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Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

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Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 1: learn this stuff they don't want you to know. A

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Speaker 1: production of iHeartRadio.

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Speaker 2: Hello, and welcome back to the show. My name is Noel.

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Speaker 3: Our colleague Matt is on adventures and will be returning soon.

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Speaker 3: They called me Ben. We're joined as always with our

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Speaker 3: super producer Dylan the Tennessee pal Facan. Most importantly, you

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Speaker 3: are here. That makes this the stuff they don't want

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Speaker 3: you to know. Noel, you and Dylan and I were

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Speaker 3: talking a little bit off air before we started rolling

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Speaker 3: about a seminal spy show called The Americans, and I

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Speaker 3: think you said you've been meaning to watch it.

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Speaker 2: It's on my list.

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Speaker 4: There's been such a glut of really great spy shows

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Speaker 4: and movies as of late, and it brought that one

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Speaker 4: back up for me. But like you know, I just

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Speaker 4: saw a black bag in the theater. It's is very

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Speaker 4: Tinker Taylor Soldier spy kind of vibe. And The Americans,

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Speaker 4: I believe it's an FX series from gosh, it's probably

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Speaker 4: ten years.

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Speaker 2: I always have spoken on very very highly.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, I was surprised by how much I enjoyed

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Speaker 3: The Americans, and I've got to check out Black Bag

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Speaker 3: that's on my list as well. But you're you're absolutely

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Speaker 3: correct there has been this uptick in espionage story spy

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Speaker 3: thrillers because they're great, you know, they're they're candy for

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Speaker 3: the mind. Even now as we realize a lot of

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Speaker 3: spy stuff that you read in fiction or you see

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Speaker 3: in film, it's entertaining, but it's not real mostly well, and.

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Speaker 4: I think we positive, maybe even on our recent episode

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Speaker 4: on why so many spies are getting caught, that may

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Speaker 4: will be a crossover between the zeitgeist of the spy

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Speaker 4: thriller and all of this kind of you know, spies

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Speaker 4: in the news of late Yeah.

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Speaker 3: I think you're absolutely onto something there, because maybe the

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Speaker 3: real world events are informing what we see in fiction.

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Speaker 3: And as a result, we got together, you and Matt

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Speaker 3: and I were talking about providing at least one example

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Speaker 3: of a genuine blockbuster spy conspiracy, the type of thing

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Speaker 3: that should ordinarily only exist in the world of fiction.

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Speaker 3: But we're going to dive into the true events that

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Speaker 3: inspired the hit TV show The Americans. This is the

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Speaker 3: tale of Operation Ghost Stories.

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Speaker 4: What a cool name right, so, but spooky, let's take

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Speaker 4: a quick worry from our sponsor and will jump right in.

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Speaker 3: Here are the facts. Would you ever be a sleeper agent?

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Speaker 2: I would be a sleepy agent?

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Speaker 3: Me too, man, he too especially great?

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Speaker 2: Yeah, I think so.

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Speaker 4: It seems like a lot of trouble, a lot of effort,

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Speaker 4: you know, for potentially just getting killed and then disavowed exactly.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, it's a high risk and we don't know whether

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Speaker 3: there are high rewards. To understand the depth of this

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Speaker 3: bizarre story, we have to talk about what it means

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Speaker 3: to actually be a sleeper agent. James Bond is not

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Speaker 3: this kind of person.

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Speaker 4: James Bond was in it for the babes man like

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Speaker 4: almost entirely. He wasn't even a very good spot like

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Speaker 4: in the movies anyway, right.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, he was terrible. He was going around. First off,

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Speaker 3: he was dat he was drinking constantly, if you've ever

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Speaker 3: seen the studies of how often he drinks in film.

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Speaker 3: And then he was telling everybody his real name all

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Speaker 3: the time.

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Speaker 4: And maybe he thought maybe he could confuse the movie

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Speaker 4: said the last name first, and then the Bond James Bond.

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Speaker 2: Wait a minute, who is this person?

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Speaker 3: To your point, He was also very sloppy in his

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Speaker 3: personal behavior, hitting on anything with a pulse, which.

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Speaker 4: Guy had mad STDs, just saying he was spreading them around.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, it's really hopefully was using protection, but that's a

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Speaker 3: great point he hit.

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Speaker 4: Protection for him would be his sweet little nine millimeters.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, and this we're bringing up this, you know, most

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Speaker 3: famous of fictional spies, because we want to contrast it

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Speaker 3: with actual sleeper agents. These folks put so much effort

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Speaker 3: into appearing really boring, like super if Beije was a person.

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Speaker 3: They want to be a beige.

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Speaker 2: All right, for sure.

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Speaker 4: It's the whole ability to blend in and really quickly

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Speaker 4: lest some James bond heads in the crowd yell at me.

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Speaker 2: James didn't use a nine millimeter.

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Speaker 4: He used a Walter PP that really cool little compact

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Speaker 4: gun that he was always posing, you know he was using.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, out of all his gadgets, he loved that little gun.

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Speaker 2: Really. Yeah.

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Speaker 3: These these sleeper agents, they infiltrate communities and workplaces. They

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Speaker 3: go about a day to day list of routines and

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Speaker 3: activities just the same way anybody else would. And because

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Speaker 3: they're here's the thing, they're usually not doing any spy

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Speaker 3: stuff for years or decades.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, that's right. They are playing the long game very slowly.

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Speaker 4: As we mentioned in our recent Spy episode or Spies

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Speaker 4: Getting Caught episode. They move their way through the ranks

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Speaker 4: of society, whether it be socially or you know, flitting

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Speaker 4: around between different government or industrial circles and just trying

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Speaker 4: to you know, win friends and influence people.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, and then years or decades down the road, once

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Speaker 3: they've established all these relationships and associations and connections, they

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Speaker 3: might get a signal and should the need arise, they

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Speaker 3: can be activated by their handler.

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Speaker 2: Yeah.

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Speaker 4: And this isn't Mansheurian candidate type activation though, who knows,

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Speaker 4: maybe that is a thing. But this is literally some

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Speaker 4: sort of covert message that has transmitted to this individual

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Speaker 4: that causes them to leap into the endgame portion of

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Speaker 4: their plan, whether it be acquiring some sort of device

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Speaker 4: you know, photographs, compromant, whatever.

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Speaker 3: Right, Yeah, it could be as simple as actively surveilling

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Speaker 3: a target, or like you said, getting maybe the new

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Speaker 3: plans for a jet or some other needo gadget. May

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Speaker 3: nuclear technology for sure, Yeah, that's a great example. Or

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Speaker 3: internal records from a government agency at the more extreme

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Speaker 3: end of the spectrum. They might be assigned to terminate

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Speaker 3: an individual, or to even commit acts of terrorism.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, terrorism, they wouldn't.

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Speaker 3: Call it that though, with no no, I don't know

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Speaker 3: what they would call it. Any number of euphemisms, right,

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Speaker 3: So exactly everything escalates at that point. Now, in the

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Speaker 3: ideal situation for these folks, you want the agent to

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Speaker 3: be able to maintain their cover after whatever task they're

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Speaker 3: activated for. But sometimes you are past a point of

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Speaker 3: no return, so the act you commit may burn your identity,

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Speaker 3: and that means you either get caught, like we're saying

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Speaker 3: at the top, or you have to be rescued exfiltrated

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Speaker 3: back to your home organization. It sounds so insane, but

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Speaker 3: it's important to note this really can happen. And one

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Speaker 3: knock on consequence of this is it leads to an

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Speaker 3: enormous amount of paranoia for the people in power.

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Speaker 2: Well as it should.

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Speaker 4: I mean, they know what they're up to, you know.

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Speaker 4: I only imagine that the enemy, or at least the

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Speaker 4: folks on the other side, are up to the same thing,

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Speaker 4: and god forbid, they're better at it than us.

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Speaker 3: Right right, And this I like that point because maybe

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Speaker 3: it's a fear of inadequacy. On some level, there's a lot.

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Speaker 2: Of insecurity and an international intelligence.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, there's a lot of For all that bravado and swagger,

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Speaker 4: they're all just you know, like worrying that the other

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Speaker 4: guys have better toys than they do.

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Speaker 2: Yeah.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, there's a lot of insecurity in the world of

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Speaker 3: security and true on many levels. Actually, yes, yeah, I

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Speaker 3: agree with you. This is this leads us to some

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Speaker 3: historical precedence. When the paranoia goes too far, you end

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Speaker 3: up with mass hysteria outbreaks like the infamous Red scares.

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Speaker 3: This is where the authority is carry Yeah, they go

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Speaker 3: completely overboard. Anybody can be a spy, just like during

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Speaker 3: the Inquisition. Anyone could be a witch.

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Speaker 2: Totally. Yeah, And once anyone can your enemy, everyone is

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Speaker 2: your enemy. You're right, You see or at least you

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Speaker 2: see your.

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Speaker 4: Enemy in everything or in everyone, And it can really

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Speaker 4: lead to some serious spiraling when you can start mixing

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Speaker 4: in propaganda, misinformation and just hatred and othering. It really

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Speaker 4: can be a pretty nasty situation pretty quickly, oh yeah,

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Speaker 4: very quickly. The US has had more than one Red Scare.

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Speaker 4: Red Scare is an era marked by a groundswell of

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Speaker 4: public fear and anxiety, in this case over the supposed

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Speaker 4: rise of communist or socialist forces. I'm picturing like an

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Speaker 4: eighties you know, Schwarzenegger action movie or something around, like,

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Speaker 4: you know, fighting the Russians or something, and somebody using

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Speaker 4: the catchphrase you just got red scared.

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Speaker 3: I love it. Let's yeah, let's put that on the books. Actually,

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Speaker 3: let's make that a thing.

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Speaker 2: Why not?

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Speaker 4: To your point, Ben, that's right, the multiple red scares

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Speaker 4: of very I guess there were different shades of red

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Speaker 4: and its Britannican notes the first one of these red

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Speaker 4: scares of varying shades, I guess the first occurred from

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Speaker 4: nineteen seventeen to nineteen twenty, and this is amid an

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Speaker 4: increase in the organizing of labor forces, labor unions, immigration, urbanization,

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Speaker 4: and industrialization. The second period Britannican notes, also called McCarthyism.

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Speaker 2: You know about that one. That one was real red

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Speaker 2: scary after.

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Speaker 4: US Senator Joseph McCarthy, took place from roughly nineteen forty

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Speaker 4: seven to nineteen fifty four. And that's the classic example

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Speaker 4: of where we were seeing our enemies in even among

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Speaker 4: our friends.

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Speaker 3: Oh yeah, this is bonkers. So in each of these

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Speaker 3: cases they just mentioned, we see a clear pattern of overreach.

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Speaker 3: During the first Red Scare, the Attorney General at the time,

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Speaker 3: a guy named a Mitchell Palmer, led a brutal series

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Speaker 3: of raids that were probably unconstitutional against individuals who were

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Speaker 3: usually going to be foreign born immigrants and for one

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Speaker 3: reason or another they were suspected of being anarchist or

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Speaker 3: communist or a radical leftist.

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Speaker 2: Sorry, dude, the headshake used to do. Just in the clock.

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Speaker 4: I mean, we're kind of living through another one of

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Speaker 4: these eras right now. Second, just you know, different flavor,

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Speaker 4: I guess of enemy. But yeah, we are seeing some

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Speaker 4: serious overreach from this administration of targeting individuals for just

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Speaker 4: something as simple as maybe having a different opinion, you know,

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Speaker 4: some someone is outspoken against the administration, and then using

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Speaker 4: some of these dog whistle kind of tactics of like,

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Speaker 4: you know, illegal immigrants who are violent criminals to just

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Speaker 4: get rid of someone that you don't like.

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Speaker 3: Right, and it will eventually, at least historical precedent shows

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Speaker 3: us that kind of overreach will eventually start touching US citizens.

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Speaker 2: As well, touching you touching people.

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Speaker 3: So sweet, Caroline about it toughly.

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Speaker 2: And not to be alarmist or anything.

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Speaker 4: I'm certainly not trying not to loose sleep over this

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Speaker 4: kind of stuff, but it's really hard to not see

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Speaker 4: the parallels when you look at these kinds of stories,

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Speaker 4: to not see the parah I did not see that coming, jokesters.

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Speaker 3: So it is likely in the Red Scares that some

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Speaker 3: of these folks were genuine assets, or they genuinely did

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Speaker 3: want to commit crimes, right, they were a danger to

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Speaker 3: national security. But even if that's likely, it is certain

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Speaker 3: that many more of the individuals targeted were just random,

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Speaker 3: innocent folks. They happened to be from the wrong country, right,

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Speaker 3: they went to the wrong meetings, or they knew the

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Speaker 3: wrong people, even if it was just like their neighbor.

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Speaker 2: Right.

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Speaker 4: During the second Red Scare, which is just after the

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Speaker 4: Second World War, at the beginning of the Cold One,

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Speaker 4: the Cold War, America is terrified the Soviet Union might

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Speaker 4: turn the entire world communists. That was kind of that,

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Speaker 4: I hope I'm using this term correct. The fade to

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Speaker 4: complete kind of of the whole situation. It was the lynchpin,

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Speaker 4: you know, Communism was the ultimate fear, and it was

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Speaker 4: used in a way to maybe accomplish some other things,

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Speaker 4: and to get rid of some inconvenient individuals by classifying

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Speaker 4: them potentially as communists. That's what McCarthy was all about

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Speaker 4: with his blacklisting Hollywood writers and trying to get rid

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Speaker 4: of people who might speak ill of him and his party.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, it was very much a thing where just like

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Speaker 3: the days of the Inquisition, That's why we call it

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Speaker 3: a witch hunt, people had already taken it as a

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Speaker 3: given that the halls of power were riddled with reds.

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Speaker 3: And Joseph McCarthy, who was if whether or not he

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Speaker 3: genuinely believed his claims, he was definitely an opportunist leveraging

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Speaker 3: that public fear and anxiety. So our buddy Heavy Joe

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Speaker 3: starts claiming that their communist sleeper agents everywhere in the government.

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Speaker 3: He went nuts. He said, I have a list of

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Speaker 3: known Soviet assets in the Department of State, and we

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Speaker 3: have to investigate the CIA and a baker's dozen of

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Speaker 3: other agencies. This got him crazy headlines. He got a

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Speaker 3: lot of attention for it, and that probably pushed him

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Speaker 3: to make increasingly extravagant claims, Like if you heard him

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Speaker 3: tell it, it sounds like every third or fourth government

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Speaker 3: employee is just a deep cover spy waiting for the

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Speaker 3: signal to blow up the White House or something.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, and we got to root him out, Ben, We

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Speaker 4: got to root him out out and expose them for

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Speaker 4: their treasonous actions. And we know looking back on all

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Speaker 4: of this that this was massive overreach. That sure, there

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Speaker 4: might have been some bad actors embedded. There might have

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Speaker 4: been a few Communists trying to spoil the Buncher, ruin

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Speaker 4: him in the America Party, but it wasn't like he described,

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Speaker 4: and it was used in such a way, as weaponized,

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Speaker 4: as darisay, in such a way where a lot of

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Speaker 4: innocent people got had their lives ruined.

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Speaker 2: Yeah.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, because you can't really, you can't really recover from

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Speaker 3: these kinds of accusations, even if they're disproven, Right, it's

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Speaker 3: still a blemish on your career. So tons of innocent

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Speaker 3: people like you said no, they lost their jobs. There

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Speaker 3: were very few actual convictions and peak behind the curtain, Yeah, right,

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Speaker 3: who saw that come in? For a long time, we

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Speaker 3: have been we'll spoil it too much, But we've been

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Speaker 3: speculating with some of our colleagues on doing an episode

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Speaker 3: entirely focused on the House on American Activities Committee or you.

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Speaker 4: Know, we should do we should get the huak to

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Speaker 4: a girl to come talk to us about.

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Speaker 2: I'm sorry, I had to do it. I had to

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Speaker 2: do it. Do you think we can leeve God can

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Speaker 2: judge me. I don't know we can do. I think

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Speaker 2: she might be available.

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Speaker 4: I think you know what though, I actually heard that

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Speaker 4: she got cast as herself in a movie.

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Speaker 3: Well that's great, man, Yeah it was.

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Speaker 4: It was a big Hollywood job too, So you know,

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Speaker 4: I hope she's okay. That whole meme coin thing really

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Speaker 4: threw her career into a tizzy. She was doing so well,

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Speaker 4: just coasting on that hawk Tua good will, and then.

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Speaker 2: Had to get into crypto, never get into crypto.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, I feel like she was misled, oh no question.

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Speaker 4: But she allowed herself to be the face of this

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Speaker 4: thing that was a genuine, you know, helping dump pump

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Speaker 4: what do they call it a rug pull? Yes, pump

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Speaker 4: and dump scam and then just sort of vanished. So

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Speaker 4: it just I don't know, it was just it just

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Speaker 4: wasn't great. But anyway, we will, we will welcome you

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Speaker 4: with open arms. Who Walktua girl, come talk to us

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Speaker 4: about the house un American Activities Committee, and maybe another

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Speaker 4: one of our colleagues will come to Yeah.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, And today, with the benefit of retrospect, we can

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Speaker 3: look back and take the red scares for the valuable

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Speaker 3: lesson that they are. They're moral panics, They're cases of

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Speaker 3: mass hysteria. This shows us the danger of sliding into paranoia.

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Speaker 3: And when you let I kind of stop quoting Incubus,

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Speaker 3: when you let fear take the wheel and steer, it

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Speaker 3: can lead quickly to the erosion of the rule of law.

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Speaker 2: You know what I say, Ben, And I say, let

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Speaker 2: Jesus take the wheel. Yeah, that's what I say.

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Speaker 3: The world's best uber driver.

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Speaker 2: He really is. He's so kind, good guy.

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Speaker 5: Ben.

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Speaker 4: I got a question, though, what a moral panic is

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Speaker 4: a not a term of abuse, but it is a

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Speaker 4: term used maybe after the fact or in retrospect. You

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Speaker 4: wouldn't call something when you're in it or you're participating

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Speaker 4: in it, a moral panic, would you, because that implies

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Speaker 4: that you're overreacting, doesn't right.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, it's often so people in say the nineties, with

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Speaker 3: the Satanic panic stuff, they would they wouldn't even call

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Speaker 3: satanic a moral paniciing.

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Speaker 4: Know exactly what we're doing we're doing the right thing.

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Speaker 4: We're getting rid of these demonic, satanic devil.

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Speaker 2: Worshipers, right.

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Speaker 3: Yeah. It's kind of like how no group wants to

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Speaker 3: be called a cult other than that banned the cult.

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Speaker 4: Do you think that history will show or will refer

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Speaker 4: to some of what we're living through in this era

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Speaker 4: politically as a moral panic?

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Speaker 3: Absolutely?

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Speaker 2: Yeah. I just want to you know, again, I'm not

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Speaker 2: here to criticize anybody's political believes whatever. You know, do

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Speaker 2: you but I just.

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Speaker 4: I think there are some certain uh historical aspects of

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Speaker 4: what's going on right now that are not going to

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Speaker 4: be looked on favorable.

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Speaker 3: And also, you know, regardless of which administration is in power,

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Speaker 3: factions of politicians will always engage in moral panics because

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Speaker 3: they're great to re election.

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Speaker 2: Yeah.

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Speaker 4: It's a way of working people up into a froth,

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Speaker 4: you know, and getting them to kind of a line

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Speaker 4: behind a common enemy. And what better enemy than an

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Speaker 4: amorphous concept that can't exist anywhere?

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Speaker 2: Right?

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Speaker 3: Yeah, we love those in the US. As a matter

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Speaker 3: of fact, the only one we had that wasn't super

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Speaker 3: popular was the War on poverty. That one got sidelined, Yeah,

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Speaker 3: war on drugs, war on terror, all the other.

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Speaker 4: Ones war, they give you power to do other stuff

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Speaker 4: and accomplish other like kind of off the book's aims

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Speaker 4: and the idea of the war. A war on anything

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Speaker 4: just means that we're always at war.

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Speaker 3: Yes, yeah, very Orwellian. And so the Red Scare teaches us,

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Speaker 3: or the Red scares teach us these lessons. But unfortunately,

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Speaker 3: then as now, these are lessons the US seems to

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Speaker 3: continually forget, and that is something that we all need

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Speaker 3: to think about in the coming years.

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Speaker 4: Do you think they're forgetting it or do you think

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Speaker 4: they just think they're smarter than the people of the past.

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Speaker 3: Properly at the top the ladder, but for the public,

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Speaker 3: I think we all forget how easily people can be pushed.

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Speaker 3: That's a good point, you know, that's a good point.

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Speaker 4: And it's easy to forget the historical precedence, especially when

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Speaker 4: you have someone speaking with such authority and such confidence,

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Speaker 4: who you maybe personally have some skin in the game with,

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Speaker 4: and you've tied part of your personality to this person

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Speaker 4: being correct or this person representing the moral authority.

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Speaker 3: Do you know what we should do? No, what do

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Speaker 3: you think? Let's play just a brief clip of Joe McCarthy,

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Speaker 3: so we can get the vibe as.

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Speaker 5: One communist on the faculty of one universality is one

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Speaker 5: communist who many One communist am the American advisors at

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Speaker 5: y'all top was one Communist too many. And even if

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Speaker 5: they were all one Communist in the state department, even

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Speaker 5: if there are only one Communist in the state department,

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Speaker 5: that will still be one Communist.

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Speaker 2: I'd be behind this guy. He sounds like he knows

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Speaker 2: what he's talking about.

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Speaker 3: As you said, little authoritative confident, there's a ticking time, Bob,

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Speaker 3: you know, high stakes.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, And I think this is an interesting point that the

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Speaker 4: idea of a moral panic only being seen as such

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Speaker 4: in retrospect, mass hysteria, et cetera.

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Speaker 2: But paranoia and prejudice aside. There are absolutely genuine conspiracies

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Speaker 2: and sleeper agents at play, no question about it. And

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Speaker 2: I think we've already alluded to that throughout.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, we'll pause for a word from our sponsors, and

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Speaker 3: then we're diving into Operation Ghost Stories. Here's where it

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Speaker 3: gets crazy. All right. It's the year two thousand. Everything

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Speaker 3: is different. You can just go and hang out at

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Speaker 3: the airport, you know what I mean.

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Speaker 4: Man, that was so cool, you could smoke on the airplane.

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Speaker 4: I think we're I think we're cool with that.

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Speaker 2: Isn't it weird?

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Speaker 4: Though there were still they're using airplanes that still have

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Speaker 4: little flippy ashtrays like on the seats. I'm only just

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Speaker 4: now starting to see those go away. Have you noticed

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Speaker 4: that a starting to finally, Yeah, but as recently as

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Speaker 4: a few years ago, that was definitely still a thing.

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Speaker 3: I always feel a little bit I wouldn't say diseased,

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Speaker 3: but I feel I always clock it when I see

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Speaker 3: an airplane that's old enough to still have those ash trays. Yep,

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Speaker 3: And I just keep thinking, what else. I hope they

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Speaker 3: have a maintenance program exactly.

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Speaker 2: No, that's okay. I hadn't thought about it in a while.

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Speaker 4: But I'm realizing now that I'm not seeing those as

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Speaker 4: much anymore.

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Speaker 2: So I think they finally passed a point where they

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Speaker 2: have Okay, guys, we got to get rid of the

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Speaker 2: ash trays. But it was a golden time.

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Speaker 3: It was a halcyon era around this time, and the

402
00:22:59,720 --> 00:23:03,040
Speaker 3: store is a bit murky. We'll see why. FBI agents

403
00:23:03,240 --> 00:23:08,119
Speaker 3: learned that there are real sleeper spies from Russia in

404
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Speaker 3: the United States. They're posing as Americans and they are

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Speaker 3: you know, this is not Red Scare level stuff. They're

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Speaker 3: not people who just happen to be from Moldova or

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Speaker 3: Belarus or something. They are Russian intelligence officers. They have

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Speaker 3: high level training, and they have ghosted into the general population.

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Speaker 3: As the FBI supervisor Alan Kohler put it, they're posing

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Speaker 3: as Americans to get access like Americans. They had children, friends, colleagues,

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Speaker 3: even their next door neighbors. We're just like, what, Michael, No,

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Speaker 3: he's the most boring guy I've met.

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Speaker 2: What a sweetheart.

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Speaker 4: And you know, Ben, I just wanted to take this

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Speaker 4: moment to point out how what a badass and am

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Speaker 4: Operation ghost Story is because it works on so many levels,

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Speaker 4: Like it evokes fear and kind of spooky vibes. But

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Speaker 4: so it's about a backstory. It's about being ghosting your

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Speaker 4: way into this country and then having a convincing and

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Speaker 4: plausible story that you are telling everybody that is forward facing,

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Speaker 4: and that is believable.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, And the FBI's operation, this was their name, Operation

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Speaker 3: ghost Stories, was the FBI investigation of finding these folks today.

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Speaker 3: I agree with I love what you're pointing out about

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Speaker 3: the levels of the name because as we know, the

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Speaker 3: FEDS don't always knock out a home run when it

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Speaker 3: comes to naming things, but they.

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Speaker 2: Did pretty well one.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, honestly, it would have been even cooler if it

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Speaker 4: was the Russian name for the operation, but.

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Speaker 2: I'll take it.

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Speaker 3: However, it would have been cooler if it was the

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Speaker 3: Russian name. Yeah, that would have had some bravado, all right.

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Speaker 3: So they found that of these people, there are ten

435
00:24:55,600 --> 00:24:58,159
Speaker 3: that they identify in the US, and a lot of

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00:24:58,160 --> 00:25:03,720
Speaker 3: them are using stolen identities of other Americans with forged documents.

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00:25:04,119 --> 00:25:07,679
Speaker 3: They enroll at US universities, they join uh, you know,

438
00:25:07,800 --> 00:25:11,639
Speaker 3: trade groups like Young Americans for blah blah blah, et cetera.

439
00:25:12,960 --> 00:25:15,200
Speaker 3: And they were all they were all being ordered by

440
00:25:15,359 --> 00:25:20,160
Speaker 3: So Russia has two intelligence agencies that can conflict at times,

441
00:25:20,320 --> 00:25:22,480
Speaker 3: sort of like how the FBI and the CIA don't

442
00:25:22,480 --> 00:25:27,280
Speaker 3: always get along. These folks are directly working for SVR,

443
00:25:27,640 --> 00:25:32,280
Speaker 3: which is a Russian intelligence agency. They are tasked with

444
00:25:32,400 --> 00:25:37,160
Speaker 3: getting information on, as you pointed out, nuclear weaponry. They

445
00:25:37,200 --> 00:25:40,159
Speaker 3: want to figure out what the US is, what stance

446
00:25:40,200 --> 00:25:43,080
Speaker 3: it has toward Iran, who's going to be the next

447
00:25:43,160 --> 00:25:47,560
Speaker 3: leader of the CIA, what's really happening in Congress. You

448
00:25:47,600 --> 00:25:50,959
Speaker 3: know what I mean? Like what teenagers? Is Matt Gates

449
00:25:51,000 --> 00:25:54,760
Speaker 3: scoring that weekend? He wasn't in play at this point.

450
00:25:54,840 --> 00:25:58,000
Speaker 4: These are important questions, Ben, and then the answer is

451
00:25:58,160 --> 00:26:00,080
Speaker 4: all of them, right.

452
00:26:00,880 --> 00:26:03,560
Speaker 3: This is the weirdest thing to mean. No, the FBI,

453
00:26:04,320 --> 00:26:07,560
Speaker 3: we still don't know how they came across this. It's

454
00:26:07,560 --> 00:26:13,879
Speaker 3: not public knowledge yet. But the FBI did not move immediately. Instead,

455
00:26:14,280 --> 00:26:20,080
Speaker 3: starting around somewhere around ten two thousand, they investigated and

456
00:26:20,160 --> 00:26:24,600
Speaker 3: built out the network until like twenty ten, So for

457
00:26:24,760 --> 00:26:30,240
Speaker 3: a decade before arresting anybody, they investigated this and when

458
00:26:30,240 --> 00:26:34,479
Speaker 3: they made their move on June twenty seventh, they got

459
00:26:35,200 --> 00:26:39,719
Speaker 3: ten people in the US and then they got another

460
00:26:40,040 --> 00:26:42,880
Speaker 3: let's call them honorable mentions kill.

461
00:26:42,920 --> 00:26:47,800
Speaker 4: We just say that the idea of child sleeper agents

462
00:26:48,040 --> 00:26:51,359
Speaker 4: is particularly interesting and troubling.

463
00:26:51,240 --> 00:26:54,520
Speaker 2: And I don't think we do that. Do we do that?

464
00:26:54,600 --> 00:26:58,760
Speaker 4: I don't think we have children spies in the United States.

465
00:27:00,200 --> 00:27:03,160
Speaker 3: Not to my knowledge, in recent history. I think, well,

466
00:27:03,240 --> 00:27:05,399
Speaker 3: I think one thing we should we do have to

467
00:27:05,400 --> 00:27:08,520
Speaker 3: point out is I'm sure a kid could be this

468
00:27:08,680 --> 00:27:10,840
Speaker 3: ethically fraud, but I'm sure a kid could be used

469
00:27:10,920 --> 00:27:16,200
Speaker 3: as an informant device. Yes, yeah, And I know, well,

470
00:27:16,240 --> 00:27:21,560
Speaker 3: from what we understand with deep cover sleeper agents from

471
00:27:21,960 --> 00:27:25,720
Speaker 3: regardless of where they're from, if they have children, they're

472
00:27:25,880 --> 00:27:29,480
Speaker 3: usually not letting the children in on the game. The

473
00:27:29,600 --> 00:27:33,000
Speaker 3: kids are innocent bystanders.

474
00:27:33,200 --> 00:27:36,320
Speaker 4: Okay, maybe all right, I'd have a hard time believing

475
00:27:36,440 --> 00:27:40,280
Speaker 4: that that's true every time, but anyway.

476
00:27:40,119 --> 00:27:42,840
Speaker 3: I'm sure. I mean, in the show The Americans is

477
00:27:42,880 --> 00:27:47,840
Speaker 3: a light spoiler. The spies in question do have children,

478
00:27:48,520 --> 00:27:52,199
Speaker 3: and a large part of the family drama piece of

479
00:27:52,240 --> 00:27:53,320
Speaker 3: this is.

480
00:27:54,960 --> 00:27:57,160
Speaker 4: Children finding out and they have to say, I believe

481
00:27:57,160 --> 00:28:00,280
Speaker 4: I've watched the first episode or I watched no of

482
00:28:00,320 --> 00:28:03,119
Speaker 4: a different thing in a movie or something where all

483
00:28:03,160 --> 00:28:05,320
Speaker 4: of a sudden, it's like we've been made. We have

484
00:28:05,440 --> 00:28:08,800
Speaker 4: to fly the coop. And now only now do the

485
00:28:08,880 --> 00:28:10,679
Speaker 4: children know something weird.

486
00:28:10,440 --> 00:28:13,240
Speaker 3: Has been going on? Right, like the Black Widow movie.

487
00:28:13,600 --> 00:28:15,879
Speaker 2: That was it? Thank you Ben, that was what it was.

488
00:28:16,080 --> 00:28:17,280
Speaker 2: That was exactly what it was.

489
00:28:17,440 --> 00:28:20,960
Speaker 3: I mean, can you imagine just all right, It's as

490
00:28:21,040 --> 00:28:26,520
Speaker 3: any parent knows, it's already tremendously stressful to shepherd your

491
00:28:26,600 --> 00:28:30,439
Speaker 3: kid through adolescence and those awkward teen years. So what

492
00:28:30,560 --> 00:28:32,960
Speaker 3: if on top of that, on top of all the

493
00:28:33,000 --> 00:28:36,560
Speaker 3: hormones and the you know, the the challenges a young

494
00:28:36,640 --> 00:28:39,440
Speaker 3: kid faces growing up. On top of all that, at

495
00:28:39,480 --> 00:28:42,440
Speaker 3: some point you're probably gonna have to tell them that

496
00:28:42,480 --> 00:28:43,600
Speaker 3: you're a spy to right.

497
00:28:44,240 --> 00:28:46,160
Speaker 4: Yeah, And I think I was baby barking up their

498
00:28:46,160 --> 00:28:49,240
Speaker 4: own tree with my initial line of questioning, because perhaps

499
00:28:49,280 --> 00:28:51,840
Speaker 4: the Russians also do not do child spies. So I

500
00:28:51,920 --> 00:28:53,880
Speaker 4: was not trying to be like, we have some sort

501
00:28:53,920 --> 00:28:58,280
Speaker 4: of moral high ground here, but if it's being done anywhere,

502
00:28:58,360 --> 00:28:59,920
Speaker 4: it's likely being done here as well.

503
00:29:00,000 --> 00:29:00,960
Speaker 2: We don't know about it.

504
00:29:01,120 --> 00:29:03,920
Speaker 3: So yeah, no's that's a good point, and I think

505
00:29:03,920 --> 00:29:08,680
Speaker 3: it's important that you make it. But also I don't

506
00:29:08,680 --> 00:29:14,600
Speaker 3: want to sound too cold war hawkish, but I do think, well,

507
00:29:14,880 --> 00:29:17,960
Speaker 3: we know for a fact much deployed Russia has a

508
00:29:18,000 --> 00:29:20,560
Speaker 3: different set of rules, They have a very different philosophy.

509
00:29:21,200 --> 00:29:22,240
Speaker 2: I think it's entirely.

510
00:29:22,000 --> 00:29:25,320
Speaker 4: Possible, and there we say plausible that there haven't been

511
00:29:25,480 --> 00:29:29,560
Speaker 4: knowing uses of children for spying purposes.

512
00:29:29,320 --> 00:29:34,320
Speaker 3: Uh huh, as unclean as it is the US during

513
00:29:34,400 --> 00:29:39,240
Speaker 3: this multi year investigation, they started internally referring to the

514
00:29:39,480 --> 00:29:44,960
Speaker 3: suspected sleeper agents as the illegals program now all at all.

515
00:29:45,520 --> 00:29:49,160
Speaker 3: In twenty ten, they made eleven arrest ten we're in

516
00:29:49,160 --> 00:29:52,640
Speaker 3: the US, and one was all the way out in Cyprus.

517
00:29:53,200 --> 00:29:57,320
Speaker 3: That guy's really interesting. The eleventh dude, Christopher Metzos, he

518
00:29:57,480 --> 00:29:59,840
Speaker 3: was sort of their money guy. He flew to the

519
00:29:59,880 --> 00:30:03,440
Speaker 3: U with literal bags of money. When he got apprehended

520
00:30:03,480 --> 00:30:08,080
Speaker 3: in Cyprus, he made bail, he skipped bail, he hit

521
00:30:08,160 --> 00:30:11,840
Speaker 3: the wind, he totally disappeared, which is kind of hard

522
00:30:11,920 --> 00:30:14,320
Speaker 3: to do in this day and age, for sure.

523
00:30:14,600 --> 00:30:17,240
Speaker 4: And Ben, can I just say, I just googled child

524
00:30:17,440 --> 00:30:21,120
Speaker 4: spies and there are a lot of agencies or organizations

525
00:30:21,120 --> 00:30:24,680
Speaker 4: that are out there trying to prevent the use of

526
00:30:24,800 --> 00:30:25,600
Speaker 4: child spies.

527
00:30:25,680 --> 00:30:27,240
Speaker 3: Oh wow, so it's a known issue.

528
00:30:27,360 --> 00:30:29,560
Speaker 2: Why using child's as children as spies?

529
00:30:29,560 --> 00:30:32,440
Speaker 4: It's such a bad IDEA High Court rules against just

530
00:30:32,520 --> 00:30:38,240
Speaker 4: for Kids law and challenge to use of children as spies.

531
00:30:38,640 --> 00:30:41,320
Speaker 4: The judge ruled, despite the self evident dangers to children,

532
00:30:41,360 --> 00:30:43,640
Speaker 4: the current guidance is not unlawful.

533
00:30:44,000 --> 00:30:45,400
Speaker 2: This isn't America, y'all.

534
00:30:46,440 --> 00:30:49,800
Speaker 3: This reminds me of a child soldier, That's what I'm saying.

535
00:30:51,200 --> 00:30:52,000
Speaker 2: That's not that different.

536
00:30:52,000 --> 00:30:54,200
Speaker 4: They're absolutely in danger in a similar way, even if

537
00:30:54,200 --> 00:30:56,200
Speaker 4: they're not like on the front lines, like you know,

538
00:30:57,000 --> 00:30:57,680
Speaker 4: killing people.

539
00:30:57,720 --> 00:30:59,920
Speaker 2: They are, you know, playing a dangerous game.

540
00:31:00,440 --> 00:31:03,560
Speaker 3: It's a good way to move communications too, write to

541
00:31:03,640 --> 00:31:04,440
Speaker 3: use a kid as a.

542
00:31:04,400 --> 00:31:07,720
Speaker 2: Courier always has been. Yeah, I mean, you know, in

543
00:31:08,520 --> 00:31:11,280
Speaker 2: like old school like conflicts.

544
00:31:11,680 --> 00:31:14,840
Speaker 3: And we know Afghanistan in particular has an issue with this.

545
00:31:15,400 --> 00:31:17,720
Speaker 3: These folks, some of them do have kids. But the

546
00:31:18,120 --> 00:31:21,680
Speaker 3: folks in the Illegals program that are the target of

547
00:31:21,720 --> 00:31:25,960
Speaker 3: Operation Ghost Stories, they're all adults. Will will give you

548
00:31:26,000 --> 00:31:30,960
Speaker 3: their names, and just to be clear, a lot of

549
00:31:31,000 --> 00:31:35,600
Speaker 3: these names are fake. The suspects are Juan Lazarro real name,

550
00:31:35,840 --> 00:31:43,440
Speaker 3: Mikhail Antoleyevich Vasenkov I butchered that one, Vicky Pelez, Donald Heathfield,

551
00:31:43,680 --> 00:31:49,120
Speaker 3: real name Andre Bezlkov, Tracy Lee and Foley, very American

552
00:31:49,160 --> 00:31:53,520
Speaker 3: sounding name. Her real name is Yolina Vavilova.

553
00:31:53,840 --> 00:31:55,760
Speaker 2: Oh it's beautiful. I love Russian names.

554
00:31:57,320 --> 00:31:59,320
Speaker 4: This child spy thing has got me going down a

555
00:31:59,400 --> 00:32:01,840
Speaker 4: rabbit all then, I'm actually realizing that a lot of

556
00:32:01,840 --> 00:32:04,360
Speaker 4: this is in the UK, and the language of the

557
00:32:04,440 --> 00:32:07,760
Speaker 4: laws in the UK are conducive to allowing child spies,

558
00:32:07,960 --> 00:32:10,640
Speaker 4: and that's what was shot down by the High courts.

559
00:32:11,400 --> 00:32:13,280
Speaker 4: But if they're doing it in the UK, you know,

560
00:32:13,320 --> 00:32:16,200
Speaker 4: the they're doing it here, you know it.

561
00:32:16,680 --> 00:32:20,880
Speaker 3: Well, it's like assassination. If a tactic works, then everybody

562
00:32:21,040 --> 00:32:23,400
Speaker 3: who can deploy that tactic is going to give it

563
00:32:23,440 --> 00:32:23,600
Speaker 3: a go.

564
00:32:24,160 --> 00:32:27,080
Speaker 4: You were you were listing off some names, Ben and

565
00:32:27,400 --> 00:32:30,240
Speaker 4: I got I was distracted down the child spy Rabbital,

566
00:32:30,280 --> 00:32:34,400
Speaker 4: but I believe you left off with Yelina Vavlova a

567
00:32:34,560 --> 00:32:37,440
Speaker 4: ka Lee Ann Foley, which is your right then it

568
00:32:37,480 --> 00:32:42,360
Speaker 4: sounds like aunt LeeAnne from from Durham. You know. We

569
00:32:42,480 --> 00:32:49,000
Speaker 4: got Richard Murphy also very just quintessentially American name aka

570
00:32:49,200 --> 00:32:55,560
Speaker 4: Vladimir Guriev Cynthia Murphy, his his wife aka Lydia Guriev.

571
00:32:55,920 --> 00:33:01,960
Speaker 4: And we've got Michael Zatoli A k al Kutzik.

572
00:33:02,560 --> 00:33:09,680
Speaker 3: And then Patricia Mills real name Natalia Para Verzeva. That's

573
00:33:09,880 --> 00:33:10,360
Speaker 3: close to that.

574
00:33:10,880 --> 00:33:14,760
Speaker 4: Well, that's easy to want to insert another ev er

575
00:33:15,120 --> 00:33:16,400
Speaker 4: kind of combo in there.

576
00:33:16,280 --> 00:33:17,120
Speaker 3: Para vera Zerra.

577
00:33:17,240 --> 00:33:18,840
Speaker 2: Yeah, that's fun to say.

578
00:33:19,720 --> 00:33:25,840
Speaker 3: And then there's Mikhail Simenko and most famously Anna Chapman.

579
00:33:26,400 --> 00:33:30,280
Speaker 3: We mentioned that the eleventh man out there in Cyprus

580
00:33:30,320 --> 00:33:34,200
Speaker 3: who escaped around the same time, there was a Russian

581
00:33:34,280 --> 00:33:37,800
Speaker 3: national who was working for Microsoft in the US. He

582
00:33:37,960 --> 00:33:42,360
Speaker 3: was apprehended, and he was deported on July thirteenth, twenty ten,

583
00:33:42,480 --> 00:33:45,240
Speaker 3: so a little bit before the big arrest. We got

584
00:33:45,280 --> 00:33:49,120
Speaker 3: to be honest with you folks, Even just based on

585
00:33:49,200 --> 00:33:52,160
Speaker 3: publicly available knowledge, this does not seem to be a

586
00:33:52,200 --> 00:33:54,520
Speaker 3: red scare. It does not seem to be a witch hunt.

587
00:33:54,840 --> 00:33:59,640
Speaker 3: Investigators found tons of concrete evidence that indicated motive tactics,

588
00:33:59,640 --> 00:34:03,360
Speaker 3: and and they found, as we mentioned, that some of

589
00:34:03,400 --> 00:34:07,280
Speaker 3: the agents functioning in his couples even had children. Maybe

590
00:34:07,360 --> 00:34:09,640
Speaker 3: not because they always wanted to start a family.

591
00:34:10,400 --> 00:34:14,080
Speaker 4: It's a cover, unto itself, the ultimate cover, because you like,

592
00:34:14,080 --> 00:34:17,480
Speaker 4: like I think maybe the fact that we spent so

593
00:34:17,600 --> 00:34:20,080
Speaker 4: much time talking about the idea of child spies and

594
00:34:20,120 --> 00:34:23,080
Speaker 4: how abhorrent that would be is the whole point, because

595
00:34:23,080 --> 00:34:26,000
Speaker 4: no one would suspect, you know, a lovely, loving couple

596
00:34:26,080 --> 00:34:29,000
Speaker 4: with their small children, because who would do that to children?

597
00:34:29,280 --> 00:34:29,759
Speaker 2: Who you know?

598
00:34:31,120 --> 00:34:36,920
Speaker 3: We would? Uh we neat America? Yeah not Nolan and

599
00:34:37,000 --> 00:34:39,600
Speaker 3: Dylan and myself or I don't know, Dylan. Where are

600
00:34:39,600 --> 00:34:39,759
Speaker 3: you at?

601
00:34:39,800 --> 00:34:42,279
Speaker 4: Which I mean you get in situations, Ben, I'm going

602
00:34:42,360 --> 00:34:43,440
Speaker 4: to quote you back at.

603
00:34:43,320 --> 00:34:47,600
Speaker 3: You you do get in situations. Dylan is not going

604
00:34:47,680 --> 00:34:51,800
Speaker 3: on record, he's not taking the bait. Well played, mister Fagin.

605
00:34:52,640 --> 00:34:57,440
Speaker 3: So okay, man, this is this is true right even

606
00:34:57,520 --> 00:34:59,960
Speaker 3: we had to take pains to point out the danger

607
00:35:00,040 --> 00:35:03,400
Speaker 3: as a paranoia because it can go wrong so quickly.

608
00:35:04,000 --> 00:35:06,560
Speaker 3: But it looks like if you go to the DOJ

609
00:35:06,840 --> 00:35:11,160
Speaker 3: and the criminal complaints, you'll see that they they nail

610
00:35:11,280 --> 00:35:14,760
Speaker 3: down not just intent and targets, but they nail down

611
00:35:15,120 --> 00:35:18,400
Speaker 3: the way folks communicated with each other, which I gotta

612
00:35:18,400 --> 00:35:22,399
Speaker 3: tell you is just it's so cool, man, just objectively,

613
00:35:23,000 --> 00:35:25,520
Speaker 3: you know, like dead drops. Haven't you ever wanted to be,

614
00:35:26,040 --> 00:35:28,880
Speaker 3: you know, to like sit on opposite sides of a

615
00:35:28,920 --> 00:35:30,080
Speaker 3: park bench And I do it.

616
00:35:30,600 --> 00:35:33,600
Speaker 4: I do it sometimes just for funsies, just by myself

617
00:35:33,640 --> 00:35:35,920
Speaker 4: and just sit there waiting for you know, my contact

618
00:35:35,960 --> 00:35:38,399
Speaker 4: who never arrives. And then I go home and cry

619
00:35:38,400 --> 00:35:39,160
Speaker 4: into my pillow.

620
00:35:39,160 --> 00:35:42,800
Speaker 3: And what language do you cry it?

621
00:35:43,920 --> 00:35:50,480
Speaker 2: I just say, yeah, yet that's Russian for now?

622
00:35:51,080 --> 00:35:56,080
Speaker 3: Yes, yes, So they found that these Russian agents would

623
00:35:56,120 --> 00:36:00,960
Speaker 3: communicate with their handlers or with the SVR proper using

624
00:36:01,080 --> 00:36:06,000
Speaker 3: messages hidden in digital photographs or things written in actual

625
00:36:06,120 --> 00:36:07,840
Speaker 3: disappearing inc Yeah.

626
00:36:08,120 --> 00:36:10,520
Speaker 4: Yeah, which is a thing we talked about the Spy

627
00:36:10,600 --> 00:36:12,560
Speaker 4: Museum that we all went to and hung out at

628
00:36:12,680 --> 00:36:13,480
Speaker 4: in DC.

629
00:36:13,719 --> 00:36:14,719
Speaker 2: Is that where we went, Ben?

630
00:36:15,520 --> 00:36:15,680
Speaker 3: Yes?

631
00:36:15,960 --> 00:36:19,680
Speaker 4: Yeah, Wait there was another one though, Wait it was

632
00:36:20,239 --> 00:36:21,960
Speaker 4: We haven't been to DC together, have we?

633
00:36:22,239 --> 00:36:24,240
Speaker 3: No? But I think we went to that same museum,

634
00:36:24,320 --> 00:36:25,160
Speaker 3: just at different times.

635
00:36:25,200 --> 00:36:26,799
Speaker 4: I think it was a different time. But then there

636
00:36:26,920 --> 00:36:30,360
Speaker 4: was the Mafia Museum. That was another one. But gosh,

637
00:36:30,360 --> 00:36:32,520
Speaker 4: I swear we've been together, but it doesn't matter. There

638
00:36:32,600 --> 00:36:35,440
Speaker 4: is an incredible spy museum where you can see a

639
00:36:35,480 --> 00:36:37,959
Speaker 4: lot of the kind of tradecraft stuff that we're talking

640
00:36:38,000 --> 00:36:41,600
Speaker 4: about here, like how invisible ink is made and deployed

641
00:36:41,640 --> 00:36:44,040
Speaker 4: and listening devices and things like that. So if you're

642
00:36:44,080 --> 00:36:46,440
Speaker 4: into this stuff and you want to see some irl,

643
00:36:46,560 --> 00:36:48,000
Speaker 4: highly recommend checking that out.

644
00:36:48,840 --> 00:36:52,520
Speaker 3: And these guys are using real old school stuff we

645
00:36:52,600 --> 00:36:56,320
Speaker 3: talked about dead drops. They're also doing the thing, oh man,

646
00:36:57,200 --> 00:36:59,520
Speaker 3: this is what are those pranks that we just have

647
00:36:59,600 --> 00:37:01,719
Speaker 3: to do one day. They're doing the thing where you

648
00:37:01,800 --> 00:37:04,759
Speaker 3: get two identical bags or like a valise or a

649
00:37:04,800 --> 00:37:09,200
Speaker 3: suitcase and then you switch them when you meet and

650
00:37:10,280 --> 00:37:14,600
Speaker 3: I love that stuff. They were also we also learned

651
00:37:14,600 --> 00:37:18,400
Speaker 3: that they were gathering information to report back to Moscow

652
00:37:18,600 --> 00:37:21,520
Speaker 3: about what the US planned to do in Central America,

653
00:37:22,200 --> 00:37:26,160
Speaker 3: what they were internally thinking about Russian foreign policy, if

654
00:37:26,160 --> 00:37:30,520
Speaker 3: there were any internal problems with the US military they

655
00:37:30,520 --> 00:37:36,360
Speaker 3: can be leveraged. And then how the US handles terrorists

656
00:37:36,920 --> 00:37:40,480
Speaker 3: on the internet, Like what kind of tools and toys

657
00:37:40,640 --> 00:37:44,600
Speaker 3: do they apply to this? And it just gets even weirder.

658
00:37:44,640 --> 00:37:46,240
Speaker 3: I don't know, should we take an ad break?

659
00:37:46,440 --> 00:37:49,160
Speaker 2: Oh we must, we got we gotta meet our dead drop.

660
00:37:59,440 --> 00:38:00,000
Speaker 3: We've returned.

661
00:38:00,280 --> 00:38:00,640
Speaker 2: All right.

662
00:38:01,000 --> 00:38:04,919
Speaker 3: The next thing is as we mentioned previously. The next

663
00:38:04,960 --> 00:38:10,040
Speaker 3: thing is proving that these assets are functioning under their

664
00:38:10,080 --> 00:38:14,080
Speaker 3: own free will and that they know what they're doing, right,

665
00:38:14,160 --> 00:38:18,240
Speaker 3: or they're aware of their position, because it's not impossible

666
00:38:18,520 --> 00:38:22,080
Speaker 3: that someone could be accidentally working for a spy group

667
00:38:22,520 --> 00:38:24,279
Speaker 3: and they don't know it, you know what I mean?

668
00:38:24,640 --> 00:38:28,239
Speaker 3: They just know some guy named Jeremy has blackmail on them.

669
00:38:28,360 --> 00:38:29,160
Speaker 2: You know Jeremy.

670
00:38:29,520 --> 00:38:30,400
Speaker 3: Yeah, you know Jeremy.

671
00:38:30,400 --> 00:38:32,680
Speaker 2: What's he got on you?

672
00:38:31,920 --> 00:38:35,200
Speaker 3: He's got nothing on me, man, We're just old friends.

673
00:38:35,920 --> 00:38:38,239
Speaker 4: That's called Jeremy's a bit of a rap scallion. He's

674
00:38:38,239 --> 00:38:39,280
Speaker 4: a bit incorrigible.

675
00:38:39,719 --> 00:38:44,200
Speaker 3: Yeah, he's a sort of a Maverick character. So all right,

676
00:38:44,280 --> 00:38:48,040
Speaker 3: So the FBI has to prove their case in public too,

677
00:38:48,680 --> 00:38:51,480
Speaker 3: because you know, we know that the FBI in the

678
00:38:51,520 --> 00:38:57,120
Speaker 3: past has run into serious controversies and accusations about so

679
00:38:57,239 --> 00:39:00,600
Speaker 3: called witch hunts. So a year, about a year after

680
00:39:01,480 --> 00:39:06,040
Speaker 3: these arrests in twenty eleven, the FBI says, okay, everybody,

681
00:39:06,239 --> 00:39:09,760
Speaker 3: here's a ton of evidence that these are actual spies.

682
00:39:10,000 --> 00:39:15,080
Speaker 3: They've got documents, photos, videos backing up these allegations. And

683
00:39:16,320 --> 00:39:19,439
Speaker 3: then the FBI also said, I've always said this that

684
00:39:19,640 --> 00:39:23,840
Speaker 3: these agents didn't get their job done, they did not

685
00:39:24,000 --> 00:39:30,799
Speaker 3: get classified info, they not you know, attain their goals,

686
00:39:31,040 --> 00:39:32,480
Speaker 3: whatever those goals may be.

687
00:39:32,640 --> 00:39:36,600
Speaker 4: This is the line being fed to the public. Or Okay, yeah,

688
00:39:36,640 --> 00:39:39,440
Speaker 4: so don't worry about it. Everything's cool. We might have

689
00:39:39,560 --> 00:39:42,400
Speaker 4: missed this for like a really really long time, but

690
00:39:42,480 --> 00:39:43,440
Speaker 4: now we're on the case.

691
00:39:43,480 --> 00:39:45,200
Speaker 2: Then nothing bad happened.

692
00:39:45,080 --> 00:39:50,479
Speaker 3: Exactly exactly. So they said, yes, these guys did get

693
00:39:50,560 --> 00:39:54,880
Speaker 3: some info, they did talk back to Russia, but mainly

694
00:39:54,920 --> 00:39:58,919
Speaker 3: what they were doing is the is something we call

695
00:40:00,600 --> 00:40:04,040
Speaker 3: and assessing. This is where spying turns into like a

696
00:40:04,120 --> 00:40:05,800
Speaker 3: multi level marketing scheme.

697
00:40:06,080 --> 00:40:08,280
Speaker 2: Okay, explain, I don't think I understand.

698
00:40:08,840 --> 00:40:13,120
Speaker 3: So spotting and assessing this is where you identify a

699
00:40:13,160 --> 00:40:17,000
Speaker 3: colleague like a coworker or someone you know through social circles,

700
00:40:17,040 --> 00:40:21,120
Speaker 3: et cetera. And you ask yourself, could these people be

701
00:40:21,920 --> 00:40:27,480
Speaker 3: vulnerable targets for baby a honeypot operation, distortion threats.

702
00:40:27,520 --> 00:40:31,080
Speaker 4: Yes, blackmail, whether it be extorting you know, money or

703
00:40:31,120 --> 00:40:33,240
Speaker 4: influence or whatever it might be. I guess it wouldn't

704
00:40:33,239 --> 00:40:36,440
Speaker 4: be money though exclusively. It would always be some greater

705
00:40:37,160 --> 00:40:40,760
Speaker 4: you know, puppet string kind of maneuver from Moscow, right.

706
00:40:41,000 --> 00:40:45,279
Speaker 3: Yeah, like access information right. And and then the the

707
00:40:45,400 --> 00:40:49,840
Speaker 3: real golden goose is determining whether you can co opt

708
00:40:50,160 --> 00:40:54,760
Speaker 3: someone to knowingly become a spy. As that's the multi

709
00:40:54,840 --> 00:40:55,480
Speaker 3: level marketing.

710
00:40:55,600 --> 00:40:58,640
Speaker 2: Then you got to you've made a new asset. Yeah,

711
00:40:59,280 --> 00:41:00,239
Speaker 2: I understand what you know.

712
00:41:01,719 --> 00:41:05,440
Speaker 3: It's weird. I hate how accurate the MLM comparison is.

713
00:41:05,480 --> 00:41:08,360
Speaker 3: But no, this is where the FBI and their statement

714
00:41:09,160 --> 00:41:13,759
Speaker 3: references a precedent we talked about in previous episode, the

715
00:41:13,880 --> 00:41:14,760
Speaker 3: Cambridge five.

716
00:41:15,200 --> 00:41:16,640
Speaker 2: Ah, yes, the Cambridge five.

717
00:41:16,760 --> 00:41:19,759
Speaker 4: Perhaps the most famous example of this tactic can be

718
00:41:19,840 --> 00:41:21,239
Speaker 4: found in the Cambridge five.

719
00:41:21,680 --> 00:41:23,000
Speaker 2: This took place in Great Britain.

720
00:41:23,440 --> 00:41:27,719
Speaker 4: Soviet intelligence talent spotters like you're referring to Ben. This

721
00:41:27,760 --> 00:41:30,680
Speaker 4: is from the FBI themselves, by the way verbatim with

722
00:41:30,840 --> 00:41:32,760
Speaker 4: you know, styling on it a little bit. These talent

723
00:41:32,800 --> 00:41:35,800
Speaker 4: spotters were able to recruit Cambridge University students in the

724
00:41:35,880 --> 00:41:39,919
Speaker 4: nineteen thirties, including futures by Kim Philby, who would later

725
00:41:40,040 --> 00:41:42,680
Speaker 4: rise to power in the British government and becomes Soviet

726
00:41:42,760 --> 00:41:46,920
Speaker 4: operatives during World War II and into the nineteen fifties.

727
00:41:46,960 --> 00:41:50,840
Speaker 4: So this, yeah, this group of Cambridge students collectively would

728
00:41:50,840 --> 00:41:52,920
Speaker 4: go on to become Soviet assets.

729
00:41:53,640 --> 00:41:57,640
Speaker 3: And they functioned to your point for so long successfully

730
00:41:57,680 --> 00:41:59,400
Speaker 3: and we still I remember we were talking about this

731
00:41:59,440 --> 00:42:03,440
Speaker 3: earlier and you started calling it the Cambridge plus or

732
00:42:03,440 --> 00:42:04,040
Speaker 3: minus five.

733
00:42:04,440 --> 00:42:06,600
Speaker 2: Well that's because, like I think there were more.

734
00:42:06,800 --> 00:42:09,600
Speaker 4: Five was just referring to the concept of it. But

735
00:42:10,360 --> 00:42:13,880
Speaker 4: there were some that are like undocumented or rather have

736
00:42:14,000 --> 00:42:16,280
Speaker 4: not been publicly named.

737
00:42:16,600 --> 00:42:19,200
Speaker 3: Yeah, what do we say? They started as the Cambridge four.

738
00:42:19,600 --> 00:42:20,440
Speaker 3: They found like a.

739
00:42:20,400 --> 00:42:24,040
Speaker 4: Ska band, doesn't it, Like wearing rude boy shoes and

740
00:42:24,120 --> 00:42:26,640
Speaker 4: like skanking, you know, to saxophone music.

741
00:42:27,200 --> 00:42:32,840
Speaker 3: I you know, I oh my sky years, your sky years?

742
00:42:33,080 --> 00:42:37,440
Speaker 2: Ben Bowl in the sky years? Did you have checkerboard pants?

743
00:42:38,960 --> 00:42:40,400
Speaker 2: Dance that you don't have dance?

744
00:42:41,440 --> 00:42:45,480
Speaker 4: I want to sometimes though in the public if anybody

745
00:42:45,520 --> 00:42:47,279
Speaker 4: isn't old like us and doesn't know what that is.

746
00:42:47,320 --> 00:42:49,640
Speaker 4: It's a dance move associated with ska music where you

747
00:42:49,760 --> 00:42:52,719
Speaker 4: kind of scissor your arms and legs sort of back

748
00:42:52,760 --> 00:42:55,839
Speaker 4: and forth in different directions, with kind of a cool

749
00:42:55,920 --> 00:42:58,759
Speaker 4: swagger to it, right, Like it's I always thought it

750
00:42:58,800 --> 00:43:00,400
Speaker 4: was cool, but now, looking back kind.

751
00:43:00,239 --> 00:43:01,080
Speaker 2: Of looks ridiculous.

752
00:43:01,160 --> 00:43:02,680
Speaker 3: Did you did you have a scoff face?

753
00:43:02,840 --> 00:43:03,280
Speaker 2: Not really.

754
00:43:03,320 --> 00:43:05,920
Speaker 4: I was in a punk band for a while, and

755
00:43:05,960 --> 00:43:09,360
Speaker 4: I did wear I remember going to a thrift store

756
00:43:09,400 --> 00:43:11,880
Speaker 4: with my older than me punk friends and getting my

757
00:43:11,920 --> 00:43:15,360
Speaker 4: first pair of thrifted like punk type outfit, you know,

758
00:43:15,760 --> 00:43:18,640
Speaker 4: And it was like the pants were old man golf

759
00:43:18,719 --> 00:43:21,200
Speaker 4: pants kind of, but they were absolutely like I had

760
00:43:21,200 --> 00:43:24,279
Speaker 4: a tartan kind of pattern on them. And then I

761
00:43:24,320 --> 00:43:26,560
Speaker 4: had some Doc Martins and I think I wore a

762
00:43:26,600 --> 00:43:28,040
Speaker 4: dog collar for a hot minute.

763
00:43:28,040 --> 00:43:30,640
Speaker 2: There bn not gonna lie time.

764
00:43:30,680 --> 00:43:34,359
Speaker 3: Nice And you know, it's a good memory to have, right.

765
00:43:34,600 --> 00:43:36,879
Speaker 4: I think these photos floating around out there somewhere, maybe

766
00:43:36,880 --> 00:43:40,040
Speaker 4: I'll try to find a few and show you, guys.

767
00:43:39,600 --> 00:43:42,960
Speaker 3: And that will take careful planning. The Feds were also

768
00:43:43,000 --> 00:43:46,120
Speaker 3: all about careful planning. They didn't that.

769
00:43:46,160 --> 00:43:47,000
Speaker 2: Was a stretch band.

770
00:43:47,040 --> 00:43:49,480
Speaker 3: But I stretch I get that.

771
00:43:49,640 --> 00:43:50,320
Speaker 2: I appreciate this.

772
00:43:51,080 --> 00:43:56,640
Speaker 3: Yes, they're they were intensely planned. It seems counterintuitive to say, Okay,

773
00:43:56,680 --> 00:43:59,719
Speaker 3: we know these folks, right, we know their intent. We

774
00:43:59,800 --> 00:44:03,800
Speaker 3: know that they are actively doing stuff or they're sleeper

775
00:44:03,840 --> 00:44:06,360
Speaker 3: agents and they may be activated at some point. So

776
00:44:06,719 --> 00:44:09,160
Speaker 3: why did they hold off on arresting them?

777
00:44:09,239 --> 00:44:10,959
Speaker 2: Oh, but you need to answered your own question.

778
00:44:11,120 --> 00:44:13,359
Speaker 4: And I think it's like, you know, we we buy

779
00:44:13,360 --> 00:44:15,640
Speaker 4: it our time, We watched and see what they know

780
00:44:15,880 --> 00:44:18,120
Speaker 4: and what they find out, who they have access to,

781
00:44:18,239 --> 00:44:20,279
Speaker 4: and in doing that, you know, we could learn a

782
00:44:20,320 --> 00:44:25,080
Speaker 4: lot about maybe our flaws and maybe find some folks

783
00:44:25,480 --> 00:44:26,360
Speaker 4: on our side.

784
00:44:26,120 --> 00:44:28,840
Speaker 2: Who are you know, need to be rooted out. Because again,

785
00:44:29,360 --> 00:44:30,120
Speaker 2: the whole.

786
00:44:29,920 --> 00:44:32,319
Speaker 4: Red Scare McCarthy ism thing, I think that's what most

787
00:44:32,320 --> 00:44:35,600
Speaker 4: people think about when they think about this era. But

788
00:44:35,880 --> 00:44:38,920
Speaker 4: to your point, Ben, I mean, the folks that aren't

789
00:44:38,960 --> 00:44:41,319
Speaker 4: just out gabbing to the public and making a big

790
00:44:41,360 --> 00:44:44,160
Speaker 4: witch hunt like McCarthy, They were having to deal with

791
00:44:44,239 --> 00:44:47,600
Speaker 4: actual effects, you know, sleeper agents and folks that were

792
00:44:47,760 --> 00:44:50,680
Speaker 4: you know, intending to do harm or to compromise the

793
00:44:50,680 --> 00:44:53,919
Speaker 4: integrity of you know, the sovereignty of the United States.

794
00:44:54,440 --> 00:44:58,680
Speaker 3: And we don't know how long the FBI investigation would

795
00:44:58,719 --> 00:45:01,200
Speaker 3: have lasted, like how long they would stretch it out

796
00:45:01,280 --> 00:45:06,440
Speaker 3: searching for more agents, more evidence. Because they had to

797
00:45:06,520 --> 00:45:10,600
Speaker 3: move quickly, they intercepted we believe they intercepted a phone

798
00:45:10,640 --> 00:45:14,480
Speaker 3: call on June twenty sixth from Anna Chapman to her father,

799
00:45:15,080 --> 00:45:18,680
Speaker 3: veteran KGB agent working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

800
00:45:19,160 --> 00:45:23,480
Speaker 3: And as soon as she confided to her dad that

801
00:45:23,600 --> 00:45:26,399
Speaker 3: she was concerned her cover might get blown, and this

802
00:45:26,520 --> 00:45:32,320
Speaker 3: led the Obama administration to move their timeline up quickly,

803
00:45:32,400 --> 00:45:35,840
Speaker 3: so the next day they arrested everybody. There were a

804
00:45:35,880 --> 00:45:38,319
Speaker 3: couple other members who of the group who were going

805
00:45:38,400 --> 00:45:41,359
Speaker 3: to travel outside of the US, and they didn't want

806
00:45:41,400 --> 00:45:43,480
Speaker 3: them to slip through their clutches.

807
00:45:44,400 --> 00:45:46,480
Speaker 4: And this also reminds me of a plot line and

808
00:45:46,520 --> 00:45:49,320
Speaker 4: another quite excellent in my opinion, at least the first

809
00:45:49,480 --> 00:45:54,040
Speaker 4: season spy show. It's a Taylor Sheridan series called Liones

810
00:45:54,360 --> 00:45:58,760
Speaker 4: with Zoe Saldana, and it really shows the military side

811
00:45:58,840 --> 00:46:01,440
Speaker 4: of this kind of stuf and these kinds of operations.

812
00:46:01,440 --> 00:46:04,520
Speaker 4: And I'm sure there's some hyperboleon there and it's overblown,

813
00:46:04,560 --> 00:46:06,600
Speaker 4: but I very much enjoyed it and found it to

814
00:46:06,800 --> 00:46:09,640
Speaker 4: be an interesting kind of peek behind the curtain about

815
00:46:09,840 --> 00:46:13,239
Speaker 4: the various levels of who knows what when and who

816
00:46:13,360 --> 00:46:16,840
Speaker 4: authorizes what operation and collateral damage and all of that stuff.

817
00:46:16,840 --> 00:46:19,520
Speaker 2: So do recommend Lioness.

818
00:46:19,600 --> 00:46:21,760
Speaker 3: Feels like a very tense job.

819
00:46:22,040 --> 00:46:23,000
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, yeah.

820
00:46:23,120 --> 00:46:24,920
Speaker 4: Nicole Kidman is in it, and it was one of

821
00:46:24,920 --> 00:46:27,640
Speaker 4: the high level of folks in the US government. And

822
00:46:27,680 --> 00:46:29,880
Speaker 4: I think she's really really great in the show. She's

823
00:46:29,920 --> 00:46:32,200
Speaker 4: a handler, like a high level handler of some of

824
00:46:32,239 --> 00:46:38,960
Speaker 4: these basically folks on our side who are turning people

825
00:46:39,719 --> 00:46:43,719
Speaker 4: close to political targets, whether it be girlfriends or wives,

826
00:46:43,719 --> 00:46:47,240
Speaker 4: specifically women in this case that's the Lions program into

827
00:46:47,280 --> 00:46:50,880
Speaker 4: assets in order to gain access to their spouses or

828
00:46:51,160 --> 00:46:52,239
Speaker 4: fathers or what have you.

829
00:46:52,280 --> 00:46:53,520
Speaker 2: And it's very interesting.

830
00:46:54,120 --> 00:46:57,279
Speaker 3: Yeah, I can't wait to check it out. We know

831
00:46:57,440 --> 00:47:02,560
Speaker 3: that this raid, these arrest when they happened, they happened suddenly,

832
00:47:02,640 --> 00:47:05,560
Speaker 3: and the FEDS come down hard. There are raids all

833
00:47:05,600 --> 00:47:08,759
Speaker 3: on the same day in Boston, Yonkers, New Jersey, and

834
00:47:08,880 --> 00:47:14,160
Speaker 3: Northern Virginia. And there was no evidence that these suspected

835
00:47:14,200 --> 00:47:18,560
Speaker 3: agents all knew of each other. The only ones who

836
00:47:18,600 --> 00:47:22,640
Speaker 3: definitely knew of each other were folks who were spouses exactly,

837
00:47:22,719 --> 00:47:25,800
Speaker 3: although that'd be funny if they were both Russian spies

838
00:47:25,800 --> 00:47:28,640
Speaker 3: and they didn't know the other one.

839
00:47:28,360 --> 00:47:31,320
Speaker 2: Was holy crap. That's the plot of mister and Missus Smith.

840
00:47:31,760 --> 00:47:33,759
Speaker 3: Yeah, they're assassins, right, yeah, and they.

841
00:47:33,719 --> 00:47:36,240
Speaker 4: Don't yeah, and they don't know, and they're both sleeper

842
00:47:36,400 --> 00:47:39,600
Speaker 4: agents essentially who are turned against each other. And the

843
00:47:40,040 --> 00:47:44,280
Speaker 4: Donald Glover Mister and Missus Smith TV series excellent.

844
00:47:44,160 --> 00:47:46,600
Speaker 2: Really, really good. A lot of people slept on that.

845
00:47:47,280 --> 00:47:50,120
Speaker 4: Sorry so as The Guardian would later go on to

846
00:47:50,200 --> 00:47:53,960
Speaker 4: describe it as the FBI's biggest known breach of Russian

847
00:47:54,000 --> 00:47:59,320
Speaker 4: intelligence communications. The Feds, uh, this is the Guardian speaking.

848
00:47:59,400 --> 00:48:03,520
Speaker 4: Read there decrypted their intel, read the embedded coded text

849
00:48:03,560 --> 00:48:05,080
Speaker 4: on images posted on the net.

850
00:48:05,360 --> 00:48:07,480
Speaker 2: I love what they're calling it, the net bug.

851
00:48:07,560 --> 00:48:11,240
Speaker 4: Their mobile phones videotaped the passing of bags of cash

852
00:48:11,600 --> 00:48:15,320
Speaker 4: and messages and invisible ink from one agent to another,

853
00:48:15,360 --> 00:48:18,239
Speaker 4: and hacked into their bogus expense claims.

854
00:48:18,520 --> 00:48:18,680
Speaker 5: Ben.

855
00:48:18,800 --> 00:48:22,000
Speaker 2: This is a very two thousand uh sentence.

856
00:48:22,320 --> 00:48:25,759
Speaker 3: They just love the net. Uh huh yeah. Yeah, it's

857
00:48:25,800 --> 00:48:29,000
Speaker 3: like that movie Hackersrite Tensions.

858
00:48:29,160 --> 00:48:29,920
Speaker 2: Yeah. Twenty ten.

859
00:48:30,040 --> 00:48:33,160
Speaker 4: This was written this opinion piece on Russian inspiring Russian

860
00:48:33,239 --> 00:48:35,920
Speaker 4: Spies Bungle was epic by.

861
00:48:35,840 --> 00:48:38,160
Speaker 2: David Hurst from The Guardian.

862
00:48:38,600 --> 00:48:41,200
Speaker 3: Yeah, I think we got to shout this one out

863
00:48:41,200 --> 00:48:46,160
Speaker 3: because I in particular love some classic British snark as

864
00:48:46,160 --> 00:48:47,920
Speaker 3: well as it's got directed at us.

865
00:48:48,360 --> 00:48:50,240
Speaker 2: For I couldn't handle it. I would crumble.

866
00:48:50,800 --> 00:48:56,760
Speaker 3: Yeah, like I I can't watch Peep Show without pacey uh,

867
00:48:56,800 --> 00:48:58,280
Speaker 3: just because of the snark.

868
00:48:58,480 --> 00:49:00,400
Speaker 4: For some reason, that one does it for me. That

869
00:49:00,400 --> 00:49:03,000
Speaker 4: one's a comfort show for me. But there are certain

870
00:49:03,040 --> 00:49:06,400
Speaker 4: British shows that are just so uncomfortable and awkward that

871
00:49:06,440 --> 00:49:08,520
Speaker 4: it just makes you kind of tense up and like, yeah,

872
00:49:08,640 --> 00:49:11,800
Speaker 4: need to I cover my eyes at cringe like I

873
00:49:11,840 --> 00:49:13,360
Speaker 4: would a horror movie sometimes.

874
00:49:13,400 --> 00:49:14,840
Speaker 2: I don't know if you felt that.

875
00:49:15,320 --> 00:49:19,879
Speaker 3: Yes, yeah, And I've seen horrible, horrific things in real

876
00:49:19,960 --> 00:49:23,279
Speaker 3: life and dealt with those as they came. But for

877
00:49:23,320 --> 00:49:29,200
Speaker 3: some reason, watching David Mitchell yet again sabotage a romantic

878
00:49:29,280 --> 00:49:32,120
Speaker 3: relationship is just horrific to me. It's horrid.

879
00:49:32,280 --> 00:49:34,520
Speaker 2: I'm with you, I get I get where you're coming from.

880
00:49:34,520 --> 00:49:34,600
Speaker 5: That.

881
00:49:35,520 --> 00:49:37,319
Speaker 2: Yeah, Britain. Well yeah.

882
00:49:37,360 --> 00:49:40,160
Speaker 4: In the review of the Spy Group's methods, they refer

883
00:49:40,200 --> 00:49:44,040
Speaker 4: to the tactics as being amateurish refer to one skin

884
00:49:44,200 --> 00:49:47,200
Speaker 4: as in the title is bungling on a massive scale.

885
00:49:47,920 --> 00:49:49,360
Speaker 4: You know when I say, I say bring back the

886
00:49:49,360 --> 00:49:52,320
Speaker 4: word bungled, bungling, nobody says bungling anymore.

887
00:49:52,360 --> 00:49:54,600
Speaker 2: I like it. It has a certain new mommy to it.

888
00:49:54,760 --> 00:49:57,400
Speaker 3: Let's make it a noun. I think that's quite a bungle.

889
00:49:57,600 --> 00:49:58,280
Speaker 2: What a bungle?

890
00:49:58,440 --> 00:50:01,080
Speaker 4: Yeah, one of my favorite bands is mister Bungle, so

891
00:50:01,120 --> 00:50:03,640
Speaker 4: I'm with you. They go on to have a spiring

892
00:50:03,680 --> 00:50:07,920
Speaker 4: uncovered before they could actually do any serious spying is

893
00:50:08,040 --> 00:50:09,160
Speaker 4: doubly embarrassing.

894
00:50:09,480 --> 00:50:13,200
Speaker 3: Ooh, the snark that's cold. That's cold, So.

895
00:50:14,000 --> 00:50:16,120
Speaker 2: It's both cold and it burns.

896
00:50:16,280 --> 00:50:19,600
Speaker 3: Yes, yeah, icy hot.

897
00:50:18,880 --> 00:50:19,200
Speaker 5: This is.

898
00:50:21,680 --> 00:50:24,520
Speaker 3: Again, as we'll see, it is in step with the

899
00:50:24,600 --> 00:50:30,280
Speaker 3: FBI's official line. Right, we caught them before something terrible

900
00:50:30,320 --> 00:50:33,160
Speaker 3: would have happened. So what happens to these folks now?

901
00:50:33,160 --> 00:50:36,359
Speaker 3: The one guy in Cyprus, he escapes. The other ten

902
00:50:36,600 --> 00:50:41,680
Speaker 3: are in US custody. They're busted, and Reuter's reports on

903
00:50:41,800 --> 00:50:46,080
Speaker 3: July seventh, twenty ten, just a few days after the arrest,

904
00:50:46,360 --> 00:50:50,520
Speaker 3: Russia and the US hatch a prisoner swap deal, the

905
00:50:50,560 --> 00:50:54,560
Speaker 3: biggest of its kind since nineteen eighty six, we're trading

906
00:50:54,600 --> 00:50:56,200
Speaker 3: our people back and forth.

907
00:50:57,080 --> 00:51:00,799
Speaker 4: So the ten individuals are arrested as part of the

908
00:51:00,880 --> 00:51:03,799
Speaker 4: illegals program at age as well would be deported to

909
00:51:03,880 --> 00:51:07,279
Speaker 4: Russia in exchange for individuals whom Russia convicted of espionage

910
00:51:07,320 --> 00:51:09,520
Speaker 4: on behalf of the US and the UK. And like

911
00:51:09,560 --> 00:51:11,440
Speaker 4: you said, man, this is something that has often done,

912
00:51:11,480 --> 00:51:16,000
Speaker 4: these prisoner exchanges. It is a bargaining chip type situation

913
00:51:16,239 --> 00:51:20,160
Speaker 4: in the world of tradecraft. It's it's yeah, and it works,

914
00:51:20,160 --> 00:51:24,319
Speaker 4: but it is also interesting because it's sort of it's

915
00:51:24,400 --> 00:51:26,680
Speaker 4: sort of like a no harm, no foul kind of

916
00:51:26,719 --> 00:51:29,839
Speaker 4: thing almost, But it's weird. I don't know how I'm

917
00:51:29,880 --> 00:51:33,360
Speaker 4: not describing it right, but yeah, you're right, it's super

918
00:51:33,600 --> 00:51:36,080
Speaker 4: it's super weird, and it can make it feel as

919
00:51:36,160 --> 00:51:40,640
Speaker 4: though all the all the work to bust these folks has.

920
00:51:40,560 --> 00:51:42,600
Speaker 3: Come to nothing exactly.

921
00:51:42,640 --> 00:51:44,839
Speaker 2: That's what I was butting up against. Thanks man.

922
00:51:44,960 --> 00:51:47,319
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, it's it can feel that way. But we

923
00:51:47,400 --> 00:51:50,879
Speaker 3: have to remember, you know, by the time these ten

924
00:51:51,040 --> 00:51:55,160
Speaker 3: spies get back to Russia, they've been thoroughly interrogated. They're

925
00:51:55,320 --> 00:51:59,120
Speaker 3: squeezed dry like a lemon. You know. If the US

926
00:51:59,200 --> 00:52:01,520
Speaker 3: thought there was more to be gained from them the

927
00:52:01,520 --> 00:52:05,719
Speaker 3: deal would not have occurred. And another another little pro

928
00:52:05,880 --> 00:52:11,799
Speaker 3: tip folks, especially during the War on Terror, it's interesting

929
00:52:12,440 --> 00:52:18,280
Speaker 3: to go back and read through stories of prison escapes

930
00:52:19,440 --> 00:52:25,160
Speaker 3: in Pakistan and parts of the stands, because not every time,

931
00:52:25,600 --> 00:52:29,120
Speaker 3: but more often than you might think, those prison escapes

932
00:52:29,200 --> 00:52:33,360
Speaker 3: were manufactured so that we didn't have to tell the

933
00:52:33,400 --> 00:52:37,000
Speaker 3: American public that we were letting some bad guys go

934
00:52:37,120 --> 00:52:38,320
Speaker 3: as part of a larger deal.

935
00:52:38,560 --> 00:52:45,120
Speaker 4: You need a lie, a deception, a prevarication.

936
00:52:46,360 --> 00:52:49,320
Speaker 2: Now it's Joe, sir. I don't mean to be jaded

937
00:52:49,360 --> 00:52:49,759
Speaker 2: about it.

938
00:52:49,760 --> 00:52:52,719
Speaker 4: It's just kind of like, this is why we do

939
00:52:52,800 --> 00:52:56,680
Speaker 4: this show, y'all. I think it's really hard to believe

940
00:52:56,800 --> 00:52:57,520
Speaker 4: at face.

941
00:52:57,360 --> 00:52:59,240
Speaker 2: Value what any government says.

942
00:52:59,400 --> 00:53:04,600
Speaker 4: Ever, whatever the administration, whatever the political climate, it's just

943
00:53:05,760 --> 00:53:09,120
Speaker 4: it's it's a game that's built on a mountain of

944
00:53:09,160 --> 00:53:10,520
Speaker 4: bullet Yeah.

945
00:53:10,719 --> 00:53:14,520
Speaker 3: Yeah, and that is a broad brush that we are

946
00:53:14,640 --> 00:53:18,000
Speaker 3: more than comfortable painting with because it has never not

947
00:53:18,120 --> 00:53:23,239
Speaker 3: been true broad brush of bullet. Right. So there are

948
00:53:23,360 --> 00:53:26,640
Speaker 3: happy endings for some of these spies. Anna Chapman in

949
00:53:26,680 --> 00:53:30,760
Speaker 3: particular becomes a sort of celebrity. She heads a youth council,

950
00:53:31,239 --> 00:53:34,680
Speaker 3: She becomes a model at fashion shows. She even runs

951
00:53:34,680 --> 00:53:37,280
Speaker 3: her own TV series. Things worked out well for Chapping.

952
00:53:37,440 --> 00:53:40,120
Speaker 2: Did they go to like the premiere of the Americans?

953
00:53:40,800 --> 00:53:43,399
Speaker 3: That'd be amazing, But I don't think they're I don't

954
00:53:43,440 --> 00:53:45,000
Speaker 3: think they're traveling back to the States.

955
00:53:45,080 --> 00:53:48,080
Speaker 2: Okay, fair enough, Yeah, that would have been cool.

956
00:53:48,120 --> 00:53:52,400
Speaker 4: Though you don't make a special dispensation for an appearance.

957
00:53:53,560 --> 00:53:56,440
Speaker 3: So it's a close call, and you know, the FBI

958
00:53:56,640 --> 00:54:01,680
Speaker 3: considers it a success story. They busted the conspiracy. There

959
00:54:01,719 --> 00:54:05,279
Speaker 3: are some great in depth reports about this fantastic documentary.

960
00:54:05,760 --> 00:54:08,120
Speaker 3: In this case, it seems that the good guys won,

961
00:54:08,400 --> 00:54:12,040
Speaker 3: but that's not quite the end because the discovery of

962
00:54:12,040 --> 00:54:14,640
Speaker 3: a group like this, even if they were a bungle,

963
00:54:15,960 --> 00:54:20,480
Speaker 3: it leads us to some disturbing implications. I mean, no,

964
00:54:20,800 --> 00:54:24,239
Speaker 3: we only caught these folks because they screwed up.

965
00:54:24,600 --> 00:54:25,120
Speaker 2: That's right.

966
00:54:25,239 --> 00:54:28,600
Speaker 4: And again, we just did an episode about this kind

967
00:54:28,600 --> 00:54:31,799
Speaker 4: of rash of spies getting caught and spies screwing up

968
00:54:31,840 --> 00:54:34,839
Speaker 4: our spy, our spies getting works.

969
00:54:35,200 --> 00:54:36,040
Speaker 2: What's going on?

970
00:54:36,239 --> 00:54:39,160
Speaker 4: To your point, band, the implications there can be pretty disturbing.

971
00:54:39,200 --> 00:54:41,640
Speaker 4: This means there's a non zero chance, as you put it,

972
00:54:41,680 --> 00:54:46,000
Speaker 4: ben of a more competent network out there potentially the

973
00:54:46,040 --> 00:54:49,560
Speaker 4: one that didn't get caught, and that's part of why

974
00:54:49,600 --> 00:54:55,120
Speaker 4: the FBI isn't exactly being entirely forthright about how they

975
00:54:55,160 --> 00:54:57,959
Speaker 4: went about identifying this ring, which totally makes sense.

976
00:54:58,760 --> 00:55:01,600
Speaker 3: Yeah, because you don't want the other if there is

977
00:55:01,680 --> 00:55:04,439
Speaker 3: another gang out there, you don't want them to know

978
00:55:04,680 --> 00:55:06,040
Speaker 3: how you catch your rabbits.

979
00:55:06,200 --> 00:55:08,960
Speaker 2: You call this a cell, right all the cell.

980
00:55:09,120 --> 00:55:15,040
Speaker 3: Yeah, they they definitely were grouped under the same umbrella

981
00:55:15,160 --> 00:55:18,719
Speaker 3: in Moscow, but they did not you know, they didn't

982
00:55:18,760 --> 00:55:20,319
Speaker 3: have group meetings with all times.

983
00:55:20,360 --> 00:55:21,080
Speaker 2: Isn't that the point?

984
00:55:21,120 --> 00:55:24,799
Speaker 4: Like a cell, they're they're siloed by nature, they don't

985
00:55:24,840 --> 00:55:26,759
Speaker 4: know about each other, but they're kind of doing the

986
00:55:26,800 --> 00:55:29,080
Speaker 4: same thing and it's sort of a numbers game, right.

987
00:55:29,200 --> 00:55:32,480
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, Yeah, they're decentralized, which is a really smart

988
00:55:32,480 --> 00:55:37,480
Speaker 3: thing to do. And second, this might disturb our international listeners.

989
00:55:38,160 --> 00:55:41,839
Speaker 3: These tactics and these groups are not limited to the US.

990
00:55:42,280 --> 00:55:45,120
Speaker 3: I know Russia has done this in the UK. They're

991
00:55:45,200 --> 00:55:48,040
Speaker 3: messing around in Australia. People are trying to get in

992
00:55:48,120 --> 00:55:52,240
Speaker 3: where they fit in. They're likely occurring around the world

993
00:55:52,360 --> 00:55:55,239
Speaker 3: right now, and some just haven't been caught because in

994
00:55:55,280 --> 00:55:58,480
Speaker 3: a very real way, to our Russian friends. The Cold

995
00:55:58,520 --> 00:55:59,960
Speaker 3: War never ended.

996
00:56:00,239 --> 00:56:01,040
Speaker 2: No, it didn't.

997
00:56:01,080 --> 00:56:03,279
Speaker 4: And can I just say Ben that your name on

998
00:56:03,320 --> 00:56:07,239
Speaker 4: our video chat today is Ben exclamation mark, which you

999
00:56:07,239 --> 00:56:09,120
Speaker 4: would say just as Ben, And.

1000
00:56:09,040 --> 00:56:10,560
Speaker 2: You're making me feel that way today.

1001
00:56:10,680 --> 00:56:14,440
Speaker 4: Very exclamatory and excited to be talking about this topic

1002
00:56:14,480 --> 00:56:16,400
Speaker 4: with you, as dark as it may be, and the

1003
00:56:16,440 --> 00:56:19,600
Speaker 4: implications being what they are, and you know, as rough

1004
00:56:19,640 --> 00:56:22,000
Speaker 4: as things might feel out there for some of us,

1005
00:56:22,880 --> 00:56:25,920
Speaker 4: many of us in the United States, it's good to

1006
00:56:25,960 --> 00:56:27,920
Speaker 4: know that you're in a good mood and you have

1007
00:56:28,000 --> 00:56:28,359
Speaker 4: my back.

1008
00:56:30,160 --> 00:56:30,480
Speaker 2: Well.

1009
00:56:30,960 --> 00:56:33,520
Speaker 3: Who knew that a small piece of punctuation could make

1010
00:56:33,560 --> 00:56:36,839
Speaker 3: such a positive difference. Yeah, you and I have had

1011
00:56:37,000 --> 00:56:42,280
Speaker 3: candidly pretty rough weeks and we're both very happy for Friday,

1012
00:56:42,560 --> 00:56:44,880
Speaker 3: and folks, we're so happy that you took the time

1013
00:56:45,000 --> 00:56:49,360
Speaker 3: to join us. We will be returning in the future

1014
00:56:49,680 --> 00:56:54,520
Speaker 3: with episodes on things like diplomatic immunity or shock doctrine,

1015
00:56:54,600 --> 00:56:57,200
Speaker 3: and then we'll have some paranormal mixed in there too.

1016
00:56:57,719 --> 00:57:02,560
Speaker 3: Or takeaway here though to your earlier question, is our

1017
00:57:02,600 --> 00:57:07,000
Speaker 3: spies getting worse technology getting better? These conspiracies are real,

1018
00:57:07,320 --> 00:57:10,360
Speaker 3: but the same technology that makes it easier to track

1019
00:57:10,520 --> 00:57:13,759
Speaker 3: sleeper spies can also make it easier for them to

1020
00:57:13,840 --> 00:57:17,480
Speaker 3: hide and communicate. There's a new world order in the

1021
00:57:17,520 --> 00:57:21,479
Speaker 3: realm of tradecraft. So tell us if you're a child spy,

1022
00:57:22,440 --> 00:57:25,080
Speaker 3: tell us what kind of sleeper agent you would be, Like,

1023
00:57:25,120 --> 00:57:26,520
Speaker 3: what would your cover job be?

1024
00:57:27,320 --> 00:57:28,240
Speaker 2: Or a sleepy agent?

1025
00:57:28,520 --> 00:57:29,720
Speaker 3: You know, a sleepy agent.

1026
00:57:29,840 --> 00:57:31,440
Speaker 2: Do you sleep with a stuffed animal?

1027
00:57:31,560 --> 00:57:31,880
Speaker 3: I do.

1028
00:57:32,600 --> 00:57:34,560
Speaker 2: I'm not gonna lie. I love a stuffed animal. My

1029
00:57:34,600 --> 00:57:35,480
Speaker 2: house is full of them.

1030
00:57:35,560 --> 00:57:37,400
Speaker 4: I had a house cleaner come over once and ask

1031
00:57:37,480 --> 00:57:39,400
Speaker 4: me if I had lots of small children.

1032
00:57:39,440 --> 00:57:40,440
Speaker 2: I don't. They're mine.

1033
00:57:42,120 --> 00:57:44,760
Speaker 3: Good, draw the line in the sand there, no, and

1034
00:57:44,840 --> 00:57:47,520
Speaker 3: let them know what's what. In the meantime, we want

1035
00:57:47,560 --> 00:57:50,280
Speaker 3: you to let us know what's what. We love your

1036
00:57:50,280 --> 00:57:54,160
Speaker 3: input on this. We'd love to hear your stories and

1037
00:57:54,600 --> 00:57:57,800
Speaker 3: you know, build out your sleeper agent or sleepy agent persona.

1038
00:57:58,040 --> 00:58:01,280
Speaker 3: Tell us all about it online via email or on

1039
00:58:01,320 --> 00:58:01,680
Speaker 3: the phone.

1040
00:58:01,800 --> 00:58:02,200
Speaker 2: It's all right.

1041
00:58:02,200 --> 00:58:04,080
Speaker 4: You can find us at the handle conspiracy Stuff, where

1042
00:58:04,120 --> 00:58:07,160
Speaker 4: we exist on all the social media platforms of note,

1043
00:58:07,200 --> 00:58:11,200
Speaker 4: I suppose that is conspiracy Stuff on x FKA, Twitter,

1044
00:58:11,280 --> 00:58:13,760
Speaker 4: on YouTube where we have video content color for your

1045
00:58:13,800 --> 00:58:16,720
Speaker 4: perusing enjoyment, and on Facebook, where we have our Facebook group.

1046
00:58:16,760 --> 00:58:18,120
Speaker 2: Here's where it gets crazy.

1047
00:58:18,440 --> 00:58:21,040
Speaker 4: Start your own sleeper cell with your fellow Here's where

1048
00:58:21,080 --> 00:58:23,560
Speaker 4: it gets crazies on Instagram and TikTok.

1049
00:58:23,560 --> 00:58:25,880
Speaker 2: However, we're conspiracy stuff show and.

1050
00:58:26,760 --> 00:58:30,200
Speaker 3: Should you engage with telephonic devices, why not give us

1051
00:58:30,240 --> 00:58:35,280
Speaker 3: a call? We are one eight three three std WYTK.

1052
00:58:36,000 --> 00:58:38,880
Speaker 3: What do you call? You will hear a hopefully familiar voice,

1053
00:58:38,920 --> 00:58:41,280
Speaker 3: and then you'll hear a beep like so beep that

1054
00:58:41,360 --> 00:58:44,240
Speaker 3: means you're off to the races three minutes. Those minutes

1055
00:58:44,280 --> 00:58:47,400
Speaker 3: are yours? Go nuts, get weird with it. You can

1056
00:58:47,440 --> 00:58:50,360
Speaker 3: give us your real name or cool nickname. Most importantly,

1057
00:58:50,720 --> 00:58:52,400
Speaker 3: just let us know if we can use your name

1058
00:58:52,480 --> 00:58:56,040
Speaker 3: and or message on the air. If you prefer to

1059
00:58:56,200 --> 00:58:59,600
Speaker 3: communicate via email, we have some good news for you.

1060
00:58:59,680 --> 00:59:03,880
Speaker 3: We're available twenty four hours a night, seven evenings a

1061
00:59:03,960 --> 00:59:06,280
Speaker 3: week at our good old fashioned email address.

1062
00:59:06,480 --> 00:59:28,520
Speaker 4: We are conspiracy at iHeartRadio dot com.

1063
00:59:28,680 --> 00:59:30,720
Speaker 2: Stuff they don't want you to know is a production

1064
00:59:30,840 --> 00:59:35,360
Speaker 2: of iHeartRadio. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app,

1065
00:59:35,440 --> 00:59:38,720
Speaker 2: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.