WEBVTT - I Know That Face

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<v Speaker 1>Brought to you by Toyota. Let's go places. Welcome to

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<v Speaker 1>Forward Thinking. Hey there, and welcome to Forward Thinking the podcast.

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<v Speaker 1>Then it looks at the future and says, then I

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<v Speaker 1>saw her face. Now I'm a believer. I'm Jonathan Strickland,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Lauren Boa, and I'm Joe mcformick. So I saw

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<v Speaker 1>something absolutely delightful the other day on the internet. You

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<v Speaker 1>shared it with us, yes, and then you thought this

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<v Speaker 1>could be a good blog post, and I said, to

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<v Speaker 1>heck with that, that could be a great podcast. That

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<v Speaker 1>is right, That is what you said, because you know

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<v Speaker 1>a good podcast when you see one, which is odd

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<v Speaker 1>because it's an auditory kind of thing that we do.

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<v Speaker 1>But anyway, well thanks a pun. That would have worked

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<v Speaker 1>if we'd already announced what today's podcast was about. What

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<v Speaker 1>we're about to get to it. Um. So I found

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<v Speaker 1>it was through Alexis Madrigals Five Intriguing Things newsletter, which

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<v Speaker 1>if you're not subscribed to that, you should check it out.

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<v Speaker 1>It's excellent. Um. The link was to a project of

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<v Speaker 1>a Korean artist group that's I believe made up of

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<v Speaker 1>two people, Shin Sung Bak and Kim Yong hun, and

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<v Speaker 1>the project was called cat or human. Okay, So for

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<v Speaker 1>those who are listening who have not had the benefit

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<v Speaker 1>of seeing this particular project, what do you how would

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<v Speaker 1>you describe what cat or human is? First of all,

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<v Speaker 1>it's not horrifying, No, it's it wasn't like a taste test. No.

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<v Speaker 1>It was also not one of those animal human hybrids

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<v Speaker 1>that I keep hearing about from the stuff They don't

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<v Speaker 1>want you to any dr Moreau, none of that. No,

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<v Speaker 1>it is merely a collection of fun of images from

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<v Speaker 1>two different algorithms, and it's marking where two different algorithms

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<v Speaker 1>went wrong. One of them was an algorithm that was

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<v Speaker 1>created to recognize human faces and say that's a human

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<v Speaker 1>face just by looking at a picture. Another was an

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<v Speaker 1>algorithm that was created to recognize cat faces by looking

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<v Speaker 1>at a picture and saying, hey, that's a cat face.

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<v Speaker 1>Of course, what's great is when they mess up, specifically

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<v Speaker 1>when the cat recognizing algorithm recognizes a human face as

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<v Speaker 1>a cat face, right, and when the human recognizing algorithm

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<v Speaker 1>recognizes a cat face as a human face. So they

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<v Speaker 1>collected images from both of these sets of mistakes and said,

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<v Speaker 1>according to these various algorithms, these people are cats and

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<v Speaker 1>these cats are people. That's exactly right. It's kind of

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<v Speaker 1>like a weird yearbook. Yeah, so that is what they

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<v Speaker 1>did from what I can tell that. You should check

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<v Speaker 1>it out on their website. The the cat people, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>look like cat people. I agree. I mean it's I

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<v Speaker 1>guess a little bit. They mostly look like people. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>they may have some features that are slightly feline. When

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<v Speaker 1>we say cat people, we mean people who may have

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<v Speaker 1>certain feline features. We don't mean people who have twenty

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<v Speaker 1>seven cats. No, not that thing, and also not the

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<v Speaker 1>thing from like doctor Who, not those cat people either. Um,

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<v Speaker 1>maybe slightly cat like eyes. Yeah, we're not talking to sleepwalk.

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<v Speaker 1>They tend to be very happy looking people with like

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<v Speaker 1>big grins ches cheshire people, which is funny because cats

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<v Speaker 1>are so evil. But anyway, the selected cats I'm looking

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<v Speaker 1>at now that we're yeah, the cats that were identified

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<v Speaker 1>as human, they all look really sour. They're not smiling cats.

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<v Speaker 1>I don't know what like, So grumpy cat might have

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<v Speaker 1>ended up being classified as a grumpy cat is not

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<v Speaker 1>one of the ones I've seen. Instead, these are cats

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<v Speaker 1>usually that are kind of wide eyed and looking straight

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<v Speaker 1>on at the camera and in this kind of like

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<v Speaker 1>what what so the reason why we even bring this up,

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<v Speaker 1>as as amazing as this particular art project is, it

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<v Speaker 1>does have to do with the technology of the future,

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<v Speaker 1>we promise. Yeah, we wanted to talk about facial recognition technology.

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<v Speaker 1>What that has to do with artificial intelligence? What is

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<v Speaker 1>it actually doing, how is it doing that, and what

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<v Speaker 1>could that possibly mean to us? Not to mention some

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<v Speaker 1>interesting looks at the future and apparently at least one

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<v Speaker 1>segment that will scare the pants off me, but I

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<v Speaker 1>don't know what it is yet. Yeah, So this we're

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<v Speaker 1>we're going to go on a journey of discovery and

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<v Speaker 1>some of us are going to be discovering right along

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<v Speaker 1>with you. So to jump into this, Uh, facial recognition

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<v Speaker 1>is part of artificial intelligence. When we talk about AI.

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<v Speaker 1>We've said this several times on this show. AI is

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<v Speaker 1>actually a very broad term, right. We often think of

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<v Speaker 1>it in terms of strong AI, some sort of computer

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<v Speaker 1>that can quote unquote think like a person. But in reality,

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<v Speaker 1>artificial intelligence incorporates lots of different elements of intelligence, right, right,

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<v Speaker 1>And one of those elements would be making sense of

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<v Speaker 1>the kind of data that makes sense to animals and

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<v Speaker 1>humans but not to computer. Right, So, like visual data

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<v Speaker 1>I can look at Joe and I can recognize that

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<v Speaker 1>that's one, that's a person. Two, I can recognize that

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<v Speaker 1>it's a male person. Three, I can recognize that it

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<v Speaker 1>is a person I already know for that that person's

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<v Speaker 1>name is Joe. Like all of this kind of stuff

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<v Speaker 1>a batman costume right now, right exactly not right now,

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<v Speaker 1>that you're not a cat, Yeah, they're there are all

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<v Speaker 1>these things. And I can also have all these other

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<v Speaker 1>associations with Joe that that you know, factor into who

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<v Speaker 1>he is and what he is, and all of this

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<v Speaker 1>is very natural to me. But all stuff we have

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<v Speaker 1>to teach computers right right, and it's very natural to

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<v Speaker 1>humans to be able to I mean, you could probably

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<v Speaker 1>recognize Joe from across the room even if he were

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<v Speaker 1>turned around, due to you knowing him well enough to

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<v Speaker 1>know like his gait and posture and like if you

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<v Speaker 1>catch kind of a weird angle from the side of

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<v Speaker 1>his face, probably still identify that as Joe. But a

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<v Speaker 1>computer doesn't have that natural capacity. Yeah, if I look

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<v Speaker 1>at if I if I meet Joe for the first

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<v Speaker 1>time and he looks me right in the eyes, we

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<v Speaker 1>shake ends, and then the next time I see him

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<v Speaker 1>he's in profile, I'm still able to recognize him. But

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<v Speaker 1>for computers that's not a trivial task, right Yeah, because

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<v Speaker 1>they're they're relying on a way of analyzing visual data

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<v Speaker 1>and breaking that down into data points. That makes sense.

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<v Speaker 1>So it is a big part of artificial intelligence, and

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<v Speaker 1>not just facial recognition, but object recognition in general. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>to get into what facial recognition is doing, there are

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<v Speaker 1>a couple of things we have to factor. One that

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<v Speaker 1>has to be able to recognize what is a face?

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<v Speaker 1>What are the elements that make up a typical face?

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<v Speaker 1>And that ends up being sort of the baseline, all right.

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<v Speaker 1>Beyond that, when we talk about facial recognition, we're usually

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<v Speaker 1>referring to two different things that are common to biometrics,

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<v Speaker 1>whether it's facial recognition, fingerprint technology, hand scans, whatever it

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<v Speaker 1>may be. And that's verification and identification. And these are

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<v Speaker 1>two related but different concepts. So verification might be something

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<v Speaker 1>you should think of with thet afore of a key. Yes,

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<v Speaker 1>verification would be something like if we needed to have

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<v Speaker 1>a biometric system to let us into the office, so

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<v Speaker 1>we might have it might be a two step verification process.

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<v Speaker 1>Right there, there's one step where we might use a

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<v Speaker 1>badge or a pen or something else to identify and

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<v Speaker 1>say this is who I claim to be. Now. At

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<v Speaker 1>that point we would then submit whatever happened. Biometric it's

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<v Speaker 1>asking for, whether it's a fingerprint scan or maybe you're

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<v Speaker 1>just looking into a camera and facial recognition software is

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<v Speaker 1>taking a look at who you are. Well, when you

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<v Speaker 1>created that profile for the system, when you created your pen,

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<v Speaker 1>when you had your fingerprint scanned or whatever it may be. UM,

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<v Speaker 1>then that's when it has uh scanned you and taking

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<v Speaker 1>those data points and associated it with your identity. So

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<v Speaker 1>what it's looking for is a match of the person

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<v Speaker 1>who is standing at the doorway with the person who

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<v Speaker 1>have a profile that it already already has set up

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<v Speaker 1>in the system. Right, Really, this is trying to get

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<v Speaker 1>a computer to do what a human would already do,

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<v Speaker 1>looking through the people of a door. So someone knocks

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<v Speaker 1>on your door says hello, it's Joe, and Jonathan comes

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<v Speaker 1>to the door and looks through the people and sees

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<v Speaker 1>that's not Joe, that's a werewolf. Then I'm denied access.

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<v Speaker 1>But at least you have some other questions you need

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<v Speaker 1>to answer before I will open that door. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>you might have had a rough n hope. Yeah, yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>you might have let your beard go a little bit

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<v Speaker 1>um or or or you know, like Jonathan could also

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<v Speaker 1>look through the people and go, that's Joe. He's wearing

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<v Speaker 1>a jaunty hat. But it's definitely still Joe and let

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<v Speaker 1>you in, I mean, depending on his feelings about johnty hat. Right, Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>do you take your hat off if you come inside?

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<v Speaker 1>That's Joe and clown makeup, but I still recognize him.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm definitely not come anyway. Yeah. But so that's the

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<v Speaker 1>sort of artificial intelligence angle on it. It's just trying

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<v Speaker 1>to recreate what happens in your brain and when you

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<v Speaker 1>look through the peepole at somebody before you let them in.

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<v Speaker 1>And these are the kind of systems, by the way,

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<v Speaker 1>that can can cause problems for people, even when they

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<v Speaker 1>have a legitimate profile set up. I did an interview

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<v Speaker 1>with Dr John Padfield for How Stuff Works where we

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<v Speaker 1>talked about biometrics in general, and he talked about this

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<v Speaker 1>is this is related. It's not facial recognition, but it's related.

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<v Speaker 1>He talked about working at a job where he had

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<v Speaker 1>to put in a pen and have a hand scan

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<v Speaker 1>before he could come into the office, and he normally

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<v Speaker 1>wears a class ring, and one day he left the

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<v Speaker 1>ring off, and so when he went to have his

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<v Speaker 1>hand scanned, his hand had a different readoubt than it

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<v Speaker 1>normally does because he didn't have this enormous lump from

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<v Speaker 1>a class ring on his finger, and it would not

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<v Speaker 1>let him into the building. He had to wait until

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<v Speaker 1>that actual human game and verified that he was who

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<v Speaker 1>he claimed to be before he was let in. Same

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<v Speaker 1>sort of thing can happen with facial recognition software. Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>but there's another thing that facial recognition software might need

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<v Speaker 1>to do, and that's, as you said, identify vacations. So

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<v Speaker 1>unlike looking through a people and saying, oh, okay, is

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<v Speaker 1>the person standing there who they said they were through

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<v Speaker 1>the door, It's more like looking at a person and saying,

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<v Speaker 1>who's that? Yeah, do I recognize this person at all?

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<v Speaker 1>So verification makes it easy for the system because it's

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<v Speaker 1>just looking for a match of who you claim to

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<v Speaker 1>be and who you are. Identification is more tricky. It's

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<v Speaker 1>saying who are you without any of that who you

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<v Speaker 1>claim to be? Stuff? Right? Right? Right? You don't well,

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, you might have a set of vague profiles

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<v Speaker 1>set up. But yeah, so this would be something like

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<v Speaker 1>a system where the police might use an identification system

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<v Speaker 1>in order to figure out the identity of someone who

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<v Speaker 1>has committed a crime and try and match that against

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<v Speaker 1>their entire database of all the photographs that they have stored.

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<v Speaker 1>This is particularly tricky because again, you can run into

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<v Speaker 1>those situations where the image you get during whatever it

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<v Speaker 1>was that happened may not be the same sort of quality,

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<v Speaker 1>the and and condition as the image that you originally

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<v Speaker 1>have in your database. But we'll talk more about that.

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<v Speaker 1>But yeah, I was going to say that's exactly right,

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<v Speaker 1>because one of the things you might be thinking now

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<v Speaker 1>is identification is harder for a lot of reasons. And

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<v Speaker 1>one of the reasons verification is easier is you typically

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<v Speaker 1>when you're verifying someone's identity, can assume that they're being

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<v Speaker 1>cooperative with the scan, that they're looking directly into the camera,

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<v Speaker 1>that you've set up a lighting situation that's conducive to

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<v Speaker 1>to measuring certain bits of their face. Exactly right, They

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<v Speaker 1>want to be verified, and they're getting in the best

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<v Speaker 1>possible scenario for the system to do that identification. You

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<v Speaker 1>don't know they might be willing to let you scan them.

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<v Speaker 1>They might not be willing, they might not be aware.

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<v Speaker 1>You can't depend on them trying to get in position

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<v Speaker 1>and make it easy for the computer or the hardware.

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<v Speaker 1>But all of us will make more sense once we

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<v Speaker 1>have explained how this facial recognition technology works. So what

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<v Speaker 1>are these computer programs looking for now? Basically, what they're

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<v Speaker 1>doing is breaking down faces into a collection of landmarks,

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<v Speaker 1>right of identical identity points I should say not identical points,

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<v Speaker 1>but identity points. So they're looking and they, depending on

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<v Speaker 1>the system, they break down the face in a different

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<v Speaker 1>way and they tend to get obviously more high resolution

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<v Speaker 1>as the technology evolves. But what they do is they

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<v Speaker 1>look for points like the the corners of eyes, the

0:12:22.960 --> 0:12:25.480
<v Speaker 1>width of the nose, the length of the nose, the

0:12:25.600 --> 0:12:28.840
<v Speaker 1>relationship between the nose and the mouth, the relationship between

0:12:28.880 --> 0:12:31.160
<v Speaker 1>the eyes and the mouth. All of these are little

0:12:31.240 --> 0:12:34.520
<v Speaker 1>data points, nodal points that the system can look at.

0:12:35.080 --> 0:12:38.560
<v Speaker 1>And then it's all the relationships between these points that

0:12:38.679 --> 0:12:42.800
<v Speaker 1>make up the identity. Right, So it's not just oh,

0:12:42.880 --> 0:12:46.680
<v Speaker 1>there's Joe, Joe has two eyes. That's not quite specific enough.

0:12:46.880 --> 0:12:49.440
<v Speaker 1>It's talking specifically about things like the width of the

0:12:49.520 --> 0:12:54.160
<v Speaker 1>eyes from one another, the distance between the the the

0:12:54.160 --> 0:12:56.640
<v Speaker 1>inner part of the eye from one to the other,

0:12:57.200 --> 0:13:00.920
<v Speaker 1>or the triangle that the eyes make with the nose. Uh.

0:13:01.200 --> 0:13:05.920
<v Speaker 1>Imagine that, but multiplied by a dozen or or a hundred,

0:13:06.120 --> 0:13:08.720
<v Speaker 1>and you've got all the different little points that make

0:13:08.840 --> 0:13:13.760
<v Speaker 1>up the the landscape fingerprint, if you will, of Joe's face.

0:13:14.640 --> 0:13:17.440
<v Speaker 1>So that when the system looks at another face, it

0:13:17.520 --> 0:13:20.280
<v Speaker 1>compares those data points, and it looks for those data

0:13:20.320 --> 0:13:23.160
<v Speaker 1>points and then compares it against what's in the database already,

0:13:23.440 --> 0:13:26.520
<v Speaker 1>And if there's a match that reaches a certain threshold,

0:13:26.920 --> 0:13:30.440
<v Speaker 1>then the system says that's Joe. Now, if it doesn't

0:13:30.559 --> 0:13:32.800
<v Speaker 1>reach that threshold, it may say it's someone else, or

0:13:32.800 --> 0:13:34.640
<v Speaker 1>it may say I do not know who this person is.

0:13:34.679 --> 0:13:37.600
<v Speaker 1>I don't have a record of this person, so, uh,

0:13:37.640 --> 0:13:39.920
<v Speaker 1>you know, I can't help you. Um. And it's all

0:13:39.960 --> 0:13:43.160
<v Speaker 1>based on statistical probability, right. So we talked about this

0:13:43.280 --> 0:13:45.520
<v Speaker 1>before in the past. IBM S. Watson is the example

0:13:45.559 --> 0:13:49.080
<v Speaker 1>I love to use, where Watson on Jeopardy would only

0:13:49.160 --> 0:13:51.760
<v Speaker 1>give an answer if it met a certain threshold of certainty,

0:13:51.960 --> 0:13:54.480
<v Speaker 1>and if it was below that then Watson wouldn't guess.

0:13:54.840 --> 0:13:58.760
<v Speaker 1>So that was kind of a calculated UH risk on

0:13:58.800 --> 0:14:00.760
<v Speaker 1>the part of IBM S teams saying, well, we don't

0:14:00.760 --> 0:14:06.200
<v Speaker 1>want it to guess incorrectly because there's right. Um, some

0:14:06.200 --> 0:14:08.800
<v Speaker 1>some of these programs will, for example, if it's not

0:14:09.640 --> 0:14:12.880
<v Speaker 1>super sure who a person is, will spit out a

0:14:12.880 --> 0:14:18.480
<v Speaker 1>series of guesses like like maybe for for human identification. Yeah, yeah,

0:14:18.520 --> 0:14:21.040
<v Speaker 1>they're in fact, usually what you'll do if you're talking

0:14:21.040 --> 0:14:25.320
<v Speaker 1>about if you're talking specifically about identification not verification, and

0:14:25.360 --> 0:14:27.880
<v Speaker 1>you're and you're looking at a person and you're trying

0:14:27.920 --> 0:14:30.880
<v Speaker 1>to mind an enormous database. Let's say that there are

0:14:31.040 --> 0:14:33.840
<v Speaker 1>thousands of people that are within this database, because in

0:14:33.960 --> 0:14:38.400
<v Speaker 1>law enforcement databases there can be many thousand people. Then

0:14:38.800 --> 0:14:41.400
<v Speaker 1>you usually have a couple of different passes at this

0:14:41.520 --> 0:14:44.640
<v Speaker 1>where one past will narrow it down to a certain

0:14:44.720 --> 0:14:49.520
<v Speaker 1>group of people that that fit the general UH scan

0:14:49.920 --> 0:14:52.480
<v Speaker 1>that goes on, and then they'll start looking for a

0:14:52.520 --> 0:14:55.960
<v Speaker 1>more in depth comparison to see which ones are the

0:14:56.000 --> 0:14:58.880
<v Speaker 1>most likely to be the same as the target, the

0:14:58.920 --> 0:15:03.360
<v Speaker 1>one that was captured whatever image or video was that

0:15:03.440 --> 0:15:07.160
<v Speaker 1>you're you're analyzing. So uh, they start looking at things

0:15:07.200 --> 0:15:10.480
<v Speaker 1>like the depth of your eye sockets, the width of

0:15:10.520 --> 0:15:13.880
<v Speaker 1>your nose, your cheap bone shape and height, your jawline.

0:15:14.080 --> 0:15:15.920
<v Speaker 1>When I when I read about this kind of stuff,

0:15:16.720 --> 0:15:19.120
<v Speaker 1>it makes me think of the character creation process of

0:15:19.240 --> 0:15:23.600
<v Speaker 1>something like Skyrim, where you get into the minute details

0:15:23.880 --> 0:15:25.920
<v Speaker 1>of what your character looks like. You're like, well, all

0:15:26.000 --> 0:15:29.320
<v Speaker 1>those things are the things that facial recognition software actually

0:15:29.360 --> 0:15:31.880
<v Speaker 1>looks at to say this is the person, because it's

0:15:31.920 --> 0:15:35.200
<v Speaker 1>what makes you look like an individual human being. Aren't

0:15:35.200 --> 0:15:39.960
<v Speaker 1>there some cat people in Skyrim? Yes? There are. Yeah,

0:15:40.000 --> 0:15:42.920
<v Speaker 1>it all comes back. I believe they're what they're called

0:15:43.400 --> 0:15:46.760
<v Speaker 1>head Head shape comes into play too, like the distance

0:15:46.800 --> 0:15:48.880
<v Speaker 1>from the eyes to the ears, the distance from the

0:15:48.920 --> 0:15:51.080
<v Speaker 1>center of the nose to the ears, any facial hair

0:15:51.160 --> 0:15:53.920
<v Speaker 1>that you may or may not have, your hairlines, stuff

0:15:53.960 --> 0:15:56.120
<v Speaker 1>like that, and that's one of the things that also

0:15:56.160 --> 0:15:59.560
<v Speaker 1>can make it tricky for a verification. For example, if

0:15:59.600 --> 0:16:02.880
<v Speaker 1>you have a distinct hairstyle and then you change it,

0:16:03.240 --> 0:16:06.640
<v Speaker 1>then you may encounter a system that no longer really

0:16:06.680 --> 0:16:09.400
<v Speaker 1>recognizes you as easily and it may mean that you

0:16:09.480 --> 0:16:12.600
<v Speaker 1>have to go and update that profile with whatever you know,

0:16:12.640 --> 0:16:14.920
<v Speaker 1>however you've changed. And of course there are other things

0:16:14.920 --> 0:16:18.640
<v Speaker 1>that can cause some issues too, but robust systems usually

0:16:18.680 --> 0:16:21.760
<v Speaker 1>will will depend upon multiple measurements. They're not looking for

0:16:21.840 --> 0:16:24.560
<v Speaker 1>just one thing. Like if you're looking at a very

0:16:24.600 --> 0:16:28.480
<v Speaker 1>simple facial recognition technology, where it's maybe something that's built

0:16:28.480 --> 0:16:30.560
<v Speaker 1>into a digital camera, and all it's supposed to do

0:16:30.640 --> 0:16:33.760
<v Speaker 1>is just detect that there is a face. Period. Yeah,

0:16:33.920 --> 0:16:37.640
<v Speaker 1>it's usually really simple stuff. It's just looking for for uh,

0:16:37.920 --> 0:16:42.200
<v Speaker 1>for shapes that correspond to what it thinks of faces,

0:16:42.440 --> 0:16:45.360
<v Speaker 1>which means they can sometimes detect faces where there are

0:16:45.400 --> 0:16:49.120
<v Speaker 1>no faces. I've seen this happen in nature photography, where

0:16:49.240 --> 0:16:51.640
<v Speaker 1>a person will hold up a camera at a tree

0:16:51.680 --> 0:16:54.600
<v Speaker 1>that has an interesting pattern on it and it will

0:16:54.600 --> 0:16:56.640
<v Speaker 1>detect it as a face. You know, you want to

0:16:57.720 --> 0:17:01.280
<v Speaker 1>exactly and you're thinking, you think, this isn't Game of Thrones.

0:17:01.840 --> 0:17:03.720
<v Speaker 1>The tree does not have red eyes. Now that's not

0:17:03.760 --> 0:17:05.560
<v Speaker 1>a This is not one of those trees that the

0:17:05.600 --> 0:17:09.520
<v Speaker 1>Starks talk about all the time. So there are times

0:17:09.560 --> 0:17:13.440
<v Speaker 1>where that kind of technology can rely on a very

0:17:13.520 --> 0:17:16.640
<v Speaker 1>simplified view of what is a face. But for things

0:17:16.680 --> 0:17:20.560
<v Speaker 1>that are really about verification and identification, they usually depend

0:17:20.640 --> 0:17:24.040
<v Speaker 1>upon multiple inputs to make sure because I mean, clearly,

0:17:24.080 --> 0:17:26.919
<v Speaker 1>if you're talking about verifying someone's identity to give them

0:17:26.960 --> 0:17:30.879
<v Speaker 1>access to something that could be really uh you know,

0:17:31.160 --> 0:17:35.359
<v Speaker 1>classified information or just uh top secret type stuff or

0:17:35.400 --> 0:17:39.280
<v Speaker 1>just just sensitive materials. Then you want to be absolutely

0:17:39.359 --> 0:17:41.360
<v Speaker 1>sure that that is who they say they are. So

0:17:42.440 --> 0:17:44.359
<v Speaker 1>some of them will even go so far as to

0:17:44.440 --> 0:17:47.200
<v Speaker 1>use multiple cameras to get more of a three dimensional

0:17:47.240 --> 0:17:49.920
<v Speaker 1>look at a person, because we know, if you're using

0:17:49.920 --> 0:17:52.480
<v Speaker 1>a single camera with a single lens, it's a flat image.

0:17:53.480 --> 0:17:55.520
<v Speaker 1>You know, it's once you see in a regular movie

0:17:55.640 --> 0:17:59.200
<v Speaker 1>or a regular picture, regular photograph, you don't get any

0:17:59.280 --> 0:18:01.400
<v Speaker 1>real sense of up there. I mean, you can see

0:18:01.400 --> 0:18:03.480
<v Speaker 1>contours and stuff, and you can tell if something is

0:18:03.520 --> 0:18:06.280
<v Speaker 1>closer or further away, and if something has been lit

0:18:06.359 --> 0:18:09.920
<v Speaker 1>really well, it might look three dimensional to you and

0:18:10.160 --> 0:18:12.080
<v Speaker 1>you might even your your brain plays a little bit

0:18:12.080 --> 0:18:14.360
<v Speaker 1>of a trick, but it's still a two D image, right,

0:18:14.400 --> 0:18:17.840
<v Speaker 1>And so if you're using a verification system or any

0:18:17.880 --> 0:18:22.040
<v Speaker 1>identification system that's reliant on a single camera, then that

0:18:22.119 --> 0:18:24.640
<v Speaker 1>makes it a little more complicated too, because it's looking

0:18:24.680 --> 0:18:27.360
<v Speaker 1>at three dimensional images but representing it as a two

0:18:27.400 --> 0:18:32.080
<v Speaker 1>dimensional image. So it that that has some elements of

0:18:32.640 --> 0:18:34.919
<v Speaker 1>difficulty there. If you have multiple cameras, then you can

0:18:34.920 --> 0:18:38.200
<v Speaker 1>get around that. You can rely on multiple inputs to

0:18:38.280 --> 0:18:41.280
<v Speaker 1>figure out how you know, how sure are you that

0:18:41.359 --> 0:18:43.919
<v Speaker 1>this person is who you think they are? Okay, but

0:18:44.040 --> 0:18:47.560
<v Speaker 1>we know facial recognition is not perfect yet. So what

0:18:47.600 --> 0:18:50.919
<v Speaker 1>are some of the challenges that are really facing facial

0:18:50.960 --> 0:18:55.960
<v Speaker 1>recognition software today. Well, facial recognition faces many problems, Joe,

0:18:56.800 --> 0:18:59.960
<v Speaker 1>thank you for throwing it to me like that. Uh, well,

0:19:00.040 --> 0:19:03.400
<v Speaker 1>we talked about the lighting issue. That's a really good example.

0:19:03.520 --> 0:19:08.160
<v Speaker 1>So if I go to create my profile, uh for

0:19:08.240 --> 0:19:10.320
<v Speaker 1>the company I work for. Let's say that I'm working

0:19:10.320 --> 0:19:14.960
<v Speaker 1>for you know, um M six, I've somehow gained clearance

0:19:15.000 --> 0:19:19.680
<v Speaker 1>to work in Britain's Superspy uh Academy. And I don't

0:19:19.720 --> 0:19:21.680
<v Speaker 1>know how I've managed to get there, but I don't

0:19:21.720 --> 0:19:24.119
<v Speaker 1>really doubt that you have. I think that's a pretty

0:19:24.240 --> 0:19:27.760
<v Speaker 1>likely Yes, this accident I'm putting on is actually not

0:19:27.840 --> 0:19:30.600
<v Speaker 1>my real accent. But at any rate, let's say that, uh,

0:19:31.000 --> 0:19:32.800
<v Speaker 1>I need to go and fill out my profile, and

0:19:32.840 --> 0:19:34.680
<v Speaker 1>so they put me in a well lit room, they

0:19:34.680 --> 0:19:37.439
<v Speaker 1>take my photograph from several angles. All of that is

0:19:37.480 --> 0:19:40.680
<v Speaker 1>factored in so that I can get into Superspy Academy

0:19:40.720 --> 0:19:43.719
<v Speaker 1>whenever I need to, uh, And then I walk up

0:19:43.760 --> 0:19:48.800
<v Speaker 1>but Superspy Academy. Unfortunately, maintenance hasn't changed out a lightbulb

0:19:48.840 --> 0:19:51.680
<v Speaker 1>that really needs to change. It's gotten very dim, it's

0:19:51.680 --> 0:19:54.800
<v Speaker 1>not giving nearly enough light, and that that dim light

0:19:54.960 --> 0:19:58.120
<v Speaker 1>is now casting odd shadows on me. And that might

0:19:58.160 --> 0:20:01.760
<v Speaker 1>be enough to throw off a facial recognition system. I

0:20:01.760 --> 0:20:05.720
<v Speaker 1>mean that you're ultimately talking about detecting light that's reflecting

0:20:05.760 --> 0:20:08.600
<v Speaker 1>off of a person. And if the lighting is different enough,

0:20:09.000 --> 0:20:12.680
<v Speaker 1>then from whatever your base photograph is, whatever your base

0:20:12.760 --> 0:20:15.560
<v Speaker 1>amount of data is for your the system, then it

0:20:15.680 --> 0:20:19.240
<v Speaker 1>may not return enough information, or at least not enough, uh,

0:20:19.280 --> 0:20:22.359
<v Speaker 1>you know, a good quality information for the system to

0:20:22.359 --> 0:20:25.080
<v Speaker 1>be able to identify you. This is true whether it's

0:20:25.119 --> 0:20:28.320
<v Speaker 1>a security camera that's on the wall, whether it's something

0:20:28.359 --> 0:20:30.800
<v Speaker 1>that's actually set up to be a verification system. I mean,

0:20:30.840 --> 0:20:34.320
<v Speaker 1>it doesn't really matter what the context is. It's it's

0:20:34.320 --> 0:20:37.960
<v Speaker 1>a real problem. Yeah, how about something even simpler. The

0:20:38.000 --> 0:20:41.600
<v Speaker 1>way you're holding your head? Yeah, yeah, greater than fifteen

0:20:41.640 --> 0:20:45.480
<v Speaker 1>degrees of tilt can really throw a wrench in facial recognition.

0:20:45.640 --> 0:20:48.200
<v Speaker 1>But I've seen this in action. Actually, when I've I've

0:20:48.200 --> 0:20:51.280
<v Speaker 1>looked up pictures of faces that we're supposed to be blurred.

0:20:51.280 --> 0:20:54.040
<v Speaker 1>We'll get into that in a minute. But weren't a

0:20:54.080 --> 0:20:56.560
<v Speaker 1>lot of the times a program that's supposed to detect

0:20:56.640 --> 0:20:59.760
<v Speaker 1>a face and blur it will miss a face that's

0:21:00.000 --> 0:21:02.919
<v Speaker 1>I agonal, right. Yeah. I mean if if you're looking

0:21:03.000 --> 0:21:07.040
<v Speaker 1>for a specific uh series of shapes and that is

0:21:07.080 --> 0:21:10.080
<v Speaker 1>what defines a face, and that those shapes are in

0:21:10.119 --> 0:21:13.640
<v Speaker 1>an orientation that's different from what you would expect, then

0:21:14.440 --> 0:21:17.119
<v Speaker 1>you can understand why a system would overlook that and

0:21:17.160 --> 0:21:20.679
<v Speaker 1>not recognize it as a face. Yeah. So my suggestion is,

0:21:20.720 --> 0:21:23.560
<v Speaker 1>if you're a criminal trying to avoid the law, just

0:21:23.640 --> 0:21:26.919
<v Speaker 1>do the limbo all the time. Just lean over. My

0:21:27.000 --> 0:21:30.480
<v Speaker 1>suggestion is don't go crime doesn't pay. That's my suggestion.

0:21:30.520 --> 0:21:32.840
<v Speaker 1>But Joe, you know, we understand that you're in the

0:21:32.880 --> 0:21:35.480
<v Speaker 1>ferious now. Now that you've let on, I am gonna

0:21:35.520 --> 0:21:39.320
<v Speaker 1>have to train my superspy techniques on you. So just

0:21:39.400 --> 0:21:42.560
<v Speaker 1>fair warning. Uh, but yeah, I mean they're there. We

0:21:42.640 --> 0:21:45.960
<v Speaker 1>have the same thing about the single camera systems having

0:21:46.000 --> 0:21:50.000
<v Speaker 1>problem detecting depth. That means that you might be able

0:21:50.040 --> 0:21:52.720
<v Speaker 1>to fool such a system by holding up a photograph

0:21:52.960 --> 0:21:56.040
<v Speaker 1>of let's let's say that you have captured a superspy

0:21:56.080 --> 0:21:59.360
<v Speaker 1>and gotten their pin and you go into superspy Academy

0:21:59.400 --> 0:22:00.840
<v Speaker 1>and you type in the in. Then you hold up

0:22:00.840 --> 0:22:04.439
<v Speaker 1>a picture of said spies face to the camera. And

0:22:04.440 --> 0:22:07.159
<v Speaker 1>it's just a single lens camera. It's not able to

0:22:08.000 --> 0:22:10.960
<v Speaker 1>detect depth. It may think that that flat image is

0:22:11.000 --> 0:22:14.280
<v Speaker 1>in fact the actual person's face. Yeah, then you get

0:22:14.280 --> 0:22:18.200
<v Speaker 1>an entrance. Yeah, how about this problem. Your face isn't

0:22:18.320 --> 0:22:23.360
<v Speaker 1>quite as unchanging as say your fingerprint or your retina. Right,

0:22:23.480 --> 0:22:26.200
<v Speaker 1>you could gain weight or lose weight, which might change

0:22:26.240 --> 0:22:29.080
<v Speaker 1>certain aspects of your face. Yeah, you could grow facial

0:22:29.119 --> 0:22:32.560
<v Speaker 1>hair or shave facial hair or your hairstyle. Like we

0:22:32.600 --> 0:22:35.960
<v Speaker 1>mentioned before, you might suffer an injury and you might

0:22:36.000 --> 0:22:38.840
<v Speaker 1>have some scarring, or you may end up having plastic

0:22:38.880 --> 0:22:42.000
<v Speaker 1>surgery or some other thing that alters your face in

0:22:42.040 --> 0:22:44.320
<v Speaker 1>a way that would be enough to throw it off

0:22:44.359 --> 0:22:47.119
<v Speaker 1>from a facial recognition software from being able to verify

0:22:47.200 --> 0:22:50.280
<v Speaker 1>or identify it. Right, It makes it harder. It means that, uh,

0:22:50.680 --> 0:22:54.080
<v Speaker 1>these systems have less variables they can work with. They

0:22:54.080 --> 0:22:56.480
<v Speaker 1>need to look for data points that aren't going to

0:22:56.520 --> 0:22:58.840
<v Speaker 1>be changing when these types of things happen to a

0:22:58.880 --> 0:23:01.760
<v Speaker 1>person's face, and that really limits what you can look at.

0:23:01.840 --> 0:23:04.280
<v Speaker 1>And I mean even even heavy eye makeup could change

0:23:04.280 --> 0:23:06.200
<v Speaker 1>the shape of your face enough to throw something up. Yeah,

0:23:06.240 --> 0:23:08.840
<v Speaker 1>there's some some elements of your face that are less

0:23:08.840 --> 0:23:12.320
<v Speaker 1>likely to change unless you've had something radically done, right

0:23:12.640 --> 0:23:16.040
<v Speaker 1>you reconstructive relative distance between your eyes and your nose,

0:23:16.160 --> 0:23:19.320
<v Speaker 1>and the curvature of your nose again, unless you've had

0:23:19.760 --> 0:23:22.920
<v Speaker 1>some sort of plastic surgery, the shape of your jaw.

0:23:23.080 --> 0:23:26.000
<v Speaker 1>These are things that are are less easy to change

0:23:26.080 --> 0:23:30.600
<v Speaker 1>without some extreme intervention. And so those are things that

0:23:30.680 --> 0:23:34.400
<v Speaker 1>a lot of facial recognition software packages rely heavily on.

0:23:34.840 --> 0:23:38.240
<v Speaker 1>Or it maybe that the relationship of marks that you

0:23:38.280 --> 0:23:40.640
<v Speaker 1>have on your face, like a mole or freckle, things

0:23:40.640 --> 0:23:42.880
<v Speaker 1>like that, things that aren't likely to change a lot

0:23:42.960 --> 0:23:46.800
<v Speaker 1>unless again you go in to have them removed, right,

0:23:46.960 --> 0:23:49.160
<v Speaker 1>you could apply makeup to cover them up. That also

0:23:49.200 --> 0:23:51.120
<v Speaker 1>could be enough to fool them. So these are all

0:23:51.240 --> 0:23:55.120
<v Speaker 1>things that that are uh that are taken into consideration

0:23:55.320 --> 0:23:57.720
<v Speaker 1>by people who designed these systems. Yeah. Yeah, there's a

0:23:57.720 --> 0:23:59.520
<v Speaker 1>new story that came out in August that I wanted

0:23:59.560 --> 0:24:02.160
<v Speaker 1>to mention here. Um that a fourteen year old case

0:24:02.160 --> 0:24:05.760
<v Speaker 1>against an alleged child sex abuser in kidnapper, a terrible

0:24:05.760 --> 0:24:09.120
<v Speaker 1>guy all around, um came back into courts when the

0:24:09.200 --> 0:24:12.960
<v Speaker 1>FBI caught their suspect thanks to their facial recognition software

0:24:13.320 --> 0:24:17.520
<v Speaker 1>of two passport style photos of the guy who had

0:24:17.520 --> 0:24:20.280
<v Speaker 1>not changed his face in the past fourteen years. Um.

0:24:20.520 --> 0:24:22.320
<v Speaker 1>I mean the dude put in like a visa application

0:24:22.359 --> 0:24:24.600
<v Speaker 1>to the U. S Embassy in Nepal, and the software

0:24:24.680 --> 0:24:30.280
<v Speaker 1>was like, hey, hey, you guys, this is totally that guy. Yeah.

0:24:30.520 --> 0:24:33.080
<v Speaker 1>So it was a really great example of of how

0:24:33.119 --> 0:24:36.879
<v Speaker 1>this kind of technology can can work towards towards catching criminals,

0:24:36.960 --> 0:24:40.359
<v Speaker 1>which is terrific um, but kind of under vary. This

0:24:40.440 --> 0:24:43.520
<v Speaker 1>one very specific circumstance in which a very good photograph

0:24:43.640 --> 0:24:47.480
<v Speaker 1>was obtained of the suspect um. And there are lots

0:24:47.480 --> 0:24:49.440
<v Speaker 1>of ways in which you can mess up. That's right.

0:24:49.480 --> 0:24:51.479
<v Speaker 1>For for all the times it works really big, there

0:24:51.520 --> 0:24:55.040
<v Speaker 1>are lots of times when facial recognition software goes wrong,

0:24:55.200 --> 0:24:58.840
<v Speaker 1>and often just goes wrong in a hilarious way. Yeah.

0:24:58.880 --> 0:25:02.919
<v Speaker 1>Sometimes a uh you know, you see where the the

0:25:03.160 --> 0:25:06.679
<v Speaker 1>drawbacks or the limitations of the technology are in in

0:25:06.680 --> 0:25:11.600
<v Speaker 1>incredibly um profound ways, you might say, so, like like

0:25:11.800 --> 0:25:15.720
<v Speaker 1>the Japanese cigarette vending machines. I remember hearing this story

0:25:15.720 --> 0:25:18.040
<v Speaker 1>when it first broke I was listening to. I think

0:25:18.040 --> 0:25:20.000
<v Speaker 1>it was probably seen nets Buzz Out Loud at the time,

0:25:20.320 --> 0:25:22.280
<v Speaker 1>which is no longer a show, but I was a

0:25:22.320 --> 0:25:25.520
<v Speaker 1>big fan and they covered this story when it first happened. Now,

0:25:25.640 --> 0:25:29.840
<v Speaker 1>these vending machines were famous because they had cameras built

0:25:29.880 --> 0:25:32.160
<v Speaker 1>into them that were supposed to be able to detect

0:25:32.560 --> 0:25:35.280
<v Speaker 1>what the age was of the person who came up

0:25:35.320 --> 0:25:39.040
<v Speaker 1>to the vending machine. So they're looking for specific features

0:25:39.200 --> 0:25:42.080
<v Speaker 1>things that would indicate someone who has reached a certain

0:25:42.160 --> 0:25:45.320
<v Speaker 1>level of maturity, and that was supposed to prevent these

0:25:45.359 --> 0:25:49.439
<v Speaker 1>machines from selling cigarettes to underage people without checking an

0:25:49.480 --> 0:25:51.960
<v Speaker 1>I D share. Yeah, yeah, because I mean it's we

0:25:52.040 --> 0:25:53.720
<v Speaker 1>used to have these cigarette machines all over the place

0:25:53.720 --> 0:25:56.239
<v Speaker 1>in the United States. They aren't really anywhere that I

0:25:56.320 --> 0:26:00.240
<v Speaker 1>know of at this point. Yeah, yeah, you can. Yeah,

0:26:00.280 --> 0:26:01.800
<v Speaker 1>you can find them in those kind of places where

0:26:01.920 --> 0:26:04.640
<v Speaker 1>presumably someone's idea has already been checked before they've entered

0:26:04.640 --> 0:26:08.119
<v Speaker 1>the premises. So the idea would be you would walk up,

0:26:08.280 --> 0:26:10.680
<v Speaker 1>you would put you know, the camera would detect whether

0:26:10.760 --> 0:26:12.760
<v Speaker 1>or not you're old enough, and then you could buy cigarettes.

0:26:13.119 --> 0:26:15.240
<v Speaker 1>And what they what people discovered was that if you

0:26:15.320 --> 0:26:17.480
<v Speaker 1>just walked up and held up a picture of a person.

0:26:17.880 --> 0:26:21.440
<v Speaker 1>The example an adult person. Yeah, the example I saw

0:26:21.560 --> 0:26:27.320
<v Speaker 1>was a picture of Bruce Willis, uh uh, like die

0:26:27.359 --> 0:26:30.080
<v Speaker 1>Hard four era Bruce Willis. If you held up a

0:26:30.080 --> 0:26:33.000
<v Speaker 1>picture of Bruce Willis, it would totally sell you cigarettes

0:26:33.359 --> 0:26:35.840
<v Speaker 1>and probably you know, say that it was a big

0:26:35.840 --> 0:26:38.000
<v Speaker 1>fan of your work. What about like a really baby

0:26:38.040 --> 0:26:41.840
<v Speaker 1>faced adult. Probably not, because again it was looking for

0:26:42.119 --> 0:26:46.040
<v Speaker 1>specific kind of features that would indicate adult nous. They

0:26:46.040 --> 0:26:47.760
<v Speaker 1>didn't find out that you didn't have to have a

0:26:47.840 --> 0:26:50.560
<v Speaker 1>very large picture for this to work. You could. You

0:26:50.560 --> 0:26:52.040
<v Speaker 1>you can hold up as something as small as a

0:26:52.160 --> 0:26:54.320
<v Speaker 1>three inch picture. We're talking about like seven and a

0:26:54.359 --> 0:26:58.119
<v Speaker 1>half centimeter picture of an adult. They did discover that

0:26:58.119 --> 0:26:59.880
<v Speaker 1>if you tried to hold up a picture as small

0:26:59.880 --> 0:27:03.639
<v Speaker 1>as one inch, that did not fly. But but you know,

0:27:03.760 --> 0:27:06.160
<v Speaker 1>something something like a three inch picture like you could

0:27:06.240 --> 0:27:08.800
<v Speaker 1>you could just carry that around and put that in

0:27:08.800 --> 0:27:11.040
<v Speaker 1>front of the camera and that was enough for you

0:27:11.080 --> 0:27:13.760
<v Speaker 1>to be able to purchase cigarettes from it. So that

0:27:13.920 --> 0:27:17.080
<v Speaker 1>shows you that this is not an infallible technology, especially

0:27:17.080 --> 0:27:20.480
<v Speaker 1>in that particular implementation. I got another funny one for you, okay,

0:27:21.000 --> 0:27:25.000
<v Speaker 1>Google street View. Yeah, so, first of all, Google street

0:27:25.080 --> 0:27:28.520
<v Speaker 1>View did not always blur out faces. Uh. In fact,

0:27:28.720 --> 0:27:31.679
<v Speaker 1>the reason why Google street View would blur out faces

0:27:31.760 --> 0:27:34.920
<v Speaker 1>was due to the kind of uproar people had when

0:27:35.000 --> 0:27:37.479
<v Speaker 1>street view first became a thing. Because what Google is

0:27:37.520 --> 0:27:41.399
<v Speaker 1>made by engineers, like engineers power Google and all of

0:27:41.440 --> 0:27:44.560
<v Speaker 1>Google's projects, and engineers are really good at figuring out

0:27:44.720 --> 0:27:49.560
<v Speaker 1>how do we create this amazing experience, but not necessarily

0:27:49.760 --> 0:27:52.160
<v Speaker 1>the best at thinking of all the implications of said

0:27:52.200 --> 0:27:55.520
<v Speaker 1>amazing experience. So sure, like, you know, it's terrific that

0:27:55.560 --> 0:27:58.679
<v Speaker 1>we have a picture of this storefront of a doctor's office,

0:27:58.720 --> 0:28:01.439
<v Speaker 1>for example, But make the people who happened to be

0:28:01.480 --> 0:28:03.680
<v Speaker 1>in front of that doctor's office that day don't want

0:28:03.720 --> 0:28:06.800
<v Speaker 1>to be permanently associated with it, right, Or you don't

0:28:06.800 --> 0:28:08.919
<v Speaker 1>want your picture on the Internet walking out of the

0:28:08.920 --> 0:28:13.240
<v Speaker 1>liquor store or a strip joint, or maybe you do.

0:28:13.440 --> 0:28:15.600
<v Speaker 1>I don't know, but there are a lot of There

0:28:15.600 --> 0:28:18.920
<v Speaker 1>are a lot of cases where someone would say, uh, yeah,

0:28:19.080 --> 0:28:23.080
<v Speaker 1>I even if I wasn't going to set establishment and

0:28:23.080 --> 0:28:25.240
<v Speaker 1>I just happened to be walking by it at the time,

0:28:25.720 --> 0:28:28.639
<v Speaker 1>Now it appears that I am giving my custom to

0:28:28.880 --> 0:28:32.080
<v Speaker 1>something that I do not approve of, and I would

0:28:32.160 --> 0:28:35.240
<v Speaker 1>much rather not be associated forever and ever with this

0:28:35.280 --> 0:28:39.240
<v Speaker 1>particular location. Right, But of course you can't just manually

0:28:39.320 --> 0:28:41.600
<v Speaker 1>blur all the faces. There's too many. You know, it'd

0:28:41.600 --> 0:28:44.320
<v Speaker 1>take it would take ages, because you know, you've got

0:28:44.360 --> 0:28:47.280
<v Speaker 1>these fleet of Google street View cars that are going

0:28:47.320 --> 0:28:51.200
<v Speaker 1>through different neighborhoods and documenting them. So Google created an

0:28:51.240 --> 0:28:55.560
<v Speaker 1>algorithm that would detect faces and then blur them automatically

0:28:56.040 --> 0:29:00.520
<v Speaker 1>to halarious results. Well, it was, as I believe you

0:29:00.560 --> 0:29:04.000
<v Speaker 1>said in the notes here, it's a bit overcautious maybe,

0:29:04.200 --> 0:29:07.560
<v Speaker 1>So it ends up blurring some wonderful things like the

0:29:07.640 --> 0:29:11.880
<v Speaker 1>colonel's face on the KFC billboard. Right. There are murals

0:29:11.920 --> 0:29:14.760
<v Speaker 1>where you you see this gorgeous artwork, except there's this

0:29:14.840 --> 0:29:18.520
<v Speaker 1>amazing blur part of it, or sometimes multiple blurs. I've

0:29:18.520 --> 0:29:22.200
<v Speaker 1>seen images on the Internet where it blurred animal faces.

0:29:22.240 --> 0:29:24.640
<v Speaker 1>So they're like some ponies by the road and it

0:29:24.760 --> 0:29:28.080
<v Speaker 1>blurred the bony faces. Look, those ponies deserve just as

0:29:28.160 --> 0:29:30.280
<v Speaker 1>much privacy as you and I. Can you tell a

0:29:30.320 --> 0:29:33.240
<v Speaker 1>horse face from a human face? Hey? Art project horse

0:29:33.320 --> 0:29:37.960
<v Speaker 1>or humans? So many jokes that I'm not gonna do it. Also,

0:29:38.000 --> 0:29:41.880
<v Speaker 1>I've seen it blurring statues. Yeah, you might have a

0:29:41.880 --> 0:29:44.280
<v Speaker 1>Buddha by the road and it's got a blurred face

0:29:44.360 --> 0:29:47.320
<v Speaker 1>like it's a criminal on America's Most Wanted. It also

0:29:47.360 --> 0:29:50.280
<v Speaker 1>does miss some others though, which which which cracks me

0:29:50.360 --> 0:29:52.440
<v Speaker 1>up on on the flip side of it, Like I've

0:29:52.480 --> 0:29:54.920
<v Speaker 1>seen like a like a dude sitting in a spa

0:29:55.520 --> 0:29:59.080
<v Speaker 1>and his mirror image is not blurred, and it's like, well,

0:29:59.640 --> 0:30:03.000
<v Speaker 1>thanks Google, Well that's that's his evil, evil twin version

0:30:03.120 --> 0:30:05.959
<v Speaker 1>right in the mirror world. Yeah. I've also seen some

0:30:06.000 --> 0:30:08.360
<v Speaker 1>images that were at least alleged to be from Google

0:30:08.400 --> 0:30:11.760
<v Speaker 1>street View that missed people's faces, often at an angle,

0:30:12.000 --> 0:30:14.800
<v Speaker 1>people who had their heads turned to the side, right,

0:30:15.200 --> 0:30:18.440
<v Speaker 1>So it again, it is not infallible, and so you know,

0:30:18.520 --> 0:30:22.600
<v Speaker 1>it's it may be that that that street View ends

0:30:22.640 --> 0:30:24.959
<v Speaker 1>up being one of those things where some folks at

0:30:24.960 --> 0:30:28.080
<v Speaker 1>Google occasionally have to go in and manually blur stuff.

0:30:29.040 --> 0:30:32.720
<v Speaker 1>But the hope is that, yeah, the hope is that

0:30:33.440 --> 0:30:37.360
<v Speaker 1>the algorithm catches the vast majority. And I'm sure that

0:30:37.560 --> 0:30:40.040
<v Speaker 1>the company would rather err on the side of caution

0:30:40.120 --> 0:30:46.000
<v Speaker 1>and have some hilarious unintentional blurring going on than miss

0:30:46.040 --> 0:30:48.720
<v Speaker 1>one or has to do it all by hand, which

0:30:48.760 --> 0:30:50.480
<v Speaker 1>would just be ridiculous, and it does. It does rely

0:30:50.520 --> 0:30:52.479
<v Speaker 1>on users to send in feedback like if you if

0:30:52.520 --> 0:30:55.320
<v Speaker 1>you find something that isn't blurred or should be blurred

0:30:55.400 --> 0:30:58.120
<v Speaker 1>or either way. On on an unrelated note, I love

0:30:58.280 --> 0:31:01.280
<v Speaker 1>the communities that have taken Google street viewed as an

0:31:01.280 --> 0:31:05.520
<v Speaker 1>opportunity to do art projects along streets that normally wouldn't

0:31:05.520 --> 0:31:07.600
<v Speaker 1>happen there. I remember there was one street where there

0:31:07.640 --> 0:31:11.240
<v Speaker 1>was an entire almost like a parade, like a story

0:31:11.360 --> 0:31:13.760
<v Speaker 1>that happens as you go down the street, where people

0:31:13.800 --> 0:31:17.720
<v Speaker 1>had uh created these tableau all the way down, ranging

0:31:17.760 --> 0:31:21.360
<v Speaker 1>from everything from uh you know, families posing together like

0:31:21.400 --> 0:31:26.560
<v Speaker 1>a nineteen fifties style sitcom to Larper's in all out combat.

0:31:26.680 --> 0:31:29.400
<v Speaker 1>It was amazing and it was just down one streets.

0:31:30.640 --> 0:31:33.320
<v Speaker 1>I think. I'm sure I've seen Google street view capture

0:31:33.360 --> 0:31:37.160
<v Speaker 1>a lot of the infamous horsehead mask. Yeah. The question then,

0:31:37.360 --> 0:31:40.560
<v Speaker 1>is the horsehead mask does it blur it? Well, I guess,

0:31:40.640 --> 0:31:43.959
<v Speaker 1>I guess we'll have to ask our listeners to find

0:31:44.240 --> 0:31:48.280
<v Speaker 1>uh you know, instances of the horsehead mask blurred and unblurred.

0:31:48.360 --> 0:31:51.240
<v Speaker 1>Maybe we can crack this mystery. But now, you know,

0:31:51.680 --> 0:31:55.120
<v Speaker 1>this also leads into the fact that we have this

0:31:55.200 --> 0:31:58.280
<v Speaker 1>blurring going on with street view shows that there is

0:31:58.360 --> 0:32:01.320
<v Speaker 1>there are some concerns with face recognition. And it's not

0:32:01.360 --> 0:32:04.280
<v Speaker 1>just the fact that are you looking up horse bording

0:32:04.360 --> 0:32:08.560
<v Speaker 1>go the horse said mask Joe. We're doing a show

0:32:08.640 --> 0:32:18.520
<v Speaker 1>right now. The time for research is over your all right. Uh.

0:32:18.720 --> 0:32:21.280
<v Speaker 1>The other cool thing, well, not cool thing. The other

0:32:21.320 --> 0:32:22.880
<v Speaker 1>thing that we have to keep in mind is the

0:32:22.880 --> 0:32:26.120
<v Speaker 1>fact that there are some concerns about facial recognition. That

0:32:26.640 --> 0:32:29.200
<v Speaker 1>you know, in this case, Google is using facial recognition

0:32:29.240 --> 0:32:32.400
<v Speaker 1>to meet concerns, but their concerns about the technology all

0:32:32.440 --> 0:32:35.479
<v Speaker 1>by itself. Right. So when we talk about officials and

0:32:35.920 --> 0:32:40.920
<v Speaker 1>organizations and governments using facial recognition technology, that sounds really

0:32:40.960 --> 0:32:43.280
<v Speaker 1>good when it's like, oh, they used it to catch

0:32:43.320 --> 0:32:47.280
<v Speaker 1>somebody who was really bad, like a dangerous violent offender. Okay,

0:32:47.320 --> 0:32:49.880
<v Speaker 1>But at the same time you have to think, well,

0:32:50.400 --> 0:32:53.960
<v Speaker 1>should we be concerned about privacy? Yeah, And the answer

0:32:53.960 --> 0:32:57.680
<v Speaker 1>to that is yes, we should be concerned about privacy. Absolutely.

0:32:57.680 --> 0:33:00.440
<v Speaker 1>We should be concerned about pay all the time. Basically. Yeah.

0:33:00.760 --> 0:33:03.680
<v Speaker 1>In the United States, more than half i think twenty

0:33:03.760 --> 0:33:06.959
<v Speaker 1>six states and the District of Columbia all allow law

0:33:07.120 --> 0:33:11.800
<v Speaker 1>enforcement to use facial recognition technology. Uh. In in the

0:33:11.880 --> 0:33:16.160
<v Speaker 1>course of their duties as peace officers. And uh, I

0:33:16.200 --> 0:33:19.760
<v Speaker 1>think there's something like twelve that do not, and then

0:33:20.040 --> 0:33:21.920
<v Speaker 1>or maybe it's it's eleven that do not and then

0:33:21.960 --> 0:33:26.840
<v Speaker 1>twelve that um have some form of of facial recognition

0:33:26.840 --> 0:33:29.280
<v Speaker 1>technology but are not currently using it. That kind of thing.

0:33:29.560 --> 0:33:33.240
<v Speaker 1>At any rate, UM, you also have this enormous database,

0:33:33.280 --> 0:33:36.440
<v Speaker 1>not just of all the different criminals have been processed

0:33:36.480 --> 0:33:39.040
<v Speaker 1>and taking mug shots have been taken that kind of thing.

0:33:39.440 --> 0:33:42.120
<v Speaker 1>I mean, mug shots really are an early form of

0:33:42.520 --> 0:33:46.520
<v Speaker 1>facial recognition that was all manual, right, It wasn't algorithms,

0:33:46.520 --> 0:33:52.320
<v Speaker 1>it was algorithms. It was like rather than manual, Well

0:33:52.360 --> 0:33:55.120
<v Speaker 1>that's fair fans. Yeah, well you have to sort through

0:33:55.160 --> 0:33:58.440
<v Speaker 1>the pictures. But at any rate, Uh, you know, now

0:33:58.440 --> 0:34:03.080
<v Speaker 1>a long process. Right now, this technology can rely on

0:34:03.120 --> 0:34:05.360
<v Speaker 1>those mugshots, but it can also you know, some of

0:34:05.400 --> 0:34:08.040
<v Speaker 1>these law enforcement agencies might be tapping into databases for

0:34:08.560 --> 0:34:11.160
<v Speaker 1>people who have I don't know, received a driver's license

0:34:11.400 --> 0:34:13.839
<v Speaker 1>or an i D, a state issued i D where

0:34:13.880 --> 0:34:17.880
<v Speaker 1>they've got an image on file that is tagged with

0:34:17.960 --> 0:34:22.560
<v Speaker 1>their identity because it is part of ascertaining that person's identity.

0:34:22.600 --> 0:34:25.120
<v Speaker 1>It's a it's a way of verifying that person's identity. Yeah,

0:34:25.120 --> 0:34:27.800
<v Speaker 1>and it also has their address and lots of other stuff,

0:34:28.239 --> 0:34:31.919
<v Speaker 1>other vitals, things like that. Yeah, that starts to maybe

0:34:32.000 --> 0:34:35.120
<v Speaker 1>become a problem when you realize. Okay, so all kinds

0:34:35.120 --> 0:34:39.279
<v Speaker 1>of people are being visually scrutinized and perhaps in a

0:34:39.400 --> 0:34:45.160
<v Speaker 1>very broadway, all considered as potential suspects in identifying faces

0:34:45.680 --> 0:34:48.959
<v Speaker 1>without even really being at the scene of or associated

0:34:49.000 --> 0:34:50.719
<v Speaker 1>with the crime in any way. Yeah, it's it's a

0:34:50.760 --> 0:34:54.040
<v Speaker 1>worry that it turns it could quickly turn into a

0:34:54.120 --> 0:34:57.440
<v Speaker 1>true surveillance state, right, not just not just that we

0:34:57.480 --> 0:35:01.560
<v Speaker 1>have this capability of looking at uh, people in the

0:35:01.760 --> 0:35:04.480
<v Speaker 1>in the in the context of a crime that's been committed,

0:35:04.480 --> 0:35:06.920
<v Speaker 1>and trying to figure out who was there, what were

0:35:06.960 --> 0:35:09.960
<v Speaker 1>their roles in the crime? Uh, and how can we

0:35:09.960 --> 0:35:11.800
<v Speaker 1>get in touch with them so that we can either

0:35:12.320 --> 0:35:14.560
<v Speaker 1>you know, detain them if we suspect that they were

0:35:14.600 --> 0:35:16.759
<v Speaker 1>part of it, or ask them questions if they were

0:35:16.760 --> 0:35:19.719
<v Speaker 1>not part of it, but they were present and uh.

0:35:19.760 --> 0:35:22.320
<v Speaker 1>And it's it's also a question of letting the public

0:35:22.400 --> 0:35:25.960
<v Speaker 1>know whether these systems are in place and whether the

0:35:26.040 --> 0:35:29.600
<v Speaker 1>law enforcement agencies have access to them. There was a

0:35:29.640 --> 0:35:34.360
<v Speaker 1>story in Ohio where there was a big backlash of

0:35:34.360 --> 0:35:37.640
<v Speaker 1>of citizens who were unaware that these systems were in

0:35:37.719 --> 0:35:41.560
<v Speaker 1>place and could be used, and the law enforcement response was,

0:35:41.880 --> 0:35:45.680
<v Speaker 1>these systems are in place, we have our own policies

0:35:45.719 --> 0:35:48.320
<v Speaker 1>in place to make sure that misuse does not happen,

0:35:48.400 --> 0:35:51.440
<v Speaker 1>because if it does happen, it will be treated with severity.

0:35:51.480 --> 0:35:53.799
<v Speaker 1>That sort of thing to try and let people know

0:35:55.000 --> 0:35:57.120
<v Speaker 1>we are relying on these things so that we can

0:35:57.200 --> 0:36:01.200
<v Speaker 1>help pursue criminals, but we're not we're not going to

0:36:01.200 --> 0:36:03.200
<v Speaker 1>tolerate any kind of misuse of the system, which I

0:36:03.200 --> 0:36:05.440
<v Speaker 1>think is an important I mean, they have to prove

0:36:05.520 --> 0:36:08.120
<v Speaker 1>that that is in fact their policy, right right, Just

0:36:08.160 --> 0:36:11.640
<v Speaker 1>saying it isn't quite enough. No, But you know, it's

0:36:11.680 --> 0:36:14.640
<v Speaker 1>one of those things that is clearly you know, it's

0:36:14.760 --> 0:36:17.239
<v Speaker 1>it's it's a it's a big concern. Oh yeah. And

0:36:17.440 --> 0:36:20.520
<v Speaker 1>it's not only on the state levels. There. The the FBI,

0:36:20.640 --> 0:36:23.600
<v Speaker 1>the Federal Bureau of Investigation here in the United States,

0:36:23.640 --> 0:36:28.080
<v Speaker 1>has an increasingly robust system called the Next Generation Identification

0:36:28.160 --> 0:36:31.640
<v Speaker 1>System or n g I, which includes and I quote

0:36:31.640 --> 0:36:35.680
<v Speaker 1>an image searching capability of photographs associated with criminal identities

0:36:36.040 --> 0:36:41.240
<v Speaker 1>um paired with this advanced increasingly advanced facial recognition software

0:36:41.239 --> 0:36:44.440
<v Speaker 1>that they're building out. Um, it just rolled out this

0:36:44.680 --> 0:36:48.760
<v Speaker 1>uh interstate Photo system or i p S yesterday September

0:36:48.840 --> 0:36:55.279
<v Speaker 1>fIF um. Really timely news. Yeah. I mean it's been

0:36:55.320 --> 0:36:57.520
<v Speaker 1>working on this for for years. I think that they

0:36:57.719 --> 0:37:01.600
<v Speaker 1>had announced their intention to do it back in two

0:37:01.600 --> 0:37:04.479
<v Speaker 1>thousand six or two thousand eight, um something around there,

0:37:04.520 --> 0:37:07.160
<v Speaker 1>and that the contract for developing all of the technology

0:37:07.320 --> 0:37:10.680
<v Speaker 1>was awarded at that time to Lockheed Martin Transportation and

0:37:10.719 --> 0:37:14.440
<v Speaker 1>Security Solutions. Not a big surprise. Luckheed has a long

0:37:14.640 --> 0:37:18.560
<v Speaker 1>history when it comes to surveillance. Look at the history

0:37:18.560 --> 0:37:22.160
<v Speaker 1>of Area fifty one for more, right, right, yeah, um. So,

0:37:22.160 --> 0:37:26.200
<v Speaker 1>so this system basically pools data from from as far

0:37:26.200 --> 0:37:28.680
<v Speaker 1>as I can tell, all levels of law enforcement and

0:37:28.719 --> 0:37:32.239
<v Speaker 1>criminal justice and distributes that data back out to those

0:37:32.280 --> 0:37:35.680
<v Speaker 1>agencies once the FBI has collected it. So in this case,

0:37:35.840 --> 0:37:39.239
<v Speaker 1>you have a kind of national system where uh you

0:37:39.320 --> 0:37:42.720
<v Speaker 1>might you know, otherwise have to rely upon a regional system.

0:37:42.880 --> 0:37:45.920
<v Speaker 1>Like a state might have access to all criminals that

0:37:45.920 --> 0:37:47.759
<v Speaker 1>have been processed in that state, but if it's a

0:37:47.800 --> 0:37:51.000
<v Speaker 1>criminal from another state that has done something, you may

0:37:51.040 --> 0:37:54.520
<v Speaker 1>not be able to link the identities easily, you would

0:37:54.560 --> 0:37:59.800
<v Speaker 1>have to have interstate cooperation, which is an incredibly complex

0:38:00.320 --> 0:38:02.560
<v Speaker 1>in the law enforcement world. Oh yeah, yeah, and and

0:38:02.600 --> 0:38:06.640
<v Speaker 1>that's what this system is intending to do. UM. At

0:38:06.640 --> 0:38:08.880
<v Speaker 1>the very least on the surface. There there are a

0:38:08.920 --> 0:38:12.560
<v Speaker 1>bunch of organizations like, for example, the Electronic Frontiers Foundation

0:38:12.600 --> 0:38:17.160
<v Speaker 1>that are calling for greater disclosure of UM and and

0:38:17.320 --> 0:38:21.680
<v Speaker 1>interoffice checks and balances on the privacy and security and

0:38:21.719 --> 0:38:26.000
<v Speaker 1>scope of this entire project UM because it's obviously concerning

0:38:26.160 --> 0:38:28.160
<v Speaker 1>well yeah, I mean it's one of those things where

0:38:28.280 --> 0:38:32.960
<v Speaker 1>right now, if you're talking about this is specifically uh

0:38:33.160 --> 0:38:38.120
<v Speaker 1>limited to people who have a criminal background, then for

0:38:38.239 --> 0:38:40.120
<v Speaker 1>a lot of people they're just going to say, oh, well,

0:38:40.160 --> 0:38:43.400
<v Speaker 1>then that that's fine. But the implication here is obviously,

0:38:43.480 --> 0:38:46.279
<v Speaker 1>well one, if you've been processed, that doesn't necessarily mean

0:38:46.320 --> 0:38:49.440
<v Speaker 1>that you're actually criminal. Yeah, yeah, you may you may

0:38:49.480 --> 0:38:52.399
<v Speaker 1>have been processed, but it was because you had been

0:38:52.880 --> 0:38:56.879
<v Speaker 1>mistakenly identified as a criminally in the system or I mean,

0:38:56.920 --> 0:38:59.640
<v Speaker 1>you know, in the case of and this is treading

0:38:59.680 --> 0:39:02.960
<v Speaker 1>on slightly opinionated territory here, apologies guys, but you know,

0:39:03.040 --> 0:39:06.920
<v Speaker 1>if you were maybe processed for participating in a non

0:39:07.080 --> 0:39:10.080
<v Speaker 1>violent protest or something. That's a great example if you

0:39:10.080 --> 0:39:12.920
<v Speaker 1>you could have been protesting something and then rounded up

0:39:13.320 --> 0:39:16.000
<v Speaker 1>as part of an effort to clear out the streets,

0:39:16.000 --> 0:39:19.480
<v Speaker 1>so after a curfew or something along those lines. I mean, uh,

0:39:19.640 --> 0:39:22.719
<v Speaker 1>that at the time we're recording this, obviously the uh,

0:39:22.800 --> 0:39:26.600
<v Speaker 1>the events in Ferguson are brought to mind in that case,

0:39:26.800 --> 0:39:29.520
<v Speaker 1>and you could easily see where people would be very

0:39:29.560 --> 0:39:33.200
<v Speaker 1>concerned about the potential misuse of the system, or even

0:39:33.280 --> 0:39:38.959
<v Speaker 1>just how the system could could inaccurately identify somebody and

0:39:39.120 --> 0:39:42.439
<v Speaker 1>that could very much impact their life in a negative way.

0:39:42.480 --> 0:39:45.000
<v Speaker 1>I mean, it's understandable why this is a frightening thing

0:39:45.000 --> 0:39:49.879
<v Speaker 1>and it needs to have a responsible and accountable administration. Right.

0:39:50.040 --> 0:39:55.560
<v Speaker 1>It's really easy, I think, especially for the general, perhaps

0:39:55.640 --> 0:39:58.680
<v Speaker 1>less informed public's imagination, to jump to something like minority

0:39:58.719 --> 0:40:03.239
<v Speaker 1>report as an example of how wrong it could go. Yeah. Yeah,

0:40:03.480 --> 0:40:07.560
<v Speaker 1>Like the example that I put here was minority report,

0:40:07.640 --> 0:40:11.000
<v Speaker 1>and I was thinking specifically about how a minority report

0:40:11.320 --> 0:40:14.440
<v Speaker 1>John Innerton walks around and is immediately identified and then

0:40:14.480 --> 0:40:18.520
<v Speaker 1>the world responds to his identity. Uh. And we think

0:40:18.520 --> 0:40:20.800
<v Speaker 1>about this in the context of the Internet of Things,

0:40:20.880 --> 0:40:23.919
<v Speaker 1>about how our our environments will adapt to us, which

0:40:23.960 --> 0:40:26.120
<v Speaker 1>is a great part of the Internet things. It's really

0:40:26.120 --> 0:40:29.319
<v Speaker 1>this magical kind of world. But it also means that

0:40:29.400 --> 0:40:31.160
<v Speaker 1>it needs to know who you are in order for

0:40:31.200 --> 0:40:33.160
<v Speaker 1>this to work. And if it knows who you are,

0:40:33.239 --> 0:40:35.680
<v Speaker 1>then maybe other people know who you are and they

0:40:35.680 --> 0:40:38.960
<v Speaker 1>may use it for good or for ill. And right now,

0:40:39.200 --> 0:40:43.400
<v Speaker 1>as it stands, we don't have like an incredible database

0:40:43.440 --> 0:40:48.360
<v Speaker 1>that has everybody's picture and everybody's identity. There are a

0:40:48.920 --> 0:40:52.719
<v Speaker 1>giant databases of that regionally, but it's not all linked

0:40:52.719 --> 0:40:56.120
<v Speaker 1>together yet. But I see that there's a note here

0:40:56.120 --> 0:40:59.239
<v Speaker 1>that's going to fill me with terror. Yeah. So this

0:40:59.320 --> 0:41:03.280
<v Speaker 1>new system the FBI is setting up will be able

0:41:03.320 --> 0:41:07.680
<v Speaker 1>to collect photos and other biometrics from civil sources. Um,

0:41:07.719 --> 0:41:10.520
<v Speaker 1>and what does that mean? That's a terrific question, y'all.

0:41:10.680 --> 0:41:17.320
<v Speaker 1>I'm not entirely share. Civil sources could include I suppose, um,

0:41:17.360 --> 0:41:23.880
<v Speaker 1>businesses that had taken fingerprints and and photographs. Um, if

0:41:23.920 --> 0:41:27.880
<v Speaker 1>those businesses choose to disclose that data to the FBI.

0:41:28.080 --> 0:41:31.160
<v Speaker 1>Could it include the Department of Motor Vehicles because that

0:41:31.160 --> 0:41:34.840
<v Speaker 1>would be everyone's driver's license. You know, that's a that

0:41:34.960 --> 0:41:37.360
<v Speaker 1>is a terrific question that I do not personally know.

0:41:37.440 --> 0:41:39.879
<v Speaker 1>The answer to um. But you know they'll they'll also

0:41:39.920 --> 0:41:43.400
<v Speaker 1>have that capacity to collect and retain images from certainly

0:41:43.400 --> 0:41:47.160
<v Speaker 1>from from crime crime scene security cameras for for later use.

0:41:47.239 --> 0:41:50.839
<v Speaker 1>So you know, even if you were just walking by

0:41:50.920 --> 0:41:54.319
<v Speaker 1>and would not have normally been called in, it's going

0:41:54.360 --> 0:41:57.440
<v Speaker 1>to be in their files. UM. I have a quote

0:41:57.480 --> 0:42:02.040
<v Speaker 1>here from their Privacy the Impact Assessment for the next

0:42:02.080 --> 0:42:06.920
<v Speaker 1>Generation Identification Interstate Photosystem from that was written in on

0:42:07.040 --> 0:42:10.800
<v Speaker 1>June nine of two eight. Actually so so a minute ago. UM,

0:42:10.880 --> 0:42:14.000
<v Speaker 1>kind of explaining what this civil business is a little

0:42:14.000 --> 0:42:16.359
<v Speaker 1>bit about. So you know part this, if you will,

0:42:17.239 --> 0:42:21.400
<v Speaker 1>Authorized non criminal justice agencies and entities will be permitted

0:42:21.480 --> 0:42:25.080
<v Speaker 1>to submit civil photographs along with civil fingerprints submissions that

0:42:25.120 --> 0:42:28.759
<v Speaker 1>were collected for non criminal purposes. These photos may either

0:42:28.800 --> 0:42:31.880
<v Speaker 1>be provided to the submitting agency by the individual or

0:42:31.960 --> 0:42:36.560
<v Speaker 1>taken directly by the submitting agency. Civil photos will supplement

0:42:36.640 --> 0:42:40.640
<v Speaker 1>the biographical information and narrative physical descriptions that are already

0:42:40.640 --> 0:42:45.280
<v Speaker 1>provided under existing practices. Yeah, that sounds a little ominous.

0:42:45.520 --> 0:42:50.000
<v Speaker 1>I mean that doesn't. That doesn't it doesn't about privacy. Actually,

0:42:49.960 --> 0:42:51.759
<v Speaker 1>it doesn't say a lot is it's a lot of

0:42:51.800 --> 0:42:55.799
<v Speaker 1>words that doesn't actually describe it sounds to me like

0:42:55.920 --> 0:42:58.799
<v Speaker 1>we can totally ask if you have this information, we

0:42:58.800 --> 0:43:00.719
<v Speaker 1>can totally ask for it, you can totally give it

0:43:00.760 --> 0:43:03.799
<v Speaker 1>to us, and then we'll have this enormous database. See

0:43:03.840 --> 0:43:06.480
<v Speaker 1>the issue that we bring up here, the reason why

0:43:06.520 --> 0:43:09.640
<v Speaker 1>this privacy issue is really important. And you know, again

0:43:09.680 --> 0:43:12.239
<v Speaker 1>there's always the argument of if you if you just

0:43:12.360 --> 0:43:15.719
<v Speaker 1>behave you don't don't do wrong, then but that's the

0:43:15.760 --> 0:43:19.680
<v Speaker 1>problem is who defines what is wrong. So if right now,

0:43:19.840 --> 0:43:22.560
<v Speaker 1>what is wrong means you know, you're obeying the law,

0:43:22.800 --> 0:43:25.160
<v Speaker 1>and the law is reasonable and the law reflects what

0:43:25.400 --> 0:43:29.200
<v Speaker 1>society feels is important, then that's one thing. But if

0:43:29.239 --> 0:43:32.240
<v Speaker 1>the law ends up changing where let's say, you aren't

0:43:32.280 --> 0:43:36.560
<v Speaker 1>allowed to uh to associate yourself with a certain political

0:43:36.640 --> 0:43:40.600
<v Speaker 1>group or a certain ideology, and then they're using these

0:43:40.600 --> 0:43:43.600
<v Speaker 1>sort of systems to identify people who do associate with

0:43:43.640 --> 0:43:47.279
<v Speaker 1>those things, that becomes a real problem. I think the

0:43:47.320 --> 0:43:50.200
<v Speaker 1>whole if you haven't done anything wrong, you don't have

0:43:50.239 --> 0:43:57.120
<v Speaker 1>anything to worry about. Argument against privacy is nonsense, false.

0:43:57.280 --> 0:44:00.400
<v Speaker 1>It just anyone who says that say to them, Okay,

0:44:00.440 --> 0:44:03.040
<v Speaker 1>can I read all your email now? I mean you're

0:44:03.040 --> 0:44:06.120
<v Speaker 1>not a criminal, are you? Yeah? I mean Obviously, people

0:44:06.160 --> 0:44:09.280
<v Speaker 1>have reasons for wanting privacy other than wanting to conceal

0:44:09.360 --> 0:44:12.719
<v Speaker 1>the fact that they've committed crimes. People, you want to

0:44:12.760 --> 0:44:15.439
<v Speaker 1>have some things that are kept private. You don't want

0:44:15.480 --> 0:44:18.600
<v Speaker 1>people knowing more about you than you want, then you

0:44:18.600 --> 0:44:21.520
<v Speaker 1>give them permission to to know. I mean, that's just

0:44:21.560 --> 0:44:25.560
<v Speaker 1>a sort of basic fact about human psychology. That's perfectly normal,

0:44:25.600 --> 0:44:27.799
<v Speaker 1>and we all feel it. I don't know anybody who

0:44:27.840 --> 0:44:29.719
<v Speaker 1>would be like, oh, yeah, you can just read all

0:44:29.760 --> 0:44:34.399
<v Speaker 1>my emails here, my text messages. Sure. And also, I mean,

0:44:34.520 --> 0:44:36.320
<v Speaker 1>you know, like I know that this is a pretty

0:44:36.360 --> 0:44:39.200
<v Speaker 1>common thing to to bring up in a discussion like this,

0:44:39.280 --> 0:44:41.560
<v Speaker 1>but you know, go back to the to the nineteen fifties,

0:44:41.600 --> 0:44:43.440
<v Speaker 1>the Cold War and the Red Scare, and the amount

0:44:43.520 --> 0:44:47.560
<v Speaker 1>of like weird blacklisting and stuff that happened to to

0:44:48.040 --> 0:44:51.120
<v Speaker 1>in courts, like legally in courts at the time. And

0:44:51.160 --> 0:44:53.080
<v Speaker 1>of course now most people are like, yeah, no, that

0:44:53.160 --> 0:44:55.800
<v Speaker 1>was our our bad are bad, sorry, guys, But yeah,

0:44:55.840 --> 0:45:01.160
<v Speaker 1>you know, you could see similar rumblings Host nine eleven too.

0:45:01.600 --> 0:45:03.880
<v Speaker 1>So that's the thing is that we cannot, you know,

0:45:04.120 --> 0:45:08.160
<v Speaker 1>we see these these these these dark sides of human

0:45:08.239 --> 0:45:12.080
<v Speaker 1>nature come up over and over again, given the right

0:45:12.200 --> 0:45:15.640
<v Speaker 1>set of circumstances, and uh, you know, when you get

0:45:15.640 --> 0:45:19.279
<v Speaker 1>a technology that enables a much more efficient means of

0:45:19.320 --> 0:45:21.879
<v Speaker 1>sorting people in that way, And of course, I mean

0:45:22.040 --> 0:45:25.239
<v Speaker 1>obviously there are some concerns there. So again the big

0:45:25.239 --> 0:45:29.240
<v Speaker 1>concern here, keeping in mind, technology itself is neither good

0:45:29.239 --> 0:45:33.759
<v Speaker 1>nor evil. It's how we employ application. So it's one

0:45:33.760 --> 0:45:36.080
<v Speaker 1>of those things that if we are responsible, if we

0:45:36.160 --> 0:45:39.120
<v Speaker 1>hold the people who have the keys to this technology

0:45:39.200 --> 0:45:42.640
<v Speaker 1>responsible and accountable, then we have a much better chance

0:45:42.800 --> 0:45:46.200
<v Speaker 1>of making sure it's being used in an appropriate way. Right.

0:45:46.239 --> 0:45:49.160
<v Speaker 1>And another thing about technology is I mean you can't

0:45:49.160 --> 0:45:51.759
<v Speaker 1>stop it. That's also true. We're not going to stop it.

0:45:51.760 --> 0:45:54.080
<v Speaker 1>It's going to happen. So it's better to set in

0:45:54.160 --> 0:45:58.880
<v Speaker 1>place standards for how it should be. Can't and say no, no, no,

0:45:58.960 --> 0:46:01.480
<v Speaker 1>we can't go there. Somebody's going to go there. It's

0:46:01.560 --> 0:46:04.600
<v Speaker 1>better to do it, right. Yeah. So here's the thing.

0:46:04.680 --> 0:46:07.200
<v Speaker 1>Now that we have these concerns, I'm starting to wonder,

0:46:08.160 --> 0:46:12.919
<v Speaker 1>are there ways to make my face undetectable? Um? Yeah,

0:46:13.080 --> 0:46:16.359
<v Speaker 1>I mean basically yes, yeah, I mean apart from just

0:46:16.440 --> 0:46:19.000
<v Speaker 1>like sticking knives in it and stuff. I yeah, No,

0:46:19.040 --> 0:46:22.920
<v Speaker 1>I don't necessarily recommend that Joe. Um, lots lots of

0:46:22.920 --> 0:46:25.359
<v Speaker 1>people are are working on that kind of thing. Um

0:46:25.360 --> 0:46:27.520
<v Speaker 1>that there's an artist by the name of Adam Harvey

0:46:27.560 --> 0:46:30.359
<v Speaker 1>who's gotten a lot of press for his ideas and

0:46:30.400 --> 0:46:35.280
<v Speaker 1>suggestions via his website, which is c V Dazzle. Um. Dazzle,

0:46:35.320 --> 0:46:38.840
<v Speaker 1>of course, being an old term for camouflage that was

0:46:38.960 --> 0:46:42.399
<v Speaker 1>used I believe starting during about World War One. Um.

0:46:43.080 --> 0:46:47.040
<v Speaker 1>He suggests not wearing makeup that enhances your facial features.

0:46:47.320 --> 0:46:52.480
<v Speaker 1>So cut out that terriffic HATI eyeliner, Joe. Um, partially

0:46:52.480 --> 0:46:55.680
<v Speaker 1>obscuring the bridge of your nose, partially obscuring your eyes,

0:46:55.920 --> 0:46:59.399
<v Speaker 1>creating asymmetry on the two sides of your face. Um,

0:46:59.840 --> 0:47:05.800
<v Speaker 1>you using makeup or hairstyling or accessories to create unfacedlike

0:47:05.920 --> 0:47:10.840
<v Speaker 1>and unheadlike shapes. Cut yeah, yeah, something like that. Sure,

0:47:10.920 --> 0:47:14.600
<v Speaker 1>and um and furthermore, being careful not to really overdo it,

0:47:14.719 --> 0:47:17.640
<v Speaker 1>which would make you more conspicuous to humanize. If I

0:47:17.719 --> 0:47:20.960
<v Speaker 1>walk out and I've got, you know, harlequin style makeup

0:47:21.120 --> 0:47:24.880
<v Speaker 1>so that facial recognition software can't tell it's me, chances

0:47:24.880 --> 0:47:26.800
<v Speaker 1>are someone else is going to look at me and say,

0:47:26.960 --> 0:47:29.319
<v Speaker 1>all right, well now, I'm even more alert to your

0:47:29.320 --> 0:47:31.480
<v Speaker 1>presence than I would have been otherwise. Sure, sure, And

0:47:31.640 --> 0:47:34.360
<v Speaker 1>you know certain things like like like masks are illegal

0:47:34.440 --> 0:47:38.279
<v Speaker 1>to wear around on the street in certain cities or

0:47:38.320 --> 0:47:41.879
<v Speaker 1>certain municipalities. Atlanta, Atlanta is one of those. I didn't

0:47:41.920 --> 0:47:44.480
<v Speaker 1>know that. I mean, I've never tried to just wear

0:47:44.520 --> 0:47:48.440
<v Speaker 1>a mask out when when Anonymous, when Anonymous were holding

0:47:49.160 --> 0:47:53.279
<v Speaker 1>various protests and they were getting together in public. You know,

0:47:53.400 --> 0:47:56.160
<v Speaker 1>the symbol of Anonymous is the guy Fox mask. And

0:47:56.160 --> 0:47:58.400
<v Speaker 1>there were quite a few places and I think Atlanta

0:47:58.520 --> 0:48:01.120
<v Speaker 1>was one of them where they were not allowed to

0:48:01.160 --> 0:48:05.320
<v Speaker 1>wear those masks. It was against the local laws. So

0:48:05.440 --> 0:48:09.680
<v Speaker 1>um yeah, there are there are cases of that, so

0:48:09.840 --> 0:48:12.120
<v Speaker 1>uh yeah, And I mean and lots of lots of

0:48:12.160 --> 0:48:16.480
<v Speaker 1>other folks are interested in designing technology to counteract the

0:48:16.520 --> 0:48:20.000
<v Speaker 1>sort of thing. Back in twenty thirteen, Japan's National Institute

0:48:20.000 --> 0:48:23.360
<v Speaker 1>of Informatics designed this pair of goggles that was fitted

0:48:23.400 --> 0:48:27.480
<v Speaker 1>with eleven near infrared LEDs, which made them invisible to

0:48:27.520 --> 0:48:30.480
<v Speaker 1>the human eye basically, but would confuse the heck out

0:48:30.480 --> 0:48:33.879
<v Speaker 1>of infrared sensitive cameras, which are often used in order

0:48:33.920 --> 0:48:37.440
<v Speaker 1>to capture images in low light situations, right exactly. Also,

0:48:37.560 --> 0:48:39.480
<v Speaker 1>it would mean that you wouldn't be able to buy cigarettes.

0:48:40.360 --> 0:48:44.200
<v Speaker 1>Of course, part of the problem is that as we

0:48:44.239 --> 0:48:46.920
<v Speaker 1>we come up with these techniques to disguise our faces,

0:48:46.960 --> 0:48:48.520
<v Speaker 1>I mean, whether or not we actually want to go

0:48:48.600 --> 0:48:52.319
<v Speaker 1>to those links. At the same time, visual identification technology

0:48:52.440 --> 0:48:55.280
<v Speaker 1>is probably just going to continue getting better and better.

0:48:55.320 --> 0:48:57.200
<v Speaker 1>I mean, it can get a lot better than it

0:48:57.360 --> 0:49:00.160
<v Speaker 1>where it is today. One of the things I thought

0:49:00.200 --> 0:49:03.560
<v Speaker 1>is going to improve obviously is wider diffusion of high

0:49:03.640 --> 0:49:07.320
<v Speaker 1>resolution imaging, because if it's trying to get your face

0:49:07.360 --> 0:49:09.719
<v Speaker 1>from a low res image, which a lot of security

0:49:09.760 --> 0:49:13.560
<v Speaker 1>cameras and things like that are fairly low resolution, it's

0:49:13.560 --> 0:49:15.719
<v Speaker 1>going to have more trouble. If if it can get

0:49:15.719 --> 0:49:18.719
<v Speaker 1>a better shot to work with, that's obviously more data well.

0:49:18.760 --> 0:49:20.719
<v Speaker 1>And also if it can rely on more than one

0:49:20.840 --> 0:49:23.920
<v Speaker 1>camera angle than that helps too because you get that

0:49:24.000 --> 0:49:27.480
<v Speaker 1>three dimensional look. Yeah, and as so as camera technology

0:49:27.520 --> 0:49:33.200
<v Speaker 1>becomes cheaper and more widespread, And as one thing, just storage,

0:49:33.239 --> 0:49:35.360
<v Speaker 1>I mean, you know how much data can you store

0:49:35.360 --> 0:49:38.839
<v Speaker 1>on these things. It's cheaper and easier to do more.

0:49:39.120 --> 0:49:42.960
<v Speaker 1>I can see that happening. Another thing is whole body recognition.

0:49:44.000 --> 0:49:46.479
<v Speaker 1>We all ever thought about this, Yeah, yeah, I've heard

0:49:46.760 --> 0:49:49.839
<v Speaker 1>I mean, like I said earlier in the podcast about

0:49:49.880 --> 0:49:52.560
<v Speaker 1>how Jonathan might be able to personally recognize you from

0:49:52.600 --> 0:49:57.000
<v Speaker 1>just your your stance. Yeah, exactly. So maybe the way

0:49:57.040 --> 0:49:59.560
<v Speaker 1>your body is shaped, your height, in the length of

0:49:59.600 --> 0:50:03.120
<v Speaker 1>your show older, is your build, your your posture, the

0:50:03.160 --> 0:50:06.840
<v Speaker 1>way you gesture. There was a study published in the

0:50:06.920 --> 0:50:10.399
<v Speaker 1>journal Psychological Science where a team led by the UT

0:50:10.600 --> 0:50:14.799
<v Speaker 1>Dallas researcher Alison Rice reported that seeing the whole body

0:50:14.960 --> 0:50:17.800
<v Speaker 1>is actually a pretty crucial factor in identifying a person,

0:50:18.000 --> 0:50:23.000
<v Speaker 1>especially when the facial data can is ambiguous. Um. So

0:50:23.160 --> 0:50:25.600
<v Speaker 1>they did a few experiments. They asked college students to

0:50:25.600 --> 0:50:29.560
<v Speaker 1>look at images of people who were somewhat difficult to identify.

0:50:29.760 --> 0:50:33.440
<v Speaker 1>So they were either two different people who look similar

0:50:34.080 --> 0:50:36.959
<v Speaker 1>or the same face, or the same person in two

0:50:37.000 --> 0:50:40.560
<v Speaker 1>different pictures where their faces looked fairly different, and they

0:50:40.640 --> 0:50:43.400
<v Speaker 1>judge these by having a computer algorithm look for the

0:50:43.440 --> 0:50:47.000
<v Speaker 1>ones that we're giving them trouble. Um. So the students

0:50:47.000 --> 0:50:50.239
<v Speaker 1>could judge identity pretty accurately when they were allowed to

0:50:50.239 --> 0:50:53.319
<v Speaker 1>look at the person's face and whole body, but not

0:50:53.560 --> 0:50:56.680
<v Speaker 1>when they saw only the faces. And the funny thing

0:50:56.760 --> 0:50:59.160
<v Speaker 1>was the students seemed to think they were relying on

0:50:59.280 --> 0:51:03.360
<v Speaker 1>faces to determine identity, but the researchers used eye tracking

0:51:03.440 --> 0:51:05.640
<v Speaker 1>software to show that they were actually looking at the

0:51:05.680 --> 0:51:09.200
<v Speaker 1>rest of the body basically for supplemental data when the

0:51:09.239 --> 0:51:13.200
<v Speaker 1>faces were somewhat ambiguous. And so the way this applies

0:51:13.280 --> 0:51:16.960
<v Speaker 1>to the software and hardware we're talking about is that,

0:51:17.040 --> 0:51:20.719
<v Speaker 1>obviously there's more data to account for. If you you

0:51:20.760 --> 0:51:23.319
<v Speaker 1>can take a picture of somebody's whole body, that gives

0:51:23.320 --> 0:51:27.239
<v Speaker 1>you a lot more to work with than just the face. Yeah, yeah, yeah,

0:51:27.239 --> 0:51:31.600
<v Speaker 1>these are the I mean, obviously, anything that's involving biometrics.

0:51:32.160 --> 0:51:35.279
<v Speaker 1>The ultimate answer here is that the more data you have,

0:51:35.400 --> 0:51:38.440
<v Speaker 1>the more sure you can be of the result. That's

0:51:38.480 --> 0:51:42.359
<v Speaker 1>exactly right. And one of the things is another advantage

0:51:42.400 --> 0:51:45.040
<v Speaker 1>that's going to be given to the people identifying you

0:51:45.080 --> 0:51:47.680
<v Speaker 1>in the futures that we're all giving up tons of

0:51:47.800 --> 0:51:50.160
<v Speaker 1>data right now. Yeah, I'm sorry, I was posting a

0:51:50.239 --> 0:51:53.960
<v Speaker 1>Facebook What are you talking about. We upload pictures of

0:51:54.040 --> 0:51:55.960
<v Speaker 1>ourselves and our friends and our family members and our

0:51:56.000 --> 0:51:59.399
<v Speaker 1>cats to Facebook and Google and et cetera basically all

0:51:59.400 --> 0:52:01.919
<v Speaker 1>the time, did it? Yes? Yeah, I mean I think

0:52:01.920 --> 0:52:05.400
<v Speaker 1>that doesn't it funny? We like complain about privacy and

0:52:05.400 --> 0:52:06.920
<v Speaker 1>then we do this, yeah, yeah, and then we do

0:52:07.040 --> 0:52:09.160
<v Speaker 1>we're like, check out this great vacation I had. Look

0:52:09.200 --> 0:52:12.640
<v Speaker 1>how awesome my look? Yeah, totally. The projected number of

0:52:12.719 --> 0:52:15.560
<v Speaker 1>photographs that the FBI is supposed to have in this

0:52:15.640 --> 0:52:18.600
<v Speaker 1>new database of THEIRS by next year, I think it's

0:52:18.640 --> 0:52:22.160
<v Speaker 1>something like fifty to fifty two million, and the number

0:52:22.200 --> 0:52:25.160
<v Speaker 1>of photographs that are on Facebook is like seven or

0:52:25.239 --> 0:52:28.839
<v Speaker 1>eight times that. It's easily Yeah, yeah, it's a lot

0:52:28.920 --> 0:52:31.759
<v Speaker 1>of photographs. Well, and keep in mind that we're talking

0:52:31.800 --> 0:52:36.160
<v Speaker 1>about facial recognition here, but there's also image matching algorithms. Right,

0:52:36.280 --> 0:52:40.160
<v Speaker 1>So if you end up being able to tap into

0:52:40.200 --> 0:52:43.880
<v Speaker 1>something like let's say that you get back door access

0:52:43.960 --> 0:52:47.560
<v Speaker 1>to the behind the scenes of one of these big

0:52:47.600 --> 0:52:52.280
<v Speaker 1>social networking sites where you can do a quick image

0:52:52.280 --> 0:52:55.480
<v Speaker 1>matching search of a of a picture you have versus

0:52:55.600 --> 0:52:59.920
<v Speaker 1>all the images that are actually contained within that social network,

0:53:00.239 --> 0:53:02.680
<v Speaker 1>most of which are tagged in some way or at

0:53:02.760 --> 0:53:06.400
<v Speaker 1>least are associated with a specific person, then you suddenly

0:53:06.400 --> 0:53:11.239
<v Speaker 1>have an incredibly powerful surveillance tools. Yeah, and there's there's

0:53:11.239 --> 0:53:14.839
<v Speaker 1>certainly concern um you know, from from activist groups among

0:53:15.000 --> 0:53:18.200
<v Speaker 1>many other human people. I think that it's similar to

0:53:18.280 --> 0:53:21.439
<v Speaker 1>how the n s A has definitely collected data from

0:53:21.640 --> 0:53:26.760
<v Speaker 1>these private organizations and businesses that for example, the FBI

0:53:27.080 --> 0:53:30.480
<v Speaker 1>might might also start tapping into that kind of thing.

0:53:30.680 --> 0:53:35.759
<v Speaker 1>So again, just not to scare everybody out there, not

0:53:35.800 --> 0:53:39.839
<v Speaker 1>to say, you know, never share anything ever with anyone. Rather,

0:53:40.080 --> 0:53:44.719
<v Speaker 1>again I'd like to to reiterate that the answer here

0:53:44.880 --> 0:53:47.719
<v Speaker 1>is that we hold people accountable, and we we do.

0:53:48.000 --> 0:53:51.160
<v Speaker 1>We demand transparency for the use of these kind of

0:53:51.160 --> 0:53:55.400
<v Speaker 1>technologies so that they are used responsibly because people are people,

0:53:55.560 --> 0:53:58.680
<v Speaker 1>you know, and and while we often will think of

0:53:58.719 --> 0:54:03.279
<v Speaker 1>these organizations as their own kind of sentient entities that

0:54:04.040 --> 0:54:07.880
<v Speaker 1>operate completely independently of the human uh you know, experience,

0:54:07.920 --> 0:54:10.479
<v Speaker 1>they're made up of humans. So we got to hold

0:54:10.520 --> 0:54:13.799
<v Speaker 1>them accountable and make sure that they're being responsible. And

0:54:14.120 --> 0:54:16.080
<v Speaker 1>there are a lot of ways that this technology is

0:54:16.120 --> 0:54:18.440
<v Speaker 1>going to be incredible and really help us out, like

0:54:18.480 --> 0:54:21.640
<v Speaker 1>in that Internet of Things scenario, but the way that

0:54:21.680 --> 0:54:23.520
<v Speaker 1>we get there is that we make sure it's being

0:54:23.600 --> 0:54:26.840
<v Speaker 1>used correctly. Yeah, so, so you know, educate yourself. Well,

0:54:26.880 --> 0:54:28.879
<v Speaker 1>I'll try to remember to to do a blog post

0:54:28.960 --> 0:54:31.440
<v Speaker 1>or something with some links for further reading, but you know,

0:54:31.880 --> 0:54:34.000
<v Speaker 1>get out there and be aware of what your local

0:54:34.160 --> 0:54:37.239
<v Speaker 1>and state and national governments are doing with your image. Yes,

0:54:37.320 --> 0:54:39.880
<v Speaker 1>it's it's important. Well, I hope you guys learned something

0:54:39.880 --> 0:54:42.680
<v Speaker 1>from this podcast. Make sure if you have any suggestions

0:54:42.680 --> 0:54:45.040
<v Speaker 1>for future episodes. Maybe you have a question that came

0:54:45.080 --> 0:54:47.360
<v Speaker 1>up during this episode, or there's just something else you

0:54:47.480 --> 0:54:49.000
<v Speaker 1>always wanted to know about. What is this going to

0:54:49.080 --> 0:54:51.040
<v Speaker 1>be like in the future. You should let us know.

0:54:51.360 --> 0:54:53.200
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0:54:55.920 --> 0:54:57.760
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0:55:01.120 --> 0:55:03.680
<v Speaker 1>our friend, Come and follow us, Come be part of

0:55:03.680 --> 0:55:06.280
<v Speaker 1>the conversation. Because you know we're heading to the future.

0:55:06.360 --> 0:55:08.560
<v Speaker 1>We don't want to leave you guys behind. So that

0:55:08.600 --> 0:55:10.920
<v Speaker 1>wraps up this episode and we'll talk to you again

0:55:11.360 --> 0:55:18.000
<v Speaker 1>really soon. For more on this topic in the future

0:55:18.040 --> 0:55:30.840
<v Speaker 1>of technology, visit forward Thinking dot com h brought to

0:55:30.840 --> 0:55:33.280
<v Speaker 1>you by Toyota. Let's go places,