WEBVTT - How Classified Information Works

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to Stuff you Should Know, a production of I

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<v Speaker 1>Heart Radio. Hey, and welcome to the podcast. I'm Josh,

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<v Speaker 1>and there's Chuck and there's Jerry over there on the download,

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<v Speaker 1>and this is Stuff you should Know the podcast, the

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<v Speaker 1>top Secret edition. Yes, exactly what you should know is

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<v Speaker 1>decided by us. That's right, we give clearance. Clarence, well,

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<v Speaker 1>that's a good one. I wouldn't have put that one together,

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<v Speaker 1>but that's great. Thanks, So Chuck, we're talking about classified information,

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<v Speaker 1>top secret information. A lot of people call it by

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<v Speaker 1>especially if you're twelve years older younger, but it's actually

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<v Speaker 1>a real thing. That's like a real designation top secret, which,

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<v Speaker 1>by the way, I went back and watched that movie

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<v Speaker 1>again for the first time in years, and it is hilarious. Yeah.

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<v Speaker 1>I just made an airplane reference in Top Secret? Is

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<v Speaker 1>uh saying that it's a Zuckers, right, Zuckers. Yeah. I

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<v Speaker 1>think they worked with somebody different that time. I'm not

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<v Speaker 1>sing what capacity, but the Zuckers were involved for sure.

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<v Speaker 1>The Balcomer. That documentary on him, it is fantastic, by

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<v Speaker 1>the way, I've heard, I have not yet to watch it.

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<v Speaker 1>We just got through a made Have you seen made

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<v Speaker 1>haven't seen made. It's a even after and you just like,

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<v Speaker 1>I wonder what bad thing is going to happen to

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<v Speaker 1>her next? I know something bad is going to It

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<v Speaker 1>really wears you down like that for sure, but it's good.

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<v Speaker 1>It's worth watching. Well, since we're on it with tv REX.

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<v Speaker 1>Before we get going, I've been watching Station eleven and

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<v Speaker 1>it's one of my favorite shows in years. Station eleven.

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<v Speaker 1>What's it on HBO? It is a from a novel,

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<v Speaker 1>a post apocalyptic virus actually pandemic weirdly, but it's more

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<v Speaker 1>on the order of like of the Earth Died and

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<v Speaker 1>but it's not the Road. It's it's more interesting, it's

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<v Speaker 1>more hopeful and artistic. Cool. I'll check it out. Did

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<v Speaker 1>you ever see The Leftovers? I think is what they

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<v Speaker 1>were called. Well, what's funny is we were watching that too.

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<v Speaker 1>We just started that because we were in that groove

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<v Speaker 1>and we never saw The Leftovers, and I heard it

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<v Speaker 1>was really good kind of and even got better through

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<v Speaker 1>the years. I envy you. I wish I could see

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<v Speaker 1>The Leftovers again for the first time. It's that. I'm

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<v Speaker 1>really excited, dude. It's very good. All right, Now we

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<v Speaker 1>should get to it because this is dense, so we're

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<v Speaker 1>talking about Yes, it is super dense. I mean this Uh.

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<v Speaker 1>We asked some help from Ed Grabanowski the grab Stir

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<v Speaker 1>and he turned into James Missioner novel. It is so dense.

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<v Speaker 1>Every paragraph is really dense. UM. And it's it's there's

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<v Speaker 1>it's inevitable, Like just researching this one, there's so much

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<v Speaker 1>to just go and read and so many rabbit holes

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<v Speaker 1>to go down, because what we're talking about is really

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<v Speaker 1>like simple concept on its face, Like there are secrets

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<v Speaker 1>that like any government would not want other governments or

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<v Speaker 1>other people are sometimes even their own people to know.

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<v Speaker 1>It would just make the functioning of that government that

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<v Speaker 1>much harder. Um, it might make the country vulnerable to attack.

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<v Speaker 1>There's a lot of reasons why you would not want

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<v Speaker 1>to share all of your business. So you want to

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<v Speaker 1>classify information based on how damaging it could be to

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<v Speaker 1>national security, and then you just decide who has clearance

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<v Speaker 1>to see that those various classifications of information. That's it,

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<v Speaker 1>that's classified information. But in practice, in reality, it's such

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<v Speaker 1>a behemoth concept that is so fraught with problems, that

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<v Speaker 1>is so often completely and utterly anti democratic. Um. And

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<v Speaker 1>then it's just so bureaucratically layer that it is extremely

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<v Speaker 1>it's an extremely dense topic. I just want to make

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<v Speaker 1>sure we added a good extra three minutes onto this

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<v Speaker 1>episode with that. Well, I think you know. The good

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<v Speaker 1>news is the history can be condensed really easily into

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<v Speaker 1>They had state secrets back in ancient times too, but

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<v Speaker 1>back then it was a lot easier to keep secrets

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<v Speaker 1>because there was no technology and there was no bureaucracy generally,

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<v Speaker 1>So if the autocratic or semi autocratic leader said it

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<v Speaker 1>was a secret, then it was a secret, and that

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<v Speaker 1>was kind of the end of it. Um, things changed

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<v Speaker 1>because of technology and because of bureaucracy, and because of

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<v Speaker 1>the development of nuclear weapons when there was truly something

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<v Speaker 1>so kind of world ending at stake that things needed

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<v Speaker 1>to be ratcheted up. And this all started with a

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<v Speaker 1>series of acts and even more so a series of

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<v Speaker 1>presidential executive orders over the years to really sort of

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<v Speaker 1>put these executive orders in place to vaguely say who

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<v Speaker 1>can know what and how we're gonna do it. And

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<v Speaker 1>then the acts come into play to say how are

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<v Speaker 1>we going to punish people who do it the wrong

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<v Speaker 1>way or don't do it? Yeah, and um, it's like

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<v Speaker 1>you said, the executive orders are where the kind of

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<v Speaker 1>classification and how thing are classified, how they become declassified,

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<v Speaker 1>how that got all sorted out. But Congress has largely

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<v Speaker 1>been left to figure out how to punish people who

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<v Speaker 1>transgress against those those um sharing that information. And that

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<v Speaker 1>whole thing started with the Defense Secrets Act of nineteen eleven, appropriately,

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<v Speaker 1>which evolved into the Espionage Act. But you hit you.

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<v Speaker 1>You use the word um that I think is really um,

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<v Speaker 1>really important and really describes one of the big problems

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<v Speaker 1>with the classification system in the United States, which is um,

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<v Speaker 1>it's vague. The descriptions, the explanations, the rules are very

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<v Speaker 1>vague and nebulous, and so there's a lot of room

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<v Speaker 1>for objectivity, and there's a lot of room to just say,

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<v Speaker 1>I don't really know what this is, so I'm just

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<v Speaker 1>gonna put it on the highest possible level of secrecy

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<v Speaker 1>that I can. Yeah, this is interesting because I think

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<v Speaker 1>the vagueness is definitely a problem that leads to part

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<v Speaker 1>of the bigger problem with classification and over classification, which

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<v Speaker 1>we're gonna talk a lot about. But I also think

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<v Speaker 1>that in a lot of cases like this, vagueness like

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<v Speaker 1>this is one area where human uh what was the

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<v Speaker 1>word he used? Error objectivity where human subjectivity kind of

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<v Speaker 1>has to come into play. Uh. And this is jumping

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<v Speaker 1>ahead a little bit, but like, as far as you

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<v Speaker 1>know what to classify something, like the way they decide

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<v Speaker 1>that is how bad will it hurt America? Is it grave?

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<v Speaker 1>Danger um? What was the second one? Um? Sort of

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<v Speaker 1>like medium grave and then just danger and that's and

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<v Speaker 1>it's you know, people can have complained that like, well

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<v Speaker 1>that's not really spelled out, But I don't know if

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<v Speaker 1>you can codify that to a t like of how

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<v Speaker 1>dangerous something is. I don't know. I believe that human

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<v Speaker 1>subjectivity has to come into play. I'm not defending over classification,

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<v Speaker 1>but I don't know. This is one of those things

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<v Speaker 1>that can be bureaucracized and legislated to the to the

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<v Speaker 1>nth degree. You know, well, it's that's ironic because the

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<v Speaker 1>whole reason this exists like this is because of bureaucracy.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, yes, but you you make a good point,

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<v Speaker 1>and I think that is ultimately the reason the driving

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<v Speaker 1>force behind keeping things vague, because you couldn't possibly describe

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<v Speaker 1>every situation and say, well, if this happens, then it

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<v Speaker 1>would cause grave danger and you want to make a

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<v Speaker 1>top secret, etcetera. Right, But like you said, the Espionage

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<v Speaker 1>Act in nineteen seventeen was brought upon by the advent

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<v Speaker 1>of World War One, and this basically um like they

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<v Speaker 1>also they already storted from the nineteen eleven version had

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<v Speaker 1>the vague terms that said, you know, you can't provide

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<v Speaker 1>this information related to national defense to people who shouldn't

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<v Speaker 1>have it. Uh, started out vague, but this is where

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<v Speaker 1>the teeth came in as far as punishment goes, because

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<v Speaker 1>it was during wartime, so it was super harsh. Yeah.

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<v Speaker 1>I remember we've talked before about Eugene Debs, who was

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<v Speaker 1>the Socialist candidate for president in the can't remember what election,

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<v Speaker 1>but around World War One, and he ran his campaign

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<v Speaker 1>from prison because he was put in prison for basically

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<v Speaker 1>denouncing the US war effort during World War One. And

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<v Speaker 1>you could not speak out against the United States military,

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<v Speaker 1>the United States itself, the United States Constitution. You couldn't

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<v Speaker 1>say anything critical about it or you could be put

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<v Speaker 1>in prison. And people were put in prison because of it.

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<v Speaker 1>And they walk that stuff back, the First Amendment violations back.

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<v Speaker 1>But the point is is a big part of it was.

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<v Speaker 1>It grew out of this idea that if you share

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<v Speaker 1>state secrets you can be seriously harshly punished like the

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<v Speaker 1>Julius and Ethel Rosenberg's were. They were actually put to

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<v Speaker 1>death under the Espionage Act and it's still around today. Um,

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<v Speaker 1>Chelsea Manning, Reality Winner, Edward Snowden, all of them were

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<v Speaker 1>prosecuted under the Espionage Act of nineteen seventeen, which basically says,

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<v Speaker 1>if you share any state any classified information, you can

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<v Speaker 1>be severely punished and lose years of your life in

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<v Speaker 1>prison or again ultimately put to death. I'm not sure

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<v Speaker 1>if that's still on the books, but it very well maybe.

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<v Speaker 1>So we should also talk about this other sort of

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<v Speaker 1>precursor to what we have today, the system we have today,

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<v Speaker 1>which was in eighteen sixty nine, and this addresses the

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<v Speaker 1>technology kind of for the first time. Um, the War Department. Uh,

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<v Speaker 1>they brought out General Order number thirty five, so cute

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<v Speaker 1>back then, number thirty five ledge. Uh. What they basically said, Hey,

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<v Speaker 1>there are cameras now that exist, so you can't be

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<v Speaker 1>in a fort, uh and take pictures of the fort

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<v Speaker 1>or above the fort or around the fort, like no

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<v Speaker 1>pictures basically anymore. And so they're acknowledging technology for the

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<v Speaker 1>first time. And the other big thing was this is

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<v Speaker 1>a peace time move, so it's the first time like

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<v Speaker 1>we weren't at war and sort of putting these rules

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<v Speaker 1>into place. Yeah, because there are rules about that kind

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<v Speaker 1>of thing, like even dating back to the Revolutionary Army

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<v Speaker 1>and the Continental Congress about this stuff. But this was

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<v Speaker 1>a that was a peace time one, and that was

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<v Speaker 1>significant because the classification system is a peace time and

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<v Speaker 1>now largely civilian system, but it found its roots in

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<v Speaker 1>the military quite rightfully. I mean even still today, even

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<v Speaker 1>people who are highly critical of the American classified information

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<v Speaker 1>system say it should basically be kept to military maneuvers,

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<v Speaker 1>maybe state department negotiations, and even then it should be

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<v Speaker 1>a very short time. But the general consensus is, yes,

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<v Speaker 1>you would not want anyone understanding or knowing what your

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<v Speaker 1>military was doing basically. Right. The first time that they

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<v Speaker 1>sort of or at least somebody started to say the

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<v Speaker 1>word over classification and and the fact that they needed

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<v Speaker 1>a sort of a tiered system was Brigadier General Arthur Murray,

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<v Speaker 1>who was Chief of Artillery at the time. He wrote

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<v Speaker 1>a letter to the Secretary of War that basically said, listen,

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<v Speaker 1>all we've got is this one classification. It's confidential, and

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<v Speaker 1>they're stamping everything confidential even if it shouldn't be confidential,

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<v Speaker 1>and that just you know, if if everything is being

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<v Speaker 1>stamped this way, then it loses its meaning. So we

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<v Speaker 1>have to And they didn't call it over classification at

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<v Speaker 1>the time. Really, I think that was just sort of

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<v Speaker 1>the first person to mention this. But he said, what

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<v Speaker 1>we really need is a tiered system of how classified

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<v Speaker 1>it should be. And they're already doing this in Britain. Uh,

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<v Speaker 1>they have their four tiered system for your eyes only only,

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<v Speaker 1>Moonraker Live and Let Die and gold remember no gold

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<v Speaker 1>member Old Finger gold Member was a good one. Now

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<v Speaker 1>for your eyes only is the actual classification. Then you

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<v Speaker 1>have for the information of commission officers only for official

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<v Speaker 1>use only and not for publication. And the chiefs of

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<v Speaker 1>Staff said, you know what, I think it's a great idea.

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<v Speaker 1>This four tiered system is probably something we should use,

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<v Speaker 1>but not these not the way you're doing it. We

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<v Speaker 1>need to be able to kind of make this up

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<v Speaker 1>as we go to It seems way too tea and

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<v Speaker 1>crumpets stuffs, so we need to I'm up with something

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<v Speaker 1>else well, I think too rigid. It sounds like they

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<v Speaker 1>wanted to be able to decide be a little nimble

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<v Speaker 1>with how they classified things as they went. Yeah, because

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<v Speaker 1>they the system they initially came up with was to

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<v Speaker 1>just basically put at the preface of say like a

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<v Speaker 1>manual or a document that says, this is only for

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<v Speaker 1>you know, this division or this this um armed services,

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<v Speaker 1>or this type of officer, this whatever, and then it

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<v Speaker 1>should not be it should not be given to anybody

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<v Speaker 1>else beyond them, um. And you could conceivably just do

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<v Speaker 1>that for every single document. But the problem is that

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<v Speaker 1>this was stuff that they were talking about in nine

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<v Speaker 1>seven in America was still fairly small federal government wise.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean it was, it was growing big time after

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<v Speaker 1>the Civil War, but compared to today, like the bureaucracy

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<v Speaker 1>was just nothing like it is. And so you could

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<v Speaker 1>conceivably do that in the armed forces. But as as

0:12:55.840 --> 0:12:59.720
<v Speaker 1>things grew and the bureaucracy grew and the government crew, um,

0:12:59.720 --> 0:13:01.880
<v Speaker 1>it became impossible to come up with this kind of

0:13:01.880 --> 0:13:04.560
<v Speaker 1>thing for every single document, and much easier to just

0:13:04.600 --> 0:13:07.280
<v Speaker 1>say this is this category, this is that category, and

0:13:07.320 --> 0:13:10.960
<v Speaker 1>this is that category, right, and those we should mention

0:13:11.000 --> 0:13:14.040
<v Speaker 1>as a little sidebar. There was even one debate for

0:13:14.080 --> 0:13:16.679
<v Speaker 1>a short time where they were coming up with the

0:13:17.000 --> 0:13:19.600
<v Speaker 1>different classification levels where they wondered if they should even

0:13:19.640 --> 0:13:23.559
<v Speaker 1>make up words. There weren't words, I guess to make

0:13:23.600 --> 0:13:26.840
<v Speaker 1>it even more confidential or confusing. But then they said,

0:13:26.840 --> 0:13:29.679
<v Speaker 1>oh wait a minute, this is this is more confusing

0:13:29.800 --> 0:13:32.960
<v Speaker 1>to us even and we don't want someone you know,

0:13:33.120 --> 0:13:37.040
<v Speaker 1>high on the totem pole which really means low, uh,

0:13:37.360 --> 0:13:40.200
<v Speaker 1>not understanding what this word even means, and then making

0:13:40.200 --> 0:13:42.640
<v Speaker 1>a mistake because of that. Yeah, so like, let's use

0:13:42.720 --> 0:13:46.600
<v Speaker 1>real word. Private piles like red turtle doesn't sound very important.

0:13:46.679 --> 0:13:49.600
<v Speaker 1>I'm sure I can tell everybody about that, that's right.

0:13:50.480 --> 0:13:52.120
<v Speaker 1>So when you say private pile, do you mean gilmer

0:13:52.160 --> 0:13:55.520
<v Speaker 1>pile or full metal jacket? Take your pick. Okay, so

0:13:55.640 --> 0:14:00.000
<v Speaker 1>I'm both doing that. Should we take a break, Yeah,

0:14:00.000 --> 0:14:01.520
<v Speaker 1>all right, we'll take a break and we'll talk about

0:14:01.760 --> 0:14:26.520
<v Speaker 1>the atomic age and how that played in right after this. Okay, chuck.

0:14:26.600 --> 0:14:28.920
<v Speaker 1>So it was all just kind of willy nilly and

0:14:29.000 --> 0:14:32.280
<v Speaker 1>the Armed Forces of America we're figuring out how to

0:14:32.400 --> 0:14:35.800
<v Speaker 1>set up their own classification system, and it was actually

0:14:35.880 --> 0:14:40.800
<v Speaker 1>supported and codified starting with one of those executive orders

0:14:41.400 --> 0:14:48.320
<v Speaker 1>that came from President Franklin Roosevelt EOE, and it basically said,

0:14:48.360 --> 0:14:51.560
<v Speaker 1>everything the military is doing is right. Um, they've got

0:14:51.600 --> 0:14:54.120
<v Speaker 1>some great terms over there, we've got some secret, we

0:14:54.240 --> 0:14:57.240
<v Speaker 1>got restricted, we've got confidential. Let's keep going with that.

0:14:57.760 --> 0:15:00.160
<v Speaker 1>And it just kind of was it was. It was

0:15:00.240 --> 0:15:02.240
<v Speaker 1>mainly coming out of the military, and the military was

0:15:02.280 --> 0:15:05.160
<v Speaker 1>figuring it out. But then, like you said, the atomic

0:15:05.200 --> 0:15:11.160
<v Speaker 1>age came along and the stakes became exponentially higher because

0:15:11.240 --> 0:15:15.640
<v Speaker 1>we had different countries conceivably working on an atomic weapon,

0:15:15.800 --> 0:15:18.880
<v Speaker 1>the likes of which had never been seen, the destructiveness

0:15:18.920 --> 0:15:21.360
<v Speaker 1>of which had never been seen ever in the history

0:15:21.400 --> 0:15:25.120
<v Speaker 1>of humanity. And like its just things got real and

0:15:25.160 --> 0:15:28.200
<v Speaker 1>the need for secrecy got real, so much so that

0:15:28.280 --> 0:15:31.640
<v Speaker 1>even before the Manhattan Projects started, the scientists that were

0:15:31.680 --> 0:15:37.680
<v Speaker 1>working on atomic research, we're keeping their research secret to themselves,

0:15:37.720 --> 0:15:40.400
<v Speaker 1>like by their own by their own like consensus, Like

0:15:40.440 --> 0:15:42.760
<v Speaker 1>they're like the public, we can't we have to be

0:15:42.800 --> 0:15:46.400
<v Speaker 1>careful publishing papers about this. Yeah, I think that's interesting

0:15:46.440 --> 0:15:49.720
<v Speaker 1>that they just sort of knew to shut up about it,

0:15:49.880 --> 0:15:53.160
<v Speaker 1>even I would imagine within their own families. That was

0:15:53.200 --> 0:15:55.680
<v Speaker 1>probably back in the day where they were like daddy

0:15:55.720 --> 0:15:57.680
<v Speaker 1>doesn't talk about what he doesn't work kind of stuff.

0:15:58.760 --> 0:16:02.560
<v Speaker 1>And finally, when the Manhattan Project, the man i Hatta

0:16:02.600 --> 0:16:06.400
<v Speaker 1>Project excuse me, officially got going, there was a dude,

0:16:06.520 --> 0:16:09.560
<v Speaker 1>one one lone man, General Leslie Groves that kind of

0:16:09.600 --> 0:16:15.240
<v Speaker 1>controlled the set of rules for secrecy and things got

0:16:15.240 --> 0:16:19.560
<v Speaker 1>a little more codified at that point through him basically saying,

0:16:20.240 --> 0:16:22.160
<v Speaker 1>you know, I'm gonna use whatever means I have under

0:16:22.200 --> 0:16:24.120
<v Speaker 1>the law and even outside the law to make sure

0:16:24.120 --> 0:16:27.080
<v Speaker 1>this stuff stays a secret. Um. But it wasn't until

0:16:27.120 --> 0:16:30.560
<v Speaker 1>these executive orders started rolling in. I think they called

0:16:30.560 --> 0:16:34.880
<v Speaker 1>stuff like restricted data and stuff like that former restricted data,

0:16:34.960 --> 0:16:40.000
<v Speaker 1>which actually was the progenitor of what would become declassification.

0:16:40.840 --> 0:16:43.360
<v Speaker 1>But uh, it's you know, it was still a little

0:16:43.360 --> 0:16:47.360
<v Speaker 1>willy nilly in that it took the these executive orders

0:16:47.640 --> 0:16:50.400
<v Speaker 1>and eventually Congress to really make this stuff law. And

0:16:50.480 --> 0:16:53.480
<v Speaker 1>at the time, even within the Manhattan Project, it was

0:16:53.520 --> 0:16:55.760
<v Speaker 1>still like this one guy saying, here, we can't we

0:16:55.760 --> 0:16:58.000
<v Speaker 1>gotta keep her to secret or I'm gonna do something

0:16:58.040 --> 0:17:00.760
<v Speaker 1>bad to you. Well, he was like the uh, like

0:17:01.000 --> 0:17:04.879
<v Speaker 1>the ultimate project manager. He was the sole person on

0:17:04.920 --> 0:17:09.040
<v Speaker 1>the planet who understood everything that was going on with

0:17:09.040 --> 0:17:12.119
<v Speaker 1>the Manhattan Project. Even the top scientists didn't fully have

0:17:12.240 --> 0:17:15.720
<v Speaker 1>like the entire picture. Only Leslie Groves did. Um. He

0:17:15.760 --> 0:17:18.840
<v Speaker 1>wouldn't let some of like the top physicists working on

0:17:18.880 --> 0:17:21.720
<v Speaker 1>the bomb talk to each other about their work. There

0:17:21.760 --> 0:17:26.000
<v Speaker 1>was a tremendous amount of compartmentalization. Mail was read and censored.

0:17:26.160 --> 0:17:28.640
<v Speaker 1>There's just tons of stuff that this guy was basically saying,

0:17:28.640 --> 0:17:30.879
<v Speaker 1>we have to do these extreme measures to keep this

0:17:31.040 --> 0:17:33.560
<v Speaker 1>under wraps. And once we enter the atomic age, you

0:17:33.600 --> 0:17:38.119
<v Speaker 1>can't go back. So that his ideas about the secrecy needed,

0:17:38.520 --> 0:17:40.720
<v Speaker 1>uh and the measures you needed to take to protect

0:17:40.720 --> 0:17:46.560
<v Speaker 1>atomic secrets eventually became the the the inspiration for how

0:17:46.640 --> 0:17:51.160
<v Speaker 1>America's classified information system like that was created. He he

0:17:51.200 --> 0:17:54.600
<v Speaker 1>created it inadvertently. He just basically came up with such

0:17:54.640 --> 0:17:58.560
<v Speaker 1>a great tight set of rules that when the Atomic

0:17:58.920 --> 0:18:01.640
<v Speaker 1>Energy Act of ninety forty six was created and they

0:18:01.680 --> 0:18:05.480
<v Speaker 1>took basically atomic research and put it to like a

0:18:05.600 --> 0:18:10.680
<v Speaker 1>government funded civilian research from the military, they said, basically

0:18:10.680 --> 0:18:12.880
<v Speaker 1>everything grows was doing, We're just going to keep doing

0:18:12.880 --> 0:18:15.560
<v Speaker 1>that and codify it. Yeah, and you know how I

0:18:15.600 --> 0:18:18.800
<v Speaker 1>mentioned that he kind of inadvertently created declassification with the

0:18:18.880 --> 0:18:24.600
<v Speaker 1>former restricted data. Uh. He also inadvertently created the derivative

0:18:24.640 --> 0:18:29.600
<v Speaker 1>classified designation, which is basically, if part of this project

0:18:29.600 --> 0:18:33.919
<v Speaker 1>we're working on is classified, then it's all classified. Um.

0:18:34.000 --> 0:18:36.040
<v Speaker 1>And you know, we'll get into the different layers of

0:18:36.040 --> 0:18:38.679
<v Speaker 1>classification later, but it was it was like, you know,

0:18:38.760 --> 0:18:41.359
<v Speaker 1>this whole thing is a big secret. It's not just

0:18:41.480 --> 0:18:43.400
<v Speaker 1>you can't talk about this one thing, and everything else

0:18:43.520 --> 0:18:46.280
<v Speaker 1>is just uh, you know whatever talk about in the

0:18:46.280 --> 0:18:49.960
<v Speaker 1>country club. It's no big deal. Um. And so after that,

0:18:50.040 --> 0:18:53.840
<v Speaker 1>so you've got um, Congress setting the punishment for sharing

0:18:54.119 --> 0:18:57.800
<v Speaker 1>state secrets UM. And then you've got Leslie Groves coming

0:18:57.880 --> 0:18:59.720
<v Speaker 1>up with the kind of the framework for how to

0:19:00.240 --> 0:19:04.359
<v Speaker 1>how to carry out a classified information system and protect information.

0:19:04.640 --> 0:19:07.199
<v Speaker 1>And then you've got the President's a succession of presidents

0:19:07.240 --> 0:19:09.800
<v Speaker 1>starting with Roosevelt and then picked up by Truman in

0:19:09.880 --> 0:19:13.879
<v Speaker 1>ninety one, issuing executive orders that really kind of spell

0:19:13.920 --> 0:19:17.480
<v Speaker 1>out how these classification systems are meant to work. And

0:19:17.520 --> 0:19:20.480
<v Speaker 1>Truman at a top secret the top secret category in

0:19:20.560 --> 0:19:23.720
<v Speaker 1>nineteen fifty one. And then the big one, UM was

0:19:23.800 --> 0:19:28.399
<v Speaker 1>Executive Order one oh two ninety UM, which was also

0:19:28.520 --> 0:19:31.560
<v Speaker 1>issued in in nineteen fifty one that said, hey, it's

0:19:31.600 --> 0:19:33.680
<v Speaker 1>not just the military who has secrets that they need

0:19:33.720 --> 0:19:36.639
<v Speaker 1>to keep. Basically, all of the Executive Branch needs to

0:19:36.680 --> 0:19:42.080
<v Speaker 1>be able to to create secret and top secret information classifications.

0:19:42.160 --> 0:19:47.320
<v Speaker 1>And he extended that power to classify information to UM

0:19:47.320 --> 0:19:50.800
<v Speaker 1>basically every agency there was, including like the Department of

0:19:50.840 --> 0:19:54.639
<v Speaker 1>Agriculture and the Department of Education UM to create to

0:19:54.760 --> 0:19:57.160
<v Speaker 1>say Nope, this is classified, this can't be this can't

0:19:57.160 --> 0:19:59.560
<v Speaker 1>be released. Yeah. They had to walk that back a

0:19:59.560 --> 0:20:02.000
<v Speaker 1>couple of years later a little bit because people were

0:20:02.480 --> 0:20:04.640
<v Speaker 1>worried that it was too broad and that too many

0:20:04.680 --> 0:20:08.480
<v Speaker 1>people were classifying things and had access to it. So

0:20:08.960 --> 0:20:12.520
<v Speaker 1>they reduced the number of agencies UH in nineteen fifty

0:20:12.600 --> 0:20:16.040
<v Speaker 1>three with another executive order and then what we ended

0:20:16.119 --> 0:20:21.520
<v Speaker 1>up with was top secret, secret, confidential, UH and restricted

0:20:22.760 --> 0:20:25.359
<v Speaker 1>And should we should we talk a little bit about

0:20:25.440 --> 0:20:29.720
<v Speaker 1>what you sent over, like how it literally works in practice. Yeah,

0:20:29.800 --> 0:20:32.480
<v Speaker 1>I think that's a good spot for it. All right.

0:20:32.680 --> 0:20:35.679
<v Speaker 1>So if you get a document and you you know,

0:20:35.760 --> 0:20:38.199
<v Speaker 1>let's say one day you get your through a FOIA

0:20:38.320 --> 0:20:42.000
<v Speaker 1>requests which we'll talk about later Free to Information Act.

0:20:42.119 --> 0:20:44.119
<v Speaker 1>If you get your hands on a document and it says,

0:20:44.880 --> 0:20:48.040
<v Speaker 1>you know, uh, it might have the title right there

0:20:48.720 --> 0:20:53.320
<v Speaker 1>with the letter you saying that it's unclassified at this point.

0:20:53.480 --> 0:20:57.480
<v Speaker 1>But with that, yeah, within the document, you're gonna have

0:20:58.040 --> 0:21:00.879
<v Speaker 1>different paragraphs, are gonna have designate aations, Like one might

0:21:00.920 --> 0:21:04.200
<v Speaker 1>say secret, one might say confidential, one might say top secret,

0:21:04.800 --> 0:21:09.399
<v Speaker 1>And this whole thing rolls up to its initial top classification.

0:21:10.040 --> 0:21:12.400
<v Speaker 1>So if part of it is top secret, then all

0:21:12.440 --> 0:21:15.280
<v Speaker 1>of it is top secret. But I guess the deal

0:21:15.440 --> 0:21:19.760
<v Speaker 1>is is for future declassification, they want those sub designations

0:21:19.840 --> 0:21:22.880
<v Speaker 1>in there, is that, right, Yeah, to make it easier

0:21:22.920 --> 0:21:26.240
<v Speaker 1>for the person you know, um sending the document out

0:21:26.280 --> 0:21:30.280
<v Speaker 1>for a foyer requested blackout. You know, any any paragraphs

0:21:30.280 --> 0:21:34.239
<v Speaker 1>that are secret confidential because part of me is like,

0:21:34.280 --> 0:21:36.280
<v Speaker 1>if it's all rolls up to top secret, if one

0:21:36.280 --> 0:21:38.920
<v Speaker 1>part is top secret, then what's the point of even

0:21:39.160 --> 0:21:42.040
<v Speaker 1>subcategorizing it? But that doesn't make sense. So in this case,

0:21:42.119 --> 0:21:44.359
<v Speaker 1>so you said that, they might have the letter you

0:21:44.560 --> 0:21:47.840
<v Speaker 1>next to the title. In that case, they're saying, you

0:21:47.880 --> 0:21:51.480
<v Speaker 1>can acknowledge the existence of this document and the title

0:21:51.480 --> 0:21:55.600
<v Speaker 1>of this document, but the document itself is considered top secret,

0:21:55.800 --> 0:21:57.720
<v Speaker 1>so you wouldn't No one would be able to see

0:21:57.720 --> 0:22:01.159
<v Speaker 1>it without a top secret clearance, right, And then depending

0:22:01.160 --> 0:22:03.879
<v Speaker 1>on what agency here with. They also have different terms.

0:22:04.800 --> 0:22:08.560
<v Speaker 1>I think the State Department says sensitive but unclassified. Uh,

0:22:08.640 --> 0:22:11.159
<v Speaker 1>the d O D and Homeland Security might use for

0:22:11.200 --> 0:22:14.560
<v Speaker 1>official use only uh. And I guess the Parks Department

0:22:14.600 --> 0:22:16.520
<v Speaker 1>says it would be a whole lot cooler if you

0:22:16.520 --> 0:22:21.600
<v Speaker 1>didn't mention this is that from parks and wrecks from

0:22:21.600 --> 0:22:23.600
<v Speaker 1>my brain just now. Oh, I liked it a lot, Chuck,

0:22:23.720 --> 0:22:27.440
<v Speaker 1>I like my friend. So, um, those those ones you

0:22:27.560 --> 0:22:30.680
<v Speaker 1>just said, sensitive but unclassified, these basically made up ones.

0:22:30.760 --> 0:22:32.960
<v Speaker 1>Those are to keep people like you and me from

0:22:32.960 --> 0:22:36.119
<v Speaker 1>being able to see this stuff. Which is a big problem,

0:22:36.160 --> 0:22:39.480
<v Speaker 1>as we'll see with with classified information and over classification,

0:22:39.560 --> 0:22:41.679
<v Speaker 1>is that the public is basically looped out by this

0:22:41.720 --> 0:22:43.440
<v Speaker 1>whole thing, but they have a stamp. This is no

0:22:43.560 --> 0:22:51.560
<v Speaker 1>dopes right, no grass, no forget so. Um. So, one

0:22:51.600 --> 0:22:53.600
<v Speaker 1>of the other things that we should say is that

0:22:53.720 --> 0:22:57.159
<v Speaker 1>there be you talked about derivative classification, which we'll talk

0:22:57.320 --> 0:23:00.159
<v Speaker 1>more about in a second. There's also original classification, and

0:23:00.640 --> 0:23:05.120
<v Speaker 1>an original classification says this new thing that we're talking about.

0:23:05.200 --> 0:23:08.840
<v Speaker 1>Let's say somebody comes up with a new gun, right,

0:23:09.760 --> 0:23:13.320
<v Speaker 1>somebody along the way will say, we don't want anybody

0:23:13.359 --> 0:23:15.080
<v Speaker 1>to know about this gun. We certainly don't want to

0:23:15.080 --> 0:23:17.480
<v Speaker 1>know how it works. So I'm going to deem this

0:23:17.520 --> 0:23:21.560
<v Speaker 1>gun top secret. There's only a handful of people in

0:23:21.600 --> 0:23:23.520
<v Speaker 1>the country you can do that, and it sounds like

0:23:23.560 --> 0:23:25.160
<v Speaker 1>a lot, But when you really step back and think

0:23:25.160 --> 0:23:29.680
<v Speaker 1>about it, Um, it's not that many federal officials typically

0:23:29.800 --> 0:23:35.320
<v Speaker 1>work in the executive branch. Um can can declare something

0:23:35.400 --> 0:23:40.520
<v Speaker 1>originally classified. That's just the original classification. Yeah, and just

0:23:40.680 --> 0:23:45.280
<v Speaker 1>quickly by the numbers that's people can classify. But uh,

0:23:45.320 --> 0:23:48.800
<v Speaker 1>and this is numbers, But more than four million people

0:23:48.960 --> 0:23:52.400
<v Speaker 1>have security clearances, including one point three million with top

0:23:52.440 --> 0:23:57.640
<v Speaker 1>secret clearance. So those people, those other four four million

0:23:57.720 --> 0:24:02.000
<v Speaker 1>people who can see class of information, they're the ones

0:24:02.119 --> 0:24:06.679
<v Speaker 1>usually who make derivative classifications. So when they start, when

0:24:06.720 --> 0:24:10.160
<v Speaker 1>they come along and they say they're tasked with creating

0:24:10.480 --> 0:24:13.680
<v Speaker 1>a handbook or an instruction manual on using that new

0:24:13.760 --> 0:24:17.520
<v Speaker 1>gun that just got a top secret classification. When they're

0:24:17.560 --> 0:24:21.600
<v Speaker 1>making that manual because they're talking about a top secret gun,

0:24:22.840 --> 0:24:27.400
<v Speaker 1>that manual is top secret. Yes, that's a derivative classification. Now,

0:24:27.480 --> 0:24:32.240
<v Speaker 1>let's say you're emailing your coworker about the progress on

0:24:32.320 --> 0:24:36.240
<v Speaker 1>the manual, that email is top secret because you're talking

0:24:36.240 --> 0:24:39.439
<v Speaker 1>about a manual that's top secret because it's talking about

0:24:39.600 --> 0:24:41.959
<v Speaker 1>the thing that was this gun that was originally deemed

0:24:42.080 --> 0:24:45.240
<v Speaker 1>top secret. Now, if you're talking about millions of people

0:24:45.640 --> 0:24:49.200
<v Speaker 1>with access to secret and top secret information and they're

0:24:49.200 --> 0:24:51.320
<v Speaker 1>all talking to one another trying to make all this

0:24:51.359 --> 0:24:55.919
<v Speaker 1>stuff work, you can see how quickly that derivative classific

0:24:56.200 --> 0:25:00.439
<v Speaker 1>is classified information can explode exponentially. In an fact, it

0:25:00.480 --> 0:25:04.120
<v Speaker 1>actually has over the years. Yeah, I mean, I guess

0:25:04.160 --> 0:25:05.639
<v Speaker 1>we could go through them. Are you talking about the

0:25:05.680 --> 0:25:12.920
<v Speaker 1>overclassification numbers? Yeah, yeah, so, Uh, the Security the Information

0:25:12.920 --> 0:25:16.760
<v Speaker 1>Security Oversight Office reported, uh, six years ago that cabinet

0:25:16.840 --> 0:25:22.640
<v Speaker 1>level agencies alone uh this is not the military, right,

0:25:23.000 --> 0:25:26.359
<v Speaker 1>classified more than fifty five million documents. And then the

0:25:26.359 --> 0:25:32.320
<v Speaker 1>Public Interest Declassification Board estimates that the intelligence community just

0:25:32.359 --> 0:25:36.760
<v Speaker 1>by themselves classifies multiple peta bytes of data every year,

0:25:37.359 --> 0:25:40.439
<v Speaker 1>which is about a petabyte is about eighty six billion

0:25:40.480 --> 0:25:45.080
<v Speaker 1>pages billion pages of either text or you know. It

0:25:45.160 --> 0:25:47.199
<v Speaker 1>points out a lot of that could be photographs and videos,

0:25:47.240 --> 0:25:50.239
<v Speaker 1>but the point is lots and lots and lots and

0:25:50.280 --> 0:25:53.080
<v Speaker 1>lots and lots of stuff. Yes, and that's just the

0:25:53.119 --> 0:25:56.760
<v Speaker 1>classification there's an entire other process for declassifying, and that

0:25:56.800 --> 0:26:01.960
<v Speaker 1>can be pretty nebulous too. Um Supposedly now nowadays if um,

0:26:02.000 --> 0:26:05.120
<v Speaker 1>if somebody doesn't doesn't get ahold of this, and very

0:26:05.119 --> 0:26:08.600
<v Speaker 1>few people are authorized to declassify stuff. Apparently the president

0:26:08.840 --> 0:26:11.960
<v Speaker 1>can declassify anything at any time, but there's procedures for

0:26:12.000 --> 0:26:15.800
<v Speaker 1>other like agency heads to declassify stuff. Um, if they

0:26:15.840 --> 0:26:18.399
<v Speaker 1>don't get ahold of a document and decided to declassify

0:26:18.440 --> 0:26:21.760
<v Speaker 1>it after ten years, if it's not that big of

0:26:21.760 --> 0:26:26.000
<v Speaker 1>a deal, it can automatically be declassified if it's very sensitive.

0:26:26.080 --> 0:26:29.200
<v Speaker 1>And again none of this is defined. Um, they're not saying, like,

0:26:29.359 --> 0:26:33.880
<v Speaker 1>you know, really sensitive like the Myli massacre documents, Um,

0:26:34.359 --> 0:26:36.159
<v Speaker 1>that kind of stuff you want to hang onto for

0:26:36.200 --> 0:26:40.199
<v Speaker 1>twenty five years. So um, there's like a system and

0:26:40.400 --> 0:26:44.200
<v Speaker 1>involved or in place, but it's not a very good system.

0:26:44.480 --> 0:26:47.520
<v Speaker 1>And even still you're saying, like, what is the stuff

0:26:47.560 --> 0:26:50.680
<v Speaker 1>that can just be automatically declassified after ten years? Should

0:26:50.680 --> 0:26:52.800
<v Speaker 1>it even be classified in the first place, which is

0:26:52.840 --> 0:26:55.639
<v Speaker 1>something we'll talk about two. Yeah, And the whole thing

0:26:55.640 --> 0:26:59.280
<v Speaker 1>with the twenty years is like what they're basically saying

0:26:59.440 --> 0:27:02.479
<v Speaker 1>is we want to wait long enough to where a

0:27:02.520 --> 0:27:06.000
<v Speaker 1>lot of the people may be dead, a lot of

0:27:06.480 --> 0:27:10.480
<v Speaker 1>maybe the Statute of Limitations could be up for any crime. Uh,

0:27:10.600 --> 0:27:13.160
<v Speaker 1>or maybe people hopefully have just gotten over to enough

0:27:13.200 --> 0:27:17.920
<v Speaker 1>to where they're not super mad about something. It's really interesting. Um,

0:27:17.960 --> 0:27:23.760
<v Speaker 1>all this comes out of uh shockingly, the last executive

0:27:23.840 --> 0:27:27.000
<v Speaker 1>order on this kind of thing was from President Obama,

0:27:27.720 --> 0:27:31.600
<v Speaker 1>which was in two thousand nine. Executive Order thirteen thousand

0:27:32.160 --> 0:27:37.600
<v Speaker 1>five six replaced all previous orders as far as classification goes,

0:27:38.280 --> 0:27:42.800
<v Speaker 1>and UH shocked that it wasn't thrown out and uh

0:27:42.840 --> 0:27:45.960
<v Speaker 1>and redone. It was a little shocking, isn't it. Yeah,

0:27:46.000 --> 0:27:48.480
<v Speaker 1>I was just I guess no one told the last

0:27:48.480 --> 0:27:52.280
<v Speaker 1>president that Obama had the last word on that, because UM, yeah,

0:27:52.280 --> 0:27:55.800
<v Speaker 1>I'm not sure how that got through. But um, that

0:27:55.960 --> 0:27:58.720
<v Speaker 1>is when it it class It moved things into top secret,

0:27:58.760 --> 0:28:02.040
<v Speaker 1>secret and confidential. And then that's when it talked about

0:28:02.119 --> 0:28:04.440
<v Speaker 1>you know, whether it was grave damage, serious damage, or

0:28:04.520 --> 0:28:09.280
<v Speaker 1>damage and uh stuff like that. So that's that's sort

0:28:09.280 --> 0:28:11.600
<v Speaker 1>of the last word on it. Um. We also should

0:28:11.640 --> 0:28:15.000
<v Speaker 1>mention there is a level above top secret called sensitive

0:28:15.040 --> 0:28:19.520
<v Speaker 1>compartmented information, and this is with when you're within if

0:28:19.560 --> 0:28:22.199
<v Speaker 1>you have top secret clearance, they're like, yeah, but you

0:28:22.240 --> 0:28:26.119
<v Speaker 1>can't even know this. Only people, these very few people

0:28:26.119 --> 0:28:28.159
<v Speaker 1>that deal with this thing specifically can even know this,

0:28:28.920 --> 0:28:32.400
<v Speaker 1>Like that is an sci designation. Sure, and that makes

0:28:32.440 --> 0:28:35.320
<v Speaker 1>total sense, And it's a very general Leslie Groves idea

0:28:35.760 --> 0:28:39.600
<v Speaker 1>compartmentalization of of of information, so that if you have

0:28:39.640 --> 0:28:42.520
<v Speaker 1>top secret clearance and you're in the Department of Energy,

0:28:43.040 --> 0:28:45.240
<v Speaker 1>they're like, uh, no, you can't have access to this

0:28:45.320 --> 0:28:48.120
<v Speaker 1>top secret weapons information has nothing to do with your job.

0:28:48.440 --> 0:28:51.560
<v Speaker 1>You can have all access to the top secret information

0:28:51.640 --> 0:28:56.320
<v Speaker 1>about the Department of energies new like cold nuclear fusion

0:28:56.800 --> 0:29:00.240
<v Speaker 1>reactor that we're secretly building, but no, we're you can't

0:29:00.240 --> 0:29:03.240
<v Speaker 1>see this this new gun design, which makes a lot

0:29:03.280 --> 0:29:05.080
<v Speaker 1>of sense, but it really just kind of goes to

0:29:05.080 --> 0:29:08.600
<v Speaker 1>show you how compartmentalized this classified information is, even in

0:29:08.640 --> 0:29:12.720
<v Speaker 1>the echelons of top secret clearance. Yeah, and within that

0:29:12.760 --> 0:29:15.320
<v Speaker 1>Obama order, there are eight types of information that can

0:29:15.360 --> 0:29:18.600
<v Speaker 1>be classified. I don't know if we need to go

0:29:18.720 --> 0:29:21.400
<v Speaker 1>through all these doing no, not necessarily, but they generally

0:29:21.440 --> 0:29:24.360
<v Speaker 1>all make sense to me though, like there's not anywhere

0:29:24.400 --> 0:29:26.880
<v Speaker 1>I'm like, oh, this one doesn't doesn't make military stuff,

0:29:26.920 --> 0:29:32.560
<v Speaker 1>weapons stuff, foreign government stuff, un vulnerability of infrastructures, just

0:29:32.680 --> 0:29:35.520
<v Speaker 1>things you would not want an enemy to to understand,

0:29:35.560 --> 0:29:39.120
<v Speaker 1>which it makes sense. And yet this executive order, it

0:29:39.120 --> 0:29:41.960
<v Speaker 1>may have cleaned up the process some, but it hasn't

0:29:42.000 --> 0:29:47.280
<v Speaker 1>helped It seems like, should we take another break? All right,

0:29:47.280 --> 0:29:49.080
<v Speaker 1>I'm an agreement on that, by the way, I don't

0:29:49.080 --> 0:29:52.320
<v Speaker 1>want to keep people in the suspense. And then we're

0:29:52.320 --> 0:29:54.600
<v Speaker 1>going to come back and talk about what some of

0:29:54.600 --> 0:29:57.280
<v Speaker 1>the problems are with over classification. And there's a lot

0:29:57.320 --> 0:30:21.880
<v Speaker 1>of them, all right. So over classification is a thing.

0:30:21.960 --> 0:30:24.760
<v Speaker 1>We talked about how many documents are classified each year,

0:30:26.240 --> 0:30:30.040
<v Speaker 1>how many peta bites and billions and billions of pages

0:30:30.880 --> 0:30:35.680
<v Speaker 1>of information and video and photos are classified. And there

0:30:35.800 --> 0:30:39.440
<v Speaker 1>is a worry that's obviously been around for a long

0:30:39.520 --> 0:30:43.280
<v Speaker 1>time that people are and there's a lot of reasons

0:30:43.360 --> 0:30:45.760
<v Speaker 1>and costs for over classification, but one of the big

0:30:45.800 --> 0:30:48.360
<v Speaker 1>reasons is that I think a lot of people don't

0:30:48.360 --> 0:30:51.880
<v Speaker 1>want to be on the hook for it, so they'll

0:30:51.880 --> 0:30:54.880
<v Speaker 1>just default to classifying something. Uh. And one of the

0:30:54.880 --> 0:30:57.960
<v Speaker 1>things the Obama order did was you had to have

0:30:58.040 --> 0:31:00.880
<v Speaker 1>your name on it if you classified it, so at

0:31:00.960 --> 0:31:03.360
<v Speaker 1>least they knew who it was and they could go

0:31:03.400 --> 0:31:06.560
<v Speaker 1>back to when it came to challenging that classification, right,

0:31:06.560 --> 0:31:10.120
<v Speaker 1>which makes sense. That's good, they added some kind of

0:31:10.120 --> 0:31:14.800
<v Speaker 1>accountability to it, right, But what are some of these costs. Well,

0:31:14.840 --> 0:31:16.840
<v Speaker 1>one of the big ones is corruption, Like if you

0:31:16.920 --> 0:31:20.400
<v Speaker 1>keep secrets and you classify everything, like it's really fun

0:31:20.440 --> 0:31:25.160
<v Speaker 1>to go look for examples of absurd over classification. Um,

0:31:25.200 --> 0:31:29.440
<v Speaker 1>there's apparently some facetious plot to overthrow Santa clause and

0:31:29.520 --> 0:31:34.400
<v Speaker 1>some report on it was classified. They routinely classify menus

0:31:34.480 --> 0:31:38.120
<v Speaker 1>at state dinner banquets, just stuff that does not need

0:31:38.200 --> 0:31:42.680
<v Speaker 1>to be classified. It reveals just how if everything is classified,

0:31:42.720 --> 0:31:45.360
<v Speaker 1>it makes it really easy to classify, which means that

0:31:45.440 --> 0:31:48.560
<v Speaker 1>you can cover up just about anything by classifying it.

0:31:48.600 --> 0:31:52.360
<v Speaker 1>And so it's a real breeding ground for corruption. Of course,

0:31:53.000 --> 0:31:57.560
<v Speaker 1>it's a real breeding ground for authoritarianism as well, because

0:31:57.600 --> 0:31:59.680
<v Speaker 1>if you're allowed to do what you want and then

0:31:59.720 --> 0:32:02.440
<v Speaker 1>cover it all up and make secrets, uh, and keep

0:32:02.480 --> 0:32:06.160
<v Speaker 1>those secrets then hide what you're doing essentially, then that

0:32:06.280 --> 0:32:09.640
<v Speaker 1>that's just a breeding ground, that's a peatrie dish for authoritarianism. Well,

0:32:09.680 --> 0:32:13.800
<v Speaker 1>I saw another really interesting UM explanation about how it

0:32:13.880 --> 0:32:17.720
<v Speaker 1>can breed authoritarianism from the outside to from a guy

0:32:17.800 --> 0:32:21.440
<v Speaker 1>named um Sean Holman. He was a professor at Mount

0:32:21.560 --> 0:32:25.080
<v Speaker 1>Royal University in Calgary, and he basically said, when you

0:32:25.160 --> 0:32:28.760
<v Speaker 1>have a government that has overtly has a mountain of

0:32:28.840 --> 0:32:33.040
<v Speaker 1>secrets that the public knows about, it creates uncertainty, and

0:32:33.080 --> 0:32:36.440
<v Speaker 1>so people look for certainty, even if it's not truthful.

0:32:36.720 --> 0:32:39.400
<v Speaker 1>They'll they'll they'll they want it, they seek it out.

0:32:39.680 --> 0:32:42.040
<v Speaker 1>So anybody can come along and make up whatever they

0:32:42.040 --> 0:32:45.520
<v Speaker 1>want about what the government's really doing or filling in

0:32:45.560 --> 0:32:48.320
<v Speaker 1>the blanks and in the in the public's knowledge, and

0:32:48.360 --> 0:32:50.320
<v Speaker 1>people will hunger for that and listen to what that

0:32:50.400 --> 0:32:55.200
<v Speaker 1>person is saying, and that can breed authoritarianism as well. Yeah,

0:32:55.280 --> 0:32:57.360
<v Speaker 1>and you know another thing we failed to mention and

0:32:57.480 --> 0:33:01.280
<v Speaker 1>is a problem with overclassification is they so far with

0:33:01.360 --> 0:33:05.280
<v Speaker 1>the Manhattan Project that Russia was tipped off because all

0:33:05.280 --> 0:33:08.480
<v Speaker 1>of a sudden there was no science, no scientific papers

0:33:08.520 --> 0:33:11.360
<v Speaker 1>coming out. And Russia was like that can also be

0:33:11.400 --> 0:33:13.880
<v Speaker 1>a bad thing because they were like, all of a sudden, uh,

0:33:13.960 --> 0:33:16.080
<v Speaker 1>or the Soviet Union, I guess, was like, m this

0:33:16.160 --> 0:33:19.000
<v Speaker 1>is very interesting. They're they're actually that's been very quiet

0:33:19.040 --> 0:33:21.520
<v Speaker 1>over there lately. So my spiy sense is going off,

0:33:21.560 --> 0:33:23.680
<v Speaker 1>they haven't used the word Adam in quite some time.

0:33:25.640 --> 0:33:28.520
<v Speaker 1>Another thing is that Hinder's research. Of course, Um, we

0:33:28.600 --> 0:33:32.600
<v Speaker 1>talked about the science. Science should be shared, and I

0:33:32.680 --> 0:33:35.480
<v Speaker 1>know that people on I know firsthand the people on

0:33:35.480 --> 0:33:39.680
<v Speaker 1>the Manhattan Project were frustrated by Groves and the fact

0:33:39.720 --> 0:33:43.440
<v Speaker 1>that they couldn't even share stuff with other science departments. Yeah,

0:33:43.520 --> 0:33:46.320
<v Speaker 1>like he just banned them from speaking. When they're finally

0:33:46.360 --> 0:33:51.520
<v Speaker 1>relented and let Oppenheimer hold like um, like weekly symposiums

0:33:51.520 --> 0:33:54.880
<v Speaker 1>trying to hammer out problems that were just intractable. Um.

0:33:54.920 --> 0:33:58.040
<v Speaker 1>But even still they were closely watched and it was

0:33:58.200 --> 0:34:00.600
<v Speaker 1>it was a difficult research client meant from what I

0:34:00.600 --> 0:34:04.840
<v Speaker 1>can tell, Uh sure. And it's also it's also a

0:34:04.920 --> 0:34:08.799
<v Speaker 1>challenge when you're a when you're an agency like the

0:34:08.840 --> 0:34:11.799
<v Speaker 1>c i A, and you're not sharing information and things

0:34:11.840 --> 0:34:16.239
<v Speaker 1>like nine eleven happened possibly because agencies aren't sharing information,

0:34:17.120 --> 0:34:19.560
<v Speaker 1>or that they're not sharing that there were no weapons

0:34:19.560 --> 0:34:22.600
<v Speaker 1>of mass destruction and we end up in war. So

0:34:22.760 --> 0:34:27.400
<v Speaker 1>sharing of information between agencies is it is something that

0:34:27.680 --> 0:34:30.640
<v Speaker 1>needs to happen more. I think yes, that was also

0:34:30.680 --> 0:34:33.600
<v Speaker 1>a big problem on nine eleven. Um. I remember seeing

0:34:33.719 --> 0:34:37.000
<v Speaker 1>on a few documentaries that came around around the twentie

0:34:37.080 --> 0:34:41.800
<v Speaker 1>anniversary of this past September, where there was like real

0:34:41.960 --> 0:34:45.520
<v Speaker 1>knowledge about a couple of the hijackers being in the

0:34:45.600 --> 0:34:47.840
<v Speaker 1>United States and that they were a problem and we

0:34:47.840 --> 0:34:50.840
<v Speaker 1>should be keeping tabs on them, and the information was

0:34:50.920 --> 0:34:54.359
<v Speaker 1>just not properly passed along. And I think the nine

0:34:54.440 --> 0:34:59.520
<v Speaker 1>eleven commission um settled on the idea that that had

0:34:59.760 --> 0:35:04.520
<v Speaker 1>had this over classification not hindered information sharing, there's a

0:35:04.560 --> 0:35:07.200
<v Speaker 1>possibility that nine eleven would have been thwarted before it

0:35:07.200 --> 0:35:12.040
<v Speaker 1>could have been carried out. Sure. Uh. Leaks is another

0:35:12.080 --> 0:35:14.480
<v Speaker 1>big one, because you know when you when you control

0:35:14.520 --> 0:35:17.239
<v Speaker 1>the information and have all the information kept secret, you

0:35:17.239 --> 0:35:20.040
<v Speaker 1>can also leak out bits of that information to to

0:35:20.080 --> 0:35:23.400
<v Speaker 1>wield as a weapon against a political enemy, and that

0:35:23.920 --> 0:35:26.160
<v Speaker 1>you know, we've we've seen that happen time and time again. Yeah,

0:35:26.200 --> 0:35:29.120
<v Speaker 1>like Valerie playing right with Dick Cheney when he outed

0:35:29.160 --> 0:35:34.160
<v Speaker 1>her to punish her husband for criticizing the Iraq war. Yeah.

0:35:34.160 --> 0:35:37.440
<v Speaker 1>I think some of the Obama executive order is to

0:35:37.760 --> 0:35:41.000
<v Speaker 1>protect whistleblowers too, I'm not mistaken. Yeah, and also to

0:35:41.040 --> 0:35:44.680
<v Speaker 1>protect people who who say this this document is being

0:35:44.719 --> 0:35:47.319
<v Speaker 1>overclassified with they bring it up to their superior. They

0:35:47.520 --> 0:35:50.359
<v Speaker 1>should not be punished for that, right. And I think

0:35:50.360 --> 0:35:53.200
<v Speaker 1>it even and I think the Executive Order even encourages

0:35:53.280 --> 0:35:57.400
<v Speaker 1>people to um, not protests, but to to question the

0:35:57.440 --> 0:36:01.520
<v Speaker 1>classification of your superiors and to be allowed to bring

0:36:01.560 --> 0:36:05.320
<v Speaker 1>that up. Yeah, you're supposed to be like, that's way off.

0:36:05.400 --> 0:36:08.680
<v Speaker 1>You really screwed that one. Uh. There's one other thing,

0:36:08.760 --> 0:36:13.920
<v Speaker 1>Chuck two about leaks is that UM over classification in

0:36:13.920 --> 0:36:18.160
<v Speaker 1>a climate where we're prosecuting leakers and whistleblowers like never before.

0:36:19.400 --> 0:36:23.880
<v Speaker 1>UM that that if we if we are classifying things

0:36:24.520 --> 0:36:29.680
<v Speaker 1>that somebody would feel morally obligated to put their own

0:36:29.880 --> 0:36:34.200
<v Speaker 1>self at risk to release to the public, should that

0:36:34.239 --> 0:36:37.640
<v Speaker 1>stuff be classified? Should we be classifying that? And the

0:36:37.640 --> 0:36:41.799
<v Speaker 1>answer is probably not. Um, that it's probably being covered up,

0:36:41.880 --> 0:36:44.480
<v Speaker 1>is what the classification is being used for. And yet

0:36:44.600 --> 0:36:48.640
<v Speaker 1>under the letter of the law, because this is classified information,

0:36:48.920 --> 0:36:52.440
<v Speaker 1>that 'spionage Act says that you can be prosecuted and

0:36:52.480 --> 0:36:56.919
<v Speaker 1>spend years in jail for following your conscience. Yeah, that's

0:36:56.920 --> 0:37:01.319
<v Speaker 1>another problem with leaks and over classification. Yeah, and you know,

0:37:01.400 --> 0:37:06.239
<v Speaker 1>to fight over classification is you know, I guess Ed

0:37:06.320 --> 0:37:08.359
<v Speaker 1>points it out very kind of plainly, like as an

0:37:08.600 --> 0:37:12.680
<v Speaker 1>as a president, you're kind of in a known situation.

0:37:13.320 --> 0:37:17.040
<v Speaker 1>If one of your big mandates is to uh make

0:37:17.080 --> 0:37:21.600
<v Speaker 1>a lot less things classified, like you might win over

0:37:21.840 --> 0:37:25.560
<v Speaker 1>you know, some some freedom of information enthusiasts, But as

0:37:25.600 --> 0:37:28.520
<v Speaker 1>a general, as a general rule, you're not going to

0:37:28.600 --> 0:37:30.719
<v Speaker 1>do yourselves any political favors by going in there and

0:37:30.719 --> 0:37:32.160
<v Speaker 1>being like, hey, you know what we need to do

0:37:32.560 --> 0:37:35.080
<v Speaker 1>is declassify a lot of stuff and not classified nearly

0:37:35.120 --> 0:37:38.520
<v Speaker 1>as many things. You're also gonna upset the intelligence community greatly.

0:37:38.600 --> 0:37:40.600
<v Speaker 1>I would assume, yeah, well it's a big part of it.

0:37:41.120 --> 0:37:43.200
<v Speaker 1>So but some people have said, okay, well there's got

0:37:43.200 --> 0:37:45.800
<v Speaker 1>to be some stuff we can do. Um time limits

0:37:45.840 --> 0:37:49.000
<v Speaker 1>is a big one. Yeah. There's a guy named Irwin

0:37:49.120 --> 0:37:53.279
<v Speaker 1>Griswald who I found in Washington post op ed. He

0:37:53.320 --> 0:37:56.640
<v Speaker 1>wrote he was the guy who prosecuted the Pentagon papers

0:37:56.680 --> 0:37:59.080
<v Speaker 1>on behalf of the government. So he prosecuted, like to

0:37:59.160 --> 0:38:02.520
<v Speaker 1>that time, the biggest leak of government secrets ever. And

0:38:02.600 --> 0:38:06.640
<v Speaker 1>he came around years later and said we're way over classifying.

0:38:06.920 --> 0:38:09.440
<v Speaker 1>He basically said, like, there may be some basis for

0:38:09.520 --> 0:38:13.040
<v Speaker 1>short term classification while plans are being made or negotiations

0:38:13.040 --> 0:38:15.720
<v Speaker 1>are going on, but apart from details of weapons systems.

0:38:15.760 --> 0:38:18.640
<v Speaker 1>There is very rarely any real risk to current national

0:38:18.680 --> 0:38:22.080
<v Speaker 1>security from the publication of facts relating to transactions in

0:38:22.080 --> 0:38:25.120
<v Speaker 1>the past, even the fairly recent past. So to put

0:38:25.120 --> 0:38:28.920
<v Speaker 1>a time limit, especially a short time limit on classified material,

0:38:29.160 --> 0:38:31.880
<v Speaker 1>that would help a lot. Yeah. I mean, is he

0:38:32.000 --> 0:38:34.719
<v Speaker 1>also the guy that said if you know a lot

0:38:34.760 --> 0:38:37.919
<v Speaker 1>about this system, then it's pretty clear that a lot

0:38:37.960 --> 0:38:41.000
<v Speaker 1>of these classifications are to cover up embarrassments. Yeah, he's

0:38:41.000 --> 0:38:45.120
<v Speaker 1>one and the same. So that's that's not good. That's like,

0:38:45.120 --> 0:38:47.680
<v Speaker 1>oh boy, this doesn't look good, so let's just classify it.

0:38:48.200 --> 0:38:51.480
<v Speaker 1>And depending on who you talked to, estimates are anywhere

0:38:51.480 --> 0:38:55.200
<v Speaker 1>from ten percent to nine of classified information can be

0:38:55.440 --> 0:38:58.759
<v Speaker 1>put in the overclassified bucket. Yeah, and be one of

0:38:58.800 --> 0:39:01.160
<v Speaker 1>the things that that he saying and that that Statistics

0:39:01.160 --> 0:39:04.520
<v Speaker 1>says is that a lot of the reason classified material

0:39:04.719 --> 0:39:08.000
<v Speaker 1>is classified is to loop the public out, either because

0:39:08.200 --> 0:39:11.640
<v Speaker 1>Congress is being fed a load of bs by some

0:39:11.680 --> 0:39:14.520
<v Speaker 1>lobbyists that don't want public input about what they're telling

0:39:14.560 --> 0:39:18.680
<v Speaker 1>Congress or um there's a real concern that a lot

0:39:18.680 --> 0:39:22.640
<v Speaker 1>of federal agencies can protect or do protect some of

0:39:22.640 --> 0:39:28.080
<v Speaker 1>the corporations that they um that they regulate from public scrutiny. Um,

0:39:28.160 --> 0:39:31.000
<v Speaker 1>that could be a really big issue too, right, Oh

0:39:31.040 --> 0:39:33.279
<v Speaker 1>for sure. Like I think the FCC in the early

0:39:33.320 --> 0:39:36.239
<v Speaker 1>two thousands said that they weren't going to allow UM

0:39:36.360 --> 0:39:40.359
<v Speaker 1>reports about outages among wireless car carriers to be made

0:39:40.360 --> 0:39:42.960
<v Speaker 1>public out of a fear of being a threat to

0:39:43.040 --> 0:39:46.160
<v Speaker 1>national security. Which yeah, I mean there's a lot of

0:39:46.160 --> 0:39:49.680
<v Speaker 1>that stuff. The the other one with the protecting the

0:39:50.120 --> 0:39:54.279
<v Speaker 1>the Department of Agriculture protecting I guess it depends on

0:39:54.480 --> 0:39:56.280
<v Speaker 1>you talked to if you want to think it's protecting

0:39:56.320 --> 0:40:00.560
<v Speaker 1>but um food producers from if they produce a food

0:40:00.560 --> 0:40:03.239
<v Speaker 1>board and illness into the food supply, like, they might

0:40:03.280 --> 0:40:05.920
<v Speaker 1>not allow that information on like who it was to

0:40:05.960 --> 0:40:08.960
<v Speaker 1>be released as a protective measure. And that's when it

0:40:09.000 --> 0:40:11.160
<v Speaker 1>gets a little dicey that in the f CC, it's like,

0:40:12.000 --> 0:40:14.319
<v Speaker 1>I don't know, I mean, these this is these are

0:40:14.600 --> 0:40:17.120
<v Speaker 1>big public companies and you're talking about the public good,

0:40:18.239 --> 0:40:20.560
<v Speaker 1>but you're throwing like a shield around it, and maybe

0:40:20.640 --> 0:40:22.759
<v Speaker 1>that's not the best thing to do. And even still,

0:40:22.840 --> 0:40:24.840
<v Speaker 1>you can take it to an even more extreme degree,

0:40:25.000 --> 0:40:28.279
<v Speaker 1>right up to the CIA's doorstep and say, um, I've

0:40:28.320 --> 0:40:32.880
<v Speaker 1>seen people argue that that you by looping the American

0:40:32.920 --> 0:40:37.040
<v Speaker 1>public out about the secret torture program, the the ghost

0:40:37.160 --> 0:40:42.520
<v Speaker 1>prisons program. Um. It kept the public from being able

0:40:42.560 --> 0:40:44.719
<v Speaker 1>to hold the debate on whether this is something we

0:40:44.760 --> 0:40:47.719
<v Speaker 1>want America to be doing or not. And that's a

0:40:47.800 --> 0:40:49.680
<v Speaker 1>huge part of it, Chuck. I mean, like the basis

0:40:49.719 --> 0:40:52.759
<v Speaker 1>of democracies, the public being looped in and then the

0:40:52.800 --> 0:40:56.040
<v Speaker 1>government carrying out the wishes of the public. If you're

0:40:56.080 --> 0:40:59.280
<v Speaker 1>looping the public out, then that's just the government operating

0:40:59.280 --> 0:41:03.000
<v Speaker 1>and deciding on your behalf without any input from you whatsoever,

0:41:03.040 --> 0:41:05.719
<v Speaker 1>because you're being completely kept in the dark. That is

0:41:05.760 --> 0:41:09.480
<v Speaker 1>a huge basis of the classification system in America. Sadly.

0:41:10.000 --> 0:41:12.920
<v Speaker 1>Oh yeah, I mean the the agencies in the military,

0:41:13.560 --> 0:41:16.279
<v Speaker 1>I think firmly believe that the public is better off

0:41:16.520 --> 0:41:19.640
<v Speaker 1>if they don't have any knowledge of this stuff and

0:41:19.960 --> 0:41:22.879
<v Speaker 1>any opinion on what we're doing behind closed doors. Yeah,

0:41:22.920 --> 0:41:24.319
<v Speaker 1>And I mean they're like, what do you want to know?

0:41:24.400 --> 0:41:26.920
<v Speaker 1>Where where water boarding people? And I think a lot

0:41:26.960 --> 0:41:28.759
<v Speaker 1>of people would say, yeah, I would have liked to

0:41:28.760 --> 0:41:30.600
<v Speaker 1>have known that so I could vote it. Whoever was

0:41:30.640 --> 0:41:33.759
<v Speaker 1>supporting that right out of office, because I don't support waterboarding,

0:41:33.840 --> 0:41:37.600
<v Speaker 1>even terrorists. No one was given that opportunity the public,

0:41:37.960 --> 0:41:40.640
<v Speaker 1>even the people who agreed with it. We're giving the

0:41:40.640 --> 0:41:45.400
<v Speaker 1>opportunity to debate the merits of it in public because

0:41:45.440 --> 0:41:49.400
<v Speaker 1>everyone was kept in the dark. Yeah, and you might think, okay,

0:41:49.440 --> 0:41:52.360
<v Speaker 1>well I actually do agree with water boarding terrorists. Well

0:41:52.360 --> 0:41:55.279
<v Speaker 1>that that was that was something the CIA kept that

0:41:55.400 --> 0:41:57.360
<v Speaker 1>you agreed with. What about all the other things that

0:41:57.400 --> 0:41:59.600
<v Speaker 1>are kept secret that you don't agree with? That as

0:41:59.680 --> 0:42:03.759
<v Speaker 1>being kept out of your ability to debate? Yeah, the

0:42:03.840 --> 0:42:08.160
<v Speaker 1>quick movie recommendation on that note, The new Paul Trader movie,

0:42:08.360 --> 0:42:13.239
<v Speaker 1>The Card Counter Fantastic. Oh yeah, won't give away too much,

0:42:13.280 --> 0:42:17.240
<v Speaker 1>but Oscar Isaacs plays a sort of a very solitary

0:42:17.280 --> 0:42:21.520
<v Speaker 1>gambler poker player who is haunted by his pass as

0:42:21.560 --> 0:42:25.080
<v Speaker 1>a former prison guard at Abu Grabe. Oh wow, okay,

0:42:25.120 --> 0:42:27.040
<v Speaker 1>I'll check that out. So there. And you know, pauls

0:42:27.040 --> 0:42:31.680
<v Speaker 1>Traders still making this really really, he's still being Paul Traders,

0:42:31.719 --> 0:42:35.080
<v Speaker 1>so tough, challenging hardcore movies. What else has he done?

0:42:36.080 --> 0:42:40.239
<v Speaker 1>He wrote Taxi Driver. Um. He also made a movie

0:42:40.280 --> 0:42:44.000
<v Speaker 1>called Hardcore Back and I think the eighties about it's

0:42:44.040 --> 0:42:48.879
<v Speaker 1>always just very grizzly, grizzly stuff. And he also did

0:42:48.920 --> 0:42:51.960
<v Speaker 1>Meet Me in St. Louis. Like the last movie he

0:42:52.000 --> 0:42:54.919
<v Speaker 1>did before this one was first Reformed, the Ethan Hawk

0:42:55.000 --> 0:42:57.680
<v Speaker 1>movie where he played the priest. I don't know if

0:42:57.719 --> 0:43:00.480
<v Speaker 1>you saw that, but because these are seen any of

0:43:00.520 --> 0:43:03.279
<v Speaker 1>his movies, I saw a taxi driver. I thought that

0:43:04.920 --> 0:43:07.360
<v Speaker 1>he used to write more movies and now he directs

0:43:07.520 --> 0:43:10.200
<v Speaker 1>quite a bit. But he also wrote. I mean he

0:43:10.200 --> 0:43:12.800
<v Speaker 1>wrote less Sentation of Christ and oh wow, this guy's

0:43:12.840 --> 0:43:16.160
<v Speaker 1>good raging bowl American Giggilo stuff like that. I love

0:43:16.200 --> 0:43:19.000
<v Speaker 1>his stuff. Yeah, you know, Pultrator, you just don't know him.

0:43:19.080 --> 0:43:24.120
<v Speaker 1>I got you anyway, great movie recommendation. But we were

0:43:24.120 --> 0:43:28.680
<v Speaker 1>talking about secret prisons and it felt relevant. So I mean,

0:43:29.040 --> 0:43:32.240
<v Speaker 1>there's like a lot of things that that people say, Okay,

0:43:32.280 --> 0:43:35.120
<v Speaker 1>you know, here's some fixes we can do. But it

0:43:35.160 --> 0:43:37.280
<v Speaker 1>seems like it all kind of comes down to Chuck

0:43:37.719 --> 0:43:42.359
<v Speaker 1>putting time limits on classified material and really raising the

0:43:42.400 --> 0:43:45.440
<v Speaker 1>bar for what qualifies as a classified material or not,

0:43:45.880 --> 0:43:49.640
<v Speaker 1>and then in conjunction with that, making the act of

0:43:49.719 --> 0:43:55.080
<v Speaker 1>classifying material um accountable, like saying like like like if

0:43:55.120 --> 0:43:58.000
<v Speaker 1>you if you over classify, you're in trouble, Like there's

0:43:58.040 --> 0:44:00.000
<v Speaker 1>something you're doing your job wrong and you're gonna get

0:44:00.000 --> 0:44:03.600
<v Speaker 1>fired and replaced. Um that those three things seem to

0:44:03.680 --> 0:44:05.600
<v Speaker 1>kind of be the bottom line, and there seems to

0:44:05.680 --> 0:44:08.719
<v Speaker 1>be almost no movement whatsoever on it. Yeah, And I

0:44:08.760 --> 0:44:11.520
<v Speaker 1>think the other two that are could be pretty impactful

0:44:11.640 --> 0:44:16.239
<v Speaker 1>is make make declassification a real thing, sort of like

0:44:16.280 --> 0:44:18.880
<v Speaker 1>a practice and less like well someone has to submit

0:44:18.880 --> 0:44:22.279
<v Speaker 1>a Fourier request or really bug us. And then within

0:44:22.360 --> 0:44:24.719
<v Speaker 1>that system, I mean, we could do an episode on

0:44:24.760 --> 0:44:27.680
<v Speaker 1>Foyer request because they don't want you to find out something.

0:44:27.719 --> 0:44:30.279
<v Speaker 1>They can They can stand bag you for years, they

0:44:30.280 --> 0:44:32.759
<v Speaker 1>can put you off. They can release a document that

0:44:33.400 --> 0:44:36.640
<v Speaker 1>is redacted, like of it is redacted and go like here,

0:44:37.520 --> 0:44:41.839
<v Speaker 1>here's here's a bunch of adjectives. Uh. So, you know,

0:44:41.960 --> 0:44:45.719
<v Speaker 1>I think making that real would help. But I don't

0:44:45.719 --> 0:44:48.719
<v Speaker 1>know if anyone's gonna have the the guts to kind

0:44:48.719 --> 0:44:51.040
<v Speaker 1>of stand up to this stuff because it's not a

0:44:51.120 --> 0:44:54.600
<v Speaker 1>very electable position. You know, Well, my friend, I'm going

0:44:54.640 --> 0:44:56.680
<v Speaker 1>to do you one better. We actually have done an

0:44:56.680 --> 0:45:01.480
<v Speaker 1>episode on for you, did we I'm gonna double check, but, um,

0:45:01.480 --> 0:45:03.959
<v Speaker 1>but I believe we did. I know we've talked about

0:45:04.000 --> 0:45:07.960
<v Speaker 1>it extensively. We have, we probably did. Yeah, so you know,

0:45:08.320 --> 0:45:09.799
<v Speaker 1>we don't even have to do that. We can just

0:45:09.840 --> 0:45:13.360
<v Speaker 1>go back and listen to yep, how foy it works. Okay, Well,

0:45:13.840 --> 0:45:15.960
<v Speaker 1>in my defense in in April, everyone, it will be

0:45:16.000 --> 0:45:19.200
<v Speaker 1>fourteen years that's true. And this is from like four

0:45:19.280 --> 0:45:21.640
<v Speaker 1>or five years ago. So don't don't, right man. I

0:45:21.640 --> 0:45:24.759
<v Speaker 1>thought you were gonna say, like last week, right, you

0:45:24.840 --> 0:45:27.200
<v Speaker 1>got anything else? I got nothing else. This is a

0:45:27.200 --> 0:45:30.640
<v Speaker 1>good one, yeah, agreed. Um, Well, thanks to the grabster

0:45:30.760 --> 0:45:32.840
<v Speaker 1>and to all the people who wrote the articles that

0:45:32.880 --> 0:45:35.839
<v Speaker 1>we use for research here. Um. And if you want

0:45:35.840 --> 0:45:39.520
<v Speaker 1>to know more about over classification, seriously, if this struck

0:45:39.560 --> 0:45:41.920
<v Speaker 1>you is at all interesting, there's a whole world out

0:45:41.960 --> 0:45:44.160
<v Speaker 1>there of debate about what should be classified and what

0:45:44.200 --> 0:45:46.520
<v Speaker 1>shouldn't and how to fix this, uh, that you might

0:45:46.560 --> 0:45:50.360
<v Speaker 1>find interesting. And since I said you might find it interesting,

0:45:50.520 --> 0:45:58.160
<v Speaker 1>it's time for listener mail. I'm gonna call this court reporter. Oh.

0:45:58.239 --> 0:45:59.880
<v Speaker 1>I like this one. This is a good one. This

0:45:59.920 --> 0:46:01.440
<v Speaker 1>is a little lengthy, but I cut it down some.

0:46:01.719 --> 0:46:03.440
<v Speaker 1>Hey guys, I'm sitting at my desk in the courthouse

0:46:03.440 --> 0:46:05.840
<v Speaker 1>in North l A County and just finished listening to

0:46:05.920 --> 0:46:08.280
<v Speaker 1>unsung Heroes of the Court, and I am still beaming.

0:46:09.160 --> 0:46:11.839
<v Speaker 1>I am a court reporter. Stenographer. I went to court

0:46:11.840 --> 0:46:15.040
<v Speaker 1>reporting straight out of high school after taking a speed

0:46:15.080 --> 0:46:17.720
<v Speaker 1>running class. Just like Chuck, I learned about court reporting

0:46:17.719 --> 0:46:20.320
<v Speaker 1>from a Career day speaker. I spoke to our class

0:46:20.320 --> 0:46:22.239
<v Speaker 1>and knew immediately that this was the job for me.

0:46:22.680 --> 0:46:24.920
<v Speaker 1>I learned how to type on an old manual typewriter

0:46:24.960 --> 0:46:27.440
<v Speaker 1>in seventh grade. Took typing every year because it was

0:46:27.480 --> 0:46:29.919
<v Speaker 1>an easy a By the time I graduated, I could

0:46:29.920 --> 0:46:33.160
<v Speaker 1>type sixty five words per minute. A couple of years later,

0:46:33.160 --> 0:46:36.240
<v Speaker 1>I got my California court reporting license the age of nineteen.

0:46:37.000 --> 0:46:39.879
<v Speaker 1>I turned fifty five next month, so thirty five plus

0:46:39.960 --> 0:46:43.040
<v Speaker 1>years later, I'm still loving my career. UH. We court

0:46:43.080 --> 0:46:45.640
<v Speaker 1>reporters are truly unsung heroes in the courtroom. I often

0:46:45.680 --> 0:46:49.160
<v Speaker 1>compare my job to a wedding photographer. Once everything is

0:46:49.200 --> 0:46:53.080
<v Speaker 1>said and done, the transcript we create is all that remains, uh,

0:46:53.080 --> 0:46:55.040
<v Speaker 1>and we're fairly invisible, so make sure you have a

0:46:55.040 --> 0:46:58.880
<v Speaker 1>good one. Our Stuno machines are incredibly high tech, equipped

0:46:58.880 --> 0:47:03.239
<v Speaker 1>with bluetooth communication for real time simultaneous transcription to laptops,

0:47:03.719 --> 0:47:07.440
<v Speaker 1>iPads and the Internet. We can access the transcript immediately

0:47:07.480 --> 0:47:10.800
<v Speaker 1>for readback and clarification for the record, which is extremely

0:47:10.880 --> 0:47:14.160
<v Speaker 1>useful to assist the lawyer's parties, the judge and juries.

0:47:14.800 --> 0:47:18.080
<v Speaker 1>That said, we are in desperate need of more court reporters. Guys.

0:47:18.520 --> 0:47:21.600
<v Speaker 1>Tech schools lost their luster in an era where everyone

0:47:21.680 --> 0:47:23.880
<v Speaker 1>felt the need to have a college degree. But just

0:47:23.920 --> 0:47:26.960
<v Speaker 1>like bailiffs that we cherish in our own courthouses, court

0:47:27.000 --> 0:47:31.239
<v Speaker 1>reporting school doesn't require a college degree. It just requires

0:47:31.239 --> 0:47:34.440
<v Speaker 1>hard work and a dedication to your profession and nerves

0:47:34.440 --> 0:47:38.240
<v Speaker 1>of steel. That's right. I have never regretted my career choice.

0:47:38.239 --> 0:47:42.000
<v Speaker 1>And I thank you Josh, Chuck and Livia Olivia's first

0:47:42.000 --> 0:47:46.560
<v Speaker 1>shoutout for highlighting uh we court reporters in the crucial

0:47:46.600 --> 0:47:50.240
<v Speaker 1>role we play in the courtroom. That is from Linda Davidson,

0:47:50.360 --> 0:47:54.040
<v Speaker 1>l a superior court official, court reporter and proud of it.

0:47:54.640 --> 0:47:56.800
<v Speaker 1>Very nice. Thank you, Linda. That was a great email.

0:47:56.880 --> 0:47:59.080
<v Speaker 1>I appreciate that one big time. That was a great

0:47:59.120 --> 0:48:02.759
<v Speaker 1>idea for an episode to Chuck. It turned out to

0:48:02.800 --> 0:48:05.319
<v Speaker 1>be pretty pretty good, and we heard from I haven't

0:48:05.360 --> 0:48:08.440
<v Speaker 1>heard from a bailiff yet, but we've heard from actually

0:48:08.440 --> 0:48:11.040
<v Speaker 1>just a couple of court reporters. No sketch rads, right,

0:48:11.400 --> 0:48:13.880
<v Speaker 1>they're quiet, Yeah, they're quiet. Oh, but get this, I

0:48:13.920 --> 0:48:17.880
<v Speaker 1>was watching Oh what case? I think the Gillaine Maxwell case,

0:48:18.400 --> 0:48:23.480
<v Speaker 1>and clearly the sketch artist who had drawn that Tom

0:48:23.480 --> 0:48:27.160
<v Speaker 1>Brady one that went viral she was producing sketches for.

0:48:27.239 --> 0:48:33.040
<v Speaker 1>I think NBC's UM National News recognized her style. I

0:48:33.080 --> 0:48:35.560
<v Speaker 1>was just looking at the one for the Elizabeth Holmes

0:48:35.920 --> 0:48:39.440
<v Speaker 1>case this morning, and now when I see those, I'm like, Okay,

0:48:39.520 --> 0:48:43.479
<v Speaker 1>nice work, it looks good. Yeah right right, well, thanks again, Linda.

0:48:43.520 --> 0:48:44.920
<v Speaker 1>If you want to be like Linda and get in

0:48:44.960 --> 0:48:46.759
<v Speaker 1>touch with us, you can send us an email to

0:48:47.040 --> 0:48:53.760
<v Speaker 1>stuff Podcast at iHeart radio dot com. Stuff you Should

0:48:53.760 --> 0:48:56.759
<v Speaker 1>Know is a production of iHeart Radio. For more podcasts

0:48:56.800 --> 0:49:00.000
<v Speaker 1>my heart Radio, visit the iHeart Radio app, Apple podcast,

0:49:00.320 --> 0:49:05.040
<v Speaker 1>or wherever you listen to your favorite shows. H