1 00:00:03,120 --> 00:00:12,640 Speaker 1: Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News. 2 00:00:20,040 --> 00:00:23,639 Speaker 2: Hello and welcome to another episode of The Odd Lots Podcast. 3 00:00:23,720 --> 00:00:26,119 Speaker 3: I'm Joe Wisenthal and I'm Tracy Alloway. 4 00:00:26,320 --> 00:00:29,200 Speaker 2: Tracy, we talk about investing all the time on the show. 5 00:00:29,320 --> 00:00:33,000 Speaker 2: We talk about private credit, we talk about hedge funds, 6 00:00:33,080 --> 00:00:35,760 Speaker 2: we talk about the market itself. But you know, there 7 00:00:35,800 --> 00:00:40,040 Speaker 2: are like a few of these gigantic institutional players out there. 8 00:00:40,240 --> 00:00:42,959 Speaker 2: One of them is insurance that like just don't get 9 00:00:42,960 --> 00:00:44,040 Speaker 2: a lot of attention. 10 00:00:43,920 --> 00:00:47,000 Speaker 3: These huge pools of capital. Yeah, you're right. 11 00:00:47,320 --> 00:00:49,760 Speaker 2: So you know we've talked about we want to talk 12 00:00:49,840 --> 00:00:54,480 Speaker 2: about insurance more, should probably talk about family offices more. Yeah, 13 00:00:54,920 --> 00:00:57,200 Speaker 2: Like that's this whole world that I don't think we've 14 00:00:57,200 --> 00:01:00,520 Speaker 2: ever really explored, but just this massive and booming source 15 00:01:00,560 --> 00:01:02,160 Speaker 2: of capital. Like what the deal is with those? 16 00:01:02,520 --> 00:01:04,960 Speaker 3: Yeah? I remember right around the time that I left 17 00:01:05,000 --> 00:01:08,000 Speaker 3: Hong Kong that was such a big story, especially in Singapore, 18 00:01:08,080 --> 00:01:12,920 Speaker 3: everyone opening family offices. But there's another category of massive 19 00:01:12,959 --> 00:01:15,240 Speaker 3: pools of capital that we need to talk. 20 00:01:15,080 --> 00:01:18,920 Speaker 2: About absolutely, and that one, of course is endowments. They're 21 00:01:19,000 --> 00:01:21,840 Speaker 2: huge and they have you know, they're distinct, they're distinct 22 00:01:21,840 --> 00:01:25,520 Speaker 2: from banks, they're distinct from insurance companies, they have their 23 00:01:25,560 --> 00:01:28,440 Speaker 2: own funding needs and their own funding profiles and the 24 00:01:28,440 --> 00:01:32,160 Speaker 2: schedules with which they need to withdraw and disburse their money. 25 00:01:32,880 --> 00:01:34,800 Speaker 2: And if you're a hedge fund, or if you're anyone 26 00:01:34,800 --> 00:01:37,240 Speaker 2: else looking for money for your investment, at the end 27 00:01:37,280 --> 00:01:39,520 Speaker 2: of the line, there's a good chance that, like, at 28 00:01:39,560 --> 00:01:41,720 Speaker 2: some point, you're going to be knocking on the door 29 00:01:41,840 --> 00:01:42,920 Speaker 2: of a really big endowment. 30 00:01:43,240 --> 00:01:46,720 Speaker 3: Yeah, So I'm really interested in kind of how that 31 00:01:46,800 --> 00:01:50,920 Speaker 3: became a thing, because, of course, university endowments nowadays are 32 00:01:50,960 --> 00:01:55,080 Speaker 3: known for making investments in things like private equity and 33 00:01:55,160 --> 00:01:58,040 Speaker 3: hedge funds and stuff like that, and I'm curious how 34 00:01:58,120 --> 00:02:01,400 Speaker 3: all of that began, and then obviously how it's been 35 00:02:01,440 --> 00:02:02,240 Speaker 3: working out. 36 00:02:02,480 --> 00:02:05,560 Speaker 2: So, you know what another cool thing, Tracy is, at 37 00:02:05,680 --> 00:02:09,720 Speaker 2: least when it comes to university endowments. I believe the 38 00:02:09,800 --> 00:02:12,600 Speaker 2: endowment of my alma mater, University of Texas, is on 39 00:02:12,639 --> 00:02:14,679 Speaker 2: that I knew that was k Yeah, is on the 40 00:02:14,760 --> 00:02:18,080 Speaker 2: verge of becoming the biggest university endowment in the country. 41 00:02:18,240 --> 00:02:21,600 Speaker 3: Right, So for years, Harvard was the biggest, right, but 42 00:02:21,680 --> 00:02:25,200 Speaker 3: it looks like it might be superseded by Joe's College. 43 00:02:25,320 --> 00:02:28,960 Speaker 3: Congratulations Joe, thank you have you been donating? Is this 44 00:02:29,040 --> 00:02:30,400 Speaker 3: all you can. 45 00:02:30,280 --> 00:02:33,760 Speaker 2: I say, I don't. I've never donated. They have so 46 00:02:33,840 --> 00:02:37,320 Speaker 2: much money already, they don't need my donation. I probably should. 47 00:02:37,840 --> 00:02:40,120 Speaker 2: I don't want to talk about how I avoid the 48 00:02:40,160 --> 00:02:42,880 Speaker 2: calls from my university, and I don't know, I feel 49 00:02:42,880 --> 00:02:43,680 Speaker 2: a little bad about it. 50 00:02:43,720 --> 00:02:46,560 Speaker 3: I think in this case, well we'll get into why, 51 00:02:46,600 --> 00:02:49,560 Speaker 3: but maybe it's okay not to donate. Well we'll talk. 52 00:02:50,200 --> 00:02:51,560 Speaker 2: I don't really want to talk about it. I don't 53 00:02:51,560 --> 00:02:53,799 Speaker 2: really you know, And even talking about how big UT 54 00:02:54,080 --> 00:02:57,279 Speaker 2: is versus I think there's actually like twenty two universities 55 00:02:57,440 --> 00:03:01,360 Speaker 2: or something served by the Texas Endowment and other things. 56 00:03:01,360 --> 00:03:03,280 Speaker 2: So I don't even know if it's a true apples 57 00:03:03,280 --> 00:03:07,160 Speaker 2: to Apple's comparison, because you know, the student body of 58 00:03:07,360 --> 00:03:11,200 Speaker 2: Texas is so jiganting. Nonetheless, if we're just looking at, Okay, 59 00:03:11,240 --> 00:03:14,560 Speaker 2: which university endowment is the biggest, at least currently, there's 60 00:03:14,560 --> 00:03:16,440 Speaker 2: a very good chance it looks like the Texas could 61 00:03:16,480 --> 00:03:18,880 Speaker 2: eclipse Harvard on that front. So we got to understand 62 00:03:18,919 --> 00:03:21,400 Speaker 2: what's going on more in endowment world. And then the 63 00:03:21,440 --> 00:03:23,320 Speaker 2: other thing is not just that Texas has grown and 64 00:03:23,320 --> 00:03:25,160 Speaker 2: that's great and I love to see it, but that 65 00:03:25,280 --> 00:03:29,360 Speaker 2: Harvard's performance has been a little bit mediocre in recent years, 66 00:03:29,480 --> 00:03:32,240 Speaker 2: even compared to just other ivs, the rest of which 67 00:03:32,720 --> 00:03:35,720 Speaker 2: sort of smaller. The Yale Endowment is sort of famous, 68 00:03:36,080 --> 00:03:39,000 Speaker 2: actually not necessarily due to its size, but because of 69 00:03:39,040 --> 00:03:43,080 Speaker 2: its longtime manager's approach to endowment investing. So we got 70 00:03:43,120 --> 00:03:45,480 Speaker 2: to learn more about what's going on with Harvard and 71 00:03:45,520 --> 00:03:49,280 Speaker 2: what's how these big institutional pools of capital, how they're performing, 72 00:03:49,280 --> 00:03:49,920 Speaker 2: and what they're doing. 73 00:03:50,040 --> 00:03:53,200 Speaker 3: Yeah, it is kind of funny that the Harvard Endowment, 74 00:03:53,360 --> 00:03:57,160 Speaker 3: which presumably employs a lot of highly paid smart people. 75 00:03:57,280 --> 00:03:59,880 Speaker 3: I think it was up about nine point six percent 76 00:04:00,080 --> 00:04:03,680 Speaker 3: in twenty twenty four, that's the preliminary fiscal year. But 77 00:04:03,800 --> 00:04:06,480 Speaker 3: of course the S and P five hundred is like 78 00:04:06,840 --> 00:04:11,120 Speaker 3: twenty two percent so far. So yeah, what's going on? 79 00:04:11,280 --> 00:04:13,440 Speaker 2: Just hy spy. No, like people will say, oh, you 80 00:04:13,440 --> 00:04:16,320 Speaker 2: can't really compare. People love to say people love to 81 00:04:16,360 --> 00:04:18,360 Speaker 2: say you can't compare things. Oh you can't compare hedge 82 00:04:18,360 --> 00:04:20,800 Speaker 2: funds return to the SMP. You can't compare an endowment 83 00:04:20,880 --> 00:04:23,800 Speaker 2: funds return to the SMB. Maybe that's true. I don't 84 00:04:23,839 --> 00:04:26,080 Speaker 2: totally get why anyway, should we learn more? 85 00:04:26,279 --> 00:04:26,840 Speaker 3: Let's do it. 86 00:04:26,920 --> 00:04:28,839 Speaker 2: Well, I'm really excited to say we do have the 87 00:04:28,880 --> 00:04:31,360 Speaker 2: perfect guest someone here at Bloomberg who I've wanted to 88 00:04:31,400 --> 00:04:34,160 Speaker 2: speak to on the podcast for a long time. We're 89 00:04:34,160 --> 00:04:37,320 Speaker 2: going to be speaking with Janet Lauren, higher education finance 90 00:04:37,360 --> 00:04:39,560 Speaker 2: reporter for Bloomberg. Janet, thank you so much for coming 91 00:04:39,560 --> 00:04:40,200 Speaker 2: on odd Laws. 92 00:04:40,360 --> 00:04:41,240 Speaker 4: Thanks for having me. 93 00:04:41,480 --> 00:04:43,679 Speaker 2: How do you get to be the higher ed finance 94 00:04:43,720 --> 00:04:47,279 Speaker 2: reporter of Bloomberg? And also, it's like we just have one, Like, 95 00:04:47,360 --> 00:04:49,880 Speaker 2: what's the deal there? These institutions are so important. We 96 00:04:49,880 --> 00:04:53,240 Speaker 2: probably have, you know, twenty people covering hedge funds. We 97 00:04:53,360 --> 00:04:55,560 Speaker 2: just have a higher education finance reporter. 98 00:04:55,880 --> 00:04:59,039 Speaker 4: Well, I've been writing about university finances for almost seventeen 99 00:04:59,120 --> 00:05:02,080 Speaker 4: years here at Bloomberg. And it's not just endowments, but 100 00:05:02,160 --> 00:05:04,360 Speaker 4: I used to write a lot about student loans back 101 00:05:04,360 --> 00:05:07,560 Speaker 4: when they were only about a trillion dollars in outstanding 102 00:05:07,600 --> 00:05:12,200 Speaker 4: debt and college admissions and endowments, and it's just a 103 00:05:12,240 --> 00:05:14,880 Speaker 4: fun job and there's a lot of money involved, and 104 00:05:14,880 --> 00:05:17,520 Speaker 4: there's a lot of nuance that most people have no 105 00:05:17,600 --> 00:05:21,000 Speaker 4: idea about. And it's thrilled to talk about Harvard as 106 00:05:21,000 --> 00:05:23,520 Speaker 4: well as the University of Texas. It has an amazing story. 107 00:05:24,279 --> 00:05:26,719 Speaker 3: Okay, so talk to us a little bit more about 108 00:05:26,760 --> 00:05:30,200 Speaker 3: how significant the space is, Like, how much money are 109 00:05:30,200 --> 00:05:31,600 Speaker 3: we actually talking about? 110 00:05:31,880 --> 00:05:33,719 Speaker 4: Off the top of my head, I mean, we're talking 111 00:05:33,720 --> 00:05:37,560 Speaker 4: about several hundred billion dollars the universe is. You know, 112 00:05:37,600 --> 00:05:41,080 Speaker 4: there aren't too many college endowments that have over a billion. 113 00:05:41,600 --> 00:05:44,800 Speaker 4: Maybe it's around fifty. I can get you the exact number, 114 00:05:45,160 --> 00:05:48,400 Speaker 4: but there certainly aren't that many the size of Harvard 115 00:05:48,560 --> 00:05:53,120 Speaker 4: and Yale and the University of Texas and Harvard, I 116 00:05:53,160 --> 00:05:57,000 Speaker 4: included many stories. Is the oldest and richest university. You know, 117 00:05:57,040 --> 00:05:59,280 Speaker 4: it goes back to the sixteen hundreds, and Harvard was 118 00:05:59,320 --> 00:06:04,160 Speaker 4: actually found, you know, through a donation and as you know, donors, alumni, 119 00:06:04,640 --> 00:06:07,960 Speaker 4: rich people in Boston gave them money over hundreds of years. 120 00:06:08,440 --> 00:06:10,719 Speaker 4: You know about that thing called compounding interests. 121 00:06:10,800 --> 00:06:14,480 Speaker 2: Yeah, imagine if you just bought spy on sixteen hundred. Sorry. 122 00:06:14,839 --> 00:06:18,280 Speaker 4: So that has certainly helped them. But in the nineteen 123 00:06:18,480 --> 00:06:22,880 Speaker 4: sixties college endowment started doing something different. Instead of having 124 00:06:23,000 --> 00:06:26,440 Speaker 4: a traditional sixty forty split, you know, with a lot 125 00:06:26,440 --> 00:06:31,120 Speaker 4: of plain vanilla type US equities bonds, they pursued a 126 00:06:31,120 --> 00:06:36,120 Speaker 4: different model. In the Ford Foundation actually presented this strategy 127 00:06:36,279 --> 00:06:40,120 Speaker 4: in schools like Harvard and Yale started using it because 128 00:06:40,200 --> 00:06:43,360 Speaker 4: their time horizon is literally in the hundreds of years, 129 00:06:43,839 --> 00:06:48,440 Speaker 4: so they liquidity for them is okay because you know, 130 00:06:48,440 --> 00:06:51,640 Speaker 4: they have a very long term horizon. So they started 131 00:06:52,480 --> 00:06:57,640 Speaker 4: moving things into liquid assets over time, private equity, hedge funds, 132 00:06:57,839 --> 00:07:01,640 Speaker 4: you know, eventually venture capital, real estate, you know, now 133 00:07:01,760 --> 00:07:04,520 Speaker 4: private credit. But at the time that was a pretty 134 00:07:04,560 --> 00:07:08,320 Speaker 4: new strategy. Harvard and Yale did things a little bit differently. 135 00:07:08,720 --> 00:07:13,320 Speaker 4: So Harvard started Harvard Management Company, which runs down and 136 00:07:13,480 --> 00:07:16,160 Speaker 4: is fifty years old this year. They actually operate not 137 00:07:16,280 --> 00:07:19,880 Speaker 4: in Cambridge but in downtown Boston in the Federal Reserve building. 138 00:07:20,080 --> 00:07:22,720 Speaker 4: It's actually very close to our Bloomberg office in Boston, 139 00:07:23,360 --> 00:07:26,960 Speaker 4: and they employed traders and it was, you know, over 140 00:07:27,000 --> 00:07:29,840 Speaker 4: two hundred people working there. They were extremely good at 141 00:07:29,840 --> 00:07:33,880 Speaker 4: their job. Their strategy was literally the envy of the world. 142 00:07:33,920 --> 00:07:36,000 Speaker 4: They made a ton of money. A guy by the 143 00:07:36,080 --> 00:07:38,800 Speaker 4: name of Jack Meyer ran the fund, and there was 144 00:07:38,840 --> 00:07:41,960 Speaker 4: some outcry by a group of alumni and people who 145 00:07:41,960 --> 00:07:44,560 Speaker 4: thought they were their managers were being paid too much 146 00:07:44,640 --> 00:07:49,880 Speaker 4: because they just consistently exceeded the market. And one year 147 00:07:50,080 --> 00:07:52,800 Speaker 4: there was a manager trying to remember, paid thirty five 148 00:07:52,840 --> 00:07:56,760 Speaker 4: million dollars and people were just aghast at that because 149 00:07:57,120 --> 00:08:00,000 Speaker 4: they made too much money. So after a lot of critics, 150 00:08:00,640 --> 00:08:04,920 Speaker 4: long story short, that model was disbanded. Jack left in 151 00:08:04,960 --> 00:08:08,880 Speaker 4: two thousand and five. They went through a succession of managers, 152 00:08:08,960 --> 00:08:13,440 Speaker 4: seven CEOs of the Harvard Management Company. Some only stayed 153 00:08:13,480 --> 00:08:15,960 Speaker 4: a short term. There were two less than two years, 154 00:08:16,440 --> 00:08:21,560 Speaker 4: several interims, changing strategies, selling off assets. You know, for 155 00:08:21,600 --> 00:08:25,680 Speaker 4: a while they were big into agriculture and real assets. 156 00:08:26,160 --> 00:08:28,720 Speaker 4: Those perform well, but then they didn't perform well. And 157 00:08:28,800 --> 00:08:31,800 Speaker 4: the current CEO has been there since December twenty sixteen. 158 00:08:32,360 --> 00:08:36,160 Speaker 4: He eventually sold a lot of those natural resources. You know, 159 00:08:36,160 --> 00:08:39,640 Speaker 4: I think, writing off like a billion dollars and you know, 160 00:08:39,760 --> 00:08:42,720 Speaker 4: change of strategy. Not at the greatest time. They didn't 161 00:08:42,720 --> 00:08:44,320 Speaker 4: have a lot of private equity, and they've ramped that 162 00:08:44,400 --> 00:08:44,800 Speaker 4: up now. 163 00:08:45,520 --> 00:08:50,000 Speaker 3: That was a great potted history of Harvard's endowment. I 164 00:08:50,000 --> 00:08:53,040 Speaker 3: ought to say, Joe, I started rewatching. Did you ever 165 00:08:53,080 --> 00:08:55,960 Speaker 3: watch The Gilmore Girls? Probably not, No, I never did. 166 00:08:56,120 --> 00:08:57,920 Speaker 3: I started rewatching Gilmore Girls. 167 00:08:57,960 --> 00:08:59,400 Speaker 2: And so are you going to tie this in? 168 00:08:59,600 --> 00:09:03,559 Speaker 3: Well, so it's all about rich people in Boston basically, 169 00:09:03,800 --> 00:09:07,360 Speaker 3: and one of the main characters has to decide between 170 00:09:07,360 --> 00:09:10,720 Speaker 3: Harvard and Yale. She eventually goes to Yale. I guess 171 00:09:10,880 --> 00:09:13,640 Speaker 3: she was lured by the performance of the endowment. 172 00:09:15,640 --> 00:09:20,320 Speaker 2: So, Jenny, you gave us the broad history of Harvard's endowment, 173 00:09:20,679 --> 00:09:22,840 Speaker 2: and I want to talk about actually like what happened 174 00:09:22,880 --> 00:09:25,400 Speaker 2: in those years from like how you have one stable 175 00:09:25,480 --> 00:09:28,199 Speaker 2: management company that goes all the way to two thousand 176 00:09:28,240 --> 00:09:29,840 Speaker 2: and five more or less, and then you run through 177 00:09:29,880 --> 00:09:31,880 Speaker 2: I think, what'd you say, like seven CEOs since then 178 00:09:31,960 --> 00:09:35,080 Speaker 2: or something, and then Tracy mentioned the Yale endowment with 179 00:09:35,160 --> 00:09:38,600 Speaker 2: their famous endowment manager for several years. David Swinton, can 180 00:09:38,640 --> 00:09:41,160 Speaker 2: you talk about like the sort of compare and contrast 181 00:09:41,320 --> 00:09:44,640 Speaker 2: between the strategic volatility and I'm not even talking about 182 00:09:44,679 --> 00:09:48,880 Speaker 2: price volatility, but the strategic management volatility of Harvard versus 183 00:09:48,960 --> 00:09:51,240 Speaker 2: the Yale model that I think David wrote a whole 184 00:09:51,240 --> 00:09:51,920 Speaker 2: book about. 185 00:09:52,160 --> 00:09:55,880 Speaker 4: So, Harvard management company files a tax return and because 186 00:09:55,880 --> 00:09:58,880 Speaker 4: of their nonprofit status, they have to disclose how much 187 00:09:58,920 --> 00:10:02,520 Speaker 4: they pay their top p people. And Yale the Investment 188 00:10:02,559 --> 00:10:07,079 Speaker 4: Office is part of Yale University. They employ outside managers 189 00:10:07,320 --> 00:10:10,840 Speaker 4: and they have a much smaller number of employees and 190 00:10:10,920 --> 00:10:14,280 Speaker 4: only a handful of listed in the tax return. And 191 00:10:14,360 --> 00:10:17,160 Speaker 4: because they're using outside managers, you know, you think of 192 00:10:17,160 --> 00:10:19,360 Speaker 4: the two and twenty model, that's not showing up in 193 00:10:19,400 --> 00:10:22,120 Speaker 4: the tax return, whereas Harvard, you know, you could see 194 00:10:22,120 --> 00:10:24,680 Speaker 4: how much they were getting paid, and people read that 195 00:10:24,960 --> 00:10:27,160 Speaker 4: and it was a big deal how much they were 196 00:10:27,160 --> 00:10:30,839 Speaker 4: getting paid. And you know, that's really a simple explanation 197 00:10:30,920 --> 00:10:33,720 Speaker 4: of why Harvard's manager's got so much more scrutiny. 198 00:10:34,400 --> 00:10:38,040 Speaker 3: So you talked about the criticism of you know, how 199 00:10:38,120 --> 00:10:43,520 Speaker 3: much they're getting paid. What's the benchmark for Harvard's performance, Like, 200 00:10:43,559 --> 00:10:45,560 Speaker 3: what are they actually comparing themselves to? 201 00:10:46,120 --> 00:10:50,520 Speaker 4: Well, many endowments create their own benchmark, surprise, so I 202 00:10:50,559 --> 00:10:52,079 Speaker 4: don't know, you know, they come up with it. And 203 00:10:52,160 --> 00:10:55,520 Speaker 4: one of the big criticisms of Harvard's pay was the 204 00:10:55,600 --> 00:10:58,640 Speaker 4: managers who did extremely well in their own asset class 205 00:10:58,960 --> 00:11:01,679 Speaker 4: would get paid base on their own performance, not the 206 00:11:01,720 --> 00:11:04,480 Speaker 4: overall performance of the endowment. So if they had a 207 00:11:04,480 --> 00:11:07,560 Speaker 4: middling return, which they have, some of these managers still 208 00:11:07,559 --> 00:11:08,920 Speaker 4: got paid quite a lot of money. 209 00:11:09,600 --> 00:11:11,680 Speaker 2: Well, then let me ask you another question. Let's say, Okay, 210 00:11:11,720 --> 00:11:13,720 Speaker 2: we don't really know what the benchmark is. So you 211 00:11:13,760 --> 00:11:17,240 Speaker 2: wrote this piece for Bloomberg a few weeks ago talking 212 00:11:17,280 --> 00:11:19,480 Speaker 2: about like issues and the performance. 213 00:11:20,040 --> 00:11:20,679 Speaker 1: What has it been? 214 00:11:20,840 --> 00:11:24,720 Speaker 2: Why now are people saying, Look, Harvard's performance is not 215 00:11:24,760 --> 00:11:27,360 Speaker 2: that great, there's some reason to be concerned. There's some 216 00:11:27,720 --> 00:11:30,240 Speaker 2: falling off in the what they're able to generate for 217 00:11:30,280 --> 00:11:30,920 Speaker 2: the university. 218 00:11:31,120 --> 00:11:33,959 Speaker 4: Well, I think some insiders, especially you know, some of 219 00:11:34,000 --> 00:11:37,040 Speaker 4: their really famous economists, they know what's going on. But 220 00:11:38,160 --> 00:11:41,880 Speaker 4: the last year the performance was overshadowed by some other issues, 221 00:11:42,320 --> 00:11:46,360 Speaker 4: especially you know, their president being thrown before Congress. You know, 222 00:11:46,400 --> 00:11:51,040 Speaker 4: the president resigned, she had plagiarism scandal. People have been 223 00:11:51,160 --> 00:11:54,880 Speaker 4: very upset about how Harvard has handled anti semitism. The 224 00:11:54,920 --> 00:11:58,240 Speaker 4: story had last week said their fundraising was down. You know, 225 00:11:58,280 --> 00:12:02,439 Speaker 4: their cash gifts was the lowest in it fell fifteen percent. 226 00:12:03,000 --> 00:12:05,559 Speaker 4: It was the lowest since twenty fifteen. You know, they 227 00:12:05,600 --> 00:12:08,440 Speaker 4: famously raise a huge amount of money. You know, they're 228 00:12:08,440 --> 00:12:10,360 Speaker 4: known for the endowment, but they're also known for being 229 00:12:10,400 --> 00:12:13,600 Speaker 4: prolific fundraisers. And you know, they did get to a 230 00:12:13,600 --> 00:12:15,920 Speaker 4: billion dollars last year. But I'm sure it wasn't easy. 231 00:12:16,360 --> 00:12:20,400 Speaker 4: Considering people are upset when Plovotnik Ken Griffin both alum 232 00:12:20,520 --> 00:12:22,880 Speaker 4: said they're not giving money that they've paused their gifts 233 00:12:22,880 --> 00:12:25,400 Speaker 4: to Harvard because the way things are going there. 234 00:12:41,160 --> 00:12:44,280 Speaker 3: So one thing I'm trying to wrap my head around is, 235 00:12:44,360 --> 00:12:47,480 Speaker 3: as we've mentioned a number of times, Harvard is a 236 00:12:47,600 --> 00:12:51,480 Speaker 3: huge pot of money. And I've heard people say stuff 237 00:12:51,600 --> 00:12:55,240 Speaker 3: like because of its size, it makes it harder to 238 00:12:55,320 --> 00:12:58,520 Speaker 3: move positions around, it can't be as nimble. But then 239 00:12:58,880 --> 00:13:02,480 Speaker 3: I think, well, it's huge, so it should be getting 240 00:13:02,559 --> 00:13:06,199 Speaker 3: like the best deals. It should have some sort of edge. 241 00:13:06,600 --> 00:13:10,040 Speaker 3: So is size here a net pro or con. 242 00:13:10,440 --> 00:13:13,120 Speaker 4: I think that's a very fair question, And you know, 243 00:13:13,320 --> 00:13:16,319 Speaker 4: Harvard will say it's so big it's hard to manage 244 00:13:16,440 --> 00:13:19,560 Speaker 4: fifty three billion dollars. Now, keep in mind the size 245 00:13:19,960 --> 00:13:22,040 Speaker 4: hasn't been that big. 246 00:13:22,120 --> 00:13:22,400 Speaker 1: Ever. 247 00:13:22,760 --> 00:13:25,680 Speaker 4: They had a huge eleven billion dollar gain in fiscal 248 00:13:25,760 --> 00:13:27,920 Speaker 4: twenty one, you know, when everybody had a crazy year. 249 00:13:28,200 --> 00:13:31,520 Speaker 4: You know, some endowments had gains of fifty percent. Harvard 250 00:13:31,600 --> 00:13:34,080 Speaker 4: was on the low end at thirty four percent, And 251 00:13:34,160 --> 00:13:37,400 Speaker 4: of course they had a huge decrease during the financial crisis, 252 00:13:37,400 --> 00:13:40,200 Speaker 4: so they've been building back up. Now. The school with 253 00:13:40,240 --> 00:13:43,320 Speaker 4: the best ten year performance is Brown and that has 254 00:13:43,320 --> 00:13:47,040 Speaker 4: the smallest endowment size, and they're definitely more nimble but 255 00:13:47,080 --> 00:13:49,959 Speaker 4: they seem to take more risk. You know, they're into 256 00:13:50,520 --> 00:13:54,160 Speaker 4: you know, you've heard maybe there's some cryptocurrency or there's 257 00:13:54,480 --> 00:13:57,720 Speaker 4: some other risk there. And if you go back and 258 00:13:57,800 --> 00:14:01,640 Speaker 4: read all the Harvard alumni the Harvard financial reports, as 259 00:14:01,640 --> 00:14:04,720 Speaker 4: I did, the current CEO talks a lot about risk. 260 00:14:04,800 --> 00:14:08,160 Speaker 4: He mentions more than once that Harvard takes less risk 261 00:14:08,240 --> 00:14:11,160 Speaker 4: than its large peers. And you know it still could 262 00:14:11,240 --> 00:14:13,320 Speaker 4: be a vestige from two thousand and eight when they 263 00:14:13,360 --> 00:14:15,160 Speaker 4: had a huge liquidity problem. 264 00:14:15,640 --> 00:14:19,080 Speaker 2: Let me ask another way of thinking about the benchmark 265 00:14:19,080 --> 00:14:21,720 Speaker 2: sitting aside. What is a good return in a given 266 00:14:21,760 --> 00:14:24,760 Speaker 2: year or a good return over five years? What is 267 00:14:24,800 --> 00:14:29,720 Speaker 2: the importance of the Harvard Endowment to the Harvard University budget? 268 00:14:30,000 --> 00:14:33,760 Speaker 2: And because there's multiple ways of financing the university, there's tuition, 269 00:14:34,480 --> 00:14:38,440 Speaker 2: there's alumni giving, there's probably other grants and stuff like that, 270 00:14:38,520 --> 00:14:41,160 Speaker 2: and then there's the money that the endowment throws off. 271 00:14:41,320 --> 00:14:45,360 Speaker 2: What does Harvard University need from the Harvard Endowment? 272 00:14:45,880 --> 00:14:50,080 Speaker 4: Well, the Harvard Endowment is the largest provider of money 273 00:14:50,120 --> 00:14:53,560 Speaker 4: to the university thirty seven percent, okay, and that's grown 274 00:14:53,640 --> 00:14:57,200 Speaker 4: over time. Ten years ago it was thirty one percent, 275 00:14:57,280 --> 00:15:00,760 Speaker 4: and twenty years ago it was twenty twenty one percent. 276 00:15:01,200 --> 00:15:04,480 Speaker 4: So in other words, Harvard University is becoming a lot 277 00:15:04,520 --> 00:15:06,280 Speaker 4: more reliant on the Harvard endowment. 278 00:15:07,640 --> 00:15:11,800 Speaker 3: So you mentioned this idea of investing in alts, and 279 00:15:11,880 --> 00:15:15,440 Speaker 3: I think Harvard was like a backer of D one 280 00:15:15,840 --> 00:15:19,560 Speaker 3: in particular a hedge fund. And I'm curious the sales 281 00:15:19,600 --> 00:15:24,080 Speaker 3: pitch from hedge funds is always uncorrelated returns. So what 282 00:15:24,400 --> 00:15:28,920 Speaker 3: happened in down years for Harvard, like in twenty twenty two, 283 00:15:29,240 --> 00:15:33,120 Speaker 3: twenty twenty three when markets were like or sorry in 284 00:15:33,160 --> 00:15:36,960 Speaker 3: twenty twenty three, when markets were falling? Did they manage 285 00:15:36,960 --> 00:15:39,640 Speaker 3: to post above average returns? 286 00:15:40,720 --> 00:15:43,720 Speaker 4: So over time in twenty twenty three, I think they 287 00:15:43,760 --> 00:15:46,960 Speaker 4: had a two point nine percent gain, which was not bad. 288 00:15:47,080 --> 00:15:49,920 Speaker 4: You know, among the Ivy League schools, a couple of 289 00:15:50,000 --> 00:15:53,280 Speaker 4: big endowments head losses. I think it was Duke and Mit. 290 00:15:53,400 --> 00:15:58,000 Speaker 4: And Mit is really strong in their returns too that 291 00:15:58,080 --> 00:16:00,600 Speaker 4: we don't sort of use them in their eight schools 292 00:16:00,640 --> 00:16:02,800 Speaker 4: because you know, the Ivy League is a sports conference, 293 00:16:02,800 --> 00:16:04,760 Speaker 4: but it's also a nice group of eight schools that 294 00:16:04,760 --> 00:16:08,280 Speaker 4: you can easily compare. And Harvard, you know, in the 295 00:16:08,320 --> 00:16:11,280 Speaker 4: big year where the in twenty one they were below 296 00:16:11,280 --> 00:16:14,800 Speaker 4: average in the IVY League. Now, they didn't traditionally have 297 00:16:15,160 --> 00:16:19,200 Speaker 4: the allocation to private equity and vcs that say Yale did. 298 00:16:19,680 --> 00:16:22,840 Speaker 4: And Harvard is now at thirty nine percent in private equity, 299 00:16:22,840 --> 00:16:26,680 Speaker 4: but they've ramped up really since twenty sixteen. I'm sorry, 300 00:16:26,720 --> 00:16:29,800 Speaker 4: it was sixteen percent maybe five years ago, six years ago, 301 00:16:29,840 --> 00:16:32,240 Speaker 4: and now they're at thirty nine percent, So they've been 302 00:16:32,360 --> 00:16:35,080 Speaker 4: ramping up sort of not at the best time. And 303 00:16:35,240 --> 00:16:38,000 Speaker 4: keep in mind that Yale has been investing in some 304 00:16:38,080 --> 00:16:41,880 Speaker 4: of these private equity firms and vc for years and 305 00:16:41,960 --> 00:16:45,160 Speaker 4: years and years, and people really want to be Yale's partner, 306 00:16:45,520 --> 00:16:47,880 Speaker 4: and Harvard sort of has a reputation of not being 307 00:16:47,920 --> 00:16:50,200 Speaker 4: the greatest partner because as you saw on the D 308 00:16:50,320 --> 00:16:53,160 Speaker 4: one example, you know, they sell and you know they 309 00:16:53,200 --> 00:16:55,440 Speaker 4: had to unload, you know, a billion dollars worth of 310 00:16:55,560 --> 00:16:59,480 Speaker 4: natural resources assets. So people clamor to be, you know, 311 00:16:59,520 --> 00:17:02,400 Speaker 4: in the Yale and the Princeton Endowment because they're seen 312 00:17:02,440 --> 00:17:05,679 Speaker 4: as just amazing partners, and Harvard doesn't seem to have 313 00:17:05,680 --> 00:17:07,040 Speaker 4: that same reputation lately. 314 00:17:07,560 --> 00:17:10,080 Speaker 2: Yeah, I mean, I don't know that much about the 315 00:17:10,160 --> 00:17:14,080 Speaker 2: Yale endowment model, but I probably should read David Swinston's 316 00:17:14,080 --> 00:17:16,320 Speaker 2: book at some point and all that and really learn 317 00:17:16,359 --> 00:17:20,240 Speaker 2: about it. But I do get the impression that it's 318 00:17:20,280 --> 00:17:22,879 Speaker 2: designed to just be not set it and forget it. 319 00:17:22,920 --> 00:17:25,280 Speaker 2: But like, truly it's all about that sort of all 320 00:17:25,359 --> 00:17:29,359 Speaker 2: cycle portfolio, right that really can just is designed to 321 00:17:29,480 --> 00:17:32,280 Speaker 2: ultimately work across a long cycle of whatever is. 322 00:17:32,280 --> 00:17:32,960 Speaker 3: In and out. 323 00:17:33,160 --> 00:17:37,160 Speaker 4: Well, they will look at firms for years before they 324 00:17:37,160 --> 00:17:39,280 Speaker 4: may make an investment, so they tend to do their 325 00:17:39,320 --> 00:17:42,760 Speaker 4: homework for a long time. And there I think I 326 00:17:42,800 --> 00:17:45,520 Speaker 4: remember on one report they said the average tenure of 327 00:17:45,840 --> 00:17:50,040 Speaker 4: their outside managers is something like thirteen years. So it's 328 00:17:50,160 --> 00:17:52,359 Speaker 4: you know, if you think getting into a school like 329 00:17:52,440 --> 00:17:55,200 Speaker 4: Yale or Princeton is hard, try getting to be one 330 00:17:55,240 --> 00:17:56,000 Speaker 4: of their managers. 331 00:17:56,040 --> 00:17:58,199 Speaker 2: Well just actually, and I want to get into this war. 332 00:17:58,280 --> 00:18:00,520 Speaker 2: But just a very quick question, does Harvard have hedge 333 00:18:00,520 --> 00:18:03,680 Speaker 2: fund allocation? Of course, oh yeah, yeah, you're already talking. Yeah, okay, god, 334 00:18:03,680 --> 00:18:04,880 Speaker 2: they do, okay. 335 00:18:04,640 --> 00:18:07,600 Speaker 4: And it's the second largest allocation now it's at thirty 336 00:18:07,600 --> 00:18:10,960 Speaker 4: two percent. The largest allocation is private equity at thirty 337 00:18:11,040 --> 00:18:11,520 Speaker 4: nine percent. 338 00:18:11,600 --> 00:18:15,480 Speaker 2: And just a very very short question. If Tracy and 339 00:18:15,520 --> 00:18:18,000 Speaker 2: I are starting a hedge fund, and it's like a 340 00:18:18,080 --> 00:18:20,399 Speaker 2: multi strategy hedge fund and all that stuff. Would Harvard 341 00:18:20,480 --> 00:18:23,159 Speaker 2: definitely be one of our stops when we're trying to 342 00:18:23,160 --> 00:18:24,159 Speaker 2: look at raising money. 343 00:18:24,800 --> 00:18:28,800 Speaker 4: Did you go to Harvard? I'm just kidding. Yeah, I 344 00:18:28,840 --> 00:18:33,000 Speaker 4: don't know. It just depends they like niche, really niche stuff. 345 00:18:33,720 --> 00:18:34,080 Speaker 3: Got it. 346 00:18:34,520 --> 00:18:37,440 Speaker 4: So if you're you know, peddling something like a Japanese 347 00:18:37,760 --> 00:18:41,120 Speaker 4: something fun that is really niche that nobody else is doing. Maybe. 348 00:18:41,680 --> 00:18:46,080 Speaker 3: So you mentioned the sort of turmoil at the upper 349 00:18:46,359 --> 00:18:50,399 Speaker 3: levels of the Harvard Endowment and I think we're on 350 00:18:51,040 --> 00:18:55,160 Speaker 3: the fifth CEO in like eleven years something like that. 351 00:18:56,000 --> 00:18:58,960 Speaker 3: Can you describe the new CEO? Like where does he 352 00:18:59,080 --> 00:19:04,639 Speaker 3: come from? And is his style different to predecessors. I 353 00:19:04,680 --> 00:19:07,640 Speaker 3: think he's done somewhere structuring of the company and things 354 00:19:07,680 --> 00:19:08,040 Speaker 3: like that. 355 00:19:08,320 --> 00:19:11,919 Speaker 4: Yes. So he came in December twenty sixteen from Columbia, 356 00:19:12,200 --> 00:19:15,399 Speaker 4: where he had excellent performance, and that was one of 357 00:19:15,400 --> 00:19:18,399 Speaker 4: the reasons why he was hired, because the performance at 358 00:19:18,400 --> 00:19:21,440 Speaker 4: Columbia used to be pretty good. But he came in 359 00:19:21,520 --> 00:19:25,320 Speaker 4: and had to steer a very large ship in a 360 00:19:25,440 --> 00:19:29,080 Speaker 4: ship that's very scrutinized. Everybody wants to know how Harvard 361 00:19:29,200 --> 00:19:32,080 Speaker 4: is doing, and as I mentioned, before they used to 362 00:19:32,240 --> 00:19:36,000 Speaker 4: employ more than two hundred people traders, and they had 363 00:19:36,000 --> 00:19:38,280 Speaker 4: a different model than Yale because they had a huge 364 00:19:38,280 --> 00:19:45,080 Speaker 4: internal presence, and they slashed that. He also reversed course 365 00:19:45,359 --> 00:19:49,679 Speaker 4: on natural resources, where that had been a huge interest 366 00:19:49,720 --> 00:19:54,200 Speaker 4: of Jane Mendillo, the previous longer term CEO of Harvard Management. 367 00:19:54,240 --> 00:19:56,359 Speaker 4: But they didn't do as well, so he sold a 368 00:19:56,359 --> 00:20:00,520 Speaker 4: lot of those off. They restructured pay again. We talked 369 00:20:00,520 --> 00:20:03,240 Speaker 4: about you know, if you're manager and you did great 370 00:20:03,280 --> 00:20:06,200 Speaker 4: in your own ASCID class, you would get handsomely rewarded, 371 00:20:06,240 --> 00:20:09,680 Speaker 4: but if the endowment as a whole was not performing well, 372 00:20:09,720 --> 00:20:12,560 Speaker 4: that didn't really matter. So he made a lot of changes. 373 00:20:13,520 --> 00:20:16,520 Speaker 2: Let's talk about Actually, you mentioned natural resources, which could 374 00:20:16,520 --> 00:20:18,480 Speaker 2: be code for a few things, so I remember I 375 00:20:18,560 --> 00:20:20,840 Speaker 2: seem to recall I just remembered another thing that I 376 00:20:20,840 --> 00:20:24,480 Speaker 2: remembered about David Swenson, which is I think he was 377 00:20:24,520 --> 00:20:26,359 Speaker 2: like really into timber. Yeah, for a while, and there 378 00:20:26,480 --> 00:20:29,320 Speaker 2: was like sort of like famously into timber. But then 379 00:20:29,359 --> 00:20:33,720 Speaker 2: there's another natural resource issue, and this will eventually allow 380 00:20:33,800 --> 00:20:35,480 Speaker 2: us to talk about what I really want to talk about, 381 00:20:35,520 --> 00:20:38,560 Speaker 2: which is the University of Texas. But of course resource 382 00:20:38,600 --> 00:20:41,800 Speaker 2: politics and resource investing is also always controversial when it 383 00:20:41,840 --> 00:20:44,840 Speaker 2: comes to you know, carbon fuels like oil and stuff 384 00:20:44,880 --> 00:20:47,520 Speaker 2: like that. So before we get into Texas and all 385 00:20:47,600 --> 00:20:50,920 Speaker 2: their oil money, what is the status of Harvard's own 386 00:20:51,600 --> 00:20:54,280 Speaker 2: investments in things like oil, et cetera. And how does 387 00:20:54,359 --> 00:20:58,120 Speaker 2: like the sort of unique politics of Harvard affect those choices. 388 00:20:58,600 --> 00:21:03,040 Speaker 4: So for a long time, most schools, you know, were 389 00:21:03,080 --> 00:21:06,720 Speaker 4: asked by their students to divest from anything related to 390 00:21:06,720 --> 00:21:10,440 Speaker 4: fossil fuels. Harvard did not divest from anything. I think 391 00:21:10,560 --> 00:21:15,760 Speaker 4: sometimes that's not understood. Well, divest means selling things, and 392 00:21:16,040 --> 00:21:19,160 Speaker 4: Harvard said, we're not going to make new investments. So 393 00:21:19,400 --> 00:21:21,840 Speaker 4: you know what it means to allow things to roll off, 394 00:21:21,880 --> 00:21:23,760 Speaker 4: You're not going to make you know, when this next 395 00:21:23,760 --> 00:21:26,800 Speaker 4: private equity fund is raising money, that means they may 396 00:21:26,840 --> 00:21:30,720 Speaker 4: not go into it. They're not selling on the secondary market. 397 00:21:31,080 --> 00:21:35,080 Speaker 4: You know, typically endowments don't have direct holdings, or you know, 398 00:21:35,119 --> 00:21:37,520 Speaker 4: maybe they have a tiny amount, maybe it was a 399 00:21:37,560 --> 00:21:40,080 Speaker 4: gift and they still have held on to it. But 400 00:21:40,160 --> 00:21:43,920 Speaker 4: typically endowments today do not have direct holdings and companies. 401 00:21:44,080 --> 00:21:45,080 Speaker 3: That's how they used. 402 00:21:44,880 --> 00:21:47,440 Speaker 4: To in you know, in the seventies and eighties and 403 00:21:47,480 --> 00:21:50,440 Speaker 4: in the eighties when you heard about schools divesting from, 404 00:21:50,640 --> 00:21:54,000 Speaker 4: you know, investments related to apartheid. They were literally selling 405 00:21:54,440 --> 00:21:57,560 Speaker 4: US companies that operated in South Africa. So that's a 406 00:21:57,640 --> 00:22:02,159 Speaker 4: huge change. So they stopped making new fossil fuel investments. 407 00:22:02,359 --> 00:22:05,760 Speaker 4: And NARV wrote in one of the reports in twenty 408 00:22:05,800 --> 00:22:08,639 Speaker 4: two when they had a loss, the CEO said Harvard 409 00:22:08,680 --> 00:22:11,640 Speaker 4: had missed out on strong returns in the energy sector 410 00:22:12,200 --> 00:22:15,639 Speaker 4: and that decision contributed, you know, marginally to the loss 411 00:22:15,800 --> 00:22:18,479 Speaker 4: a year. But at the same time, you look at 412 00:22:18,480 --> 00:22:23,879 Speaker 4: a place like Texas which has huge amounts of cash 413 00:22:24,000 --> 00:22:26,840 Speaker 4: coming in because of oil, and let's is this a 414 00:22:26,840 --> 00:22:28,400 Speaker 4: good time to bring up their history? Yeah? 415 00:22:28,440 --> 00:22:29,479 Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, there's a good way. 416 00:22:29,760 --> 00:22:32,560 Speaker 3: Good Where does the how did the oil money kind 417 00:22:32,600 --> 00:22:33,240 Speaker 3: of start? 418 00:22:33,440 --> 00:22:37,080 Speaker 4: So it was kind of a fluke in a lucky 419 00:22:37,119 --> 00:22:40,280 Speaker 4: stroke of history. In the late eighteen seventies, the state 420 00:22:40,320 --> 00:22:44,359 Speaker 4: of Texas set aside land for higher education, and it 421 00:22:44,400 --> 00:22:46,679 Speaker 4: was supposed to be near the railroad, but it was 422 00:22:46,720 --> 00:22:50,720 Speaker 4: too valuable and it got moved to West Texas, and 423 00:22:51,440 --> 00:22:55,360 Speaker 4: eventually higher education in Texas was allotted something like two 424 00:22:55,359 --> 00:22:58,479 Speaker 4: point one million acres in West Texas and they were 425 00:22:58,480 --> 00:23:03,000 Speaker 4: supposed to generate money by agriculture or grazing rights, and 426 00:23:03,040 --> 00:23:05,959 Speaker 4: the plan was eventually to sell it. But then in 427 00:23:06,040 --> 00:23:10,040 Speaker 4: nineteen twenty three, something happened. Joe, do you know what happened? 428 00:23:11,080 --> 00:23:14,919 Speaker 2: Well, black Gold yet struck. Now there's a there at 429 00:23:14,960 --> 00:23:18,080 Speaker 2: the University of Texas campus, there's this little I don't 430 00:23:18,080 --> 00:23:20,520 Speaker 2: know if it's still there, but yeah, twenty years ago 431 00:23:20,520 --> 00:23:23,280 Speaker 2: there's this little like sort of I don't know, exhibit, 432 00:23:23,640 --> 00:23:26,359 Speaker 2: and they played this audio. It's like spinble top black 433 00:23:26,440 --> 00:23:28,679 Speaker 2: Gold and it has like with this like really like 434 00:23:28,720 --> 00:23:31,920 Speaker 2: exaggerated Texas accent, and there's like a fake oil derrick 435 00:23:32,040 --> 00:23:34,000 Speaker 2: or oil well or something like that. This sort of 436 00:23:34,040 --> 00:23:36,240 Speaker 2: shows like where it all came from. 437 00:23:36,720 --> 00:23:40,560 Speaker 4: So in nineteen twenty three they literally started getting all 438 00:23:40,560 --> 00:23:43,680 Speaker 4: this revenue from oil. And I did a story a 439 00:23:43,720 --> 00:23:45,639 Speaker 4: couple of years ago. I went down to Midland and 440 00:23:45,680 --> 00:23:49,399 Speaker 4: I went on on the land and that year they 441 00:23:49,440 --> 00:23:53,400 Speaker 4: got something like two billion dollars in cash. And it's 442 00:23:53,440 --> 00:23:57,600 Speaker 4: it's completely separate from their endowment. It's not generated from investments. 443 00:23:57,640 --> 00:24:00,720 Speaker 4: It's just cash that comes in. And the crazy thing 444 00:24:00,720 --> 00:24:04,800 Speaker 4: about it is, you know they're you know you hear, oh, well, 445 00:24:04,880 --> 00:24:07,199 Speaker 4: at some point energy is not going to be you 446 00:24:07,200 --> 00:24:09,600 Speaker 4: know is not going to be as valuable, which you know, 447 00:24:09,960 --> 00:24:13,080 Speaker 4: it's still going to be around for twenty thirty years 448 00:24:13,080 --> 00:24:15,600 Speaker 4: generating a lot of money for Texas. But they're in 449 00:24:15,960 --> 00:24:19,600 Speaker 4: the best position for wind and solar also, which is 450 00:24:19,600 --> 00:24:22,639 Speaker 4: a really you know, nascent industry there. But you know, 451 00:24:22,680 --> 00:24:24,760 Speaker 4: when when you're ready for that, they're going to make 452 00:24:24,800 --> 00:24:25,560 Speaker 4: a lot of money too. 453 00:24:26,119 --> 00:24:29,080 Speaker 3: It is kind of crazy to think that that decision 454 00:24:29,160 --> 00:24:32,199 Speaker 3: to set aside land in like the eighteen hundreds is 455 00:24:32,440 --> 00:24:36,320 Speaker 3: really paying off now. So every once in a while, 456 00:24:36,440 --> 00:24:41,359 Speaker 3: Joe will tweet something about the Texas Longhorns, the football team, 457 00:24:41,600 --> 00:24:44,439 Speaker 3: and so one thing I'm curious about is we're talking 458 00:24:44,440 --> 00:24:48,720 Speaker 3: about all this money that's flowing into universities. What's the 459 00:24:48,840 --> 00:24:52,600 Speaker 3: breakdown of like where colleges get their money. So I 460 00:24:52,600 --> 00:24:56,879 Speaker 3: imagine it's a mix of donations, returns from endowments, or 461 00:24:57,000 --> 00:24:58,720 Speaker 3: sports like part of that too. 462 00:24:59,520 --> 00:25:01,840 Speaker 4: I don't think I think it's a huge amount. I mean 463 00:25:01,920 --> 00:25:05,000 Speaker 4: unless you're you know, one of the schools like Texas 464 00:25:05,000 --> 00:25:08,080 Speaker 4: that actually makes money on sports. But it's a very 465 00:25:08,119 --> 00:25:11,960 Speaker 4: small number of schools actually collect you know, somewhat of 466 00:25:11,960 --> 00:25:14,640 Speaker 4: a I don't want to say a prophet, but generate revenue. 467 00:25:15,000 --> 00:25:17,920 Speaker 4: But you know, many schools have weird histories of how 468 00:25:17,920 --> 00:25:21,119 Speaker 4: they made their money, like Emery for example, in Atlanta. 469 00:25:21,400 --> 00:25:23,359 Speaker 4: They're one of the richest schools and part of the 470 00:25:23,400 --> 00:25:26,119 Speaker 4: reason is because of the Koch stock that was given 471 00:25:26,160 --> 00:25:29,520 Speaker 4: to them and they eventually sold. Northwestern is one of 472 00:25:29,520 --> 00:25:33,440 Speaker 4: the richest schools because a drug called Lyrica was developed 473 00:25:33,480 --> 00:25:36,120 Speaker 4: in the chemistry department one of their presidents a few 474 00:25:36,200 --> 00:25:39,639 Speaker 4: years a few presidents back, decided to sell half of 475 00:25:39,720 --> 00:25:43,480 Speaker 4: the royalties and that's you know why they had why 476 00:25:43,520 --> 00:25:45,000 Speaker 4: they became one of the richest schools. 477 00:25:45,560 --> 00:25:48,520 Speaker 2: Sorry, I'm just thinking more about that little exhibit on 478 00:25:48,520 --> 00:25:49,120 Speaker 2: the Texas camp. 479 00:25:49,119 --> 00:25:49,800 Speaker 3: But there's the other thing. 480 00:25:49,840 --> 00:25:53,480 Speaker 2: They're like black Goal Texas c which they also said, 481 00:25:53,520 --> 00:25:54,720 Speaker 2: I love that Texas ce. 482 00:25:54,880 --> 00:25:57,040 Speaker 3: Why didn't we go see that exhibit? 483 00:25:57,240 --> 00:25:58,960 Speaker 2: Yeah, I don't know, but it's like one of those 484 00:25:58,960 --> 00:26:01,080 Speaker 2: things where it's like if you're college student, you're like 485 00:26:01,119 --> 00:26:03,560 Speaker 2: walking around and you may be like drunken eleven pm 486 00:26:03,720 --> 00:26:06,000 Speaker 2: at night and you're like walking through campus like you 487 00:26:06,080 --> 00:26:08,560 Speaker 2: stopped there and the audio is playing. If I recall 488 00:26:08,600 --> 00:26:10,960 Speaker 2: like twenty four to seven next to this pump, and. 489 00:26:11,280 --> 00:26:13,520 Speaker 3: I'm sure you're not speaking from personal experience. 490 00:26:13,520 --> 00:26:15,480 Speaker 2: I don't see, not really, but that's like a thing 491 00:26:15,520 --> 00:26:17,639 Speaker 2: that you do, Okay, I get like Texas has this 492 00:26:17,680 --> 00:26:20,879 Speaker 2: big advantage because of this flute gift from over one 493 00:26:20,920 --> 00:26:23,359 Speaker 2: hundred years ago, and they discovered all the oil and 494 00:26:23,560 --> 00:26:26,679 Speaker 2: you know, and the wind and solar coming up. But 495 00:26:26,840 --> 00:26:29,600 Speaker 2: like it's not just that they've done a good job too, right, Well. 496 00:26:29,440 --> 00:26:32,960 Speaker 4: They're huge. I mean it's a huge campus. And initially 497 00:26:33,359 --> 00:26:38,080 Speaker 4: that money only funded two campuses, U T Austin, and 498 00:26:38,160 --> 00:26:40,560 Speaker 4: we can't forget about Texas A and M in college station. 499 00:26:40,880 --> 00:26:44,720 Speaker 4: They share, they share that land. Two thirds goes to 500 00:26:44,880 --> 00:26:48,280 Speaker 4: University of Texas at Austin, one third goes to Texas 501 00:26:48,280 --> 00:26:51,000 Speaker 4: A and M. And they pull that money together and 502 00:26:51,040 --> 00:26:55,040 Speaker 4: it's invested in a company called you Timco. They followed 503 00:26:55,040 --> 00:26:59,040 Speaker 4: the Harvard Management company model and they created a separate company. 504 00:26:59,400 --> 00:27:02,040 Speaker 4: And you tim is based in Austin. And you know, 505 00:27:02,080 --> 00:27:04,439 Speaker 4: if you're a hedge fund and you're visiting, you know, 506 00:27:04,520 --> 00:27:08,240 Speaker 4: the big Texas pension funds, you Timco is there in Austin, 507 00:27:08,400 --> 00:27:09,760 Speaker 4: so it would just be another place. 508 00:27:09,920 --> 00:27:13,240 Speaker 2: So Tracy, because of my Texas roots and we're starting 509 00:27:13,280 --> 00:27:16,560 Speaker 2: our odd lots multi strategy hedge fund we would stop 510 00:27:16,600 --> 00:27:18,719 Speaker 2: at you, Timco rather than Harvard. That would be our 511 00:27:18,720 --> 00:27:19,919 Speaker 2: first stop rather than Harvard. 512 00:27:19,920 --> 00:27:21,920 Speaker 3: It sounds like you just want to go to Texas. 513 00:27:22,040 --> 00:27:23,480 Speaker 2: Yeah, but I also want the money. 514 00:27:23,640 --> 00:27:27,400 Speaker 3: Yeah, Okay. One thing I'm wondering is so endowments are 515 00:27:27,440 --> 00:27:31,240 Speaker 3: invested heavily in private equity, which we talked about, and 516 00:27:31,440 --> 00:27:34,520 Speaker 3: it feels to me like there's a little bit more 517 00:27:34,640 --> 00:27:38,679 Speaker 3: criticism of private equity right now than there used to be. 518 00:27:38,800 --> 00:27:41,200 Speaker 3: There is a big piece in the Guardian about how 519 00:27:41,240 --> 00:27:44,280 Speaker 3: private equity is like ruining the economy and things like that. 520 00:27:45,040 --> 00:27:47,440 Speaker 3: Do you think there's going to be any pressure to 521 00:27:47,520 --> 00:27:48,639 Speaker 3: divest from PE? 522 00:27:49,800 --> 00:27:51,400 Speaker 4: Well, I don't know that they would want to sell 523 00:27:51,440 --> 00:27:54,320 Speaker 4: anything on the secondary market, but they you know, perhaps 524 00:27:54,680 --> 00:27:56,560 Speaker 4: you know, they may not want to re up and 525 00:27:56,640 --> 00:27:59,680 Speaker 4: increase their allocation because at this point they're quite large, 526 00:28:00,000 --> 00:28:02,520 Speaker 4: you know, Harvard and Yale and Princeton, they're all around 527 00:28:02,560 --> 00:28:06,040 Speaker 4: the thirty nine percent ish percentage. And part of the 528 00:28:06,080 --> 00:28:08,240 Speaker 4: reason is, again I keep going back to twenty twenty 529 00:28:08,280 --> 00:28:11,560 Speaker 4: one when they had these crazy returns, but you know 530 00:28:11,600 --> 00:28:14,879 Speaker 4: the value of their private equity books just really increased 531 00:28:14,960 --> 00:28:18,960 Speaker 4: with those returns, So you know, it's just a it's 532 00:28:19,000 --> 00:28:22,280 Speaker 4: a bigger share of their endowment. And plus you know, 533 00:28:22,320 --> 00:28:25,800 Speaker 4: they've had great returns up until recently. And you know, 534 00:28:25,800 --> 00:28:28,639 Speaker 4: when you think of when David Swinston started investing in 535 00:28:28,640 --> 00:28:31,720 Speaker 4: private equity decades ago, there wasn't that much money, so 536 00:28:31,760 --> 00:28:34,040 Speaker 4: it was easier to get crazy returns as they did. 537 00:28:50,240 --> 00:28:52,240 Speaker 2: So where are we in terms of the biggest How 538 00:28:52,280 --> 00:28:56,640 Speaker 2: close are we towards my U Timco eclipsing a Harvard 539 00:28:56,680 --> 00:28:58,720 Speaker 2: management company? Like what are we talking about here? 540 00:28:58,840 --> 00:29:00,760 Speaker 4: Well, it's hard to tell. I mean if you look 541 00:29:00,800 --> 00:29:03,960 Speaker 4: at how Harvard did in the last ten years in 542 00:29:04,000 --> 00:29:06,880 Speaker 4: their annualized returns and the year that ended twenty twenty three, 543 00:29:07,480 --> 00:29:10,560 Speaker 4: they were in the bottom twenty percent. So it's hard 544 00:29:10,560 --> 00:29:12,760 Speaker 4: to tell. I mean, if you get another banner year 545 00:29:12,760 --> 00:29:15,880 Speaker 4: with energy and they keep getting a couple billion dollars 546 00:29:15,880 --> 00:29:17,080 Speaker 4: in cash, But. 547 00:29:17,120 --> 00:29:19,080 Speaker 2: Like Hony, how much literally is the gap? Like what 548 00:29:19,120 --> 00:29:20,560 Speaker 2: do we know of in terms of their size? 549 00:29:20,600 --> 00:29:22,800 Speaker 4: I don't know if I've seen what U Timco size 550 00:29:22,840 --> 00:29:26,120 Speaker 4: is right now, but you know, a couple billion here 551 00:29:26,160 --> 00:29:27,120 Speaker 4: and there, so we're close. 552 00:29:28,320 --> 00:29:31,320 Speaker 3: Okay. So the other thing that's going on, speaking of 553 00:29:31,440 --> 00:29:36,800 Speaker 3: public criticism, is some of the Israel Palestine controversy that's 554 00:29:36,840 --> 00:29:40,400 Speaker 3: happened at Harvard over the past year. Talk to us 555 00:29:40,440 --> 00:29:43,920 Speaker 3: about that and what impact that's been having on donations. 556 00:29:44,960 --> 00:29:49,240 Speaker 4: So Harvard has been at the forefront of protests on campus, 557 00:29:49,720 --> 00:29:53,720 Speaker 4: like many schools, they had encampments. There's ended in the 558 00:29:53,760 --> 00:29:56,680 Speaker 4: spring without police arrests. I think everybody was very happy 559 00:29:56,720 --> 00:29:59,960 Speaker 4: about that. But there was a tremendous amount of criticism 560 00:30:00,120 --> 00:30:03,560 Speaker 4: over the last year about how they've handled anti semitism 561 00:30:03,600 --> 00:30:08,800 Speaker 4: on campus, protests, encampments, and alumni really mobilized and said 562 00:30:08,800 --> 00:30:13,640 Speaker 4: we're not donating, and you know in alumni, very wealthy 563 00:30:13,680 --> 00:30:17,120 Speaker 4: ones like Lenn Blovotnik and just sort of your average 564 00:30:17,360 --> 00:30:19,760 Speaker 4: Harvard alum, you know, said we're not going to do this. 565 00:30:20,360 --> 00:30:24,840 Speaker 4: And they're known for being amazing fundraisers. They've raised over 566 00:30:24,880 --> 00:30:29,400 Speaker 4: a billion dollars every year since twenty fourteen. They usually 567 00:30:29,520 --> 00:30:33,320 Speaker 4: raised the most, although Stanford has raised more in some years. 568 00:30:33,360 --> 00:30:37,400 Speaker 4: And donations were down fifteen percent and in the year 569 00:30:37,600 --> 00:30:40,800 Speaker 4: ended in June, and when you think about when they 570 00:30:40,800 --> 00:30:43,440 Speaker 4: were in the news so much at the end of December, 571 00:30:43,640 --> 00:30:47,680 Speaker 4: remember there was that congressional hearing in December fifth with 572 00:30:47,760 --> 00:30:51,400 Speaker 4: the presidents of Penn MIT and Harvard. They were, you know, 573 00:30:51,440 --> 00:30:55,200 Speaker 4: in the news NonStop until the end of December. She 574 00:30:55,320 --> 00:30:58,960 Speaker 4: ultimately stepped down, clutting gay the president on January second. 575 00:30:59,360 --> 00:31:03,600 Speaker 4: But when do most people make their gifts to colleges. 576 00:31:04,320 --> 00:31:07,320 Speaker 4: They make their gifts at the end of the calendar year, 577 00:31:07,640 --> 00:31:09,560 Speaker 4: and that was not a great time for Harvard. 578 00:31:10,560 --> 00:31:12,720 Speaker 2: I just have one last question, and it's a little 579 00:31:12,760 --> 00:31:17,240 Speaker 2: bit philosophical. Am I bad for donating to my college? 580 00:31:17,320 --> 00:31:20,720 Speaker 2: I had an amazing time at Texas. I mean this seriously. 581 00:31:20,800 --> 00:31:23,320 Speaker 2: I had an amazing time at Texas. Nothing I actually 582 00:31:23,440 --> 00:31:25,240 Speaker 2: learned led directly to a job, but it was a 583 00:31:25,240 --> 00:31:28,959 Speaker 2: formative experience. I look back on it fondly. I've been 584 00:31:29,120 --> 00:31:33,479 Speaker 2: very fortunate in my career since then. Many good things 585 00:31:33,520 --> 00:31:35,800 Speaker 2: that have happened in my life were roughly from that 586 00:31:35,960 --> 00:31:38,920 Speaker 2: time that I spent there. Like, should I think about 587 00:31:38,920 --> 00:31:41,120 Speaker 2: this differently? Because when I look at it's like they 588 00:31:41,160 --> 00:31:44,760 Speaker 2: have tons of money, they don't really need anymore. Like 589 00:31:45,000 --> 00:31:45,520 Speaker 2: pitch me that. 590 00:31:45,560 --> 00:31:48,160 Speaker 4: It's like a good idea, Well, do you want to 591 00:31:48,160 --> 00:31:51,200 Speaker 4: help students have a similar experience that you do. 592 00:31:51,200 --> 00:31:52,120 Speaker 2: They have tons of money. 593 00:31:52,200 --> 00:31:55,200 Speaker 4: I don't know, maybe there's something in particular you can 594 00:31:55,320 --> 00:31:58,720 Speaker 4: tailor your donation to something specifically, I mean, and that's 595 00:31:58,760 --> 00:32:00,320 Speaker 4: one of the podcasts. 596 00:32:00,400 --> 00:32:00,800 Speaker 1: Yeah. 597 00:32:00,840 --> 00:32:03,520 Speaker 4: Well, that's one of the things that Harvard complains about 598 00:32:03,640 --> 00:32:06,040 Speaker 4: is a lot of their money is they say it's restricted. 599 00:32:06,080 --> 00:32:08,040 Speaker 4: Oh yeah, right, so if you give money to the 600 00:32:08,080 --> 00:32:10,160 Speaker 4: crew team, they can't spend it in theory on the 601 00:32:10,200 --> 00:32:10,880 Speaker 4: tennis team. 602 00:32:11,000 --> 00:32:11,240 Speaker 1: Right. 603 00:32:11,320 --> 00:32:13,920 Speaker 4: So you could say I want to you know, I 604 00:32:13,920 --> 00:32:17,000 Speaker 4: want to give it to something, and then there you go. 605 00:32:17,160 --> 00:32:20,360 Speaker 4: It could be named after you if you want. 606 00:32:20,840 --> 00:32:23,400 Speaker 2: Yeah, maybe a little maybe a little podcast studio at 607 00:32:23,400 --> 00:32:24,840 Speaker 2: the j School. 608 00:32:25,040 --> 00:32:26,680 Speaker 3: There you guysenthal podcast. 609 00:32:26,720 --> 00:32:28,360 Speaker 2: Yea there, maybe maybe that. 610 00:32:28,680 --> 00:32:31,120 Speaker 4: And they you know, one thing about these gifts is 611 00:32:31,280 --> 00:32:33,600 Speaker 4: you know, their multi year so you could make up 612 00:32:33,680 --> 00:32:36,480 Speaker 4: pledge over ten years or whatever the case. 613 00:32:36,560 --> 00:32:39,640 Speaker 2: But I'm open to changing my mind on this. So 614 00:32:39,720 --> 00:32:41,400 Speaker 2: I just but you know, I wrestle with it because 615 00:32:41,400 --> 00:32:44,360 Speaker 2: I just between the three of us here in the room, 616 00:32:44,760 --> 00:32:47,640 Speaker 2: like I think I have the number that like they 617 00:32:47,680 --> 00:32:49,720 Speaker 2: call me on like I either haven't blocked or like 618 00:32:49,760 --> 00:32:51,479 Speaker 2: I have like it says like do not answer. 619 00:32:52,080 --> 00:32:52,640 Speaker 1: I'm open to. 620 00:32:52,760 --> 00:32:55,480 Speaker 2: I'm open to like kind of cruel. That's yeah, I know, 621 00:32:55,720 --> 00:32:57,600 Speaker 2: That's what I'm saying. I have a little issue I have. 622 00:32:57,720 --> 00:33:00,959 Speaker 2: I have some misgivings, and I'm open to rethinking this 623 00:33:01,040 --> 00:33:03,280 Speaker 2: question at this stage in my life. Janet Lauren, thank 624 00:33:03,280 --> 00:33:05,840 Speaker 2: you so much for coming on. I really appreciate it. 625 00:33:05,880 --> 00:33:21,160 Speaker 1: Thanks for having me, Tracy. 626 00:33:21,240 --> 00:33:25,400 Speaker 2: I am going to use this podcast for the most 627 00:33:25,600 --> 00:33:29,360 Speaker 2: nakedly egregious self serving purpose ever right now, and I 628 00:33:29,400 --> 00:33:30,720 Speaker 2: just want everyone to be aware of that. 629 00:33:30,760 --> 00:33:35,120 Speaker 3: Okay, Wait, is it urging listeners to continue to support 630 00:33:35,280 --> 00:33:37,520 Speaker 3: the pod so that you can make donations to Steve? 631 00:33:37,680 --> 00:33:41,120 Speaker 2: No? No, no, I'm like open to rethinking my philosophy 632 00:33:41,120 --> 00:33:43,720 Speaker 2: on donations because I probably when I blocked the number, 633 00:33:43,800 --> 00:33:45,960 Speaker 2: I was like, you know, much younger and earlier in 634 00:33:46,000 --> 00:33:49,240 Speaker 2: my career. No, you know what I've thought. I can't 635 00:33:49,240 --> 00:33:51,800 Speaker 2: believe I'm going to say this out loud. I've thought 636 00:33:53,200 --> 00:33:56,880 Speaker 2: that a nice, I quote retirement job for me would 637 00:33:56,960 --> 00:34:00,800 Speaker 2: be being some sort of adjunct professor at the journalism 638 00:34:00,840 --> 00:34:02,600 Speaker 2: school at UT And like, you know, I've done a 639 00:34:02,640 --> 00:34:05,640 Speaker 2: lot in digital media and like maybe through donations or something, 640 00:34:06,040 --> 00:34:07,720 Speaker 2: find a way back into that community. 641 00:34:07,760 --> 00:34:09,880 Speaker 3: Yeah, start laying the ground right now. 642 00:34:09,920 --> 00:34:13,879 Speaker 2: Basically, start prepaying my salary, make a bunch of donations 643 00:34:14,120 --> 00:34:16,480 Speaker 2: so that you know, twenty years from now, when we 644 00:34:16,520 --> 00:34:19,160 Speaker 2: stop doing odd lots. There's like this pool of money 645 00:34:19,160 --> 00:34:21,400 Speaker 2: that can fund my adjunct degree. 646 00:34:21,600 --> 00:34:21,839 Speaker 3: Yeah. 647 00:34:22,000 --> 00:34:25,919 Speaker 2: Absolutely, but maybe someone will hear that. And like I'm 648 00:34:25,960 --> 00:34:26,960 Speaker 2: just saying. 649 00:34:27,840 --> 00:34:29,200 Speaker 3: Don't go to Texas, Joe. 650 00:34:29,280 --> 00:34:29,640 Speaker 4: No I'm not. 651 00:34:30,160 --> 00:34:32,839 Speaker 2: I'm just yeah, I won't, Okay, but I but yeah, 652 00:34:32,960 --> 00:34:35,440 Speaker 2: maybe someone will listen and at the University of Texas 653 00:34:35,480 --> 00:34:37,279 Speaker 2: Journalism School and hear about. 654 00:34:37,000 --> 00:34:40,799 Speaker 3: My twenty years twenty year Yeah. You know. 655 00:34:40,880 --> 00:34:42,759 Speaker 2: One other thing though, for real, though, I think it's 656 00:34:42,800 --> 00:34:47,120 Speaker 2: really interesting about this, and I hadn't realized, is the 657 00:34:47,200 --> 00:34:50,680 Speaker 2: difference in the corporate structure between the Harvard Endowment and 658 00:34:50,800 --> 00:34:53,800 Speaker 2: the Yale Endowment. And so you can and so anyone 659 00:34:53,880 --> 00:34:56,400 Speaker 2: can just look at the Harvard endowments. Why are you 660 00:34:56,440 --> 00:34:59,040 Speaker 2: paying all these people so much? Have you heard? Passive 661 00:34:59,120 --> 00:35:02,160 Speaker 2: is the future? All these fees And yet you could 662 00:35:02,200 --> 00:35:05,680 Speaker 2: have another institution that's doing fantastically and no one sees 663 00:35:05,680 --> 00:35:08,680 Speaker 2: how much they're paying managers or how much individual star 664 00:35:08,800 --> 00:35:12,040 Speaker 2: traders are getting because those independent star traders are at 665 00:35:12,040 --> 00:35:14,359 Speaker 2: the hedge funds that no one actually gets to see 666 00:35:14,400 --> 00:35:17,400 Speaker 2: because they don't file some independent return you know. 667 00:35:17,640 --> 00:35:20,600 Speaker 3: Speaking of transparency, I saw this really great chart in 668 00:35:20,640 --> 00:35:24,840 Speaker 3: the Harvard Crimson the student newspaper, and it's the word 669 00:35:25,000 --> 00:35:28,200 Speaker 3: count of the annual message. I love that from the 670 00:35:28,239 --> 00:35:33,160 Speaker 3: Harvard Management Company CEO, the Endowment CEO, and I think 671 00:35:33,600 --> 00:35:37,759 Speaker 3: it used to be like over three thousand words typically 672 00:35:37,920 --> 00:35:41,000 Speaker 3: and now it's gone down to a little over one thousand. 673 00:35:41,280 --> 00:35:44,160 Speaker 3: So interesting. That's where a lot of the criticism of 674 00:35:44,440 --> 00:35:47,200 Speaker 3: lack of transparency at Harvard comes from. 675 00:35:47,440 --> 00:35:49,480 Speaker 2: Yeah, well you just get rid of all, you know, 676 00:35:49,600 --> 00:35:51,600 Speaker 2: don't have any in house traders talking your thing, and 677 00:35:51,600 --> 00:35:54,960 Speaker 2: you let the third party managers, the hedge funds be 678 00:35:55,239 --> 00:35:57,480 Speaker 2: let them write the words in the letters. That's their 679 00:35:57,560 --> 00:35:58,960 Speaker 2: job is to write words in the letters. 680 00:35:59,080 --> 00:36:01,319 Speaker 3: That's right. We leave it there. Let's leave it there, 681 00:36:01,520 --> 00:36:05,040 Speaker 3: all right. This has been another episode of the Authots podcast. 682 00:36:05,200 --> 00:36:08,240 Speaker 3: I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway. 683 00:36:08,600 --> 00:36:11,440 Speaker 2: And I'm Jill Wisenthal. You can follow me at the Stalwart. 684 00:36:11,600 --> 00:36:14,640 Speaker 2: Follow our guest Janet Lauren at Janet Lauren and check 685 00:36:14,640 --> 00:36:17,560 Speaker 2: out her recent big take on the Harvard Endowment on 686 00:36:17,600 --> 00:36:21,160 Speaker 2: Bloomberg dot com. Follow our producers Carmen Rodriguez at Kerman 687 00:36:21,280 --> 00:36:24,960 Speaker 2: armand Dashel Bennett at Dashbot and Kilbrooks at Kilbrooks and 688 00:36:25,000 --> 00:36:27,520 Speaker 2: Thank you to our producer Moses onam form our Odd 689 00:36:27,560 --> 00:36:30,040 Speaker 2: Lots content. Go to Bloomberg dot com slash odd Lots, 690 00:36:30,040 --> 00:36:32,719 Speaker 2: where have transcripts, a blog and a newsletter and you 691 00:36:32,760 --> 00:36:34,799 Speaker 2: can chat about all of these topics twenty four to 692 00:36:34,800 --> 00:36:38,400 Speaker 2: seven in our discord Discord dot gg slash od Lots. 693 00:36:38,640 --> 00:36:42,120 Speaker 3: And if you want more odd Lots content, you should 694 00:36:42,239 --> 00:36:44,960 Speaker 3: check out an offer that we have running right now. 695 00:36:45,040 --> 00:36:50,520 Speaker 3: You can become a Bloomberg subscriber at a special introductory rate. 696 00:36:50,760 --> 00:36:53,000 Speaker 3: All you have to do is go to Bloomberg dot 697 00:36:53,000 --> 00:36:57,000 Speaker 3: com Forward slash Podcast offer and then click on the 698 00:36:57,040 --> 00:37:00,200 Speaker 3: link in the show notes, and if you do that, 699 00:37:00,280 --> 00:37:04,120 Speaker 3: you will get ad free Odd Lots of episodes as 700 00:37:04,239 --> 00:37:08,880 Speaker 3: well as access to our new daily newsletter. Thanks for listening.