WEBVTT - Dan Ivascyn Is Excited About a New Era in Fixed Income

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<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News.

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<v Speaker 2>Hello and welcome to another episode of The Odd Laws podcast.

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<v Speaker 3>I'm joll Wisenthal and I'm Tracy Alloway.

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<v Speaker 2>Tracy, you know, we've been doing this podcast for ten.

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<v Speaker 3>Years, I am aware. Yeah, no, a whole decade.

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<v Speaker 2>And we've been doing episodes about big picture things and

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<v Speaker 2>things that have changed and what's different now in twenty

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<v Speaker 2>twenty five or twenty fifteen when we started. And some

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<v Speaker 2>things are the same, some things that are different, etcetera.

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<v Speaker 2>But I think, and we've mentioned this before, I think

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<v Speaker 2>the one thing that could not be more different here's

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<v Speaker 2>the raids environment. We were right in the middle of,

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<v Speaker 2>like the zerp decade or the Zerp era, maybe in

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<v Speaker 2>twenty fifteen. Maybe at that point, the FED had tried

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<v Speaker 2>to hike one time already and then the market sort

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<v Speaker 2>of slapped it down and said, oh no, no, no,

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<v Speaker 2>no more, We're not ready for more rate hikes, et cetera.

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<v Speaker 2>The raid environment could not be more different than when

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<v Speaker 2>we first started this podcast.

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<v Speaker 3>Absolutely. Can I say one thing about the anniversary, Yeah,

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<v Speaker 3>so we started the podcast in November twenty fifteen. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 3>we were going to celebrate for the month of November,

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<v Speaker 3>but we're now in December, So are we going to

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<v Speaker 3>make this a two month celebration.

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<v Speaker 2>Well, you know, we're having our ten year anniversary party

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<v Speaker 2>in December, so I think it's allowed. Well's just believing,

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<v Speaker 2>you know, it's allowed to bleed the ten years into

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<v Speaker 2>both months, given that we're formally celebrating in December. I

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<v Speaker 2>think this is how I'm rationalizing this framing for this conversation.

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<v Speaker 2>Since yes, we're no longer we're technically no longer an

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<v Speaker 2>anniversary month.

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<v Speaker 3>I guess it's our party and we can celebrate as

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<v Speaker 3>long as we want however we want. But you're absolutely

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<v Speaker 3>right about the rates environment, and you know you could

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<v Speaker 3>see that if you go back and look at some

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<v Speaker 3>of the old episodes. The other thing that strikes me

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<v Speaker 3>looking back at the old podcast episodes is how many

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<v Speaker 3>of them were about shadow banking, which of course nowadays

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<v Speaker 3>recall private credit. And that's another thing that's changed enormously.

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<v Speaker 3>So the private credit market now basically rivals the public

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<v Speaker 3>credit market in terms of size, and there's obviously a

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<v Speaker 3>lot of concern about what that means. The outlooks lots

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<v Speaker 3>of differences.

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<v Speaker 2>Lots of differences. Yeah, completely dramatic and setting aside the

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<v Speaker 2>big picture questions, there are also some small picture questions,

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<v Speaker 2>maybe how you put.

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<v Speaker 3>It, immediate questions.

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<v Speaker 2>At the time we were recording this, it looks like

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<v Speaker 2>the December meeting is basically a lock that there's going

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<v Speaker 2>to be a cut. But up until recently there was

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<v Speaker 2>a lot of market uncertainty.

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<v Speaker 3>If we recorded this two weeks ago, it would have

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<v Speaker 3>looked very different.

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<v Speaker 2>It would looked very different, and you know what happens

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<v Speaker 2>after December highly uncertain on many dimensions the follow through

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<v Speaker 2>for the rate cutting cycle. There have been increases in

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<v Speaker 2>various credit concerns of various source. We've had a few

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<v Speaker 2>small blow ups, but you know, nothing that big. But

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<v Speaker 2>like what Jamie Diamond called the cockroaches, we mentioned it

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<v Speaker 2>on the show that suddenly people are talking about credit

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<v Speaker 2>default swaps uncertain high tech companies, which is very unusual.

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<v Speaker 3>But there's that's what Star Wars meme. I haven't heard

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<v Speaker 3>that word in a long time, that's right.

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<v Speaker 2>But with the AI build out and how much that's

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<v Speaker 2>getting financed by various forms of credit, suddenly people are

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<v Speaker 2>talking about the fact that big tech companies are credits,

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<v Speaker 2>which we don't really think about very much. And so

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<v Speaker 2>there are some big picture of things, but also some

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<v Speaker 2>things happening right here and right now that weren't further

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<v Speaker 2>understanding and further explanation from the people who really understand

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<v Speaker 2>them absolutely well. I'm very excited to say we really

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<v Speaker 2>do have the perfect guests, someone who we've had on

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<v Speaker 2>the show before, but someone we love speaking to. We

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<v Speaker 2>are going to be speaking with Dan Ivison. He is

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<v Speaker 2>the CIO over at PIMCO, which of course everybody should

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<v Speaker 2>know about. So Dan, thank you so much for coming

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<v Speaker 2>back on the Outlaws podcast.

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<v Speaker 4>Thanks for having me, and congratulations on the big ten

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<v Speaker 4>year anniversary. It's an honor to be invited back during

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<v Speaker 4>this series of podcasts.

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<v Speaker 3>Thank you so much.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, very kind of you to say, let's start small picture.

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<v Speaker 2>I think this episode will be out before the meeting.

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<v Speaker 2>The market is saying it's going to be a lock.

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<v Speaker 2>They're definitely going to cut rates. But beyond that, when

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<v Speaker 2>you look into twenty twenty six, there's sort of two

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<v Speaker 2>different questions. There's the ongoing uncertainty about who is going

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<v Speaker 2>to be the next FED chair, and then there's just

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<v Speaker 2>the questions about how much appetite this existing committee has

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<v Speaker 2>to continue a rate cutting cycle, So I'd love to

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<v Speaker 2>get you know, what are you thinking about for the

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<v Speaker 2>twenty twenty six and what we could be expecting.

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<v Speaker 4>Sure, so you know, we do think the Fed's likely

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<v Speaker 4>to cut rates at the upcoming meeting. We also think

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<v Speaker 4>that this is a FED that would like to get

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<v Speaker 4>rates a bit lower into twenty twenty six. The challenge,

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<v Speaker 4>of course, is that we expect to see a little

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<v Speaker 4>bit of reacceleration in the economy during the first half

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<v Speaker 4>of the year, and we also expect inflation to remain

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<v Speaker 4>comfortably above the central bank targets. So you know, we

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<v Speaker 4>believe this FED when they say they're going to continue

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<v Speaker 4>to focus on the data, we do think the data is.

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<v Speaker 5>Going to be a bit confusing.

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<v Speaker 4>The general view you know today at PIMCU, with significant uncertainty,

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<v Speaker 4>is that they probably do get rates down another half

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<v Speaker 4>of percent or so next year, which is close to

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<v Speaker 4>what's being priced into the market today. But again, if

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<v Speaker 4>you see meaningful reacceleration in the growth data, and more importantly,

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<v Speaker 4>if you see even a modest up ticket inflation, this FED,

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<v Speaker 4>you know, even with a new chair, will will likely

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<v Speaker 4>be willing to remain on hold and then I think

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<v Speaker 4>the other point, and this came up with one of

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<v Speaker 4>your recent guests, is that there's the front end policy

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<v Speaker 4>rate and then there's the reaction out in longer maturities.

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<v Speaker 4>We do think there's a chance if this FED cuts

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<v Speaker 4>aggressively into strengthening data higher inflation, you may actually get

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<v Speaker 4>a selloff in the long end of the curve. So

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<v Speaker 4>that could be a bit self defeating, and I think

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<v Speaker 4>something that will be a topic into next year if

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<v Speaker 4>we do get that reacceleration that we expect.

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<v Speaker 2>There's a lot you said there that I want to

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<v Speaker 2>follow up on just in that one answer, but just

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<v Speaker 2>very quickly, what is the idea, the gist behind why

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<v Speaker 2>you expect dead Q on reacceleration.

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<v Speaker 4>Yeah, A lot of it's you know, related to significant momentum,

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<v Speaker 4>you know, in terms of capital investment, you know, associated

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<v Speaker 4>with AI as well as the delayed positive growth impact.

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<v Speaker 5>Of the so called Big Beautiful Bill.

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<v Speaker 4>A lot of the corporate tax extensions happened retroactively for

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<v Speaker 4>the consumer of the household in many instances, you're going

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<v Speaker 4>to begin to see the direct impact in terms of

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<v Speaker 4>positive refunds coming into the new year. So again, you know,

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<v Speaker 4>plenty of uncertainty, you know, a lot of cross currents

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<v Speaker 4>in this economy, but we do think there's the chance

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<v Speaker 4>that you'll get some moderate reacceleration in the first half

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<v Speaker 4>of the year. You know, we're looking at a growth environment,

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<v Speaker 4>you know, for next year in the United States at

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<v Speaker 4>least somewhere in the one and a half to two

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<v Speaker 4>percent type range. So again that's an environment we're from

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<v Speaker 4>a traditional tailor rule perspective. We don't think that the

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<v Speaker 4>FED needs to cut a lot more from here, although

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<v Speaker 4>you know, we do think that this FED, particularly with

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<v Speaker 4>new membership and a new chair, would like to get

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<v Speaker 4>rates lower.

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<v Speaker 3>Since you mentioned the new chair, this is more of

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<v Speaker 3>a long term, thoughtful question. But obviously, for the majority

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<v Speaker 3>of your career as a bond manager, I don't think

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<v Speaker 3>FED independence has really been much of a concern, right.

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<v Speaker 3>We certainly haven't seen the degree of headlines that we

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<v Speaker 3>are seeing lately with Kevin Hassett emerging as the front

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<v Speaker 3>runner for the new FED chair position. How do you

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<v Speaker 3>as a bond manager view that particular issue and do

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<v Speaker 3>you have to start handicapping the way you invest because

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<v Speaker 3>of this?

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<v Speaker 4>I think to a degree, I think if you go

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<v Speaker 4>back several decades, you know, you can question the concept

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<v Speaker 4>of FED independence a little bit, and I think even

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<v Speaker 4>from the perspective of this fed's expanded mandate in recent years,

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<v Speaker 4>what the market's really focused on is independence related to

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<v Speaker 4>the setting of policy rates, which you know, of course

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<v Speaker 4>have a direct impact. So from that perspective, we are

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<v Speaker 4>monitoring the situation like other investors. We do think less

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<v Speaker 4>independent FED has implications, particularly in longer maturities, where you

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<v Speaker 4>may need a bit more risk premium when you're dealing

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<v Speaker 4>with uncertainty around FED independence. But generally speaking, when we

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<v Speaker 4>think about you know, who's being considered for the FED role,

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<v Speaker 4>including Kevin Hasseert, you know, we do think that there'll

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<v Speaker 4>be a general spirit of independence there. We still think,

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<v Speaker 4>you know, the chair is one vote, so to speak,

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<v Speaker 4>and we have a committee that will continue to focus

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<v Speaker 4>on the dual mandate. So yes, it's a consideration, it's

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<v Speaker 4>an input into our decisions. It's not a major concern.

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<v Speaker 4>We do think that you know, the group that's being

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<v Speaker 4>considered are you know, certainly highly qualified and will likely

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<v Speaker 4>you know, continue to take a sufficiently independent view regarding

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<v Speaker 4>monetary policy.

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<v Speaker 2>Let me ask you kind of the same question, but

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<v Speaker 2>with a slightly different framing. It's December twenty twenty five

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<v Speaker 2>right now, so we've had like over four years now,

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<v Speaker 2>I think over four years now of the FED missing

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<v Speaker 2>on its inflation on the two on getting inflation durably

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<v Speaker 2>back to two And if the FED is going to

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<v Speaker 2>continue cutting as it looks like it's going to do

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<v Speaker 2>in December, that signals a further willingness to ease policy

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<v Speaker 2>even with inflation over its ostensible target setting. Aside the

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<v Speaker 2>strict question of independence, do you think the FED, regardless

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<v Speaker 2>even the current composition and the likely composition going to

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<v Speaker 2>be forward, is just not going to take two percent

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<v Speaker 2>seriously as perhaps it might have in the past.

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<v Speaker 4>Yes, that's a great question, and I think that in

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<v Speaker 4>a general sense the two percent target matters, but not

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<v Speaker 4>so much the current inflation rate. You're absolutely right. We've

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<v Speaker 4>been operating, you know, and living with an inflation rate

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<v Speaker 4>meaningfully above their target for quite some time. But when

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<v Speaker 4>you look at inflationary expectations, and I think when you

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<v Speaker 4>talk to central bankers you know here in the United

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<v Speaker 4>States as well as outside this country, the inflationary expectations

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<v Speaker 4>piece is what's critically important. So when you look at

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<v Speaker 4>longer term break even inflation rate, they've continued to be

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<v Speaker 4>very very well behaved. You saw a bit of an

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<v Speaker 4>uptick at the upbreak of the war in Ukraine, and

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<v Speaker 4>then you saw an uptick around the tariff announcements earlier

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<v Speaker 4>this year. But when you look at a ten year

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<v Speaker 4>tip break even rate, just to use one of several proxies,

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<v Speaker 4>no one measure is perfect, you're down around two and

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<v Speaker 4>quarter percent on CPI inflation. So to the extent that

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<v Speaker 4>inflationary expectations remain well contained, we do think that the

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<v Speaker 4>central banks willing to look through some of the more

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<v Speaker 4>higher frequency data to the extent that you see those

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<v Speaker 4>longer term expectations become unanchored. We do think that's a

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<v Speaker 4>risk for a FED that's too aggressive in cutting rates here.

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<v Speaker 4>We do think that the mindset will change, not only

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<v Speaker 4>the mindset of the Fed, but we think the market

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<v Speaker 4>reaction could be counterproductive, not only in terms of higher

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<v Speaker 4>long term interest rates, but an impact on risk assets

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<v Speaker 4>as well. So you know, the markets have let the

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<v Speaker 4>Fed get away with running fairly accommodated policy into a

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<v Speaker 4>three percent type inflation world. Because again, there are a

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<v Speaker 4>lot of other forces at work that very well could

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<v Speaker 4>be disinflationary over the long term, and there still is

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<v Speaker 4>significant confidence in global central banks and being able to

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<v Speaker 4>generally keep inflation close to the target on a longer

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<v Speaker 4>term basis. So you know, again, so far, so good,

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<v Speaker 4>but you know, this is all going to be a

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<v Speaker 4>key source of uncertainty, you know, into twenty six and beyond.

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<v Speaker 3>I feel like uncertainty is constantly the keyword on our

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<v Speaker 3>podcast nowadays, since longer dated expectations and yields keeps coming up.

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<v Speaker 3>In this conversation, I got to ask, do you believe

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<v Speaker 3>in the term premium or rather, is the term premium

0:11:38.160 --> 0:11:41.000
<v Speaker 3>a useful concept to you as a big bond investor?

0:11:41.480 --> 0:11:43.680
<v Speaker 4>It is, and you know, when we look at you know,

0:11:43.679 --> 0:11:45.680
<v Speaker 4>where we're going to invest, you know, we like to

0:11:45.679 --> 0:11:48.760
<v Speaker 4>get paid for, you know, taking more risk. We do,

0:11:49.120 --> 0:11:51.800
<v Speaker 4>you know, see an elevated term premium certainly relative to

0:11:51.840 --> 0:11:54.800
<v Speaker 4>where we were five or ten years ago, and that's

0:11:54.920 --> 0:11:59.760
<v Speaker 4>made longer maturity investments a bit more attractive. With that said,

0:12:00.000 --> 0:12:02.560
<v Speaker 4>there's lots of reasons why the term premium should be higher.

0:12:02.840 --> 0:12:06.200
<v Speaker 4>Inflation is one of them. Global debt levels, US debt

0:12:06.240 --> 0:12:09.679
<v Speaker 4>and deficit levels are another. We probably live in a

0:12:09.720 --> 0:12:13.040
<v Speaker 4>world today given what's going on in terms of focusing

0:12:13.080 --> 0:12:16.680
<v Speaker 4>on tariffs and bringing back supply chains, you know, to

0:12:16.920 --> 0:12:20.960
<v Speaker 4>domestic markets, the need for you know, higher risk premium.

0:12:21.080 --> 0:12:23.400
<v Speaker 4>So you know, as a firm today, we we like

0:12:23.520 --> 0:12:26.960
<v Speaker 4>longer maturity bonds more, but we're still you know, tend

0:12:26.960 --> 0:12:30.000
<v Speaker 4>to keep our positions concentrated in shorter maturities, and we

0:12:30.040 --> 0:12:32.920
<v Speaker 4>would expect over the next few years a little bit

0:12:32.920 --> 0:12:36.720
<v Speaker 4>of additional underperformance in the very very long end of

0:12:36.760 --> 0:12:39.880
<v Speaker 4>the yield curve. So we do think it's important. It's

0:12:39.920 --> 0:12:42.719
<v Speaker 4>interesting people focus a lot on the deficit situation in

0:12:42.760 --> 0:12:45.880
<v Speaker 4>the United States. As an investor, you don't want to

0:12:45.960 --> 0:12:49.360
<v Speaker 4>lend to a perfect high quality credit you get paid

0:12:49.360 --> 0:12:51.520
<v Speaker 4>so much to do so. So in some sense, we want,

0:12:52.000 --> 0:12:55.040
<v Speaker 4>you know, just enough fiscal irresponsibility where we and our

0:12:55.400 --> 0:12:58.200
<v Speaker 4>end investors get paid more to lend, but not so

0:12:58.280 --> 0:13:00.560
<v Speaker 4>much where it becomes a concern in term the overall

0:13:00.640 --> 0:13:03.080
<v Speaker 4>viability of the system. So we think we're in the

0:13:03.120 --> 0:13:06.440
<v Speaker 4>midst of that type of market environment today, but things

0:13:06.480 --> 0:13:08.160
<v Speaker 4>can go a bit too far if we don't get

0:13:08.480 --> 0:13:11.200
<v Speaker 4>the deficit or the inflation situation under control. Over the

0:13:11.240 --> 0:13:26.599
<v Speaker 4>next couple of a few years.

0:13:29.520 --> 0:13:32.920
<v Speaker 2>Can you talk about the role of bonds in a portfolio? Again,

0:13:33.120 --> 0:13:37.479
<v Speaker 2>this is something that in twenty fifteen, bonds fit beautifully

0:13:37.559 --> 0:13:41.160
<v Speaker 2>into a diversified portfolio because they were paying something, but

0:13:41.240 --> 0:13:43.959
<v Speaker 2>also they had that nice and verse correlation and so

0:13:44.120 --> 0:13:47.760
<v Speaker 2>you got that natural hedge, et cetera. We haven't had

0:13:47.880 --> 0:13:51.720
<v Speaker 2>that very like that beautiful inverse correlation between risk assets

0:13:51.760 --> 0:13:54.760
<v Speaker 2>and bonds for a long time, which undermines one of

0:13:54.800 --> 0:13:58.440
<v Speaker 2>the cases for the diversified investor of having like a

0:13:58.440 --> 0:14:01.960
<v Speaker 2>big slug of perhaps longer duration assets. How do you

0:14:01.960 --> 0:14:04.199
<v Speaker 2>think in twenty twenty five, how do you sell the

0:14:04.240 --> 0:14:10.120
<v Speaker 2>case that diversified investors should still keep some allocation to

0:14:10.280 --> 0:14:11.480
<v Speaker 2>duration or fixed income.

0:14:11.920 --> 0:14:14.280
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, so it's interesting. I know this is a ten

0:14:14.320 --> 0:14:17.040
<v Speaker 4>year anniversary show, so you know, went back it looked

0:14:17.040 --> 0:14:19.960
<v Speaker 4>at the performance of bonds versus other things, you know,

0:14:20.000 --> 0:14:23.560
<v Speaker 4>over the last ten years, and the divergence in performance

0:14:23.560 --> 0:14:27.080
<v Speaker 4>over the last decade has been remarkable and it explains

0:14:27.080 --> 0:14:28.640
<v Speaker 4>a lot. If you look at the S and P

0:14:28.760 --> 0:14:31.600
<v Speaker 4>five hundred over the last ten years, in absolute terms,

0:14:31.600 --> 0:14:34.400
<v Speaker 4>you generated a return of about fifteen percent a year

0:14:34.920 --> 0:14:37.560
<v Speaker 4>adjusted for inflation. I think it's up close to twelve

0:14:37.600 --> 0:14:40.640
<v Speaker 4>percent or so I'm rounding a little bit. When you'll

0:14:40.640 --> 0:14:43.360
<v Speaker 4>get the performance of you know, the Bloomberg aggregate index

0:14:43.400 --> 0:14:46.400
<v Speaker 4>over that ten year period, the return annually has been

0:14:46.440 --> 0:14:50.520
<v Speaker 4>below two percent in absolute terms. When you subtract inflation,

0:14:50.760 --> 0:14:54.760
<v Speaker 4>you ended up with negative returns in bonds for ten years.

0:14:54.880 --> 0:14:57.280
<v Speaker 4>So not only has the correlation broken down, but you

0:14:57.280 --> 0:15:00.600
<v Speaker 4>didn't make any money in owning bonds. When you look

0:15:00.600 --> 0:15:04.200
<v Speaker 4>at the starting valuations today under any type of reasonable

0:15:04.280 --> 0:15:07.640
<v Speaker 4>longer term valuation framework, none of which have to mean

0:15:07.680 --> 0:15:10.400
<v Speaker 4>revert quickly, but you know, you look at a you know,

0:15:10.400 --> 0:15:14.240
<v Speaker 4>a Schiller pe type arrangement or equity risk premium type argument.

0:15:14.760 --> 0:15:17.520
<v Speaker 4>You don't need a great correlation on bonds versus equities.

0:15:17.760 --> 0:15:20.720
<v Speaker 4>What the relative valuations would suggest is that there's a

0:15:20.760 --> 0:15:23.800
<v Speaker 4>good chance that bonds outperform stocks over the next five

0:15:23.880 --> 0:15:26.760
<v Speaker 4>or ten years, or at least have returns on a

0:15:26.840 --> 0:15:31.000
<v Speaker 4>risk adjusted basis very very close to stocks. So you

0:15:31.040 --> 0:15:33.520
<v Speaker 4>don't have to rest on a correlation argument. You know,

0:15:33.560 --> 0:15:35.640
<v Speaker 4>you don't have to focus on well bonds do well

0:15:35.720 --> 0:15:39.160
<v Speaker 4>during periods where people are losing their jobs or you know,

0:15:39.240 --> 0:15:41.800
<v Speaker 4>income growth is negative. You can just from a pure

0:15:41.880 --> 0:15:47.320
<v Speaker 4>valuation perspective, find the acid class quite attractive absolute and relative.

0:15:47.640 --> 0:15:51.280
<v Speaker 4>I think the second point around correlations is that correlations

0:15:51.320 --> 0:15:54.520
<v Speaker 4>between stocks and bonds will tend to break down when

0:15:54.600 --> 0:15:58.400
<v Speaker 4>inflation is the primary risk factor. Today, yes, inflation is

0:15:58.400 --> 0:16:01.200
<v Speaker 4>above central bank targets, but there's a lot of uncertainty

0:16:01.600 --> 0:16:05.400
<v Speaker 4>on the economic side. You do have this complex economy

0:16:05.440 --> 0:16:09.000
<v Speaker 4>where tremendous value you know within the tech sector, tremendous

0:16:09.000 --> 0:16:13.880
<v Speaker 4>capital and investment, yet lower income households are feeling considerable pain.

0:16:14.560 --> 0:16:18.240
<v Speaker 4>If AI is very very successful at increasing productivity, that

0:16:18.280 --> 0:16:21.560
<v Speaker 4>could mean significant job loss across key segments of the economy.

0:16:21.720 --> 0:16:24.000
<v Speaker 4>So the bottom line is that risks are more balanced.

0:16:24.600 --> 0:16:26.960
<v Speaker 4>We don't think correlations are going to ever come back

0:16:27.000 --> 0:16:30.160
<v Speaker 4>to the really, really neat clean levels you know a

0:16:30.200 --> 0:16:33.000
<v Speaker 4>decade or so ago, when inflation simply wasn't a problem

0:16:33.040 --> 0:16:36.120
<v Speaker 4>at all, you know, across the global economy. But we

0:16:36.200 --> 0:16:38.920
<v Speaker 4>have seen correlations improve a bit, and we would expecting

0:16:38.960 --> 0:16:42.760
<v Speaker 4>to go forward basis correlations to improve further. I think

0:16:42.800 --> 0:16:45.400
<v Speaker 4>it's important again to look at a global opportunity set.

0:16:45.880 --> 0:16:49.080
<v Speaker 4>I think that the correlation arguments are stronger in areas

0:16:49.080 --> 0:16:52.680
<v Speaker 4>of the world that have the best fiscal position. But

0:16:52.800 --> 0:16:54.600
<v Speaker 4>in general, you know, not only do we think that

0:16:54.640 --> 0:16:57.440
<v Speaker 4>the valuations are quite attractive, you know, we do think

0:16:57.440 --> 0:16:59.960
<v Speaker 4>the correlations will be a bit better certainly that we experience.

0:17:00.000 --> 0:17:01.640
<v Speaker 5>It's coming out of the culture tray.

0:17:01.720 --> 0:17:04.320
<v Speaker 2>Twenty fifteen, bonds were an easy sell. It turns out

0:17:04.320 --> 0:17:07.240
<v Speaker 2>they weren't the best investment. Twenty twenty five maybe a

0:17:07.320 --> 0:17:09.919
<v Speaker 2>harder cell, but the math says that now is actually

0:17:09.920 --> 0:17:12.240
<v Speaker 2>the time to expand your exposure.

0:17:12.280 --> 0:17:13.840
<v Speaker 3>Well, I guess in ten years when we do the

0:17:13.840 --> 0:17:17.840
<v Speaker 3>twenty year anniversary, we will be able to judge. But Dan,

0:17:18.640 --> 0:17:21.240
<v Speaker 3>you know, since we're talking about why people should buy bonds,

0:17:21.280 --> 0:17:24.119
<v Speaker 3>one of the surprising things that happened this year was

0:17:24.520 --> 0:17:28.360
<v Speaker 3>we had the big tariff drama and we saw markets

0:17:28.359 --> 0:17:31.600
<v Speaker 3>go down, We saw a bond yield spike. Everyone was

0:17:31.640 --> 0:17:34.199
<v Speaker 3>talking about the sell America trade. So this idea that

0:17:34.240 --> 0:17:36.639
<v Speaker 3>you didn't want to hold onto US assets because of

0:17:36.680 --> 0:17:41.879
<v Speaker 3>all that policy uncertainty. And now you know, in December

0:17:42.080 --> 0:17:45.359
<v Speaker 3>twenty twenty five, yields have come down quite a lot,

0:17:45.400 --> 0:17:48.639
<v Speaker 3>although I have to say the dollar is still fairly weak.

0:17:49.280 --> 0:17:53.760
<v Speaker 3>You were always kind of resistant to the sell America idea,

0:17:53.760 --> 0:17:56.520
<v Speaker 3>and you pushed back on it. What did you see

0:17:56.680 --> 0:17:59.080
<v Speaker 3>that perhaps others didn't.

0:17:59.760 --> 0:17:59.879
<v Speaker 5>Well.

0:18:00.080 --> 0:18:03.240
<v Speaker 4>Again, I think a lot has to do with starting valuations.

0:18:03.480 --> 0:18:07.720
<v Speaker 4>After a significant period of underperformance across the US fixed

0:18:07.720 --> 0:18:10.359
<v Speaker 4>income or global fixed income, you ended up with a

0:18:10.359 --> 0:18:14.280
<v Speaker 4>decent valuation cushion. So I think that's always important in markets. Yes,

0:18:14.400 --> 0:18:17.040
<v Speaker 4>there was news that in a narrow sense was negative

0:18:17.240 --> 0:18:20.719
<v Speaker 4>for bonds and negative for US bonds or US assets

0:18:20.760 --> 0:18:24.399
<v Speaker 4>in particular. You started with a decent yield cushion. You know,

0:18:24.440 --> 0:18:27.879
<v Speaker 4>we began the year, you know, with yields ten year treasuries,

0:18:27.920 --> 0:18:30.639
<v Speaker 4>you know, up near five percent. A five percent yield

0:18:30.640 --> 0:18:33.320
<v Speaker 4>even in a three percent inflation worlds not that bad.

0:18:33.880 --> 0:18:36.280
<v Speaker 4>I think the second point, though, you know, we weren't

0:18:36.400 --> 0:18:39.280
<v Speaker 4>overly convicted in just owning the United States. And I

0:18:39.280 --> 0:18:40.520
<v Speaker 4>think if I could, you know, you're part of the

0:18:40.560 --> 0:18:43.920
<v Speaker 4>most important thing I can say today is that global

0:18:43.960 --> 0:18:47.359
<v Speaker 4>bond investing is back. For so many years, capitalists poured

0:18:47.359 --> 0:18:49.920
<v Speaker 4>into the US markets. It's poured into the US markets

0:18:49.920 --> 0:18:52.840
<v Speaker 4>focusing on private credit, you know, which has grown you know,

0:18:52.880 --> 0:18:55.920
<v Speaker 4>the most here in this country. But very very quietly,

0:18:56.200 --> 0:19:00.920
<v Speaker 4>you've seen underperformance across the global fixed thing come opportunities

0:19:00.960 --> 0:19:04.399
<v Speaker 4>set where today even you know, from a US dollar

0:19:04.880 --> 0:19:10.080
<v Speaker 4>based investors perspective, there's great yield, great sources of diversification.

0:19:10.440 --> 0:19:13.960
<v Speaker 4>So it's not that we were, you know, insistent on

0:19:14.119 --> 0:19:17.960
<v Speaker 4>just owning US assets. In fact, we've gradually diversified into

0:19:18.000 --> 0:19:20.320
<v Speaker 4>other areas of the market. We just thought that there

0:19:20.400 --> 0:19:23.520
<v Speaker 4>was good value and good yield in the US, a

0:19:23.560 --> 0:19:27.080
<v Speaker 4>sufficient cushion, and then by extending into these other markets,

0:19:27.240 --> 0:19:30.240
<v Speaker 4>a great way to generate incremental return by good old

0:19:30.240 --> 0:19:33.040
<v Speaker 4>fashioned relative value trading in markets today that are less

0:19:33.040 --> 0:19:35.720
<v Speaker 4>correlated than they were during those years coming out of

0:19:35.760 --> 0:19:39.240
<v Speaker 4>the global financial crisis and where you just have a

0:19:39.280 --> 0:19:42.720
<v Speaker 4>really really exciting time to troll dual fashion training across

0:19:42.840 --> 0:19:45.640
<v Speaker 4>yield curves, across markets and avoid what.

0:19:45.760 --> 0:19:49.720
<v Speaker 2>Changed because it seemed like, you know, it felt like

0:19:50.480 --> 0:19:53.160
<v Speaker 2>international investing across any acid class was like a real

0:19:53.200 --> 0:19:54.679
<v Speaker 2>suckers thing. It's like, oh, this is going to be

0:19:54.680 --> 0:19:57.720
<v Speaker 2>the year that we're going to diversify internationally. You didn't

0:19:57.720 --> 0:20:01.720
<v Speaker 2>get paid at all for it. Flipped such that actually

0:20:01.720 --> 0:20:04.600
<v Speaker 2>both stocks too, because international equity markets have done very

0:20:04.640 --> 0:20:07.320
<v Speaker 2>well and have outperformed the US. It's kind of surprising

0:20:07.320 --> 0:20:11.480
<v Speaker 2>in many respects. But what switched such that now there's

0:20:11.520 --> 0:20:13.600
<v Speaker 2>been real opportunities to make money.

0:20:13.600 --> 0:20:17.080
<v Speaker 4>Looking abroad, Yeah, well again, valuations have improved. You know,

0:20:17.240 --> 0:20:19.680
<v Speaker 4>we talked about, you know, the real poor performance of

0:20:19.720 --> 0:20:22.439
<v Speaker 4>the US bond market over the last decade. As we

0:20:22.480 --> 0:20:26.359
<v Speaker 4>all know, yields were outright negative in many areas of

0:20:26.400 --> 0:20:28.520
<v Speaker 4>the world, So we talked about low yields. You subtract

0:20:28.520 --> 0:20:30.720
<v Speaker 4>that low inflation rate, you end up with a negative number,

0:20:31.280 --> 0:20:35.240
<v Speaker 4>and big portions of the global fixed income opportunity set

0:20:35.440 --> 0:20:38.280
<v Speaker 4>you'd have to subtract anything you started with a negative number.

0:20:38.480 --> 0:20:41.360
<v Speaker 4>So a lot of this has just been the repricing

0:20:41.400 --> 0:20:44.119
<v Speaker 4>of markets that started not only at low levels, but

0:20:44.280 --> 0:20:47.760
<v Speaker 4>negative yield levels. Then the second piece relates to policy

0:20:48.040 --> 0:20:50.359
<v Speaker 4>coming out of the global financial crisis. Not only were

0:20:50.440 --> 0:20:54.399
<v Speaker 4>yields low, but you've had such incredible policy activism where

0:20:54.440 --> 0:20:57.399
<v Speaker 4>on any signs of economic weakness you had a massive

0:20:57.400 --> 0:21:02.240
<v Speaker 4>fiscal response, a massive monetary paul response COVID, you know,

0:21:02.280 --> 0:21:05.040
<v Speaker 4>the ultimate example of that. And today, you know, with

0:21:05.119 --> 0:21:08.760
<v Speaker 4>debt levels and deficit levels where they are, policy makers

0:21:08.800 --> 0:21:11.800
<v Speaker 4>don't have that flexibility. So you're back to an environment

0:21:11.840 --> 0:21:14.680
<v Speaker 4>where markets increasingly have to stand on their own based

0:21:14.720 --> 0:21:17.879
<v Speaker 4>on fundamentals and that's just an exciting time. It means

0:21:17.880 --> 0:21:22.040
<v Speaker 4>more risk premium in markets, more term premium, higher yields,

0:21:22.200 --> 0:21:26.760
<v Speaker 4>with significant valuation cushion absolute and relative to what looked

0:21:26.760 --> 0:21:30.760
<v Speaker 4>to be quite expensive equity markets, and then just less correlation.

0:21:31.080 --> 0:21:33.040
<v Speaker 4>You have situations even over the course of the last

0:21:33.119 --> 0:21:35.960
<v Speaker 4>couple of months where a political surprise in Japan or

0:21:35.960 --> 0:21:40.760
<v Speaker 4>France creates lots of local volatility in those markets. Uncertainty

0:21:40.840 --> 0:21:45.200
<v Speaker 4>and French politics impacts UK politics because they have similar

0:21:45.440 --> 0:21:49.560
<v Speaker 4>challenges in terms of getting their deficit situation under control

0:21:50.040 --> 0:21:53.640
<v Speaker 4>in economic productivity higher. So it reminds us a lot

0:21:53.800 --> 0:21:56.760
<v Speaker 4>more like the mid nineties, you know, back before you

0:21:56.840 --> 0:22:01.480
<v Speaker 4>had this massive volatility, suffocation from policy, and again with

0:22:01.560 --> 0:22:04.000
<v Speaker 4>deficits where they are, with inflation where it is today

0:22:04.080 --> 0:22:07.080
<v Speaker 4>versus central bank targets. It's likely that over the next

0:22:07.119 --> 0:22:09.000
<v Speaker 4>several years, you know, you're going to continue to be

0:22:09.040 --> 0:22:12.400
<v Speaker 4>in this type of environment good value, good relative value,

0:22:12.640 --> 0:22:15.160
<v Speaker 4>and then much less correlated markets, which you know lead

0:22:15.240 --> 0:22:17.880
<v Speaker 4>to you know, some some good opportunity to generate incredential

0:22:17.920 --> 0:22:20.680
<v Speaker 4>return above starting yield levels.

0:22:21.040 --> 0:22:23.360
<v Speaker 3>Well, we wanted to talk about private credit as well, because,

0:22:23.400 --> 0:22:25.320
<v Speaker 3>as we said in the intro, this is one thing

0:22:25.359 --> 0:22:29.159
<v Speaker 3>that has changed quite a lot since twenty fifteen. People

0:22:29.240 --> 0:22:33.520
<v Speaker 3>obviously have different characterizations of private credit, but I'm curious

0:22:33.600 --> 0:22:37.280
<v Speaker 3>how you think about that space and how you would

0:22:37.320 --> 0:22:41.879
<v Speaker 3>define or how you would measure things like transparency and

0:22:41.920 --> 0:22:46.159
<v Speaker 3>opaqueness and customization in the credit waterfall and things like that,

0:22:46.200 --> 0:22:50.679
<v Speaker 3>because again, one person's extremely transparent market can be another

0:22:50.760 --> 0:22:54.440
<v Speaker 3>person's opaque morass of potential defaults.

0:22:55.119 --> 0:22:57.920
<v Speaker 4>Yes, I talked for the rest of the show here

0:22:57.920 --> 0:23:01.560
<v Speaker 4>in this topic. First of all, surprise it took this

0:23:01.600 --> 0:23:04.520
<v Speaker 4>long to get to the private credit topic. But look

0:23:04.520 --> 0:23:07.719
<v Speaker 4>at you know, not much of this is new. You know,

0:23:07.840 --> 0:23:11.359
<v Speaker 4>when I joined PIMCO back in the late nineteen nineties,

0:23:11.560 --> 0:23:13.560
<v Speaker 4>I spent the good portion of my initial time at

0:23:13.600 --> 0:23:17.439
<v Speaker 4>the firm focusing on the underwriting of private assets. You know,

0:23:17.520 --> 0:23:19.479
<v Speaker 4>we call them pure privates, but these were you know,

0:23:19.520 --> 0:23:22.280
<v Speaker 4>four A two privates that were created as part of

0:23:22.320 --> 0:23:25.760
<v Speaker 4>the Securities Act of nineteen thirty three, one forty four

0:23:25.800 --> 0:23:28.359
<v Speaker 4>A privates, which are quite popular. I think the first

0:23:28.359 --> 0:23:32.360
<v Speaker 4>one was issued back in nineteen ninety. The technology that's

0:23:32.400 --> 0:23:36.280
<v Speaker 4>being utilized to fund AI infrastructure today, some of these

0:23:36.320 --> 0:23:39.760
<v Speaker 4>off balance sheet contingent or make whole guarantee type frameworks

0:23:40.240 --> 0:23:43.080
<v Speaker 4>were around in the mid to late nineteen nineties. The

0:23:43.119 --> 0:23:46.840
<v Speaker 4>difference today is that you have this massive capital investment need,

0:23:47.520 --> 0:23:49.480
<v Speaker 4>so the deals are larger, but a lot of the

0:23:49.520 --> 0:23:52.200
<v Speaker 4>technology has just been dusted off, so to speak, for

0:23:52.680 --> 0:23:55.560
<v Speaker 4>the new era. And the other point that's important, and

0:23:55.840 --> 0:23:59.240
<v Speaker 4>when we're talking about historical returns, I think this explains

0:23:59.400 --> 0:24:02.680
<v Speaker 4>a lot, is that what's been so unique in terms

0:24:02.720 --> 0:24:05.879
<v Speaker 4>of credit asset performance in general has been the post

0:24:05.880 --> 0:24:08.760
<v Speaker 4>global financial crisis period. Well, we have it at a

0:24:08.760 --> 0:24:11.720
<v Speaker 4>sustained period of economic weakness. In fact, one of my

0:24:11.760 --> 0:24:16.720
<v Speaker 4>favorite data series is looking at how lower quality lending

0:24:16.920 --> 0:24:20.600
<v Speaker 4>performed since way back during the Michael Milken days when

0:24:20.640 --> 0:24:23.400
<v Speaker 4>he helped to create that market. If you go back

0:24:23.400 --> 0:24:25.520
<v Speaker 4>to the early nineteen eighties all the way up to

0:24:25.520 --> 0:24:28.879
<v Speaker 4>the global financial crisis, if you had just blindly bought

0:24:29.359 --> 0:24:32.920
<v Speaker 4>the lowest quality credit that's out there proxy by high

0:24:32.960 --> 0:24:37.320
<v Speaker 4>yield senior secured loans direct lending blend the index, you

0:24:37.320 --> 0:24:39.280
<v Speaker 4>would have ended up with only about a half a

0:24:39.320 --> 0:24:43.760
<v Speaker 4>percentage point of incremental performance versus high quality bonds over

0:24:43.800 --> 0:24:46.760
<v Speaker 4>that entire period. And the way it worked was that

0:24:46.800 --> 0:24:47.840
<v Speaker 4>you made a lot of money. You have a lot

0:24:47.840 --> 0:24:49.080
<v Speaker 4>of money, a lot of money, a lot of money.

0:24:49.080 --> 0:24:51.080
<v Speaker 4>Then you gave it all back. Then you made a

0:24:51.320 --> 0:24:52.600
<v Speaker 4>lot of a lot of lot, gave it all back, and

0:24:52.680 --> 0:24:55.960
<v Speaker 4>we'd go back to the late eighties when you had

0:24:56.240 --> 0:24:59.320
<v Speaker 4>that period initial period of aggressive underwriting. You had the

0:24:59.359 --> 0:25:02.240
<v Speaker 4>savings and loan crisis of the early nineties, you had

0:25:02.240 --> 0:25:05.200
<v Speaker 4>the LTCM or the Asian Financial crisis in the late nineties,

0:25:05.280 --> 0:25:07.560
<v Speaker 4>than the Internet bubble and the telecom issues of the

0:25:07.600 --> 0:25:10.800
<v Speaker 4>early two thousands, then of course the Global Financial Crisis.

0:25:11.560 --> 0:25:15.520
<v Speaker 4>That was a more normal credit environment since the GFC

0:25:15.800 --> 0:25:19.200
<v Speaker 4>just blindly buying the lowest quality credit on the board,

0:25:19.280 --> 0:25:22.439
<v Speaker 4>whether it's private credit or lower quality public credit, you

0:25:22.560 --> 0:25:26.000
<v Speaker 4>generated seven percent a year more than high quality bonds,

0:25:26.480 --> 0:25:29.520
<v Speaker 4>and that explains a lot. Not surprisingly, you've seen massive

0:25:29.560 --> 0:25:32.719
<v Speaker 4>growth in that area of the market. Now, you know,

0:25:33.000 --> 0:25:35.439
<v Speaker 4>weaker credit tends to perform well when stocks go up

0:25:35.480 --> 0:25:38.240
<v Speaker 4>fifteen percent a year. But again, you know that's where

0:25:38.280 --> 0:25:41.880
<v Speaker 4>we are today. I hear all the discussion about God,

0:25:41.920 --> 0:25:44.199
<v Speaker 4>you know, underwriting's worse than the public side versus the

0:25:44.200 --> 0:25:47.879
<v Speaker 4>private side. The reality is, when you've grown this much,

0:25:48.520 --> 0:25:52.119
<v Speaker 4>when you've lent so much money to weaker quality borrowers,

0:25:52.640 --> 0:25:56.080
<v Speaker 4>when covenants have weakened, when spreads are tight, when equities

0:25:56.080 --> 0:25:58.800
<v Speaker 4>have gone up consistently as much as they have, you're

0:25:58.800 --> 0:26:01.679
<v Speaker 4>going to have challenges in these markets. So when we

0:26:01.760 --> 0:26:04.760
<v Speaker 4>think about credit, we look at it under sort of

0:26:04.840 --> 0:26:10.679
<v Speaker 4>two continuums. One liquidity. Certain assets are completely illiquid. The

0:26:10.720 --> 0:26:13.080
<v Speaker 4>only decision you get to make is the purchase decision,

0:26:13.200 --> 0:26:15.679
<v Speaker 4>so you better be right. And then at the other

0:26:15.760 --> 0:26:18.400
<v Speaker 4>end of the extreme, you have very very liquid assets

0:26:18.480 --> 0:26:20.840
<v Speaker 4>where you can change your mind on a regular basis.

0:26:21.080 --> 0:26:23.879
<v Speaker 4>And then you have economic sensitivity. You have assets that

0:26:23.920 --> 0:26:26.800
<v Speaker 4>are very insensitive to the economy, that are very very

0:26:26.840 --> 0:26:29.680
<v Speaker 4>high quality. Then at the other extreme, you have assets

0:26:29.760 --> 0:26:33.440
<v Speaker 4>with a tremendous amount of economic sensitivity, a tremendous amount

0:26:33.440 --> 0:26:39.560
<v Speaker 4>of sensitivity to AI related disruption, other forms of economic weakness,

0:26:39.720 --> 0:26:42.400
<v Speaker 4>an anticipated competition, and you just want to make sure

0:26:42.440 --> 0:26:45.040
<v Speaker 4>you get paid enough. And with stocks near all time highs,

0:26:45.080 --> 0:26:48.600
<v Speaker 4>with spreads tight, with covenants weak, they are going to

0:26:48.640 --> 0:26:51.159
<v Speaker 4>be problems. And I think as an investor, you just

0:26:51.200 --> 0:26:53.359
<v Speaker 4>need to acknowledge that you're not getting paid what you

0:26:53.520 --> 0:26:56.480
<v Speaker 4>got to take that risk five or ten years ago,

0:26:57.080 --> 0:26:59.199
<v Speaker 4>and you just want to be defensive. You want to

0:26:59.240 --> 0:27:03.080
<v Speaker 4>be skeptical, But it's not so much private versus public.

0:27:03.520 --> 0:27:05.960
<v Speaker 4>I think it's just thoughtful underwriting and just understanding that

0:27:06.000 --> 0:27:09.119
<v Speaker 4>we're at a time where, given the strong historical performance,

0:27:09.520 --> 0:27:12.040
<v Speaker 4>given the fact that we haven't had a sustained period

0:27:12.040 --> 0:27:15.560
<v Speaker 4>of economics slowing for a long time, some complacency has

0:27:15.600 --> 0:27:19.200
<v Speaker 4>worked their way into these higher risk areas.

0:27:18.800 --> 0:27:19.520
<v Speaker 5>Of the market.

0:27:20.480 --> 0:27:24.040
<v Speaker 3>Well, talk a little bit more about competition in private credit,

0:27:24.119 --> 0:27:27.960
<v Speaker 3>because I imagine it's good to be PIMCO when it comes

0:27:27.960 --> 0:27:32.160
<v Speaker 3>to sourcing deals and maybe negotiating the terms. But does

0:27:32.200 --> 0:27:35.840
<v Speaker 3>even someone like you, a truly big bond manager have

0:27:35.960 --> 0:27:39.760
<v Speaker 3>to deal with competitive pressures where if you don't agree

0:27:39.800 --> 0:27:42.280
<v Speaker 3>to one bond term, someone else will swoop in and

0:27:42.320 --> 0:27:44.199
<v Speaker 3>agree to it and take it away from you.

0:27:44.480 --> 0:27:45.040
<v Speaker 5>Absolutely.

0:27:45.080 --> 0:27:47.399
<v Speaker 4>And again, I think the other point about public and

0:27:47.440 --> 0:27:50.760
<v Speaker 4>private markets is that they're well integrated. You know, we

0:27:50.760 --> 0:27:52.840
<v Speaker 4>could talk about convergence, you know a bit a bit later,

0:27:52.960 --> 0:27:54.119
<v Speaker 4>have have some views there.

0:27:54.160 --> 0:27:55.359
<v Speaker 5>But you know, when an.

0:27:55.280 --> 0:27:58.240
<v Speaker 4>Issuer looks at their options, they're going to test the

0:27:58.240 --> 0:28:02.080
<v Speaker 4>public option, they'll test the private option. And there is

0:28:02.119 --> 0:28:05.080
<v Speaker 4>a lot of competition, a lot of competition for market share.

0:28:05.160 --> 0:28:06.919
<v Speaker 4>When you look at a lot of the managers, particularly

0:28:06.960 --> 0:28:10.800
<v Speaker 4>in the private credit space, they announce very very aggressive

0:28:10.920 --> 0:28:14.439
<v Speaker 4>growth assumptions. You know, as an investor sometimes you know,

0:28:14.840 --> 0:28:17.479
<v Speaker 4>I wish in certain quarters people would talk about, you know,

0:28:17.520 --> 0:28:19.600
<v Speaker 4>if we can find value for the end investor, we

0:28:19.640 --> 0:28:22.200
<v Speaker 4>will grow this much. All too often, you know, after

0:28:22.240 --> 0:28:24.919
<v Speaker 4>a pretty bullish environment for credit, it's was simply going

0:28:24.960 --> 0:28:28.000
<v Speaker 4>to grow a lot. So you know, we do see

0:28:28.280 --> 0:28:32.840
<v Speaker 4>time and time again situations where you start the underwriting process,

0:28:33.400 --> 0:28:35.680
<v Speaker 4>you get down to the point where it's time to

0:28:35.720 --> 0:28:38.400
<v Speaker 4>get into a final round and you don't get the

0:28:38.520 --> 0:28:42.560
<v Speaker 4>terms that we feel we need as extenders of credit

0:28:42.680 --> 0:28:46.600
<v Speaker 4>in this marketplace. And that's just again symptomatic of the

0:28:46.640 --> 0:28:49.160
<v Speaker 4>fact that there's a lot of demand for these assets

0:28:49.440 --> 0:28:52.280
<v Speaker 4>and there's a lot of demand relative to the supply

0:28:52.520 --> 0:28:55.280
<v Speaker 4>across many segments of the market. And that's true not

0:28:55.320 --> 0:28:58.200
<v Speaker 4>only of below investment grade risk, but it's very very

0:28:58.200 --> 0:29:01.720
<v Speaker 4>true of certain transactions with an investment grade rating, at

0:29:01.800 --> 0:29:05.920
<v Speaker 4>least from a rating agency. So you know, given tight spreads,

0:29:05.960 --> 0:29:08.760
<v Speaker 4>given the competition, you just have to say no. And

0:29:09.080 --> 0:29:12.240
<v Speaker 4>I'll go back to my earlier point. What's so exciting

0:29:12.240 --> 0:29:15.240
<v Speaker 4>about this market today is that you do not need

0:29:15.280 --> 0:29:19.640
<v Speaker 4>to take on aggressively underwritten credit to generate return the

0:29:19.720 --> 0:29:23.080
<v Speaker 4>high quality area of the market, especially if you expand globally.

0:29:23.160 --> 0:29:26.160
<v Speaker 4>If you take advantage of liquidity, which typically means flexibility

0:29:26.160 --> 0:29:29.480
<v Speaker 4>for end investors, you can have a high quality portfolio

0:29:29.520 --> 0:29:32.400
<v Speaker 4>where you don't have to sacrifice return. Very different than

0:29:32.400 --> 0:29:35.080
<v Speaker 4>where we were ten years ago, but again pretty exciting.

0:29:35.120 --> 0:29:38.120
<v Speaker 4>Now we can go up in quality without again giving

0:29:38.200 --> 0:29:42.160
<v Speaker 4>up return and in some cases ironically picking up expected return.

0:29:58.240 --> 0:30:00.479
<v Speaker 2>I want to go back to something you said, and

0:30:00.520 --> 0:30:03.240
<v Speaker 2>I didn't quite get it, but I think it's important,

0:30:03.240 --> 0:30:05.440
<v Speaker 2>and of course it's very interesting to our audience. You're

0:30:05.480 --> 0:30:07.480
<v Speaker 2>talking about the AI financing, and I think you said

0:30:07.480 --> 0:30:11.080
<v Speaker 2>something contingent, makehold guarantees. I don't tell us about these

0:30:11.080 --> 0:30:14.680
<v Speaker 2>financing as you see them. And what is the history,

0:30:15.120 --> 0:30:18.760
<v Speaker 2>How novel are they relative to past financings, or how

0:30:18.840 --> 0:30:21.160
<v Speaker 2>much is it that these are structures that were very

0:30:21.200 --> 0:30:24.720
<v Speaker 2>much in place for something else are now being reproposed

0:30:24.800 --> 0:30:26.080
<v Speaker 2>into this new exciting area.

0:30:26.800 --> 0:30:30.880
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, I'll start with what's new, which is lending to

0:30:31.040 --> 0:30:34.880
<v Speaker 4>support the growth and AI and related infrastructure.

0:30:35.160 --> 0:30:35.360
<v Speaker 5>There.

0:30:35.400 --> 0:30:38.959
<v Speaker 4>You're talking about several trillion dollars of investment need. So

0:30:39.560 --> 0:30:42.320
<v Speaker 4>that's what's new, But you know what's not so new

0:30:42.400 --> 0:30:46.000
<v Speaker 4>is this idea that companies would like to keep a

0:30:46.040 --> 0:30:49.120
<v Speaker 4>good portion of their debt off their balance sheet or

0:30:49.120 --> 0:30:53.720
<v Speaker 4>come up with structures that limit their overall financial liability

0:30:53.800 --> 0:30:57.720
<v Speaker 4>or give them some flexibility to manage that liability over time,

0:30:58.280 --> 0:31:01.440
<v Speaker 4>and as an end investor to lend to those companies.

0:31:01.960 --> 0:31:05.800
<v Speaker 4>You know, it's important to acknowledge that lenning against tech firms,

0:31:05.920 --> 0:31:09.959
<v Speaker 4>lenning against AI infrastructure, lenning against AI chips is risky.

0:31:10.160 --> 0:31:12.200
<v Speaker 4>That could be a real good investment if you own

0:31:12.200 --> 0:31:14.680
<v Speaker 4>the equity, may not be a great investment if you

0:31:14.680 --> 0:31:16.640
<v Speaker 4>own the bonds, where at most you get your coupon

0:31:16.760 --> 0:31:18.480
<v Speaker 4>and you hope to get par back at the end

0:31:18.520 --> 0:31:20.920
<v Speaker 4>of the day. So a lot of the underwriting of

0:31:20.960 --> 0:31:23.320
<v Speaker 4>these transactions, and there have been a lot and we

0:31:23.360 --> 0:31:25.920
<v Speaker 4>expect a lot more to come over the course of

0:31:25.960 --> 0:31:29.200
<v Speaker 4>the next few years, is to understand the form of

0:31:29.240 --> 0:31:33.320
<v Speaker 4>that guarantee and understand the entity that's providing that guarantee,

0:31:33.320 --> 0:31:36.120
<v Speaker 4>whether it's in the form of lease payments or other

0:31:36.160 --> 0:31:40.520
<v Speaker 4>type of makehold type arrangements. And these types of structures

0:31:40.720 --> 0:31:44.240
<v Speaker 4>are what have been around for many, many years. You know,

0:31:44.280 --> 0:31:46.440
<v Speaker 4>back in the mid in late nineteen nineties. You know

0:31:46.640 --> 0:31:49.440
<v Speaker 4>a lot of times these would be done by Wall

0:31:49.440 --> 0:31:53.240
<v Speaker 4>Street financial institutions, sometimes across a segment of their business

0:31:53.240 --> 0:31:56.960
<v Speaker 4>where they would use a corporate guarantee to arbitrage a

0:31:57.040 --> 0:32:00.440
<v Speaker 4>bit of the radio agency frameworks. At other time times

0:32:00.520 --> 0:32:05.880
<v Speaker 4>these deals were backed by large ships, equipment, other areas

0:32:05.880 --> 0:32:08.960
<v Speaker 4>of the market. So it was the same type of analysis,

0:32:09.000 --> 0:32:11.920
<v Speaker 4>the same type of underwriting checklist, which involves a lot

0:32:11.920 --> 0:32:15.640
<v Speaker 4>of lawyers to ensure that you understand the guarantee how

0:32:15.680 --> 0:32:18.040
<v Speaker 4>you have to realize on that guarantee, and that's not

0:32:18.120 --> 0:32:18.959
<v Speaker 4>so different today.

0:32:19.160 --> 0:32:22.280
<v Speaker 2>And just to be clear, the guarantee we're talking about

0:32:22.320 --> 0:32:27.520
<v Speaker 2>here is okay, here is a hypothetical SPV that owns

0:32:27.520 --> 0:32:30.560
<v Speaker 2>a data center and it borrows money and finances, et cetera.

0:32:30.840 --> 0:32:34.120
<v Speaker 2>And the guarantee question is how much will the tenant

0:32:34.160 --> 0:32:36.040
<v Speaker 2>of that data center, which didn't want to have all

0:32:36.040 --> 0:32:38.480
<v Speaker 2>that DEBTA on their books, maybe like a Facebook or

0:32:38.480 --> 0:32:41.600
<v Speaker 2>one of the hyperscalers, how much are they actually committed

0:32:42.040 --> 0:32:45.320
<v Speaker 2>to being a tenant for the long term They're basically

0:32:45.320 --> 0:32:46.800
<v Speaker 2>that's what we're talking about.

0:32:46.760 --> 0:32:50.320
<v Speaker 4>Absolutely correct. And why it matters here is you're typically

0:32:50.360 --> 0:32:55.320
<v Speaker 4>talking about investment grade rated counterparties on these transactions where

0:32:55.880 --> 0:32:59.680
<v Speaker 4>the infrastructure itself, the assets that are partially backing the

0:32:59.800 --> 0:33:02.920
<v Speaker 4>d a lot of stablone basis would achieve a very

0:33:03.000 --> 0:33:05.880
<v Speaker 4>very low rating. So how do you create a structure

0:33:05.920 --> 0:33:10.120
<v Speaker 4>where you improve the credit quality while meeting the needs

0:33:10.200 --> 0:33:13.479
<v Speaker 4>of those that are looking to borrow within this market.

0:33:13.640 --> 0:33:16.080
<v Speaker 4>So again, the whole key is to make sure that

0:33:16.680 --> 0:33:20.320
<v Speaker 4>something that the radio agencies may assign investment grade rating too,

0:33:20.600 --> 0:33:24.520
<v Speaker 4>is in fact investment grade from a fundamental credit quality perspective.

0:33:24.560 --> 0:33:26.880
<v Speaker 4>And I think that's another theme. You know, in talking

0:33:26.880 --> 0:33:30.960
<v Speaker 4>about private credit, you know there are more economically sensitive,

0:33:31.080 --> 0:33:34.240
<v Speaker 4>lower quality loans, and then there's been a lot of

0:33:34.240 --> 0:33:37.160
<v Speaker 4>growth on the investment grade side. It is very, very

0:33:37.200 --> 0:33:40.040
<v Speaker 4>dangerous to assume something has an investment grade rating just

0:33:40.080 --> 0:33:43.080
<v Speaker 4>because of the rating agencies assign a rating to it.

0:33:43.080 --> 0:33:45.920
<v Speaker 4>It's critically important that you do your own credit work. Today,

0:33:45.960 --> 0:33:48.640
<v Speaker 4>all too frequently you will have an investment grade rating

0:33:48.680 --> 0:33:51.800
<v Speaker 4>from one entity. And again, market participants for years have

0:33:51.840 --> 0:33:54.160
<v Speaker 4>always joked, if you can only find one investment grade rating,

0:33:54.200 --> 0:33:56.920
<v Speaker 4>it's pretty fair to assume everyone else's below investment grade.

0:33:57.040 --> 0:33:59.400
<v Speaker 4>So the bottom line is that there's been a lot

0:33:59.440 --> 0:34:04.680
<v Speaker 4>of aggress of underwriting going on, even with instruments that

0:34:04.880 --> 0:34:07.479
<v Speaker 4>carry an investment grade rating at least from one entity.

0:34:07.880 --> 0:34:10.839
<v Speaker 4>And again when spreads are tight, when documentation is relatively weak,

0:34:10.880 --> 0:34:13.120
<v Speaker 4>it's just critically important that you do your own fundamental

0:34:13.160 --> 0:34:15.799
<v Speaker 4>credit work. I do think Pimpco has some advantages in

0:34:15.840 --> 0:34:19.279
<v Speaker 4>that area, both in terms of experience and resources, but

0:34:19.360 --> 0:34:21.920
<v Speaker 4>it's super important because you're not always getting the terms

0:34:21.920 --> 0:34:24.320
<v Speaker 4>that you want. When you do, you can unlock tremendous

0:34:24.400 --> 0:34:27.200
<v Speaker 4>value for your clients. But this is an environment where

0:34:27.280 --> 0:34:29.880
<v Speaker 4>we have to be really really selective as a bond

0:34:29.920 --> 0:34:30.840
<v Speaker 4>investor at least.

0:34:31.160 --> 0:34:34.560
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, when I think back to the twenty fifteen environment,

0:34:34.600 --> 0:34:36.799
<v Speaker 3>I remember a lot of people were writing stories about

0:34:36.840 --> 0:34:40.000
<v Speaker 3>the triple B bubble in investment grade. So Triple B

0:34:40.120 --> 0:34:42.960
<v Speaker 3>is the lowest tier of investment grade and that had

0:34:43.000 --> 0:34:48.360
<v Speaker 3>been absolutely exploding post financial crisis, and everyone expect not everyone,

0:34:48.480 --> 0:34:51.000
<v Speaker 3>A lot of people expected that to end in tiers,

0:34:51.120 --> 0:34:55.040
<v Speaker 3>and instead it ended with all those like Triple b's

0:34:55.120 --> 0:34:58.000
<v Speaker 3>getting upgraded and a lot of junk getting upgraded as well,

0:34:58.000 --> 0:34:59.759
<v Speaker 3>and having a bunch of rising stars, which I don't

0:34:59.760 --> 0:35:03.839
<v Speaker 3>think a lot of people were necessarily expecting, but talk

0:35:03.880 --> 0:35:07.960
<v Speaker 3>a little bit more about the rating agencies. What are

0:35:08.040 --> 0:35:11.840
<v Speaker 3>the pressures that you think are perhaps driving them to

0:35:12.840 --> 0:35:16.480
<v Speaker 3>rate some of these structures higher than they otherwise might be.

0:35:17.520 --> 0:35:20.600
<v Speaker 4>Well, again, there are multiple radio agencies that have different

0:35:20.600 --> 0:35:24.439
<v Speaker 4>philosophies to how they arrive at a rating, and there's

0:35:24.480 --> 0:35:27.759
<v Speaker 4>going to be understandable disagreement, you know, within markets. But

0:35:28.000 --> 0:35:30.080
<v Speaker 4>issuers are quite shrewd. You know, they're going to go

0:35:30.200 --> 0:35:33.719
<v Speaker 4>to where they get the most favorable ratings treatment. This

0:35:33.760 --> 0:35:36.080
<v Speaker 4>has always been the case, and I think the important

0:35:36.120 --> 0:35:38.840
<v Speaker 4>point to notice that when stocks are going up fifteen

0:35:38.840 --> 0:35:41.880
<v Speaker 4>percent a year, when the economy is growing, when you

0:35:41.880 --> 0:35:45.280
<v Speaker 4>don't have a sustained period of economic weakness, even poorly

0:35:45.360 --> 0:35:49.320
<v Speaker 4>underwritten credit will mature. We experience that in an extreme sense,

0:35:49.400 --> 0:35:52.480
<v Speaker 4>you know, during the two thousands. What we try to do,

0:35:52.600 --> 0:35:58.279
<v Speaker 4>is active investors is to underwrite two weaker economic environments,

0:35:58.520 --> 0:36:02.319
<v Speaker 4>environments where you know those underlying entities or the infrastructure

0:36:02.520 --> 0:36:04.680
<v Speaker 4>you know that you that you're lending against go into

0:36:04.719 --> 0:36:07.520
<v Speaker 4>a period of weakness. And I think that's where you know,

0:36:07.680 --> 0:36:11.320
<v Speaker 4>good fundamental credit work in this type of environment that

0:36:11.360 --> 0:36:14.960
<v Speaker 4>we're in today that's very much driven by rating arbitrage.

0:36:15.040 --> 0:36:17.319
<v Speaker 4>You know, seeking out investment grade ratings, you know, for

0:36:17.360 --> 0:36:20.480
<v Speaker 4>an insurance balance sheet or reinsurance balance sheet as an example.

0:36:21.000 --> 0:36:26.560
<v Speaker 4>You can lead at times to aggressive decisions. So I

0:36:26.640 --> 0:36:27.960
<v Speaker 4>think it's just a nature of the fact that you

0:36:28.000 --> 0:36:31.560
<v Speaker 4>have multiple agencies and some will be more optimistic in

0:36:31.600 --> 0:36:32.920
<v Speaker 4>certain areas than others.

0:36:32.960 --> 0:36:33.880
<v Speaker 5>But that's great.

0:36:33.920 --> 0:36:36.000
<v Speaker 4>You know, if we didn't have those sources of disagreement,

0:36:36.000 --> 0:36:39.360
<v Speaker 4>that wouldn't be opportunities to generate incremental return, you know,

0:36:39.440 --> 0:36:40.799
<v Speaker 4>versus passive alternatives.

0:36:41.600 --> 0:36:45.000
<v Speaker 2>While we're here on credit. Actually, you know, there's probably

0:36:45.000 --> 0:36:47.120
<v Speaker 2>about a month ago or a month and a half ago,

0:36:47.360 --> 0:36:50.720
<v Speaker 2>that's when we were getting all those headlines about tree color.

0:36:51.239 --> 0:36:53.920
<v Speaker 2>And that was when Jamie Diamond made the sort of

0:36:53.960 --> 0:36:57.960
<v Speaker 2>famous crickets thing. I was getting real corea cockroaches.

0:36:58.040 --> 0:37:00.799
<v Speaker 3>I hate cockroaches and I like crickets, So I want

0:37:00.840 --> 0:37:01.439
<v Speaker 3>to make that clear.

0:37:01.520 --> 0:37:04.719
<v Speaker 2>Crickets are lovely. Yeah, right, I should not associate them

0:37:04.800 --> 0:37:07.560
<v Speaker 2>with credit blow ups. That's completely unfair to crickets. It's

0:37:07.600 --> 0:37:10.200
<v Speaker 2>fair to cockroaches. Jamie Diamond made those cocker I was

0:37:10.200 --> 0:37:12.120
<v Speaker 2>getting worried. I saw all these heads like going another

0:37:12.160 --> 0:37:14.120
<v Speaker 2>antity took a hit on this another entity. I was

0:37:14.120 --> 0:37:16.000
<v Speaker 2>like oh, this is very familiar. I don't like I

0:37:16.040 --> 0:37:18.840
<v Speaker 2>don't like how many times the same company appears in

0:37:18.920 --> 0:37:21.960
<v Speaker 2>the headlines. But we haven't gotten that much actually since then.

0:37:22.120 --> 0:37:24.319
<v Speaker 2>It's not like there have been five more of those.

0:37:24.640 --> 0:37:27.320
<v Speaker 2>I'm just sort of curing is setting aside some of

0:37:27.360 --> 0:37:29.840
<v Speaker 2>the data center, the sexy private credit stuff that everyone's

0:37:29.840 --> 0:37:32.399
<v Speaker 2>focused on. Do you do you think over the last

0:37:32.440 --> 0:37:36.640
<v Speaker 2>several years, was there some systematically bad underwriting going on,

0:37:36.760 --> 0:37:39.400
<v Speaker 2>especially over the last few years, or were there isolated

0:37:39.440 --> 0:37:42.160
<v Speaker 2>cockroaches the first cockroach before they had a chance to

0:37:42.440 --> 0:37:45.560
<v Speaker 2>lay eggs and make babies, the lonely cockroaches.

0:37:45.640 --> 0:37:46.000
<v Speaker 5>Yeah?

0:37:46.080 --> 0:37:49.760
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, So look again, because there's been so much growth

0:37:49.920 --> 0:37:54.160
<v Speaker 4>in lending to lower quality companies, and again, the last

0:37:54.160 --> 0:37:58.359
<v Speaker 4>major cycle was lending to lower quality households. Yeah right,

0:37:58.640 --> 0:38:02.399
<v Speaker 4>you know, there's going to be areas of excess, and

0:38:02.560 --> 0:38:05.480
<v Speaker 4>I think people are focused on these areas.

0:38:05.680 --> 0:38:07.440
<v Speaker 5>But again, when you look at.

0:38:07.239 --> 0:38:12.359
<v Speaker 4>The cumulative delinquencies and losses, yes they've increased a bit

0:38:12.400 --> 0:38:15.799
<v Speaker 4>over the last few years, but these situations have been

0:38:16.000 --> 0:38:20.239
<v Speaker 4>relatively isolated. But again, anytime you've had this much credit expansion,

0:38:20.880 --> 0:38:23.520
<v Speaker 4>you're going to have challenges, and these challenges are happening

0:38:23.680 --> 0:38:26.680
<v Speaker 4>in a relatively strong economy, so we don't think this

0:38:26.719 --> 0:38:29.359
<v Speaker 4>will be a catastrophe. The word I've used is that

0:38:29.360 --> 0:38:32.120
<v Speaker 4>there's likely going to be disappointment in certain areas of

0:38:32.120 --> 0:38:35.040
<v Speaker 4>the credit markets that have performed exceptionally well over the

0:38:35.120 --> 0:38:38.680
<v Speaker 4>last ten to fifteen years. But that shouldn't be viewed

0:38:38.680 --> 0:38:42.200
<v Speaker 4>as an overly controversial statement. That's how markets work. You know,

0:38:42.280 --> 0:38:45.399
<v Speaker 4>credit was very cheap ten or fifteen years ago, high

0:38:45.480 --> 0:38:48.400
<v Speaker 4>quality bonds were very very expensive. Today, credit spreads are

0:38:48.440 --> 0:38:51.200
<v Speaker 4>near all time tights, equities are near all time highs,

0:38:51.760 --> 0:38:55.760
<v Speaker 4>and valuate high quality bonds looks reasonable relative to their history.

0:38:56.040 --> 0:38:58.759
<v Speaker 4>So you know, starting valuations tend to be pretty big

0:38:58.880 --> 0:39:02.440
<v Speaker 4>drivers of future turns. If the economy continues to grow,

0:39:02.440 --> 0:39:05.040
<v Speaker 4>if stocks keep going up fifteen percent a year, yes,

0:39:05.160 --> 0:39:08.640
<v Speaker 4>these will be relatively isolated situations, but if you get

0:39:08.640 --> 0:39:12.040
<v Speaker 4>into a period of economic weakness, losses will go up

0:39:12.080 --> 0:39:15.560
<v Speaker 4>and they'll likely be some disappointment. I think that's the

0:39:15.560 --> 0:39:17.200
<v Speaker 4>best way to categorize it. And then I think the

0:39:17.239 --> 0:39:20.200
<v Speaker 4>second important point when you look at markets in a

0:39:20.239 --> 0:39:23.719
<v Speaker 4>longer term historical context, is that regulators hate bailing out

0:39:23.760 --> 0:39:27.640
<v Speaker 4>the same sectors twice back during the GFC, it was

0:39:27.760 --> 0:39:30.640
<v Speaker 4>lending to the consumer. It was excessive lending from the

0:39:30.680 --> 0:39:33.560
<v Speaker 4>banks that caused all of the problems, almost took down

0:39:33.600 --> 0:39:37.600
<v Speaker 4>the financial system, and not surprisingly, the regulations towards the

0:39:37.640 --> 0:39:41.719
<v Speaker 4>banks and towards consumer lending was massive. And today when

0:39:41.760 --> 0:39:44.720
<v Speaker 4>you look at the world, the household balance sheets, certainly

0:39:44.719 --> 0:39:49.520
<v Speaker 4>middle income and above cohort groups hasn't been stronger this strong,

0:39:49.520 --> 0:39:53.400
<v Speaker 4>and several decades there's record amounts of borrower equity in

0:39:53.480 --> 0:39:56.680
<v Speaker 4>these areas of the market have been very, very strong.

0:39:56.840 --> 0:40:01.000
<v Speaker 4>From an underwriting perspective, the areas that escape the scrutiny

0:40:01.000 --> 0:40:02.640
<v Speaker 4>of the last time, you know, a lot of lending

0:40:02.640 --> 0:40:05.920
<v Speaker 4>to non financial corporates, a lot of this mid market

0:40:05.960 --> 0:40:09.480
<v Speaker 4>private lending that came out of that period relatively unscathed

0:40:09.520 --> 0:40:12.880
<v Speaker 4>from a regulatory perspective, has grown a lot. So I

0:40:12.920 --> 0:40:15.560
<v Speaker 4>think a lot of this just relates to longer term cycles.

0:40:15.719 --> 0:40:18.360
<v Speaker 4>PIPCO is talking in a much different way back in

0:40:18.360 --> 0:40:20.359
<v Speaker 4>two thousand and five, in two thousand and six, where

0:40:20.360 --> 0:40:23.080
<v Speaker 4>we were screaming from the rooftop saying that you know,

0:40:23.120 --> 0:40:25.560
<v Speaker 4>what was going on was so irrational that there were

0:40:25.719 --> 0:40:28.960
<v Speaker 4>major problems ahead. That's not where we are and That's

0:40:29.000 --> 0:40:32.359
<v Speaker 4>why I sometimes sound a bit more negative than we are.

0:40:32.600 --> 0:40:35.200
<v Speaker 4>I think that the idea of disappointment is the way

0:40:35.200 --> 0:40:37.680
<v Speaker 4>people should think about some of these areas of the

0:40:37.719 --> 0:40:39.600
<v Speaker 4>credit markets. And the good news is you don't have

0:40:39.640 --> 0:40:42.840
<v Speaker 4>to accept disappointment. You can simply accept the fact that

0:40:42.880 --> 0:40:45.279
<v Speaker 4>you had a great performance run and that by going

0:40:45.360 --> 0:40:48.480
<v Speaker 4>up in quality, expanding into a global opportunity set that

0:40:48.560 --> 0:40:51.879
<v Speaker 4>hasn't been sufficiently embraced just yet, perhaps voting a little

0:40:51.920 --> 0:40:55.080
<v Speaker 4>bit of non dollar exposure gets you in the same

0:40:55.160 --> 0:40:58.759
<v Speaker 4>place with much more resiliency, much more downside protection, and

0:40:59.320 --> 0:41:02.040
<v Speaker 4>a lot more liquidity or flexibility to change your mind

0:41:03.080 --> 0:41:04.120
<v Speaker 4>in the future as well.

0:41:04.920 --> 0:41:07.640
<v Speaker 3>Since you brought up household balance sheets, can you talk

0:41:07.640 --> 0:41:11.240
<v Speaker 3>to us a little bit about your housing outlook, because

0:41:11.640 --> 0:41:15.240
<v Speaker 3>I believe PIMCO has been pretty bullish on mortgages recently,

0:41:15.480 --> 0:41:17.720
<v Speaker 3>but at the same time we've seen a slight slow

0:41:17.760 --> 0:41:21.000
<v Speaker 3>down in the housing market. But then again, we still

0:41:21.000 --> 0:41:26.080
<v Speaker 3>have long term structural tailwinds, such as a massive undersupply

0:41:26.560 --> 0:41:29.239
<v Speaker 3>of homes in the US. Where do you see that

0:41:29.440 --> 0:41:32.440
<v Speaker 3>going in the coming years, particularly, you know, if we

0:41:32.440 --> 0:41:35.520
<v Speaker 3>were to see inflationary pressures start to pick up and

0:41:35.560 --> 0:41:38.000
<v Speaker 3>those longer end yields start to rise.

0:41:38.760 --> 0:41:42.200
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, so we are very bullish on housing related investments

0:41:42.440 --> 0:41:45.080
<v Speaker 4>in the United States as well as in other areas

0:41:45.280 --> 0:41:49.680
<v Speaker 4>around the world. Agency guaranteed mortgages still traded very widespreads

0:41:49.840 --> 0:41:53.160
<v Speaker 4>relative to corporates. Even in an absolute sense. We think

0:41:53.200 --> 0:41:55.400
<v Speaker 4>it's a very high quality, liquid area of the market

0:41:55.560 --> 0:41:58.200
<v Speaker 4>that again makes a lot of sense to own a

0:41:58.320 --> 0:42:02.400
<v Speaker 4>cross a variety of different mandates. We also like lending

0:42:02.680 --> 0:42:06.840
<v Speaker 4>in the non guaranteed area against the house simply because

0:42:06.960 --> 0:42:08.760
<v Speaker 4>borrowers have record amounts of equity.

0:42:08.920 --> 0:42:11.719
<v Speaker 3>So when you lend its collateral. Yeah, that's what it

0:42:11.760 --> 0:42:13.320
<v Speaker 3>sounds like. You love collateral.

0:42:13.600 --> 0:42:17.680
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, we like good documentation and good, good, good collateral.

0:42:17.840 --> 0:42:20.719
<v Speaker 4>You know, at least all else equal. But you know,

0:42:20.760 --> 0:42:23.960
<v Speaker 4>it's not a major bet on the directionality of homes.

0:42:24.000 --> 0:42:28.840
<v Speaker 4>When you're lending against a household that has seventy percentage

0:42:28.880 --> 0:42:32.080
<v Speaker 4>points of of borrow equity, your home can go down

0:42:32.160 --> 0:42:35.359
<v Speaker 4>quite a bit and you're very well protected. That same

0:42:35.440 --> 0:42:38.920
<v Speaker 4>dynamic exists you know, over the UK, across Europe, you know,

0:42:39.000 --> 0:42:41.440
<v Speaker 4>and even in other parts of the world. So you know,

0:42:41.520 --> 0:42:44.560
<v Speaker 4>again regulators don't like building out the same sectors twice

0:42:44.680 --> 0:42:48.440
<v Speaker 4>that's pretty good acid allocation advice. It's quite straightforward. But also,

0:42:48.600 --> 0:42:52.960
<v Speaker 4>you know, you have much better fundamentals across households. But

0:42:53.000 --> 0:42:56.840
<v Speaker 4>to your specific question around housing, it's a tough situation.

0:42:57.040 --> 0:42:59.960
<v Speaker 4>We do think that homes are going to remain elevation

0:43:00.280 --> 0:43:03.560
<v Speaker 4>from a valuation perspective, and affordability is going to remain

0:43:03.680 --> 0:43:06.480
<v Speaker 4>quite constrained because there's no easy answer. You know, you

0:43:06.520 --> 0:43:08.920
<v Speaker 4>bring the mortgage rate down, the home price goes up.

0:43:09.440 --> 0:43:12.399
<v Speaker 4>You know, affordability doesn't change in a meaningful sense. What

0:43:12.480 --> 0:43:15.279
<v Speaker 4>we really need in this country and other parts of

0:43:15.320 --> 0:43:18.520
<v Speaker 4>the world are more homes, more housing units. And again

0:43:18.640 --> 0:43:22.000
<v Speaker 4>because of a lot of the post global financial crisis regulation,

0:43:22.560 --> 0:43:25.399
<v Speaker 4>it's been real hard to build new homes. So our

0:43:25.440 --> 0:43:27.680
<v Speaker 4>base case view is that home price is going to

0:43:27.680 --> 0:43:30.400
<v Speaker 4>moderate here on a national level. You could see, at

0:43:30.480 --> 0:43:34.120
<v Speaker 4>least in real terms, you know, some steady declines over

0:43:34.120 --> 0:43:37.600
<v Speaker 4>the course of the next several years in certain markets

0:43:37.840 --> 0:43:40.799
<v Speaker 4>that are a bit overextended, you know, a bit more volatility.

0:43:41.160 --> 0:43:43.360
<v Speaker 4>But we do think that you know, home price is

0:43:43.440 --> 0:43:47.080
<v Speaker 4>going to remain elevated from a historical perspective, just because

0:43:47.080 --> 0:43:49.360
<v Speaker 4>of the fact that people have locked in very, very

0:43:49.400 --> 0:43:52.319
<v Speaker 4>low mortgage rates thirty years, you know, not just five

0:43:52.400 --> 0:43:54.239
<v Speaker 4>or ten years. You know which which we're you know,

0:43:54.360 --> 0:43:58.759
<v Speaker 4>mortgage durations, you know, popular pre GFC. So you know

0:43:58.800 --> 0:44:00.719
<v Speaker 4>you're not going to see you know, two much turnover.

0:44:01.080 --> 0:44:04.120
<v Speaker 4>And unfortunately that means that homes for you know a

0:44:04.160 --> 0:44:07.040
<v Speaker 4>lot of younger Americans are going to remain out of reach.

0:44:07.280 --> 0:44:10.440
<v Speaker 4>But but again, maybe some incremental benefit, maybe you know,

0:44:10.480 --> 0:44:13.759
<v Speaker 4>this administration get mortgage rates down a bit through some

0:44:13.880 --> 0:44:16.680
<v Speaker 4>creative policy the next couple of years. By the way,

0:44:16.719 --> 0:44:20.560
<v Speaker 4>we'd like that given pimco's current positioning. But again without

0:44:20.600 --> 0:44:23.160
<v Speaker 4>without building new homes which are going to take you know, many,

0:44:23.200 --> 0:44:25.920
<v Speaker 4>many years. You know, there's no easy solution.

0:44:26.200 --> 0:44:28.319
<v Speaker 2>I want to go back. You mentioned this idea, there's

0:44:28.440 --> 0:44:32.600
<v Speaker 2>there's an optimal amount of fiscal profligacy from the perspective

0:44:32.840 --> 0:44:34.919
<v Speaker 2>of the bond investor. Maybe you want them to push

0:44:34.960 --> 0:44:36.279
<v Speaker 2>it a little bit because then you get paid a

0:44:36.280 --> 0:44:38.200
<v Speaker 2>little bit for taking it on. But obviously you don't

0:44:38.200 --> 0:44:40.399
<v Speaker 2>want them to push so forth where you get some

0:44:40.560 --> 0:44:43.640
<v Speaker 2>fiscal dominance spiral leading to higher and high inflation. You

0:44:43.680 --> 0:44:45.960
<v Speaker 2>want to find that sweet spot, you know, I mentioned

0:44:45.960 --> 0:44:48.560
<v Speaker 2>we're talking a little bit about politics, earlier about whether

0:44:49.440 --> 0:44:52.640
<v Speaker 2>independent central bank can be sustained. But when you look abroad,

0:44:53.440 --> 0:44:55.360
<v Speaker 2>you know, it seems like in a lot of pretty

0:44:55.440 --> 0:44:57.920
<v Speaker 2>major current we're not the only country that's having political

0:44:58.000 --> 0:45:02.360
<v Speaker 2>volatility these days. We're concerned about the approach that the

0:45:02.400 --> 0:45:04.520
<v Speaker 2>new Japanese PM is going to take it. So we

0:45:04.560 --> 0:45:08.239
<v Speaker 2>know that rates are higher in Japan. France, very indebted country.

0:45:08.680 --> 0:45:10.879
<v Speaker 2>They seem to have like a new government every two weeks.

0:45:10.880 --> 0:45:12.880
<v Speaker 2>I like lose track of all the times their government

0:45:12.960 --> 0:45:17.600
<v Speaker 2>collapses and so forth. The UK, very indebted country. The

0:45:17.719 --> 0:45:21.080
<v Speaker 2>moment anyone takes office, their approval ratings plunge to negative

0:45:21.120 --> 0:45:23.600
<v Speaker 2>thirty or whatever. There's a lot going on on the

0:45:23.600 --> 0:45:26.640
<v Speaker 2>political front, and that sort of determines whether countries are

0:45:26.680 --> 0:45:30.080
<v Speaker 2>even it's even possible to run what might be more

0:45:30.120 --> 0:45:33.680
<v Speaker 2>responsible fiscal policies. Is that something that I don't know

0:45:33.800 --> 0:45:35.320
<v Speaker 2>keeps you up at night, is the right term, But

0:45:35.760 --> 0:45:38.000
<v Speaker 2>is that something that's a big part of your work

0:45:38.280 --> 0:45:41.839
<v Speaker 2>is trying to understand, especially when you think abroad, understand

0:45:41.880 --> 0:45:44.280
<v Speaker 2>the political dynamics and all these countries that are happening

0:45:44.320 --> 0:45:44.680
<v Speaker 2>right now.

0:45:45.320 --> 0:45:45.840
<v Speaker 5>Yeah.

0:45:45.840 --> 0:45:49.439
<v Speaker 4>Absolutely, And you know we get together once a year,

0:45:49.600 --> 0:45:51.880
<v Speaker 4>you know, talk about the outlook for economies and markets

0:45:51.920 --> 0:45:54.880
<v Speaker 4>over a five year type timeframe. And you know, one

0:45:54.920 --> 0:45:57.000
<v Speaker 4>of our advisors I think put it well was that,

0:45:57.080 --> 0:45:58.680
<v Speaker 4>you know, we used to live in a world where

0:45:59.080 --> 0:46:03.760
<v Speaker 4>you know, economic outcomes would drive politics. If economies were strong,

0:46:04.239 --> 0:46:07.000
<v Speaker 4>you know, politicians usually ended up in a in a

0:46:07.040 --> 0:46:11.080
<v Speaker 4>good situation. They're they're, they're, they're, they're, they're stay in office.

0:46:11.520 --> 0:46:15.520
<v Speaker 4>Today it feels like it's a bit reversed where political priorities,

0:46:15.840 --> 0:46:19.919
<v Speaker 4>geopolitical tensions are driving economics. And I think you see

0:46:19.920 --> 0:46:22.040
<v Speaker 4>that to a degree with tariff policy, you see it,

0:46:22.120 --> 0:46:25.160
<v Speaker 4>you know, to a degree with with various forms of reassuring.

0:46:25.280 --> 0:46:29.080
<v Speaker 4>You see it in terms of these populist tendencies across markets.

0:46:29.280 --> 0:46:32.479
<v Speaker 4>So they're all very, very important and a lot more

0:46:32.520 --> 0:46:34.440
<v Speaker 4>important than they were in the past. And I think

0:46:34.480 --> 0:46:36.480
<v Speaker 4>it takes a lot of humility from someone like myself

0:46:36.600 --> 0:46:38.680
<v Speaker 4>and others that grew up you know, doing you know,

0:46:38.760 --> 0:46:42.560
<v Speaker 4>discounted cash flow analysis and you know, derivative pricing as

0:46:42.560 --> 0:46:46.160
<v Speaker 4>opposed to understanding the political economy. So you know, we

0:46:46.320 --> 0:46:49.960
<v Speaker 4>think that that's important both from the perspective of gaining

0:46:50.000 --> 0:46:54.439
<v Speaker 4>in edge in markets, but also understanding that sometimes will

0:46:54.440 --> 0:46:57.600
<v Speaker 4>be wrong and when you're running the debt levels that

0:46:57.719 --> 0:47:01.840
<v Speaker 4>countries are running or your deficits in overall debt levels,

0:47:02.360 --> 0:47:04.680
<v Speaker 4>there's going to be some unpredictability. And that's why this

0:47:04.800 --> 0:47:08.840
<v Speaker 4>idea of looking to exploit a global opportunity set prudent

0:47:08.880 --> 0:47:12.840
<v Speaker 4>diversification targeting some countries outside the US that aren't running

0:47:12.920 --> 0:47:15.319
<v Speaker 4>you know, six seven percent deficits, and there are high

0:47:15.400 --> 0:47:19.600
<v Speaker 4>quality countries out there, Australia being an example, Germany being

0:47:19.600 --> 0:47:22.000
<v Speaker 4>another example, even the United Kingdom, although they have a

0:47:22.000 --> 0:47:25.000
<v Speaker 4>lot less policy flexibility than we do, given that there

0:47:25.040 --> 0:47:29.600
<v Speaker 4>were smaller open economy with their own currency offer attractive yields.

0:47:29.760 --> 0:47:32.919
<v Speaker 4>So this is less about picking your favorite country from

0:47:32.920 --> 0:47:36.840
<v Speaker 4>our perspective, it's more looking at take advantage of attractive

0:47:36.880 --> 0:47:40.720
<v Speaker 4>opportunities around the globe, with some tilt towards those countries

0:47:40.719 --> 0:47:43.319
<v Speaker 4>that are balancing their budget and that do have a

0:47:43.320 --> 0:47:46.280
<v Speaker 4>better overall fiscal picture. And we haven't talked about emerging markets,

0:47:46.280 --> 0:47:48.640
<v Speaker 4>but they are. You know a few emerging markets that

0:47:49.239 --> 0:47:51.719
<v Speaker 4>you know, this cycle got ahead of inflation, that have

0:47:51.800 --> 0:47:55.760
<v Speaker 4>been in some sense more fiscally prudent than their developed

0:47:55.760 --> 0:47:59.600
<v Speaker 4>market counterparties, and that have very very high yields even

0:47:59.600 --> 0:48:03.640
<v Speaker 4>ad just for inflation rates. So even some diversification in

0:48:03.680 --> 0:48:06.360
<v Speaker 4>some of the higher quality areas of the emerging markets,

0:48:06.920 --> 0:48:10.399
<v Speaker 4>from our perspective, represents real good value or real good

0:48:10.480 --> 0:48:15.239
<v Speaker 4>sources of diversification in return versus some of these assets

0:48:15.320 --> 0:48:17.160
<v Speaker 4>you know here in the United States that have performed

0:48:17.200 --> 0:48:20.960
<v Speaker 4>real well historically, but where when you look at the

0:48:21.080 --> 0:48:23.920
<v Speaker 4>likelihood for forward performance just just look a little bit

0:48:24.000 --> 0:48:24.680
<v Speaker 4>less interesting.

0:48:25.680 --> 0:48:28.919
<v Speaker 3>Actually, this reminds me thinking back to twenty fifteen. Twenty

0:48:29.000 --> 0:48:31.839
<v Speaker 3>fifteen was actually a big year for PIMCO because it

0:48:31.880 --> 0:48:35.359
<v Speaker 3>was your first full year without Bill Gross, right, who

0:48:35.680 --> 0:48:39.759
<v Speaker 3>left in late twenty fourteen. Can you talk to us

0:48:39.800 --> 0:48:43.840
<v Speaker 3>perhaps how the culture of PIMCO has changed over the

0:48:43.880 --> 0:48:46.880
<v Speaker 3>past ten years, and how you would describe that evolution,

0:48:47.000 --> 0:48:49.439
<v Speaker 3>because I imagine it's been a long time, it must

0:48:49.480 --> 0:48:50.759
<v Speaker 3>have shifted a little bit.

0:48:51.480 --> 0:48:51.719
<v Speaker 5>Yeah.

0:48:51.719 --> 0:48:54.160
<v Speaker 4>Look, well, you know, the way Bill left the firm

0:48:54.280 --> 0:48:57.239
<v Speaker 4>was an ideal, to say the least. But you know,

0:48:57.280 --> 0:49:00.319
<v Speaker 4>Bill left us in an incredibly strong position. You know,

0:49:00.360 --> 0:49:02.279
<v Speaker 4>he created a lot of the frameworks that we still

0:49:02.400 --> 0:49:05.879
<v Speaker 4>use today to make decisions. Bill was a strong personality,

0:49:05.880 --> 0:49:09.400
<v Speaker 4>but he believed in teamwork and believe that investing was

0:49:09.600 --> 0:49:12.439
<v Speaker 4>a team sport, you know, so to speak. So from

0:49:12.440 --> 0:49:15.040
<v Speaker 4>that perspective, there didn't need to be a lot of

0:49:15.520 --> 0:49:20.040
<v Speaker 4>change or certainly not radical change. But over this period,

0:49:20.239 --> 0:49:23.160
<v Speaker 4>you know, markets have become you know, so much more specialized.

0:49:23.400 --> 0:49:27.680
<v Speaker 4>Client needs have evolved, you know, over time, the introduction

0:49:27.840 --> 0:49:33.319
<v Speaker 4>of a more sizable private opportunity set has been important. Technology,

0:49:33.400 --> 0:49:38.080
<v Speaker 4>big data, using you know, trading techniques, portfolio trading in

0:49:38.520 --> 0:49:41.480
<v Speaker 4>other automated you know type, you know, trading strategies are

0:49:41.480 --> 0:49:44.200
<v Speaker 4>all critically important. So you know, we're a much more

0:49:44.239 --> 0:49:47.200
<v Speaker 4>specialized firm today, which is a function of again, you know,

0:49:47.360 --> 0:49:50.160
<v Speaker 4>evolving client needs, but also just you know the realities

0:49:50.160 --> 0:49:52.760
<v Speaker 4>of this world that we live in today, where data

0:49:52.920 --> 0:49:57.960
<v Speaker 4>is abundant, much less expensive to access. So from that perspective,

0:49:58.000 --> 0:50:01.919
<v Speaker 4>we've needed to adapt, you know, even more global. So

0:50:02.160 --> 0:50:06.720
<v Speaker 4>you know, we tend to utilize regional committees in regional

0:50:07.160 --> 0:50:10.880
<v Speaker 4>decision making structures, but a lot stayed the same at

0:50:10.960 --> 0:50:12.839
<v Speaker 4>least in terms of mindset, and we try to really

0:50:12.920 --> 0:50:15.680
<v Speaker 4>leverage you know, the history and the experience the firm

0:50:15.760 --> 0:50:20.839
<v Speaker 4>has had managing and navigating through more challenging markets. Twenty

0:50:20.920 --> 0:50:23.880
<v Speaker 4>two is rough, you know, from both stocks and but

0:50:24.000 --> 0:50:27.840
<v Speaker 4>you know, in general, you know, the environment's been reasonably forgiving,

0:50:28.000 --> 0:50:31.040
<v Speaker 4>but you can always get into these you know, tougher periods,

0:50:31.040 --> 0:50:33.759
<v Speaker 4>and again we try to use these structures that you know,

0:50:33.840 --> 0:50:36.560
<v Speaker 4>build put in place and buill deserves.

0:50:37.200 --> 0:50:38.279
<v Speaker 5>Trying to about a credit for.

0:50:38.320 --> 0:50:40.560
<v Speaker 2>It's funny in your last answer there there were like

0:50:40.640 --> 0:50:44.440
<v Speaker 2>five things you said that could merit full follow ups

0:50:44.520 --> 0:50:47.920
<v Speaker 2>or even full follow up episodes, like about changing client

0:50:48.040 --> 0:50:51.080
<v Speaker 2>needs over time, or what happens when the cost of

0:50:51.160 --> 0:50:55.160
<v Speaker 2>data goes from costly to fairly affordable, et cetera. All

0:50:55.200 --> 0:50:58.240
<v Speaker 2>those sort of interesting things. But just my last question,

0:50:58.480 --> 0:51:00.960
<v Speaker 2>and it sort of relates to technology. You know, when

0:51:01.000 --> 0:51:04.720
<v Speaker 2>it comes to AI in investing, we've talked a little

0:51:04.760 --> 0:51:07.280
<v Speaker 2>bit more on the short term like high frequency side

0:51:07.400 --> 0:51:09.719
<v Speaker 2>and the sort of models that they use and the

0:51:09.760 --> 0:51:12.720
<v Speaker 2>signals that they use, and how that sort of relates

0:51:12.760 --> 0:51:16.200
<v Speaker 2>to AI and their application. But for a firm like

0:51:16.280 --> 0:51:20.560
<v Speaker 2>PIMCO and when you're thinking about longer term holding periods

0:51:20.680 --> 0:51:23.400
<v Speaker 2>and you want to have some a good collateral and

0:51:23.480 --> 0:51:27.760
<v Speaker 2>good documentation, et cetera. Currently today, have you found ways

0:51:27.840 --> 0:51:31.920
<v Speaker 2>to apply cutting edge AI technology to the process of

0:51:31.960 --> 0:51:33.040
<v Speaker 2>good security selection.

0:51:33.960 --> 0:51:37.239
<v Speaker 4>We have, and we're finding ways to utilize the technology

0:51:37.239 --> 0:51:40.080
<v Speaker 4>at an accelerating rate. We do some of this and

0:51:40.160 --> 0:51:43.840
<v Speaker 4>some of our you know, more quant focused strategies, you know,

0:51:43.880 --> 0:51:47.920
<v Speaker 4>where we look to use AI to actually drive alpha,

0:51:48.200 --> 0:51:52.799
<v Speaker 4>But just AI as a tool to drive efficiency has

0:51:52.920 --> 0:51:58.560
<v Speaker 4>been will be critically important to managing an investment platform.

0:51:59.200 --> 0:52:01.759
<v Speaker 4>Just the ease in which you can access data that

0:52:01.800 --> 0:52:06.000
<v Speaker 4>you can use AI to help support overall analysis, both

0:52:06.040 --> 0:52:09.240
<v Speaker 4>at the company level, the individual investment level, but even

0:52:09.760 --> 0:52:13.279
<v Speaker 4>coming through economic history and understanding some of these geopolitical

0:52:13.400 --> 0:52:16.960
<v Speaker 4>trends in themes that are hard, at least intuitively to

0:52:17.080 --> 0:52:19.680
<v Speaker 4>grasp are going to be critically important. In fact, before

0:52:20.080 --> 0:52:23.279
<v Speaker 4>our discussion today, spend considerable time with our head of

0:52:23.320 --> 0:52:27.600
<v Speaker 4>technology and our head of implementation talking about various firm

0:52:27.600 --> 0:52:29.600
<v Speaker 4>wide initiatives. And I think the only other point is

0:52:30.080 --> 0:52:33.160
<v Speaker 4>my own use of AI, both at home and at

0:52:33.239 --> 0:52:36.040
<v Speaker 4>the office has gone up almost exponentially over the last

0:52:36.160 --> 0:52:38.239
<v Speaker 4>year or two. And I'm the last person you want

0:52:38.280 --> 0:52:41.640
<v Speaker 4>to rely on to understand this technology. It's the younger

0:52:41.640 --> 0:52:44.160
<v Speaker 4>folks that we hired over the last year that are

0:52:44.200 --> 0:52:46.799
<v Speaker 4>helping us with a lot of this perspective. So this

0:52:46.960 --> 0:52:52.480
<v Speaker 4>is going to be quite disruptive, probably productivity enhancing, you know,

0:52:52.520 --> 0:52:54.600
<v Speaker 4>at the economy wide level, but it's also going to

0:52:54.640 --> 0:52:57.600
<v Speaker 4>lead to considerable disruption, and it's important that we don't

0:52:57.600 --> 0:52:59.919
<v Speaker 4>get disrupted and that we use this technology to drive

0:53:00.040 --> 0:53:02.680
<v Speaker 4>client returns. But you know, it's going to be important

0:53:03.080 --> 0:53:05.560
<v Speaker 4>in so many ways and we're really really embracing it

0:53:05.600 --> 0:53:06.840
<v Speaker 4>here here at Pimco.

0:53:07.239 --> 0:53:09.760
<v Speaker 2>Dan Ivison, thank you so much for coming on odd Laws.

0:53:09.840 --> 0:53:13.320
<v Speaker 2>That was a fantastic conversation. Really appreciate you taking the time,

0:53:13.840 --> 0:53:15.239
<v Speaker 2>and we're going to check back in with you in

0:53:15.280 --> 0:53:17.879
<v Speaker 2>twenty thirty five and see how well you got how

0:53:17.920 --> 0:53:20.320
<v Speaker 2>well one got paid for taking a little bit of

0:53:20.400 --> 0:53:21.080
<v Speaker 2>duration here.

0:53:21.280 --> 0:53:23.680
<v Speaker 4>Great Joe Tracy, thanks again and correct congratulations on the

0:53:24.239 --> 0:53:26.440
<v Speaker 4>big milestone and so much.

0:53:26.480 --> 0:53:28.640
<v Speaker 3>We thank you so much. Dad really appreciate it.

0:53:28.840 --> 0:53:43.640
<v Speaker 2>Thank you guys, Tracy. I thought that was greatly I

0:53:43.680 --> 0:53:46.680
<v Speaker 2>really enjoyed talking to Dan. Fantastic overview.

0:53:46.840 --> 0:53:49.120
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, so a couple of things stood out to me.

0:53:49.239 --> 0:53:52.200
<v Speaker 3>So number one the idea of no more free lunch

0:53:52.320 --> 0:53:54.759
<v Speaker 3>and credit, although people have been talking about that for

0:53:54.800 --> 0:53:57.640
<v Speaker 3>a while now, and obviously with the great environment changing,

0:53:57.719 --> 0:54:00.400
<v Speaker 3>you can see that argument. The other thing that I

0:54:00.440 --> 0:54:04.560
<v Speaker 3>really liked was his description of policymakers don't want to

0:54:04.560 --> 0:54:05.720
<v Speaker 3>bail out the same thing twice.

0:54:05.880 --> 0:54:08.440
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, that's interesting framework or way to think about it.

0:54:08.560 --> 0:54:08.759
<v Speaker 5>Yeah.

0:54:08.800 --> 0:54:11.400
<v Speaker 3>Absolutely, And it kind of reminded me of there's another

0:54:11.480 --> 0:54:15.800
<v Speaker 3>person in credit who used to tell me a line

0:54:15.920 --> 0:54:19.960
<v Speaker 3>about how he invests, which is follow the bad guys. Right, So,

0:54:20.200 --> 0:54:22.680
<v Speaker 3>like the guys that blew up in one part of

0:54:22.719 --> 0:54:26.400
<v Speaker 3>the market usually, you know, start doing.

0:54:26.200 --> 0:54:29.120
<v Speaker 2>Something to act, they're going to get their acting. Are

0:54:29.120 --> 0:54:30.480
<v Speaker 2>you saying they're going to get their act together? Or

0:54:30.480 --> 0:54:32.000
<v Speaker 2>they're going to do something I'm saying, they.

0:54:31.880 --> 0:54:34.879
<v Speaker 3>Move to the new thing, and then that blows up.

0:54:35.000 --> 0:54:37.480
<v Speaker 3>And so if you can just identify the bad guys

0:54:37.600 --> 0:54:41.080
<v Speaker 3>and just follow their career trajectories, just short everything the

0:54:41.120 --> 0:54:41.759
<v Speaker 3>bad guys do.

0:54:41.960 --> 0:54:43.359
<v Speaker 5>I love that. I love that take.

0:54:43.880 --> 0:54:47.000
<v Speaker 2>You know what was really I had not realized that

0:54:47.160 --> 0:54:50.640
<v Speaker 2>stat he said about how little you got paid for

0:54:50.800 --> 0:54:54.360
<v Speaker 2>taking for buying poor credits up until the GFC. Yeah,

0:54:54.400 --> 0:54:57.120
<v Speaker 2>and then post GFC is just totally flipped that you

0:54:57.239 --> 0:54:59.520
<v Speaker 2>just got you should just go as far out on

0:54:59.600 --> 0:55:02.279
<v Speaker 2>the credit at risk curve as you possibly can, and

0:55:02.320 --> 0:55:05.799
<v Speaker 2>you've just walloped anything safe. And I knew that, I

0:55:05.800 --> 0:55:09.239
<v Speaker 2>guess on some level, but the extreme of that statistical divergence,

0:55:09.440 --> 0:55:11.919
<v Speaker 2>but you know, you have to think we had that

0:55:12.200 --> 0:55:14.160
<v Speaker 2>well it was more than a hiccup in twenty twenty,

0:55:14.360 --> 0:55:17.040
<v Speaker 2>but we did bounce back very fast from it. So

0:55:17.160 --> 0:55:19.879
<v Speaker 2>really what we were looking at is, you know, well

0:55:19.880 --> 0:55:23.680
<v Speaker 2>over fifteen years now of the lines just going up,

0:55:23.719 --> 0:55:26.320
<v Speaker 2>and you have to think about what are the things

0:55:26.320 --> 0:55:29.320
<v Speaker 2>that accumulate over that time, or the patterns that accumulate,

0:55:29.400 --> 0:55:32.520
<v Speaker 2>or the habits, etc. And this idea that there's a

0:55:32.560 --> 0:55:34.560
<v Speaker 2>lot of safety at the far end of the risk

0:55:34.600 --> 0:55:37.439
<v Speaker 2>curve and that people don't care and that maybe now

0:55:37.520 --> 0:55:39.880
<v Speaker 2>some of the perception that there's safety at the far

0:55:40.000 --> 0:55:42.319
<v Speaker 2>end of the risk curve and how much that's been

0:55:42.840 --> 0:55:44.480
<v Speaker 2>burnished into people is very interesting.

0:55:44.640 --> 0:55:47.600
<v Speaker 3>Absolutely. The other thing he said that I thought was

0:55:47.880 --> 0:55:50.319
<v Speaker 3>very poignant was the idea of you have all these

0:55:50.360 --> 0:55:54.600
<v Speaker 3>private credit firms starting up right and promising these astonishing

0:55:54.640 --> 0:55:57.520
<v Speaker 3>returns for investors. And he made the point that, like,

0:55:58.160 --> 0:56:00.160
<v Speaker 3>you can't just say you're going to make all this

0:56:00.239 --> 0:56:03.560
<v Speaker 3>money at private credit because like those deals might not

0:56:04.080 --> 0:56:06.560
<v Speaker 3>be out there and available to you. You have to

0:56:06.600 --> 0:56:09.600
<v Speaker 3>do it on a risk or value adjusted basis. Yeah,

0:56:09.640 --> 0:56:12.719
<v Speaker 3>and as I say that, I see a headline in

0:56:12.760 --> 0:56:16.640
<v Speaker 3>Bloomberg about Capital Group getting into private credit as well.

0:56:16.719 --> 0:56:19.480
<v Speaker 3>So this is the thing. Like it's a booming market.

0:56:19.520 --> 0:56:22.920
<v Speaker 3>There are a lot of competitive pressures, both on the

0:56:23.040 --> 0:56:25.799
<v Speaker 3>lender side and also on the credit rating side, and

0:56:25.840 --> 0:56:29.360
<v Speaker 3>you can see people really scrambling to get into the

0:56:29.440 --> 0:56:32.440
<v Speaker 3>market and accumulate as much as they can. And so

0:56:32.960 --> 0:56:36.360
<v Speaker 3>the temptation, of course is to you know, accept lower terms,

0:56:36.400 --> 0:56:39.520
<v Speaker 3>accept lower quality totally. All right, shall we leave it there.

0:56:39.560 --> 0:56:40.520
<v Speaker 2>Let's leave it there, all right.

0:56:40.560 --> 0:56:42.960
<v Speaker 3>This has been another episode of the Odd Loots podcast.

0:56:43.000 --> 0:56:46.160
<v Speaker 3>I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway.

0:56:45.800 --> 0:56:47.960
<v Speaker 2>And I'm Jill Wisenthal. You can follow me at the

0:56:48.000 --> 0:56:51.399
<v Speaker 2>stall Work. Follow our producers Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Arman,

0:56:51.480 --> 0:56:54.839
<v Speaker 2>Dash'll Bennett at Dashbot and kill Brooks at Killbrooks. More

0:56:54.840 --> 0:56:57.479
<v Speaker 2>Odd Laws content. Go to Bloomberg dot com slash odd

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<v Speaker 2>Lots with a daily newsletter and all of our episode

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0:57:05.600 --> 0:57:08.680
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