WEBVTT - Infiltrating an International Ransomware Gang

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<v Speaker 1>Pushkin. Just a quick note, this is a bonus episode

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<v Speaker 1>of What's Your Problem, and it's sponsored by Microsoft. John

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<v Speaker 1>Demaggio studies cybercrime for a living. It's his job. But

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<v Speaker 1>when he wanted to understand an international cybercrime gang called

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<v Speaker 1>lock Bit, he realized he couldn't learn everything he wanted

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<v Speaker 1>to know from the outside, so he started trying to

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<v Speaker 1>figure out how to get people on the inside to

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<v Speaker 1>tell him what he needed to know.

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<v Speaker 2>So I spent a lot of time studying going back

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<v Speaker 2>to World War Two when they started having all these

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<v Speaker 2>documents about how to use the human trade craft to

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<v Speaker 2>sort of recruit and convince people to do things that

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<v Speaker 2>they don't necessarily know that they're doing to support your cause.

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<v Speaker 1>So were you telling me you started studying sort of

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<v Speaker 1>World War two era spycraft.

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<v Speaker 3>Yes, that's correct.

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<v Speaker 1>What's something you learn from World War two era spycraft

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<v Speaker 1>that helped you weasel your way into a ransomware gang?

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<v Speaker 2>Everything from their ego to understanding who their adversary is

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<v Speaker 2>and making them feel that being friends with you will

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<v Speaker 2>benefit them because you have a common enemy, or even

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<v Speaker 2>even being adversarial towards them and saying certain things just

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<v Speaker 2>to see what the reaction is to sometimes understand the truth.

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<v Speaker 3>There's also the sort.

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<v Speaker 2>Of the plan and prepare phase where you have to

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<v Speaker 2>go and sort of stalk them and understand who their

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<v Speaker 2>contacts are, who their friends are, who their enemies are,

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<v Speaker 2>where they hang out online, all of that stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>So you have this set of strategic ideas in your mind,

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<v Speaker 1>what do you actually do?

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<v Speaker 3>So what I did.

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<v Speaker 2>The first thing I did is I needed to figure

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<v Speaker 2>out sort of their digital fingerprint, so I profiled them.

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<v Speaker 2>I began looking across the dark web. Obviously started with

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<v Speaker 2>the easy One, their data leak site, their own infrastructure,

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<v Speaker 2>and I went from there and I eventually found the

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<v Speaker 2>forums that they live on. And there's some very prominent

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<v Speaker 2>Russian hacking forums that have been around for about twenty years,

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<v Speaker 2>so it made sense to start there. And sure enough,

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<v Speaker 2>they were very prevalent on that website. They were very

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<v Speaker 2>involved with conversations, They have friends, their enemies, and they

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<v Speaker 2>do their business. So they actually would go there just

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<v Speaker 2>to talk and sort of hang out with their buddies.

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<v Speaker 2>And the drama, it was like it was like a

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<v Speaker 2>soap opera. The drama these guys would getting these big

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<v Speaker 2>arguments are the stupidest things. I just started profiling and

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<v Speaker 2>visually mapping out who is who, who they were talking to,

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<v Speaker 2>what those other people's roles were. Again, then I would

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<v Speaker 2>find the ones who are their friends, and I would

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<v Speaker 2>try to approach them and the people who worked for them.

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<v Speaker 1>And did it work.

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<v Speaker 3>It did well, It sort of worked.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Jacob Goldstein, and this is what's your problem. My

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<v Speaker 1>guest today is John DiMaggio. John is the chief security

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<v Speaker 1>strategist at a company called Analyst One, and I wanted

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<v Speaker 1>to talk with John about Lockbit, this ransomware gang that

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<v Speaker 1>was behind attacks that extorted over one hundred million dollars

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<v Speaker 1>from companies around the world. John wrote this sort of

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<v Speaker 1>book length series of online posts about Lockbit. It was

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<v Speaker 1>part of a thing John called the Ransomware Diaries. The

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<v Speaker 1>story of Lockbit is a great window into the ransomware industry,

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<v Speaker 1>and it is an industry with a lot of remarkable

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<v Speaker 1>similarities to ordinary non criminal industries. Lockbitch tried to brand itself,

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<v Speaker 1>It tried to attract talent and notch keywins, just like

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<v Speaker 1>any software company. But then there's also the part that

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<v Speaker 1>is not like any software company. There is the crime part,

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<v Speaker 1>and it was the crime part where Lockbit went too

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<v Speaker 1>far and wound up drawing the ire of international law

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<v Speaker 1>enforcement agencies that in fact have their own set of

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<v Speaker 1>innovative strategies. And John watched all this happen up close.

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<v Speaker 1>He told me his key contact on the inside had

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<v Speaker 1>the user name lock bits up, short for Lockbit Support.

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<v Speaker 2>I didn't know it at the time when I first

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<v Speaker 2>started talking to them, but what I found out as

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<v Speaker 2>I began to talk more is there were two personalities

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<v Speaker 2>behind the account.

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<v Speaker 3>One seemed to be much.

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<v Speaker 2>Younger, friendlier, more in tune with sort of pop culture,

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<v Speaker 2>and the other one, who I gave a name mister

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<v Speaker 2>grumpy Pants, because he was all business, always serious, and

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<v Speaker 2>that was kind of how I differentiated.

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<v Speaker 1>Tell me about the sort of conversations you had with

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<v Speaker 1>lockbits up, like, what was the nature of those exchanges.

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<v Speaker 3>Well, so you have.

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<v Speaker 2>To understand that when I did the initial part that

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<v Speaker 2>was sort of cover pretending to be somebody else. I

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<v Speaker 2>only got so far with that, and after I wrote

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<v Speaker 2>The Ransomware Diaries Volume one, they knew who I was.

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<v Speaker 2>The farthest I got was talking to them is myself,

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<v Speaker 2>and they you know, it was just I started with with, Hey,

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<v Speaker 2>do you guys know who I am? I want to

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<v Speaker 2>have a conversation with you, And they were, you know,

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<v Speaker 2>said to me, yeah, your favorite researcher. We love you, okay,

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<v Speaker 2>And they were very willing to talk, which is why

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<v Speaker 2>I got so much farther talking to them as myself

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<v Speaker 2>as I did pretending to be a hacker.

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<v Speaker 1>Uh Huh. What's the thing you learned from lock bits up?

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<v Speaker 1>What's a what's a What's one detail of your understanding

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<v Speaker 1>that was improved by that relationship?

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<v Speaker 2>Well, there were a lot of things, but one of

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<v Speaker 2>the key things I had learned was information about uh.

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<v Speaker 2>They prob internal problems that they had with affiliates. For example,

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<v Speaker 2>they complained that they've got really good hackers, but some

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<v Speaker 2>of these hackers are younger kids, and they're good at hacking,

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<v Speaker 2>but they're really bad at negotiating, uh, And he was.

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<v Speaker 2>They were unhappy about the amount of money coming in,

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<v Speaker 2>so they talked about that and coming up with a

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<v Speaker 2>with a model of how much they would accept, and

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<v Speaker 2>they created sort of a formula per company, and so

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<v Speaker 2>just things like that, things around tech resources. They asked

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<v Speaker 2>me one time if I would buy them. They couldn't

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<v Speaker 2>get a they they couldn't get a Domain tools account,

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<v Speaker 2>and they wanted to know because they couldn't pay for

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<v Speaker 2>it with crypto, they want to know if I would

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<v Speaker 2>buy it for them, which, of course they're playing with me,

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<v Speaker 2>you know. And it was sort of a cat and

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<v Speaker 2>mouse fun relationship for a while of going back and forth.

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<v Speaker 2>So it was friendly for most of our relationship until

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<v Speaker 2>it wasn't.

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<v Speaker 1>So okay, So you're in this world and I just

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<v Speaker 1>want to step back for a minute to talk about

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<v Speaker 1>what's going on in a big way. Right, there's this

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<v Speaker 1>phrase that's sort of central here, which is ransomware as

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<v Speaker 1>a service. Ransomware is like straightforwards something a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>people are familiar with. It's basically, some bad actor, some hacker,

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<v Speaker 1>hacks into some companies' computers, locks them up and says

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<v Speaker 1>we're not going to unlock them unless you pay us

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<v Speaker 1>a ransom. That's ransomware.

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<v Speaker 3>Exactly.

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<v Speaker 1>What is ransomware as a service? What is I mean?

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<v Speaker 1>We know about software as a service, right, it's basically

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<v Speaker 1>you pay whatever amount of a month and you get to

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<v Speaker 1>use software. What's ransomware as a service.

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<v Speaker 2>So ransomware is a service. There's more than just ransomware.

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<v Speaker 2>So you have this two part model where you have

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<v Speaker 2>a service provider. That service provider provides the actual ransomware code.

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<v Speaker 2>They also provide infrastructure. So the provider provides these services,

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<v Speaker 2>the hacker goes and does the dirty work of actual hacking,

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<v Speaker 2>and together when a victim pays the extortion, they share

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<v Speaker 2>the profit from it. The benefit from using this model

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<v Speaker 2>is you can have a lot higher volume than if

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<v Speaker 2>it was just five guys in a group doing it themselves.

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<v Speaker 2>By using this model, you can have many people doing

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<v Speaker 2>attacks on your behalf. Much higher volume of attacks, much

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<v Speaker 2>higher revenue.

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<v Speaker 1>So Lockbit is basically just a software company. They're like

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<v Speaker 1>an enterprise software company. They write software and provide various

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<v Speaker 1>tools for users. But in this case the users are criminals,

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<v Speaker 1>are people who want to hack into various computer systems

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<v Speaker 1>and steal data and extort money.

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<v Speaker 3>That's correct.

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<v Speaker 2>But the other piece to it is the service provider aspect.

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<v Speaker 2>They're the ones that are sort of in charge, that

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<v Speaker 2>run the show, that give direction, that step in whenever

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<v Speaker 2>there's an issue, if there's a victim not paying, sometimes

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<v Speaker 2>they'll come in and help with the negotiation or take

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<v Speaker 2>over or give direction on how much you can you

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<v Speaker 2>can accept as a payment, or even say this is

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<v Speaker 2>what you can or cannot hack this company. So they're

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<v Speaker 2>definitely in the leadership chair.

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<v Speaker 1>So I want to talk about how lockbit sort of

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<v Speaker 1>grows and makes a name for itself. And one of

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<v Speaker 1>the things that's really interesting is kind of how uninteresting

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<v Speaker 1>it is. It's like, oh, it's this international criminal gang

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<v Speaker 1>and they're acting like a boring software company, and it

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<v Speaker 1>seems like a key early moment for them as they're

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<v Speaker 1>trying to grow and differentiate themselves in the market. Is

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<v Speaker 1>this summer paper contest in to tell me about that?

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, it's it's pretty crazy.

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<v Speaker 2>So on this long running forum that I mentioned earlier,

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<v Speaker 2>this Russian hacking forum, lockbit really wanted to to get

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<v Speaker 2>their brand out there. So what they did is they

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<v Speaker 2>sponsored this hacking paper contest, meaning hackers would submit these

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<v Speaker 2>papers on different ways to hack and lockbit they would

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<v Speaker 2>they would take part in this and they would help review.

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<v Speaker 2>And there was five winners and the I think I

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<v Speaker 2>don't remember what the what the what the I think

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<v Speaker 2>was five thousand dollars maybe.

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<v Speaker 1>Uh, you put a screenshot in your report. And what's

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<v Speaker 1>amazing is how banal. It looks it looks totally like

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<v Speaker 1>some college software contest or just some boring enterprise software company.

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<v Speaker 1>Like there's this little kind of clip art of just

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<v Speaker 1>like a dude at a laptop with a little plant

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<v Speaker 1>next to him, although there is also a skull and

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<v Speaker 1>crossbones next to him. It's like, we're just coders, but we're bad.

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<v Speaker 1>And as you said, first place is five thousand dollars,

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<v Speaker 1>which seems like not that much. Right, they're exploiting that.

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<v Speaker 1>They're stealing tens of millions of dollars at this point, right.

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<v Speaker 1>And then it says like accepted article topics, just like

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<v Speaker 1>it would in a college contest, but under accepted article topics,

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<v Speaker 1>it says hacks any methods for pouring shells, fixing, elevating rights,

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<v Speaker 1>your story is and tricks interesting hack stories. It's such

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<v Speaker 1>a fantastic combination of well banality and evil.

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<v Speaker 3>It is.

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<v Speaker 2>But here's what you have to think about. There's two

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<v Speaker 2>benefits for this. One what I mentioned, sort of getting

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<v Speaker 2>their name out and getting known with hackers. But two,

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<v Speaker 2>they're looking for those upcoming rising stars, if you.

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<v Speaker 1>Will, recruitment. It's talents, right, and yeah.

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<v Speaker 2>That's right, and that's why Lackbit was different than most

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<v Speaker 2>of these are the ransomware groups, because they approached it

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<v Speaker 2>is a business and they thought out of the box

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<v Speaker 2>and that's kind of what would set them ahead in

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<v Speaker 2>a part at the time from other ransomware groups.

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<v Speaker 1>So does it work this strategy?

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<v Speaker 3>It absolutely worked.

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<v Speaker 2>I mean, there's a reason that people know their name

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<v Speaker 2>and know who they are, and there's a reason that

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<v Speaker 2>they have so many people that at the time in

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<v Speaker 2>a way really wanted to work for them over other groups.

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<v Speaker 2>It was propaganda and it worked.

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<v Speaker 1>And so it seems like by around twenty twenty one

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<v Speaker 1>they've hit the big time. And there's this one hack

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<v Speaker 1>in particular that you write about in the summer of

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<v Speaker 1>twenty one of Accenture, the big international consulting company. Tell

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<v Speaker 1>me about the Accenture hack.

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<v Speaker 2>So in the Accenture hack, you know, the affiliate had

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<v Speaker 2>gone in compromised them, they locked down their data, and

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<v Speaker 2>lock Bit, you know, put on their site that you

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<v Speaker 2>know they were a victim. Reporter started to report about it,

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<v Speaker 2>and you got a lot of buzz in the media. Now,

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<v Speaker 2>the problem with the Accenture hack is that Accenture denied

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<v Speaker 2>that the hack took place. Initially saying that it wasn't

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<v Speaker 2>real and it didn't happen. The issue with that is

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<v Speaker 2>their customer's data was on their website and you could

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<v Speaker 2>you could go see it and validate it and download

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<v Speaker 2>samples of it.

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<v Speaker 1>The customer's data was on the lockbit website.

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<v Speaker 3>That's correct.

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<v Speaker 2>That's correct, and it was just a sampling, but you

0:12:32.596 --> 0:12:36.316
<v Speaker 2>could see this information and it looked quite authentic.

0:12:37.116 --> 0:12:42.196
<v Speaker 1>So so does this accenture hack sort of put Lockbit

0:12:42.316 --> 0:12:43.836
<v Speaker 1>on the map in a bigger way?

0:12:44.796 --> 0:12:50.196
<v Speaker 3>Oh? I mean the media surrounding that was was was

0:12:50.396 --> 0:12:50.836
<v Speaker 3>very loud.

0:12:50.836 --> 0:12:54.676
<v Speaker 2>I mean it was across many organizations. Lots of of

0:12:54.876 --> 0:13:00.236
<v Speaker 2>of well known journalists and organizations reported on it. All

0:13:00.316 --> 0:13:03.156
<v Speaker 2>this feeds into the propaganda. Now the journalist shouldn't report

0:13:03.196 --> 0:13:05.476
<v Speaker 2>on it. I'm just saying, you know, lockbit plays that

0:13:05.556 --> 0:13:07.636
<v Speaker 2>to benefit him as them as well.

0:13:07.716 --> 0:13:10.876
<v Speaker 1>Yeah, So basically the press coverage is good for lockbit

0:13:10.996 --> 0:13:14.196
<v Speaker 1>because hackers see it and go to lockbit and say, hey,

0:13:14.276 --> 0:13:16.076
<v Speaker 1>I want to be an affiliate and do some hacking.

0:13:16.236 --> 0:13:18.876
<v Speaker 2>Essentially, that's right, and to be fair, the same thing

0:13:18.916 --> 0:13:21.716
<v Speaker 2>from me from writing these reports. Yes, it helps researchers

0:13:21.796 --> 0:13:24.436
<v Speaker 2>law enforcement, but it also helps them that that's the

0:13:24.436 --> 0:13:26.316
<v Speaker 2>reason that they were friendly to me is because they

0:13:26.316 --> 0:13:28.836
<v Speaker 2>were fans of a lot. I have probably just as

0:13:28.836 --> 0:13:31.596
<v Speaker 2>many criminal hackers that are fans of the ransomware diaries

0:13:31.636 --> 0:13:35.676
<v Speaker 2>as there are researchers and you know, right, regular people

0:13:35.716 --> 0:13:36.476
<v Speaker 2>that are not criminals.

0:13:36.556 --> 0:13:42.356
<v Speaker 1>Well, I mean there's an ecosystem here, right, like the

0:13:42.356 --> 0:13:44.956
<v Speaker 1>the job. There's a universe of people whose job is

0:13:44.996 --> 0:13:48.516
<v Speaker 1>fighting criminals and a universe of people who are criminals

0:13:48.556 --> 0:13:51.676
<v Speaker 1>who are trying to evade being caught. Right, And that's right,

0:13:52.076 --> 0:13:54.836
<v Speaker 1>the kind of intellectual universe has got to be almost

0:13:54.996 --> 0:13:57.876
<v Speaker 1>entirely overlapping. Everybody's trying to figure out what everybody else

0:13:57.956 --> 0:14:00.756
<v Speaker 1>is doing. Everybody's sort of using the same tricks on

0:14:00.796 --> 0:14:04.596
<v Speaker 1>each other. It makes sense that the bad guys and

0:14:04.676 --> 0:14:06.316
<v Speaker 1>the good guys would be reading the same.

0:14:06.116 --> 0:14:08.156
<v Speaker 3>Stuff it does.

0:14:08.356 --> 0:14:11.156
<v Speaker 2>And you know that's really where that uh that that

0:14:11.156 --> 0:14:15.036
<v Speaker 2>that that human framework came in because his ego was

0:14:15.036 --> 0:14:17.476
<v Speaker 2>was the main thing I was able to play on

0:14:18.196 --> 0:14:21.236
<v Speaker 2>in order to get information. And even when there were

0:14:21.276 --> 0:14:23.236
<v Speaker 2>lies in that information, you know, I talked to the

0:14:23.236 --> 0:14:25.076
<v Speaker 2>people who work for them, So I would take those

0:14:25.156 --> 0:14:27.156
<v Speaker 2>lies and I would present them in a different way

0:14:27.316 --> 0:14:30.316
<v Speaker 2>to those people to get a response, and that would

0:14:30.356 --> 0:14:32.316
<v Speaker 2>help me to validate what's real and what's not.

0:14:32.596 --> 0:14:35.276
<v Speaker 1>Is there some specific example of playing on his ego,

0:14:35.436 --> 0:14:37.916
<v Speaker 1>something you said to flatter him or something.

0:14:38.756 --> 0:14:40.876
<v Speaker 2>Uh well, yeah, you know one of the one of

0:14:40.876 --> 0:14:43.796
<v Speaker 2>the things that that was big for him was, you know,

0:14:43.876 --> 0:14:46.516
<v Speaker 2>he wanted to be sort of the Darth Vader of

0:14:46.596 --> 0:14:49.716
<v Speaker 2>ransomware of my words, not his, but you know, he

0:14:49.716 --> 0:14:52.556
<v Speaker 2>he wanted to be this this top person. So you

0:14:52.556 --> 0:14:54.796
<v Speaker 2>know when you would talk about him changing the game

0:14:54.836 --> 0:14:58.756
<v Speaker 2>of ransomware and telling him, you know, you guys are

0:14:58.476 --> 0:15:00.756
<v Speaker 2>are are on top? You know, how did you get there?

0:15:00.796 --> 0:15:03.716
<v Speaker 2>How did you how did you get ahead of other

0:15:03.756 --> 0:15:08.756
<v Speaker 2>groups like like REvil and uh in in time, Black Matter,

0:15:09.276 --> 0:15:11.876
<v Speaker 2>in groups like that, And you know he loved that.

0:15:11.956 --> 0:15:14.036
<v Speaker 2>You know, it would just that was a thing that

0:15:14.036 --> 0:15:17.436
<v Speaker 2>would get mister grumpy pants talking was sort of playing

0:15:17.436 --> 0:15:20.076
<v Speaker 2>on his ego, you know, asking questions about how he

0:15:20.156 --> 0:15:23.636
<v Speaker 2>got to be the top brand in ransomware and how

0:15:23.676 --> 0:15:25.036
<v Speaker 2>he's better than all the other ones.

0:15:25.236 --> 0:15:26.756
<v Speaker 3>And he fed right into that.

0:15:30.836 --> 0:15:33.716
<v Speaker 1>Coming up after the break, what happens when lockbit is

0:15:33.796 --> 0:15:48.236
<v Speaker 1>used to hack a hospital for children with cancer, So

0:15:48.436 --> 0:15:53.116
<v Speaker 1>kind of early twenty twenties Lockbit is king of the

0:15:53.196 --> 0:15:56.676
<v Speaker 1>ransomware world. And then it seems like in about twenty

0:15:56.756 --> 0:15:59.916
<v Speaker 1>twenty three they sort of start going too far or

0:15:59.956 --> 0:16:03.956
<v Speaker 1>their affiliates start going too far right, they start to

0:16:03.996 --> 0:16:09.476
<v Speaker 1>get into trouble, and it seems like the back of

0:16:10.236 --> 0:16:13.876
<v Speaker 1>hospital that is actually called Thick Kids, which is yeh,

0:16:14.316 --> 0:16:19.156
<v Speaker 1>a children's cancer hospital in Canada, is kind of a

0:16:19.196 --> 0:16:25.716
<v Speaker 1>turning point. And like I do wonder, like you could

0:16:25.756 --> 0:16:30.756
<v Speaker 1>hack anybody, why would you hack a cancer hospital for children? Like,

0:16:30.796 --> 0:16:33.596
<v Speaker 1>is it because you want to be as evil as possible?

0:16:34.796 --> 0:16:37.836
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it's because they see them as a as an

0:16:37.876 --> 0:16:41.116
<v Speaker 2>easy target because a hospital has to be available and

0:16:41.156 --> 0:16:48.516
<v Speaker 2>make their resources easily accessible by their patients, clients, medical organizations,

0:16:49.036 --> 0:16:52.796
<v Speaker 2>and inherently the more accessible something is less secure it is.

0:16:53.116 --> 0:16:55.156
<v Speaker 2>So it makes them an easy target. They have a

0:16:55.276 --> 0:16:59.196
<v Speaker 2>lot of money, and they're more likely to pay because

0:16:59.236 --> 0:17:01.836
<v Speaker 2>the data is so sensitive and the systems that are

0:17:01.916 --> 0:17:04.916
<v Speaker 2>encrypted are so critical that it makes them a ripe

0:17:04.956 --> 0:17:08.516
<v Speaker 2>target and that's the reason that they'll go after them. Initially,

0:17:09.996 --> 0:17:14.196
<v Speaker 2>the hospital was hacked, the systems were encrypted, data was stolen,

0:17:14.436 --> 0:17:16.996
<v Speaker 2>and they didn't they weren't going to let them out

0:17:17.036 --> 0:17:19.956
<v Speaker 2>of this. They were going to force them to pay

0:17:20.236 --> 0:17:22.156
<v Speaker 2>or they weren't going to give them the key to

0:17:22.196 --> 0:17:24.876
<v Speaker 2>decryptor systems, and didn't seem to care that these kids

0:17:24.876 --> 0:17:27.436
<v Speaker 2>couldn't get the care that they needed and the treatments

0:17:27.476 --> 0:17:30.996
<v Speaker 2>that they needed. The only reason so what ended up

0:17:30.996 --> 0:17:33.956
<v Speaker 2>happening was with all the media around it, it was

0:17:33.996 --> 0:17:37.276
<v Speaker 2>such a bad look for Lockbit that the leadership of

0:17:37.316 --> 0:17:41.396
<v Speaker 2>the group decided, after you know, about two weeks, they decided, Okay,

0:17:41.636 --> 0:17:43.356
<v Speaker 2>we're going to go ahead and we're going to give

0:17:43.396 --> 0:17:46.316
<v Speaker 2>them the cryption key, just because this was getting to

0:17:46.356 --> 0:17:49.196
<v Speaker 2>be too hot. And if you remember, like the whole

0:17:49.196 --> 0:17:52.556
<v Speaker 2>Colonial Pipeline thing with the Dark Side ransomware group, you

0:17:52.556 --> 0:17:55.396
<v Speaker 2>know that got that got so much attention that you know,

0:17:55.476 --> 0:17:58.156
<v Speaker 2>government agencies got involved and went after them, and when

0:17:58.156 --> 0:18:01.636
<v Speaker 2>that happens, it's very bad for ransomware groups. So they

0:18:02.116 --> 0:18:05.676
<v Speaker 2>essentially saw things could possibly go that direction with the

0:18:05.676 --> 0:18:08.356
<v Speaker 2>amount of bad publicity they were getting, and decided it

0:18:08.396 --> 0:18:10.596
<v Speaker 2>wasn't worth it the payment they were going to get,

0:18:10.676 --> 0:18:13.356
<v Speaker 2>and they went ahead and provided the hospital with the

0:18:14.036 --> 0:18:17.236
<v Speaker 2>decryption key so they could get those systems back online.

0:18:18.276 --> 0:18:22.516
<v Speaker 1>And and in fact, their concern about a backlash was justified. Right,

0:18:22.556 --> 0:18:27.116
<v Speaker 1>it seems like international governments, kind of led by the UK,

0:18:27.796 --> 0:18:32.436
<v Speaker 1>do start to go after Lockbit around this point. Right,

0:18:32.916 --> 0:18:35.316
<v Speaker 1>What do you do if you're a government and you

0:18:35.396 --> 0:18:37.956
<v Speaker 1>want to go after a Russian hecking gang?

0:18:39.556 --> 0:18:43.436
<v Speaker 2>Well, it's not easy. The things that you have to

0:18:43.476 --> 0:18:45.756
<v Speaker 2>do is you have to use resources that people like

0:18:45.836 --> 0:18:49.396
<v Speaker 2>me don't have available to try to figure out their

0:18:49.436 --> 0:18:53.876
<v Speaker 2>their infrastructure, their hosting infrastructure, what what what where their

0:18:53.916 --> 0:18:57.436
<v Speaker 2>servers live? Uh, and then which is very difficult when

0:18:57.436 --> 0:18:59.636
<v Speaker 2>they're there the dark web.

0:18:59.636 --> 0:19:00.636
<v Speaker 3>It's hard to figure.

0:19:00.356 --> 0:19:02.476
<v Speaker 1>That out because there's this is the cat and mouse thing.

0:19:02.516 --> 0:19:06.516
<v Speaker 1>They're like complicated smart systems. These people used to hide

0:19:06.996 --> 0:19:08.436
<v Speaker 1>their location essentially.

0:19:08.756 --> 0:19:12.756
<v Speaker 2>That's that's right, and so that's one aspect is trying

0:19:12.796 --> 0:19:14.556
<v Speaker 2>to figure out that infrastructure.

0:19:15.156 --> 0:19:16.236
<v Speaker 3>In some cases you.

0:19:16.196 --> 0:19:18.116
<v Speaker 2>Can use legal means to take it down, but with

0:19:18.196 --> 0:19:22.036
<v Speaker 2>groups like Lockbit, often they will use service providers that

0:19:22.076 --> 0:19:25.676
<v Speaker 2>are in countries that cater to criminal activity and won't

0:19:25.676 --> 0:19:29.156
<v Speaker 2>respond subpoenas. The other thing, though, that lawn that these

0:19:29.196 --> 0:19:32.316
<v Speaker 2>governments and law enforcements try to get into is the

0:19:32.316 --> 0:19:37.076
<v Speaker 2>infrastructure that is public, the panel that the bad guys

0:19:37.316 --> 0:19:41.396
<v Speaker 2>use to log into with the graphical interface to control

0:19:41.556 --> 0:19:44.556
<v Speaker 2>these attacks, and there's technical ways to do that, and

0:19:44.596 --> 0:19:47.036
<v Speaker 2>then there's also the ways of infiltrating the people who

0:19:47.076 --> 0:19:50.796
<v Speaker 2>work for the group to get their credentials access.

0:19:50.516 --> 0:19:53.676
<v Speaker 1>So they're basically hacking. They're basically hacking the hackers. So

0:19:54.156 --> 0:20:00.516
<v Speaker 1>in February of twenty twenty four, this international coalition of

0:20:00.556 --> 0:20:05.276
<v Speaker 1>law enforcement agencies actually takes over lockbit sort of publicly

0:20:05.316 --> 0:20:08.996
<v Speaker 1>facing site, right Lockbit's dark websites tell me about that.

0:20:09.876 --> 0:20:12.636
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, So it was great when you went to the

0:20:12.636 --> 0:20:16.356
<v Speaker 2>website that that day, it was no longer Lockbit's data

0:20:16.436 --> 0:20:21.076
<v Speaker 2>leak site. Instead it was a mock site, so it

0:20:21.156 --> 0:20:26.196
<v Speaker 2>looks just like it, except instead of having real victims

0:20:26.236 --> 0:20:30.876
<v Speaker 2>within the site, the NCAA put the criminals as the victims,

0:20:31.036 --> 0:20:34.516
<v Speaker 2>and they named affiliates with the victims, and they had

0:20:34.516 --> 0:20:37.476
<v Speaker 2>a countdown timer for for lock bits up saying they

0:20:37.476 --> 0:20:39.156
<v Speaker 2>were going to release his identity ha.

0:20:39.556 --> 0:20:41.556
<v Speaker 1>And the countdown timer is the kind of thing that

0:20:41.556 --> 0:20:43.876
<v Speaker 1>the that the bad guys use when they hack a company,

0:20:43.916 --> 0:20:45.076
<v Speaker 1>saying we're gonna.

0:20:44.836 --> 0:20:47.516
<v Speaker 3>That's rite yeah, uh huh, yeah, that's what they do.

0:20:47.556 --> 0:20:50.716
<v Speaker 2>A count down timer for traditional victims is how long

0:20:50.756 --> 0:20:53.196
<v Speaker 2>they have to pay to the data's lead so in.

0:20:53.076 --> 0:20:58.036
<v Speaker 1>The same way that Lockbit was essentially marketing itself. Now

0:20:58.076 --> 0:21:01.076
<v Speaker 1>the now the cops, now the law enforcement officials, are

0:21:01.236 --> 0:21:05.036
<v Speaker 1>are doing that same kind of marketing. They're sort of

0:21:05.076 --> 0:21:09.116
<v Speaker 1>doing this kind of propagandistic thing to attract attention, presumer

0:21:09.436 --> 0:21:11.876
<v Speaker 1>what to scare off all the affiliates, like why why

0:21:11.916 --> 0:21:13.916
<v Speaker 1>would they be doing it in this showy way just

0:21:13.956 --> 0:21:15.356
<v Speaker 1>for attention to get good press.

0:21:15.476 --> 0:21:18.956
<v Speaker 2>No, it was it was a psychological operation. So prior

0:21:18.996 --> 0:21:21.596
<v Speaker 2>to this, they didn't they never did this there. The

0:21:21.916 --> 0:21:23.636
<v Speaker 2>way they took sites down were just to take it

0:21:23.636 --> 0:21:25.916
<v Speaker 2>down and put a message up saying law enforcement took

0:21:25.916 --> 0:21:29.756
<v Speaker 2>this down. This was psychological. It was meant to put

0:21:29.796 --> 0:21:33.716
<v Speaker 2>stress on the people who worked for the organization and

0:21:33.796 --> 0:21:37.356
<v Speaker 2>being concerned that they no longer had anonymity and that

0:21:37.436 --> 0:21:41.596
<v Speaker 2>their names and information was now being reviewed and revealed

0:21:41.596 --> 0:21:45.316
<v Speaker 2>by law enforcement. And the whole goal of this was

0:21:45.316 --> 0:21:48.516
<v Speaker 2>was to affect the lockbit brand and to make people

0:21:48.716 --> 0:21:50.196
<v Speaker 2>not trust Lockbit.

0:21:49.956 --> 0:21:51.716
<v Speaker 3>Or want to work for the organization.

0:21:52.476 --> 0:21:55.236
<v Speaker 2>So it was very planned in, thought out and methodical.

0:21:55.436 --> 0:21:58.476
<v Speaker 2>It wasn't just, you know, to get attention. It was

0:21:58.556 --> 0:22:02.636
<v Speaker 2>specifically to hurt that brand and make affiliates afraid to

0:22:02.716 --> 0:22:05.836
<v Speaker 2>work for them. And in addition to that mock website

0:22:05.916 --> 0:22:08.156
<v Speaker 2>on the back end that panel that I was mentioning

0:22:08.156 --> 0:22:11.236
<v Speaker 2>that admin paneled that they would use now when that

0:22:11.316 --> 0:22:14.156
<v Speaker 2>took place, when the takedown took place, when the affiliates

0:22:14.156 --> 0:22:17.276
<v Speaker 2>logged into that panel, they had tailored messages with their

0:22:17.396 --> 0:22:21.476
<v Speaker 2>username by law enforcement saying, hey, you're logging into the panel.

0:22:21.636 --> 0:22:22.516
<v Speaker 3>We know who you are.

0:22:22.676 --> 0:22:25.556
<v Speaker 2>We've been monitoring the activity you've been doing. We've got

0:22:25.596 --> 0:22:27.636
<v Speaker 2>your wallets. We're going to be coming to talk to

0:22:27.716 --> 0:22:32.756
<v Speaker 2>you soon. So it was it was very detrimental to criminals.

0:22:33.076 --> 0:22:35.516
<v Speaker 2>That was a brilliant operation in my opinion.

0:22:35.876 --> 0:22:38.236
<v Speaker 1>And you mentioned that they had a countdown timer for

0:22:38.356 --> 0:22:41.396
<v Speaker 1>when they were going to reveal the name of Lockbit,

0:22:41.516 --> 0:22:44.716
<v Speaker 1>sup the person. Oh that you said, there's people, but

0:22:44.716 --> 0:22:48.156
<v Speaker 1>at least one of the people behind this, behind Lockbit,

0:22:48.236 --> 0:22:50.156
<v Speaker 1>one of the key Lockbit players. Did they in fact

0:22:50.236 --> 0:22:51.516
<v Speaker 1>reveal the name of that person.

0:22:52.676 --> 0:22:55.156
<v Speaker 2>They didn't when the countdown time, or they didn't when

0:22:55.516 --> 0:22:57.636
<v Speaker 2>they did they at that time they didn't, but there's

0:22:57.636 --> 0:22:59.596
<v Speaker 2>a reason that they didn't. But they did not do

0:22:59.716 --> 0:23:03.276
<v Speaker 2>that in February. The reason that they didn't is because

0:23:03.516 --> 0:23:06.916
<v Speaker 2>Lockbit agreed to tell them information about some of his

0:23:07.116 --> 0:23:09.836
<v Speaker 2>adversarial group. There was a group called black who he

0:23:09.876 --> 0:23:11.836
<v Speaker 2>didn't like, and he agreed to try and get to

0:23:11.836 --> 0:23:12.756
<v Speaker 2>give them information.

0:23:13.076 --> 0:23:15.276
<v Speaker 1>So use they used the threat of naming him as

0:23:15.356 --> 0:23:22.476
<v Speaker 1>leverage and getting him to flip. Basically, that's correct. Do

0:23:22.556 --> 0:23:24.956
<v Speaker 1>we know who he is now? Was he ever named?

0:23:25.996 --> 0:23:26.676
<v Speaker 3>Yeah? It was.

0:23:27.356 --> 0:23:30.476
<v Speaker 2>It was several months later. The site came back online,

0:23:31.716 --> 0:23:34.716
<v Speaker 2>meaning the law enforcement version of the site came back online.

0:23:34.916 --> 0:23:37.876
<v Speaker 2>There was a new timer, and once again they said

0:23:37.876 --> 0:23:41.316
<v Speaker 2>they were going to reveal Lockfit's name, and the timer

0:23:41.356 --> 0:23:44.636
<v Speaker 2>began again, and on May seventh, when that timer expired,

0:23:44.756 --> 0:23:48.916
<v Speaker 2>they did. They released his name and his picture, Dmitry Koshewev.

0:23:50.116 --> 0:23:53.556
<v Speaker 2>They put that out there, indicted him, wanted posters the

0:23:53.556 --> 0:23:54.396
<v Speaker 2>whole nine yards.

0:23:54.916 --> 0:23:55.956
<v Speaker 1>Is that grumpy pants?

0:23:56.636 --> 0:23:59.436
<v Speaker 3>That's well my opinion.

0:23:59.996 --> 0:24:03.676
<v Speaker 2>My opinion is that that was the younger person and

0:24:03.796 --> 0:24:05.996
<v Speaker 2>the other guy's still out there, but I think law

0:24:06.036 --> 0:24:08.716
<v Speaker 2>enforcement might tell you otherwise, though they do agree with

0:24:08.756 --> 0:24:09.676
<v Speaker 2>me that there's two people.

0:24:09.916 --> 0:24:13.036
<v Speaker 1>So he's been indicted but not arrested. Is that what

0:24:13.076 --> 0:24:13.556
<v Speaker 1>you're saying?

0:24:13.756 --> 0:24:17.276
<v Speaker 2>That's correct because he's in Russia and there's protections there.

0:24:17.956 --> 0:24:21.396
<v Speaker 2>The law enforcement just can't get their hands on them. Unfortunately,

0:24:21.436 --> 0:24:25.076
<v Speaker 2>the criminals are protected when they're in Russia.

0:24:24.756 --> 0:24:27.436
<v Speaker 1>So is that the end of Lockbit?

0:24:28.676 --> 0:24:32.036
<v Speaker 2>It's not, you would think it is, But most almost

0:24:32.116 --> 0:24:34.796
<v Speaker 2>every other group that this has happened to, that's the

0:24:34.876 --> 0:24:37.196
<v Speaker 2>end of the story, or at least it causes them

0:24:37.196 --> 0:24:39.876
<v Speaker 2>to take that operation down and they have to start

0:24:39.916 --> 0:24:43.236
<v Speaker 2>from scratch somewhere else with a new operation, with a

0:24:43.276 --> 0:24:46.276
<v Speaker 2>new name and a new brand. But Lockbit worked so

0:24:46.356 --> 0:24:49.676
<v Speaker 2>hard on that brand. I don't think he'll ever take

0:24:49.716 --> 0:24:53.676
<v Speaker 2>it away until he's till they actually arrest everybody. But no,

0:24:53.916 --> 0:24:58.716
<v Speaker 2>they continued, but they continued at a much lower level.

0:24:58.796 --> 0:25:01.956
<v Speaker 2>They didn't have the equality of hackers still working for them.

0:25:02.596 --> 0:25:05.916
<v Speaker 2>They started having to lie about attacks to try and

0:25:05.956 --> 0:25:08.156
<v Speaker 2>stack the numbers and things of that nature.

0:25:08.516 --> 0:25:10.876
<v Speaker 1>Do you think they'll unforcement officials campaign the whole thing

0:25:10.916 --> 0:25:13.236
<v Speaker 1>of like naming the people and doing all the stunts

0:25:13.276 --> 0:25:15.196
<v Speaker 1>on the website. You think that worked? You think it

0:25:15.236 --> 0:25:17.716
<v Speaker 1>was sort of like Lockbit rose on marketing and in

0:25:17.716 --> 0:25:20.316
<v Speaker 1>a way fell on the marketing of the governments.

0:25:20.436 --> 0:25:23.676
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, well, was it one hundred percent effective, No, but

0:25:23.876 --> 0:25:26.516
<v Speaker 2>it was about eighty percent effective. And prior to this,

0:25:26.716 --> 0:25:28.716
<v Speaker 2>I would say that most of those operations were like

0:25:28.796 --> 0:25:31.676
<v Speaker 2>forty percent effective. And what I mean by that is

0:25:32.196 --> 0:25:37.356
<v Speaker 2>this actually affected the brand where people, the quality hackers,

0:25:37.396 --> 0:25:40.756
<v Speaker 2>the quality affiliates. Why would they work for this organization

0:25:40.876 --> 0:25:43.196
<v Speaker 2>with all this heat where they can't trust that they're

0:25:43.196 --> 0:25:45.476
<v Speaker 2>going to be protected when they can go work for

0:25:45.516 --> 0:25:46.916
<v Speaker 2>some other premier worgans.

0:25:46.716 --> 0:25:50.036
<v Speaker 1>Like any software company. Their biggest problem is finding and

0:25:50.116 --> 0:25:50.996
<v Speaker 1>keeping good people.

0:25:51.716 --> 0:25:53.476
<v Speaker 3>That's right, That's exactly right.

0:25:54.316 --> 0:25:56.076
<v Speaker 1>And by good people, I guess in this case, it

0:25:56.116 --> 0:26:00.236
<v Speaker 1>means bad people, right. So okay, so this is a

0:26:00.316 --> 0:26:03.276
<v Speaker 1>year ago. Basically, this is early twenty twenty four. Lockbit

0:26:03.316 --> 0:26:07.716
<v Speaker 1>gets mostly taken down, not knocked out, at least knocked down.

0:26:09.116 --> 0:26:11.156
<v Speaker 1>Where are we today, Like, what is the state of

0:26:11.196 --> 0:26:12.396
<v Speaker 1>the ransomware industry?

0:26:12.876 --> 0:26:16.956
<v Speaker 2>So it's changed a bit. I would say you have

0:26:16.996 --> 0:26:20.116
<v Speaker 2>more groups, but you don't have sort of these. You

0:26:20.156 --> 0:26:25.636
<v Speaker 2>don't have as many big organizations that sort of hold

0:26:25.996 --> 0:26:30.676
<v Speaker 2>all the majority of attacks. You have smaller to medium

0:26:30.716 --> 0:26:34.116
<v Speaker 2>sized groups that work more under the radar, meaning they're

0:26:34.156 --> 0:26:37.036
<v Speaker 2>not doing the same volume of attacks. They're also not

0:26:37.156 --> 0:26:41.036
<v Speaker 2>getting the same amount of money and ransom extortions as

0:26:41.076 --> 0:26:45.596
<v Speaker 2>they did before. But they're still out there. They're just

0:26:45.756 --> 0:26:47.956
<v Speaker 2>doing it, the model just changed a little bit.

0:26:48.036 --> 0:26:51.396
<v Speaker 1>And so as part of the idea that, oh, maybe

0:26:51.436 --> 0:26:53.716
<v Speaker 1>trying to have a big name and be like a

0:26:53.756 --> 0:26:57.836
<v Speaker 1>famous criminal gang is not a good long term strategy.

0:26:58.116 --> 0:26:59.676
<v Speaker 3>That's exactly correct.

0:26:59.996 --> 0:27:02.316
<v Speaker 2>I think that this is what really made them realize

0:27:02.316 --> 0:27:05.556
<v Speaker 2>that people are sort of lower on the radar, just

0:27:05.596 --> 0:27:08.516
<v Speaker 2>trying to get money and extort, but not necessarily have

0:27:08.596 --> 0:27:10.276
<v Speaker 2>this voice that's heard across the world.

0:27:10.796 --> 0:27:14.116
<v Speaker 1>What's like, what's the big lesson to you from the

0:27:14.116 --> 0:27:14.956
<v Speaker 1>Lockbit story.

0:27:16.476 --> 0:27:21.436
<v Speaker 2>The big lesson there is being voisterous. Having this ego

0:27:21.756 --> 0:27:27.276
<v Speaker 2>is actually a downfall. Being loud, getting publicity, getting your

0:27:27.356 --> 0:27:29.876
<v Speaker 2>name out there, well, that might help attract people to

0:27:29.876 --> 0:27:32.836
<v Speaker 2>come work for you. There's the opposite side of that,

0:27:32.876 --> 0:27:35.716
<v Speaker 2>where it also attracts a lot of attention from law enforcement,

0:27:35.796 --> 0:27:38.276
<v Speaker 2>and if you're a criminal group, that's not a good thing.

0:27:38.436 --> 0:27:41.916
<v Speaker 2>And I think bad guys have figured that out between

0:27:42.436 --> 0:27:45.756
<v Speaker 2>mainly from twenty twenty four with both the black Cat

0:27:45.836 --> 0:27:49.076
<v Speaker 2>ransomware group and with Lockbit. Those were your prominent players,

0:27:49.556 --> 0:27:52.756
<v Speaker 2>and those guys both got decimated by law enforcement, and

0:27:52.796 --> 0:27:55.636
<v Speaker 2>that happened because of the attention that they drew to themselves.

0:27:55.756 --> 0:27:59.436
<v Speaker 2>So I think That's the lesson that adversaries have learned

0:27:59.556 --> 0:28:02.316
<v Speaker 2>is you have to be quieter about what you do.

0:28:05.356 --> 0:28:16.956
<v Speaker 1>Lively. Back in a minute with the lightning round. Let's

0:28:17.116 --> 0:28:19.876
<v Speaker 1>finish with the lightning round. It's gonna be a little

0:28:19.916 --> 0:28:24.796
<v Speaker 1>more random and a little more about you. Okay, what's

0:28:24.836 --> 0:28:26.996
<v Speaker 1>one thing you learned when you hacked into the Pentagon

0:28:27.116 --> 0:28:30.236
<v Speaker 1>as a fifteen year old boy?

0:28:31.316 --> 0:28:34.156
<v Speaker 2>Oh man, That's the reason that had I talked to

0:28:34.196 --> 0:28:36.676
<v Speaker 2>these criminals and I sometimes have empathy to want to

0:28:36.676 --> 0:28:39.836
<v Speaker 2>help them change what they're doing, is because I got

0:28:39.876 --> 0:28:43.116
<v Speaker 2>a second chance, and I remember that fear, and I

0:28:43.236 --> 0:28:45.676
<v Speaker 2>want to try to help some of these young kids

0:28:45.716 --> 0:28:48.516
<v Speaker 2>to change what they're doing and not continue down this road.

0:28:48.596 --> 0:28:51.156
<v Speaker 1>What actually happened there? What was it that happened?

0:28:51.276 --> 0:28:55.076
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, So my stepfather worked for Colon Powell during the

0:28:55.356 --> 0:28:57.836
<v Speaker 2>Iraq War. He was at the Pentagon and he had

0:28:57.836 --> 0:29:00.876
<v Speaker 2>a classified system in our basement, and I had a

0:29:00.876 --> 0:29:04.036
<v Speaker 2>friend over and I was really into computers and hacking

0:29:04.116 --> 0:29:06.876
<v Speaker 2>figuring things out. And I didn't do anything elaborate. I

0:29:06.916 --> 0:29:08.836
<v Speaker 2>just figured out his credentials and I logged in and

0:29:08.876 --> 0:29:12.756
<v Speaker 2>was put looking around. Nothing elaborate, but enough that it

0:29:12.876 --> 0:29:17.236
<v Speaker 2>got attention and bad things happened, and and the FBI showed.

0:29:16.996 --> 0:29:17.356
<v Speaker 3>Up and things.

0:29:17.476 --> 0:29:18.996
<v Speaker 1>The FBI showed up at your house.

0:29:19.716 --> 0:29:21.596
<v Speaker 3>Yeah they did. It was It was not a good

0:29:21.636 --> 0:29:22.076
<v Speaker 3>day for me.

0:29:24.276 --> 0:29:26.956
<v Speaker 1>I'm glad it worked out in the end. It did.

0:29:27.156 --> 0:29:27.516
<v Speaker 3>It did.

0:29:28.236 --> 0:29:30.316
<v Speaker 2>It only worked out though, because of who he worked for,

0:29:30.396 --> 0:29:32.436
<v Speaker 2>my stepfather, and the connections that he had, and the

0:29:32.436 --> 0:29:35.156
<v Speaker 2>fact that I had no prior record. That's the reason

0:29:35.196 --> 0:29:36.956
<v Speaker 2>that it worked. And I had a summer where I

0:29:36.996 --> 0:29:39.636
<v Speaker 2>had to go work at Fort Belvoir doing community service,

0:29:39.836 --> 0:29:41.516
<v Speaker 2>but I just do such a good job they wanted

0:29:41.516 --> 0:29:44.676
<v Speaker 2>to hire me to work there. So it was definitely

0:29:44.716 --> 0:29:46.876
<v Speaker 2>a life changing experience. And then I joined the army

0:29:46.916 --> 0:29:50.876
<v Speaker 2>and became a military police officer. So that was my story.

0:29:50.956 --> 0:29:51.996
<v Speaker 2>But it worked out well for him.

0:29:52.036 --> 0:29:56.276
<v Speaker 1>So I understand that when you were a military police officer,

0:29:56.676 --> 0:30:00.556
<v Speaker 1>you did undercover drug bys I did. What's something you

0:30:00.636 --> 0:30:04.356
<v Speaker 1>learned doing undercover drug byes as a military police officer?

0:30:04.956 --> 0:30:07.116
<v Speaker 2>What I learned is it's not black and white. It's

0:30:07.156 --> 0:30:09.116
<v Speaker 2>not just you're a bad guy or a good guy.

0:30:09.476 --> 0:30:11.876
<v Speaker 2>There are there there's still human beings.

0:30:12.436 --> 0:30:15.156
<v Speaker 1>What's one thing you learned pushing carts at home depot.

0:30:17.476 --> 0:30:19.236
<v Speaker 2>That you should never have an ego because I did

0:30:19.276 --> 0:30:21.236
<v Speaker 2>all that crazy work and I got out and I

0:30:21.276 --> 0:30:23.996
<v Speaker 2>could not get a job in law enforcement because of

0:30:24.036 --> 0:30:27.996
<v Speaker 2>my tattoos. At the time, you couldn't have visible tattoos,

0:30:28.036 --> 0:30:30.836
<v Speaker 2>at least in Virginia. Tried to join the FBI because

0:30:30.836 --> 0:30:32.916
<v Speaker 2>I smoked weed in high school at the time, day

0:30:32.916 --> 0:30:33.716
<v Speaker 2>at a zero tolerance.

0:30:33.716 --> 0:30:36.116
<v Speaker 3>I couldn't get into that. I didn't couldn't get.

0:30:36.036 --> 0:30:38.356
<v Speaker 2>A job, and I had to start at the very bottom.

0:30:38.956 --> 0:30:40.916
<v Speaker 2>I've been working retail. I'm not even in the store.

0:30:40.956 --> 0:30:44.156
<v Speaker 2>I'm in the parking lot, you know. That was I

0:30:44.236 --> 0:30:45.916
<v Speaker 2>was living out of my truck for a couple of weeks,

0:30:45.916 --> 0:30:48.236
<v Speaker 2>and then I rented a room at a house. That house,

0:30:48.316 --> 0:30:49.036
<v Speaker 2>they were selling.

0:30:48.876 --> 0:30:49.716
<v Speaker 3>Drugs out of the house.

0:30:49.796 --> 0:30:52.356
<v Speaker 2>The cops raided it, rested everybody but me, but I

0:30:52.356 --> 0:30:54.316
<v Speaker 2>couldn't even get in the house to get my stuff.

0:30:54.396 --> 0:30:56.116
<v Speaker 3>I mean, it was a tough time in my life.

0:30:58.076 --> 0:31:00.316
<v Speaker 1>I'm going to change gears to talk about something much

0:31:00.356 --> 0:31:05.516
<v Speaker 1>more pedestrian. Now, what's your favorite depiction of hacking in

0:31:05.556 --> 0:31:09.116
<v Speaker 1>a work of fiction? Uh?

0:31:09.556 --> 0:31:15.516
<v Speaker 2>Corey Uh, there's an author, Corey Doctro, brilliant guy. He's

0:31:15.516 --> 0:31:19.916
<v Speaker 2>one of my favorite authors, and he does hacker fiction

0:31:20.036 --> 0:31:24.156
<v Speaker 2>if you will, and he's got a probably twenty books now,

0:31:24.316 --> 0:31:28.076
<v Speaker 2>but they're they're phenomenal, especially the Homeland series. That's one

0:31:28.076 --> 0:31:28.556
<v Speaker 2>of my favorite.

0:31:28.556 --> 0:31:32.796
<v Speaker 1>Okay, Homeland series. Who's your favorite cyber criminal in real life?

0:31:36.676 --> 0:31:39.756
<v Speaker 2>I would probably say the hacker known as us D

0:31:39.876 --> 0:31:43.276
<v Speaker 2>O D. He is a He is a hacker who's

0:31:43.316 --> 0:31:46.716
<v Speaker 2>not Russian. Uh. He lives in Brazil. I became very

0:31:46.716 --> 0:31:51.156
<v Speaker 2>good friends with him. I've never written about him. He

0:31:51.276 --> 0:31:54.396
<v Speaker 2>wasn't a target of mine. He helped me actually when

0:31:54.476 --> 0:31:57.796
<v Speaker 2>I was going after ransom VC and he gave me

0:31:57.836 --> 0:31:59.956
<v Speaker 2>a lot of good insight information and we just became

0:32:00.036 --> 0:32:03.836
<v Speaker 2>friends for a long time and we talked and he

0:32:03.916 --> 0:32:06.116
<v Speaker 2>was somebody who I really had wanted to help. He's

0:32:06.156 --> 0:32:07.916
<v Speaker 2>in jail now, so you can figure out if I

0:32:07.956 --> 0:32:08.916
<v Speaker 2>was able to help him or not.

0:32:10.316 --> 0:32:13.716
<v Speaker 1>Why? Why him? What was what was that relationship?

0:32:15.756 --> 0:32:20.036
<v Speaker 2>You know, he had issues like like everybody, but you know,

0:32:20.236 --> 0:32:22.636
<v Speaker 2>he was a he had a good side to him.

0:32:22.956 --> 0:32:24.516
<v Speaker 2>There was a side to him. He was a decent

0:32:24.556 --> 0:32:29.916
<v Speaker 2>person and I really thought if he hadn't become a criminal,

0:32:29.996 --> 0:32:32.276
<v Speaker 2>he's somebody that would have been in the cybersecurity field.

0:32:33.316 --> 0:32:37.436
<v Speaker 2>He did have empathy for people. He hated law enforcement

0:32:37.516 --> 0:32:39.836
<v Speaker 2>in the government, but he did have empathy for people,

0:32:40.516 --> 0:32:42.276
<v Speaker 2>and he was somebody who I could talk to and

0:32:42.596 --> 0:32:44.996
<v Speaker 2>and actually feel like I could I could make a

0:32:44.996 --> 0:32:46.836
<v Speaker 2>difference with the conversations that we had.

0:32:53.156 --> 0:32:56.796
<v Speaker 1>John DiMaggio is the chief security strategist at Analyst One.

0:32:57.636 --> 0:33:00.676
<v Speaker 1>Today's show was produced by Gabriel Hunter Chang. It was

0:33:00.876 --> 0:33:03.676
<v Speaker 1>edited by Lydia Jean Kott and engineered.

0:33:03.156 --> 0:33:03.996
<v Speaker 3>By Sarah Buguer.

0:33:04.596 --> 0:33:07.156
<v Speaker 1>I'm Jacob Goldstein and we'll be back later this week

0:33:07.196 --> 0:33:15.436
<v Speaker 1>with another episode of What's Your Problem. A port Asner

0:33:17.516 --> 0:33:17.676
<v Speaker 1>SA