 00:01:34,640 Speaker 1: this is necessary? Well, you know what, um so Brexit 32 00:01:34,680 --> 00:01:38,000 Speaker 1: definitely changes all the rule if you will, because we 33 00:01:38,040 --> 00:01:40,520 Speaker 1: really don't know how it's going to evolve. You can 34 00:01:40,520 --> 00:01:42,200 Speaker 1: make the argument that the Bank of England was a 35 00:01:42,200 --> 00:01:45,200 Speaker 1: little bit aggressive in making a move right now, but 36 00:01:45,560 --> 00:01:48,440 Speaker 1: Marko was pretty pretty pointed in his belief that there 37 00:01:48,480 --> 00:01:51,800 Speaker 1: was going to be a slow down in UM in 38 00:01:51,800 --> 00:01:54,680 Speaker 1: the UK economy, and he acted based based on that, 39 00:01:54,880 --> 00:01:58,280 Speaker 1: and of the prevailing thought was that there's going to 40 00:01:58,360 --> 00:02:00,440 Speaker 1: be a spillover effect into other eCos. To me, so 41 00:02:00,480 --> 00:02:03,360 Speaker 1: I think we're gonna continue to see this doubest type 42 00:02:03,360 --> 00:02:05,840 Speaker 1: of commentary come out of at least three of the 43 00:02:05,920 --> 00:02:08,840 Speaker 1: four bigger central banks, you know, the FED being the exception, 44 00:02:08,880 --> 00:02:11,640 Speaker 1: which is still saying that they're in a position to 45 00:02:12,160 --> 00:02:15,160 Speaker 1: raise rates this year. So and this seems to be 46 00:02:15,440 --> 00:02:17,000 Speaker 1: one of the tough things for the FED. Actually, if 47 00:02:17,000 --> 00:02:19,280 Speaker 1: you look at w I r P, those are world 48 00:02:19,440 --> 00:02:23,200 Speaker 1: interest rate projections, very important page on your Bloomberg where 49 00:02:23,200 --> 00:02:25,200 Speaker 1: you can check out the odds of the Fed's next 50 00:02:25,240 --> 00:02:27,280 Speaker 1: rate hike going meeting by meeting, and it's a good 51 00:02:27,280 --> 00:02:30,120 Speaker 1: bank of Japan, all the big develop nation central banks. 52 00:02:30,720 --> 00:02:33,560 Speaker 1: Now there's no the odds of a of a rate 53 00:02:33,639 --> 00:02:37,840 Speaker 1: hike don't move above in the FED funds futures market 54 00:02:37,919 --> 00:02:41,000 Speaker 1: view until the end of next year. That was already 55 00:02:41,040 --> 00:02:43,959 Speaker 1: at September. Now, granted they may be under pricing when 56 00:02:44,000 --> 00:02:47,240 Speaker 1: the Fed's gonna move, but that's idea seems to be that, 57 00:02:47,280 --> 00:02:49,200 Speaker 1: you know, it's getting harder and harder for the FED 58 00:02:49,240 --> 00:02:50,880 Speaker 1: to high grades because the rest of the world is 59 00:02:50,919 --> 00:02:52,680 Speaker 1: going in the opposite direction. They don't want to be 60 00:02:52,720 --> 00:02:56,079 Speaker 1: the odd central bank out. I think I think you 61 00:02:56,120 --> 00:02:58,839 Speaker 1: got a spot on, and I will UM, I will 62 00:02:58,840 --> 00:03:00,680 Speaker 1: promote w I r P. Also, I use that I 63 00:03:00,760 --> 00:03:03,680 Speaker 1: use that page pretty much every day. UM. The market 64 00:03:03,880 --> 00:03:07,600 Speaker 1: is definitely looking at the Fed's words in a very 65 00:03:07,680 --> 00:03:11,840 Speaker 1: skeptical eye. Um, the you know, whether it's the GDP 66 00:03:12,040 --> 00:03:15,360 Speaker 1: number that we had, whether it's the you know, bouncy 67 00:03:15,440 --> 00:03:18,160 Speaker 1: employment number. I guess we'll see whether or not UM 68 00:03:18,320 --> 00:03:22,120 Speaker 1: last month's employment report was more indicative of where UM 69 00:03:22,240 --> 00:03:24,040 Speaker 1: jobs were in the US or the one before that, 70 00:03:24,080 --> 00:03:27,480 Speaker 1: which showed a very weak job market. But um, now 71 00:03:27,520 --> 00:03:29,760 Speaker 1: the market is expecting to ECP to do something. The 72 00:03:29,760 --> 00:03:32,400 Speaker 1: market is expecting more from the Bank of Japan. The 73 00:03:32,440 --> 00:03:35,560 Speaker 1: market is expecting and and and pretty much the Bank 74 00:03:35,600 --> 00:03:37,240 Speaker 1: of England said that they would be ready to act, 75 00:03:37,320 --> 00:03:39,320 Speaker 1: to act if they needed to. It makes it really 76 00:03:39,320 --> 00:03:41,720 Speaker 1: hard for the FED in that type of environment. Does 77 00:03:41,720 --> 00:03:44,560 Speaker 1: it just make it easier and less expensive for governments 78 00:03:44,600 --> 00:03:47,680 Speaker 1: to borrow and issue lots of debt, whether it's the 79 00:03:47,800 --> 00:03:52,920 Speaker 1: U S Treasury or whether it's the UK Treasury. Yeah, 80 00:03:52,960 --> 00:03:55,280 Speaker 1: barn costs there are definitely low. UM. So from a 81 00:03:55,320 --> 00:03:58,600 Speaker 1: mathematical perspective, Um, you know, when they issue debt, it 82 00:03:58,680 --> 00:04:01,280 Speaker 1: is going to cost less. When they're when they refinance 83 00:04:01,320 --> 00:04:04,000 Speaker 1: older bonds with higher coupons, it's gonna cause less. But 84 00:04:04,000 --> 00:04:07,960 Speaker 1: there is so much debt that's being issued and Um. 85 00:04:08,000 --> 00:04:10,880 Speaker 1: It doesn't take much of a backup and yields to 86 00:04:11,120 --> 00:04:14,960 Speaker 1: really start to worry people. Um. The next part of 87 00:04:15,120 --> 00:04:20,240 Speaker 1: the accommodation uh slash stimulus. Stimulus discussion has started to 88 00:04:20,480 --> 00:04:23,560 Speaker 1: um uh go down the route of helicopter money. And 89 00:04:23,600 --> 00:04:27,280 Speaker 1: you know, whether or not that would really make investors 90 00:04:27,360 --> 00:04:30,440 Speaker 1: uncomfortable U is something to be seen. But you know, 91 00:04:30,560 --> 00:04:32,200 Speaker 1: Karney today said that he was not a fan of 92 00:04:32,200 --> 00:04:34,919 Speaker 1: helicopter money. Uh. Carney said today that he UM and 93 00:04:34,960 --> 00:04:37,440 Speaker 1: this is the Bank of England governor um said that 94 00:04:37,480 --> 00:04:39,960 Speaker 1: he was not a fan of negative eiel So uh, 95 00:04:40,000 --> 00:04:41,599 Speaker 1: we're not expecting that to come out of the Bank 96 00:04:41,600 --> 00:04:43,480 Speaker 1: of England, but that is kind of the next stage 97 00:04:43,480 --> 00:04:47,839 Speaker 1: when the tools become far scarcer and the episicacy, the 98 00:04:47,839 --> 00:04:51,960 Speaker 1: efficacy of what they're doing is questioned. Well, and he 99 00:04:52,040 --> 00:04:55,960 Speaker 1: was quite adamant, wasn't he. He's uh definitely in league 100 00:04:56,000 --> 00:04:59,600 Speaker 1: with said chair Janet Yellen that negative interest rates or 101 00:04:59,680 --> 00:05:04,719 Speaker 1: negative bond yields anyway, certainly not not something he's heading toward. Uh. 102 00:05:04,760 --> 00:05:08,640 Speaker 1: And of course, UH, it's possible too that he does 103 00:05:08,640 --> 00:05:11,279 Speaker 1: not face the same kind of situation, for example, the 104 00:05:11,279 --> 00:05:14,039 Speaker 1: Bank of Japan does, right, I mean yes, the UK 105 00:05:14,120 --> 00:05:16,200 Speaker 1: economy is going to take a big hit from Brexit. 106 00:05:16,360 --> 00:05:18,840 Speaker 1: And Carl Weinberg from High Frequency Economics and the same 107 00:05:18,880 --> 00:05:20,960 Speaker 1: thing earlier on the show today that you just said 108 00:05:21,000 --> 00:05:24,120 Speaker 1: there's no precedent for Brexit. Nobody, no one can say 109 00:05:24,120 --> 00:05:26,400 Speaker 1: in two years where the US the UK economy is 110 00:05:26,440 --> 00:05:29,000 Speaker 1: going to be. But it went into all of this 111 00:05:29,640 --> 00:05:33,960 Speaker 1: with remember, up until the Brexit worries, maybe the UK 112 00:05:34,120 --> 00:05:37,080 Speaker 1: was gonna see a rate hike. So maybe that's another 113 00:05:37,120 --> 00:05:40,159 Speaker 1: reason he's not going to consider it. He doesn't have to. Well, 114 00:05:40,279 --> 00:05:42,480 Speaker 1: you know, I'll say that I was encouraged that he 115 00:05:42,600 --> 00:05:46,120 Speaker 1: was adamant about not going into the negative yield regime 116 00:05:46,240 --> 00:05:49,039 Speaker 1: or or a really um dead seat against it. And 117 00:05:49,080 --> 00:05:52,200 Speaker 1: I was encouraged that um he really dismissed the concept 118 00:05:52,240 --> 00:05:55,520 Speaker 1: of helicopter money. So it certainly makes the argument that 119 00:05:55,520 --> 00:05:57,480 Speaker 1: that is one of the reasons the Fed wants the 120 00:05:57,560 --> 00:06:00,760 Speaker 1: high rates if they can, because would give them a 121 00:06:00,760 --> 00:06:03,039 Speaker 1: few more options. And remember it's not like they have 122 00:06:03,120 --> 00:06:06,640 Speaker 1: a whole lot, but being able to start a bond 123 00:06:06,640 --> 00:06:09,640 Speaker 1: buying program again, being able to actually cut rates and 124 00:06:09,720 --> 00:06:14,200 Speaker 1: not have them in negative territorial territory already is an 125 00:06:14,200 --> 00:06:16,560 Speaker 1: advantage that at least the b o E and the 126 00:06:16,640 --> 00:06:19,960 Speaker 1: FED has UM so they can um take that hard 127 00:06:20,000 --> 00:06:23,480 Speaker 1: line and hopefully, uh give the market a little bit 128 00:06:23,480 --> 00:06:26,400 Speaker 1: of comfort that we're not going down there. But uh, well, 129 00:06:26,600 --> 00:06:30,040 Speaker 1: once again get into an area where there's not a 130 00:06:30,080 --> 00:06:33,240 Speaker 1: lot of room if in fact, these economies turn or 131 00:06:33,279 --> 00:06:35,400 Speaker 1: there is a big financial shock, and and and that 132 00:06:35,600 --> 00:06:38,680 Speaker 1: is this ongoing concern that we've had for you know, 133 00:06:38,839 --> 00:06:42,159 Speaker 1: quite some time, because um, we're not seeing the growth 134 00:06:42,200 --> 00:06:46,440 Speaker 1: that one would expect this late in um an accommodation cycle, 135 00:06:47,000 --> 00:06:50,039 Speaker 1: and they're just are not that many traditional tools that 136 00:06:50,040 --> 00:06:53,320 Speaker 1: are left in their toolbox. Well, Marvin, you just said it. 137 00:06:53,360 --> 00:06:57,200 Speaker 1: If all of the action that they have taken after 138 00:06:57,520 --> 00:07:01,159 Speaker 1: the financial debacle of two thousand and eight, if the 139 00:07:01,240 --> 00:07:05,400 Speaker 1: action for lower interest rates has produced anemic growth and 140 00:07:05,440 --> 00:07:08,680 Speaker 1: continues to produce anemic growth, or at least you have 141 00:07:08,760 --> 00:07:14,320 Speaker 1: it concurrently, why don't they stop doing that? I mean, 142 00:07:14,480 --> 00:07:16,800 Speaker 1: isn't that the definition of the crazy thing? Right? I mean, 143 00:07:16,840 --> 00:07:20,640 Speaker 1: you know, if you keep getting the same results, stop, 144 00:07:21,320 --> 00:07:24,119 Speaker 1: you know, absolutely great question, and we would be second 145 00:07:24,120 --> 00:07:26,280 Speaker 1: guessing as to whether or not things would be far worse. 146 00:07:26,320 --> 00:07:29,800 Speaker 1: So that certainly would be their argument. Um, But that's 147 00:07:29,840 --> 00:07:32,240 Speaker 1: a that's a pretty thin I mean, I'm not saying 148 00:07:32,240 --> 00:07:34,160 Speaker 1: that's your argument. I'm just saying, but that's a that's 149 00:07:34,160 --> 00:07:38,840 Speaker 1: a pretty you know, thin, uh, basis on on which 150 00:07:38,840 --> 00:07:42,840 Speaker 1: to you know, basis uh, you know, global monetary policy. Yeah, 151 00:07:42,960 --> 00:07:47,120 Speaker 1: and um, and you know, Governor Carney was quite adamant 152 00:07:47,200 --> 00:07:51,440 Speaker 1: in his um in answering one of his statements where um, 153 00:07:51,480 --> 00:07:54,200 Speaker 1: I believe someone asked about either negative interest rates and 154 00:07:54,400 --> 00:07:57,720 Speaker 1: or what savers should do, and he was of the 155 00:07:57,760 --> 00:07:59,760 Speaker 1: approach that, you know, we think that X number of 156 00:07:59,760 --> 00:08:01,720 Speaker 1: people are going to lose their job and we can't 157 00:08:01,720 --> 00:08:06,160 Speaker 1: stand by. So while it is kind of a thin argument, 158 00:08:06,160 --> 00:08:08,000 Speaker 1: it's an argument that I believe a lot of these 159 00:08:08,000 --> 00:08:10,560 Speaker 1: central bankers hold true to heart. Um. We've kind of 160 00:08:10,600 --> 00:08:14,040 Speaker 1: heard that come out of dragging before. Uh. And we've 161 00:08:14,080 --> 00:08:17,280 Speaker 1: heard and read about, um about how the Fed kind 162 00:08:17,280 --> 00:08:21,679 Speaker 1: of views it's extraordinary policy as okay, But but Marvin, 163 00:08:21,720 --> 00:08:25,720 Speaker 1: let's let's just suppose that some of your clients actually 164 00:08:25,800 --> 00:08:30,160 Speaker 1: received a decent yield on their bonds. What would they 165 00:08:30,240 --> 00:08:31,920 Speaker 1: do with that money? Would they not go out and 166 00:08:32,000 --> 00:08:36,599 Speaker 1: spend it in the economy? Um? You know, absolutely, it 167 00:08:36,640 --> 00:08:40,120 Speaker 1: would be a better environment for savers and UM again. 168 00:08:40,760 --> 00:08:43,200 Speaker 1: You and I I think are are coming from the 169 00:08:43,200 --> 00:08:47,800 Speaker 1: same approach where we think that this um really artificially 170 00:08:47,880 --> 00:08:52,280 Speaker 1: low rate environment is not doing what it's supposed to 171 00:08:52,280 --> 00:08:57,080 Speaker 1: do from from from the economic perspective. At the same time, 172 00:08:57,200 --> 00:09:00,120 Speaker 1: we've got central bankers that do not seem to be 173 00:09:00,160 --> 00:09:03,120 Speaker 1: comfortable allowing volatility to come to the market for any 174 00:09:03,120 --> 00:09:05,240 Speaker 1: extended period of time, and we see them time and 175 00:09:05,280 --> 00:09:09,000 Speaker 1: time again, Uh go in and try to quash that 176 00:09:09,080 --> 00:09:13,920 Speaker 1: volatility whenever it spikes, And unfortunately those periods of volatility 177 00:09:14,080 --> 00:09:18,319 Speaker 1: seem to be more frequent, um slightly, you know, more acute, 178 00:09:18,480 --> 00:09:23,840 Speaker 1: and the responses um from the central banks come quicker. 179 00:09:24,280 --> 00:09:27,600 Speaker 1: And it's really this vicious cycle that we find ourselves in. Well, 180 00:09:27,640 --> 00:09:29,680 Speaker 1: you know, I think I could take the other side 181 00:09:29,679 --> 00:09:32,680 Speaker 1: of this too. So let's imagine a world where central 182 00:09:32,720 --> 00:09:35,720 Speaker 1: banks start raising their key rates. Let's say the banking 183 00:09:35,880 --> 00:09:39,000 Speaker 1: can raise the key rates. People would sell those or 184 00:09:39,040 --> 00:09:41,960 Speaker 1: buy those guilts so fast, push up that price, push 185 00:09:42,000 --> 00:09:44,640 Speaker 1: the yield down even further because they'd say, oh my gosh, 186 00:09:44,880 --> 00:09:47,000 Speaker 1: he's gonna make what could be a mild recession into 187 00:09:47,000 --> 00:09:49,680 Speaker 1: a deep recession. I think the presumption is here that 188 00:09:49,840 --> 00:09:53,160 Speaker 1: central banks alone control what the bond market does. There's 189 00:09:53,160 --> 00:09:56,199 Speaker 1: a lot of investors out there making decisions now. True, 190 00:09:56,800 --> 00:10:00,160 Speaker 1: if they keep buying bonds, that's gonna keep dry being 191 00:10:00,160 --> 00:10:02,760 Speaker 1: down yields and pushing you know, the yields lower and 192 00:10:03,120 --> 00:10:05,320 Speaker 1: you know, bringing down the yields on US treasuries. But 193 00:10:05,600 --> 00:10:07,280 Speaker 1: I think that's the one of the problems for for 194 00:10:07,440 --> 00:10:10,959 Speaker 1: central banks right now. They only really control the short end. Yeah. Well, 195 00:10:11,120 --> 00:10:13,720 Speaker 1: well a few things UM kind of that that are 196 00:10:14,200 --> 00:10:16,439 Speaker 1: you know, very interesting observations from what you just said. 197 00:10:16,520 --> 00:10:19,040 Speaker 1: Number one is that we do have a flat yield curve, 198 00:10:19,480 --> 00:10:22,600 Speaker 1: so and that curve continues to flatten, and today we 199 00:10:22,640 --> 00:10:25,040 Speaker 1: did see a flattening as well as a decline in 200 00:10:25,160 --> 00:10:28,480 Speaker 1: um an overall yields. So the long end UH declined 201 00:10:28,520 --> 00:10:31,559 Speaker 1: even more than the UH than the short ends. So 202 00:10:31,880 --> 00:10:36,920 Speaker 1: that certainly is not a resounding um affirmation of you know, 203 00:10:36,960 --> 00:10:40,800 Speaker 1: future growth in the economy. Um. The other aspect of 204 00:10:40,840 --> 00:10:42,880 Speaker 1: it is that, you know, if they do wind up 205 00:10:42,920 --> 00:10:46,319 Speaker 1: buying as much of the markets as they do, as 206 00:10:46,400 --> 00:10:49,679 Speaker 1: we have in Japan, those markets start start to function 207 00:10:49,920 --> 00:10:53,560 Speaker 1: very very um uh. They start to misbehave in a 208 00:10:53,559 --> 00:10:56,200 Speaker 1: way that's very difficult to either analyze and or for 209 00:10:56,240 --> 00:10:59,880 Speaker 1: the central banks to control. And we saw yields into 210 00:11:00,080 --> 00:11:04,880 Speaker 1: hand increase from a percentage perspective after UM, the I 211 00:11:04,920 --> 00:11:09,200 Speaker 1: guess disappointing b O j um decision as well as 212 00:11:09,240 --> 00:11:12,840 Speaker 1: the disappointment from the physical stimulus perspective. Um, it's performed 213 00:11:12,960 --> 00:11:15,720 Speaker 1: very poorly from a percentage perspective. Granted, you know, you 214 00:11:15,720 --> 00:11:18,600 Speaker 1: went from negative negatives, so financing costs for the Japanese 215 00:11:18,600 --> 00:11:22,840 Speaker 1: government is still pretty low, but the roads investor confidence 216 00:11:23,080 --> 00:11:26,440 Speaker 1: in kind of this low rate environment, you can very 217 00:11:26,640 --> 00:11:29,080 Speaker 1: easily wind yoursel wind up in a situation where it 218 00:11:29,080 --> 00:11:31,840 Speaker 1: becomes harder for these governments to finance themselves. And that's 219 00:11:31,880 --> 00:11:34,160 Speaker 1: a big concern too, because the amount of debt out 220 00:11:34,200 --> 00:11:37,680 Speaker 1: there um is quite large that the central banks own. 221 00:11:37,880 --> 00:11:41,400 Speaker 1: Even though we keep talking about a scarcity of government bonds, 222 00:11:42,080 --> 00:11:44,280 Speaker 1: well that's if that's scared. If that's scarcity of government 223 00:11:44,320 --> 00:11:46,800 Speaker 1: bonds continues, maybe the central banks can just open up 224 00:11:46,800 --> 00:11:49,719 Speaker 1: their books and start selling some of them. Yeah, yeah, 225 00:11:49,800 --> 00:11:52,240 Speaker 1: you know. UM, I had hoped that as part of 226 00:11:52,240 --> 00:11:54,719 Speaker 1: the normalization process that said would start to reduce its 227 00:11:54,720 --> 00:11:58,920 Speaker 1: balance sheets. Um. You know, And again the perspective is 228 00:11:59,000 --> 00:12:02,000 Speaker 1: that the central banks are starting or continue to expand 229 00:12:02,000 --> 00:12:04,400 Speaker 1: their balance sheets, so we're not even getting at that discussion, 230 00:12:04,480 --> 00:12:07,680 Speaker 1: but they certainly could. Um. It would help normalize the market. 231 00:12:08,000 --> 00:12:11,480 Speaker 1: It would possibly um get the curve to be more 232 00:12:11,520 --> 00:12:14,520 Speaker 1: positively shaped, which you know from a from from an 233 00:12:14,520 --> 00:12:18,240 Speaker 1: investor perspective, might um build a little bit of comfort 234 00:12:18,280 --> 00:12:21,600 Speaker 1: into the future prospects of the economy. But it's a 235 00:12:21,679 --> 00:12:23,960 Speaker 1: very big house of cards. You talk about the housing market, 236 00:12:23,960 --> 00:12:27,080 Speaker 1: you talk about UM, you talked about a lot of 237 00:12:27,080 --> 00:12:28,880 Speaker 1: these other sound curves that are flying. Kind of the 238 00:12:28,880 --> 00:12:33,199 Speaker 1: implications for those moves do become magnified. Thank you very 239 00:12:33,280 --> 00:12:36,280 Speaker 1: much for spending time with us. Marvin Lowe is senior 240 00:12:36,360 --> 00:12:40,520 Speaker 1: Global Markets strategist for b n Y MELON, giving us 241 00:12:40,520 --> 00:12:44,200 Speaker 1: his perspective on the Bank of England's rate decision today 242 00:12:44,600 --> 00:12:47,840 Speaker 1: and the policy of central banks around the world.