1 00:00:00,360 --> 00:00:04,080 Speaker 1: So everyone, this is one of our classic episodes, and 2 00:00:04,200 --> 00:00:08,280 Speaker 1: this is one of the episodes that appeared to unfortunately 3 00:00:08,360 --> 00:00:14,600 Speaker 1: become increasingly prescient. Yeah, m wraps hanging out on your street? 4 00:00:15,040 --> 00:00:17,760 Speaker 1: Is this the one about the seminole um rock band 5 00:00:17,800 --> 00:00:24,279 Speaker 1: the police becoming your army? No, but but somebody sure 6 00:00:24,400 --> 00:00:26,840 Speaker 1: was a smart alec when they wrote the meta for 7 00:00:26,880 --> 00:00:31,880 Speaker 1: this one. Yeah. Any time, anytime my dog on something 8 00:00:31,920 --> 00:00:35,560 Speaker 1: related to the show, it's usually my fault. But yeah, 9 00:00:35,720 --> 00:00:39,440 Speaker 1: this is this is a topic that you know, originally 10 00:00:39,520 --> 00:00:41,640 Speaker 1: we got we got a little bit of pushback about 11 00:00:41,880 --> 00:00:45,720 Speaker 1: we did an episode on the militarization of police, the 12 00:00:45,800 --> 00:00:51,760 Speaker 1: origins of that recent militarization, and a little bit of 13 00:00:51,800 --> 00:00:56,880 Speaker 1: speculation about the future and the economics behind this. Not 14 00:00:56,960 --> 00:01:01,800 Speaker 1: for nothing. Uh did Matt just shout out im wraps, Yeah, 15 00:01:02,160 --> 00:01:08,000 Speaker 1: M wraps grenade launchers. Uh? Serious, surplus headed to us 16 00:01:08,040 --> 00:01:11,560 Speaker 1: your not hopefully not doorway, but maybe around the corner, 17 00:01:11,800 --> 00:01:14,959 Speaker 1: just on the street sometimes. So sit back and you 18 00:01:14,959 --> 00:01:17,199 Speaker 1: don't have to but put on that red and blue 19 00:01:17,280 --> 00:01:21,440 Speaker 1: light and enjoy this episode from UFOs two Ghosts and 20 00:01:21,560 --> 00:01:25,560 Speaker 1: Government cover Ups. History is writ with unexplained events. You 21 00:01:25,600 --> 00:01:28,320 Speaker 1: can turn back now or learn the stuff they don't 22 00:01:28,400 --> 00:01:36,760 Speaker 1: want you to Now. Hello, I am Matt and I 23 00:01:36,760 --> 00:01:39,000 Speaker 1: am Ben, and this is stuff they don't want you 24 00:01:39,080 --> 00:01:42,640 Speaker 1: to know. Uh, and that's always we're with our super 25 00:01:42,720 --> 00:01:46,440 Speaker 1: producer Noel here, Noel, could we get some sirens or 26 00:01:46,480 --> 00:01:49,320 Speaker 1: maybe like the remember that Cops theme song? I'm pretty 27 00:01:49,320 --> 00:01:51,040 Speaker 1: sure we're gonna have any of those just in the 28 00:01:51,120 --> 00:01:55,120 Speaker 1: mix already. Oh, that's true. For anyone who's a long 29 00:01:55,160 --> 00:01:58,000 Speaker 1: time listener, you may have heard references now our show 30 00:01:58,080 --> 00:02:01,880 Speaker 1: or other shows to the sirens that occasionally come through 31 00:02:01,880 --> 00:02:06,320 Speaker 1: our super secret studio here, super super secret in the 32 00:02:06,360 --> 00:02:11,800 Speaker 1: middle of Bucket. Yeah. The neighborhood of Buckhead in Atlanta, Georgia, 33 00:02:11,919 --> 00:02:16,680 Speaker 1: for those who are not illuminated to this idea, is 34 00:02:18,240 --> 00:02:21,320 Speaker 1: full of cranky people. Yeah, it's a fair way to 35 00:02:21,360 --> 00:02:24,360 Speaker 1: say it. It is the I don't know, I guess 36 00:02:24,360 --> 00:02:28,840 Speaker 1: the financial district of Atlanta. Yeah. Yeah, it's kind of 37 00:02:28,880 --> 00:02:32,080 Speaker 1: like the Uh. They're right. There are some big businesses 38 00:02:32,120 --> 00:02:37,160 Speaker 1: here and some upscale areas, so one would think, hey, wait, 39 00:02:37,800 --> 00:02:41,240 Speaker 1: Matt and Ben, aren't police sirens more likely to be 40 00:02:41,280 --> 00:02:46,400 Speaker 1: associated with less wealthy areas well? The problem here is 41 00:02:46,440 --> 00:02:50,639 Speaker 1: that a lot of those sirens come from cops giving 42 00:02:50,720 --> 00:02:54,600 Speaker 1: people tickets for bad driving. Yes, there's lots of money 43 00:02:54,639 --> 00:02:58,520 Speaker 1: to be made from citations. I mean people to protect 44 00:02:58,560 --> 00:03:01,120 Speaker 1: from speeding drivers. Right, Well, there are also quite a 45 00:03:01,160 --> 00:03:03,919 Speaker 1: few drivers here. My car show host is coming out 46 00:03:04,040 --> 00:03:07,280 Speaker 1: who don't feel like they should need to obey the 47 00:03:07,360 --> 00:03:09,040 Speaker 1: rules of the road. There's no one on the road 48 00:03:09,080 --> 00:03:13,200 Speaker 1: but me and my Mercedes. Slash BMW slash whatever you 49 00:03:13,240 --> 00:03:17,400 Speaker 1: want to assert there. But for most people, just the threat, 50 00:03:17,680 --> 00:03:24,000 Speaker 1: the possibility of being punished by the police or cited 51 00:03:24,040 --> 00:03:28,480 Speaker 1: by the police, is enough of a deterrent that we 52 00:03:28,560 --> 00:03:32,000 Speaker 1: will pretend that those lines in the middle of the 53 00:03:32,080 --> 00:03:35,880 Speaker 1: road are something else other than paint. Right. The police 54 00:03:35,920 --> 00:03:42,040 Speaker 1: have a psychologically crucial role in the I guess, the 55 00:03:42,080 --> 00:03:46,119 Speaker 1: cohesion of a state, not just the United States. And 56 00:03:46,240 --> 00:03:50,320 Speaker 1: today we're talking about something that was um, that's an 57 00:03:50,360 --> 00:03:53,480 Speaker 1: idea that you had proposed force earlier, which was the 58 00:03:53,560 --> 00:03:58,600 Speaker 1: militarization of police. Well, yeah, the this topic is coming 59 00:03:58,680 --> 00:04:02,120 Speaker 1: up all over the place. I'm seeing links, tons of links, 60 00:04:02,240 --> 00:04:06,240 Speaker 1: especially on Reddit, about certain instances. There was one in 61 00:04:06,280 --> 00:04:08,640 Speaker 1: Georgia not long ago, I think it was the last 62 00:04:08,680 --> 00:04:13,040 Speaker 1: month where there was a no knock drug grade house 63 00:04:13,600 --> 00:04:16,159 Speaker 1: and a baby was sleeping in the room I guess 64 00:04:16,200 --> 00:04:18,240 Speaker 1: the living room with the rest of the family, and 65 00:04:18,680 --> 00:04:22,040 Speaker 1: flash band grenade landed in the crib. The child was 66 00:04:22,080 --> 00:04:24,320 Speaker 1: in a medically induced coma for a while. I believe 67 00:04:24,680 --> 00:04:28,520 Speaker 1: the child is out now the coma or I'm not 68 00:04:28,560 --> 00:04:31,760 Speaker 1: positive on that. I need to look back up and anyway, Yeah, 69 00:04:31,960 --> 00:04:34,720 Speaker 1: it's all over the place. The Cato Institute has been 70 00:04:34,760 --> 00:04:39,040 Speaker 1: talking about this what's the what's no knock grade is 71 00:04:39,120 --> 00:04:41,679 Speaker 1: when in the middle of the night, a swat team 72 00:04:41,839 --> 00:04:46,279 Speaker 1: or other form of paramilitary style police force breaks into 73 00:04:46,320 --> 00:04:50,279 Speaker 1: a home, usually just bust through the front door and 74 00:04:50,960 --> 00:04:54,960 Speaker 1: takes everybody, basically detains everyone in the house, and searches 75 00:04:55,000 --> 00:04:59,960 Speaker 1: the house. And that is typically or the thread the read. 76 00:05:00,000 --> 00:05:04,240 Speaker 1: Really it is based on intelligence that has been gathered, 77 00:05:04,760 --> 00:05:07,200 Speaker 1: so they're not just rolling the dice and picking a 78 00:05:07,320 --> 00:05:11,120 Speaker 1: house they believe. The problem is a lot of times 79 00:05:11,160 --> 00:05:15,560 Speaker 1: the information that they're given is maybe not perfect, or 80 00:05:15,600 --> 00:05:18,200 Speaker 1: perhaps they are raiding the wrong house. There are many 81 00:05:18,200 --> 00:05:21,880 Speaker 1: instances of the wrong houses being rated then a person 82 00:05:21,920 --> 00:05:23,679 Speaker 1: And so I know we're getting a little deep already 83 00:05:23,760 --> 00:05:25,919 Speaker 1: before we're getting into this bend. These are just the 84 00:05:26,000 --> 00:05:28,160 Speaker 1: things that have been on my mind. Yeah, I think 85 00:05:28,200 --> 00:05:32,240 Speaker 1: it's important to know why you wanted to cover this. UM. 86 00:05:32,520 --> 00:05:36,360 Speaker 1: I think it's just something that I don't potentially see 87 00:05:36,400 --> 00:05:40,560 Speaker 1: myself dealing with, cross crossing fingers, knocking out wood and all. 88 00:05:41,839 --> 00:05:44,839 Speaker 1: But it is UM a fear now I think that 89 00:05:44,920 --> 00:05:50,920 Speaker 1: exists across America, especially that the police might show up 90 00:05:50,920 --> 00:05:53,679 Speaker 1: for some reason, maybe just because they have wrong intel 91 00:05:54,160 --> 00:05:58,800 Speaker 1: and busting your house. Okay, So the transformation of perception 92 00:05:58,839 --> 00:06:04,160 Speaker 1: of the police UM a protective force to a uh, 93 00:06:04,400 --> 00:06:10,760 Speaker 1: punitive force. Okay. That's what's interesting here is that we 94 00:06:10,839 --> 00:06:15,400 Speaker 1: have these two groups, right, the police and the military. UH. 95 00:06:15,440 --> 00:06:19,640 Speaker 1: And in our video series this week, we've taken a 96 00:06:19,720 --> 00:06:24,479 Speaker 1: look at some of the intersections between the rights of 97 00:06:24,560 --> 00:06:30,280 Speaker 1: civilians or citizens and the rights and responsibilities of police officers. 98 00:06:30,279 --> 00:06:33,080 Speaker 1: We had Cany Record Police, one of our old episodes 99 00:06:33,680 --> 00:06:38,320 Speaker 1: updated as excellent remix and classic out there on Monday. 100 00:06:38,360 --> 00:06:41,440 Speaker 1: I think of this week, and we have another upcoming 101 00:06:41,480 --> 00:06:46,640 Speaker 1: episode which is going to be about this militarization of 102 00:06:46,680 --> 00:06:49,839 Speaker 1: police topic. We found a lot of interesting things while 103 00:06:49,839 --> 00:06:53,080 Speaker 1: we were doing UH. While we're doing this UM, one 104 00:06:53,120 --> 00:06:58,080 Speaker 1: of one of the easiest, most basic B level if 105 00:06:58,080 --> 00:07:02,080 Speaker 1: I could say that is way to differentiate between the 106 00:07:02,120 --> 00:07:05,320 Speaker 1: police and the military comes to us from a guy 107 00:07:05,520 --> 00:07:10,280 Speaker 1: named Radley Balco. Yes, he has a quote here. Well, 108 00:07:10,320 --> 00:07:12,400 Speaker 1: he's also it should be noted that he's the author 109 00:07:12,440 --> 00:07:14,880 Speaker 1: of several books. One of them is Rise of the 110 00:07:14,920 --> 00:07:18,200 Speaker 1: Warrior Cop, the Militarization of America's police forces, and the 111 00:07:18,200 --> 00:07:22,400 Speaker 1: other is Overkill The Rise of Paramilitary Police Raids in America. 112 00:07:22,760 --> 00:07:26,080 Speaker 1: And you can re Overkill for free online via the 113 00:07:26,160 --> 00:07:29,840 Speaker 1: Cato Institute. Nice and his quote that he has here 114 00:07:30,320 --> 00:07:31,800 Speaker 1: where I guess we're going to kind of get things 115 00:07:31,880 --> 00:07:35,600 Speaker 1: rolling with this. He says, quote, these are two very 116 00:07:35,640 --> 00:07:38,720 Speaker 1: different jobs. The role of police officers is to protect 117 00:07:38,720 --> 00:07:41,880 Speaker 1: our rights and keep the peace, while the military's job 118 00:07:42,080 --> 00:07:45,920 Speaker 1: is to annihilate foreign enemies. And uh, let's go ahead 119 00:07:46,000 --> 00:07:51,200 Speaker 1: and have the whoa hold on sound effect there? Thanks Noel, 120 00:07:51,680 --> 00:07:57,120 Speaker 1: everybody who objected to that differentiation by Balco, we understand 121 00:07:57,120 --> 00:07:59,840 Speaker 1: where you're coming from. It is it is an over 122 00:08:00,000 --> 00:08:04,640 Speaker 1: simplification to say the military's job is to annihilate foreign enemies. Uh, 123 00:08:04,760 --> 00:08:07,920 Speaker 1: some people would prefer something like something a little more 124 00:08:07,960 --> 00:08:11,880 Speaker 1: glass half full, like to protect America's interest abroad. Yeah, 125 00:08:11,960 --> 00:08:17,880 Speaker 1: well that's uh filled with something okay. Uh the role 126 00:08:17,920 --> 00:08:20,920 Speaker 1: of police officers to protect rights, keep the peace. Some 127 00:08:20,960 --> 00:08:23,720 Speaker 1: people would say, well, the role of police officers is 128 00:08:23,760 --> 00:08:28,040 Speaker 1: just to enforce the law and not necessarily to protect people. 129 00:08:28,440 --> 00:08:31,720 Speaker 1: But yeah, I think that it's it's sad that it 130 00:08:31,840 --> 00:08:34,880 Speaker 1: used to go without saying and it doesn't anymore that 131 00:08:35,080 --> 00:08:40,160 Speaker 1: both members of the military current and past, and uh, 132 00:08:40,320 --> 00:08:44,679 Speaker 1: members of police forces current past are also people who 133 00:08:44,679 --> 00:08:47,920 Speaker 1: would save innocent lives, you know, people who would save 134 00:08:47,920 --> 00:08:53,720 Speaker 1: criminal lives, honestly, absolutely, and the police and military, depending 135 00:08:53,720 --> 00:08:56,120 Speaker 1: on who you're talking to, referred to in this kind 136 00:08:56,160 --> 00:09:01,199 Speaker 1: of monolithic block figure, this entire group that you speak about, 137 00:09:02,000 --> 00:09:04,719 Speaker 1: uh if you know, if you're talking about them one 138 00:09:04,760 --> 00:09:07,720 Speaker 1: occurrence or something the way I did earlier. I kind 139 00:09:07,720 --> 00:09:10,160 Speaker 1: of talked about the police as this one thing, but 140 00:09:10,280 --> 00:09:13,080 Speaker 1: really it's just a group of individuals and each one 141 00:09:13,640 --> 00:09:16,360 Speaker 1: just as different from the last. So we kind of 142 00:09:16,400 --> 00:09:18,959 Speaker 1: have to remember that when we're talking about this subject. Yeah, 143 00:09:19,000 --> 00:09:21,480 Speaker 1: these are all human beings on both sides of this debate. 144 00:09:21,520 --> 00:09:23,680 Speaker 1: And one of the reasons that we take pains to 145 00:09:23,760 --> 00:09:29,280 Speaker 1: set this up is because the militarization of police can 146 00:09:29,320 --> 00:09:32,600 Speaker 1: be a controversial topic, and whenever you deal with the 147 00:09:32,640 --> 00:09:38,640 Speaker 1: controversial topic. One thing that unscrupulous opponents will do on 148 00:09:38,679 --> 00:09:41,239 Speaker 1: the other side of a debate to try to discredit 149 00:09:41,280 --> 00:09:46,240 Speaker 1: you or dissuade you is to rely upon emotional arguments, 150 00:09:46,320 --> 00:09:49,800 Speaker 1: you know, to say, uh, you know, like the wars 151 00:09:49,880 --> 00:09:53,920 Speaker 1: that people have been falsely led into hinged upon emotional things, 152 00:09:53,960 --> 00:09:58,640 Speaker 1: not on facts. So what we're doing is just talking 153 00:09:58,679 --> 00:10:00,320 Speaker 1: about the facts, and we want to get it out 154 00:10:00,320 --> 00:10:02,520 Speaker 1: of the way and say that we're not talking about 155 00:10:02,559 --> 00:10:07,320 Speaker 1: these people as just some group of faceless, mindless machines. 156 00:10:07,440 --> 00:10:10,840 Speaker 1: These are these are real people and in many in 157 00:10:10,880 --> 00:10:15,360 Speaker 1: the vast majority of cases, uh, neither members of the 158 00:10:15,400 --> 00:10:19,640 Speaker 1: military nor most police officers are responsible for the policies 159 00:10:20,000 --> 00:10:23,360 Speaker 1: that come down, right, These mandates been for for decades. 160 00:10:23,520 --> 00:10:27,400 Speaker 1: It's this difference has been rather evident between police officers 161 00:10:27,520 --> 00:10:31,240 Speaker 1: or the police force and military. And that's on all 162 00:10:31,280 --> 00:10:33,920 Speaker 1: kinds of different levels. You can look at the tactics, 163 00:10:34,200 --> 00:10:37,080 Speaker 1: you can look at their equipment, um, kind of the 164 00:10:37,120 --> 00:10:39,480 Speaker 1: methodology that they used to go about what they're doing. 165 00:10:40,080 --> 00:10:42,320 Speaker 1: And this diconomy ben was kind of taken as a 166 00:10:42,400 --> 00:10:48,360 Speaker 1: given basically, like there is there is an absolute underlying 167 00:10:48,400 --> 00:10:51,120 Speaker 1: difference between police and military, and we know that there's 168 00:10:51,120 --> 00:10:54,400 Speaker 1: some overlap to write. Both the police and members of 169 00:10:54,400 --> 00:10:59,080 Speaker 1: the military do differ from civilians in with some very 170 00:10:59,120 --> 00:11:03,640 Speaker 1: expectations as well and in practice at least different treatment 171 00:11:03,720 --> 00:11:05,920 Speaker 1: under the law. It could be something formal like a 172 00:11:06,040 --> 00:11:09,800 Speaker 1: military court that a soldier goes to, or something informal 173 00:11:09,920 --> 00:11:14,120 Speaker 1: like the infamous Blue line of loyalty where cops will 174 00:11:14,679 --> 00:11:18,240 Speaker 1: band together to protect another police officer. Well, and there's 175 00:11:18,240 --> 00:11:20,080 Speaker 1: a reason they do that a lot of times, and 176 00:11:20,080 --> 00:11:23,760 Speaker 1: it's because they're in harm's way almost constantly, well, a 177 00:11:23,840 --> 00:11:25,880 Speaker 1: lot of the time they're in harm's way, and that 178 00:11:25,920 --> 00:11:29,880 Speaker 1: could be because they're protecting themselves, protecting a civilian and 179 00:11:30,000 --> 00:11:33,319 Speaker 1: other citizen, or even you know, protecting you know, you're 180 00:11:33,520 --> 00:11:36,480 Speaker 1: really good friend perhaps who was also happening he happens 181 00:11:36,480 --> 00:11:39,560 Speaker 1: to beyond the police force. Sure, or there's you know, 182 00:11:39,720 --> 00:11:43,160 Speaker 1: let's not forget that mob rule is a thing that 183 00:11:43,200 --> 00:11:46,319 Speaker 1: can happen, and there are times when police are protecting 184 00:11:46,360 --> 00:11:49,880 Speaker 1: criminals so that they could have their do rights under 185 00:11:49,920 --> 00:11:54,680 Speaker 1: the law. And let's also point out that because of 186 00:11:54,720 --> 00:12:00,360 Speaker 1: the way that um entertainment disguised as news is often 187 00:12:00,400 --> 00:12:03,760 Speaker 1: presented to people, you're probably not going to hear about 188 00:12:03,800 --> 00:12:07,120 Speaker 1: a lot of the heroic stories which are often going 189 00:12:07,200 --> 00:12:09,600 Speaker 1: to hear about are going to be the bad guy cases, 190 00:12:09,720 --> 00:12:12,560 Speaker 1: you know, the one the someone who uh flipped and 191 00:12:12,600 --> 00:12:16,440 Speaker 1: went dirty for a little bit of side money off drugs, 192 00:12:16,679 --> 00:12:21,440 Speaker 1: or someone who committed a war crime because that sells 193 00:12:21,559 --> 00:12:27,040 Speaker 1: more advertising space. Right. Um, But we do know, uh, 194 00:12:27,280 --> 00:12:30,920 Speaker 1: we do know that in the United States, at least, 195 00:12:31,400 --> 00:12:34,600 Speaker 1: the concept of the separation between the police and the 196 00:12:34,679 --> 00:12:39,160 Speaker 1: military is a huge deal, and it's it's something that 197 00:12:39,240 --> 00:12:40,960 Speaker 1: a lot of people may have heard about for the 198 00:12:41,000 --> 00:12:43,680 Speaker 1: first time, but it is by no means the first 199 00:12:43,679 --> 00:12:46,920 Speaker 1: time that this has been a concern in the United States. 200 00:12:47,080 --> 00:12:51,760 Speaker 1: As a matter of fact, are older legislators that came 201 00:12:51,800 --> 00:12:54,880 Speaker 1: before US were so concerned about this that they passed 202 00:12:54,880 --> 00:12:57,600 Speaker 1: a law about it, right, That's right, the posse commentat 203 00:12:57,640 --> 00:13:02,400 Speaker 1: US Act of So this thing was basically designed to 204 00:13:02,480 --> 00:13:07,920 Speaker 1: create a clear division between the military and the domestic forces, 205 00:13:08,040 --> 00:13:11,839 Speaker 1: the police forces in the US. So, yeah, it says 206 00:13:11,920 --> 00:13:15,640 Speaker 1: that the US military. Originally it's aid the US military 207 00:13:16,000 --> 00:13:20,840 Speaker 1: uh cannot intervene in law enforcement operations, so domestic stuff 208 00:13:20,840 --> 00:13:24,360 Speaker 1: that the police would do. Um, no matter how bad, 209 00:13:24,920 --> 00:13:28,880 Speaker 1: Blockbuster may want you to return that blue ray, you 210 00:13:29,040 --> 00:13:32,680 Speaker 1: stole right before the store closed. They cannot send the 211 00:13:32,760 --> 00:13:36,120 Speaker 1: Marines after you. That is a comforting thought. I mean 212 00:13:36,240 --> 00:13:39,160 Speaker 1: that there still is like one Blockbuster open I think 213 00:13:39,240 --> 00:13:43,040 Speaker 1: I think it's in Alaska. Actually there's several. I'm sorry, Blockbuster. 214 00:13:44,040 --> 00:13:46,120 Speaker 1: Just a lot of these stories closed. Farbuster. I want 215 00:13:46,120 --> 00:13:47,640 Speaker 1: you to know that I would still be using your 216 00:13:47,640 --> 00:13:49,880 Speaker 1: store if you were open. I did until you closed. 217 00:13:50,160 --> 00:13:53,400 Speaker 1: Oh gosh, yeah, I brought it down. Sorry, man, So 218 00:13:53,520 --> 00:13:58,120 Speaker 1: now my best example. But this is not a uniform, um, 219 00:13:59,000 --> 00:14:02,120 Speaker 1: not a blanket law. Right. There exceptions, Oh yeah, there's 220 00:14:02,200 --> 00:14:04,920 Speaker 1: there are a couple of different exceptions. There's one provision 221 00:14:04,920 --> 00:14:08,560 Speaker 1: in there that says the law can be temporarily um, 222 00:14:08,600 --> 00:14:12,760 Speaker 1: I guess repealed for certain instances. And there's even a 223 00:14:12,760 --> 00:14:15,080 Speaker 1: waiver that the president can sign that can kind of 224 00:14:15,440 --> 00:14:18,640 Speaker 1: suspend the law. Yeah, like a hall pass for the 225 00:14:18,679 --> 00:14:23,920 Speaker 1: military to enter into the that's for emergency situations, right, 226 00:14:24,400 --> 00:14:26,920 Speaker 1: and you know it's I think it's been used twice 227 00:14:27,160 --> 00:14:31,880 Speaker 1: in the US. Yeah, least twice. Yeah, at least twice. Um, 228 00:14:31,880 --> 00:14:35,440 Speaker 1: probably more than that. Now that that comes from a 229 00:14:35,600 --> 00:14:39,560 Speaker 1: um House stuff Works article that our buddy Josh wrote 230 00:14:39,720 --> 00:14:42,960 Speaker 1: on the Delta Force. Right. Oh yeah, that's exactly I 231 00:14:42,960 --> 00:14:47,640 Speaker 1: remember that, and they're they're a fairly mysterious thing that 232 00:14:47,680 --> 00:14:51,640 Speaker 1: we should probably cover um in a future episode two 233 00:14:51,640 --> 00:14:56,240 Speaker 1: now that I think about it. So, critics of the 234 00:14:56,360 --> 00:15:00,240 Speaker 1: current trend between the police and the military tell us 235 00:15:00,280 --> 00:15:04,880 Speaker 1: that pretty much from the jump, Posse commatatas has been 236 00:15:04,960 --> 00:15:10,280 Speaker 1: under attack by various, various interest groups. And it is 237 00:15:10,360 --> 00:15:13,080 Speaker 1: true that over the decades, this Act has been changed 238 00:15:13,160 --> 00:15:16,280 Speaker 1: and there have been exceptions added, and a lot of 239 00:15:16,320 --> 00:15:19,680 Speaker 1: these either existed in the original Act, like the you know, 240 00:15:19,720 --> 00:15:23,480 Speaker 1: the National Guard and State Defense forces are under the 241 00:15:23,520 --> 00:15:26,640 Speaker 1: governor of a state, so those don't really apply with 242 00:15:26,720 --> 00:15:30,920 Speaker 1: Posse commatatas um, and then there are some added later 243 00:15:31,840 --> 00:15:37,760 Speaker 1: with the Insurrection Act during the Los Angeles riots, right, Yeah, 244 00:15:37,840 --> 00:15:41,320 Speaker 1: that was a huge one. And then gosh, there's one 245 00:15:41,320 --> 00:15:45,200 Speaker 1: where the Attorney General can request that the Secretary of 246 00:15:45,280 --> 00:15:51,080 Speaker 1: Defense provides emergency assistance if basically a civilian law enforcement 247 00:15:51,080 --> 00:15:55,760 Speaker 1: agency can't handle a situation there they have inadequate equipment 248 00:15:55,960 --> 00:16:00,840 Speaker 1: or forces. Um l a p D attack by Godzilla, 249 00:16:01,120 --> 00:16:03,520 Speaker 1: we can't handle that, well, yeah, or if there's a 250 00:16:03,600 --> 00:16:09,160 Speaker 1: real nuclear material threat that kind of thing, radiological weapons. Yeah, oh, 251 00:16:09,200 --> 00:16:12,040 Speaker 1: the military can also come in as a support role 252 00:16:12,520 --> 00:16:18,360 Speaker 1: for certain joints Special Operations Command stock Yeah. Uh yeah, 253 00:16:18,640 --> 00:16:22,000 Speaker 1: so people still to this day debate about whether or 254 00:16:22,000 --> 00:16:26,720 Speaker 1: not posse comitatus is being eroded, as well as the 255 00:16:26,760 --> 00:16:31,800 Speaker 1: specifics about how and when nation's military should be called 256 00:16:31,800 --> 00:16:38,240 Speaker 1: to act domestically. Um. So this militarization, right, So we've 257 00:16:38,360 --> 00:16:42,000 Speaker 1: established that there's a history of it, and in our 258 00:16:42,120 --> 00:16:47,040 Speaker 1: video we talked about the history of swat teams a 259 00:16:47,040 --> 00:16:49,800 Speaker 1: little bit, right, Yeah, if you want to learn more 260 00:16:49,800 --> 00:16:53,400 Speaker 1: about that, please go back and watch our videos. Um. 261 00:16:53,480 --> 00:16:56,320 Speaker 1: But okay, so long story short, the SWAT team became 262 00:16:56,360 --> 00:16:59,680 Speaker 1: really popular with the police and the public to an 263 00:16:59,680 --> 00:17:05,080 Speaker 1: extent and politicians. Uh. And that's because they there were 264 00:17:05,119 --> 00:17:09,080 Speaker 1: several highly publicized events where SWAT team was used and 265 00:17:09,760 --> 00:17:12,440 Speaker 1: they came out looking really good because they were effective. 266 00:17:12,520 --> 00:17:17,720 Speaker 1: They were fast and mostly effective. Right. Yeah. They became 267 00:17:18,200 --> 00:17:21,760 Speaker 1: sort of the next hot item. I mean the movies 268 00:17:21,840 --> 00:17:27,879 Speaker 1: involving swat teams, television shows. Uh. When they when they 269 00:17:28,600 --> 00:17:31,600 Speaker 1: first came out, which is towards the sixties, as we 270 00:17:31,640 --> 00:17:35,680 Speaker 1: talked about our upcoming episode, Uh, they had a fairly 271 00:17:36,440 --> 00:17:42,200 Speaker 1: narrowly defined mission and they operated in primarily urban areas. 272 00:17:42,240 --> 00:17:46,000 Speaker 1: So throughout the seventies there these they come out in 273 00:17:46,400 --> 00:17:50,360 Speaker 1: um probably the mid sixties as a result of, uh, 274 00:17:51,160 --> 00:17:53,840 Speaker 1: some problems that the l a p D was actually having, 275 00:17:54,040 --> 00:17:58,719 Speaker 1: not Godzilla related. Well, yeah, larger firearms being used by 276 00:17:59,160 --> 00:18:03,679 Speaker 1: criminals when they were trying to respond, body armor being used, 277 00:18:04,600 --> 00:18:12,000 Speaker 1: enormous racial tension getting very close to um a a 278 00:18:12,240 --> 00:18:15,359 Speaker 1: unrest that would be like a regional war. Yeah, full 279 00:18:15,400 --> 00:18:18,200 Speaker 1: scale writing was happening. Yeah, like a city war. So 280 00:18:19,480 --> 00:18:22,840 Speaker 1: gradually swat teams increase. You know, this large urban area 281 00:18:22,880 --> 00:18:26,040 Speaker 1: gets one, this one gets one. People are saying, oh, 282 00:18:26,040 --> 00:18:29,639 Speaker 1: finally we have someone for hostage negotiations or things that 283 00:18:29,680 --> 00:18:34,679 Speaker 1: are already on the brink of catastrophic violence. And uh 284 00:18:34,720 --> 00:18:38,640 Speaker 1: this worked in there. Not only their public perception continued 285 00:18:38,680 --> 00:18:41,880 Speaker 1: to rise, but more and more police departments looked at 286 00:18:41,920 --> 00:18:47,439 Speaker 1: these paramilitary units favorably. And then something crazy happened in 287 00:18:47,480 --> 00:18:51,600 Speaker 1: the nineteen eighties. Well yeah, right, well right before the yeah, yeah, 288 00:18:52,160 --> 00:18:55,359 Speaker 1: Nixon gave his famous speech or I guess it was 289 00:18:55,400 --> 00:18:57,720 Speaker 1: a little talking point that he added in about public 290 00:18:57,800 --> 00:19:01,320 Speaker 1: enemy number one being drugs and drug use. Then we 291 00:19:01,359 --> 00:19:05,000 Speaker 1: get to the Reagan administration in the eighties, and we 292 00:19:05,119 --> 00:19:08,000 Speaker 1: look at not that nothing happened in between those two, 293 00:19:09,160 --> 00:19:12,120 Speaker 1: because there are certainly things that happened, But that's during 294 00:19:12,119 --> 00:19:15,680 Speaker 1: the Reagan administration. We had all kinds of new funding, 295 00:19:16,080 --> 00:19:19,399 Speaker 1: new equipment. UM. I think in nineteen eight six, we 296 00:19:19,480 --> 00:19:23,000 Speaker 1: have a short clip of this. In ninety six, the 297 00:19:23,040 --> 00:19:28,320 Speaker 1: Reagan administration had increased the Drug Enforcement Agency and basically 298 00:19:28,359 --> 00:19:31,800 Speaker 1: War on drugs um amount of money they were spending 299 00:19:31,800 --> 00:19:35,560 Speaker 1: by three times at least from one to eighty six UM. 300 00:19:35,600 --> 00:19:38,800 Speaker 1: And that includes swat teams and all kinds of other 301 00:19:38,840 --> 00:19:42,199 Speaker 1: paramilitary police units all across the country. You know, I 302 00:19:42,280 --> 00:19:43,760 Speaker 1: just want to point out when you said not that 303 00:19:43,840 --> 00:19:46,560 Speaker 1: we're saying nothing happened in the seventies. What if that's 304 00:19:46,600 --> 00:19:52,760 Speaker 1: the phantom history. Nine seventies just didn't happen. If you 305 00:19:52,760 --> 00:19:55,880 Speaker 1: were born, then they lied to you, go go find 306 00:19:55,880 --> 00:19:59,160 Speaker 1: the hospital, asked for the original birth certificate. It goes 307 00:19:59,200 --> 00:20:02,040 Speaker 1: so deep, man, I am, I am so kidding. Please 308 00:20:02,080 --> 00:20:04,199 Speaker 1: don't do that unless you need a copy of your 309 00:20:04,240 --> 00:20:07,480 Speaker 1: birth certificate. But UM, yeah, that's right. That's a great 310 00:20:07,480 --> 00:20:13,159 Speaker 1: point in X. Reagan did issue this National Security Decision Directive, 311 00:20:13,480 --> 00:20:17,119 Speaker 1: and this is interesting because it calls drugs a threat 312 00:20:17,160 --> 00:20:23,400 Speaker 1: to US national security and national security all in addition 313 00:20:23,400 --> 00:20:26,639 Speaker 1: to being a legitimate concern for a country. In the 314 00:20:26,720 --> 00:20:29,520 Speaker 1: United States at least and in a lot of Western countries, 315 00:20:29,840 --> 00:20:33,359 Speaker 1: it's begun to function as this password for unlimited money. 316 00:20:33,480 --> 00:20:36,760 Speaker 1: It's like the Konami code. That's exactly what it is. 317 00:20:37,080 --> 00:20:40,480 Speaker 1: National security. Oh, thank you, I'll take all of that. Well, 318 00:20:40,480 --> 00:20:43,760 Speaker 1: so we really can't handle it national security. Okay, that's fine. 319 00:20:43,800 --> 00:20:47,000 Speaker 1: Here's seven more billion dollars. So yeah, that's that's a 320 00:20:47,880 --> 00:20:49,960 Speaker 1: I know we're being a bit tongue in cheek about it, 321 00:20:50,000 --> 00:20:53,720 Speaker 1: but it does, in this case at least unlock a 322 00:20:53,760 --> 00:20:57,720 Speaker 1: hell of a lot of funding. And the every uh, 323 00:20:57,880 --> 00:21:03,639 Speaker 1: everybody is cooperating to share information, equipment, tactics. We have 324 00:21:03,680 --> 00:21:06,680 Speaker 1: a little bit of a list of the different things, 325 00:21:06,800 --> 00:21:11,240 Speaker 1: uh that that we're pasted. Right, So we talked about Reagan, 326 00:21:11,400 --> 00:21:16,160 Speaker 1: but then, uh, in nineteen n some other stuff happened. Yeah, 327 00:21:16,200 --> 00:21:20,720 Speaker 1: Congress ordered the National Guard to assist drug enforcement efforts, 328 00:21:21,240 --> 00:21:25,680 Speaker 1: and and because of his order, National Guard troops today 329 00:21:26,080 --> 00:21:30,160 Speaker 1: still patrol for marijuana plants and assist in basically this 330 00:21:30,800 --> 00:21:33,560 Speaker 1: huge anti drug operation, and every state in the country 331 00:21:33,600 --> 00:21:38,880 Speaker 1: looking for the plants themselves. In nineteen eighty nine, President 332 00:21:39,000 --> 00:21:42,919 Speaker 1: Bush created a series of regional task force in the 333 00:21:43,000 --> 00:21:48,080 Speaker 1: d D Department of Defense just to cooperate, just to 334 00:21:48,160 --> 00:21:53,720 Speaker 1: facilitate cooperation, excuse me, between the military and police forces. 335 00:21:54,160 --> 00:21:58,359 Speaker 1: So how do we best coordinate uh this transfer of 336 00:21:58,400 --> 00:22:04,760 Speaker 1: equipment or vehicle weaponry, tactics training, Uh, people that were 337 00:22:04,760 --> 00:22:07,639 Speaker 1: on the lookout for you know, you can also if 338 00:22:07,640 --> 00:22:10,200 Speaker 1: you read between the lines here, clearly that's a comment 339 00:22:10,320 --> 00:22:13,160 Speaker 1: on wire tapping. Oh sure, well, and keep in mind 340 00:22:13,240 --> 00:22:15,760 Speaker 1: we're we're involved. The US is involved in all kinds 341 00:22:15,760 --> 00:22:22,479 Speaker 1: of narco wars all across Central and South America, and 342 00:22:22,480 --> 00:22:25,639 Speaker 1: it's the military performing all of those actions. So then 343 00:22:25,720 --> 00:22:28,760 Speaker 1: they're working directly with perhaps people and you know, if 344 00:22:28,800 --> 00:22:31,520 Speaker 1: anything gets inside the United States, they're trying to coordinate 345 00:22:31,560 --> 00:22:35,200 Speaker 1: with that. So then in the do o D issued 346 00:22:35,200 --> 00:22:39,240 Speaker 1: this memorandum that authorizes a transfer of equipment and tech 347 00:22:39,720 --> 00:22:42,360 Speaker 1: to state and local police. And in that same year, 348 00:22:42,480 --> 00:22:48,520 Speaker 1: Congress created the Reutilization Program, which essentially facilitated the handling 349 00:22:48,960 --> 00:22:53,800 Speaker 1: of military gear over to civilian and police agencies. So 350 00:22:54,240 --> 00:22:58,439 Speaker 1: if we look at specific numbers, what what does that mean? Exactly? Okay, 351 00:22:58,480 --> 00:23:04,480 Speaker 1: So just but between and nineteen seven the Pentagon distributed 352 00:23:04,600 --> 00:23:09,320 Speaker 1: three thousand, eight hundred M sixteens, two thousand, one hundred 353 00:23:09,359 --> 00:23:13,719 Speaker 1: and eighty five M fourteens, seventy three grenade launchers, and 354 00:23:13,960 --> 00:23:18,840 Speaker 1: a hundred and twelve armored personnel carriers to civilian police 355 00:23:18,920 --> 00:23:22,480 Speaker 1: agencies all across the country. Right one year alone, that 356 00:23:22,680 --> 00:23:26,480 Speaker 1: totals up to more than one point two million pieces 357 00:23:26,600 --> 00:23:30,439 Speaker 1: of military equipment. And this is just a brief history. 358 00:23:30,520 --> 00:23:33,080 Speaker 1: So we can now we can talk about the current 359 00:23:33,119 --> 00:23:36,080 Speaker 1: state of militarization. Because, as I believe we say in 360 00:23:36,080 --> 00:23:39,119 Speaker 1: our video, whether or not you are an opponent of 361 00:23:39,160 --> 00:23:41,879 Speaker 1: this you think it's bad, or you're an advocate of 362 00:23:41,880 --> 00:23:43,720 Speaker 1: it and you think that it's an effective way to 363 00:23:43,760 --> 00:23:48,480 Speaker 1: prevent crime. No one can deny that the police in 364 00:23:48,640 --> 00:23:52,840 Speaker 1: the United States and several other countries are increasingly militarized, 365 00:23:52,880 --> 00:23:55,439 Speaker 1: both in terms of tactics and equipment. Okay, man, So 366 00:23:55,520 --> 00:23:59,360 Speaker 1: let's look at the current state. We've talked about seventies, eighties, nineties. 367 00:23:59,680 --> 00:24:03,840 Speaker 1: Where are we right now. In a widely cited survey, 368 00:24:04,520 --> 00:24:08,720 Speaker 1: this criminologist Peter Kraska, he found that as of seven, 369 00:24:08,760 --> 00:24:12,439 Speaker 1: almost nine percent of cities with populations fifty thousand or 370 00:24:12,520 --> 00:24:17,200 Speaker 1: more had at least one paramilitary police unit. That's twice 371 00:24:17,240 --> 00:24:20,679 Speaker 1: as many in the mid nineteen eighties. And let's stroll 372 00:24:20,760 --> 00:24:23,400 Speaker 1: through some more numbers here. Uh, this is from the 373 00:24:23,440 --> 00:24:27,520 Speaker 1: Washington Post. Uh. The a c. L. You released a 374 00:24:27,600 --> 00:24:32,520 Speaker 1: yearlong study of this tendency and police forces looked at 375 00:24:32,520 --> 00:24:36,639 Speaker 1: eight hundred deployments of SWAT, special weapon and tactics teams 376 00:24:36,720 --> 00:24:40,600 Speaker 1: across twenty local, state, and federal agencies from two thousand 377 00:24:40,680 --> 00:24:45,080 Speaker 1: eleven to two thousand twelve. So statistically speaking, this is 378 00:24:45,280 --> 00:24:48,439 Speaker 1: pretty much fresh fresh out of the pizza oven, as 379 00:24:48,520 --> 00:24:51,720 Speaker 1: fresh as we can probably get, right. Uh. Sixty two 380 00:24:52,160 --> 00:24:55,520 Speaker 1: of those raids survey were to conduct searches for drugs, 381 00:24:55,920 --> 00:25:01,680 Speaker 1: not the narrowly defined uh, incredibly dangerous stuff. Now, of course, 382 00:25:01,720 --> 00:25:03,760 Speaker 1: these these people are putting their lives at risk when 383 00:25:03,800 --> 00:25:07,919 Speaker 1: they do this, but the uh, the interdiction of drugs 384 00:25:08,040 --> 00:25:12,200 Speaker 1: was not originally a SWAT team mission or even within 385 00:25:12,240 --> 00:25:16,080 Speaker 1: their realm. This is what we call mission creep um. 386 00:25:16,119 --> 00:25:19,560 Speaker 1: Just under eight percent were to serve as search warrant, 387 00:25:19,800 --> 00:25:22,040 Speaker 1: so that means eight and ten of these SWAT raids 388 00:25:22,280 --> 00:25:26,040 Speaker 1: were not initiated to get a school shooter or a 389 00:25:26,080 --> 00:25:30,360 Speaker 1: hostage taker and escaped felon, but to investigate someone who 390 00:25:30,440 --> 00:25:35,200 Speaker 1: is still suspected of committing a crime. Yeah, they sent 391 00:25:35,280 --> 00:25:38,720 Speaker 1: the big dogs to find someone suspected of a crime. 392 00:25:39,760 --> 00:25:42,639 Speaker 1: I mean, you know, suspected is a heck of word 393 00:25:42,720 --> 00:25:46,160 Speaker 1: because legally in the u s you're required to say suspectful. Yeah, 394 00:25:46,240 --> 00:25:48,240 Speaker 1: and and if you are able to get a warrant, 395 00:25:48,280 --> 00:25:52,719 Speaker 1: there's probably enough evidence against you to at least what 396 00:25:52,840 --> 00:25:55,720 Speaker 1: they believe to prove, right. Yeah. So you know, we're 397 00:25:55,720 --> 00:25:57,800 Speaker 1: not saying they're all good guys or all bad guys. 398 00:25:57,920 --> 00:26:01,000 Speaker 1: It's just their suspect. But what we are saying is 399 00:26:01,080 --> 00:26:05,520 Speaker 1: that some of the reasons that SWAT teams are often 400 00:26:06,000 --> 00:26:09,480 Speaker 1: justified right as a as an expense because it's expensive 401 00:26:09,520 --> 00:26:13,199 Speaker 1: to have such a high level of training, expertise, and equipment. Um, 402 00:26:13,240 --> 00:26:17,600 Speaker 1: the common justification is to prevent violent things from happening. 403 00:26:17,880 --> 00:26:20,760 Speaker 1: But it looks like, according to this a c LU report, 404 00:26:20,760 --> 00:26:23,560 Speaker 1: at least that just seven percent of those SWAT raids 405 00:26:23,600 --> 00:26:27,200 Speaker 1: were for hostages, barricades, or active shooter scenarios. So kind 406 00:26:27,200 --> 00:26:30,439 Speaker 1: of the original reasoning for having a SWAT team, just 407 00:26:30,560 --> 00:26:33,080 Speaker 1: in back in the day, the reason for their creation, right. 408 00:26:33,119 --> 00:26:36,080 Speaker 1: And additionally, we'll just launch, a list, a couple more effects, 409 00:26:36,280 --> 00:26:38,040 Speaker 1: and it's all again According to the a c l 410 00:26:38,119 --> 00:26:40,840 Speaker 1: you study, in at least thirty six percent of these 411 00:26:40,840 --> 00:26:45,760 Speaker 1: SWAT raids studies, no contraband at all was found. So 412 00:26:46,960 --> 00:26:52,240 Speaker 1: in you know, a home invasion, right or an active mission. Uh. 413 00:26:52,280 --> 00:26:58,919 Speaker 1: And not only not only do they not prevent violent crime, 414 00:26:59,359 --> 00:27:01,680 Speaker 1: which don't know, that's kind of unfair to say, Matt, 415 00:27:01,760 --> 00:27:06,119 Speaker 1: because it's really tough to say that someone didn't prevent 416 00:27:06,240 --> 00:27:12,200 Speaker 1: something negative, right, Yeah, but but there wasn't any you know, contrabants, 417 00:27:12,240 --> 00:27:17,000 Speaker 1: no illegal weapons or counterfeit money or drugs or something 418 00:27:17,040 --> 00:27:21,800 Speaker 1: like that. Uh. The scary part is that the the 419 00:27:21,880 --> 00:27:26,679 Speaker 1: a c l U estimates that, due to incomplete police reports, 420 00:27:26,800 --> 00:27:29,120 Speaker 1: this figure could be higher than thirty six. It could 421 00:27:29,119 --> 00:27:33,000 Speaker 1: be sixty. Um. Now, we do know that there are 422 00:27:33,040 --> 00:27:37,960 Speaker 1: other things that occur here, like swat tactics are disproportionately 423 00:27:38,040 --> 00:27:40,399 Speaker 1: used on people of color. If you just look at 424 00:27:40,400 --> 00:27:46,080 Speaker 1: the numbers, UM, there's usually fourced century swat deployments involved 425 00:27:46,119 --> 00:27:49,760 Speaker 1: a fourth century battering ram boot explosive device. Then in 426 00:27:49,800 --> 00:27:53,399 Speaker 1: over half of those raids, the police find failed to 427 00:27:53,440 --> 00:27:57,000 Speaker 1: find anything really any kind of weapon. Um. But the 428 00:27:57,000 --> 00:27:59,320 Speaker 1: presence of which is cited for the reason of these 429 00:27:59,400 --> 00:28:01,640 Speaker 1: violent attacks. So they they'll go in saying, well these 430 00:28:01,720 --> 00:28:04,239 Speaker 1: this guy's armed or this group is armed, but then 431 00:28:04,280 --> 00:28:06,679 Speaker 1: they won't find anything. And there's another question there that 432 00:28:06,720 --> 00:28:09,399 Speaker 1: goes back to the safety of the people conducting these things. 433 00:28:09,680 --> 00:28:13,080 Speaker 1: How do you know if they're not armed? Right? Well, yeah, 434 00:28:13,160 --> 00:28:15,320 Speaker 1: and if you think they may be armed, how do 435 00:28:15,359 --> 00:28:18,760 Speaker 1: you not go in guns blazing and throwing flash bangs. 436 00:28:19,600 --> 00:28:24,000 Speaker 1: So yeah, so this is our this is our overall 437 00:28:24,480 --> 00:28:28,919 Speaker 1: look with a little more detail about the nature of 438 00:28:29,600 --> 00:28:32,960 Speaker 1: militarization in this day and age in this state. And 439 00:28:33,240 --> 00:28:37,600 Speaker 1: when we return from a word from our sponsor will 440 00:28:37,680 --> 00:28:49,080 Speaker 1: get into some of the scarier conspiratorial stuff. Oh man, 441 00:28:49,120 --> 00:28:51,120 Speaker 1: I don't know if I can call these beats much more. 442 00:28:52,080 --> 00:28:54,120 Speaker 1: I s where beat farming is not what Dad said 443 00:28:54,160 --> 00:28:58,200 Speaker 1: it would be. They's just hard work all day, all night, 444 00:28:58,960 --> 00:29:02,600 Speaker 1: and then all the next day. Oh man, I wonder 445 00:29:02,640 --> 00:29:04,840 Speaker 1: what's on TV. Oh, can't watch TV. I got a 446 00:29:04,880 --> 00:29:08,360 Speaker 1: harvest rest of these beats. Oh excuse me, excuse me? 447 00:29:08,400 --> 00:29:11,080 Speaker 1: Their friends? What do you get in here? Well, you 448 00:29:11,120 --> 00:29:13,640 Speaker 1: have left the door opened, But never mind that I 449 00:29:13,680 --> 00:29:16,640 Speaker 1: would have rammed it down anyway. I couldn't help. But 450 00:29:16,840 --> 00:29:19,880 Speaker 1: over here on the wire tap that you're having a 451 00:29:20,040 --> 00:29:22,120 Speaker 1: you're having a tough time at your day job. What 452 00:29:22,120 --> 00:29:25,640 Speaker 1: what is that exactly? Well, I've been farming beats on 453 00:29:25,680 --> 00:29:28,800 Speaker 1: this farm, has been in my family of seven generations. Uh, 454 00:29:28,880 --> 00:29:33,240 Speaker 1: you know, yeah, it's a it's a noble profession for sure, 455 00:29:33,880 --> 00:29:36,560 Speaker 1: but it also seems like it could be one fraught 456 00:29:36,640 --> 00:29:38,960 Speaker 1: with problems. What what kind of problems do you have 457 00:29:39,280 --> 00:29:42,040 Speaker 1: farming these beats? Well, sometimes the beats are too close 458 00:29:42,080 --> 00:29:45,360 Speaker 1: together and they may make like a double beat harder. 459 00:29:45,720 --> 00:29:47,400 Speaker 1: It's harder for those to get him out. Some of 460 00:29:47,400 --> 00:29:50,360 Speaker 1: the machine yable malfunction. A lot of times there's not 461 00:29:50,480 --> 00:29:53,640 Speaker 1: enough water. That's one of the biggest problems. To be honest, Well, 462 00:29:53,760 --> 00:29:56,600 Speaker 1: what would you say if I told you that we 463 00:29:56,680 --> 00:29:59,920 Speaker 1: could not only fix your problems, but give you an 464 00:30:00,120 --> 00:30:03,200 Speaker 1: entirely new set of problems that you've never seen before. 465 00:30:03,640 --> 00:30:06,320 Speaker 1: To be honest, I'm not really interested much in that. 466 00:30:06,440 --> 00:30:11,840 Speaker 1: Maybe I can get a brochure. Just imagine instead of 467 00:30:11,880 --> 00:30:15,440 Speaker 1: this beat up old tractor, what if you had a tank, 468 00:30:15,800 --> 00:30:22,760 Speaker 1: a mind resistant ambush proof vehicle with armor. Now, now 469 00:30:22,760 --> 00:30:26,400 Speaker 1: you got my don't worry, You'll have armor too, and 470 00:30:26,640 --> 00:30:29,520 Speaker 1: those other beat farmers are going to be absolutely no 471 00:30:29,800 --> 00:30:33,560 Speaker 1: possible potential threat that they might someday be if you're 472 00:30:33,640 --> 00:30:37,280 Speaker 1: also armed with armor piercing rounds, because, believe me, friend, 473 00:30:37,560 --> 00:30:41,000 Speaker 1: those other beat farmers already have armor. Now do you 474 00:30:41,040 --> 00:30:44,520 Speaker 1: have any money? Yes, we have. We have so many minds. 475 00:30:44,520 --> 00:30:49,040 Speaker 1: We have mind launchers. Uh. Certainly, just from the military 476 00:30:49,200 --> 00:30:53,959 Speaker 1: surplus of the past four minutes alone, we have produced 477 00:30:54,160 --> 00:30:59,200 Speaker 1: enough armor and war grade weaponry to supply your beat 478 00:30:59,240 --> 00:31:04,160 Speaker 1: farm for decades to come. Are you interested, Well, that depends, 479 00:31:04,560 --> 00:31:07,160 Speaker 1: uh how much? How much are we talking here? Because 480 00:31:07,280 --> 00:31:10,800 Speaker 1: you know I don't exactly make a lot of money. Oh, yes, okay, 481 00:31:10,800 --> 00:31:14,400 Speaker 1: not to worry. Are you a terrorist? No? Do you 482 00:31:14,440 --> 00:31:21,240 Speaker 1: sell drugs? No? Then it's free. What yes, sir, that's right, 483 00:31:21,400 --> 00:31:24,520 Speaker 1: free just for doing your parts? Are you giving me? 484 00:31:24,880 --> 00:31:27,360 Speaker 1: I am not kidding. I am legally not allowed to 485 00:31:27,400 --> 00:31:30,800 Speaker 1: make jokes. Oh my god, I can't believe. I feel 486 00:31:30,800 --> 00:31:33,360 Speaker 1: like luckiest made in the world. Bring it in, boys. Oh, 487 00:31:33,400 --> 00:31:37,160 Speaker 1: we're also giving you an army. Oh the power. I 488 00:31:37,200 --> 00:31:40,680 Speaker 1: could feel the power. Yes, that's right. Whether you're a 489 00:31:40,760 --> 00:31:45,120 Speaker 1: law enforcement or librarian of beat farmer or anything between, 490 00:31:45,920 --> 00:31:50,080 Speaker 1: we two can help you here at Military Surplus FT 491 00:31:50,480 --> 00:31:53,960 Speaker 1: you've gotten gum and that stands for or the war. 492 00:31:54,640 --> 00:31:57,960 Speaker 1: That's right, So do your part it help us use 493 00:31:58,240 --> 00:32:02,240 Speaker 1: up this gigantic military surplus that we have built. The 494 00:32:02,280 --> 00:32:08,360 Speaker 1: American way, we just got too many tanks. Military Surplus 495 00:32:08,360 --> 00:32:09,680 Speaker 1: f t W dout GOV is not the part of 496 00:32:09,720 --> 00:32:12,280 Speaker 1: the United States government, the government of Mexico, Canada, the Bahamas, 497 00:32:12,400 --> 00:32:14,800 Speaker 1: or any other Gribbean nations. Military Cerplus ft W dut 498 00:32:14,840 --> 00:32:17,840 Speaker 1: DOVE is not legally a recognized charity Antonocracy donations. Military 499 00:32:17,880 --> 00:32:20,680 Speaker 1: Cyplus ft W DUCKUVE is legally barred from any comment, consideration, 500 00:32:20,760 --> 00:32:23,240 Speaker 1: or statement regarding privatized militaries. The International Criminical Cort, the 501 00:32:23,240 --> 00:32:24,880 Speaker 1: I S S, the U N or NBC brought to 502 00:32:24,920 --> 00:32:35,080 Speaker 1: you by Illumination Global Unlimited and we're back. Uh So 503 00:32:35,200 --> 00:32:37,520 Speaker 1: that's a little bit of a tongue in cheek commercial 504 00:32:37,640 --> 00:32:42,120 Speaker 1: for sure, but it leads us seamlessly into some of 505 00:32:42,160 --> 00:32:47,800 Speaker 1: the conspiracy theories about militarization of the police. Right now, 506 00:32:48,320 --> 00:32:51,800 Speaker 1: if you're the chief of a local police department, you 507 00:32:51,840 --> 00:32:55,240 Speaker 1: can kind of have your own military on a very 508 00:32:55,280 --> 00:32:59,720 Speaker 1: small scale, right, And that's what the opponents would say. Uh, 509 00:33:00,160 --> 00:33:02,120 Speaker 1: I guess Before we dive into this, one point I 510 00:33:02,160 --> 00:33:06,000 Speaker 1: do want to make is that for cash strapped police 511 00:33:06,040 --> 00:33:10,080 Speaker 1: precincts in rural areas or something, uh, this is a 512 00:33:10,240 --> 00:33:14,840 Speaker 1: gigantic boon. And indeed, it would be a little bit 513 00:33:14,880 --> 00:33:17,440 Speaker 1: thick headed to walk away from this because you know, 514 00:33:17,520 --> 00:33:22,080 Speaker 1: things like body armor and bulletproof helmets absolutely necessary to write. 515 00:33:22,760 --> 00:33:26,040 Speaker 1: But the one of the big conspiracy theories, of course, 516 00:33:26,400 --> 00:33:30,680 Speaker 1: is that there is a what Huffington's Post called a 517 00:33:30,760 --> 00:33:37,800 Speaker 1: police industrial complex, the idea that private corporations that manufacture 518 00:33:37,920 --> 00:33:41,560 Speaker 1: arms and weapons have made these big agreements with the 519 00:33:41,640 --> 00:33:46,000 Speaker 1: US government and that they're making military hardware that no 520 00:33:46,040 --> 00:33:49,560 Speaker 1: one actually needs. Well, yeah, you get the money. Somebody 521 00:33:49,600 --> 00:33:52,120 Speaker 1: has to take it now that we've manufactured it, or 522 00:33:52,160 --> 00:33:54,760 Speaker 1: else we just lost a whole bunch of money, and 523 00:33:55,040 --> 00:33:57,080 Speaker 1: then someone will notice and we won't get as much 524 00:33:57,120 --> 00:33:59,720 Speaker 1: money for our our budget next our next funding cycle. 525 00:33:59,840 --> 00:34:02,280 Speaker 1: Right Like, if you don't use the entirety of your budget, 526 00:34:02,600 --> 00:34:04,880 Speaker 1: then it looks as though you should get your budget 527 00:34:04,880 --> 00:34:07,520 Speaker 1: cut next year. You've got to increase the budget. So 528 00:34:07,840 --> 00:34:11,120 Speaker 1: the what's interesting about this theory is that there is 529 00:34:11,280 --> 00:34:15,840 Speaker 1: a there's a little bit of plausibility to it because 530 00:34:15,880 --> 00:34:19,240 Speaker 1: we know. One of the strange one of the strange 531 00:34:19,320 --> 00:34:24,600 Speaker 1: things about legislating an agreement that goes past, you know, 532 00:34:24,719 --> 00:34:27,400 Speaker 1: two or four years, is that the people who sign 533 00:34:27,480 --> 00:34:31,560 Speaker 1: it are often not in office to see what happens later, 534 00:34:31,680 --> 00:34:33,720 Speaker 1: see the effects of it, whether it's a good idea, 535 00:34:33,760 --> 00:34:37,959 Speaker 1: whether it's a smart one, whether there are too many 536 00:34:38,360 --> 00:34:41,840 Speaker 1: jets or not enough jets. And and this is something 537 00:34:42,080 --> 00:34:46,319 Speaker 1: that is a common concern in the world's militaries as well. 538 00:34:46,840 --> 00:34:48,600 Speaker 1: You know, if we just look at the F thirty 539 00:34:48,600 --> 00:34:53,480 Speaker 1: five debacle going on now, and then there's the and 540 00:34:53,480 --> 00:34:56,400 Speaker 1: then there's the other idea, a little bit more conspiratorial, 541 00:34:57,160 --> 00:35:03,600 Speaker 1: which is that maybe the companies themselves are pushing this 542 00:35:04,040 --> 00:35:07,400 Speaker 1: for a new market. Yeah. Have you ever heard of 543 00:35:09,120 --> 00:35:15,719 Speaker 1: Urban Shield Expo? Uh? I have. I don't mean to 544 00:35:15,760 --> 00:35:17,839 Speaker 1: say to that much of it that was good though 545 00:35:18,000 --> 00:35:21,799 Speaker 1: ractorial things. We mentioned this I think every year in Oakland, California. 546 00:35:21,920 --> 00:35:27,120 Speaker 1: Right yeah. This is where they essentially invite as many 547 00:35:27,160 --> 00:35:31,000 Speaker 1: police departments and sheriff departments of local police out there 548 00:35:31,520 --> 00:35:35,640 Speaker 1: and basically it's this huge expo think comic con, but 549 00:35:35,960 --> 00:35:41,040 Speaker 1: with military grade weapons for your police department, right yeah, 550 00:35:41,080 --> 00:35:46,600 Speaker 1: And these these vendors are advertising various various hardware, but 551 00:35:46,719 --> 00:35:50,880 Speaker 1: they're also training sessions on things like how to diffuse 552 00:35:50,920 --> 00:35:55,839 Speaker 1: a bomb or how to uh run point on a raid. 553 00:35:56,040 --> 00:35:58,920 Speaker 1: It's essentially it really is just a gun show with 554 00:35:58,960 --> 00:36:01,120 Speaker 1: more equipment, because if you've ever been to a gun show, 555 00:36:01,160 --> 00:36:04,200 Speaker 1: you know there's all kinds of things like training available 556 00:36:04,200 --> 00:36:07,840 Speaker 1: to you there. Well, now, let's talk about one of 557 00:36:07,880 --> 00:36:12,320 Speaker 1: the conspiracy conspiratorial ideas, because it's not just one idea 558 00:36:12,760 --> 00:36:18,040 Speaker 1: that is uh maybe the furthest from mainstream discourse, but 559 00:36:18,080 --> 00:36:21,160 Speaker 1: it's something that a lot of people are really worried about. Right, Yeah, 560 00:36:21,239 --> 00:36:23,680 Speaker 1: this this is the idea that the reason all of 561 00:36:23,719 --> 00:36:25,880 Speaker 1: these weapons are in the hands of the local police 562 00:36:25,960 --> 00:36:30,680 Speaker 1: is because the government or someone is preparing for mass 563 00:36:30,719 --> 00:36:35,480 Speaker 1: civil unrest. And this goes back to the FEMA camps theories. 564 00:36:35,480 --> 00:36:39,840 Speaker 1: This goes back to I mean there's so many the 565 00:36:39,920 --> 00:36:43,920 Speaker 1: ammunition buy up. Yeah, there are a lot of aspects 566 00:36:43,960 --> 00:36:45,880 Speaker 1: to this, and there are a lot of pieces. To 567 00:36:45,880 --> 00:36:49,120 Speaker 1: be honest, they're not necessarily connected at least to that 568 00:36:49,200 --> 00:36:52,120 Speaker 1: head of the octopus thing, but there are a lot 569 00:36:52,120 --> 00:36:57,439 Speaker 1: of interesting, let's say, happenings, right, Yeah, some I can't 570 00:36:57,440 --> 00:37:01,359 Speaker 1: remember who it was, it was either somebody on our 571 00:37:01,520 --> 00:37:05,000 Speaker 1: Facebook or our Twitter, which you can you can hang 572 00:37:05,000 --> 00:37:08,279 Speaker 1: out with us there as well, anytime you wish. Matt 573 00:37:08,320 --> 00:37:10,759 Speaker 1: and I are on there all the time. Uh. On 574 00:37:10,560 --> 00:37:14,400 Speaker 1: one of those somebody's somebody said conspiracy if I'm a 575 00:37:14,440 --> 00:37:18,759 Speaker 1: conspiracy theorist, or maybe you're a coincidence theorist. Yeah, oh man, 576 00:37:18,840 --> 00:37:21,600 Speaker 1: where was that? I think that was on YouTube? Maybe 577 00:37:21,680 --> 00:37:24,879 Speaker 1: I was on YouTube? Okay comment, Yeah that that made 578 00:37:24,960 --> 00:37:27,240 Speaker 1: me laugh and I thought that was a well written 579 00:37:27,280 --> 00:37:30,239 Speaker 1: turn of phrase. But yeah. We also have videos on 580 00:37:30,400 --> 00:37:33,840 Speaker 1: the Second Civil War, the people who wanted to succeed, 581 00:37:34,320 --> 00:37:39,200 Speaker 1: And that's really interesting because as you and I know, uh, 582 00:37:39,560 --> 00:37:43,520 Speaker 1: groups of people in the United States attempt to succeed 583 00:37:43,920 --> 00:37:46,719 Speaker 1: way more often than you would think, way more often 584 00:37:46,719 --> 00:37:49,600 Speaker 1: than you even hear about. Yeah, so much more often. 585 00:37:50,160 --> 00:37:53,760 Speaker 1: And uh, you know, around the United States alone, dozens 586 00:37:53,760 --> 00:37:56,920 Speaker 1: and dozens of apocalyptic groups think the world will end, 587 00:37:57,000 --> 00:38:00,760 Speaker 1: so they don't care what's gonna happen next year. Uh, 588 00:38:01,040 --> 00:38:04,120 Speaker 1: they don't care. I'm not saying they're violent by any means. Well, yeah, 589 00:38:04,200 --> 00:38:08,360 Speaker 1: you just when you lose, when you lose that desire 590 00:38:08,840 --> 00:38:11,920 Speaker 1: to live on for the next, for the future, what's 591 00:38:11,960 --> 00:38:16,200 Speaker 1: coming right, future. It's terrifying and and because and of 592 00:38:16,239 --> 00:38:18,000 Speaker 1: course when you think about it, it would be this 593 00:38:18,200 --> 00:38:23,959 Speaker 1: massive swell of problems if these succession movements were advertised 594 00:38:23,960 --> 00:38:27,040 Speaker 1: on the news, right, which is why we very rarely 595 00:38:27,480 --> 00:38:31,520 Speaker 1: hear about these active functioning groups. And it makes you 596 00:38:31,520 --> 00:38:35,640 Speaker 1: think maybe the news is controlled. Then yeah, well maybe 597 00:38:35,640 --> 00:38:39,200 Speaker 1: the news will succeed in uh start their own countries, right, 598 00:38:39,360 --> 00:38:42,520 Speaker 1: But then also you know the same thing will happen 599 00:38:43,000 --> 00:38:49,600 Speaker 1: in other large countries like China is constantly working to 600 00:38:49,920 --> 00:38:54,719 Speaker 1: keep these various disparate groups and territories united and to 601 00:38:55,000 --> 00:39:01,560 Speaker 1: quell rebellions, right, so those rebellions are off not advertised 602 00:39:01,560 --> 00:39:03,400 Speaker 1: in the Chinese news the way they are in the 603 00:39:03,480 --> 00:39:08,080 Speaker 1: United States. The Internet itself is controlled so much they're 604 00:39:08,440 --> 00:39:11,960 Speaker 1: trying to stop You saw the I forget. I think 605 00:39:11,960 --> 00:39:16,480 Speaker 1: it's a John Oliver piece maybe about the Genemen Square 606 00:39:16,600 --> 00:39:21,120 Speaker 1: protests that that happened every year. But the Internet is 607 00:39:21,160 --> 00:39:25,319 Speaker 1: controlled so heavily that they've actually blocked phrases, all these 608 00:39:25,320 --> 00:39:27,480 Speaker 1: different phrases that groups have been trying to put out 609 00:39:27,520 --> 00:39:30,680 Speaker 1: there to refer to the Tenement Square massacre, and now 610 00:39:30,760 --> 00:39:33,720 Speaker 1: all of them are blocked. You know, it's really strange. 611 00:39:33,920 --> 00:39:37,840 Speaker 1: I don't know if this is still the case, but um, 612 00:39:37,960 --> 00:39:42,440 Speaker 1: using in the past, using uh the Internet in some 613 00:39:42,520 --> 00:39:46,040 Speaker 1: parts of China, not only would it be monitored, but 614 00:39:46,120 --> 00:39:50,640 Speaker 1: there'd be these little like cartoon cop characters who would 615 00:39:50,640 --> 00:39:52,840 Speaker 1: show up and say, hey, you know, just for your safety, 616 00:39:53,239 --> 00:39:56,520 Speaker 1: keeping an eye on you. And the weirdest thing was, man, 617 00:39:56,600 --> 00:39:59,839 Speaker 1: the weirdest thing was they have blue eyes. So if 618 00:39:59,840 --> 00:40:03,080 Speaker 1: you ever get a chance to look up these characters, yeah, 619 00:40:03,120 --> 00:40:05,720 Speaker 1: this is my my One of my old professors pointed 620 00:40:05,760 --> 00:40:07,080 Speaker 1: this out and he and I talked about it for 621 00:40:07,080 --> 00:40:08,919 Speaker 1: a while, and I still don't know what's going on there, 622 00:40:09,239 --> 00:40:13,799 Speaker 1: but it is it is true that the possibility of 623 00:40:13,840 --> 00:40:20,040 Speaker 1: domestic unrest, it is a historic uh is it an 624 00:40:20,040 --> 00:40:23,279 Speaker 1: historic threat to any empire? And if you look at 625 00:40:23,440 --> 00:40:27,680 Speaker 1: just the size of the United States and the elements 626 00:40:27,719 --> 00:40:31,920 Speaker 1: that it brings together. I were I one of the 627 00:40:32,040 --> 00:40:34,960 Speaker 1: chess masters of the country, I would also be concerned 628 00:40:35,360 --> 00:40:39,799 Speaker 1: with domestic unrest and national security. You know, it is 629 00:40:39,800 --> 00:40:42,759 Speaker 1: a real thing. But a lot of people, Jane and 630 00:40:42,880 --> 00:40:47,000 Speaker 1: John q public are are very concerned that, uh, for 631 00:40:47,080 --> 00:40:50,080 Speaker 1: some reason, a group might come down on them. Uh. 632 00:40:50,280 --> 00:40:53,319 Speaker 1: The you know, if you look at what happened in 633 00:40:53,360 --> 00:40:57,080 Speaker 1: the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Uh. That raised a lot 634 00:40:57,160 --> 00:40:59,960 Speaker 1: of people's concerns as well. And I have to say 635 00:41:00,160 --> 00:41:02,520 Speaker 1: there there are quite a few things that John and 636 00:41:02,600 --> 00:41:05,080 Speaker 1: Jane Q public in the US might be a bit 637 00:41:05,120 --> 00:41:08,520 Speaker 1: ticked off about a ton of little things, a couple 638 00:41:08,719 --> 00:41:11,680 Speaker 1: really big things. And that's what we're gonna be talking 639 00:41:11,719 --> 00:41:14,439 Speaker 1: about next week. Well that's what we talked about every week, 640 00:41:14,520 --> 00:41:18,760 Speaker 1: isn't it. But we're gonna be covering some very specific things, um, 641 00:41:18,800 --> 00:41:22,279 Speaker 1: about the food we put into our bodies, about the 642 00:41:22,400 --> 00:41:26,400 Speaker 1: things that are added to that food. And it's a 643 00:41:26,480 --> 00:41:30,240 Speaker 1: highly controversial subject, but we're gonna look at it and 644 00:41:30,640 --> 00:41:34,280 Speaker 1: see what we can find. So in the meantime, we would, 645 00:41:34,360 --> 00:41:37,239 Speaker 1: as always like to thank you so much for uh 646 00:41:37,400 --> 00:41:40,440 Speaker 1: taking some time to check out our show. We are 647 00:41:40,600 --> 00:41:44,080 Speaker 1: overdue for listener mail episodes. Rings send some of those 648 00:41:44,120 --> 00:41:47,080 Speaker 1: to us if we haven't replied yet. Don't you worry. 649 00:41:47,160 --> 00:41:50,280 Speaker 1: We are storing these up and checking our list twice 650 00:41:50,360 --> 00:41:54,400 Speaker 1: like some sort of weird um duo Santa clause. I 651 00:41:54,440 --> 00:41:57,560 Speaker 1: don't know, yeah, yeah, the pieces of the Joker. I 652 00:41:57,560 --> 00:41:59,960 Speaker 1: have a huge external hard drive now that's just pumping 653 00:42:00,320 --> 00:42:02,719 Speaker 1: emails and stuff it's true. Yeah, and we do have 654 00:42:02,760 --> 00:42:06,360 Speaker 1: a naughty, nice algorithm, but that is not true. But 655 00:42:06,440 --> 00:42:09,040 Speaker 1: what is true is that you can find us on Facebook, 656 00:42:09,080 --> 00:42:11,400 Speaker 1: you can find us on Twitter. We have a website 657 00:42:11,400 --> 00:42:14,040 Speaker 1: where you can find all of our videos and all 658 00:42:14,200 --> 00:42:17,319 Speaker 1: of our podcasts. Will even into a blog occasionally. Our 659 00:42:17,400 --> 00:42:20,319 Speaker 1: website is Stuff they Don't Want You to Know dot Com. 660 00:42:20,360 --> 00:42:23,360 Speaker 1: And that's the end of this classic episode. If you 661 00:42:23,440 --> 00:42:27,520 Speaker 1: have any thoughts or questions about this episode, you can 662 00:42:27,520 --> 00:42:30,120 Speaker 1: get into contact with us in a number of different ways. 663 00:42:30,320 --> 00:42:31,879 Speaker 1: One of the best is to give us a call. 664 00:42:31,920 --> 00:42:35,680 Speaker 1: Our number is one eight three three std w y 665 00:42:35,760 --> 00:42:37,920 Speaker 1: t K. If you don't want to do that, you 666 00:42:37,960 --> 00:42:40,440 Speaker 1: can send us a good old fashioned email. We are 667 00:42:40,680 --> 00:42:45,080 Speaker 1: conspiracy at i heart radio dot com. Stuff they Don't 668 00:42:45,080 --> 00:42:47,640 Speaker 1: Want You to Know is a production of I heart Radio. 669 00:42:47,960 --> 00:42:50,200 Speaker 1: For more podcasts from my heart Radio, visit the i 670 00:42:50,280 --> 00:42:53,200 Speaker 1: heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to 671 00:42:53,200 --> 00:42:54,040 Speaker 1: your favorite shows.