1 00:00:03,800 --> 00:00:06,400 Speaker 1: On this episode of News World. My guest today just 2 00:00:06,480 --> 00:00:09,800 Speaker 1: returned from a trip to Lithuania and Israel. But the 3 00:00:09,840 --> 00:00:13,280 Speaker 1: issue most concerning him right now is the Chinese Communist 4 00:00:13,320 --> 00:00:17,800 Speaker 1: Party's ability to conduct a cyber enabled economic warfare campaign 5 00:00:18,120 --> 00:00:22,000 Speaker 1: against Taiwan. This campaign might be able to deliver Taiwan 6 00:00:22,320 --> 00:00:26,079 Speaker 1: to the Chinese Communist Party with minimal damage. So what 7 00:00:26,079 --> 00:00:28,639 Speaker 1: should I say to do to stop it. I'm really 8 00:00:28,640 --> 00:00:32,879 Speaker 1: pleased to welcome my guest, Admiral Mark Montgomery, Senior Fellow 9 00:00:33,080 --> 00:00:44,760 Speaker 1: at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Mark, welcome, and 10 00:00:44,880 --> 00:00:46,480 Speaker 1: thank you for joining me on News World. 11 00:00:47,120 --> 00:00:48,480 Speaker 2: Thank you for having me today here, sir. 12 00:00:49,159 --> 00:00:52,839 Speaker 1: It's a very important topic. Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of 13 00:00:52,840 --> 00:00:56,200 Speaker 1: the US Indo Pacific Command, during a Senate Armed Services 14 00:00:56,200 --> 00:00:59,720 Speaker 1: Committee hearing on April tenth, said that quote, China is 15 00:00:59,760 --> 00:01:04,080 Speaker 1: in increasing addressive actions near Taiwan. Are not just exercises, 16 00:01:04,400 --> 00:01:07,720 Speaker 1: they are rehearsals. Do you think China is ramping up 17 00:01:07,720 --> 00:01:10,440 Speaker 1: for something or are these just military exercises? 18 00:01:11,640 --> 00:01:15,520 Speaker 2: Sam is right, Admal Paparo, the Peycock commander, the Chinese 19 00:01:15,600 --> 00:01:18,640 Speaker 2: are rehearsing. Now. I think what's important I stand here 20 00:01:18,680 --> 00:01:21,200 Speaker 2: is that that is the most dangerous scenario when they 21 00:01:21,240 --> 00:01:23,240 Speaker 2: do this kind of cross straight invasion, that's what they're 22 00:01:23,280 --> 00:01:26,040 Speaker 2: rehearsing for. Maybe the next most dangerous is a full 23 00:01:26,080 --> 00:01:30,840 Speaker 2: scale blockade. But what's really got me worried is is 24 00:01:30,880 --> 00:01:33,320 Speaker 2: something less than that, what we call the most likely 25 00:01:33,360 --> 00:01:35,280 Speaker 2: scenario in the military and the one that you really 26 00:01:35,319 --> 00:01:38,080 Speaker 2: need to make sure you're planning for, and that's a 27 00:01:38,120 --> 00:01:42,560 Speaker 2: cyber enabled economic warfare campaign against Taiwan. Well, my personal 28 00:01:42,600 --> 00:01:45,880 Speaker 2: belief is General Sector G will not do that unless 29 00:01:45,880 --> 00:01:49,720 Speaker 2: he knows that should the conflict escalate, he could win 30 00:01:49,760 --> 00:01:54,520 Speaker 2: across straight invasion. So admal Paparo as pey Coom, he's 31 00:01:54,520 --> 00:01:57,200 Speaker 2: preparing for that cross sate invasion, making sure Chairman G 32 00:01:57,400 --> 00:01:59,320 Speaker 2: never wakes up in the morning and says, you know, 33 00:01:59,360 --> 00:02:02,440 Speaker 2: I could go if I had to, I could, And 34 00:02:02,480 --> 00:02:05,520 Speaker 2: that way we prevent the cyber naval economic warfare campaign 35 00:02:05,760 --> 00:02:07,720 Speaker 2: that I think is ongoing and would just have to 36 00:02:07,760 --> 00:02:10,679 Speaker 2: be slightly increased on the Riostat for China to be 37 00:02:10,680 --> 00:02:11,240 Speaker 2: able to do it. 38 00:02:12,160 --> 00:02:15,160 Speaker 1: How big a challenge would it be for the Chinese 39 00:02:15,240 --> 00:02:18,800 Speaker 1: communists to actually try to invade and occupy Taiwan. 40 00:02:19,280 --> 00:02:22,040 Speaker 2: This is really hard. There's one military in the world 41 00:02:22,040 --> 00:02:24,000 Speaker 2: that I know could do it, and it's us, But 42 00:02:24,040 --> 00:02:26,200 Speaker 2: I wouldn't want to do it against our own defenses. 43 00:02:26,720 --> 00:02:28,640 Speaker 2: You know, this is a very dangerous thing and also 44 00:02:29,200 --> 00:02:32,200 Speaker 2: inevitably you damage the heck out of Taiwan. I mean, 45 00:02:32,720 --> 00:02:37,480 Speaker 2: they want Taiwan for very historical cultural, societal reasons, and 46 00:02:37,520 --> 00:02:40,240 Speaker 2: they would take it broken, but they would prefer to 47 00:02:40,280 --> 00:02:42,839 Speaker 2: take it whole. And to take it whole, I think 48 00:02:42,960 --> 00:02:46,280 Speaker 2: is to get Taiwan to bend the knee so because 49 00:02:46,320 --> 00:02:49,840 Speaker 2: it's so hard, because it would be so calamitous, I 50 00:02:49,840 --> 00:02:54,040 Speaker 2: think that drives China towards seeking a solution where they 51 00:02:54,320 --> 00:02:59,080 Speaker 2: pressure break the societal resilience of Taiwan, bring them to heal, 52 00:02:59,600 --> 00:03:01,920 Speaker 2: and then and integrate them fully into their economy. 53 00:03:02,639 --> 00:03:06,520 Speaker 1: Currently, the Chinese, they're actually producing slightly more fighters than 54 00:03:06,560 --> 00:03:09,720 Speaker 1: we are, about one point two to one, and our 55 00:03:09,800 --> 00:03:13,320 Speaker 1: shipbuilding capacity has just collapsed. Something i'd like you to 56 00:03:13,360 --> 00:03:16,919 Speaker 1: sort of comment on our concerned to you that despite 57 00:03:16,919 --> 00:03:19,800 Speaker 1: the efforts of the new Trump administration that in the 58 00:03:19,800 --> 00:03:23,520 Speaker 1: short run, the Chinese are clearly out preparing us. 59 00:03:24,360 --> 00:03:26,919 Speaker 2: Well, You're exactly right. In fact, the shipbuilding number is 60 00:03:27,040 --> 00:03:29,680 Speaker 2: much worse than the fighter number. The number of warships 61 00:03:29,680 --> 00:03:32,160 Speaker 2: are producing three to four to five to one we're 62 00:03:32,200 --> 00:03:34,600 Speaker 2: producing each year. The number of merchant ships, by the way, 63 00:03:34,639 --> 00:03:36,080 Speaker 2: is two hundred to one. If you really want to 64 00:03:36,080 --> 00:03:41,400 Speaker 2: get uncomfortable, you're absolutely right. This is not unsolvable. Korea 65 00:03:41,840 --> 00:03:46,000 Speaker 2: has two great, big shipyards, both of which can produce 66 00:03:46,040 --> 00:03:48,400 Speaker 2: a support ship, you know, an oil or a logistics 67 00:03:48,400 --> 00:03:52,040 Speaker 2: ship for about twenty eight cents on the dollar that 68 00:03:52,120 --> 00:03:54,640 Speaker 2: a US ship yard would produce it at. So that 69 00:03:54,680 --> 00:03:58,240 Speaker 2: tells you two things. One we can get better. Two 70 00:03:58,280 --> 00:04:00,800 Speaker 2: we're going to need help. It's got a great idea 71 00:04:00,800 --> 00:04:03,320 Speaker 2: with this executive order, and Senators Kelly and Wicker and 72 00:04:03,360 --> 00:04:06,600 Speaker 2: others have been pushing us for years. They've got a 73 00:04:06,640 --> 00:04:09,280 Speaker 2: team set up at the NFC just to work this, 74 00:04:09,400 --> 00:04:13,080 Speaker 2: led by a guy named doctor Jerry Hendrix. This whole setup, 75 00:04:13,680 --> 00:04:16,560 Speaker 2: we can get this right. The problem is, it took 76 00:04:16,640 --> 00:04:18,960 Speaker 2: us forty years to get in this hole. We're not 77 00:04:19,000 --> 00:04:21,080 Speaker 2: going to get out in four And you know, the 78 00:04:21,120 --> 00:04:24,400 Speaker 2: hardest thing in government is to commit to a strategic 79 00:04:24,480 --> 00:04:28,159 Speaker 2: plan to fix something that your success or successor will enjoy. 80 00:04:28,520 --> 00:04:31,359 Speaker 2: That just is not how our presidents have operated for 81 00:04:31,400 --> 00:04:34,240 Speaker 2: the last twenty years. And so I'm concerned that they 82 00:04:34,279 --> 00:04:36,200 Speaker 2: won't make the number one thing, number thing, which is 83 00:04:36,240 --> 00:04:39,279 Speaker 2: restore our actual ship to capability, reach out to the 84 00:04:39,320 --> 00:04:41,160 Speaker 2: Koreans for help and get this. 85 00:04:41,160 --> 00:04:44,760 Speaker 1: Fixed in the short run. Could we, in fact still 86 00:04:44,839 --> 00:04:48,000 Speaker 1: make it prohibitively expensive to come across the street. 87 00:04:48,680 --> 00:04:51,240 Speaker 2: We can't. That's the beauty right now. They couldn't, you know. 88 00:04:51,520 --> 00:04:55,600 Speaker 2: An admiral named Phil Davidson back in twenty twenty one said, hey, 89 00:04:56,120 --> 00:04:59,480 Speaker 2: China could execute this by twenty twenty seven. That's based 90 00:04:59,480 --> 00:05:01,080 Speaker 2: on I think we did. When I was at Indopay 91 00:05:01,120 --> 00:05:04,080 Speaker 2: Commons the J three, I would draw a line that said, 92 00:05:04,120 --> 00:05:08,200 Speaker 2: here's us capability was slightly with our allies slightly upslope 93 00:05:08,240 --> 00:05:10,799 Speaker 2: a little bit of slope game one or two percent 94 00:05:10,800 --> 00:05:14,240 Speaker 2: every year, and here's the Chinese capability to do the invasion. 95 00:05:14,240 --> 00:05:17,240 Speaker 2: It was exponential in crossing us in twenty twenty seven. 96 00:05:17,800 --> 00:05:21,400 Speaker 2: What Adam Davidson forgot to say was that this could 97 00:05:21,520 --> 00:05:24,200 Speaker 2: happen in twenty twenty seven unless we take action or 98 00:05:24,279 --> 00:05:26,720 Speaker 2: China fails to take action, and a number of things 99 00:05:26,760 --> 00:05:29,880 Speaker 2: that happens is twenty twenty one. Number one, Russia invade 100 00:05:30,040 --> 00:05:32,960 Speaker 2: Ukraine and we had a Holy Count moment on munitions, 101 00:05:32,960 --> 00:05:35,599 Speaker 2: which is one of our big shortfalls, not just in 102 00:05:35,720 --> 00:05:39,240 Speaker 2: ground stuff in Ukraine, anti ship stuff and anti air 103 00:05:39,240 --> 00:05:42,680 Speaker 2: stuff out in the Pacific. We've really been working on that. 104 00:05:43,240 --> 00:05:46,040 Speaker 2: Japan's gotten crazy, you know, they're doubling their defense budget 105 00:05:46,080 --> 00:05:48,000 Speaker 2: over about a five year period or four year period. 106 00:05:48,279 --> 00:05:50,400 Speaker 2: Taiwan's increased their defense spending and they're going to hit 107 00:05:50,440 --> 00:05:54,320 Speaker 2: three percent of GDP this year. Australia's increased their defense spending. 108 00:05:54,640 --> 00:05:57,400 Speaker 2: Philippines has gotten more integrated with US with the election 109 00:05:57,480 --> 00:06:01,640 Speaker 2: of Marcos Junior, and then most important, China screwed up 110 00:06:01,680 --> 00:06:04,840 Speaker 2: COVID response and as a result they've slowed, so we've 111 00:06:05,000 --> 00:06:09,000 Speaker 2: increased our upslope, they've decreased their exponential gain. If you 112 00:06:09,040 --> 00:06:12,360 Speaker 2: ask me, that intersection is now twenty thirty twenty thirty one, 113 00:06:12,480 --> 00:06:15,000 Speaker 2: and we keep pushing it. So, Sarah, there's a lot 114 00:06:15,040 --> 00:06:17,479 Speaker 2: we can do. And I'll say one last thing. I 115 00:06:17,520 --> 00:06:20,240 Speaker 2: wouldn't believe my son's a young officer at ENSIGN and 116 00:06:20,320 --> 00:06:22,520 Speaker 2: he selected a ship out of Japan. I would have 117 00:06:22,520 --> 00:06:24,880 Speaker 2: been counseling hard against that. If I thought that this 118 00:06:25,080 --> 00:06:25,680 Speaker 2: was a loser. 119 00:06:26,360 --> 00:06:27,920 Speaker 1: Somebody else would point out to me. By the way, 120 00:06:27,960 --> 00:06:31,159 Speaker 1: that the way the two Straits work north and south 121 00:06:31,200 --> 00:06:35,160 Speaker 1: of Taiwan, that it's actually really dangerous for the Chinese 122 00:06:35,200 --> 00:06:39,000 Speaker 1: communists to get west of Taiwan because they literally could 123 00:06:39,040 --> 00:06:41,720 Speaker 1: get cut off and not be capable of getting back. 124 00:06:42,839 --> 00:06:43,200 Speaker 1: That's right. 125 00:06:43,240 --> 00:06:45,320 Speaker 2: Once they get a lodgment. Let's say they get a 126 00:06:45,360 --> 00:06:48,320 Speaker 2: lodgment down south, which I think they'll get a lodgment, 127 00:06:48,839 --> 00:06:52,080 Speaker 2: They've got to keep logistically, you know, refreshing it. And 128 00:06:52,120 --> 00:06:54,800 Speaker 2: if there's something we're really good at, it's killing things 129 00:06:54,800 --> 00:06:57,440 Speaker 2: on the move. I mean, we have the best targeting 130 00:06:57,480 --> 00:07:00,320 Speaker 2: complex that we have long range missiles. If you have 131 00:07:00,320 --> 00:07:03,320 Speaker 2: a high value target like lots of logistics coming across, 132 00:07:03,600 --> 00:07:04,840 Speaker 2: you're going to be a lot of trouble. So that's 133 00:07:04,880 --> 00:07:07,520 Speaker 2: number one. Number two, they've got to get east of 134 00:07:07,560 --> 00:07:12,080 Speaker 2: Taiwan and keep our airpower away. That is hard. Our 135 00:07:12,160 --> 00:07:15,000 Speaker 2: air force is obviously the pre eminent air force in 136 00:07:15,040 --> 00:07:18,280 Speaker 2: the world. F thirty five has demonstrated over I Ran 137 00:07:18,640 --> 00:07:21,320 Speaker 2: twice in the last year and by us on many 138 00:07:21,320 --> 00:07:24,000 Speaker 2: occasions to be the pre eminent fighter in the world. 139 00:07:24,440 --> 00:07:27,240 Speaker 2: The B two's the preeminent bomber in the world. Those 140 00:07:27,280 --> 00:07:30,640 Speaker 2: PLA forces east of Taiwan, they're all going to go away, 141 00:07:30,920 --> 00:07:32,520 Speaker 2: and the question is how fast can we move them 142 00:07:32,560 --> 00:07:35,160 Speaker 2: back to get airpower. So this is a hard fight 143 00:07:35,200 --> 00:07:38,760 Speaker 2: for the Chinese, a military that now has zero people 144 00:07:38,960 --> 00:07:40,080 Speaker 2: that have served in combat. 145 00:07:40,440 --> 00:07:42,600 Speaker 1: That's the other thing, which is as the Russians learning 146 00:07:43,000 --> 00:07:45,720 Speaker 1: on their three day journey to Kiev, it turns out 147 00:07:45,760 --> 00:07:48,840 Speaker 1: if you've not done it, and you haven't practiced it, 148 00:07:48,840 --> 00:07:50,640 Speaker 1: it's really really hard. 149 00:07:51,760 --> 00:07:53,840 Speaker 2: You know, you're right, And in fact I was one 150 00:07:53,840 --> 00:07:55,760 Speaker 2: of the people they called. I'd been the US European 151 00:07:55,760 --> 00:07:58,640 Speaker 2: Command Deputy director for plans, so I spent a lot 152 00:07:58,640 --> 00:08:01,080 Speaker 2: of time in the Ukrainians. I was called in before 153 00:08:01,640 --> 00:08:04,080 Speaker 2: the invasion, and you know, I gave the wrong estimate 154 00:08:04,200 --> 00:08:06,000 Speaker 2: like everyone else. I said, the Russian army is going 155 00:08:06,040 --> 00:08:07,680 Speaker 2: to cut through them like a hot knife and butter. 156 00:08:08,480 --> 00:08:11,480 Speaker 2: What all of us failed to understand was they're no 157 00:08:11,520 --> 00:08:14,920 Speaker 2: longer a large scale maneuver army. They can't do logistics. 158 00:08:14,920 --> 00:08:17,760 Speaker 2: This is what we're great at. I mean, civilian lives 159 00:08:17,760 --> 00:08:21,800 Speaker 2: were great, Amazon, you know, ups FedEx. We're just really 160 00:08:21,800 --> 00:08:24,880 Speaker 2: good at logistics. Our problem, by the way, the military 161 00:08:24,920 --> 00:08:27,360 Speaker 2: is to last mile, Like how do I get round 162 00:08:27,480 --> 00:08:29,880 Speaker 2: to an infantryman on the front line that last couple 163 00:08:30,000 --> 00:08:32,680 Speaker 2: hundred yards to get it to them. The Russian problem 164 00:08:32,800 --> 00:08:36,040 Speaker 2: was the first mile is they left their bases, their fuel, 165 00:08:36,320 --> 00:08:40,040 Speaker 2: their communications, their food, their command and control. It also 166 00:08:40,120 --> 00:08:43,240 Speaker 2: cease to function and they ground to a halt halfway 167 00:08:43,280 --> 00:08:46,520 Speaker 2: to Kiev. That's an important lesson for us. We take 168 00:08:46,600 --> 00:08:49,640 Speaker 2: our logistics for granted, we can't do that. We have 169 00:08:49,679 --> 00:08:52,080 Speaker 2: to continue to invest in it and remind ourselves only 170 00:08:52,120 --> 00:08:56,200 Speaker 2: one country in the world can do large scale maneuver warfare, 171 00:08:56,320 --> 00:08:57,559 Speaker 2: and that's the United States. 172 00:08:57,760 --> 00:09:01,840 Speaker 1: Well, and frankly, as you move towards artificial intelligence and robotics, 173 00:09:02,360 --> 00:09:04,760 Speaker 1: we're going to have all sorts of solutions that are 174 00:09:04,760 --> 00:09:07,160 Speaker 1: going to revolutionize our capacity to do this stuff. 175 00:09:07,840 --> 00:09:11,360 Speaker 2: Yeah, add small modular reactors. When I was pay COMJ three, 176 00:09:11,440 --> 00:09:14,400 Speaker 2: ye this four thousand troops, five thousand troops spread over 177 00:09:14,480 --> 00:09:17,160 Speaker 2: a third of the world. You're trying to get them logistics. 178 00:09:17,200 --> 00:09:21,480 Speaker 2: It was a nightmare. And the biggest nightmare was fuel 179 00:09:22,360 --> 00:09:25,040 Speaker 2: getting fueled, not just the planes or ships, but to 180 00:09:25,120 --> 00:09:27,679 Speaker 2: equipment to ground. Here. I'm of the belief I've been 181 00:09:27,720 --> 00:09:29,560 Speaker 2: taking a lot of briefs from these guys who are 182 00:09:29,600 --> 00:09:33,280 Speaker 2: running one to five megawat small modular reactors. They're not 183 00:09:33,400 --> 00:09:35,600 Speaker 2: that far away, you know, and they're basically in a 184 00:09:35,600 --> 00:09:38,839 Speaker 2: Sierra Land container. I'm a nuclear engineer in the Navy. 185 00:09:38,880 --> 00:09:42,400 Speaker 2: I understand what inherently safe means. These are inherently safe 186 00:09:42,800 --> 00:09:45,400 Speaker 2: the way we cool the reactors and such. So I 187 00:09:45,480 --> 00:09:47,840 Speaker 2: feel very comfortable that that's going to be a long 188 00:09:47,920 --> 00:09:49,400 Speaker 2: term solution for the US military. 189 00:09:50,200 --> 00:09:52,440 Speaker 1: One of the things you've been focusing on is is 190 00:09:52,480 --> 00:09:58,280 Speaker 1: it possible with a cyber campaign to subdue Taiwan without 191 00:09:58,280 --> 00:10:01,319 Speaker 1: physical violence walks through that. I mean, I think that's 192 00:10:01,840 --> 00:10:03,480 Speaker 1: revolutionary and probably right. 193 00:10:04,120 --> 00:10:06,360 Speaker 2: The Taiwan leadership leaves. I have briefed this to both 194 00:10:06,600 --> 00:10:09,959 Speaker 2: former presidents I am current President Lie and his whole team. 195 00:10:10,240 --> 00:10:13,280 Speaker 2: They understand exactly what you just said, what I think 196 00:10:13,360 --> 00:10:15,720 Speaker 2: China's going to do. They could come to conclusion they 197 00:10:15,720 --> 00:10:18,040 Speaker 2: could not win across straight invasion, but also come to 198 00:10:18,080 --> 00:10:20,319 Speaker 2: the conclusion that we're not willing to fight it. If 199 00:10:20,360 --> 00:10:23,959 Speaker 2: either of those two happens, they will turn the riastat 200 00:10:24,040 --> 00:10:28,920 Speaker 2: on financial, energy, and communications critical infrastructure. So what I 201 00:10:28,960 --> 00:10:31,559 Speaker 2: mean by that is they will conduct nine cyber attacks 202 00:10:31,600 --> 00:10:34,240 Speaker 2: on them, so things like on the energy infrastructure, put 203 00:10:34,280 --> 00:10:38,400 Speaker 2: a missile closure area around the southern LNG port liquid 204 00:10:38,480 --> 00:10:41,760 Speaker 2: natural gas. Port liquid natural gas is fifty percent of 205 00:10:41,760 --> 00:10:45,280 Speaker 2: the Taiwan grid, and they have six days of excess 206 00:10:45,320 --> 00:10:48,360 Speaker 2: supply really stowage, and they get one LNG a day. 207 00:10:48,720 --> 00:10:50,679 Speaker 2: So if you stop the one lerg a day from coming, 208 00:10:50,920 --> 00:10:52,640 Speaker 2: and you can do it by a missile closure area, 209 00:10:53,120 --> 00:10:56,200 Speaker 2: you might call their largest distributor, Qatar. If you're trying 210 00:10:56,200 --> 00:10:59,360 Speaker 2: to and saying you give five percent to Taiwan that 211 00:10:59,400 --> 00:11:01,680 Speaker 2: you give to us, we think we should stop giving 212 00:11:01,720 --> 00:11:04,360 Speaker 2: a Taiwan. They just might you convince some of the 213 00:11:04,400 --> 00:11:07,320 Speaker 2: countries that have flagged these energy shipping don't go to 214 00:11:07,480 --> 00:11:08,679 Speaker 2: tow it. There's all kinds of things you can do 215 00:11:08,720 --> 00:11:11,800 Speaker 2: in there. In communications. You could drop an anchor when 216 00:11:11,840 --> 00:11:14,800 Speaker 2: that's happened more times than we can count now on 217 00:11:15,000 --> 00:11:18,320 Speaker 2: submarine cables, cables that produce ninety five percent of the 218 00:11:18,360 --> 00:11:21,319 Speaker 2: Internet flow in the world on these submerged cables. And 219 00:11:21,360 --> 00:11:23,800 Speaker 2: there's things you can do to bank stop payments from 220 00:11:23,960 --> 00:11:27,520 Speaker 2: mainland Chinese facilities to Taiwan and then lay on top 221 00:11:27,559 --> 00:11:30,000 Speaker 2: of it a cyber attack that hits the electrical grid. 222 00:11:30,360 --> 00:11:32,760 Speaker 2: One thing I'll say about in addition having that stowage 223 00:11:32,760 --> 00:11:37,520 Speaker 2: problem with LNG. The Taiwan grid operates at seventy eight 224 00:11:37,760 --> 00:11:42,240 Speaker 2: or seventy five percent capacity at all times. That's the highest. 225 00:11:42,320 --> 00:11:46,439 Speaker 2: OECD ours is like forty seven percent, and maybe California 226 00:11:46,480 --> 00:11:49,920 Speaker 2: is sixty percent because they're crazy, But those are inherently 227 00:11:50,360 --> 00:11:54,120 Speaker 2: fragile electrical power grids when you're operating above sixty percent, 228 00:11:54,360 --> 00:11:56,040 Speaker 2: and they're at seventy four percent, the most of an 229 00:11:56,080 --> 00:11:59,560 Speaker 2: OECD country, so they're very vulnerable to a cyber attack 230 00:11:59,679 --> 00:12:01,839 Speaker 2: on that grid. And there's cyber attacks you can do 231 00:12:01,880 --> 00:12:05,920 Speaker 2: on the financial services systems, on the communications networks. Will 232 00:12:05,960 --> 00:12:08,640 Speaker 2: Taiwan get access to starlink. There's gonna be a lot 233 00:12:08,640 --> 00:12:10,880 Speaker 2: of pressure on Elon Musk from the Chinese to not 234 00:12:10,920 --> 00:12:13,400 Speaker 2: allow that to happen. So there's all these factors in 235 00:12:13,440 --> 00:12:17,679 Speaker 2: there that give China opportunity. What we've got to do 236 00:12:17,800 --> 00:12:20,960 Speaker 2: is figure out, and we're running tabletops on this that say, look, 237 00:12:21,000 --> 00:12:23,480 Speaker 2: how do you prevent this, how do you mitigate it 238 00:12:23,480 --> 00:12:25,439 Speaker 2: when it starts to happen, and how do you respond 239 00:12:25,679 --> 00:12:28,560 Speaker 2: so you can recover really rapidly. If you can fix 240 00:12:28,600 --> 00:12:31,679 Speaker 2: all those things and demonstrate that to China ahead of time, 241 00:12:32,520 --> 00:12:35,000 Speaker 2: you then restore deterreents in this very hard area. 242 00:12:35,760 --> 00:12:39,800 Speaker 1: It seems to me that that's both a defensive cyber strategy 243 00:12:40,280 --> 00:12:44,440 Speaker 1: but the capacity for a very aggressive offensive cyber strategy, 244 00:12:44,520 --> 00:12:46,600 Speaker 1: which we really haven't demonstrated much of. 245 00:12:47,600 --> 00:12:49,120 Speaker 2: So you're absolutely right. I mean, one of the things 246 00:12:49,120 --> 00:12:51,120 Speaker 2: that is very interesting for US is that we have 247 00:12:51,240 --> 00:12:54,839 Speaker 2: not responded. We've allowed the level of acceptable activity by 248 00:12:54,880 --> 00:12:58,080 Speaker 2: the adversary. The adversary can be China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, 249 00:12:58,240 --> 00:13:02,400 Speaker 2: or criminal actors allowed the bar about which we'll respond 250 00:13:02,440 --> 00:13:05,280 Speaker 2: to be elevated over four or five administrations, so a 251 00:13:05,440 --> 00:13:07,840 Speaker 2: very high level. You know what the result of that 252 00:13:07,960 --> 00:13:10,680 Speaker 2: is new is that's why volt Typhoon happened. Vault Typhoon 253 00:13:11,320 --> 00:13:14,600 Speaker 2: was a Chinese advanced persistent threat. So a Chinese attack 254 00:13:14,679 --> 00:13:23,400 Speaker 2: team inserted malicious software into our rail, financial services, aviation ports, 255 00:13:23,480 --> 00:13:28,240 Speaker 2: all our critical infrastructures in Kuam, Hawaii, maybe the West coast. 256 00:13:28,400 --> 00:13:29,880 Speaker 2: They have a map in the US. I'm pretty sure 257 00:13:29,880 --> 00:13:32,840 Speaker 2: they hit everything and we get them a hat tip. 258 00:13:32,920 --> 00:13:35,920 Speaker 2: Let good move, boys. If they had done this with 259 00:13:36,040 --> 00:13:39,560 Speaker 2: a thousand backpacks with semtechs in it and put the 260 00:13:39,600 --> 00:13:42,760 Speaker 2: same kind of effective malware, you know, something that disrupts 261 00:13:42,800 --> 00:13:45,760 Speaker 2: this critical infrastructure in wartime with a note that said 262 00:13:45,800 --> 00:13:48,640 Speaker 2: courtesy to pla maybe a middle finger, we might be 263 00:13:48,679 --> 00:13:51,240 Speaker 2: a war but somehow, like I said in cyber space, 264 00:13:51,240 --> 00:13:53,360 Speaker 2: for like a good job, boys had tip. So we 265 00:13:53,400 --> 00:13:56,080 Speaker 2: have raised the bar for what we'll respond to to 266 00:13:56,120 --> 00:14:00,640 Speaker 2: an unacceptably high level. So we have not demonstrated are 267 00:14:01,200 --> 00:14:04,719 Speaker 2: cyber bona fides. People know we have good offensive capabilities. 268 00:14:05,120 --> 00:14:08,000 Speaker 2: They suspect we do things, but we haven't actually done 269 00:14:08,080 --> 00:14:24,800 Speaker 2: things to hold China accountable with it. 270 00:14:25,680 --> 00:14:28,480 Speaker 1: How much of that is the culture of the National 271 00:14:28,480 --> 00:14:31,080 Speaker 1: Security Agency in this whole sense of we don't want 272 00:14:31,120 --> 00:14:32,600 Speaker 1: people to know what we can really do, so we 273 00:14:32,640 --> 00:14:36,120 Speaker 1: never do what we can really do, or worse, Oh. 274 00:14:36,040 --> 00:14:37,760 Speaker 2: I've got this great tool and this great access I 275 00:14:37,760 --> 00:14:40,240 Speaker 2: don't want to burn it. You know. My answer to 276 00:14:40,240 --> 00:14:42,440 Speaker 2: that is, we pay you a lot of money billions, 277 00:14:42,840 --> 00:14:45,560 Speaker 2: have more tools, more accesses. By the way, that Chinese 278 00:14:45,560 --> 00:14:49,200 Speaker 2: don't appear to be constrained by that tools and accesses problem. 279 00:14:49,400 --> 00:14:52,040 Speaker 2: They're going crazy on our systems. And look, I know 280 00:14:52,120 --> 00:14:54,560 Speaker 2: we like to have a higher level of plausible deniability. 281 00:14:55,000 --> 00:14:57,440 Speaker 2: I get it. We have a higher attention to colateral 282 00:14:57,880 --> 00:15:01,720 Speaker 2: unexpected clateral damage. I get it. It's harder for democracies 283 00:15:01,760 --> 00:15:05,120 Speaker 2: to fight in this gray zone, but it's not impossible, 284 00:15:05,640 --> 00:15:07,240 Speaker 2: and we need to do a much better job at 285 00:15:07,240 --> 00:15:07,640 Speaker 2: it well. 286 00:15:07,640 --> 00:15:09,360 Speaker 1: And then frankly, we might like them to know that 287 00:15:09,400 --> 00:15:11,160 Speaker 1: we're doing it exactly. 288 00:15:11,520 --> 00:15:14,360 Speaker 2: I call that determs by demonstration. I think every once 289 00:15:14,400 --> 00:15:16,240 Speaker 2: in a while you get to pull one of the 290 00:15:16,280 --> 00:15:19,120 Speaker 2: monkey's out and beat them. You really have to demonstrate 291 00:15:19,520 --> 00:15:21,880 Speaker 2: that you have the capability to do something and a 292 00:15:21,920 --> 00:15:24,960 Speaker 2: willingness to use it. And this is what Mike Waltz said. 293 00:15:25,040 --> 00:15:27,200 Speaker 2: He's had a rough few months, but one of the 294 00:15:27,280 --> 00:15:29,800 Speaker 2: really smart things he said coming in is we need 295 00:15:29,800 --> 00:15:32,840 Speaker 2: to be more offensive in our reply. And I think 296 00:15:32,840 --> 00:15:35,480 Speaker 2: I would put offensive in both terms. I offend you 297 00:15:36,400 --> 00:15:38,720 Speaker 2: and I'm more offensive, and I think we really need 298 00:15:38,720 --> 00:15:40,760 Speaker 2: to do that, particularly to the Chinese. 299 00:15:41,160 --> 00:15:43,280 Speaker 1: Let me go back to Taiwan for a second. The 300 00:15:43,320 --> 00:15:47,600 Speaker 1: degree to which the entire planet relies on Taiwan for 301 00:15:47,680 --> 00:15:51,280 Speaker 1: computer chips is an astonishing vulnerability. 302 00:15:52,280 --> 00:15:54,040 Speaker 2: By the way, that's logic chips. If you go to 303 00:15:54,040 --> 00:15:57,240 Speaker 2: memory chips, they're all from Korea. So we're dependent on 304 00:15:57,280 --> 00:15:58,960 Speaker 2: a lot of our allies of partners. If I had 305 00:15:59,000 --> 00:16:01,440 Speaker 2: told you were dependent on the UK, for these, you'd 306 00:16:01,480 --> 00:16:04,280 Speaker 2: probably let it go. Now. Look, the UK is not 307 00:16:04,320 --> 00:16:08,280 Speaker 2: eighty kilometers from Russia. I get it. There's a lot 308 00:16:08,320 --> 00:16:11,200 Speaker 2: of reasons I like Taiwan. One that the one Chinese country. 309 00:16:11,200 --> 00:16:13,200 Speaker 2: I know that it's a democracy with a freedom of 310 00:16:13,200 --> 00:16:16,360 Speaker 2: the press, free elections, and a market based system, right. 311 00:16:16,600 --> 00:16:18,720 Speaker 2: And I think they're a great example in mainland China 312 00:16:18,840 --> 00:16:20,560 Speaker 2: that you could have done this. You chose not to. 313 00:16:21,200 --> 00:16:25,120 Speaker 2: But they're our partner. They really for all intentsive purposes 314 00:16:25,160 --> 00:16:26,760 Speaker 2: there an ally, I know we don't call them that. 315 00:16:27,160 --> 00:16:30,600 Speaker 2: For the Taiwan Relations Act established the conditions. I mean, 316 00:16:31,360 --> 00:16:33,000 Speaker 2: we've agreed to sell you the weapons you need to 317 00:16:33,000 --> 00:16:35,360 Speaker 2: defend yourself, and we've agreed to make a war plan 318 00:16:35,440 --> 00:16:38,240 Speaker 2: to come defend you. I know there's no Article five there, 319 00:16:38,320 --> 00:16:40,040 Speaker 2: although I'm not sure what an Article five is worth 320 00:16:40,080 --> 00:16:43,000 Speaker 2: it this exact second. But there's a level of partnership 321 00:16:43,000 --> 00:16:45,480 Speaker 2: in an alliance, so I try not to overreact to that. 322 00:16:45,840 --> 00:16:50,000 Speaker 2: I do think there's some things that should be home 323 00:16:50,080 --> 00:16:53,240 Speaker 2: shored or put in Canada or Mexico, you know, very 324 00:16:53,280 --> 00:16:57,040 Speaker 2: closely shored kind of USMCA shored, so that we can 325 00:16:57,600 --> 00:17:01,480 Speaker 2: have better guaranteed access to it. Time but it's not 326 00:17:01,640 --> 00:17:04,960 Speaker 2: all of Taiwan. It's a percentage of what Taiwan's doing. 327 00:17:05,600 --> 00:17:07,600 Speaker 2: And it would be too expensive that the Chips Act 328 00:17:07,800 --> 00:17:10,320 Speaker 2: might move three or four or five percent of our 329 00:17:10,359 --> 00:17:14,239 Speaker 2: alliance from Taiwan the United States maybe five percent. And 330 00:17:14,280 --> 00:17:17,280 Speaker 2: that was what fifty two billion plus several hundred billion 331 00:17:17,320 --> 00:17:18,960 Speaker 2: worth of company investment. 332 00:17:19,359 --> 00:17:21,800 Speaker 1: So they really are a sort of a world asset. 333 00:17:21,960 --> 00:17:24,160 Speaker 2: Yeah, smart country, right. 334 00:17:24,520 --> 00:17:26,320 Speaker 1: Do you think that was a conscious strategy. 335 00:17:26,840 --> 00:17:30,879 Speaker 2: Not initially. The conscious strategy was after the President on 336 00:17:30,960 --> 00:17:34,040 Speaker 2: occasion says something that's not quite right. He says, Taiwan 337 00:17:34,080 --> 00:17:39,119 Speaker 2: stole TSMC. They did not steal TSMC. Texas Instruments allowed 338 00:17:39,119 --> 00:17:42,760 Speaker 2: TSMC to go to Taiwan, went Morris. The team left 339 00:17:43,200 --> 00:17:45,639 Speaker 2: when they weren't being properly promoted and advocated for, in 340 00:17:45,680 --> 00:17:48,640 Speaker 2: their opinion, went to Taiwan. There's a book called Shipboard 341 00:17:48,680 --> 00:17:51,920 Speaker 2: is pretty good on it. Taiwan definitely created the conditions 342 00:17:51,960 --> 00:17:55,560 Speaker 2: for success for TSMC. Had a more legacy chip company 343 00:17:55,600 --> 00:17:59,399 Speaker 2: called UMC, and those companies have thrived. I would say 344 00:17:59,440 --> 00:18:03,199 Speaker 2: if you took a strict wto like microscope to it, 345 00:18:03,240 --> 00:18:05,520 Speaker 2: you wouldn't be happy with everything they did there. But 346 00:18:06,040 --> 00:18:09,240 Speaker 2: they created the conditions for success. I think somewhere around 347 00:18:09,240 --> 00:18:13,240 Speaker 2: two thousand and eight they started to realize, hey, this 348 00:18:13,320 --> 00:18:15,959 Speaker 2: is something that can become part of our security envelope, 349 00:18:16,240 --> 00:18:19,919 Speaker 2: and by twenty fifteen it was a security envelope. So 350 00:18:20,000 --> 00:18:22,639 Speaker 2: I think not the initial attention. Initial attention was make money. 351 00:18:23,400 --> 00:18:27,000 Speaker 2: The final intention was security coverage. 352 00:18:27,560 --> 00:18:30,240 Speaker 1: You did an article for National Interests March twenty first, 353 00:18:31,080 --> 00:18:34,800 Speaker 1: entitled to confront China, President Trump should target its state 354 00:18:34,880 --> 00:18:38,040 Speaker 1: owned enterprises. And I just noticed today that there's an 355 00:18:38,880 --> 00:18:42,760 Speaker 1: indication that in all of their tariff negotiations they're going 356 00:18:42,840 --> 00:18:47,280 Speaker 1: to have weakening the Chinese relationship as a function of 357 00:18:47,320 --> 00:18:50,719 Speaker 1: getting to an agreement. That apparently their strategy in part 358 00:18:51,000 --> 00:18:55,320 Speaker 1: is to methodically begin isolating China and breaking its trade relations. 359 00:18:55,960 --> 00:18:57,320 Speaker 1: Is this a rational approach? 360 00:18:58,200 --> 00:19:00,760 Speaker 2: That's pretty big. Look, I'm still from the school of 361 00:19:01,000 --> 00:19:04,960 Speaker 2: if by sneakers aren't made by weaker prisoners, I'll buy 362 00:19:04,960 --> 00:19:08,280 Speaker 2: them from China because they're a lot cheaper. But there's 363 00:19:08,320 --> 00:19:10,919 Speaker 2: a list of emerging technologies that we should not do 364 00:19:11,040 --> 00:19:14,120 Speaker 2: foreign direct investment in, do co production with, do joint 365 00:19:14,200 --> 00:19:18,320 Speaker 2: ventures with, or purchase for our critical infrastructure, our government, 366 00:19:18,359 --> 00:19:20,960 Speaker 2: or our military. And that list is getting longer. In fact, 367 00:19:21,000 --> 00:19:23,400 Speaker 2: my biggest problem up in Congress because I work every 368 00:19:23,480 --> 00:19:29,240 Speaker 2: year with legislation about drones or lied are or silicon carbide, 369 00:19:29,240 --> 00:19:31,720 Speaker 2: all kinds of different things that were TikTok and we're 370 00:19:31,720 --> 00:19:34,959 Speaker 2: trying to get ourselves off of. And most Congressmen, as 371 00:19:35,000 --> 00:19:36,840 Speaker 2: you know, they're good men and women. They want to 372 00:19:36,840 --> 00:19:38,800 Speaker 2: do the right thing. But more than one said to me, 373 00:19:38,960 --> 00:19:41,000 Speaker 2: how many more things are there? Mark, And I said, 374 00:19:41,040 --> 00:19:44,320 Speaker 2: it's unlimited. It's how many places of China get invest 375 00:19:44,400 --> 00:19:47,000 Speaker 2: is part of their twenty twenty five and twenty thirty 376 00:19:47,000 --> 00:19:49,120 Speaker 2: five plants. And I'll tell you one thing about China. 377 00:19:49,119 --> 00:19:51,240 Speaker 2: They lay it out maybe in Mandarin, and I have 378 00:19:51,240 --> 00:19:53,520 Speaker 2: to have somebody translated for me that they lay out 379 00:19:53,560 --> 00:19:55,080 Speaker 2: their plans and we're going to have to confront them 380 00:19:55,080 --> 00:19:57,760 Speaker 2: and all these emerging technologies. So the degree that the 381 00:19:57,760 --> 00:20:01,240 Speaker 2: White House targets the right emergent technology for that, that's 382 00:20:01,240 --> 00:20:03,600 Speaker 2: the right call. If they try to do everything everywhere, 383 00:20:03,640 --> 00:20:06,360 Speaker 2: all at once, I think that's going to be overly 384 00:20:06,400 --> 00:20:09,879 Speaker 2: prescriptive and really jam a lot of our partners and 385 00:20:09,920 --> 00:20:13,560 Speaker 2: allies throughout Asia. If we try to block all that trade. 386 00:20:13,960 --> 00:20:16,960 Speaker 1: How likely is it that our partners will just get 387 00:20:16,960 --> 00:20:19,159 Speaker 1: irritated enough with us so they'll decide China is a 388 00:20:19,160 --> 00:20:19,840 Speaker 1: better partner. 389 00:20:20,480 --> 00:20:23,680 Speaker 2: Right, that's a big step. Right, it's not the economic 390 00:20:23,720 --> 00:20:27,400 Speaker 2: step that hurts, right, because China's economic negotiations or we're 391 00:20:27,400 --> 00:20:29,119 Speaker 2: a big country, you're a small country. Now listen to 392 00:20:29,160 --> 00:20:31,679 Speaker 2: what's going to happen. Oh, we've only had one president 393 00:20:31,760 --> 00:20:33,119 Speaker 2: do that, and it's kind of good, you know. As 394 00:20:33,119 --> 00:20:35,800 Speaker 2: you can see, it's been stop and go. It's hard 395 00:20:35,800 --> 00:20:39,080 Speaker 2: for us to be that country. But in security, I 396 00:20:39,119 --> 00:20:44,520 Speaker 2: don't know that Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Singapore or 397 00:20:44,600 --> 00:20:48,320 Speaker 2: Australia are willing to make China their security partner choice. 398 00:20:48,400 --> 00:20:51,400 Speaker 2: I think that's too big a pitch, did it. Here's 399 00:20:51,440 --> 00:20:57,720 Speaker 2: who would though, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam. They've already got Cambodi, 400 00:20:57,760 --> 00:21:00,680 Speaker 2: Allaos and you know you can keep them. But those 401 00:21:00,760 --> 00:21:04,280 Speaker 2: last three. Take a look at what chevanje just visited. Right, 402 00:21:04,440 --> 00:21:06,879 Speaker 2: he just did bilateral meetings with each of them. And 403 00:21:06,960 --> 00:21:11,159 Speaker 2: I guarantee you he's saying, look how I act. I'm predictable. 404 00:21:11,600 --> 00:21:14,280 Speaker 2: You may not like everything I do, but I'm predictable. 405 00:21:15,000 --> 00:21:17,840 Speaker 2: Look how he acts. And that's a problem. 406 00:21:17,880 --> 00:21:21,640 Speaker 1: For US, it creates a sense of insecurity because it's 407 00:21:21,680 --> 00:21:22,959 Speaker 1: not predictable. 408 00:21:22,960 --> 00:21:23,879 Speaker 2: Particularly in Asia. 409 00:21:23,920 --> 00:21:41,320 Speaker 3: That's a problem. 410 00:21:41,520 --> 00:21:43,919 Speaker 1: Let me ask you about your most recent trips. On 411 00:21:43,960 --> 00:21:46,160 Speaker 1: the one side, you are on the edge of Russia, 412 00:21:46,560 --> 00:21:48,120 Speaker 1: and on the other side, you're one of the most 413 00:21:48,280 --> 00:21:51,560 Speaker 1: difficult security problems in the world. Talk about both of those. 414 00:21:51,600 --> 00:21:54,600 Speaker 1: What are your thoughts. You've just been there, sure, So. 415 00:21:54,600 --> 00:21:57,440 Speaker 2: First I went to Lithuania. It's tough. It's one of 416 00:21:57,480 --> 00:21:59,960 Speaker 2: these weird things. You go to Lithuania. Very few America 417 00:22:00,080 --> 00:22:02,640 Speaker 2: and no government people are showing up for like conferences. 418 00:22:03,000 --> 00:22:06,720 Speaker 2: Every administration has had the beginning illustration. It's especially being 419 00:22:06,800 --> 00:22:10,240 Speaker 2: enforced during this administration. Even generals and admirals, you know, 420 00:22:10,560 --> 00:22:13,399 Speaker 2: career people can't show up. So I'm there and the 421 00:22:13,440 --> 00:22:16,719 Speaker 2: Europeans were coming after me pretty hard on Panels. I said, hey, 422 00:22:16,760 --> 00:22:19,240 Speaker 2: wait a minute, let's be clear here. The problem you 423 00:22:19,240 --> 00:22:22,800 Speaker 2: have in Europe is you Eastern Europeans are committed to 424 00:22:22,800 --> 00:22:24,920 Speaker 2: your defense. You're doing exactly what Donald Trump said. There's 425 00:22:24,920 --> 00:22:27,040 Speaker 2: three bolts are all hitting four percent this year or 426 00:22:27,040 --> 00:22:29,119 Speaker 2: in the next twelve months, and five percent in the 427 00:22:29,160 --> 00:22:32,720 Speaker 2: next eighteen months. Poland's already at four point six percent 428 00:22:32,800 --> 00:22:37,400 Speaker 2: headed to five percent those four countries, you're fantastic, great commitment, 429 00:22:37,640 --> 00:22:41,080 Speaker 2: no GDP to have this based on then Germany and 430 00:22:41,119 --> 00:22:43,239 Speaker 2: they're there, the Germans, the Brits, and the French are there. 431 00:22:43,280 --> 00:22:46,120 Speaker 2: I'm like, you guys have all the GDP and you're 432 00:22:46,119 --> 00:22:48,800 Speaker 2: a solid one point five to two point one percent. 433 00:22:49,440 --> 00:22:52,520 Speaker 2: President Trump's right. I don't know if I call free loading, 434 00:22:53,000 --> 00:22:55,480 Speaker 2: but you have been overly reliant on us, and it's 435 00:22:55,520 --> 00:22:58,240 Speaker 2: time for you to spend three to four percent of 436 00:22:58,280 --> 00:23:00,960 Speaker 2: your defense on GDP. It's time, I'm for you to 437 00:23:01,000 --> 00:23:04,119 Speaker 2: stop making energy deals with the Russians. It's time for 438 00:23:04,200 --> 00:23:07,440 Speaker 2: you to decide do you consider Vladimir Putin a threat 439 00:23:07,800 --> 00:23:10,800 Speaker 2: if you do take the normal actions you would take 440 00:23:10,840 --> 00:23:13,200 Speaker 2: if there was a bully in your backyard, and don't 441 00:23:13,240 --> 00:23:15,040 Speaker 2: just have us point to the Eastern Europeans and say 442 00:23:15,040 --> 00:23:17,639 Speaker 2: they're doing it. Because most of those bolts, I think 443 00:23:17,680 --> 00:23:21,640 Speaker 2: their total GDP probably been that up much past ten billion, right, 444 00:23:21,720 --> 00:23:23,320 Speaker 2: I mean it's a little more than that, but not 445 00:23:23,400 --> 00:23:24,200 Speaker 2: much more a. 446 00:23:24,200 --> 00:23:27,080 Speaker 1: Large American county. 447 00:23:26,160 --> 00:23:28,880 Speaker 2: Yeah, exactly, And so we have that problem, and then 448 00:23:28,960 --> 00:23:30,960 Speaker 2: you have to be honest with them. Look, I don't 449 00:23:30,960 --> 00:23:33,680 Speaker 2: think it was just President Trump saying it in twenty seventeen, 450 00:23:34,200 --> 00:23:37,720 Speaker 2: Vladimir Putin's invasion of Crimea in twenty fourteen and his 451 00:23:37,920 --> 00:23:40,960 Speaker 2: invasion of ukraineing more broadly in twenty twenty two. It's 452 00:23:41,040 --> 00:23:44,000 Speaker 2: what's driving them up, and whatever it is, I don't care. 453 00:23:44,640 --> 00:23:47,719 Speaker 2: The Western Europeans have to match the Eastern Europeans, and 454 00:23:47,920 --> 00:23:50,520 Speaker 2: they need to do it quick, because there is a 455 00:23:50,520 --> 00:23:52,920 Speaker 2: anti European You can see it in those signal gait, 456 00:23:53,400 --> 00:23:58,000 Speaker 2: those signal texts. There's a strong anti European vibe among 457 00:23:58,119 --> 00:24:02,080 Speaker 2: some of the President's closest nationals purity advisors, not Mike Waltz, 458 00:24:02,119 --> 00:24:04,400 Speaker 2: but some of the other ones. That should really make 459 00:24:04,440 --> 00:24:06,480 Speaker 2: europe scared. When people say that in a text that 460 00:24:06,560 --> 00:24:09,560 Speaker 2: they think no one will read, that's probably what they believe. 461 00:24:10,119 --> 00:24:12,800 Speaker 2: And there's a strong anti European sentiment from both Vice 462 00:24:12,800 --> 00:24:16,000 Speaker 2: President Advance and Secretary Defense accents well. 463 00:24:16,000 --> 00:24:19,400 Speaker 1: And in a sense, all they're doing is acting al 464 00:24:19,440 --> 00:24:22,239 Speaker 1: what Trump has said publicly. I mean, the Europeans have 465 00:24:22,280 --> 00:24:23,240 Speaker 1: to get their act together. 466 00:24:24,000 --> 00:24:26,399 Speaker 2: I agree, and I think President Trump's more of an 467 00:24:26,400 --> 00:24:28,159 Speaker 2: opportunist than an isolationist. 468 00:24:28,840 --> 00:24:32,359 Speaker 1: Nothing he's done indicates isolationism. He has golf courses and 469 00:24:32,359 --> 00:24:36,560 Speaker 1: hotels across the planet. He's married to a European. His 470 00:24:36,720 --> 00:24:39,480 Speaker 1: mother came from Scotland. I think one of his sons 471 00:24:39,560 --> 00:24:42,120 Speaker 1: was in the Balkans looking at opening up a hotel. 472 00:24:42,600 --> 00:24:46,520 Speaker 1: But I think he's rapidly committed to America. 473 00:24:46,640 --> 00:24:49,920 Speaker 2: So I'm hoping that we're going to reduce our presence 474 00:24:49,960 --> 00:24:51,560 Speaker 2: in Europe, but I think we can do it in 475 00:24:51,560 --> 00:24:55,160 Speaker 2: a smart way. Before the Ukraine invasion, there was about 476 00:24:55,200 --> 00:24:58,760 Speaker 2: fifty five fifty thousand plus US troops spread throughout Europe 477 00:24:59,320 --> 00:25:02,359 Speaker 2: permanently there in Germany and Italy and uk I hope 478 00:25:02,359 --> 00:25:04,879 Speaker 2: we don't touch those because those are all enablers. They 479 00:25:04,880 --> 00:25:07,720 Speaker 2: would allow Americans to fight. They could be anywhere. They 480 00:25:07,760 --> 00:25:09,199 Speaker 2: help us fight in the Middle East, they help us 481 00:25:09,200 --> 00:25:11,280 Speaker 2: fight in Africa, they help us fight in Europe. Keep 482 00:25:11,280 --> 00:25:14,520 Speaker 2: them there. We then had about fifteen to twenty thousand 483 00:25:14,600 --> 00:25:17,680 Speaker 2: rotating through Poland because we liked what Poland's doing in 484 00:25:17,760 --> 00:25:20,720 Speaker 2: the Bolts, and then we added about fifteen to twenty 485 00:25:20,720 --> 00:25:24,440 Speaker 2: thousand to help the Ukrainian effort. I think their drawdown 486 00:25:24,480 --> 00:25:26,800 Speaker 2: should be of that third group, Hey draw that down. 487 00:25:26,880 --> 00:25:29,199 Speaker 2: If we're telling Europe, you take over this training mission, 488 00:25:29,520 --> 00:25:33,200 Speaker 2: you take over this logistics mission in a very measured way. 489 00:25:33,359 --> 00:25:36,639 Speaker 2: Where Europe comes in, we go out, We draw that force, 490 00:25:37,560 --> 00:25:40,719 Speaker 2: and I think leave yourself with the permanent forces that 491 00:25:40,840 --> 00:25:45,520 Speaker 2: enable we're fighting around the world from European logistics heads 492 00:25:46,000 --> 00:25:49,919 Speaker 2: and the forces that are in Eastern Europe that are 493 00:25:49,920 --> 00:25:52,119 Speaker 2: a real deterrent. I mean they're not at the Berlin Brigade. 494 00:25:52,119 --> 00:25:55,280 Speaker 2: They're more than that their division, but they're a real 495 00:25:55,320 --> 00:25:58,480 Speaker 2: deterrent to putin doing something that would be a bad 496 00:25:58,600 --> 00:26:01,199 Speaker 2: deal for if a Baltic state. According to Donald Trump's 497 00:26:01,200 --> 00:26:04,199 Speaker 2: current math, if a Baltic state or Poland is invaded, 498 00:26:04,240 --> 00:26:06,280 Speaker 2: he will defend them. He said, if you spend the 499 00:26:06,359 --> 00:26:08,639 Speaker 2: right amount of money on defention, you're the kind of 500 00:26:09,000 --> 00:26:11,399 Speaker 2: I like. Well, those are the kind of allies we like, 501 00:26:11,880 --> 00:26:14,200 Speaker 2: and they're the most likely to be invaded. We better 502 00:26:14,280 --> 00:26:17,440 Speaker 2: keep the deterred force here that says, hey, I'm serious, 503 00:26:17,480 --> 00:26:18,600 Speaker 2: don't do this, Vladimir. 504 00:26:18,960 --> 00:26:22,640 Speaker 1: From your perspective, can the Ukrainians continue to fight? 505 00:26:23,359 --> 00:26:25,600 Speaker 2: I didn't mention this before, but I go to Ukraine 506 00:26:25,800 --> 00:26:27,960 Speaker 2: every quarter or so every two quarters, then do some 507 00:26:28,040 --> 00:26:30,560 Speaker 2: training there with their senior officers for a couple of weeks. 508 00:26:31,000 --> 00:26:32,840 Speaker 2: So I have a pretty good perception of the look. 509 00:26:33,119 --> 00:26:35,359 Speaker 2: But I didn't command an army division or corps anything 510 00:26:35,400 --> 00:26:38,080 Speaker 2: like that. I'm a Navy officer, but I have a 511 00:26:38,080 --> 00:26:43,440 Speaker 2: good understanding of resilience, resilience and senior officers resilience, senior enlisted. 512 00:26:44,080 --> 00:26:47,760 Speaker 2: The Ukrainians are tough, they are not buckling. Solinski is 513 00:26:47,760 --> 00:26:51,360 Speaker 2: an outward He reflects his country in a way many 514 00:26:51,440 --> 00:26:53,840 Speaker 2: leaders don't. I mean, you know, he really does reflect with. 515 00:26:54,640 --> 00:26:57,879 Speaker 1: So, I mean, how long can putin withstand the scale 516 00:26:57,920 --> 00:27:00,600 Speaker 1: of sacrifices They have lost a while a lot of people. 517 00:27:00,880 --> 00:27:03,960 Speaker 2: That's the interesting thing. Who's resilience breaks first? Is it 518 00:27:04,040 --> 00:27:07,639 Speaker 2: the West, which now is really Europe? Is it the 519 00:27:07,720 --> 00:27:09,679 Speaker 2: Ukrainians and the Russians? I think the Russians are in 520 00:27:09,720 --> 00:27:12,080 Speaker 2: play on this. I mean, he's got a real problem there. 521 00:27:12,119 --> 00:27:14,159 Speaker 2: So here's what I'd say first to other questions. I 522 00:27:14,200 --> 00:27:18,040 Speaker 2: do want to say, the Europeans can provide the money. 523 00:27:18,119 --> 00:27:21,040 Speaker 2: The Ukraine needs to buy some European equipment and mostly 524 00:27:21,080 --> 00:27:23,240 Speaker 2: American equipment. It kind of bummed me up the other 525 00:27:23,359 --> 00:27:25,959 Speaker 2: night was Lesky said I need to buy patriots and 526 00:27:26,200 --> 00:27:29,320 Speaker 2: President Trump was dismissive. I'm like, sir, that's exactly what 527 00:27:29,359 --> 00:27:32,159 Speaker 2: you wanted to do. Take someone else's money, go to 528 00:27:32,359 --> 00:27:35,719 Speaker 2: Raytheon and buy fifteen million dollars worth of Raytheon stuff 529 00:27:35,880 --> 00:27:37,919 Speaker 2: and then go shoot it and a bad guy. I 530 00:27:37,960 --> 00:27:39,800 Speaker 2: think we can get to yes on that. As I said, 531 00:27:39,840 --> 00:27:41,840 Speaker 2: he's an opportunist. Let him come around on it. 532 00:27:42,240 --> 00:27:45,239 Speaker 1: My hunch is that they may be wrong, but I 533 00:27:45,280 --> 00:27:48,280 Speaker 1: think that he and Witkoff honestly believe they're on the 534 00:27:48,359 --> 00:27:48,960 Speaker 1: edge of a deal. 535 00:27:49,080 --> 00:27:50,520 Speaker 2: They're not. I think they're wrong. 536 00:27:50,800 --> 00:27:53,879 Speaker 1: Look, I'm with you. I'm very skeptical then reflecting what 537 00:27:53,960 --> 00:27:56,840 Speaker 1: I think. The reason I think they are so who 538 00:27:56,920 --> 00:28:00,560 Speaker 1: virtually soft on Putin is to say, look, you can 539 00:28:00,640 --> 00:28:02,240 Speaker 1: relax and agree to it. Sease far. 540 00:28:02,680 --> 00:28:04,199 Speaker 2: I think you're right, and I think you're right to 541 00:28:04,200 --> 00:28:06,359 Speaker 2: think that they might be misjudging Putin. And so to 542 00:28:06,359 --> 00:28:09,240 Speaker 2: get your other question, Putin's got this weird dynamic going 543 00:28:09,600 --> 00:28:13,239 Speaker 2: thirty five percent, maybe forty percent of his GDP is 544 00:28:13,240 --> 00:28:17,560 Speaker 2: fossil fuel sales. Fossil fuel price is cratered. Turned the tariffs, 545 00:28:17,720 --> 00:28:22,840 Speaker 2: Thank you, President Trump. MBS Manzaman and Opek have increased output, 546 00:28:22,920 --> 00:28:24,960 Speaker 2: you know, making it harder for Russian to sell. And 547 00:28:25,040 --> 00:28:26,920 Speaker 2: if we were to move in with a third element 548 00:28:27,080 --> 00:28:30,640 Speaker 2: and really really secondary section, the shadow fleet. That means 549 00:28:30,680 --> 00:28:35,159 Speaker 2: going after Chinese and Indian companies that are buying. His 550 00:28:35,280 --> 00:28:38,120 Speaker 2: ability to get that thirty five to forty percent will 551 00:28:38,120 --> 00:28:41,280 Speaker 2: be put in jeopardy. Here's the other crushing fact for him. 552 00:28:41,680 --> 00:28:44,480 Speaker 2: His federal budget's basically two things. Forty percent on defense, 553 00:28:45,120 --> 00:28:48,240 Speaker 2: sixty percent on Babushka, you know, buying off his base. 554 00:28:48,960 --> 00:28:51,600 Speaker 2: That's even a high percentage by American standard, right, And 555 00:28:51,640 --> 00:28:54,160 Speaker 2: so he's gonna have trouble if you reduce the amount 556 00:28:54,200 --> 00:28:57,200 Speaker 2: going in. He either has to decrease defense spending or 557 00:28:57,240 --> 00:29:00,160 Speaker 2: decrease support to his base. I don't think he's I'm 558 00:29:00,240 --> 00:29:03,280 Speaker 2: really excited about doing either of those. No politician would be, 559 00:29:03,560 --> 00:29:05,960 Speaker 2: but particularly Putent. So that's going to be a tough 560 00:29:06,000 --> 00:29:07,800 Speaker 2: thing for him. I guarantee you there'll be no critical 561 00:29:07,840 --> 00:29:11,720 Speaker 2: infrastructure work done in Russia for the next five years 562 00:29:11,760 --> 00:29:14,000 Speaker 2: because of the commitments they've done, and they have bad 563 00:29:14,040 --> 00:29:16,680 Speaker 2: critical structure of beginning. So yes, is he at risk? 564 00:29:16,760 --> 00:29:19,760 Speaker 2: I think so. But the other problem is he's an authoritarian. 565 00:29:20,240 --> 00:29:24,720 Speaker 2: He doesn't break until he fully disintegrates. Democracies break when 566 00:29:24,720 --> 00:29:27,840 Speaker 2: the people begin to lose faith in the leadership. And 567 00:29:27,880 --> 00:29:30,040 Speaker 2: that comes much earlier than the disintegration. 568 00:29:30,360 --> 00:29:32,600 Speaker 1: Yeah, I think that's right. Tell me just briefly about 569 00:29:32,640 --> 00:29:33,480 Speaker 1: your visit to Israel. 570 00:29:33,720 --> 00:29:36,360 Speaker 2: So i'd say, on Israel first, there's a war going 571 00:29:36,400 --> 00:29:38,440 Speaker 2: on in Gaza. It's not a small war, it's a 572 00:29:38,440 --> 00:29:41,880 Speaker 2: big war. And what's going on is Hammas still exists. 573 00:29:42,480 --> 00:29:45,200 Speaker 2: Israel has basically been told by everyone else, go get 574 00:29:45,320 --> 00:29:47,239 Speaker 2: rid of that problem. Now no one said it out 575 00:29:47,320 --> 00:29:49,880 Speaker 2: loud because they want to be able to criticize Israel privately, 576 00:29:50,360 --> 00:29:54,160 Speaker 2: except for the United States. But the Saudis, the uae Qatar, 577 00:29:54,240 --> 00:29:58,000 Speaker 2: whoever's going to pay to rebuild and finance whatever becomes 578 00:29:58,040 --> 00:30:02,360 Speaker 2: of Gaza, they need him cleared out. The Egyptians who 579 00:30:02,360 --> 00:30:03,960 Speaker 2: are going to provide the security, and I use that 580 00:30:04,040 --> 00:30:06,360 Speaker 2: term loosely with the Egyptians are not going to be 581 00:30:06,400 --> 00:30:10,800 Speaker 2: able to defeat Hamas, So they need Hamas really disarmed 582 00:30:10,800 --> 00:30:13,320 Speaker 2: and defeated to the greatest degree possible when they enter 583 00:30:13,400 --> 00:30:16,520 Speaker 2: to provide security. Who's going to have to do that, Israel. 584 00:30:17,200 --> 00:30:20,360 Speaker 2: This isn't the sacrifice of those hostages. The hostages who 585 00:30:20,440 --> 00:30:22,800 Speaker 2: are going to be killed because they're strapped to high 586 00:30:22,880 --> 00:30:26,160 Speaker 2: value targets. And whether israelis target them, or they're just 587 00:30:26,200 --> 00:30:28,920 Speaker 2: in the wrong place at the wrong time, or they're executed. 588 00:30:29,240 --> 00:30:31,960 Speaker 2: I feel very uncomfortable for the remaining hostages. But this 589 00:30:32,000 --> 00:30:34,400 Speaker 2: is a hard deal. We're eighteen months into this almost 590 00:30:34,720 --> 00:30:37,000 Speaker 2: They've got to take care of business and they've got 591 00:30:37,040 --> 00:30:39,240 Speaker 2: to destroy these and so what I saw was armor, 592 00:30:39,840 --> 00:30:44,520 Speaker 2: heavy small arms fire and then significant air power being applied. 593 00:30:45,160 --> 00:30:47,840 Speaker 2: And the big lesson for Israel here is they better 594 00:30:47,880 --> 00:30:51,400 Speaker 2: have munitions orders with the United States. Donald Trump is 595 00:30:51,400 --> 00:30:53,640 Speaker 2: an open store to them, which they should take full 596 00:30:53,680 --> 00:30:56,520 Speaker 2: advantage of. And I've been telling them, slow down on 597 00:30:56,800 --> 00:30:59,920 Speaker 2: building your own defense industrial base right now by munition, 598 00:31:00,280 --> 00:31:03,520 Speaker 2: buy munitions, Buy munitions now, because they need to buy 599 00:31:03,560 --> 00:31:07,040 Speaker 2: two thousand, five hundred pounders tank rounds, hundred twenty million 600 00:31:07,400 --> 00:31:09,520 Speaker 2: artillery rounds to be ready for their next flight, and 601 00:31:09,520 --> 00:31:11,880 Speaker 2: they need to buy arrow. Here's the last thing I'll 602 00:31:11,880 --> 00:31:14,600 Speaker 2: tell you. The Israelis have always told me for twenty years. 603 00:31:14,720 --> 00:31:16,600 Speaker 2: They always said, we never want US troops on our 604 00:31:16,600 --> 00:31:19,480 Speaker 2: soil defending US. You know what they have today, US 605 00:31:19,560 --> 00:31:23,400 Speaker 2: troops manning THAD batteries, shooting down Huti weapons and preparing 606 00:31:23,440 --> 00:31:26,960 Speaker 2: to shoot down Iranian weapons. And they need them because 607 00:31:26,960 --> 00:31:29,120 Speaker 2: they're low on arrow is my guests. I mean, otherwise 608 00:31:29,120 --> 00:31:31,000 Speaker 2: they have never let this happen. So they need to 609 00:31:31,000 --> 00:31:34,040 Speaker 2: build arrow. These guys need to buy munitions like drunken 610 00:31:34,080 --> 00:31:37,880 Speaker 2: sailors for four solid years, and we need to be 611 00:31:38,120 --> 00:31:39,800 Speaker 2: the munitions factory that does it for them. 612 00:31:40,280 --> 00:31:43,680 Speaker 1: When you have a people's war in an urban area, 613 00:31:43,720 --> 00:31:45,480 Speaker 1: how do you actually destroy Hamas? 614 00:31:46,320 --> 00:31:49,840 Speaker 2: I think it's destroy and disarmed as much as possible. 615 00:31:50,440 --> 00:31:52,080 Speaker 2: At some point you got to get into the Egyptians 616 00:31:52,480 --> 00:31:55,920 Speaker 2: and then destroy the whole tunnel network. And I got 617 00:31:55,920 --> 00:31:57,720 Speaker 2: to tell you the Egyptians when their own security is 618 00:31:57,760 --> 00:32:00,080 Speaker 2: in there, I hope they have the good graces all 619 00:32:00,200 --> 00:32:03,320 Speaker 2: Hamas to build a tunnel network to Egypt, which despite 620 00:32:03,400 --> 00:32:05,840 Speaker 2: US giving them one point three billion a year for 621 00:32:06,040 --> 00:32:11,560 Speaker 2: three decades, they allowed Hamas to build a underground network 622 00:32:11,600 --> 00:32:13,440 Speaker 2: that allowed all those terrorists to go out and get 623 00:32:13,440 --> 00:32:17,320 Speaker 2: trained in Iran and elsewhere in Turkey and other places. 624 00:32:17,720 --> 00:32:20,520 Speaker 2: I mean, this is insane. The Egyptians need as much 625 00:32:20,560 --> 00:32:22,040 Speaker 2: help as they can get. I don't think they're a 626 00:32:22,040 --> 00:32:22,760 Speaker 2: competent army. 627 00:32:23,520 --> 00:32:25,200 Speaker 1: What do you think happens with Iram? 628 00:32:25,440 --> 00:32:28,400 Speaker 2: Look, if I were president, I would actually impose costs 629 00:32:28,400 --> 00:32:30,200 Speaker 2: of them right now, for the UTIs Houtas are still 630 00:32:30,200 --> 00:32:31,880 Speaker 2: shooting weapons. By the way, at our ships. 631 00:32:32,120 --> 00:32:34,200 Speaker 1: You're not going to bomb the Houfis into submission. 632 00:32:34,240 --> 00:32:38,479 Speaker 2: They'll find another ragged vedouin area. They'll keep moving. What 633 00:32:38,520 --> 00:32:41,520 Speaker 2: you need to do is hold their primary sponsor accountable, 634 00:32:41,520 --> 00:32:43,080 Speaker 2: a person who provides them with a lot of their 635 00:32:43,080 --> 00:32:45,400 Speaker 2: equipment and a lot of their money, and that's Iran. 636 00:32:45,480 --> 00:32:48,280 Speaker 2: We should strike the Irani import that they ship from 637 00:32:48,560 --> 00:32:52,040 Speaker 2: Iranian production facilities that the Israelis didn't strike because they 638 00:32:52,040 --> 00:32:54,120 Speaker 2: struck a lot of them, and one or two they're 639 00:32:54,120 --> 00:32:56,760 Speaker 2: spy ships. And we can do this. I won't say 640 00:32:56,760 --> 00:33:01,120 Speaker 2: cost free. Every combat sortie has risk, but it's pretty 641 00:33:01,120 --> 00:33:03,200 Speaker 2: clear to me now that Elon Musk was not right 642 00:33:03,200 --> 00:33:05,800 Speaker 2: about the F thirty five. It can destroy the fourth 643 00:33:05,920 --> 00:33:09,200 Speaker 2: largest air defense system in the world without laws. So 644 00:33:09,280 --> 00:33:11,720 Speaker 2: we can do this mission with Bee Jesus and do that. 645 00:33:11,760 --> 00:33:14,080 Speaker 2: I'm not talking about the full nuclear mission. I give 646 00:33:14,120 --> 00:33:17,000 Speaker 2: you a hard destructive mission that says, hey boys, the 647 00:33:17,120 --> 00:33:19,880 Speaker 2: US is in. After seventeen years of saying we might 648 00:33:19,920 --> 00:33:23,840 Speaker 2: bomb you, we actually bombed you. When Steve Woodcoff shows up, 649 00:33:24,040 --> 00:33:25,800 Speaker 2: we want to see a lot of grace and if 650 00:33:25,840 --> 00:33:28,320 Speaker 2: we don't see it. We'll talk to our IDF friends 651 00:33:28,680 --> 00:33:30,840 Speaker 2: and we'll come visit you again, and this time we'll 652 00:33:30,840 --> 00:33:33,600 Speaker 2: bring B two's and we'll take care of your nuclear enterprise. 653 00:33:34,040 --> 00:33:36,480 Speaker 2: To me, that's the long term solution here. Start with 654 00:33:36,520 --> 00:33:39,200 Speaker 2: a strike that says we're freaking serious. See where it 655 00:33:39,240 --> 00:33:42,160 Speaker 2: goes diplomatically. If it doesn't work, then solve it militarily. 656 00:33:43,080 --> 00:33:46,040 Speaker 1: If you were advising Trump, would you say that at 657 00:33:46,040 --> 00:33:50,120 Speaker 1: some point, if Putin continues to target civilians, that we 658 00:33:50,240 --> 00:33:53,600 Speaker 1: have to pretty dramatically raise the cost for him. Yep. 659 00:33:53,680 --> 00:33:55,960 Speaker 2: What I would do is sell them attack, give them 660 00:33:56,200 --> 00:34:00,360 Speaker 2: attack and some PDA our long ring strike weapons them. 661 00:34:00,520 --> 00:34:02,560 Speaker 2: The first ones we gave them President Biden didn't give 662 00:34:02,560 --> 00:34:05,920 Speaker 2: them the good targeting data and didn't give them permissions. 663 00:34:06,280 --> 00:34:08,799 Speaker 2: So they now have good targeting data, and I have 664 00:34:08,800 --> 00:34:12,080 Speaker 2: permissions to strike inside Russia. Give them more. Attack thems 665 00:34:12,120 --> 00:34:15,160 Speaker 2: and we have lots of them. Give them some. Tell 666 00:34:15,200 --> 00:34:18,799 Speaker 2: them you can't strike civilian targets, strike legitimate military and 667 00:34:18,880 --> 00:34:23,600 Speaker 2: military service and critical infstructure targets. Only our attackers are accurate, 668 00:34:24,120 --> 00:34:26,560 Speaker 2: and they'll have a successful attack. And you tell Trump 669 00:34:26,760 --> 00:34:29,000 Speaker 2: putting you in it. Hey, the next attack they get attack, 670 00:34:29,320 --> 00:34:31,680 Speaker 2: attack happens, you give attack them and you say we 671 00:34:31,719 --> 00:34:33,640 Speaker 2: gave attackers. By the way, enjoy. 672 00:34:34,520 --> 00:34:37,879 Speaker 1: Right, got it? That's great. You're always remarkable, and Mark, 673 00:34:37,960 --> 00:34:39,879 Speaker 1: I want to thank you for joining me. I want 674 00:34:39,880 --> 00:34:42,560 Speaker 1: to let our listeners know they can find more about 675 00:34:42,600 --> 00:34:45,759 Speaker 1: the work you're doing by visiting your website for the 676 00:34:45,800 --> 00:34:50,160 Speaker 1: Foundation for Defensive Democracies at FDD dot org. And I 677 00:34:50,200 --> 00:34:52,040 Speaker 1: really appreciate you taking time to be with us. 678 00:34:52,320 --> 00:34:53,640 Speaker 2: Hey, thank you for having me, Sarah. It was a 679 00:34:53,680 --> 00:34:54,200 Speaker 2: real pleasure. 680 00:34:59,120 --> 00:35:01,640 Speaker 1: Thank you to my guests. Admiral Mark Montgomery. You can 681 00:35:01,640 --> 00:35:05,040 Speaker 1: get a link to Foundation for Defensive Democracies on our 682 00:35:05,120 --> 00:35:08,600 Speaker 1: show page at newtsworld dot com. Newtsworld is produced by 683 00:35:08,600 --> 00:35:13,160 Speaker 1: Gingwid three sixty and iHeartMedia. Our executive producer is Guarnsey Sloan. 684 00:35:13,560 --> 00:35:16,920 Speaker 1: Our researcher is Rachel Peterson. The artwork for the show 685 00:35:17,280 --> 00:35:20,080 Speaker 1: was created by Steve Penley. Special thanks to the team 686 00:35:20,120 --> 00:35:23,319 Speaker 1: at Ginwich three sixty. If you've been enjoying Newtsworld, I 687 00:35:23,360 --> 00:35:25,880 Speaker 1: hope you'll go to Apple Podcast and both rate us 688 00:35:25,920 --> 00:35:28,840 Speaker 1: with five stars and give us a review so others 689 00:35:28,840 --> 00:35:31,759 Speaker 1: can learn what it's all about. Right now, listeners of 690 00:35:31,840 --> 00:35:35,480 Speaker 1: Newtsworld can sign up for my three freeweekly columns at 691 00:35:35,480 --> 00:35:39,360 Speaker 1: gingwidstree sixty dot com slash newsletter. I'm Newt Gingrich. This 692 00:35:39,560 --> 00:35:40,279 Speaker 1: is Newtsworld.