1 00:00:02,120 --> 00:00:03,239 Speaker 1: CAUs Media. 2 00:00:05,000 --> 00:00:08,080 Speaker 2: Hello and welcome back to Better Offline. I'm your host 3 00:00:08,200 --> 00:00:08,799 Speaker 2: ed Zetron. 4 00:00:09,039 --> 00:00:21,800 Speaker 1: Of course, in. 5 00:00:21,760 --> 00:00:24,159 Speaker 2: The last episode, I went over why Google's monopoly is 6 00:00:24,200 --> 00:00:26,439 Speaker 2: such a problem and why monopolies are a form of 7 00:00:26,480 --> 00:00:29,720 Speaker 2: societal cancer. And in this episode, I'll go over want 8 00:00:29,760 --> 00:00:32,360 Speaker 2: my App and next to Google after their anti trust trial. 9 00:00:33,040 --> 00:00:34,479 Speaker 2: And by the time you hear this, it will have 10 00:00:34,479 --> 00:00:37,040 Speaker 2: been a few weeks since Judge a Amit Meta ruled 11 00:00:37,080 --> 00:00:40,520 Speaker 2: that Google was an illegal monopoly in search and online advertising. 12 00:00:41,000 --> 00:00:44,320 Speaker 2: The next phase of this saga, though not including any appeals, 13 00:00:44,479 --> 00:00:48,040 Speaker 2: will decide what penalties will come. Although it will be 14 00:00:48,120 --> 00:00:50,839 Speaker 2: several months and most likely several years before we learn 15 00:00:50,920 --> 00:00:53,479 Speaker 2: exactly what happens to Google, it's clear that the company 16 00:00:53,520 --> 00:00:56,960 Speaker 2: sits on a dangerous precipice. In addition to a monetary 17 00:00:57,000 --> 00:00:59,960 Speaker 2: penalty which is fairly likely and which could certainly be 18 00:01:00,040 --> 00:01:02,600 Speaker 2: in the billions of dollars, Judge Meta will likely force 19 00:01:02,640 --> 00:01:05,360 Speaker 2: Google to want to take some action that would effectively 20 00:01:05,440 --> 00:01:08,240 Speaker 2: end its monopoly status or at the very least support 21 00:01:08,280 --> 00:01:10,959 Speaker 2: more competition, and we'll get to those in the second 22 00:01:11,360 --> 00:01:13,480 Speaker 2: But it's worth noting that we need to talk about 23 00:01:13,520 --> 00:01:17,039 Speaker 2: how we got here. For this I'm going to be 24 00:01:17,080 --> 00:01:20,880 Speaker 2: heavily relying on Judge Meta's three hundred page ruling. Judge 25 00:01:20,920 --> 00:01:23,479 Speaker 2: Meta didn't concern himself with how Google got big because 26 00:01:23,520 --> 00:01:26,520 Speaker 2: nanto trust law, there's nothing really prohibiting you from achieving 27 00:01:26,560 --> 00:01:29,560 Speaker 2: dominance by being good and better than the competition. And 28 00:01:29,640 --> 00:01:31,800 Speaker 2: to be fair, for the first couple of decades, Google 29 00:01:31,920 --> 00:01:35,759 Speaker 2: was genuinely superior to any alternative. This was evidenced by 30 00:01:35,760 --> 00:01:38,319 Speaker 2: its early reviews with Danny Sullivan, who now works for 31 00:01:38,360 --> 00:01:40,399 Speaker 2: Google as a guy who occasionally pretends to care about 32 00:01:40,400 --> 00:01:42,680 Speaker 2: what reporters think, but at the time he wrote for 33 00:01:42,760 --> 00:01:45,600 Speaker 2: Search Engine Watch and he said, so how about results. 34 00:01:45,920 --> 00:01:48,080 Speaker 2: I think many people will be pleased, especially for the 35 00:01:48,120 --> 00:01:50,880 Speaker 2: ever popular single and two word queries. A search for 36 00:01:51,000 --> 00:01:53,720 Speaker 2: Bill Clinton brought the White House site up at number one. 37 00:01:54,000 --> 00:01:57,160 Speaker 2: A search for Disney top Rankdisney dot Com and sections 38 00:01:57,160 --> 00:01:59,360 Speaker 2: with it like Disney World, the Disney Channel, and Walt 39 00:01:59,400 --> 00:02:03,720 Speaker 2: Disney Picture. Yet interesting alternative sites like Werner's unofficial Disney 40 00:02:03,760 --> 00:02:07,040 Speaker 2: Park links also made it to that list. Now let's 41 00:02:07,120 --> 00:02:09,800 Speaker 2: just taken aside here. I'm just gonna go to Google 42 00:02:09,800 --> 00:02:11,920 Speaker 2: dot Com as we speak. I'm gonna take Disney in 43 00:02:11,960 --> 00:02:14,880 Speaker 2: I'm gonna read you what's on there. So the first 44 00:02:15,120 --> 00:02:17,680 Speaker 2: things at the top are all sponsored. It's sponsored, and 45 00:02:17,720 --> 00:02:20,920 Speaker 2: then tickets and tours is very big font and then 46 00:02:20,960 --> 00:02:27,560 Speaker 2: there's five different options to buy something on trip dot com, 47 00:02:27,720 --> 00:02:31,359 Speaker 2: some sort of vacation package, and then another thing from 48 00:02:31,400 --> 00:02:34,800 Speaker 2: a company called Undercover Tourist. And then the results are 49 00:02:35,000 --> 00:02:39,560 Speaker 2: Disney dot Com and disneyplasen well Disneyworld. But that those 50 00:02:39,600 --> 00:02:42,960 Speaker 2: are like the They are the smallest thing on this 51 00:02:43,000 --> 00:02:45,800 Speaker 2: page compared to the Disney store link in Vegas, and 52 00:02:45,880 --> 00:02:49,440 Speaker 2: the four or five different sponsored pieces of content. And 53 00:02:49,480 --> 00:02:52,720 Speaker 2: if you scroll down, it's Disney Products YouTube, Disney, Disney 54 00:02:52,720 --> 00:02:54,800 Speaker 2: on Eggs, Disney Parks. Oh, this is all pretty good, 55 00:02:55,040 --> 00:02:58,200 Speaker 2: but no original content. There's like one hundred thousand different 56 00:02:58,240 --> 00:03:00,800 Speaker 2: Disney blogs that just aren't on there. Google don't give 57 00:03:00,840 --> 00:03:04,560 Speaker 2: a shit, but they used to. Google also outclassed the 58 00:03:04,560 --> 00:03:07,000 Speaker 2: competition on a technical level, as noted by Brian Durell, 59 00:03:07,080 --> 00:03:09,640 Speaker 2: former sceening of Director of Production Operations at Alta Vista, 60 00:03:09,919 --> 00:03:12,880 Speaker 2: in a hacker Use post. He blamed Altavista's demise on 61 00:03:12,960 --> 00:03:15,720 Speaker 2: its failure to update its result indexes, which in turn 62 00:03:15,960 --> 00:03:18,000 Speaker 2: meant that many of their front page results led to 63 00:03:18,000 --> 00:03:22,160 Speaker 2: outdated or dead links, and I quote this was particularly 64 00:03:22,200 --> 00:03:25,320 Speaker 2: bad because one of our earliest strong points was fresh indexes. 65 00:03:25,560 --> 00:03:28,200 Speaker 2: Our ability to refresh the supplementary index on the flight 66 00:03:28,360 --> 00:03:31,400 Speaker 2: was awesome. When you lose one of your primary strengths, 67 00:03:31,520 --> 00:03:34,960 Speaker 2: it's noticeable, he said, adding that the decline in Altavista's 68 00:03:35,000 --> 00:03:37,440 Speaker 2: index quality was due to a loss of focus within 69 00:03:37,480 --> 00:03:40,560 Speaker 2: the company. Oh would hate for that to happen to Google. 70 00:03:41,400 --> 00:03:44,920 Speaker 2: Google was at the time, both objectively and subjectively better 71 00:03:44,920 --> 00:03:47,200 Speaker 2: than anything else, and so it grew, and like I 72 00:03:47,240 --> 00:03:49,400 Speaker 2: said last episode, it became a verb, kind of like 73 00:03:49,440 --> 00:03:52,280 Speaker 2: how we say photoshop instead of airbrush, or xerox instead 74 00:03:52,280 --> 00:03:56,960 Speaker 2: of photocopy, and better offline listener instead of average criminal. 75 00:03:57,680 --> 00:04:00,160 Speaker 2: Not only did it fend off its earliest competitors, but 76 00:04:00,200 --> 00:04:02,400 Speaker 2: it also brushed past anyone that would try to steal 77 00:04:02,440 --> 00:04:06,720 Speaker 2: its market share, like damp musk Acolyte Jason Kalakanis's Malhallow, 78 00:04:07,040 --> 00:04:09,400 Speaker 2: which was a human created search engine, a bit like 79 00:04:09,400 --> 00:04:12,640 Speaker 2: the early version of Yahoo and Kull, which emphasized its 80 00:04:12,720 --> 00:04:16,840 Speaker 2: larger search indexes and privacy centric ethos as the thingishing factors. 81 00:04:18,320 --> 00:04:21,000 Speaker 2: Just so we are clear, being popular or superior is 82 00:04:21,080 --> 00:04:24,919 Speaker 2: not an antitrust valulation. No, no, no, no, that's not 83 00:04:25,000 --> 00:04:27,960 Speaker 2: the problem. What Google did afterwards was the problem, and 84 00:04:28,000 --> 00:04:30,359 Speaker 2: in the eyes of Judge Meta and the US government, 85 00:04:30,440 --> 00:04:32,880 Speaker 2: was also illegal as a though, a lot of the 86 00:04:32,880 --> 00:04:35,400 Speaker 2: things am about to cite are from this ruling, which 87 00:04:35,400 --> 00:04:37,800 Speaker 2: makes linking to them kind of hard. Please don't be 88 00:04:37,839 --> 00:04:41,080 Speaker 2: mad at me. But much of this ruling discusses something 89 00:04:41,080 --> 00:04:44,119 Speaker 2: called distribution, which refers to how Google makes its search 90 00:04:44,160 --> 00:04:47,680 Speaker 2: product accessible to users. The Google website is the most 91 00:04:47,680 --> 00:04:50,400 Speaker 2: obvious example of that, but it also includes browser and 92 00:04:50,440 --> 00:04:53,920 Speaker 2: device integrations. You ever wonder why the default browser option 93 00:04:54,000 --> 00:04:57,000 Speaker 2: on Safari and Firefox is Google? I kind of said 94 00:04:57,040 --> 00:05:00,360 Speaker 2: it last episode. It's because Google pays these but he's 95 00:05:00,400 --> 00:05:03,479 Speaker 2: a lot of money. In the United States, half of 96 00:05:03,480 --> 00:05:06,120 Speaker 2: all searches happen through an access point were Google is 97 00:05:06,120 --> 00:05:08,920 Speaker 2: paid to be the default. A further twenty percent come 98 00:05:08,960 --> 00:05:11,279 Speaker 2: through Google Chrome, which is made by Google. And does 99 00:05:11,320 --> 00:05:15,200 Speaker 2: it follows that Google is the default search engine? Little 100 00:05:15,200 --> 00:05:19,200 Speaker 2: monopoly and your monopoly hit my ride. Only thirty percent 101 00:05:19,279 --> 00:05:22,240 Speaker 2: of US search queries take place in environments where Google 102 00:05:22,320 --> 00:05:25,719 Speaker 2: is not the default browser, Which is not to say 103 00:05:25,760 --> 00:05:27,560 Speaker 2: that all those searches are going to Duck duck go 104 00:05:27,760 --> 00:05:30,320 Speaker 2: or bing, but rather that consumers have made an active 105 00:05:30,360 --> 00:05:33,479 Speaker 2: decision to use whatever browser they've selected. And while you 106 00:05:33,520 --> 00:05:36,479 Speaker 2: could argue that the consumers could choose to change the 107 00:05:36,520 --> 00:05:39,920 Speaker 2: default on Safari or Firefox to something other than Google, 108 00:05:39,920 --> 00:05:43,200 Speaker 2: the reality is, as shown by Google's own internal research 109 00:05:43,240 --> 00:05:46,440 Speaker 2: and communications, that most consumers either don't know how or 110 00:05:46,560 --> 00:05:51,159 Speaker 2: just don't care to. Another internal study mentioned in the judgment, 111 00:05:51,240 --> 00:05:53,520 Speaker 2: this time from twenty twenty, showed that half of all 112 00:05:53,640 --> 00:05:56,359 Speaker 2: US iPhone users didn't even know what search engine they 113 00:05:56,400 --> 00:06:00,000 Speaker 2: were using. The ruling also points out that in some cases, 114 00:06:00,360 --> 00:06:03,400 Speaker 2: there are inherent points of friction dissuade users from changing 115 00:06:03,400 --> 00:06:07,120 Speaker 2: their default search engine. Switching on Android was arguably more 116 00:06:07,120 --> 00:06:10,120 Speaker 2: difficult than nonios, the ruling said, also noting that the 117 00:06:10,120 --> 00:06:12,920 Speaker 2: smaller screen of a smartphone and general fiddliness of things 118 00:06:13,000 --> 00:06:16,880 Speaker 2: was a further deterrm. Google's own estimates show that if 119 00:06:16,880 --> 00:06:20,000 Speaker 2: it lost search placement on iOS to another provider, it 120 00:06:20,000 --> 00:06:23,080 Speaker 2: would lose between sixty and eighty percent of its traffic 121 00:06:23,560 --> 00:06:25,719 Speaker 2: just because of how tricky it is to change these 122 00:06:25,720 --> 00:06:30,360 Speaker 2: default settings. And so you're starting to get an understanding 123 00:06:30,440 --> 00:06:33,160 Speaker 2: of the importance of these default placement deals for Google 124 00:06:33,200 --> 00:06:35,560 Speaker 2: and how critical they are to its bottom line. In 125 00:06:35,600 --> 00:06:38,760 Speaker 2: twenty twenty one, Mozilla made eighty percent of its operating budget, 126 00:06:38,839 --> 00:06:41,920 Speaker 2: or four hundred million dollars, by selling default placement to Google. 127 00:06:41,960 --> 00:06:46,800 Speaker 2: Two these monopolies have real consequences. Apple meanwhile, owns a 128 00:06:46,800 --> 00:06:50,200 Speaker 2: percentage of advertising revenue from queries made from Safari and Chrome, 129 00:06:50,560 --> 00:06:53,640 Speaker 2: even though Apple doesn't actually bundle Chrome with its devices. 130 00:06:54,279 --> 00:06:57,200 Speaker 2: In twenty twenty two, this amounted to about twenty billion dollars, 131 00:06:57,240 --> 00:06:59,560 Speaker 2: which was double the figure of twenty twenty and amounted 132 00:06:59,560 --> 00:07:02,560 Speaker 2: to one six of Apple's operating profit from that year. 133 00:07:03,680 --> 00:07:07,360 Speaker 2: Google also assigned deals with several US carriers like T Mobile, Verizon, 134 00:07:07,440 --> 00:07:10,360 Speaker 2: in AT, and T, as well as other Android manufacturers, 135 00:07:10,360 --> 00:07:13,800 Speaker 2: including Samsung and Motorola. The terms of these deals differ 136 00:07:13,840 --> 00:07:16,920 Speaker 2: between companies, but they usually account for a percentage of revenue, 137 00:07:16,960 --> 00:07:20,960 Speaker 2: with the actual percentage varying from contract to contract. While 138 00:07:21,000 --> 00:07:23,160 Speaker 2: these deals are undoubtedly good for the balance sheets of 139 00:07:23,160 --> 00:07:26,040 Speaker 2: these companies, they do impose restrictions on what these companies 140 00:07:26,080 --> 00:07:28,920 Speaker 2: can do. Take Samsung, for example, which has around thirty 141 00:07:28,960 --> 00:07:32,320 Speaker 2: one percent of US smartphone market share, second only to Apple. 142 00:07:33,080 --> 00:07:36,360 Speaker 2: In twenty nineteen, Samsung wanted to integrate technology from a 143 00:07:36,360 --> 00:07:38,880 Speaker 2: startup called Branch, which would allow users to search for 144 00:07:38,920 --> 00:07:42,600 Speaker 2: content within installed applications, as well as to a limited extent, 145 00:07:42,800 --> 00:07:45,000 Speaker 2: content from the Internet, although it was not to be 146 00:07:45,120 --> 00:07:49,240 Speaker 2: clear a proper search engine in any real sense. Despite 147 00:07:49,320 --> 00:07:51,680 Speaker 2: how there was a little bit of initial excitement around this, 148 00:07:52,120 --> 00:07:56,920 Speaker 2: Samsung also saw h kind of become clear that the 149 00:07:56,960 --> 00:07:59,920 Speaker 2: way Branch worked conflicted with their agreement with Google, and 150 00:08:00,120 --> 00:08:01,920 Speaker 2: so the software had to be reworked in a way 151 00:08:01,960 --> 00:08:05,920 Speaker 2: that massively limited its functionality. While the partnership went ahead, 152 00:08:06,000 --> 00:08:09,120 Speaker 2: it was nowhere near as lucrative as Branch first hoped. 153 00:08:09,400 --> 00:08:13,200 Speaker 2: The software was crippled and thus much less attractive. Similarly, 154 00:08:13,280 --> 00:08:15,600 Speaker 2: AT and T also wanted to pre install Branch on 155 00:08:15,640 --> 00:08:18,320 Speaker 2: its devices, but decided against it when it couldn't get 156 00:08:18,320 --> 00:08:20,640 Speaker 2: clarity from Google whether it violated the terms of its 157 00:08:20,680 --> 00:08:24,480 Speaker 2: revenue sharing deal. Google, it seemed simply stonewalled AT and 158 00:08:24,520 --> 00:08:27,560 Speaker 2: T into submission. And this is again going back to 159 00:08:27,560 --> 00:08:31,720 Speaker 2: the Matt Stolar interview I did. When you have rules 160 00:08:31,760 --> 00:08:33,800 Speaker 2: like this, when you have monopolies, they do operate like 161 00:08:33,880 --> 00:08:37,200 Speaker 2: miniature governments. And indeed, this is an example Google didn't 162 00:08:37,200 --> 00:08:39,959 Speaker 2: even need to intimidate these people. In most cases, they 163 00:08:40,040 --> 00:08:42,280 Speaker 2: just made enough money and they were scared enough of 164 00:08:42,360 --> 00:08:45,360 Speaker 2: violating the deal that they literally made their devices worse. 165 00:08:45,400 --> 00:08:49,040 Speaker 2: They didn't install cool software for fear that Google might 166 00:08:49,120 --> 00:08:52,280 Speaker 2: sue them and cut off a lucrative revenue share. It's 167 00:08:52,440 --> 00:08:56,720 Speaker 2: nasty even Apple, a company that is at varying times 168 00:08:56,960 --> 00:09:00,120 Speaker 2: close to or the most valuable company in the world, 169 00:09:00,160 --> 00:09:03,640 Speaker 2: itself constrained by this devil's deal with Google. At one point, 170 00:09:03,679 --> 00:09:06,800 Speaker 2: Google insisted on altering the terms of its agreement to 171 00:09:06,800 --> 00:09:09,400 Speaker 2: prevent Apple from suggesting relevant links to users through the 172 00:09:09,400 --> 00:09:11,800 Speaker 2: Safari search bar, as such a feature would be and 173 00:09:11,840 --> 00:09:15,880 Speaker 2: I quote, substantially similar to Google search. Apple, for what 174 00:09:15,960 --> 00:09:18,240 Speaker 2: it's worth, has said that it did not feel constrained 175 00:09:18,240 --> 00:09:20,520 Speaker 2: by these restrictions, which makes it fine with me. Then 176 00:09:20,559 --> 00:09:23,720 Speaker 2: I'm kidding the kidding. I'd argue that they would say 177 00:09:23,760 --> 00:09:25,920 Speaker 2: that because they were making twenty billion dollars each year 178 00:09:25,920 --> 00:09:28,160 Speaker 2: from Google. And if I'm honest, if somebody gave me 179 00:09:28,240 --> 00:09:30,400 Speaker 2: twenty billion dollars, I'd let them do whatever they wanted. 180 00:09:30,880 --> 00:09:32,559 Speaker 2: Hit me with a baseball back, roun me over with 181 00:09:32,600 --> 00:09:34,319 Speaker 2: your car. I don't care call me a pig. I'll 182 00:09:34,320 --> 00:09:37,760 Speaker 2: oink for you. Give me twenty billion dollars. I need 183 00:09:37,800 --> 00:09:40,680 Speaker 2: twenty billion dollars. Please give it to me now. But 184 00:09:40,760 --> 00:09:43,160 Speaker 2: if you can't give me your money, then perhaps you'll 185 00:09:43,160 --> 00:09:45,840 Speaker 2: hand it to one of the extremely well targeted advertisements 186 00:09:45,960 --> 00:09:48,320 Speaker 2: that follow this wonderful message once that will make you 187 00:09:48,360 --> 00:09:50,280 Speaker 2: say wow. This is definitely one that Ed wanted to 188 00:09:50,280 --> 00:10:03,000 Speaker 2: follow what he just said, and we're back. And we're 189 00:10:03,040 --> 00:10:06,640 Speaker 2: back with Google. As I've kind of hinted at, I 190 00:10:06,679 --> 00:10:10,320 Speaker 2: don't think without their ad monopoly and with their Google 191 00:10:10,320 --> 00:10:13,160 Speaker 2: Search monopoly, I don't think Google is a profitable business. 192 00:10:13,160 --> 00:10:16,080 Speaker 2: And I definitely don't think Google Search is a profitable business. 193 00:10:16,320 --> 00:10:19,160 Speaker 2: I think it's actually kind of a cost center. Search 194 00:10:19,360 --> 00:10:21,880 Speaker 2: is in effect the vehicle in how Google gets people 195 00:10:21,880 --> 00:10:25,200 Speaker 2: to look at billions of dollars of advertisements every single day, 196 00:10:25,440 --> 00:10:28,520 Speaker 2: and Google doesn't allow any other competing business to show 197 00:10:28,559 --> 00:10:31,880 Speaker 2: adds on its turf. It has exclusivity, and as the 198 00:10:31,960 --> 00:10:35,400 Speaker 2: ruling found, that exclusivity has allowed Google to raise prices 199 00:10:35,400 --> 00:10:37,960 Speaker 2: at will, looking to see how far it can push 200 00:10:37,960 --> 00:10:40,720 Speaker 2: advertisers before they walk away, you know, to the other 201 00:10:40,760 --> 00:10:44,640 Speaker 2: place they can advertise to this many people in twenty seventeen, 202 00:10:44,679 --> 00:10:47,640 Speaker 2: the company ran an experiment where it strongly increased certain 203 00:10:47,679 --> 00:10:51,840 Speaker 2: prices for a cohor fifteen percent of advertisers for six weeks. 204 00:10:52,240 --> 00:10:55,679 Speaker 2: It found that half of the initial revenue getting stuck, 205 00:10:56,080 --> 00:10:58,840 Speaker 2: and found that there was no significant evidence that advertisers 206 00:10:58,840 --> 00:11:02,160 Speaker 2: were changing what products they don Google would later do 207 00:11:02,240 --> 00:11:05,280 Speaker 2: further studies where it significantly hyped prices on advertisers, and 208 00:11:05,320 --> 00:11:07,720 Speaker 2: each time it learned that it could charge more without 209 00:11:07,720 --> 00:11:10,880 Speaker 2: losing them. While Google acknowledged there was a limit to 210 00:11:10,920 --> 00:11:13,120 Speaker 2: how far it could push things, they believed that there 211 00:11:13,200 --> 00:11:15,640 Speaker 2: was still more value to extract from its customers, and 212 00:11:15,679 --> 00:11:18,360 Speaker 2: so it's set upon a strategy of gradually, though significantly, 213 00:11:18,360 --> 00:11:21,800 Speaker 2: I should add raising prices across short intervals, as in 214 00:11:21,880 --> 00:11:24,800 Speaker 2: the siding. Goddamn, is this company so fucking evil? They 215 00:11:24,800 --> 00:11:28,280 Speaker 2: should be eradicated from existence. The fact that people like 216 00:11:28,320 --> 00:11:30,640 Speaker 2: this function in good societies only prove that there are 217 00:11:30,679 --> 00:11:33,320 Speaker 2: things wrong in the world. Every time I read about them, 218 00:11:33,320 --> 00:11:38,200 Speaker 2: I feel poison in my veins. But there's more. These 219 00:11:38,280 --> 00:11:42,400 Speaker 2: price rises Judge Meta noted were oftentimed when Google was 220 00:11:42,440 --> 00:11:44,640 Speaker 2: at risk of not meeting its revenue goals, and when 221 00:11:44,640 --> 00:11:46,760 Speaker 2: the company was at risk of showing some sort of 222 00:11:46,760 --> 00:11:49,560 Speaker 2: slow down in its ads business. Hey remember the code 223 00:11:49,640 --> 00:11:52,920 Speaker 2: yellow from twenty nineteen from the man that destroyed Google Search, 224 00:11:53,480 --> 00:11:56,559 Speaker 2: that was all around raising metrics because they were worried 225 00:11:56,559 --> 00:11:59,959 Speaker 2: about query growth. Google does not care. They will do 226 00:12:00,240 --> 00:12:03,600 Speaker 2: whatever they need to to make revenue. They will make 227 00:12:03,679 --> 00:12:06,760 Speaker 2: your products worse, they will make it more expensive for 228 00:12:06,800 --> 00:12:09,920 Speaker 2: advertisers to advertise to you. And it's all thanks to 229 00:12:09,960 --> 00:12:14,120 Speaker 2: their goddamn monopolies and these changes, these increases through the 230 00:12:14,160 --> 00:12:17,320 Speaker 2: pricing of advertising and the way that they took money 231 00:12:17,360 --> 00:12:20,240 Speaker 2: from advertisers. They were done with this insane lack of 232 00:12:20,240 --> 00:12:24,319 Speaker 2: transparency and this is really stomach turning, this beer. This company. 233 00:12:24,520 --> 00:12:27,360 Speaker 2: People should be in jail for this. Google didn't tell 234 00:12:27,440 --> 00:12:29,800 Speaker 2: advertisers that the costs were going up, but rather they 235 00:12:29,840 --> 00:12:32,960 Speaker 2: were timing these increases so that these increases could be 236 00:12:32,960 --> 00:12:38,280 Speaker 2: dismissed as noise or ordinary price fluctuations generated within advertising auctions. 237 00:12:39,120 --> 00:12:41,280 Speaker 2: The last point is important, by the way, as Google 238 00:12:41,320 --> 00:12:43,800 Speaker 2: also tried to rig these auctions in their own favor. 239 00:12:44,320 --> 00:12:46,559 Speaker 2: One way they accomplished this, by the way, is by 240 00:12:46,600 --> 00:12:50,199 Speaker 2: removing the ability for advertisers to remove themselves from certain auctions. 241 00:12:50,720 --> 00:12:52,840 Speaker 2: When someone buys a text out on Google, what they're 242 00:12:52,880 --> 00:12:55,520 Speaker 2: really doing is selecting a keyword or keywords under which 243 00:12:55,520 --> 00:12:58,000 Speaker 2: they want their ads to appear. The problem is that 244 00:12:58,000 --> 00:12:59,880 Speaker 2: people may use different words for a search with the 245 00:13:00,080 --> 00:13:03,480 Speaker 2: same intent. So one person might say kid's clothing where 246 00:13:03,520 --> 00:13:06,000 Speaker 2: another might say children's clothing. And this is a problem 247 00:13:06,080 --> 00:13:07,760 Speaker 2: for advertisers because you want to make sure that you 248 00:13:07,800 --> 00:13:10,240 Speaker 2: capture the audience you want, right, And this is a 249 00:13:10,240 --> 00:13:13,040 Speaker 2: problem that Google fixed by adding other relevant keywords to 250 00:13:13,120 --> 00:13:17,800 Speaker 2: an advertiser's bid without telling them. Now, this might seem 251 00:13:17,840 --> 00:13:19,640 Speaker 2: like a nice thing that Google did, making sure that 252 00:13:19,679 --> 00:13:24,360 Speaker 2: your money goes further, right, The problem is, as the 253 00:13:24,440 --> 00:13:28,120 Speaker 2: ruling showed, the Google interpreted the word relevant in the 254 00:13:28,120 --> 00:13:31,400 Speaker 2: broadest way possible, so kids clothing would, as one shot 255 00:13:31,440 --> 00:13:35,480 Speaker 2: shown in the ruling showed, include phrases like newborn children's 256 00:13:35,480 --> 00:13:39,640 Speaker 2: clothing or kid's clothing Canada or Tjmax kids wear. And 257 00:13:39,720 --> 00:13:41,760 Speaker 2: what's great is if you don't like this, you have 258 00:13:41,880 --> 00:13:44,640 Speaker 2: no one else to advertise, with no other choices. And 259 00:13:44,679 --> 00:13:47,880 Speaker 2: while Google initially allowed advertisers to opt out of this feature, 260 00:13:47,880 --> 00:13:50,720 Speaker 2: which they called semantic matching, or use a limited version 261 00:13:50,760 --> 00:13:55,240 Speaker 2: that would only include grammatical variations like pluralization, so children clothing, 262 00:13:55,400 --> 00:13:58,000 Speaker 2: children's clothing, and so on and so forth, They of 263 00:13:58,000 --> 00:14:01,319 Speaker 2: course remove these options. It means that unless the advertiser 264 00:14:01,440 --> 00:14:04,800 Speaker 2: explicitly states what keywords they don't want their advert to 265 00:14:04,800 --> 00:14:07,520 Speaker 2: appear under, they're going to be bid on search results 266 00:14:07,760 --> 00:14:10,679 Speaker 2: that aren't relevant to their needs. And guess who controls 267 00:14:10,960 --> 00:14:14,720 Speaker 2: what are relevant? Google? Google. Google's the one that tells 268 00:14:14,720 --> 00:14:16,880 Speaker 2: you how much money to spend on Google. You don't 269 00:14:16,960 --> 00:14:19,600 Speaker 2: like it, well, you can work with Google to advertise 270 00:14:19,640 --> 00:14:22,880 Speaker 2: on Google, and otherwise you go fuck yourself. And this 271 00:14:22,960 --> 00:14:25,680 Speaker 2: in turn increases the amount of advertisers bidding for space 272 00:14:25,720 --> 00:14:28,440 Speaker 2: in an auction, which in turn results in higher prices 273 00:14:28,440 --> 00:14:33,880 Speaker 2: for advertisers in a completely unpredictable way that's predictably evil. 274 00:14:34,680 --> 00:14:38,400 Speaker 2: Not only does Google control the supply, they literally control 275 00:14:38,440 --> 00:14:42,000 Speaker 2: the demand. And while Google at one point provided advertisers 276 00:14:42,000 --> 00:14:45,560 Speaker 2: with detailed information about their matched keywords and the algorithmically 277 00:14:45,600 --> 00:14:48,320 Speaker 2: selected ones at that it no longer does so. As 278 00:14:48,360 --> 00:14:51,080 Speaker 2: a result, advertisers are effectively forced to guess what keywords 279 00:14:51,080 --> 00:14:53,000 Speaker 2: their ad might appear under, and they have no other 280 00:14:53,080 --> 00:14:55,280 Speaker 2: vendor to go to who might be a little more transparent. 281 00:14:55,840 --> 00:14:57,880 Speaker 2: This in turn, by the way, pushes them to larger 282 00:14:57,920 --> 00:15:00,800 Speaker 2: advertising agencies who have a better relation and ship with Google, 283 00:15:00,920 --> 00:15:03,240 Speaker 2: who might have keyword banks that they know that they 284 00:15:03,280 --> 00:15:05,200 Speaker 2: can cut out so that the advertising dollars are more 285 00:15:05,200 --> 00:15:08,800 Speaker 2: efficiently spent. This in turn makes advertising agencies, especially the 286 00:15:08,840 --> 00:15:12,320 Speaker 2: bigger ones, more powerful and hurt small businesses. It's so 287 00:15:12,560 --> 00:15:16,000 Speaker 2: cool watching this happen. It doesn't make me angry at all. 288 00:15:17,200 --> 00:15:19,920 Speaker 2: But in his ruling, Judge Meta found that Google's practices 289 00:15:20,040 --> 00:15:23,080 Speaker 2: had degraded the quality of its text advertisements and charge 290 00:15:23,160 --> 00:15:27,000 Speaker 2: super competitive prices for text advertisements. At the same time, 291 00:15:27,200 --> 00:15:30,760 Speaker 2: by maintaining Google's stranglehold on the search market, they effectively 292 00:15:30,760 --> 00:15:33,920 Speaker 2: limited how much rivals like Being can make from advertising. 293 00:15:34,600 --> 00:15:37,480 Speaker 2: Even if Microsoft built a better ad tech platform than Google, 294 00:15:37,640 --> 00:15:39,760 Speaker 2: its share of spending would remain in line with its 295 00:15:39,800 --> 00:15:43,520 Speaker 2: market share and I quote here By locking in a 296 00:15:43,600 --> 00:15:47,880 Speaker 2: huge comparatative query volume advantage through its exclusive agreements, Google 297 00:15:47,960 --> 00:15:50,520 Speaker 2: ensures that advertisers will continue to spend ninety percent of 298 00:15:50,560 --> 00:15:53,320 Speaker 2: their text ad dollars with Google, regardless of increases in 299 00:15:53,400 --> 00:15:57,160 Speaker 2: price or decreases in quality. That is an anti competitive 300 00:15:57,160 --> 00:15:59,320 Speaker 2: effect in the marketplace, and as Judge Metter is said 301 00:15:59,320 --> 00:16:03,400 Speaker 2: that is bluddy well right, So what happens next. There's 302 00:16:03,440 --> 00:16:05,880 Speaker 2: four un likely outcomes here, each with their own advantages 303 00:16:05,960 --> 00:16:08,920 Speaker 2: or disadvantages and their own level of probability have come 304 00:16:08,960 --> 00:16:11,360 Speaker 2: into pass and had tip by the way to Adam 305 00:16:11,440 --> 00:16:16,560 Speaker 2: Kolovicik for highlighting these. Google may be ordered to cease 306 00:16:16,600 --> 00:16:19,480 Speaker 2: engaging in default search deals kind of the most obvious one, 307 00:16:19,560 --> 00:16:21,920 Speaker 2: leaving the likes of Apple, Samsung, and Mozilla free to 308 00:16:22,000 --> 00:16:25,160 Speaker 2: sign agreements with other search providers, although these agreements would 309 00:16:25,360 --> 00:16:28,120 Speaker 2: almost certainly be less favorable than their current ones, and 310 00:16:28,240 --> 00:16:31,840 Speaker 2: indeed would be I don't know competitive, It's going to 311 00:16:31,880 --> 00:16:34,480 Speaker 2: be a mess. As the ruling showed, both Apple and 312 00:16:34,520 --> 00:16:37,520 Speaker 2: Mozilla have at times flirted with or been courted by 313 00:16:37,520 --> 00:16:39,960 Speaker 2: the likes of Microsoft and Yahoo, although the terms were 314 00:16:39,960 --> 00:16:42,400 Speaker 2: never as favorable as I mentioned, and guess what they 315 00:16:42,400 --> 00:16:45,640 Speaker 2: didn't take them Judge Meta might although the how is 316 00:16:45,680 --> 00:16:48,640 Speaker 2: pretty difficult here, as Apple and Mozilla aren't defendants in 317 00:16:48,680 --> 00:16:51,240 Speaker 2: this case. Force browser developers to offer use as a 318 00:16:51,280 --> 00:16:53,760 Speaker 2: ballot screen where people could choose what search engine they'd 319 00:16:53,800 --> 00:16:57,840 Speaker 2: like to use. This would probably boost the market share 320 00:16:57,840 --> 00:17:01,080 Speaker 2: of smaller search providers by a small degree, although I 321 00:17:01,080 --> 00:17:04,439 Speaker 2: imagine most would just opt, through habit or preference, to 322 00:17:04,480 --> 00:17:08,520 Speaker 2: pick Google at the very least until a viable alternative 323 00:17:08,520 --> 00:17:12,640 Speaker 2: gains momentum. But this is still a start. It's still good. Well, 324 00:17:12,640 --> 00:17:15,560 Speaker 2: then again, it's entirely possible that people might try something 325 00:17:15,600 --> 00:17:17,879 Speaker 2: new and either because they like what they've selected or 326 00:17:17,920 --> 00:17:20,680 Speaker 2: through sheer inertia, they don't go back to Google. As 327 00:17:20,680 --> 00:17:23,920 Speaker 2: Google's data shows, this is a real threat, especially on mobile, 328 00:17:23,960 --> 00:17:26,560 Speaker 2: which accounts for a massive portion of its search traffic 329 00:17:26,560 --> 00:17:29,920 Speaker 2: and thus its ad revenue. Google may be forced to 330 00:17:29,920 --> 00:17:32,560 Speaker 2: share click and query data with rivals, although again this 331 00:17:32,680 --> 00:17:36,000 Speaker 2: poses its own thorny issues, especially when it comes to privacy. 332 00:17:36,440 --> 00:17:38,760 Speaker 2: At the very least, it should at least tell advertisers 333 00:17:38,760 --> 00:17:41,280 Speaker 2: what keywords they're buying and give them meaningful opportunities to 334 00:17:41,320 --> 00:17:44,240 Speaker 2: opt out of irrelevant queries. While this sounds like a 335 00:17:44,280 --> 00:17:46,240 Speaker 2: minor slap on the wrist, it has the potential to 336 00:17:46,280 --> 00:17:50,679 Speaker 2: cost Google billions. Google's made so much money from forcing 337 00:17:50,720 --> 00:17:53,119 Speaker 2: advertisers to buy slots on searches they don't want or 338 00:17:53,160 --> 00:17:55,639 Speaker 2: care about, and by forcing people into auctions against their 339 00:17:55,640 --> 00:17:58,800 Speaker 2: will or knowledge. When buyers are empowered, it follows that 340 00:17:58,840 --> 00:18:01,160 Speaker 2: the price of ads will decrease commensurate with the lower 341 00:18:01,240 --> 00:18:04,119 Speaker 2: levels of demand, And I don't know consumer choice is 342 00:18:04,119 --> 00:18:06,639 Speaker 2: good and Google does not like consumer choice, so I 343 00:18:06,720 --> 00:18:11,000 Speaker 2: assume it's less profitable to let people choose things. But finally, 344 00:18:11,119 --> 00:18:14,160 Speaker 2: Judge Meta may order the actual breakup of Google, compelling 345 00:18:14,240 --> 00:18:18,160 Speaker 2: the company to divest Chrome, Android, or more than likely 346 00:18:18,200 --> 00:18:22,120 Speaker 2: its advertising division. This remedy is arguably the most potent 347 00:18:22,440 --> 00:18:24,879 Speaker 2: and one that Google is most likely to oppose, and 348 00:18:24,920 --> 00:18:28,360 Speaker 2: it's also the most funny. But let's get into why 349 00:18:28,400 --> 00:18:31,960 Speaker 2: it's thorny. Chrome and Android are based on open source products, 350 00:18:32,000 --> 00:18:35,040 Speaker 2: the chromeum Project and the Android open Source Project, respectively, 351 00:18:35,440 --> 00:18:38,639 Speaker 2: and short of prohibiting Google from contributing code or providing funding, 352 00:18:38,800 --> 00:18:40,800 Speaker 2: it would have a leading role in these developments and 353 00:18:40,840 --> 00:18:45,119 Speaker 2: thus real influence. Moreover, Google's presence in Android isn't just 354 00:18:45,160 --> 00:18:48,280 Speaker 2: in the operating system itself, but everything else called Google 355 00:18:48,320 --> 00:18:52,600 Speaker 2: Mobile Services or GMS. GMS is the package of software 356 00:18:52,600 --> 00:18:55,040 Speaker 2: that turns an Android phone into a Google phone. It 357 00:18:55,119 --> 00:18:57,119 Speaker 2: includes the apps that company installed when you buy a 358 00:18:57,160 --> 00:19:00,720 Speaker 2: Samsung or Gaomi phone, like Gmail, Google Chrome, Google Assistant, 359 00:19:00,760 --> 00:19:03,920 Speaker 2: and so on, and also Google Gemini, as well as 360 00:19:03,920 --> 00:19:07,480 Speaker 2: the APIs that allow third party applications to integrate with them. 361 00:19:07,680 --> 00:19:10,480 Speaker 2: Any ruling that doesn't force Google to divest these components 362 00:19:10,600 --> 00:19:13,159 Speaker 2: is for the most part, toothless, and any ruling that 363 00:19:13,200 --> 00:19:15,680 Speaker 2: says effectively that Google can no longer build apps, or 364 00:19:15,760 --> 00:19:18,159 Speaker 2: rather build apps for the mobile os it's most closely 365 00:19:18,200 --> 00:19:23,280 Speaker 2: associated with, it's kind of hard to imagine. Moreover, Google 366 00:19:23,320 --> 00:19:26,440 Speaker 2: could also just ditch Android. It's already working on its 367 00:19:26,440 --> 00:19:30,360 Speaker 2: own OS called Future. It's already using Future in production devices, 368 00:19:30,400 --> 00:19:33,160 Speaker 2: though it's unclear how invested they are in the project, 369 00:19:33,400 --> 00:19:35,560 Speaker 2: and as I've previously mentioned in the last episode, I 370 00:19:35,560 --> 00:19:37,840 Speaker 2: don't know how much staying power anything new and Google 371 00:19:37,880 --> 00:19:41,720 Speaker 2: actually has. Combine this with native support for existing Android apps, 372 00:19:41,720 --> 00:19:44,119 Speaker 2: which it likely already has and if not, could be 373 00:19:44,160 --> 00:19:47,800 Speaker 2: implemented as others like Microsoft and Huawei have pretended to, 374 00:19:48,680 --> 00:19:52,000 Speaker 2: it would effectively skirt any restrictions imposed on Google's involvement 375 00:19:52,040 --> 00:19:56,840 Speaker 2: in Android proper. The biggest scariest thing for Google would 376 00:19:56,880 --> 00:19:59,520 Speaker 2: be any separation of church and state between Google Search 377 00:19:59,560 --> 00:20:03,000 Speaker 2: and its ap avertising platform. Doing so would be potentially 378 00:20:03,080 --> 00:20:05,639 Speaker 2: ruinous for this company, which is why Google will do 379 00:20:05,720 --> 00:20:08,439 Speaker 2: literally anything to stop it. But it's the remedy that 380 00:20:08,440 --> 00:20:12,480 Speaker 2: would actually change things. Google's lack of competition in search 381 00:20:13,040 --> 00:20:15,399 Speaker 2: is a symptom of its ability to set pricing in 382 00:20:15,480 --> 00:20:18,119 Speaker 2: terms of advertising on search, and it's a problem that 383 00:20:18,119 --> 00:20:20,480 Speaker 2: can be solved by removing its ability to do so. 384 00:20:20,680 --> 00:20:23,000 Speaker 2: And let's face it, Google Search doesn't make that much 385 00:20:23,040 --> 00:20:25,159 Speaker 2: money on its own. The thing that brings home the 386 00:20:25,200 --> 00:20:27,520 Speaker 2: bacon is the ads on search and the ads you 387 00:20:27,560 --> 00:20:30,360 Speaker 2: get with each query. If the ad business becomes its 388 00:20:30,359 --> 00:20:33,800 Speaker 2: own separate entity, Google will have to entirely rethink how 389 00:20:33,840 --> 00:20:38,280 Speaker 2: it monetizes search. And for san Da Pischai, that's a 390 00:20:38,400 --> 00:20:41,800 Speaker 2: terrifying thought. I mean, what's he do? How do you 391 00:20:41,960 --> 00:20:44,880 Speaker 2: rig the tables if you don't own the casino? And 392 00:20:44,920 --> 00:20:46,800 Speaker 2: by the way, I'm in beautiful Las Vegas, Nevada. We 393 00:20:46,840 --> 00:20:51,520 Speaker 2: they never rigged the tables here. That's sacrilegious. But it's 394 00:20:51,560 --> 00:20:53,920 Speaker 2: not like there's another business for him to fall back upon. 395 00:20:54,359 --> 00:20:56,159 Speaker 2: As a discussed at the end of the last episode, 396 00:20:56,200 --> 00:20:58,919 Speaker 2: Google's largely lost the ability to innovate and execute on 397 00:20:58,960 --> 00:21:01,640 Speaker 2: new ideas, and a new ideas that do eventually hit 398 00:21:01,640 --> 00:21:05,400 Speaker 2: the market are usually and often just in a few months. Murdered, 399 00:21:06,000 --> 00:21:09,280 Speaker 2: the bolt gun comes out chunk. They throw them in 400 00:21:09,320 --> 00:21:12,360 Speaker 2: the open grave with Google Reader. But seriously, what does 401 00:21:12,400 --> 00:21:14,959 Speaker 2: Google have other than products that directly lead to its 402 00:21:15,000 --> 00:21:19,520 Speaker 2: own advertising technologies. What is there besides Cloud? And even 403 00:21:19,560 --> 00:21:21,879 Speaker 2: Cloud is a marginal player at best when compared to 404 00:21:21,920 --> 00:21:27,520 Speaker 2: Microsoft's Azure and Amazon's Aws. There's nothing. Before you get 405 00:21:27,560 --> 00:21:29,919 Speaker 2: too excited, it is worth noting that Google will no 406 00:21:30,000 --> 00:21:33,359 Speaker 2: doubt fight this ruling to the very end, using every 407 00:21:33,600 --> 00:21:37,720 Speaker 2: single avenue of appeal, every dirty trick, until they're successful 408 00:21:37,800 --> 00:21:40,800 Speaker 2: or they've run out of options. These little fuckers are 409 00:21:40,800 --> 00:21:42,960 Speaker 2: going to go after everything, and they're going to look 410 00:21:43,000 --> 00:21:45,720 Speaker 2: specifically an appeal, which, by the way, little Apple loup 411 00:21:45,720 --> 00:21:48,159 Speaker 2: court session for you here, and if there's a loyalist thing, 412 00:21:48,200 --> 00:21:51,760 Speaker 2: I'm sorry. Basically, Apple loop court appeals are not a 413 00:21:51,800 --> 00:21:54,480 Speaker 2: retrial of the facts. It is a procedural thing. They'll 414 00:21:54,520 --> 00:21:56,520 Speaker 2: be looking to see whether the judge meta messed up. 415 00:21:56,920 --> 00:21:58,920 Speaker 2: And I'll tell you a little bit about how that's 416 00:21:58,960 --> 00:22:01,639 Speaker 2: happened in the past and how bad that is and 417 00:22:01,680 --> 00:22:04,720 Speaker 2: why I'm a little worried it might work. Sure, there's 418 00:22:04,760 --> 00:22:07,280 Speaker 2: now a bipartisan dislike a big tech and I don't 419 00:22:07,320 --> 00:22:10,280 Speaker 2: think any of the recently appointed Supreme Court judges other 420 00:22:10,320 --> 00:22:12,200 Speaker 2: than the ones that might be on the take. 421 00:22:12,240 --> 00:22:12,679 Speaker 3: I don't know. 422 00:22:13,600 --> 00:22:16,440 Speaker 2: I don't think they care about Google. Trump doesn't like Google, 423 00:22:16,680 --> 00:22:19,280 Speaker 2: Harris doesn't like Google. I don't think anyone that's coming 424 00:22:19,359 --> 00:22:21,440 Speaker 2: up is going to be like, we must protect the 425 00:22:21,440 --> 00:22:24,400 Speaker 2: most evil tech company of them all other than Beta. 426 00:22:24,480 --> 00:22:27,879 Speaker 2: They hate them, and Google Search is bad for most people. 427 00:22:27,960 --> 00:22:31,320 Speaker 2: Most people realize this is a problem, and this ruling, 428 00:22:31,359 --> 00:22:34,160 Speaker 2: by the way, despite it being extremely long, is really 429 00:22:34,160 --> 00:22:37,800 Speaker 2: worth reading. It was very forensic in its case against Google. 430 00:22:37,880 --> 00:22:40,280 Speaker 2: The facts on the ground and those obtained through discovery, 431 00:22:40,480 --> 00:22:43,080 Speaker 2: they're pretty hard to argue with. On the flip side, 432 00:22:43,119 --> 00:22:45,480 Speaker 2: Google also has near unlimited funds to throw out this 433 00:22:45,560 --> 00:22:47,520 Speaker 2: legal bow, which, as I point out in a bit 434 00:22:47,760 --> 00:22:51,399 Speaker 2: is absolutely existential for Google and their law being to 435 00:22:51,400 --> 00:22:55,440 Speaker 2: try and change their fate, hope they lose, and depressingly, 436 00:22:55,480 --> 00:22:58,920 Speaker 2: the US hasn't proven particularly effective at curbing this horrible 437 00:22:58,960 --> 00:23:02,200 Speaker 2: monopoly bullshit in the past, and I'm going to tell 438 00:23:02,200 --> 00:23:06,119 Speaker 2: you why. But before I do that, do you have money? 439 00:23:06,920 --> 00:23:09,639 Speaker 2: Do you have a wallet? Are there credit cards in 440 00:23:09,680 --> 00:23:12,880 Speaker 2: the wallet? Perhaps this upcoming product might be a thing 441 00:23:12,920 --> 00:23:15,040 Speaker 2: that you could stick your credit card in, or maybe 442 00:23:15,040 --> 00:23:17,479 Speaker 2: it's a podcast that you could download for free. I 443 00:23:17,480 --> 00:23:20,880 Speaker 2: don't know. I'm not an advertiser. I'm just the guy 444 00:23:20,920 --> 00:23:24,280 Speaker 2: speaking before the ads. Now, the ads that follow, they're 445 00:23:24,440 --> 00:23:27,879 Speaker 2: directly chosen from my brain. They have a neuralink in Serbia. 446 00:23:27,880 --> 00:23:30,399 Speaker 2: I've got the third neuralink and it's connected to the 447 00:23:30,520 --> 00:23:33,800 Speaker 2: ad server with the company, and that's why all of 448 00:23:33,840 --> 00:23:35,480 Speaker 2: these ads are so well targeted. 449 00:23:35,880 --> 00:23:50,240 Speaker 3: Please to enjoy it, and we're back. 450 00:23:51,400 --> 00:23:53,639 Speaker 2: But now it's time for a little history lesson and 451 00:23:53,680 --> 00:23:56,400 Speaker 2: a story about how remarkably different the computing market could 452 00:23:56,440 --> 00:24:01,200 Speaker 2: look today if legislation had actually succeeded. In the nineteen eighties, 453 00:24:01,320 --> 00:24:04,119 Speaker 2: ms DOS rapidly emerged as the dominant operating system for 454 00:24:04,160 --> 00:24:06,840 Speaker 2: IBM compatible computers, and by the end of the decade, 455 00:24:07,000 --> 00:24:09,960 Speaker 2: it held eighty percent of the market. What its growth 456 00:24:10,119 --> 00:24:12,720 Speaker 2: was in no small part due to Microsoft's chummy relationship 457 00:24:12,760 --> 00:24:16,680 Speaker 2: with IBM. They also benefited from changing market conditions, some 458 00:24:16,720 --> 00:24:19,199 Speaker 2: savy tech and business moves, and a few missteps by 459 00:24:19,240 --> 00:24:21,840 Speaker 2: the competitors. But no, it wouldn't be fair to ascribe 460 00:24:21,920 --> 00:24:25,440 Speaker 2: Microsoft's success just to its vast resources and technical chops. 461 00:24:26,119 --> 00:24:29,320 Speaker 2: He also resorted to strong arming hardware manufacturers and too 462 00:24:29,359 --> 00:24:32,440 Speaker 2: only selling computers with Windows or ms DOSS, or making 463 00:24:32,480 --> 00:24:36,560 Speaker 2: Windows and ms DOS artificially more preferable to buying an alternative. 464 00:24:37,080 --> 00:24:39,480 Speaker 2: One tactic, which started in nineteen eighty three and continued 465 00:24:39,600 --> 00:24:42,360 Speaker 2: until the mid nineties, was the force manufacturers to sell 466 00:24:42,440 --> 00:24:45,040 Speaker 2: an ms DOS license with each machine, even if the 467 00:24:45,040 --> 00:24:48,520 Speaker 2: customer wanted something like bos Ors two. This would be 468 00:24:48,600 --> 00:24:51,399 Speaker 2: done by strong arming vendors into buying licenses in bulk, 469 00:24:51,680 --> 00:24:54,840 Speaker 2: and not as you'd perhaps expect by demand for the 470 00:24:54,880 --> 00:24:57,679 Speaker 2: product because the product was better. Now, how'd they do this? 471 00:24:58,359 --> 00:25:00,800 Speaker 2: What they did was they set the individual license price 472 00:25:00,840 --> 00:25:03,600 Speaker 2: for an ms DOS license so high that buying in 473 00:25:03,640 --> 00:25:05,920 Speaker 2: bulk was basically the only way to do it, and 474 00:25:06,000 --> 00:25:08,960 Speaker 2: outright refused to sell to any vendor that purchased alternatives, 475 00:25:09,520 --> 00:25:12,280 Speaker 2: or they just refused to sell them Windows. In the 476 00:25:12,320 --> 00:25:14,679 Speaker 2: show notes, I've linked to the great paper from the 477 00:25:14,720 --> 00:25:17,280 Speaker 2: summer nineteen ninety five issue of the Anti Trust Bulletin 478 00:25:17,359 --> 00:25:22,280 Speaker 2: Journal about this. It's sickening. Microsoft's insistence on bulk licensing 479 00:25:22,320 --> 00:25:25,280 Speaker 2: agreements meant that asking for a competing operating system wouldn't 480 00:25:25,320 --> 00:25:28,399 Speaker 2: actually reduce the cost of the computer. Instead, it would 481 00:25:28,440 --> 00:25:31,480 Speaker 2: increase it because the vendor had already bought a specific 482 00:25:31,560 --> 00:25:34,560 Speaker 2: number of licenses, and they're incentivized to bundle the cost 483 00:25:34,600 --> 00:25:38,320 Speaker 2: into each machine they sell. Buying a competing operating system 484 00:25:38,400 --> 00:25:40,919 Speaker 2: like dr doss would in fact mean paying twice for 485 00:25:41,000 --> 00:25:45,200 Speaker 2: an operating system. It sucks. These licenses would typically only 486 00:25:45,240 --> 00:25:47,879 Speaker 2: valid for two years, which by the way, cost Microsoft. 487 00:25:47,880 --> 00:25:50,439 Speaker 2: There was no price difference. They just chose this, and 488 00:25:50,480 --> 00:25:54,600 Speaker 2: Microsoft didn't provide any refunds for unused licenses, meaning vendors 489 00:25:54,600 --> 00:25:57,359 Speaker 2: had an incentive to aggressively offload them onto customers, like 490 00:25:57,400 --> 00:26:00,200 Speaker 2: providing them for free or cheaply with anyone who a 491 00:26:00,240 --> 00:26:02,440 Speaker 2: new computer, or by framing it a stars as a 492 00:26:02,440 --> 00:26:07,400 Speaker 2: perk purchase. Another tactic designed to bolster sales of Microsoft's 493 00:26:07,400 --> 00:26:10,680 Speaker 2: productivity software while crippling its rivals, was to use secret 494 00:26:10,720 --> 00:26:14,520 Speaker 2: APIs to control windows that were only accessible to Microsoft 495 00:26:14,560 --> 00:26:18,399 Speaker 2: software and not to anyone else. Microsoft's rivals claimed that 496 00:26:18,400 --> 00:26:22,000 Speaker 2: these public APIs were generally speaking, not as good and 497 00:26:22,040 --> 00:26:24,400 Speaker 2: meant that their software performed worse on Windows, which by 498 00:26:24,400 --> 00:26:26,920 Speaker 2: the early nineteen nineties had reached near monopoly status in 499 00:26:26,960 --> 00:26:30,280 Speaker 2: the PC market. The YouTube channel retrobytes goes into this 500 00:26:30,320 --> 00:26:32,440 Speaker 2: practice in some detail. If you're curious, and I'll link 501 00:26:32,480 --> 00:26:35,280 Speaker 2: to that in the notes. Anyway, My point is that 502 00:26:35,320 --> 00:26:37,880 Speaker 2: Microsoft was a bit of a bastard back then, argue 503 00:26:37,920 --> 00:26:39,879 Speaker 2: they still are, and by the mid nineties they were 504 00:26:39,880 --> 00:26:43,639 Speaker 2: already facing some scrutiny from the FTC, which opened investigations 505 00:26:43,640 --> 00:26:46,120 Speaker 2: and delivered a couple of little slaps on the wrist, 506 00:26:46,200 --> 00:26:49,680 Speaker 2: which Microsoft, of course fought. In nineteen ninety five, Microsoft 507 00:26:49,720 --> 00:26:53,080 Speaker 2: released Internet Explorer, its first entrant into the web browser market, 508 00:26:53,119 --> 00:26:55,520 Speaker 2: which competed with early style works like Mosaic, as well 509 00:26:55,560 --> 00:26:58,000 Speaker 2: as Netscape, which was the dominant player at the time, 510 00:26:58,119 --> 00:27:01,919 Speaker 2: an opera which was rapidly gaining THEMNENTUS. Microsoft knew the 511 00:27:01,920 --> 00:27:03,639 Speaker 2: Internet was going to be a huge deal, and so 512 00:27:03,680 --> 00:27:06,439 Speaker 2: it did everything it could to make Internet Explorer the 513 00:27:06,480 --> 00:27:10,320 Speaker 2: dominant browser. This included bundling Ie with Windows and structuring 514 00:27:10,359 --> 00:27:13,119 Speaker 2: it so that you couldn't remove Internet Explorer without breaking 515 00:27:13,119 --> 00:27:16,520 Speaker 2: parts of the operating system. Rivals also claimed that Internet 516 00:27:16,560 --> 00:27:19,840 Speaker 2: Explorer benefited from hidden APIs, which in turn mean that 517 00:27:19,880 --> 00:27:24,080 Speaker 2: competing browsers wouldn't work quite as well. In nineteen ninety eight, 518 00:27:24,200 --> 00:27:26,960 Speaker 2: the US Department of Justice filed a suit against Microsoft, 519 00:27:27,000 --> 00:27:29,280 Speaker 2: accusing it of breaching the Sherman Act, the same law 520 00:27:29,280 --> 00:27:32,879 Speaker 2: that Judge Ammitt Meta rulled Google violated by establishing a 521 00:27:32,920 --> 00:27:35,639 Speaker 2: near monopoly of the X eighty six computer market, and 522 00:27:35,720 --> 00:27:39,399 Speaker 2: Microsoft lost the trial and the release of Bill Gates's 523 00:27:39,400 --> 00:27:42,160 Speaker 2: deposition takes, which are hilarious. He responded with I don't 524 00:27:42,160 --> 00:27:44,080 Speaker 2: recall to most questions and he asked for the definition 525 00:27:44,119 --> 00:27:47,679 Speaker 2: of WI een ask anyway. It was humiliating for Microsoft. 526 00:27:48,240 --> 00:27:51,199 Speaker 2: In two thousand, Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson ordered the breakup 527 00:27:51,240 --> 00:27:54,240 Speaker 2: of Microsoft into two companies, one responsible for the operating 528 00:27:54,280 --> 00:27:57,719 Speaker 2: system and one that would create applications. As you'd expect, 529 00:27:57,720 --> 00:28:00,280 Speaker 2: Microsoft appealed, and the following year in Apple Look, Court 530 00:28:00,320 --> 00:28:03,320 Speaker 2: reversed the ruling on a technicality as Judge Jackson had 531 00:28:03,320 --> 00:28:05,960 Speaker 2: improperly discussed the case with the media before its conclusion. 532 00:28:06,560 --> 00:28:09,680 Speaker 2: While the findings of the case stood, Jackson's ruling was overturned, 533 00:28:09,680 --> 00:28:13,280 Speaker 2: allowing Microsoft to reach a settlement with the Department of Justice, 534 00:28:13,359 --> 00:28:16,160 Speaker 2: and so we got another slap on the rest. Microsoft 535 00:28:16,200 --> 00:28:18,480 Speaker 2: would have to share its private APIs with competitors and 536 00:28:18,520 --> 00:28:20,960 Speaker 2: agreed to five years of monitoring where a Department of 537 00:28:21,080 --> 00:28:24,000 Speaker 2: Justice representative could unannounced sharp up to its officers and 538 00:28:24,040 --> 00:28:27,000 Speaker 2: demand access to source code and records. The Department of 539 00:28:27,080 --> 00:28:30,720 Speaker 2: Justice also created a technical committee, which consisted of three experts, 540 00:28:30,920 --> 00:28:33,600 Speaker 2: none of whom could be recent Microsoft employees or contractors, 541 00:28:33,720 --> 00:28:38,240 Speaker 2: to ensure their compliance. Microsoft could, however, keep bundling software 542 00:28:38,280 --> 00:28:41,040 Speaker 2: like Internet Explorer with its operating system, which meant that 543 00:28:41,080 --> 00:28:43,760 Speaker 2: its near monopoly on the browser market would remain relatively 544 00:28:43,880 --> 00:28:48,520 Speaker 2: unchallenged for another eight years until Google Chrome arrived. I 545 00:28:48,560 --> 00:28:50,880 Speaker 2: don't take any pleasure in saying that I loathed Google. 546 00:28:51,480 --> 00:28:53,640 Speaker 2: As someone who grew up on the Internet, it was 547 00:28:53,960 --> 00:28:56,720 Speaker 2: really the product that showed me the possibilities of the 548 00:28:56,720 --> 00:28:59,480 Speaker 2: Web and expanded my horizons with every search and click 549 00:28:59,560 --> 00:29:02,280 Speaker 2: I used Google. Shit done, I still do. None of 550 00:29:02,360 --> 00:29:04,480 Speaker 2: us like that Google's bad. I wish it was good. 551 00:29:04,840 --> 00:29:07,440 Speaker 2: It was, and as I've already said, I've said this 552 00:29:07,520 --> 00:29:09,479 Speaker 2: a lot of times, it was a really good product 553 00:29:09,480 --> 00:29:11,480 Speaker 2: at the time, and it was good like five ten 554 00:29:11,560 --> 00:29:14,760 Speaker 2: years ago, I swear. But now it's become corrupted. Now 555 00:29:14,840 --> 00:29:18,360 Speaker 2: Google is just at its core rotten. This company used 556 00:29:18,400 --> 00:29:19,640 Speaker 2: to say, don't be evil. 557 00:29:20,040 --> 00:29:20,240 Speaker 1: I know. 558 00:29:20,320 --> 00:29:22,240 Speaker 2: One of the early jokes in the show was the 559 00:29:22,280 --> 00:29:24,520 Speaker 2: Lionel Huts thing with the red marker, and it's don't 560 00:29:24,520 --> 00:29:27,080 Speaker 2: comma be evil exclamation mark, But that's kind of what 561 00:29:27,120 --> 00:29:31,120 Speaker 2: it is now. They just distort markets, they block competition. 562 00:29:31,160 --> 00:29:31,880 Speaker 2: They don't give a. 563 00:29:31,800 --> 00:29:32,440 Speaker 3: Fuck about you. 564 00:29:32,480 --> 00:29:34,800 Speaker 2: They don't give a fuck about their advertisers. They know 565 00:29:34,920 --> 00:29:39,760 Speaker 2: everyone's trapped in the system. They're also just boring now. 566 00:29:40,360 --> 00:29:44,440 Speaker 2: I remember when Google launched Gmail, I remember the hubbub. 567 00:29:44,520 --> 00:29:47,360 Speaker 2: I remember people selling the invites on eBay. It was 568 00:29:47,480 --> 00:29:50,800 Speaker 2: genuinely cool, and it was far superior to everything else 569 00:29:50,880 --> 00:29:54,440 Speaker 2: on the market, hot Mail, Yahoo Mail. They were dogshit 570 00:29:54,480 --> 00:29:58,640 Speaker 2: in comparison, you know, I'm ray. Google Docs, Google Reader, Rip, 571 00:29:59,160 --> 00:30:02,280 Speaker 2: and even Google Fiber were all ambitious, clever, and worthwhile 572 00:30:02,320 --> 00:30:05,520 Speaker 2: products that actually people like and use and are happy with. 573 00:30:06,560 --> 00:30:10,160 Speaker 2: Now we have Android phones with AI features that nobody wants, 574 00:30:10,840 --> 00:30:14,840 Speaker 2: these horrible, dreadful generative AI tools that mislead and misrepresent, 575 00:30:14,960 --> 00:30:19,080 Speaker 2: and a family of products that, while once genuinely were useful, 576 00:30:19,520 --> 00:30:22,600 Speaker 2: they feel like stale and unhelpful. They don't feel like 577 00:30:22,640 --> 00:30:26,280 Speaker 2: they're made for human beings. They feel like little experiments 578 00:30:26,720 --> 00:30:30,640 Speaker 2: except where the rats man. That's cliche. Oh well, and 579 00:30:30,680 --> 00:30:34,160 Speaker 2: there's a genuine chance here though, there really is. I 580 00:30:34,240 --> 00:30:36,440 Speaker 2: know I've kind of given you a little bit of 581 00:30:36,480 --> 00:30:38,760 Speaker 2: a cynical view there is a chance here that if 582 00:30:38,840 --> 00:30:43,640 Speaker 2: Judge Metta truly punishes Google, that it could genuinely fix 583 00:30:43,720 --> 00:30:47,120 Speaker 2: this company by destroying it. And I think that's a 584 00:30:47,160 --> 00:30:50,040 Speaker 2: good thing for the future of the tech industry. Google 585 00:30:50,240 --> 00:30:52,680 Speaker 2: as a company used to be symbolic of a kind 586 00:30:52,680 --> 00:30:56,360 Speaker 2: of stable equilibrium and capitalism, a profitable company that made 587 00:30:56,400 --> 00:31:00,160 Speaker 2: societally useful products, ones that change lives mostly for the better, 588 00:31:00,520 --> 00:31:03,080 Speaker 2: with a culture that actively encouraged a kind of digital 589 00:31:03,120 --> 00:31:06,920 Speaker 2: experimentation that in turn led to better, cooler products like 590 00:31:07,000 --> 00:31:11,040 Speaker 2: Gmail and Google News. And let me just be really 591 00:31:11,080 --> 00:31:16,000 Speaker 2: abundantly clear, that company is dead. Google as you know 592 00:31:16,120 --> 00:31:20,480 Speaker 2: it is dead. What remains is alphabet, a private equity 593 00:31:20,480 --> 00:31:23,960 Speaker 2: firm run by a management consolean hiring other management consultants 594 00:31:24,000 --> 00:31:26,720 Speaker 2: to dump money into dominating industries and extracting as much 595 00:31:26,800 --> 00:31:31,959 Speaker 2: value as possible before the market's collapse. Google is lazy, languid, ugly, 596 00:31:32,200 --> 00:31:35,040 Speaker 2: bereft of innovation, and bereft of the kind of culture 597 00:31:35,040 --> 00:31:38,360 Speaker 2: that made it so powerful in the first place. This 598 00:31:38,440 --> 00:31:41,040 Speaker 2: isn't a company full of genius engineers allowed to do 599 00:31:41,080 --> 00:31:44,600 Speaker 2: great work. It's a company run by assholes. It's a 600 00:31:44,600 --> 00:31:48,320 Speaker 2: company run by management consultants, sundarp is shy. He is 601 00:31:48,440 --> 00:31:52,120 Speaker 2: cancerous to innovation. He makes two hundred million dollars making 602 00:31:52,120 --> 00:31:56,120 Speaker 2: products worse yet more profitable. Prabagar Ragavan is a poison 603 00:31:56,160 --> 00:31:59,040 Speaker 2: in the veins of Silicon Valley, and Liz read is 604 00:31:59,080 --> 00:32:01,480 Speaker 2: a class trait to so the engineers that actually care 605 00:32:01,520 --> 00:32:06,320 Speaker 2: about creating great products. At sixteen hundred Amphitheata Parkway. The 606 00:32:06,400 --> 00:32:10,880 Speaker 2: company Google deserves to be obliterated because in its current form, 607 00:32:11,040 --> 00:32:13,560 Speaker 2: it is defaulted on its duty to the tech industry, 608 00:32:13,640 --> 00:32:16,680 Speaker 2: to its customers, and even to its own mission. The 609 00:32:16,760 --> 00:32:19,920 Speaker 2: only way to fix Google is to destroy it and 610 00:32:19,960 --> 00:32:23,280 Speaker 2: to force it to start earning customers again. To fix 611 00:32:23,320 --> 00:32:26,560 Speaker 2: the tech industry, we must obliterate every single one of 612 00:32:26,560 --> 00:32:30,120 Speaker 2: these monopolies metas hold on advertising, Apples, hold on the 613 00:32:30,120 --> 00:32:33,920 Speaker 2: app store, Googles, hold on Search and its associated advertising arms. 614 00:32:34,080 --> 00:32:36,600 Speaker 2: Every single one flies in the face of Yu and 615 00:32:36,760 --> 00:32:39,520 Speaker 2: I love technology and runs counter to the notion that 616 00:32:39,560 --> 00:32:43,400 Speaker 2: Silicon Valley has a meaningful place in society. All of 617 00:32:43,440 --> 00:32:46,400 Speaker 2: these people, they talk about the meritocracy, they talk about 618 00:32:46,400 --> 00:32:50,360 Speaker 2: earning one's place. It's hard graft and burning that makes 619 00:32:50,400 --> 00:32:52,880 Speaker 2: these great companies. But look at them. Do any of 620 00:32:52,920 --> 00:32:56,320 Speaker 2: these companies really look like they're built out of hard work. No, 621 00:32:56,920 --> 00:33:01,920 Speaker 2: they giant cons cons wrapped in companies, wrapped in monopolies, 622 00:33:02,160 --> 00:33:06,520 Speaker 2: wrapped in bullshit that makes products worse. Big Tech had 623 00:33:06,560 --> 00:33:09,960 Speaker 2: a really good thing going. Big Tech made so much 624 00:33:10,040 --> 00:33:14,120 Speaker 2: money without really trying that hard, and all they had 625 00:33:14,160 --> 00:33:16,680 Speaker 2: to do was not get too greedy. But they did. 626 00:33:16,920 --> 00:33:21,160 Speaker 2: They always do. So we as a society should reject 627 00:33:21,160 --> 00:33:24,760 Speaker 2: companies over a certain size, and we should indeed reject 628 00:33:24,880 --> 00:33:27,280 Speaker 2: everything that Big Tech is saying about their hard work. 629 00:33:28,040 --> 00:33:31,320 Speaker 2: The GENERATIVEAI boom is disgusting, and it's disgusting because it 630 00:33:31,360 --> 00:33:34,320 Speaker 2: shows such an incredible contempt for society itself, for the 631 00:33:34,360 --> 00:33:37,959 Speaker 2: creators that it's depriving of a future because bosses are 632 00:33:38,000 --> 00:33:40,200 Speaker 2: lazy and don't trust their customers or care about the 633 00:33:40,240 --> 00:33:42,480 Speaker 2: customers enough to provide them with real things made by 634 00:33:42,520 --> 00:33:46,760 Speaker 2: real humans. Generative AI is just proof that these companies 635 00:33:46,760 --> 00:33:50,080 Speaker 2: can't innovate anymore. It's proof that they don't care about 636 00:33:50,080 --> 00:33:53,040 Speaker 2: the customer enough to create something useful, and honestly, it 637 00:33:53,080 --> 00:33:55,720 Speaker 2: shows that they don't know how to run real companies anymore. 638 00:33:56,920 --> 00:34:00,640 Speaker 2: So I challenge you, the listener, to continue to critique 639 00:34:00,680 --> 00:34:03,280 Speaker 2: these companies. To move away from their software where you can, 640 00:34:03,320 --> 00:34:06,160 Speaker 2: and they know how impossible that is because of these monopolies. 641 00:34:06,320 --> 00:34:08,520 Speaker 2: But I also encourage you to talk to your friends, 642 00:34:08,560 --> 00:34:12,160 Speaker 2: your family, especially those not super online, and tell them 643 00:34:12,200 --> 00:34:15,160 Speaker 2: about monopolies. Tell them about this podcast, sure, but talk 644 00:34:15,200 --> 00:34:19,719 Speaker 2: to them about monopolies. Make monopolies general parlance in good conversation. 645 00:34:21,080 --> 00:34:23,719 Speaker 2: Look for the monopolies in your life. Look at how 646 00:34:23,800 --> 00:34:27,000 Speaker 2: people have successful businesses, not from providing a great product, 647 00:34:27,280 --> 00:34:31,759 Speaker 2: but from fucking everyone around them, from cheating. Because that's 648 00:34:31,760 --> 00:34:34,920 Speaker 2: what a monopoly is. It's a cheat, a cheat by 649 00:34:34,920 --> 00:34:38,680 Speaker 2: a lazy person, a cheat by an incurious person, a 650 00:34:38,760 --> 00:34:43,360 Speaker 2: cheat from a scumbag. And you're not like them. I 651 00:34:43,440 --> 00:34:47,040 Speaker 2: know that, and I want you to talk about monopolies 652 00:34:47,040 --> 00:34:48,640 Speaker 2: in your general life. I know it sounds silly, I 653 00:34:48,640 --> 00:34:51,440 Speaker 2: know it sounds ridiculous like talking to regular people about this, 654 00:34:51,800 --> 00:34:55,919 Speaker 2: but these monopolies ruin your life. These monopolies are where 655 00:34:55,960 --> 00:34:58,839 Speaker 2: so many pain points in your lives come from, both 656 00:34:58,880 --> 00:35:02,759 Speaker 2: in tech and in regular lives. Thank you so much 657 00:35:02,800 --> 00:35:05,280 Speaker 2: for listening to this, thank you so much for giving 658 00:35:05,280 --> 00:35:08,000 Speaker 2: me your time. And as I've kind of hinted before, 659 00:35:08,040 --> 00:35:09,920 Speaker 2: we've been renewed for a second season. You've got a 660 00:35:09,920 --> 00:35:13,000 Speaker 2: few more episodes of season one before season two starts, 661 00:35:13,000 --> 00:35:15,840 Speaker 2: and nothing's really gonna change. But again, I'm so grateful 662 00:35:15,840 --> 00:35:17,799 Speaker 2: to have you as listeners. I really am. It's a 663 00:35:17,800 --> 00:35:19,640 Speaker 2: pleasure to do this, it's a pleasure to serve you, 664 00:35:20,080 --> 00:35:21,799 Speaker 2: and I will be trying to make it better. I 665 00:35:21,840 --> 00:35:24,880 Speaker 2: don't really have a way of monopolizing anything, and also 666 00:35:24,920 --> 00:35:26,600 Speaker 2: I don't think I have that in me. I'm just 667 00:35:26,640 --> 00:35:38,360 Speaker 2: too pissed naturally, have a great week. Thank you for 668 00:35:38,360 --> 00:35:41,080 Speaker 2: listening to Better Offline. The editor and composer of the 669 00:35:41,080 --> 00:35:44,160 Speaker 2: Better Offline theme song is Matasowski. You can check out 670 00:35:44,200 --> 00:35:47,759 Speaker 2: more of his music and audio projects at Matasowski dot com, 671 00:35:48,000 --> 00:35:52,880 Speaker 2: M A T t O. S O w Ski dot com. 672 00:35:52,960 --> 00:35:55,279 Speaker 2: You can email me at easy at Better offline dot 673 00:35:55,280 --> 00:35:57,520 Speaker 2: com or visit Better offline dot com to find more 674 00:35:57,560 --> 00:36:00,959 Speaker 2: podcast links and of course, my newsletter. I also really 675 00:36:00,960 --> 00:36:03,279 Speaker 2: recommend you go to chat dot Where's youread dot at 676 00:36:03,280 --> 00:36:05,719 Speaker 2: to visit the discord, and go to our slash Better 677 00:36:05,760 --> 00:36:08,919 Speaker 2: Offline to check out I'll Reddit. Thank you so much 678 00:36:08,960 --> 00:36:12,760 Speaker 2: for listening. Better Offline is a production of Cool Zone Media. 679 00:36:12,920 --> 00:36:15,759 Speaker 2: For more from Cool Zone Media, visit our website cool 680 00:36:15,800 --> 00:36:19,160 Speaker 2: zonemedia dot com, or check us out on the iHeartRadio app, 681 00:36:19,239 --> 00:36:21,920 Speaker 2: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you get your podcasts.