Speaker 1: Hello, and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots podcast.
Speaker 1: I'm Tracy Allaway and I'm Joe. Wisn'tal so, Joe. We
Speaker 1: are on part two of our epic library series. Yeah,
Speaker 1: I'm this is I'm very excited about this series. I'm
Speaker 1: you know, I always learn a lot from doing these
Speaker 1: podcasts with you, but this is one area that I
Speaker 1: know is a incredibly important to the way the financial
Speaker 1: system works library and the transition away from it, and
Speaker 1: also an area that I don't know nearly enough. So
Speaker 1: I'm very excited that we are moving on to part
Speaker 1: two of this year. Yeah, and just as a reminder,
Speaker 1: if you haven't listened to the first episode, you definitely should.
Speaker 1: But we basically spoke about everything that went wrong with libror,
Speaker 1: sort of pre and post financial crisis, So just as
Speaker 1: a quick reminder, there was a huge library scandal. The
Speaker 1: idea of having banks submit the reference rate for basically
Speaker 1: an unsecured loan that would be made between dealer banks
Speaker 1: was really thrown into doubt and q OR. Fast forward
Speaker 1: to where we are today and there's a huge effort
Speaker 1: underway to try to replace libraor with a brand new
Speaker 1: reference rate, right and just I mean, I assume everyone
Speaker 1: should have listened to the first episode, but just a
Speaker 1: reminder why we care in part is because so many
Speaker 1: financial contract derivative loans, etcetera. Are priced in some way
Speaker 1: off this singular reference rate. And so when it was
Speaker 1: sort of everyone realized that the old one had flaws
Speaker 1: in terms of how it was constructed, and it was
Speaker 1: open to manipulation and so forth. There is now the
Speaker 1: effort underway to get all all these contracts and debts
Speaker 1: and everything else to price around new singular stand Yeah.
Speaker 1: So in this particular episode, we're going to focus on
Speaker 1: what that new reference rate is, and we have really
Speaker 1: the perfect person to talk about it, someone who's been
Speaker 1: covering the short term dollar funding markets for years now,
Speaker 1: and I've certainly been reading his research for years. It's
Speaker 1: Joe Abote, Barclay's analyst. Joe, thanks so much for coming
Speaker 1: on the show. Thank you. How's the library transition going.
Speaker 1: How would you characterize where we actually are at this
Speaker 1: moment in time. I'd say that we're making progress. Um,
Speaker 1: you know, within the last two years, we obviously decided
Speaker 1: on what kind of benchmark replacement rate to use. I
Speaker 1: think the challenge at this point is to get people
Speaker 1: to actually use it. We're seeing developments of in futures
Speaker 1: market and term rates that reference this. We've seen people
Speaker 1: start to issue off of the rate itself. But you
Speaker 1: know this is still, relatively speaking, early days in the process.
Speaker 1: You know, we need to see volumes in particular and
Speaker 1: a number of different sectors, whether it's issuing front in
Speaker 1: terms of borrowing, whether it's in terms of hedging. We
Speaker 1: need to see that activity pick up at this point.
Speaker 1: So I'd say early days, but hopefully optimistic. So just
Speaker 1: to back up for a second, we know that after
Speaker 1: after we sort of agreed upon that Libel couldn't be sustained,
Speaker 1: what are the regulatory demands and from whom were these
Speaker 1: regulatory demands made on the financial system to find and
Speaker 1: develop a new reference rate? So um, pretty much it
Speaker 1: was a global effort, but largely it came from out
Speaker 1: of the UK where they were regulating the p r
Speaker 1: A was regulating the live AR and you know, obviously
Speaker 1: they had done the work, you know, in terms of
Speaker 1: the identifying the deficiencies in the unsecured rate, and so
Speaker 1: you know they were leading the effort. It was adopted
Speaker 1: by the fellow reserve. I think back in two thousand
Speaker 1: and fourteen and the FED effectively convened a committee called
Speaker 1: the Alternative Reference Rate Committee, which then began work to
Speaker 1: find an alternative reference rate, and then once that reference
Speaker 1: rate was decided, the Alternative Reference Rate Committee would move
Speaker 1: to kind of the adoption phase, right, so speaking to
Speaker 1: end users, if you will, to get them to start
Speaker 1: using the new rate. So it's been a you know,
Speaker 1: to your point, it's been a multi multi year process
Speaker 1: begun with regulators. So the alternative reference rate that they
Speaker 1: eventually settled on, and we spoke a little bit about
Speaker 1: this in the first episode, but it's something called the
Speaker 1: Secured Overnight Financing Rate or s o f R. So
Speaker 1: for how did they settle on that one, and what
Speaker 1: in your view is the key difference between it and
Speaker 1: the predecessor LIBOR. They essentially gave the Alternative Reference Rate
Speaker 1: Committee marching orders and told them, you know, find a
Speaker 1: replacement rate. It must be based on transparent liquid and
Speaker 1: deep market um so that you wouldn't have a submission
Speaker 1: process as is the case with live OR, and there
Speaker 1: were certain rates that you were not allowed to use
Speaker 1: basically policy instruments, right, So you could use the FED
Speaker 1: funds rate for example, and you know, after much deliberation,
Speaker 1: the Alternative Refeinary Committee settled on the SOFA. And the
Speaker 1: key difference is that I think between sofur and libor
Speaker 1: are really threefold. Right. One is that the SOFA rate
Speaker 1: is an overnight interest rate, and of course libor as
Speaker 1: a three month rate with a forward looking component. The
Speaker 1: second is that sofur is a treasury repo rate, so
Speaker 1: again it's a secured funding rate and libor is an
Speaker 1: unsecured bank borrowing rate. And then the third element of this,
Speaker 1: which is tied to that, is the fact that libor
Speaker 1: incorporates bank credit risk, which is not present in sofur. Right,
Speaker 1: So as a treasury repo rate, essentially your boring money
Speaker 1: by pledging treasury collateral, it should be especially on an
Speaker 1: overnight basis, should be risk free. So again you have
Speaker 1: a credit component a term component that are not present
Speaker 1: in the in in in so fur. So you mentioned
Speaker 1: that the the sort of benchmark rate couldn't be just
Speaker 1: a pure policy rate, So we can't just say, oh,
Speaker 1: based on Fed funds, But isn't a system that sort
Speaker 1: of de facto if it's based on the repot prices
Speaker 1: and reposing credit free treasuries, isn't it. It sounds to
Speaker 1: me like kind of a backdoor policy rate. Nonetheless, I
Speaker 1: think that's correct. I think that, you know, so FUR
Speaker 1: moves in tandem with UH with changes in the policy rate.
Speaker 1: So when the FED cuts rates, so FUR goes down,
Speaker 1: and generally speaking, it goes down by about the same amount.
Speaker 1: I think the difference is that the FEDS policy rate,
Speaker 1: the FED funds rate, is based on a fairly small
Speaker 1: market and there's only effectively one lender in that market.
Speaker 1: You know, the FED doesn't want to tie its policy
Speaker 1: to a benchmark interest rate where it's possible in the
Speaker 1: future that, let's say the FED decides that the Fed
Speaker 1: funds market is too small and wants to use a
Speaker 1: different policy instrument. If all of these a hundred trillion
Speaker 1: dollars or so in terms of live or exposure for
Speaker 1: all of that was based on FED funds, you know,
Speaker 1: moving to a different policy rate would be a much
Speaker 1: more complicated issue than just deciding on, you know, the
Speaker 1: communications strategy that the FED is going to adopt. So
Speaker 1: I agree it's kind of a back door approach, but again,
Speaker 1: so far is based st on you know, a huge
Speaker 1: volume of transactions. One final point that I want to
Speaker 1: make too, is that in an ideal world, the FED
Speaker 1: has complete control over the FED funds rate in REPO
Speaker 1: and in sofur. The FED doesn't have complete control over sofur.
Speaker 1: It can influence sofur and is very effective in doing that,
Speaker 1: but you know, sometimes sofur moves um, you know, kind
Speaker 1: of independent of FED actions. I wanted to bring up
Speaker 1: exactly this point, which is, in September of last year,
Speaker 1: we saw REPO the REBO rate shoot up, and then
Speaker 1: we saw the sofur rate basically spike along with it.
Speaker 1: And there were some people at the time who made
Speaker 1: the point that maybe you don't want a reference rate
Speaker 1: that can be that volatile UM. What's your away from
Speaker 1: that experience? My takeaway from the experience is that yes,
Speaker 1: that you know, as I was saying before, you know
Speaker 1: so for if it can influence it but can't control it,
Speaker 1: you know, on a high frequency basis day by day.
Speaker 1: I think the volatility in the overnight sofa rate is
Speaker 1: a little bit misleading, in part because the expectation is
Speaker 1: that when people you know moved to a sofa world,
Speaker 1: they're going to be using an average of daily SOFA quotes.
Speaker 1: So you're gonna be looking at you know, whether it's
Speaker 1: a three month average, one month average, You're going to
Speaker 1: be taking that as as your benchmark reference rate as
Speaker 1: opposed to the overnight interest rate. So that should take
Speaker 1: some of the volatility out of the out of the
Speaker 1: overnight rate that you know people are concerned about. But again,
Speaker 1: you have to take an overnight interest rate and convert
Speaker 1: that to a term rate like library, which means that
Speaker 1: you're doing some averaging. The question is am I doing
Speaker 1: averaging from a backward looking perspective or am I doing
Speaker 1: the averaging from a forward looking perspective? And that's a
Speaker 1: key difference between libor and SOFER right where library is
Speaker 1: you know, kind of what do I think the average
Speaker 1: bank funding rate is going to be over the three months?
Speaker 1: If I'm looking at so FUR, I'm basically saying, you know,
Speaker 1: at least at this point, what's the average overnight interest
Speaker 1: rate over the past three months? Right, And that's a
Speaker 1: little bit different than libor. Mhm h Joe. I have
Speaker 1: a quick question and then a follow up question. The
Speaker 1: quick question is what is the official deadline? Remind me
Speaker 1: for when this transition is supposed to have been complete.
Speaker 1: So the official deadline for the end of publication of
Speaker 1: libra ar is December. Okay, So the longer question I
Speaker 1: have is explained to us the complexity why is it?
Speaker 1: And I you were just talking a little bit about
Speaker 1: it in terms of the depth of this market and
Speaker 1: the challenge of converting an overnight rate into a term rate.
Speaker 1: Talk to us about the specific difficulties of you have
Speaker 1: all these contracts that are denominated in lib or, why
Speaker 1: we can't just go through all the contracts, scratch out
Speaker 1: the line lieb or replaced them with so fur and
Speaker 1: the new world is here. Yeah, I mean, I wish
Speaker 1: it were that simple. Uh turns out and I where
Speaker 1: it's not. Otherwise we wouldn't even be having this conversation.
Speaker 1: But yeah, I mean, I think, first of all, there's
Speaker 1: a technological challenge, right that in many cases there's hundreds
Speaker 1: and thousands of different instruments or references that a single
Speaker 1: bank may have that refers to library. You can take
Speaker 1: the example of of an oil company, for example, where
Speaker 1: it's not really using libor as a boring rate, it's
Speaker 1: using it as a penalty rate for people who you know,
Speaker 1: hypothetically don't make a delivery, they have to pay a
Speaker 1: charge that's equal to libor plus five hundred, and you
Speaker 1: have to go through and find all of those references,
Speaker 1: which is a monumental task. The second element of this,
Speaker 1: I think is that when you look at most financial
Speaker 1: market contracts, they have not been you know, written with
Speaker 1: fallback clauses or adequate fallback clauses for situation in which
Speaker 1: live board doesn't exist. So you know, they were kind
Speaker 1: of developed without a replacement rate in mind. And because
Speaker 1: of that there are certain things that can happen. So
Speaker 1: if you had, you know, some contracts where you know
Speaker 1: the default assumption if libralar is not available, is the
Speaker 1: floating rate on your instrument becomes whatever the last posted
Speaker 1: libel rate was, and your security becomes effectively a fixed
Speaker 1: rate security. So let's say that you've hedged yourself, or
Speaker 1: you think you've hedged yourself against interest rate risk. You're
Speaker 1: now going to have an instrument where you know the
Speaker 1: final years of its maturity, it's fixed, and that interest
Speaker 1: rate is whatever happened to be the last posted libelry rate.
Speaker 1: So if we're in a super high interest rate environment
Speaker 1: at some point and you fixed it at whatever that
Speaker 1: rate is and rates fall, you're going to be experiencing
Speaker 1: payment shock of some kind. So I think that that
Speaker 1: that's the problem. And again it's a big legal challenge
Speaker 1: to kind of go through and write these or rewrite
Speaker 1: these fallbacks. And that's just that's floating rate notes. I'm
Speaker 1: not talking about mortgages or syndicated loans and things like that,
Speaker 1: where you know, in some cases you need to have
Speaker 1: a approval of all the investors to agree to change
Speaker 1: the coupon on a security. It's a much much bigger
Speaker 1: challenge than just cutting and pasting. Are there any operational
Speaker 1: risks in the meantime during this time when we're actually
Speaker 1: making the transition from libor to sofer? For instance, a
Speaker 1: few people have been to talking about the prospect of
Speaker 1: zombie libor, which is this reference rate that is sort
Speaker 1: of dead but basically still operational and haunting the market
Speaker 1: in many ways and might not be totally reflective of
Speaker 1: what's actually going on in funding markets. Is that a risk?
Speaker 1: I think it's a potential risk, although I think that
Speaker 1: regulators are you know, realizing that that's a challenge, and
Speaker 1: so you know, the they've been kind of recommending people
Speaker 1: put in kind of what's known as pre cessation clauses,
Speaker 1: and the pre cessation clause would basically, you know, kind
Speaker 1: of trigger itself in the event that regulators deem that
Speaker 1: libor itself is not a representative interest rate. Once that happens,
Speaker 1: you know, the expectation is that publication of library would cease.
Speaker 1: To your point about the zombie situation, you might have
Speaker 1: a scenario, let's say, where you know, regulators have said
Speaker 1: the rate is no longer representative, but it's still being published.
Speaker 1: So you now have kind of a published interest rate
Speaker 1: that people can you know, legally still use, but it's
Speaker 1: been deemed unrepresentative. And that that's kind of your zombie
Speaker 1: lib or situation. You know. Zombie libor in other cases
Speaker 1: would require banks to kind of continue to contribute to
Speaker 1: the libor panel. And I struggled to see situations in
Speaker 1: which banks would willingly contribute to uh AN index when
Speaker 1: they don't have to and when there's an alternative benchmark
Speaker 1: that other people are using. So to me, I think
Speaker 1: that zombie library risk is is a low probability, but
Speaker 1: you know there's probably other operational risk that we need
Speaker 1: consider that. You know, people are working on right now,
Speaker 1: so just in terms of hitting regulatory benchmarks in demands,
Speaker 1: how realistic are they in your view in terms of
Speaker 1: making this changeover and what other kind of forbearance or
Speaker 1: moves might regulators be forced to make, you know, in
Speaker 1: the coming months ahead to deal with the question of
Speaker 1: whether we can actually UH Sunset Library as planned. You know,
Speaker 1: you could probably make the case that there should be
Speaker 1: a legislative approach that prevents you know, a litany of
Speaker 1: UM lawsuits that could follow, you know, triggering of fallbacks
Speaker 1: and the replacement of the of LIB or we might
Speaker 1: see something along those lines UM in the future right
Speaker 1: to kind of speed the process along and to kind
Speaker 1: of prevent it from getting gummed up. Banks are probably
Speaker 1: the furthest along in terms of the transition and making
Speaker 1: the necessary language and fullbacks and things like that. I
Speaker 1: think the non financial sector is probably not quite as
Speaker 1: far along in this process, and you know that might
Speaker 1: require you know, more education and urgency from ARC and regulators.
Speaker 1: I'm not sure how that gets done, to be honest.
Speaker 1: How much does UM the creation of things like um
Speaker 1: SO for futures actually help, because I think the Creme
Speaker 1: has been rolling out those contracts UM and we've actually
Speaker 1: had a few trades. Does that help with adoption? I
Speaker 1: actually think it's necessary for adoption. Right. You need to
Speaker 1: drive it as market that you can rely on for
Speaker 1: two reasons. One is to develop that term forward looking
Speaker 1: so for rate that I mentioned earlier. The second is
Speaker 1: that you need this market to be able to hedge. Right,
Speaker 1: you need to be able to know that I can
Speaker 1: convert a series of floating rate payments into fixed rate payments.
Speaker 1: If I want to go in the other direction, you
Speaker 1: need to be able to kind of to your point earlier,
Speaker 1: I want to hedge against changes in FED policy, for example,
Speaker 1: so I want to be able to use an interest
Speaker 1: rate that allows me to do that. So the ruts
Speaker 1: market is absolutely crucial for adoption of SOFA. Just remember
Speaker 1: that the your dollar market is massive compared to the
Speaker 1: size of the actual underlying trades that go into lib or.
Speaker 1: So if you think about just the size of your
Speaker 1: dollar futures, and I think it's something like two or
Speaker 1: three million UH contracts that get traded on a daily basis,
Speaker 1: you compare that to what really am ouns to about
Speaker 1: a hundred and fifty million dollars a day in double
Speaker 1: a financial cp issuance. You get to see how the
Speaker 1: derivatives market is actually far more significant, at least in
Speaker 1: terms of size, than the actual cash market. In the
Speaker 1: case of Sofur, it's the opposite. We have a much
Speaker 1: bigger cash market, right, so for volumes about a trillion
Speaker 1: dollars and you know, something like I don't know, and
Speaker 1: I'm gonna probably gonna get this wrong, but a few
Speaker 1: hundred thousand contracts are trading on a daily basis, and
Speaker 1: so for future so again, you know, I think the
Speaker 1: perspective here is the same, which is that the cash
Speaker 1: market a lot of volume futures market needs to develop
Speaker 1: in order for the for broader adoption is so fur.
Speaker 1: So just talking about the transition and potential problems is
Speaker 1: halfhearted transition a place where we could see some difficulties. So,
Speaker 1: for instance, if a company is borrowing at a libor
Speaker 1: based rate but they're getting money from a SOFER based swap,
Speaker 1: that could end up being like quite a bad mismatch.
Speaker 1: I would imagine, does that come up at all? That
Speaker 1: comes up frequently. So the issue is particularly acute for
Speaker 1: certain types of banks, who's you know, lending activity is
Speaker 1: all based off kind of libor and their funding is
Speaker 1: also off of lib or if they have to start
Speaker 1: making loans off and so for, but their funding is
Speaker 1: kind of all off of library. There's a mismatch, you know.
Speaker 1: The the big concern that people have is that, you know,
Speaker 1: you've got a lending rate that implicitly includes a bank
Speaker 1: credit component, and you know, a borrowing rate let's say
Speaker 1: that's based off of a risk free rate. What happens
Speaker 1: in an environment, let's say where there's a flight to
Speaker 1: quality and people are piling into treasuries and repo and
Speaker 1: those rates are falling, but you're borrowing is all based
Speaker 1: off of lie or, and that's moving in the other
Speaker 1: direction because bank credit risk is going up and there's
Speaker 1: no easy solution to that. To be honest, you can
Speaker 1: again rely on the derivatives market to kind of hedge
Speaker 1: some of that. But you know, the concern that people
Speaker 1: have is that there's a mismatch there. And you know
Speaker 1: the answer to this is that there will be a
Speaker 1: market that develops and picks up volume to kind of
Speaker 1: offset that rally risk if you want to call it. That.
Speaker 1: There will be a cost associated with it. My dealers
Speaker 1: are going to charge people for that. But again, it
Speaker 1: does add to the cost of transitioning to sofer. Last question, Joe,
Speaker 1: because I know you have to go, but as all
Speaker 1: these issues crop up, doesn't make you maybe more sympathetic
Speaker 1: to the library process as it was like, maybe there's
Speaker 1: a benefit to having banks come up with interest rates. Uh,
Speaker 1: you know, clearly it's embedded in the financial system as well.
Speaker 1: But maybe maybe you can make an argument even that
Speaker 1: it's countercyclical. I'm being a little bit facetious by the
Speaker 1: way I suppose you could, But to be honest, I'd
Speaker 1: much rather have an interest rate that's based on transactions
Speaker 1: UM and transparent transactions that I can look at. I
Speaker 1: struggle because you know, I can look at REPO and
Speaker 1: I think I have a decent understanding of what, you know,
Speaker 1: are the factors that move and drive repo. I have
Speaker 1: little or no transparency into bank boring rates beyond what
Speaker 1: I can see in you know, the commercial paper market,
Speaker 1: and oftentimes I'm I see movements in library of you know,
Speaker 1: in some cases a couple of basis points, and I
Speaker 1: have no explanation for that move That to me, makes
Speaker 1: it a difficult benchmark interest rate to use. If you
Speaker 1: you know, if you can't understand why it's moving on
Speaker 1: a day by day basis so far. On the other hand,
Speaker 1: I can kind of get I kind of understand why
Speaker 1: it moves up and down. I may not be able
Speaker 1: to forecast it on a daily basis with precision, but
Speaker 1: at least kind of understand what's going on in that market.
Speaker 1: There's a lot less transparency and um, you know, in
Speaker 1: the markets that are underlying Library, and I don't want
Speaker 1: to get into the all of the details, but Library
Speaker 1: is increasingly relying on Level three submissions, which basically require
Speaker 1: inputs from various different markets and different waitings attached to them.
Speaker 1: So you're getting even less transparency in the submission process
Speaker 1: as the library moves further and further closer and closer
Speaker 1: to its um it's deadline. Well, Joe, I think that's
Speaker 1: a good place to leave it. Thank you so much
Speaker 1: for coming on the show. We really appreciate it. Thank you.
Speaker 1: Thanks sure, that was great. I learned a lot. I
Speaker 1: enjoyed that conversation. I know we got a little bit
Speaker 1: um detailed in some parts of it, but I think
Speaker 1: that's the way to go, given that so much of
Speaker 1: the transition away from Library is actually all about those technicalities,
Speaker 1: like how do you the contracts which never foresaw this
Speaker 1: notion that one day we would be moving away from
Speaker 1: live horror? Yeah, exactly right. I mean I do think
Speaker 1: like in my mind this idea that's like, okay, well,
Speaker 1: libra or roughly trades in line with every other interest
Speaker 1: rate most of the time, and so for more or
Speaker 1: less trading in line with policy rates except for some
Speaker 1: occasional deviation. So why can't you just swap them? And
Speaker 1: I thought Joe did a great uh job explaining why
Speaker 1: nothing is remotely that simple when you're talking about rewriting
Speaker 1: contracts that never had this kind of one step shift
Speaker 1: in mind. Right. And the other thing that this really
Speaker 1: puts me in mind of is that zombie librar ideas.
Speaker 1: So not only do you have a shrinking pool of
Speaker 1: banks that are actually submitting their library estimates, as Joe mentioned,
Speaker 1: but you also have those estimates getting priced off level
Speaker 1: three assets, which I don't know people remember, but those
Speaker 1: are the things that are the most difficult to sort
Speaker 1: of price. So there's this notion that library is getting
Speaker 1: sort of sketchier and sketchier while the entire world is
Speaker 1: still trying to get to a place where so far,
Speaker 1: so far is the default. Right? You know what, this,
Speaker 1: this whole transition debate really reminds me of tracing. Are
Speaker 1: you gonna see a bitcoin? I'm really worried? No, no, no, no, no, no, nothing,
Speaker 1: nothing like, okay, go on, what does it remind you? Um?
Speaker 1: You know how? Like ever, once in a while, like
Speaker 1: people will we talk about some social network and like, oh,
Speaker 1: Facebook sucks. Facebook takes our privacy and our Facebook whatever.
Speaker 1: Why can't we all just switch to something new? Or
Speaker 1: Twitter sucks? Why can't we switch to say new? And
Speaker 1: it never seems to happen. And the reason is like
Speaker 1: network effects of a thing that everyone coalesced around are
Speaker 1: not There's no easy way to just sort of like
Speaker 1: red folks like I'll just jump at it, because even
Speaker 1: if if half the people jump, then then each of
Speaker 1: the new networks is not have as valuable, They're much
Speaker 1: less valuable because, for obvious reason, network effects compound. That
Speaker 1: makes sense when people are all on the same thing.
Speaker 1: So many things that we like talk about in the
Speaker 1: real world were like this sucks. Why can't we move
Speaker 1: off it? Whether it's Facebook, whether it's Twitter, whether it's
Speaker 1: the struggles that we've seen of the entire world being
Speaker 1: dependent on the US dollar or for trade. And of
Speaker 1: course this essentially all come down with this problem of
Speaker 1: it's just not so easy for us all to jump
Speaker 1: at the same time onto the new thing, even if
Speaker 1: we could clearly identify the new thing is better. See now,
Speaker 1: I thought you were going to start talking about bitcoin
Speaker 1: because of course network effects where at played there when
Speaker 1: it came to cryptocurrency adoption. Well, I guess that there's
Speaker 1: that too, but you know, no need, no need to
Speaker 1: bring bitcoin. Okay, Yes, I feel kind of bad. All right,
Speaker 1: let's leave it there before um I say anything else.
Speaker 1: This has been an other episode of the All Thoughts podcast.
Speaker 1: I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me on Twitter at
Speaker 1: Tracy Alloway and I'm Joe wi Isn't all. You could
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