1 00:00:01,840 --> 00:00:05,000 Speaker 1: Also media. 2 00:00:06,640 --> 00:00:09,479 Speaker 2: Hi everyone, and welcome to it could happen here. 3 00:00:10,280 --> 00:00:12,639 Speaker 1: It's me James today and I am very lucky to 4 00:00:12,720 --> 00:00:13,760 Speaker 1: join by Garrison. 5 00:00:13,840 --> 00:00:16,840 Speaker 2: Hi Ge, Hello, Hi Garrison. 6 00:00:16,840 --> 00:00:19,680 Speaker 1: I've some of you here today to talk about boats, 7 00:00:20,000 --> 00:00:22,720 Speaker 1: a topic that white men love. But we're not going 8 00:00:22,720 --> 00:00:24,640 Speaker 1: to talk about like going out on the lake and 9 00:00:25,480 --> 00:00:27,080 Speaker 1: looking for bass today. 10 00:00:27,360 --> 00:00:29,600 Speaker 2: I've only done bass fishing ones. It's not for me. 11 00:00:29,880 --> 00:00:31,840 Speaker 3: Do you hold up the fish for the picture? Do 12 00:00:31,880 --> 00:00:32,600 Speaker 3: you do the picture? 13 00:00:32,880 --> 00:00:35,760 Speaker 1: I wasn't blessed with a bass on that trip, but 14 00:00:35,800 --> 00:00:37,680 Speaker 1: I did get to It was very interesting because the 15 00:00:37,680 --> 00:00:40,440 Speaker 1: guy had like a purple boat with gold flex in it. 16 00:00:40,600 --> 00:00:43,440 Speaker 1: It didn't represent who I thought he was as a person. 17 00:00:43,520 --> 00:00:45,479 Speaker 1: Turned out actually he had a boat sponsorship and he 18 00:00:45,520 --> 00:00:47,519 Speaker 1: was going to sell it. But ah, it was a 19 00:00:47,520 --> 00:00:50,240 Speaker 1: cool boat. I got to drive that boat pretty fast 20 00:00:50,280 --> 00:00:53,159 Speaker 1: through some doughnuts and stuff. So that's another thing that 21 00:00:53,240 --> 00:00:56,440 Speaker 1: calls to a part of my soul. I want to 22 00:00:56,480 --> 00:00:59,960 Speaker 1: talk about private maritime security today. The reason why I've 23 00:01:00,080 --> 00:01:04,399 Speaker 1: course is that Iran is currently attacking boats in the 24 00:01:04,480 --> 00:01:08,720 Speaker 1: Strait of Horn Moves and elsewhere. Right there's some boats 25 00:01:09,000 --> 00:01:12,959 Speaker 1: were attacked in portant Basara yesterday. We're recording this on Thursday. 26 00:01:13,400 --> 00:01:16,800 Speaker 1: At the time of recording, they have attacked six boats. 27 00:01:16,959 --> 00:01:19,400 Speaker 1: It's more likely than not that there will be more 28 00:01:19,440 --> 00:01:22,119 Speaker 1: boats attacked by the time you are listening to this. 29 00:01:22,560 --> 00:01:24,920 Speaker 2: It's been a really bad week for boat guys. 30 00:01:25,160 --> 00:01:28,120 Speaker 3: It's been a bad year for boats in general. 31 00:01:28,319 --> 00:01:29,160 Speaker 2: Oh, Venezuela. 32 00:01:29,280 --> 00:01:33,240 Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, let's talk about private maritime security. 33 00:01:33,280 --> 00:01:35,479 Speaker 2: So, like, when these boats are. 34 00:01:35,319 --> 00:01:38,399 Speaker 1: Transmitting the Strait of horn Moves, right, the United States 35 00:01:38,520 --> 00:01:41,920 Speaker 1: has offered and then rescinded the offer to escort them 36 00:01:42,000 --> 00:01:44,440 Speaker 1: through the Straight of Horn Moves. It's very unlikely that 37 00:01:44,440 --> 00:01:47,720 Speaker 1: the United States is going to be able to sufficiently 38 00:01:47,840 --> 00:01:50,240 Speaker 1: escort every boat that goes through the State of Horn Moves. 39 00:01:50,240 --> 00:01:55,280 Speaker 1: And this is a longstanding issue, right. I think probably 40 00:01:55,400 --> 00:01:58,560 Speaker 1: lots of listeners won't be aware of the long history 41 00:01:58,800 --> 00:02:03,560 Speaker 1: of private security on ships. Right. I'm only going to 42 00:02:03,560 --> 00:02:05,560 Speaker 1: talk about this in the context of the twenty first century, 43 00:02:05,600 --> 00:02:06,280 Speaker 1: but this goes. 44 00:02:06,080 --> 00:02:06,920 Speaker 2: A lot further back. 45 00:02:07,640 --> 00:02:11,160 Speaker 1: It's largely a consequence of the way the law governs 46 00:02:11,200 --> 00:02:15,360 Speaker 1: the ocean. It's actually the same wow, sorry, yeah, daddy, 47 00:02:15,400 --> 00:02:15,959 Speaker 1: long legs. 48 00:02:16,120 --> 00:02:18,040 Speaker 2: I don't know if it's an American word for that 49 00:02:18,040 --> 00:02:18,640 Speaker 2: that I don't. 50 00:02:18,480 --> 00:02:19,560 Speaker 3: Know Daddy long legs. 51 00:02:19,560 --> 00:02:24,000 Speaker 1: That's okay, Yeah, absolute unit has just entered my office space. 52 00:02:25,440 --> 00:02:28,400 Speaker 1: World LM be the reason that we can have private 53 00:02:28,400 --> 00:02:31,880 Speaker 1: security contractors, often with machine guns, etc. On boats, It's 54 00:02:31,919 --> 00:02:35,320 Speaker 1: the same reason that horrific labor abuses are perpetrated on 55 00:02:35,360 --> 00:02:40,160 Speaker 1: boats on a daily basis. Right, Perhaps the most well 56 00:02:40,200 --> 00:02:42,359 Speaker 1: documented are among the most well documented are the ones 57 00:02:42,360 --> 00:02:45,760 Speaker 1: off Thailand on fishing ships, which often involve Burmese refugees 58 00:02:45,840 --> 00:02:49,720 Speaker 1: or people fleeing me anma right there essentially enslaved on 59 00:02:49,800 --> 00:02:53,920 Speaker 1: these boats or in sort of indentured servitude of trying 60 00:02:53,960 --> 00:02:56,920 Speaker 1: to quote unquote pay off their trip out of the 61 00:02:56,919 --> 00:02:59,639 Speaker 1: country they were fleeing. Right, I'm not talking about labor 62 00:02:59,680 --> 00:03:03,040 Speaker 1: abuses today. I want to talk more about private security. 63 00:03:03,280 --> 00:03:07,040 Speaker 1: Most of security provided two boats in the world. 64 00:03:07,120 --> 00:03:08,160 Speaker 2: In general, it's not. 65 00:03:08,120 --> 00:03:12,040 Speaker 1: Provided by states. It is provided by private military contractors. 66 00:03:12,120 --> 00:03:12,320 Speaker 2: Right. 67 00:03:13,040 --> 00:03:15,920 Speaker 1: Earlier on in the twentieth century, the typical profile of 68 00:03:15,919 --> 00:03:17,600 Speaker 1: one of these people would have been that they'd left 69 00:03:17,680 --> 00:03:20,680 Speaker 1: the military in a state in the global north. They 70 00:03:20,720 --> 00:03:24,040 Speaker 1: had found let's say, life for employment in the civilian 71 00:03:24,040 --> 00:03:27,160 Speaker 1: world to be difficult for them. And I've met a 72 00:03:27,280 --> 00:03:29,799 Speaker 1: number of these people in a number of places. Many 73 00:03:29,880 --> 00:03:33,359 Speaker 1: of them went to parts of Africa thinking that they 74 00:03:33,400 --> 00:03:37,320 Speaker 1: were going to work protecting wildlife and then ending up 75 00:03:37,520 --> 00:03:41,760 Speaker 1: protecting large container ships instead, or attempting to work for 76 00:03:41,800 --> 00:03:44,120 Speaker 1: a company that would one day let them protect wildlife 77 00:03:44,200 --> 00:03:47,000 Speaker 1: or something similar. Generally, the companies they end up working 78 00:03:47,040 --> 00:03:52,040 Speaker 1: for are generally referred to as private maritime security companies PMSCs, 79 00:03:52,200 --> 00:03:56,080 Speaker 1: as opposed to PMC private military contractor, although it is 80 00:03:56,600 --> 00:03:59,600 Speaker 1: a version of the same thing. Generally, these companies offer 81 00:03:59,640 --> 00:04:02,440 Speaker 1: a shipping company a sort of package, and it's not 82 00:04:02,640 --> 00:04:06,119 Speaker 1: just armed. Security also include stuff like intelligence, crisis response, 83 00:04:06,200 --> 00:04:10,080 Speaker 1: and potential intervention. I spoke to someone, for instance, who 84 00:04:10,160 --> 00:04:12,200 Speaker 1: had worked for a shipping company and his major job 85 00:04:12,320 --> 00:04:16,040 Speaker 1: was to deal with when people were kidnapped off the boats. 86 00:04:16,720 --> 00:04:20,200 Speaker 1: He would then either go and rescue the people or 87 00:04:20,400 --> 00:04:22,719 Speaker 1: negotiate with the people who would kidnapped them. 88 00:04:22,920 --> 00:04:27,680 Speaker 3: These are like cargo ships, oil tankers like what kind of. 89 00:04:27,960 --> 00:04:30,720 Speaker 1: Yeah, so mostly they are on large commercial vessels, right, 90 00:04:30,760 --> 00:04:34,919 Speaker 1: cargo ships, oil tankers, things with an expensive cargo, although 91 00:04:34,960 --> 00:04:39,159 Speaker 1: it is not unheard of for pmsc's. For instance, you 92 00:04:39,200 --> 00:04:42,080 Speaker 1: may have a maritime security company to secure your large 93 00:04:42,080 --> 00:04:42,760 Speaker 1: mega yacht. 94 00:04:42,839 --> 00:04:46,280 Speaker 3: Sure, right, or another boat that you're worried about. Did 95 00:04:46,279 --> 00:04:48,279 Speaker 3: these happen on my cruise ships? Sometimes? 96 00:04:48,440 --> 00:04:51,479 Speaker 1: Yes, there was a shootout in the early two thousand 97 00:04:51,640 --> 00:04:55,159 Speaker 1: so I shoot out, it's probably private security characters on it. 98 00:04:55,240 --> 00:04:58,360 Speaker 1: I think it was an Italian cruise ship fired at 99 00:04:58,440 --> 00:05:00,640 Speaker 1: pirates who are attempting to board cruise ship. 100 00:05:00,800 --> 00:05:01,520 Speaker 3: Huh. 101 00:05:01,640 --> 00:05:06,200 Speaker 1: It's a lot less uncommon than you would think. 102 00:05:06,920 --> 00:05:10,240 Speaker 3: So when we're planning the twenty twenty eight Cool Zone 103 00:05:10,240 --> 00:05:14,080 Speaker 3: Media Cruise all access included, we're going to have to 104 00:05:14,120 --> 00:05:15,599 Speaker 3: contact with one of these companies. 105 00:05:15,760 --> 00:05:17,680 Speaker 1: I think we can probably bring that in house. I 106 00:05:17,720 --> 00:05:20,719 Speaker 1: think that that would be the goal at that point. 107 00:05:20,839 --> 00:05:26,359 Speaker 1: Right within the Greater iHeart Ecosystem Garrison, we have so 108 00:05:26,520 --> 00:05:31,440 Speaker 1: many automatic weapons. You don't listen to the like Belfed 109 00:05:31,520 --> 00:05:37,360 Speaker 1: Machine Gun podcast, the iHeart Militia. It's US and TED 110 00:05:37,440 --> 00:05:40,400 Speaker 1: cruise and we're we haven't really agreed on very much 111 00:05:40,480 --> 00:05:43,200 Speaker 1: other than gun ownership. Maybe we should talk about when 112 00:05:43,240 --> 00:05:47,279 Speaker 1: the real reason like PMSCs took off in the twenty 113 00:05:47,320 --> 00:05:51,880 Speaker 1: first century was the rise in piracy of Somalia. Right 114 00:05:52,400 --> 00:05:55,280 Speaker 1: before this piracy had existed, mostly in Southeast Asia. On 115 00:05:55,320 --> 00:05:57,360 Speaker 1: piracy has guested for as long as people going on 116 00:05:57,440 --> 00:06:01,400 Speaker 1: boats has existed, right, Let's specifically piracy off Southeast Asia 117 00:06:01,440 --> 00:06:04,520 Speaker 1: had before this been more of a like a smash 118 00:06:04,560 --> 00:06:07,520 Speaker 1: and grab kind of situation, like turn up, take what 119 00:06:07,560 --> 00:06:12,520 Speaker 1: you can leave. What was distinct in this piracy that 120 00:06:12,560 --> 00:06:14,560 Speaker 1: we began to see from like two thousand and eight 121 00:06:14,600 --> 00:06:18,640 Speaker 1: onwards was that pirates were either trying to see the 122 00:06:18,800 --> 00:06:23,280 Speaker 1: entire cargo of a vessel the vessel itself, or to 123 00:06:23,400 --> 00:06:27,200 Speaker 1: kidnap people from the vessel and hold them for ransom. 124 00:06:27,760 --> 00:06:32,719 Speaker 1: I guess the most high profile case was called the Maskalabama. 125 00:06:32,760 --> 00:06:33,960 Speaker 2: Are you familiar with this one? 126 00:06:34,480 --> 00:06:34,560 Speaker 3: No? 127 00:06:35,480 --> 00:06:37,640 Speaker 2: Okay, this is that's good because you get to hear 128 00:06:37,680 --> 00:06:38,240 Speaker 2: a story. 129 00:06:38,360 --> 00:06:41,120 Speaker 3: I don't keep up with piratenews dot org. 130 00:06:41,720 --> 00:06:45,200 Speaker 2: Really, I can see you being like pirate curious. No, 131 00:06:45,240 --> 00:06:46,080 Speaker 2: you're not interested in. 132 00:06:46,400 --> 00:06:48,920 Speaker 3: I've always had kind of a love hate relationship with pirates, Okay, 133 00:06:49,240 --> 00:06:53,119 Speaker 3: you know, undeniably cool in some way, also a little 134 00:06:53,120 --> 00:06:53,680 Speaker 3: bit messy. 135 00:06:53,760 --> 00:06:54,760 Speaker 2: They can be messy. 136 00:06:55,000 --> 00:06:58,320 Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, lots of overlap between pirates and anarchism. 137 00:06:58,360 --> 00:06:59,919 Speaker 2: I'm sure you've this is true. 138 00:07:00,080 --> 00:07:03,320 Speaker 3: Yeah, some of my same critiques there for you both sides. 139 00:07:03,440 --> 00:07:04,800 Speaker 2: Yeah. Yeah, I can also be messy. 140 00:07:05,000 --> 00:07:07,599 Speaker 3: As soon as the pirates all start wearing matching black suits, 141 00:07:07,600 --> 00:07:08,800 Speaker 3: then we can talk. 142 00:07:08,839 --> 00:07:11,640 Speaker 1: I think that's inherently like the piracy isn't about that. 143 00:07:11,680 --> 00:07:13,080 Speaker 1: Piracy is about self expression. 144 00:07:13,200 --> 00:07:14,240 Speaker 3: That's the thing, got it. 145 00:07:14,720 --> 00:07:19,360 Speaker 1: Yeah, well, yeah, great, disagree. I like a diverse pirate 146 00:07:19,440 --> 00:07:24,280 Speaker 1: outfit personally, in this case, a small vessel, right. I 147 00:07:24,280 --> 00:07:26,840 Speaker 1: think they had four or five pirates. 148 00:07:27,000 --> 00:07:27,560 Speaker 2: They had like. 149 00:07:27,560 --> 00:07:32,320 Speaker 1: Pretty basic weaponry RTE like kalashnikovs. I think they boarded 150 00:07:32,440 --> 00:07:36,360 Speaker 1: the mess Galabama. The boat had a pirate alarm, and 151 00:07:36,400 --> 00:07:41,120 Speaker 1: they sounded the pirate alarm. In this you have to 152 00:07:41,120 --> 00:07:47,320 Speaker 1: struggle to repress your like eighteenth century like mind pallas, right, Yeah. Yeah, 153 00:07:47,400 --> 00:07:51,680 Speaker 1: the crew sheltered in. They had like a safe room. Yeah, 154 00:07:51,840 --> 00:07:54,200 Speaker 1: they went in this safe room. Well, they captured the 155 00:07:54,280 --> 00:07:57,840 Speaker 1: captain of the ship pretty quickly. The ship didn't have 156 00:07:57,840 --> 00:08:01,120 Speaker 1: any means of defending itself other than it tried to, 157 00:08:01,320 --> 00:08:03,800 Speaker 1: like I'm not a massive boat understander, it tried to 158 00:08:03,920 --> 00:08:07,520 Speaker 1: use its rudder to swamp the pirate ship as it 159 00:08:07,600 --> 00:08:09,920 Speaker 1: was coming up, so like kind of flick it and 160 00:08:10,040 --> 00:08:13,640 Speaker 1: that didn't work. Yeah, And one member of the ship's 161 00:08:13,640 --> 00:08:20,080 Speaker 1: crew who hid himself with a knife and successfully subdued 162 00:08:20,160 --> 00:08:24,960 Speaker 1: and captured the leader of the pirates and the crew 163 00:08:25,160 --> 00:08:29,160 Speaker 1: then attempted to trade this person for their captain. They 164 00:08:29,240 --> 00:08:33,120 Speaker 1: tied up the pirate who they had captured attempted to 165 00:08:33,120 --> 00:08:38,000 Speaker 1: trade him for their captain. The pirates took the leader 166 00:08:38,000 --> 00:08:39,760 Speaker 1: of the pirates and then never gave the crew their 167 00:08:39,800 --> 00:08:43,360 Speaker 1: captain and then made off in a lifeboat with a 168 00:08:43,440 --> 00:08:47,360 Speaker 1: large amount of cash and the captain. This resulted in 169 00:08:47,400 --> 00:08:50,960 Speaker 1: a standoff. Now, the Mescalabama was a I believe a 170 00:08:51,080 --> 00:08:54,920 Speaker 1: US flagged ship. It may have been a US Dutch ship, 171 00:08:54,960 --> 00:08:56,680 Speaker 1: but it was flagged to like a nation in the 172 00:08:56,720 --> 00:08:59,440 Speaker 1: major in the global north right. This would become relevant later. 173 00:09:00,160 --> 00:09:05,439 Speaker 1: The United States sent two boats which proceeded to engage 174 00:09:05,440 --> 00:09:08,880 Speaker 1: in a standoff with the lifeboat for several days, where 175 00:09:09,120 --> 00:09:11,800 Speaker 1: they first attempted to drop a SAP phone and a 176 00:09:11,800 --> 00:09:12,880 Speaker 1: mobile phone to. 177 00:09:12,840 --> 00:09:13,840 Speaker 2: The pirates in the lifeboat. 178 00:09:13,880 --> 00:09:15,880 Speaker 1: The pirates through those in the ocean because they thought 179 00:09:15,920 --> 00:09:18,160 Speaker 1: that they were using them to communicate with the captain 180 00:09:18,160 --> 00:09:20,200 Speaker 1: of the ship. At one point, the captain, who they'd 181 00:09:20,200 --> 00:09:23,040 Speaker 1: held hostage, ended up in the ocean, but then he 182 00:09:23,080 --> 00:09:27,800 Speaker 1: got back into the lifeboat. The situation was resolved eventually 183 00:09:27,880 --> 00:09:31,400 Speaker 1: by the Navy seals shooting all the pirates. They were 184 00:09:31,440 --> 00:09:34,120 Speaker 1: based on one of the US ships, and they used 185 00:09:34,120 --> 00:09:36,199 Speaker 1: siper rifles to shoot the pirates. 186 00:09:36,280 --> 00:09:38,240 Speaker 2: Really yep, they shot. 187 00:09:38,000 --> 00:09:40,280 Speaker 1: Them all off the lifeboat while the captain of the 188 00:09:40,320 --> 00:09:43,960 Speaker 1: ship was also in the lifeboat. WHOA, yeah, no, then 189 00:09:44,440 --> 00:09:46,600 Speaker 1: I would be shocked if that's not a film about this, 190 00:09:46,760 --> 00:09:48,679 Speaker 1: or I know the captain of the ship has written 191 00:09:48,720 --> 00:09:52,440 Speaker 1: a book about his time being captured. But obviously, like 192 00:09:52,520 --> 00:09:55,920 Speaker 1: this kind of rattled the world, right, It scared a 193 00:09:55,920 --> 00:09:58,120 Speaker 1: lot of people, specifically in the shipping industry, because this 194 00:09:58,200 --> 00:10:02,160 Speaker 1: is a scary thing to happen, and specifically this change 195 00:10:02,160 --> 00:10:06,120 Speaker 1: in the nature of piracy from taking stuff to potentially 196 00:10:06,600 --> 00:10:09,920 Speaker 1: capturing people. And I believe the goal of the pirates 197 00:10:09,960 --> 00:10:12,520 Speaker 1: here was to get the captain ashore where they could hide. 198 00:10:12,400 --> 00:10:14,240 Speaker 2: Him more easily, right in Somalia. 199 00:10:14,280 --> 00:10:18,559 Speaker 1: And then it becomes entirely different issue when you're trying 200 00:10:18,559 --> 00:10:21,040 Speaker 1: to get US troops into a completely different country to 201 00:10:21,120 --> 00:10:22,119 Speaker 1: rescue someone. 202 00:10:21,920 --> 00:10:23,959 Speaker 3: A different land mass. Yeah. 203 00:10:24,080 --> 00:10:27,439 Speaker 1: Yeah, And I think it's really important to talk about 204 00:10:27,480 --> 00:10:32,040 Speaker 1: like the jurisdictional issues here because they are what gives 205 00:10:32,160 --> 00:10:35,240 Speaker 1: the pmsc is so much leeway. I think we'll take 206 00:10:35,280 --> 00:10:38,440 Speaker 1: a little break talking about jurisdiction and then we will 207 00:10:38,440 --> 00:10:38,920 Speaker 1: come back. 208 00:10:50,000 --> 00:10:50,760 Speaker 2: All right, we're back. 209 00:10:51,760 --> 00:10:55,120 Speaker 1: So to understand private maritime security companies, you've got to 210 00:10:55,160 --> 00:10:58,640 Speaker 1: understand the world of flags of convenience first. Familiar with 211 00:10:58,679 --> 00:11:02,960 Speaker 1: flags the convenience garrison. No, No, okay, this is good. 212 00:11:03,240 --> 00:11:06,160 Speaker 1: This is James gets to download shit that he reads 213 00:11:06,160 --> 00:11:08,600 Speaker 1: that no, for no reason at like eleven o'clock at night. 214 00:11:09,480 --> 00:11:14,280 Speaker 1: There are nations in the world states that allow vessels 215 00:11:14,320 --> 00:11:17,080 Speaker 1: to register under their flag even if the owner of 216 00:11:17,080 --> 00:11:18,800 Speaker 1: the vessel it's not a citizen of that country. 217 00:11:19,440 --> 00:11:20,920 Speaker 2: It's called an open registry. 218 00:11:21,240 --> 00:11:23,760 Speaker 1: So if you hang out in the port, spend time 219 00:11:23,800 --> 00:11:25,720 Speaker 1: looking at boats, to look at the flags of other boats, 220 00:11:26,080 --> 00:11:29,640 Speaker 1: you will often see flags of a few countries. The 221 00:11:29,679 --> 00:11:34,200 Speaker 1: most common ones are Liberia, Panama, and the Republic of 222 00:11:34,200 --> 00:11:39,080 Speaker 1: the Marshall Islands. The reason that boat owners might choose 223 00:11:39,320 --> 00:11:42,720 Speaker 1: let's say you Garrison have a boat right or a 224 00:11:42,840 --> 00:11:47,680 Speaker 1: shipping company Garrison Davis Boats Incorporated, and you don't want 225 00:11:47,679 --> 00:11:50,679 Speaker 1: to register them in Canada or the United States, might 226 00:11:50,679 --> 00:11:53,840 Speaker 1: be to avoid tax liability. Might be to avoid like 227 00:11:54,040 --> 00:11:58,559 Speaker 1: what you consider to be burdens and safety regulations, okay, 228 00:11:59,640 --> 00:12:04,160 Speaker 1: might be to avoid the frustrating constraints of Canadian labor law, 229 00:12:05,160 --> 00:12:08,400 Speaker 1: or it might be to avoid some ecological constraints on 230 00:12:08,440 --> 00:12:12,800 Speaker 1: your boats which your flag nation might impose. And generally 231 00:12:13,360 --> 00:12:15,880 Speaker 1: flags of convenience have very little in the way of 232 00:12:15,920 --> 00:12:20,040 Speaker 1: taxation and regulation, right and so people might choose to 233 00:12:20,120 --> 00:12:23,880 Speaker 1: flag their vessel in Liberia, Panama, Publican, Marshall Islands, Hong 234 00:12:24,000 --> 00:12:29,040 Speaker 1: Kong instead to avoid some of those issues. Right now, 235 00:12:29,679 --> 00:12:33,120 Speaker 1: the issue comes when you read say you register your 236 00:12:33,120 --> 00:12:35,600 Speaker 1: boat in Liberia and your boat is off on its 237 00:12:35,600 --> 00:12:39,080 Speaker 1: way delivering things, and then some pirates sees your boat. 238 00:12:39,120 --> 00:12:41,800 Speaker 3: I'm guessing Liberia is not going to be of much assistance. 239 00:12:42,000 --> 00:12:45,920 Speaker 1: Yeah, they're not coming, yeah, yeah, the Liberian Navy is 240 00:12:45,960 --> 00:12:48,920 Speaker 1: not available to help you in that instance right now. 241 00:12:49,520 --> 00:12:54,360 Speaker 1: Because there tends to be very little constraint on flags 242 00:12:54,360 --> 00:12:56,880 Speaker 1: of convenience, there's also very little constraint on what can 243 00:12:57,000 --> 00:13:01,440 Speaker 1: happen on those boats, right so you could hire a 244 00:13:01,440 --> 00:13:04,920 Speaker 1: private maritime security company and they could protect your boat, 245 00:13:04,920 --> 00:13:08,120 Speaker 1: and the chances are the flagger convenience country would not 246 00:13:08,520 --> 00:13:12,000 Speaker 1: regulate anything that they did on your boat or the 247 00:13:12,040 --> 00:13:16,280 Speaker 1: weaponry they held on your boat. Ah, the rMIDAS the 248 00:13:16,320 --> 00:13:20,240 Speaker 1: Marshall Islands does, does regulate somewhat the weaponry that the 249 00:13:20,280 --> 00:13:23,040 Speaker 1: Marshal Islands flagged boats could have. I think the reason 250 00:13:23,080 --> 00:13:25,280 Speaker 1: there are so many boats flagged in the Marshall Islands, 251 00:13:25,320 --> 00:13:27,800 Speaker 1: at least in part, is because half the world's tuna 252 00:13:28,000 --> 00:13:32,040 Speaker 1: is caught in Marshall Islands waters. So a lot of 253 00:13:32,040 --> 00:13:35,160 Speaker 1: those vessels will probably have They'll choose for the Marshal 254 00:13:35,200 --> 00:13:37,960 Speaker 1: Islands flag because it allows them to fish in territorial waters. 255 00:13:38,000 --> 00:13:40,920 Speaker 1: Would be my guess. I've met some some contractors on 256 00:13:40,960 --> 00:13:42,520 Speaker 1: Marshal Lea's boat, so I'm not a guy who is 257 00:13:42,600 --> 00:13:46,360 Speaker 1: a helicopter pilot for a tuna fishing boat in a 258 00:13:46,400 --> 00:13:49,680 Speaker 1: bar once. I guess they fly the helicopter to look 259 00:13:49,720 --> 00:13:52,840 Speaker 1: for the fish and then the boat comes and catches 260 00:13:52,880 --> 00:13:53,320 Speaker 1: the fish. 261 00:13:53,800 --> 00:13:55,880 Speaker 2: Huh Yeah, fascinating world. 262 00:13:56,400 --> 00:13:58,880 Speaker 1: I don't think it's a highly enjoyable job, but I 263 00:13:58,880 --> 00:14:00,880 Speaker 1: think it's people do it tog They're flight hours up 264 00:14:00,880 --> 00:14:04,640 Speaker 1: so they can do other things. So because of this 265 00:14:05,480 --> 00:14:08,440 Speaker 1: legal it's not really a legal gray area, just the 266 00:14:08,440 --> 00:14:10,920 Speaker 1: fact that these people are not regulated in any way. 267 00:14:11,000 --> 00:14:13,320 Speaker 2: Right people can carry weapons on ships. 268 00:14:13,400 --> 00:14:16,319 Speaker 1: Now, in the case of piracy off Somalia specifically, the 269 00:14:16,400 --> 00:14:20,040 Speaker 1: United Nations did authorize military action against Somali pirates, and 270 00:14:20,400 --> 00:14:25,440 Speaker 1: between twenty and forty boats were there at any given 271 00:14:25,560 --> 00:14:30,040 Speaker 1: time in the next four years trying to police piracy. 272 00:14:30,080 --> 00:14:34,400 Speaker 1: But that's not enough boats because every boat that is 273 00:14:34,640 --> 00:14:36,720 Speaker 1: moving through that area is at risk for piracy. And 274 00:14:36,840 --> 00:14:42,280 Speaker 1: pirates can use very small boats to board very big boats, right, 275 00:14:42,320 --> 00:14:45,840 Speaker 1: And unless that very big boat is somehow able to 276 00:14:45,880 --> 00:14:48,560 Speaker 1: defend itself, all they need is a few weapons and 277 00:14:48,600 --> 00:14:51,000 Speaker 1: the ability to get out board, and they're hard to truck, right. 278 00:14:51,480 --> 00:14:53,760 Speaker 1: I've heard from people who did contracting in the pre 279 00:14:53,920 --> 00:14:56,040 Speaker 1: two thousand and eight era that basically that they put 280 00:14:56,040 --> 00:14:57,920 Speaker 1: barbed wire on the edge of the boat to stop 281 00:14:57,960 --> 00:15:00,000 Speaker 1: people getting on, and then they had the l rap 282 00:15:00,240 --> 00:15:03,720 Speaker 1: like they was that long range the sound weapon. Yeah, 283 00:15:03,720 --> 00:15:05,680 Speaker 1: the sound weapon, And I'm not sure that it was 284 00:15:05,760 --> 00:15:07,600 Speaker 1: there as a weapon. I think it was there to 285 00:15:07,640 --> 00:15:11,320 Speaker 1: notify other ships like get out the way, but that 286 00:15:11,400 --> 00:15:13,800 Speaker 1: it could be weaponized. And then after that it was 287 00:15:13,840 --> 00:15:17,200 Speaker 1: like big sticks and harsh words, I guess. So like 288 00:15:17,440 --> 00:15:19,160 Speaker 1: when you have the guys who took over the mesk 289 00:15:19,160 --> 00:15:22,440 Speaker 1: Alabama coming in with a few kalashnikov they have the 290 00:15:22,480 --> 00:15:25,360 Speaker 1: balance of force on their side, right, That. 291 00:15:25,440 --> 00:15:26,960 Speaker 2: Is no longer the case anymore. 292 00:15:27,360 --> 00:15:30,360 Speaker 1: Initially in two thousand and nine, groups like Blackwater tried 293 00:15:30,400 --> 00:15:33,360 Speaker 1: to get in on this, and they did it actually 294 00:15:33,400 --> 00:15:37,200 Speaker 1: by more or less, I guess, like copying the privateer 295 00:15:37,320 --> 00:15:41,560 Speaker 1: model that we'd seen in the nineteenth century. They refitted 296 00:15:41,600 --> 00:15:47,080 Speaker 1: commercial boats with weapons and offered them like for higher 297 00:15:47,200 --> 00:15:49,800 Speaker 1: as like a rental, like as an accompaniment. 298 00:15:49,960 --> 00:15:51,800 Speaker 3: They would like gas scort another ship. 299 00:15:52,280 --> 00:15:56,480 Speaker 1: Yeah, they'd escort you through this dangerous area and then 300 00:15:56,760 --> 00:15:59,040 Speaker 1: turn around and escort someone who was going the other way. 301 00:15:59,160 --> 00:16:00,000 Speaker 2: Or that was the idea. 302 00:16:00,080 --> 00:16:03,440 Speaker 1: Yes, sure, it didn't really work a because it was 303 00:16:03,480 --> 00:16:07,040 Speaker 1: expensive right to run these vessels, and b because you 304 00:16:07,240 --> 00:16:09,080 Speaker 1: need so many of them, and so what they ended 305 00:16:09,160 --> 00:16:12,960 Speaker 1: up doing instead was actually stationing people on the vessels. 306 00:16:13,680 --> 00:16:18,160 Speaker 1: So these security contractors will now live on the oil 307 00:16:18,280 --> 00:16:21,720 Speaker 1: tanker or the container ship, either for its all journey 308 00:16:21,760 --> 00:16:23,760 Speaker 1: or for the duration of the time which it's considered 309 00:16:24,160 --> 00:16:25,320 Speaker 1: danger well. 310 00:16:25,320 --> 00:16:27,960 Speaker 3: And also, I mean, if pirates try to get onto 311 00:16:28,000 --> 00:16:31,360 Speaker 3: the big ship and all of the military guys are 312 00:16:31,360 --> 00:16:33,960 Speaker 3: on a different ship a little bit behind, you have 313 00:16:34,040 --> 00:16:36,720 Speaker 3: to get those guys onto the other ship, right. 314 00:16:36,560 --> 00:16:38,240 Speaker 1: And then then now you're shooting at the ship that 315 00:16:38,240 --> 00:16:40,080 Speaker 1: you're supposed to be protecting. And I can see that big. 316 00:16:40,280 --> 00:16:42,240 Speaker 3: That does just make it a little bit more complicated. 317 00:16:42,320 --> 00:16:47,840 Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, Unfortunately, the way, according to reports I've read, 318 00:16:47,880 --> 00:16:49,520 Speaker 1: I should say, the way they have got around this 319 00:16:49,600 --> 00:16:54,600 Speaker 1: issue is by preemptively shooting at vessels that they consider 320 00:16:54,680 --> 00:16:57,440 Speaker 1: to be a threat. Sure, and there are plenty of 321 00:16:57,480 --> 00:17:00,280 Speaker 1: allegations of them. We'll get onto the lack of really 322 00:17:00,280 --> 00:17:03,960 Speaker 1: any means of legal accountability at some point. What they 323 00:17:04,000 --> 00:17:08,800 Speaker 1: do instead is they allow contractors to go on the ships, 324 00:17:08,960 --> 00:17:10,320 Speaker 1: and these contractors then have. 325 00:17:10,320 --> 00:17:11,240 Speaker 2: To be armed. Right. 326 00:17:11,320 --> 00:17:14,320 Speaker 1: The way they tend to be armed is depending on 327 00:17:14,359 --> 00:17:16,440 Speaker 1: the flag of the ship and what regulations it has. 328 00:17:16,520 --> 00:17:18,760 Speaker 1: Right generally, if they're entering into an area where they 329 00:17:18,760 --> 00:17:21,160 Speaker 1: can't be armed, they have what are called floating armories. 330 00:17:21,520 --> 00:17:22,679 Speaker 2: Those are what they sound like. 331 00:17:23,119 --> 00:17:26,600 Speaker 1: You don't understand how long in my freelance career I 332 00:17:26,720 --> 00:17:30,320 Speaker 1: spent trying to get onto one of these particular boats. 333 00:17:30,800 --> 00:17:31,640 Speaker 2: It was a long time. 334 00:17:32,040 --> 00:17:34,480 Speaker 3: So is this just like a tiny boat on a 335 00:17:34,520 --> 00:17:36,240 Speaker 3: string with a whole winch of guns on it? Like 336 00:17:36,280 --> 00:17:37,399 Speaker 3: what it could be? 337 00:17:37,520 --> 00:17:40,000 Speaker 1: It could be an old oil platform, it could be 338 00:17:40,000 --> 00:17:43,480 Speaker 1: a little boat, could be a big boat. Sometimes the 339 00:17:43,840 --> 00:17:47,840 Speaker 1: contractors themselves will like that's where the contractors will meet 340 00:17:47,880 --> 00:17:50,320 Speaker 1: the big boat, right and they'll get on it there, 341 00:17:50,359 --> 00:17:52,040 Speaker 1: so they have like an area they can hang out, 342 00:17:52,080 --> 00:17:53,520 Speaker 1: like it has living facilities. 343 00:17:53,840 --> 00:17:54,480 Speaker 3: Huh. 344 00:17:54,560 --> 00:17:56,760 Speaker 1: I've spoken to a few people in this world, but 345 00:17:57,440 --> 00:17:59,440 Speaker 1: you know, if you happen to be listening and you're 346 00:17:59,480 --> 00:18:02,760 Speaker 1: boat secure, guy, I know. This is continues to fascinate 347 00:18:02,800 --> 00:18:05,040 Speaker 1: me as an area where like the state doesn't exist 348 00:18:05,080 --> 00:18:09,240 Speaker 1: and we have this like post state private militarization. 349 00:18:09,840 --> 00:18:13,679 Speaker 3: It's like anarcho capitalism. Yeah, yeah, yes, yeah, yeah, exactly 350 00:18:13,720 --> 00:18:15,920 Speaker 3: it is. It is a vision of the ancap future 351 00:18:15,920 --> 00:18:18,520 Speaker 3: that I don't love. That is very interesting. 352 00:18:18,600 --> 00:18:23,440 Speaker 1: Right, there were states that offered to have like vessel detachments. 353 00:18:23,680 --> 00:18:24,439 Speaker 2: The Dutch did this. 354 00:18:24,520 --> 00:18:26,560 Speaker 1: I believe they would be like, we will send you 355 00:18:27,080 --> 00:18:29,720 Speaker 1: I'm not familiar with the Dutch military. Sorry, Dutch listeners, 356 00:18:29,960 --> 00:18:32,359 Speaker 1: Dutch marines, I imagine, right, and you can have a 357 00:18:32,359 --> 00:18:36,000 Speaker 1: few of them on your boat. But even Dutch companies 358 00:18:36,000 --> 00:18:38,960 Speaker 1: are Dutch flag vessels weren't using it because it was 359 00:18:38,760 --> 00:18:41,520 Speaker 1: so much paperwork and the government couldn't keep up with 360 00:18:41,560 --> 00:18:42,080 Speaker 1: their demands. 361 00:18:42,080 --> 00:18:43,480 Speaker 2: So they might now what to get some guys, what's 362 00:18:43,520 --> 00:18:44,440 Speaker 2: pay them? Fine? 363 00:18:44,720 --> 00:18:49,920 Speaker 1: Yeah, the state has more or less completely removed itself 364 00:18:49,920 --> 00:18:55,440 Speaker 1: from the sphere and removed itself from doing anything approaching accountability, 365 00:18:55,960 --> 00:19:01,000 Speaker 1: and so it is extremely hard for these people to 366 00:19:01,240 --> 00:19:06,840 Speaker 1: be held accountable for things that they do in international waters. Right, 367 00:19:07,720 --> 00:19:12,760 Speaker 1: there are like industry standards in the industry itself sets, 368 00:19:13,280 --> 00:19:14,960 Speaker 1: in the same way that there are standards for cops 369 00:19:14,960 --> 00:19:18,040 Speaker 1: that the cops themselves set, and those have generally not 370 00:19:18,560 --> 00:19:21,800 Speaker 1: been the best means of accountability. Right in the theory, 371 00:19:22,480 --> 00:19:26,240 Speaker 1: anytime they engage someone, certainly, if they kill someone, the 372 00:19:26,359 --> 00:19:28,280 Speaker 1: ship's authorities should report that. 373 00:19:28,600 --> 00:19:31,840 Speaker 2: Yeah hopefully, Yeah cool, I'm sure they will. I'm sure 374 00:19:31,840 --> 00:19:34,000 Speaker 2: they love to do the paperwork. But then who would 375 00:19:34,000 --> 00:19:34,520 Speaker 2: they report it to? 376 00:19:34,640 --> 00:19:34,800 Speaker 3: Right? 377 00:19:34,800 --> 00:19:37,879 Speaker 1: Do they report it to the country they suspect the 378 00:19:37,920 --> 00:19:42,240 Speaker 1: people they are shooting at their country? Do they report 379 00:19:42,280 --> 00:19:45,760 Speaker 1: it to the flag of convenience country? Do they report 380 00:19:45,800 --> 00:19:49,080 Speaker 1: it to the company they work for? Like, I'm sure 381 00:19:49,080 --> 00:19:52,720 Speaker 1: there is some jurisdiction of maritime law which would give 382 00:19:52,800 --> 00:19:56,240 Speaker 1: us an answer to that, But in practice there appears 383 00:19:56,240 --> 00:19:59,760 Speaker 1: to be very little mechanism for accountability, in the same 384 00:19:59,800 --> 00:20:02,960 Speaker 1: way that there is very little mechanism for accountability for 385 00:20:03,040 --> 00:20:06,520 Speaker 1: labor law violations at sea. I would recommend if people 386 00:20:06,560 --> 00:20:10,600 Speaker 1: haven't listened this podcast called Outlaw Ocean. It's probably five 387 00:20:10,680 --> 00:20:12,800 Speaker 1: or six years old at this point. I think it 388 00:20:12,840 --> 00:20:16,400 Speaker 1: was in New York Times Investigation along with someone else. 389 00:20:16,440 --> 00:20:19,359 Speaker 1: It was a good podcast about labor violations at sea, 390 00:20:19,880 --> 00:20:23,160 Speaker 1: and they specifically looked at some of these fishing vessels 391 00:20:23,720 --> 00:20:25,760 Speaker 1: and the fact that they use people who are essentially 392 00:20:25,800 --> 00:20:29,240 Speaker 1: an indentured servitude. But they also touched on private maritime security. 393 00:20:30,320 --> 00:20:34,879 Speaker 1: These days we see a lot less piracy off Somalia 394 00:20:34,920 --> 00:20:39,359 Speaker 1: right it has reached its peak. I found this little 395 00:20:39,520 --> 00:20:42,119 Speaker 1: chunk in an article I was reading on jastore this 396 00:20:42,160 --> 00:20:45,560 Speaker 1: morning that I thought was interesting. Quote maritime security companies 397 00:20:45,600 --> 00:20:49,000 Speaker 1: have been consulted on greenpeace activists attempt to climb onto 398 00:20:49,040 --> 00:20:52,280 Speaker 1: a gas prom off your platform in September twenty thirteen 399 00:20:52,920 --> 00:20:55,960 Speaker 1: to protest ruling in the Arctic and attacks against oil 400 00:20:56,000 --> 00:20:58,600 Speaker 1: and gas installations by the Movement for the Emancipation as 401 00:20:58,640 --> 00:21:01,280 Speaker 1: a Niche a Delta. So I guess these people have 402 00:21:01,320 --> 00:21:06,160 Speaker 1: a wide remit in which they operate. As I say, 403 00:21:06,200 --> 00:21:11,720 Speaker 1: they's somewhat different from like land based PMCs because land 404 00:21:11,760 --> 00:21:15,280 Speaker 1: brace private military contractors are generally operating either with backup 405 00:21:15,320 --> 00:21:17,280 Speaker 1: from a state or as back up to a state, 406 00:21:17,960 --> 00:21:23,240 Speaker 1: and so there is like an accountability mechanism somewhat there. 407 00:21:23,280 --> 00:21:27,600 Speaker 1: We saw in the Global War on Terror that we 408 00:21:28,119 --> 00:21:32,280 Speaker 1: still lack accountability mechanisms for private military contractors on land, 409 00:21:32,280 --> 00:21:34,439 Speaker 1: but that certainly remains the case on the ocean. 410 00:21:34,520 --> 00:21:34,800 Speaker 3: Right. 411 00:21:35,000 --> 00:21:38,000 Speaker 1: Yeah, So another thing we should consider here is a 412 00:21:38,119 --> 00:21:42,000 Speaker 1: historical parallels, right, And the obvious historical parallel would be 413 00:21:42,240 --> 00:21:45,320 Speaker 1: looked to nineteen eighty seven and the what's generally referred 414 00:21:45,359 --> 00:21:48,800 Speaker 1: to as the tanker War. Right. What the United States 415 00:21:49,080 --> 00:21:52,040 Speaker 1: attempted to do was to open up a channel. The 416 00:21:52,040 --> 00:21:54,160 Speaker 1: straightform moves is very narrow. As I said, it's narrowest point. 417 00:21:54,160 --> 00:21:56,879 Speaker 1: It's just twenty one miles. There are two channels because 418 00:21:56,880 --> 00:21:59,360 Speaker 1: obviously not the entire twenty one miles is deep enough 419 00:21:59,480 --> 00:22:02,000 Speaker 1: ships to go through. There are two channels that are 420 00:22:02,000 --> 00:22:05,119 Speaker 1: each about two miles wide, and they're three kilometers wide. 421 00:22:05,160 --> 00:22:08,560 Speaker 1: It's still not very great at that conversion. So the 422 00:22:08,640 --> 00:22:10,639 Speaker 1: United States attempted is to open one channel and then 423 00:22:10,720 --> 00:22:11,719 Speaker 1: run a convoy system. 424 00:22:11,800 --> 00:22:12,040 Speaker 2: Right. 425 00:22:12,240 --> 00:22:14,520 Speaker 1: Think about when you have roadworks and you know, the 426 00:22:14,600 --> 00:22:16,280 Speaker 1: cars go one way, and then the cars go the 427 00:22:16,320 --> 00:22:17,680 Speaker 1: other way, and someone goes in front of you and 428 00:22:17,720 --> 00:22:19,600 Speaker 1: they have like a flashing light tow you to follow 429 00:22:19,640 --> 00:22:21,960 Speaker 1: them or what have you. And the United States attempted 430 00:22:22,000 --> 00:22:26,160 Speaker 1: to escort convoys of mostly reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers through 431 00:22:26,400 --> 00:22:30,679 Speaker 1: the straight Horn moves right. The very first escort mission 432 00:22:31,200 --> 00:22:35,080 Speaker 1: involved a Kuwaiti oil tanker that had reflagged as an 433 00:22:35,080 --> 00:22:39,639 Speaker 1: American tanker become the Bridgeton, and it was the Bridgeton 434 00:22:39,920 --> 00:22:44,439 Speaker 1: that struck an underwater mine on that very first mission. 435 00:22:44,560 --> 00:22:47,040 Speaker 1: I didn't cause any casualties, it did cause damage to 436 00:22:47,119 --> 00:22:49,680 Speaker 1: the ship. During that same operation in the United States 437 00:22:49,720 --> 00:22:52,399 Speaker 1: ship also struck a mine. The it was called the 438 00:22:52,480 --> 00:22:54,480 Speaker 1: United States Samuel Roberts Samuel B. 439 00:22:54,640 --> 00:22:55,000 Speaker 2: Roberts. 440 00:22:55,080 --> 00:22:58,960 Speaker 1: I believe it struck a mine while transiting international waters. 441 00:22:59,160 --> 00:23:01,240 Speaker 1: It just goes to show that when there are minds 442 00:23:01,920 --> 00:23:05,280 Speaker 1: in this area, in any area, it's very hard to 443 00:23:05,320 --> 00:23:07,160 Speaker 1: know when they've all been removed, and it's very hard 444 00:23:07,160 --> 00:23:11,280 Speaker 1: to know where they all are right now. During that 445 00:23:11,480 --> 00:23:16,800 Speaker 1: same operation, a United States warship mistakenly shot down an 446 00:23:16,880 --> 00:23:20,280 Speaker 1: Aralian civilian flight, killing all two hundred and ninety people 447 00:23:20,280 --> 00:23:25,920 Speaker 1: on board. This goes to show how crowded the space 448 00:23:26,200 --> 00:23:29,119 Speaker 1: is around the straight Before moves, and it goes to 449 00:23:29,200 --> 00:23:33,040 Speaker 1: show how I mean, even in a relatively modern war rate, 450 00:23:33,119 --> 00:23:37,359 Speaker 1: the possibility for mistakes is very high. And that's before 451 00:23:37,359 --> 00:23:39,440 Speaker 1: you even consider the fact that the Trump administration is. 452 00:23:39,400 --> 00:23:40,480 Speaker 2: Willing to accept. 453 00:23:41,200 --> 00:23:44,160 Speaker 1: Even among administrations as the United States, they are willing 454 00:23:44,240 --> 00:23:48,800 Speaker 1: to accept a very high number of innocent deaths. I 455 00:23:48,840 --> 00:23:51,199 Speaker 1: also want to talk about, because this is such a 456 00:23:51,240 --> 00:23:55,080 Speaker 1: small straight to crowded straight rape, the possibility of attack 457 00:23:55,560 --> 00:23:59,920 Speaker 1: is not just limited to naval attack, right to boats. 458 00:24:00,440 --> 00:24:03,080 Speaker 1: We know that US destroyed most of Iran's navy, and 459 00:24:03,119 --> 00:24:06,159 Speaker 1: we're going to speak about how the IGC navy is 460 00:24:06,160 --> 00:24:09,360 Speaker 1: not the same as Iran's regular flag navy. Right when 461 00:24:09,400 --> 00:24:13,320 Speaker 1: we talk about the Iranian navy big gray boats, Yes, 462 00:24:13,359 --> 00:24:16,399 Speaker 1: the US has destroyed many of those. With the IGC, 463 00:24:16,600 --> 00:24:20,480 Speaker 1: we're looking at much smaller, fast attack vessels, right, sometimes 464 00:24:20,480 --> 00:24:23,400 Speaker 1: civilian vessels with a machine gun mounted to them. 465 00:24:23,960 --> 00:24:25,359 Speaker 2: Those have not all been destroyed. 466 00:24:25,400 --> 00:24:27,719 Speaker 1: It will be very hard for United States to destroy 467 00:24:27,760 --> 00:24:30,040 Speaker 1: those all from the air, as it will be for 468 00:24:30,080 --> 00:24:35,000 Speaker 1: the United States to destroy the ground attack capability that 469 00:24:35,080 --> 00:24:35,720 Speaker 1: Iran has. 470 00:24:35,800 --> 00:24:35,960 Speaker 2: Right. 471 00:24:35,960 --> 00:24:40,760 Speaker 1: They have Hormus missiles, they have Shahied drones, they can 472 00:24:40,920 --> 00:24:46,119 Speaker 1: use regular unguided rockets, a shahed drone from anywhere in 473 00:24:46,160 --> 00:24:50,320 Speaker 1: the country of Iran, given its range, could hit a 474 00:24:50,400 --> 00:24:55,040 Speaker 1: boat in the Strait of Hormos. These Hornmus class missiles, 475 00:24:55,160 --> 00:24:58,119 Speaker 1: they're called Hormus missiles, so they're launch from vehicles. 476 00:24:58,200 --> 00:24:58,320 Speaker 2: Right. 477 00:24:58,320 --> 00:25:00,879 Speaker 1: It looks like a lorry and it comes out and 478 00:25:00,880 --> 00:25:03,359 Speaker 1: it pops up its back lifts like the miss island 479 00:25:03,440 --> 00:25:07,240 Speaker 1: launches it. These are very easy to hide, right. Lots 480 00:25:07,480 --> 00:25:10,480 Speaker 1: of entities in this region use tunnels and caves to 481 00:25:10,560 --> 00:25:13,919 Speaker 1: hide things. I'm sure the Iranian state does too. But 482 00:25:13,960 --> 00:25:16,359 Speaker 1: you could hide one of these missile launches anywhere in 483 00:25:16,359 --> 00:25:18,160 Speaker 1: a city in a cave and a tunnel. It only 484 00:25:18,160 --> 00:25:21,679 Speaker 1: needs to pop out deliver its missile, and then it 485 00:25:21,680 --> 00:25:24,120 Speaker 1: can be abandoned right, or it can go back into 486 00:25:24,119 --> 00:25:27,440 Speaker 1: its cave whatever it wants. But the Iranians don't need 487 00:25:27,480 --> 00:25:31,320 Speaker 1: to destroy every ship that transits the Strait of horn 488 00:25:31,320 --> 00:25:33,800 Speaker 1: Moves to close the Straight of horn Moos. First of all, 489 00:25:33,800 --> 00:25:35,359 Speaker 1: there are only two three kilometer channels. 490 00:25:35,400 --> 00:25:35,520 Speaker 3: Right. 491 00:25:35,520 --> 00:25:37,800 Speaker 1: If there is a wrecked ship in one of those channels, 492 00:25:37,880 --> 00:25:40,960 Speaker 1: the channel gets smaller and smaller, and therefore your chance 493 00:25:41,000 --> 00:25:44,280 Speaker 1: of hitting the mines that are there gets higher and higher. Right, 494 00:25:44,320 --> 00:25:48,480 Speaker 1: Because there's less way to go around them. The Iranians 495 00:25:49,000 --> 00:25:53,560 Speaker 1: only have to make transiting the Straight of Horn moves 496 00:25:53,920 --> 00:25:58,000 Speaker 1: uninsurable to succeed. Right, So, what has happened with private 497 00:25:58,000 --> 00:26:02,720 Speaker 1: maritime security contractors so far is that their presence has 498 00:26:02,840 --> 00:26:06,000 Speaker 1: made transiting high risk areas areas at high risk for 499 00:26:06,119 --> 00:26:13,199 Speaker 1: piracy an insurable effort. Because frequently you will hear that 500 00:26:13,359 --> 00:26:17,560 Speaker 1: a ship with armed security has never been taken by pirates. 501 00:26:18,000 --> 00:26:21,040 Speaker 1: That's really hard for us to confirm, right like, there's 502 00:26:21,080 --> 00:26:24,560 Speaker 1: no independent data on that, but certainly it likely reduces 503 00:26:24,560 --> 00:26:26,080 Speaker 1: a chance of them being taken by pirates, and that 504 00:26:26,119 --> 00:26:30,879 Speaker 1: has made them insurable. The Iranians knocking out one or 505 00:26:30,880 --> 00:26:34,679 Speaker 1: two tankers will make the Straight of Horn moons an 506 00:26:34,760 --> 00:26:38,359 Speaker 1: uninsurable passage, or it will make that insurance so costly 507 00:26:39,119 --> 00:26:43,359 Speaker 1: that commercial entities will not be willing to undertake that journey. 508 00:26:43,400 --> 00:26:45,600 Speaker 1: Right now, Donald Trump has said the United States will 509 00:26:45,640 --> 00:26:50,640 Speaker 1: act as the insurer, I know, man like, it will 510 00:26:50,680 --> 00:26:52,679 Speaker 1: be a lot of tankers for us to buy the 511 00:26:53,040 --> 00:26:55,399 Speaker 1: if the Iranians keep you know, they've they've knocked out 512 00:26:55,440 --> 00:27:00,160 Speaker 1: two large vessels overnight, it seems unlikely. Donal Trump's said 513 00:27:00,160 --> 00:27:01,479 Speaker 1: a lot of things, right, not all of them are 514 00:27:01,480 --> 00:27:04,200 Speaker 1: true very well. Even in the last few weeks or 515 00:27:04,280 --> 00:27:05,720 Speaker 1: Trump to said a lot of things about the Straight 516 00:27:05,720 --> 00:27:08,919 Speaker 1: of Horror moves that were not true. So we will see. 517 00:27:09,160 --> 00:27:11,679 Speaker 1: But I wanted to explain some of those threats. Have 518 00:27:11,680 --> 00:27:23,359 Speaker 1: to talk about the specific naval threat now that IGC Navy, 519 00:27:25,480 --> 00:27:28,000 Speaker 1: all right, So let's move on to discussing what exactly 520 00:27:28,119 --> 00:27:31,520 Speaker 1: this means in the current era. Right when the United 521 00:27:31,520 --> 00:27:33,640 Speaker 1: States is saying the Straight of Horror moves is open 522 00:27:33,680 --> 00:27:37,200 Speaker 1: except for Iran shooting at ships, and Iran is radioing 523 00:27:37,240 --> 00:27:39,840 Speaker 1: ships right now and telling them that they're not allowed 524 00:27:39,840 --> 00:27:41,639 Speaker 1: to enter the Straight of Horror moos and thenre obviously 525 00:27:41,720 --> 00:27:46,120 Speaker 1: threatening them if they do. So, what we will see 526 00:27:46,200 --> 00:27:48,760 Speaker 1: right now in the Straight of Horror moves is this 527 00:27:48,920 --> 00:27:53,120 Speaker 1: situation where Iran has a few mechanisms for attacking these 528 00:27:53,440 --> 00:27:56,200 Speaker 1: these ships. Right, the one that's being talked about the 529 00:27:56,240 --> 00:28:00,520 Speaker 1: most are minds, and the minds that are run has 530 00:28:00,520 --> 00:28:02,760 Speaker 1: to my understanding, and just straight up World War two 531 00:28:03,359 --> 00:28:05,919 Speaker 1: le C minds. If you ever played Mine Sweeper Garrison, 532 00:28:06,000 --> 00:28:07,959 Speaker 1: yeah yeah, yeah, yeah, So they look like that, right. 533 00:28:07,960 --> 00:28:10,240 Speaker 1: They have these big contact fuses on them, that is 534 00:28:10,280 --> 00:28:12,680 Speaker 1: what they are, right. The way the current works in 535 00:28:12,720 --> 00:28:14,480 Speaker 1: a straight up horn moves if they can kind of 536 00:28:14,520 --> 00:28:17,520 Speaker 1: circulate around, okay, which will make them you know, you 537 00:28:17,520 --> 00:28:19,480 Speaker 1: can't be like, okay that this area is mine. 538 00:28:20,240 --> 00:28:22,800 Speaker 3: We're just going to avoid the mines. Yeah, right, Like 539 00:28:22,800 --> 00:28:25,560 Speaker 3: this whole strait is mine now. And as we covered 540 00:28:25,600 --> 00:28:28,840 Speaker 3: in ed on Friday, the US doesn't have a great 541 00:28:28,920 --> 00:28:31,040 Speaker 3: capacity to remove those mines. 542 00:28:31,800 --> 00:28:34,640 Speaker 1: But the thing which has been less discussed is that 543 00:28:34,680 --> 00:28:39,440 Speaker 1: the IIGC has tons and if they don't have, if 544 00:28:39,440 --> 00:28:41,280 Speaker 1: they run out, it's very easy to make more, right 545 00:28:41,360 --> 00:28:41,720 Speaker 1: of like. 546 00:28:42,440 --> 00:28:44,320 Speaker 2: Civilian fast boats. 547 00:28:44,840 --> 00:28:46,800 Speaker 1: Think of a little boat with a motor on the 548 00:28:46,840 --> 00:28:49,120 Speaker 1: back and a belt fed machine gun in the front, 549 00:28:49,280 --> 00:28:55,760 Speaker 1: right like, very easy to take those boats and swarm 550 00:28:55,920 --> 00:28:58,280 Speaker 1: a large vessel, right Like, even if that vessel has 551 00:28:58,360 --> 00:29:01,800 Speaker 1: private security on board. The straightforward moves is twenty one 552 00:29:01,840 --> 00:29:04,600 Speaker 1: miles across. Like you could harass people if you had 553 00:29:04,600 --> 00:29:05,240 Speaker 1: a jet ski. 554 00:29:05,360 --> 00:29:07,360 Speaker 3: Yeah, you could have a little jet ski technical or 555 00:29:07,440 --> 00:29:09,440 Speaker 3: just tell yeah yeah with an RPG on the back. 556 00:29:09,600 --> 00:29:11,040 Speaker 3: Yeah yeah. Yeah. 557 00:29:11,880 --> 00:29:14,800 Speaker 1: The most dudes rock vessel that it's ever taken to 558 00:29:14,840 --> 00:29:16,760 Speaker 1: the seas. Yeah, I might have to hand it to 559 00:29:16,800 --> 00:29:21,320 Speaker 1: that LGC if they did that, but under very few 560 00:29:22,400 --> 00:29:24,880 Speaker 1: I don't know. Circumstances. Yeah, do you have to hand 561 00:29:24,920 --> 00:29:27,480 Speaker 1: it to the Yeah, the Iranian state in any capacity. 562 00:29:27,560 --> 00:29:30,720 Speaker 1: Now I'm shitting around like I think the state of 563 00:29:30,720 --> 00:29:36,320 Speaker 1: irun is terrible, misogynist, violent and oppressive entity and shouldn't exist. 564 00:29:36,800 --> 00:29:39,920 Speaker 1: Just to be like super duper clear. They also have 565 00:29:40,680 --> 00:29:43,280 Speaker 1: what are called uncrewed surface vessels. 566 00:29:43,880 --> 00:29:47,080 Speaker 2: I'm sure they use like the gender neutral framing, but 567 00:29:47,320 --> 00:29:48,000 Speaker 2: they are. 568 00:29:49,480 --> 00:29:51,760 Speaker 1: Think of a large Think of a boat that doesn't 569 00:29:51,760 --> 00:29:55,120 Speaker 1: have anyone driving it, right, And it was uncrewed surface 570 00:29:55,200 --> 00:29:58,520 Speaker 1: vessels that they used last night at the time of 571 00:29:58,600 --> 00:30:03,200 Speaker 1: recording to explode a tanker in the port in Barcera. Right, Okay, 572 00:30:03,360 --> 00:30:09,320 Speaker 1: very hard for the United States to stop these uncrewed 573 00:30:09,440 --> 00:30:12,520 Speaker 1: surface vessels, right, They are like the Shihi drone of 574 00:30:12,520 --> 00:30:16,360 Speaker 1: the ocean. This boat's not coming home. It's designed to 575 00:30:16,840 --> 00:30:20,480 Speaker 1: eliminate another boat, but it can be It could be steered, right, 576 00:30:20,920 --> 00:30:24,800 Speaker 1: It's not just like a torpedo. So what exactly are 577 00:30:24,840 --> 00:30:27,960 Speaker 1: the options I guess for the United States. Trump has 578 00:30:28,120 --> 00:30:30,840 Speaker 1: offered to secure shipping through the straight ofform moose. 579 00:30:30,960 --> 00:30:31,160 Speaker 2: Right. 580 00:30:32,000 --> 00:30:35,400 Speaker 1: He offered to accompany ships. The Navy doesn't have the 581 00:30:35,480 --> 00:30:39,360 Speaker 1: capacity to do that, to accompany the amount of the world. 582 00:30:39,480 --> 00:30:41,920 Speaker 1: Shipping that goes through the straight ofform moos would require 583 00:30:42,760 --> 00:30:45,840 Speaker 1: masses of ships to accompany them, right, They'd have to 584 00:30:45,880 --> 00:30:48,280 Speaker 1: travel at the same speed as these ships. Some of 585 00:30:48,280 --> 00:30:52,000 Speaker 1: these ships are flagged to countries all over the world, right, 586 00:30:52,000 --> 00:30:54,320 Speaker 1: including countries the US doesn't have the best relationship with, 587 00:30:54,520 --> 00:31:00,720 Speaker 1: especially right now. The companies could hire more private marriage security, 588 00:31:00,760 --> 00:31:03,680 Speaker 1: and I'm sure they will, but also like part of 589 00:31:03,720 --> 00:31:06,240 Speaker 1: the role of private maritime security companies is to be like, 590 00:31:06,320 --> 00:31:09,240 Speaker 1: don't do that, it's too dangerous. And going through a 591 00:31:09,280 --> 00:31:13,200 Speaker 1: straight upward moves right now is probably too dangerous, right, sure, 592 00:31:13,680 --> 00:31:17,720 Speaker 1: So I don't know how you would quickly equip a 593 00:31:17,880 --> 00:31:20,840 Speaker 1: ship in a way that you could be like cast 594 00:31:20,880 --> 00:31:24,120 Speaker 1: iron secure that it will be able to fend off 595 00:31:24,600 --> 00:31:27,160 Speaker 1: like a little swarm of little boats. 596 00:31:27,160 --> 00:31:28,280 Speaker 2: Trying to attack it. Right. 597 00:31:28,760 --> 00:31:30,960 Speaker 1: I don't think an RPG could sink one of these ships, 598 00:31:31,000 --> 00:31:33,320 Speaker 1: but it could really fucking give it a bad day. 599 00:31:33,400 --> 00:31:35,240 Speaker 1: Oh you know, Like it's not a good situation when 600 00:31:35,240 --> 00:31:38,320 Speaker 1: there's a hole in your boat, from what I understand. So, like, 601 00:31:39,040 --> 00:31:41,440 Speaker 1: the other option would be for the US to put 602 00:31:41,680 --> 00:31:45,880 Speaker 1: personnel on these ships, which would be problematic from a 603 00:31:45,920 --> 00:31:50,120 Speaker 1: number of approaches. Right, it is a Liberian flagship, and 604 00:31:50,160 --> 00:31:53,160 Speaker 1: now you're asking, like what US marines to risk their 605 00:31:53,160 --> 00:31:56,120 Speaker 1: lives to defend the Liberian flagship so everyone can get 606 00:31:56,160 --> 00:31:59,840 Speaker 1: their TIMU purchases, and like, we can not slow. 607 00:31:59,600 --> 00:32:00,600 Speaker 2: Down glow trade. 608 00:32:01,120 --> 00:32:05,680 Speaker 1: There is not a good option here, Like the state, 609 00:32:06,240 --> 00:32:09,160 Speaker 1: the States of the world couldn't find a good option 610 00:32:09,440 --> 00:32:13,880 Speaker 1: when we were dealing with piracy in two thousand and nine, ten, eleven, twelve. Right, 611 00:32:13,960 --> 00:32:19,560 Speaker 1: they felt better outsourcing the accountability for that to private companies. 612 00:32:19,960 --> 00:32:25,000 Speaker 1: The States didn't want to have to wear the reputation 613 00:32:25,160 --> 00:32:28,080 Speaker 1: damage for like this boat once again opened up with 614 00:32:28,120 --> 00:32:30,200 Speaker 1: a belt fed on what turned out to be a 615 00:32:30,240 --> 00:32:33,360 Speaker 1: fishing vessel, or they felt like that liability was too 616 00:32:33,440 --> 00:32:35,200 Speaker 1: much for them, right, So they didn't want to do it, 617 00:32:35,200 --> 00:32:37,959 Speaker 1: and they would much rather have private companies do it. 618 00:32:38,360 --> 00:32:43,720 Speaker 1: I don't really see an option here that makes the 619 00:32:43,760 --> 00:32:46,480 Speaker 1: shipping safe going through this area. 620 00:32:46,680 --> 00:32:49,120 Speaker 3: You could not start a war with Iran. 621 00:32:49,640 --> 00:32:51,720 Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, that is a really good option, actually one 622 00:32:51,760 --> 00:32:55,400 Speaker 1: that one that sadly that ship has sailed as they say, garrison, 623 00:32:55,840 --> 00:33:00,360 Speaker 1: but yeah, it is. This industry is already problematic, Like 624 00:33:00,920 --> 00:33:04,440 Speaker 1: even before the United States started bombing Venezuela and the 625 00:33:04,520 --> 00:33:07,680 Speaker 1: Colombian fishing vessels or vessels that it accused of being 626 00:33:07,880 --> 00:33:11,240 Speaker 1: drug traffickers. There has been a long history of a 627 00:33:11,320 --> 00:33:15,280 Speaker 1: lack of accountability for people being killed at sea and 628 00:33:15,400 --> 00:33:19,080 Speaker 1: for people being abused at sea through labor violations. I 629 00:33:19,120 --> 00:33:23,000 Speaker 1: don't really see a way we come out of this 630 00:33:23,160 --> 00:33:29,040 Speaker 1: without more damage to innocent lives, right, Like, either the 631 00:33:29,160 --> 00:33:32,560 Speaker 1: United States just decides that it's going to go like 632 00:33:32,680 --> 00:33:35,400 Speaker 1: scorched earth on any boat it sees in the straight 633 00:33:35,400 --> 00:33:38,520 Speaker 1: ofform moves isn't like a big tanker. But even then, 634 00:33:38,920 --> 00:33:41,520 Speaker 1: these these like these vessels, they're not all US flagged, right, 635 00:33:41,560 --> 00:33:44,040 Speaker 1: the US doesn't have a means to be like, yeah, okay, 636 00:33:44,120 --> 00:33:46,800 Speaker 1: you can go now, you can't go now. The straightform 637 00:33:46,800 --> 00:33:50,200 Speaker 1: moves is not in the United States. It doesn't control 638 00:33:50,200 --> 00:33:53,920 Speaker 1: that water, and so I don't really see a solution 639 00:33:54,080 --> 00:33:56,880 Speaker 1: for this now. Like, one thing that the world of 640 00:33:56,920 --> 00:34:01,760 Speaker 1: private maritime security shows us is that neoliberal globalism is 641 00:34:01,840 --> 00:34:05,680 Speaker 1: willing to look the other way a great deal and 642 00:34:05,720 --> 00:34:09,080 Speaker 1: allow a great deal of violence on behalf of corporations, 643 00:34:09,200 --> 00:34:12,200 Speaker 1: not on behalf of the state. Right Like, when people 644 00:34:12,200 --> 00:34:16,640 Speaker 1: are getting engaged by these vessels, it is to protect property, granted, 645 00:34:16,719 --> 00:34:19,040 Speaker 1: sometimes it is also to protect life, right, Like these 646 00:34:19,040 --> 00:34:21,279 Speaker 1: pirates have killed people and kidnap people as such. But 647 00:34:22,080 --> 00:34:24,440 Speaker 1: the state has been willing to seed its monopoly on 648 00:34:24,560 --> 00:34:28,880 Speaker 1: violence at the high seas because it could find a 649 00:34:28,880 --> 00:34:31,680 Speaker 1: good solution to this, and it's been willing to overlook 650 00:34:31,719 --> 00:34:33,640 Speaker 1: a lot of loss of life. And I just don't 651 00:34:33,719 --> 00:34:36,719 Speaker 1: see a way that this doesn't lead to more loss 652 00:34:36,719 --> 00:34:39,080 Speaker 1: of life, and that is probably what we have to 653 00:34:39,080 --> 00:34:42,480 Speaker 1: look forward to. It may have already begun happening in 654 00:34:42,480 --> 00:34:45,560 Speaker 1: the Strait of Hormus between when we record this and 655 00:34:45,600 --> 00:34:48,840 Speaker 1: when you hear it, but it is deeply concerning and 656 00:34:48,840 --> 00:34:51,440 Speaker 1: pretty shit given that there are so many people just 657 00:34:51,480 --> 00:34:53,640 Speaker 1: trying to make their way and live their lives in 658 00:34:53,640 --> 00:34:57,520 Speaker 1: that area. Yeah, it's a happy one. Shout out to 659 00:34:57,560 --> 00:35:02,000 Speaker 1: Greenpeace also for also patronizing these companies. 660 00:35:02,400 --> 00:35:03,680 Speaker 3: Yeah, you told me this was going to be a 661 00:35:03,680 --> 00:35:05,080 Speaker 3: recording about pirates. 662 00:35:05,480 --> 00:35:09,480 Speaker 1: There were pirates in it. That was a big yeah. 663 00:35:09,640 --> 00:35:12,160 Speaker 1: But I know, if you're a pirate and you're listening, 664 00:35:12,480 --> 00:35:14,239 Speaker 1: I would love to hear from more pirates. 665 00:35:14,480 --> 00:35:18,960 Speaker 3: Between the pirates, the private maritime contractors, and the governments, 666 00:35:19,000 --> 00:35:23,120 Speaker 3: it's like everyone here has their own issues. Yeah, and 667 00:35:23,160 --> 00:35:27,120 Speaker 3: all these issues are getting massively intensified by the conflict 668 00:35:27,400 --> 00:35:29,279 Speaker 3: and aran obviously. 669 00:35:29,160 --> 00:35:31,799 Speaker 1: Yeah, before we even talk about the ecological crisis that 670 00:35:31,800 --> 00:35:34,239 Speaker 1: we will see in the Gulf, right, Like, you start 671 00:35:34,239 --> 00:35:37,440 Speaker 1: putting holes in oil tankers, that is going to be 672 00:35:37,560 --> 00:35:41,480 Speaker 1: absolutely horrific for the environment. Again in an area where 673 00:35:41,480 --> 00:35:43,799 Speaker 1: people are ready to struggling to make it by I. 674 00:35:43,719 --> 00:35:46,400 Speaker 3: Mean, why don't they just pull a pull of fitz Coronaldo. 675 00:35:46,600 --> 00:35:50,239 Speaker 3: Why don't they just pull those ships up? Oh God, 676 00:35:51,200 --> 00:35:52,480 Speaker 3: avoid them straight altogether. 677 00:35:52,680 --> 00:35:54,840 Speaker 1: Maybe people haven't seen this, and this surface is like 678 00:35:54,840 --> 00:35:57,799 Speaker 1: every three days right now on Twitter, Like, why don't 679 00:35:57,840 --> 00:36:01,960 Speaker 1: they just go across land? It turns out that mountains, 680 00:36:02,000 --> 00:36:05,800 Speaker 1: big mountains, hard water doesn't like going uphill, quite a 681 00:36:05,880 --> 00:36:09,800 Speaker 1: challenging terrain to transit. I think maybe people don't realize 682 00:36:09,800 --> 00:36:11,560 Speaker 1: that eighty percent think I believe it's eighty percent. 683 00:36:11,440 --> 00:36:13,800 Speaker 2: Of global trade still travels by boat. 684 00:36:13,920 --> 00:36:16,760 Speaker 1: Yeah, Like it is still the way that most things 685 00:36:16,840 --> 00:36:20,800 Speaker 1: get to most places. And I think we are about 686 00:36:20,840 --> 00:36:23,680 Speaker 1: to find out that the boat ignorers are about to 687 00:36:23,680 --> 00:36:26,920 Speaker 1: find out if this continues for weeks or months, then 688 00:36:26,920 --> 00:36:28,440 Speaker 1: it will be incredibly detrimental. 689 00:36:29,160 --> 00:36:31,799 Speaker 3: Is this a good or a bad time to enter 690 00:36:31,880 --> 00:36:37,200 Speaker 3: the private mirriortime contracting business. How much are you enjoying 691 00:36:37,239 --> 00:36:41,400 Speaker 3: your life decently? Well, okay, yeah, probably stay out of 692 00:36:41,480 --> 00:36:43,040 Speaker 3: it and bye with you. Because they got to be 693 00:36:43,040 --> 00:36:44,960 Speaker 3: getting a lot of money. But also they're in the 694 00:36:45,120 --> 00:36:47,279 Speaker 3: one of the most highest positions they've probably ever been in. 695 00:36:47,880 --> 00:36:51,680 Speaker 1: And so yeah, this was already an area of military 696 00:36:51,719 --> 00:36:55,080 Speaker 1: contracting that people look to get into and get out of. 697 00:36:55,320 --> 00:36:57,759 Speaker 1: I would say, like the bulk of these folks now 698 00:36:57,960 --> 00:37:01,239 Speaker 1: will be the ones I've met. I've been Colombians. The 699 00:37:01,360 --> 00:37:04,280 Speaker 1: Colombians provide a lot of military contractors around the world. Now, 700 00:37:04,600 --> 00:37:08,239 Speaker 1: the people who are able to get out of it 701 00:37:08,280 --> 00:37:10,600 Speaker 1: will do business in other areas, right Like they'll do 702 00:37:11,600 --> 00:37:14,040 Speaker 1: other private close protection and stuff like that. There are 703 00:37:14,040 --> 00:37:16,680 Speaker 1: protective details for journalists I know in who are operating 704 00:37:16,680 --> 00:37:19,080 Speaker 1: in Iraq right now. Sure, yeah, these people will be 705 00:37:19,080 --> 00:37:22,040 Speaker 1: making a lot of money, I think, especially like probably 706 00:37:22,080 --> 00:37:25,319 Speaker 1: consulting right now with global shipping. I was reading about 707 00:37:25,320 --> 00:37:28,200 Speaker 1: the East India Company this morning. I was learning, for instance, 708 00:37:28,280 --> 00:37:30,839 Speaker 1: that the value of a t ship leave it in 709 00:37:30,960 --> 00:37:34,800 Speaker 1: China was a billion dollars in twenty twenty four money, 710 00:37:35,080 --> 00:37:39,040 Speaker 1: which is how like these private maritime security companies in 711 00:37:39,080 --> 00:37:41,640 Speaker 1: another age were able to develop, right because it was 712 00:37:41,719 --> 00:37:45,960 Speaker 1: worth boat jacking, that boat pirating, whatever that's called, because 713 00:37:46,200 --> 00:37:47,480 Speaker 1: of the value of tea. 714 00:37:47,280 --> 00:37:47,880 Speaker 2: At that time. 715 00:37:48,040 --> 00:37:50,759 Speaker 1: So it's not a new problem. But there was a 716 00:37:50,760 --> 00:37:54,160 Speaker 1: relatively short period of time in global trade history in 717 00:37:54,160 --> 00:37:57,359 Speaker 1: which the state attempted to advance any form of hegemony 718 00:37:58,120 --> 00:38:00,840 Speaker 1: over the high seas, and it is comple deletely retreated 719 00:38:00,880 --> 00:38:03,680 Speaker 1: from that in the twenty first century. It will be 720 00:38:04,719 --> 00:38:07,880 Speaker 1: very difficult for any state to try and regain that now, Like, 721 00:38:07,920 --> 00:38:10,759 Speaker 1: I don't see even the United States doesn't really. 722 00:38:10,480 --> 00:38:14,520 Speaker 2: Have the capacity to do that. Garrison looks ponderous. 723 00:38:15,120 --> 00:38:18,080 Speaker 3: Yeah, well, I guess I'll cancel my TEAMU orders. 724 00:38:19,160 --> 00:38:22,839 Speaker 1: They'll come someone someone right now is strapping a belt 725 00:38:22,840 --> 00:38:23,799 Speaker 1: fed machine gun to a. 726 00:38:23,800 --> 00:38:27,320 Speaker 2: Boat to make sure that you. 727 00:38:26,120 --> 00:38:28,440 Speaker 1: Get your team orders. It is like, really kind of 728 00:38:28,480 --> 00:38:33,480 Speaker 1: fucked that we're asking like people to run a mine field, right, 729 00:38:33,560 --> 00:38:36,000 Speaker 1: Like an understand global train is not just TEAMU orders, 730 00:38:36,040 --> 00:38:38,200 Speaker 1: but certainly a lot of stuff is consumed when the 731 00:38:38,239 --> 00:38:39,359 Speaker 1: global and author doesn't need. 732 00:38:39,280 --> 00:38:39,920 Speaker 2: To be consumed. 733 00:38:40,000 --> 00:38:43,279 Speaker 1: And it is wild that right now the solution of 734 00:38:43,280 --> 00:38:45,439 Speaker 1: the global shipping industry seems to be some of these 735 00:38:45,480 --> 00:38:48,280 Speaker 1: people will die, but we will keep the oil moving 736 00:38:48,320 --> 00:38:51,600 Speaker 1: and the treats moving. But that has been as I 737 00:38:51,640 --> 00:38:54,239 Speaker 1: hope I've illustrated here, right, Like some people will die, 738 00:38:54,239 --> 00:38:56,800 Speaker 1: but we will keep the treats moving. Has been pretty 739 00:38:56,840 --> 00:38:58,680 Speaker 1: much status of the shipping industry for most of the 740 00:38:58,760 --> 00:38:59,520 Speaker 1: twenty first century. 741 00:38:59,640 --> 00:39:03,520 Speaker 3: Yeah, that's this status of the entire world at this point. Yeah, yeah, 742 00:39:03,520 --> 00:39:06,080 Speaker 3: that is the capitalist logic, right. It's just it's like 743 00:39:06,160 --> 00:39:08,799 Speaker 3: particularly I think, particularly naked here. 744 00:39:09,480 --> 00:39:09,640 Speaker 2: Yeah. 745 00:39:09,680 --> 00:39:12,520 Speaker 1: I highly recommend the Outlaw Ocean podcast if you're interested 746 00:39:12,560 --> 00:39:15,200 Speaker 1: in learning more about this. I will link to some 747 00:39:15,280 --> 00:39:18,200 Speaker 1: of the Jstore deep dive that I went on this 748 00:39:18,280 --> 00:39:21,440 Speaker 1: morning if you are able to get past the jay 749 00:39:21,440 --> 00:39:24,000 Speaker 1: Store paywall and would like to read that. I think 750 00:39:24,000 --> 00:39:26,200 Speaker 1: that's about all we got. Anything else you want to 751 00:39:26,200 --> 00:39:27,640 Speaker 1: say about boats Garrison. 752 00:39:27,800 --> 00:39:29,480 Speaker 3: Now is the age of pirates. 753 00:39:30,280 --> 00:39:34,320 Speaker 1: Yeah, our flag means a complete lack of accountability. 754 00:39:37,360 --> 00:39:39,880 Speaker 3: It could happen here is a production of cool Zone Media. 755 00:39:40,040 --> 00:39:43,120 Speaker 3: For more podcasts from cool Zone Media, visit our website 756 00:39:43,200 --> 00:39:45,759 Speaker 3: cool Zonemedia dot com, or check us out on the 757 00:39:45,760 --> 00:39:49,719 Speaker 3: iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to podcasts. 758 00:39:50,160 --> 00:39:52,080 Speaker 3: You can now find sources for it could happen here. 759 00:39:52,120 --> 00:39:55,120 Speaker 3: Listened directly in episode descriptions. Thanks for listening,