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Speaker 1: Welcome to Stuff you Should Know, a production of I

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Speaker 1: Heart Radio. Hey, and welcome to the podcast. I'm Josh,

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Speaker 1: and there's Chuck and there's Jerry over there on the download,

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Speaker 1: and this is Stuff you should Know the podcast, the

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Speaker 1: top Secret edition. Yes, exactly what you should know is

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Speaker 1: decided by us. That's right, we give clearance. Clarence, well,

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Speaker 1: that's a good one. I wouldn't have put that one together,

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Speaker 1: but that's great. Thanks, So Chuck, we're talking about classified information,

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Speaker 1: top secret information. A lot of people call it by

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Speaker 1: especially if you're twelve years older younger, but it's actually

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Speaker 1: a real thing. That's like a real designation top secret, which,

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Speaker 1: by the way, I went back and watched that movie

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Speaker 1: again for the first time in years, and it is hilarious. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: I just made an airplane reference in Top Secret? Is

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Speaker 1: uh saying that it's a Zuckers, right, Zuckers. Yeah. I

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Speaker 1: think they worked with somebody different that time. I'm not

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Speaker 1: sing what capacity, but the Zuckers were involved for sure.

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Speaker 1: The Balcomer. That documentary on him, it is fantastic, by

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Speaker 1: the way, I've heard, I have not yet to watch it.

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Speaker 1: We just got through a made Have you seen made

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Speaker 1: haven't seen made. It's a even after and you just like,

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Speaker 1: I wonder what bad thing is going to happen to

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Speaker 1: her next? I know something bad is going to It

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Speaker 1: really wears you down like that for sure, but it's good.

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Speaker 1: It's worth watching. Well, since we're on it with tv REX.

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Speaker 1: Before we get going, I've been watching Station eleven and

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Speaker 1: it's one of my favorite shows in years. Station eleven.

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Speaker 1: What's it on HBO? It is a from a novel,

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Speaker 1: a post apocalyptic virus actually pandemic weirdly, but it's more

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Speaker 1: on the order of like of the Earth Died and

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Speaker 1: but it's not the Road. It's it's more interesting, it's

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Speaker 1: more hopeful and artistic. Cool. I'll check it out. Did

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Speaker 1: you ever see The Leftovers? I think is what they

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Speaker 1: were called. Well, what's funny is we were watching that too.

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Speaker 1: We just started that because we were in that groove

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Speaker 1: and we never saw The Leftovers, and I heard it

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Speaker 1: was really good kind of and even got better through

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Speaker 1: the years. I envy you. I wish I could see

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Speaker 1: The Leftovers again for the first time. It's that. I'm

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Speaker 1: really excited, dude. It's very good. All right, Now we

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Speaker 1: should get to it because this is dense, so we're

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Speaker 1: talking about Yes, it is super dense. I mean this Uh.

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Speaker 1: We asked some help from Ed Grabanowski the grab Stir

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Speaker 1: and he turned into James Missioner novel. It is so dense.

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Speaker 1: Every paragraph is really dense. UM. And it's it's there's

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Speaker 1: it's inevitable, Like just researching this one, there's so much

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Speaker 1: to just go and read and so many rabbit holes

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Speaker 1: to go down, because what we're talking about is really

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Speaker 1: like simple concept on its face, Like there are secrets

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Speaker 1: that like any government would not want other governments or

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Speaker 1: other people are sometimes even their own people to know.

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Speaker 1: It would just make the functioning of that government that

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Speaker 1: much harder. Um, it might make the country vulnerable to attack.

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Speaker 1: There's a lot of reasons why you would not want

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Speaker 1: to share all of your business. So you want to

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Speaker 1: classify information based on how damaging it could be to

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Speaker 1: national security, and then you just decide who has clearance

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Speaker 1: to see that those various classifications of information. That's it,

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Speaker 1: that's classified information. But in practice, in reality, it's such

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Speaker 1: a behemoth concept that is so fraught with problems, that

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Speaker 1: is so often completely and utterly anti democratic. Um. And

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Speaker 1: then it's just so bureaucratically layer that it is extremely

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Speaker 1: it's an extremely dense topic. I just want to make

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Speaker 1: sure we added a good extra three minutes onto this

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Speaker 1: episode with that. Well, I think you know. The good

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Speaker 1: news is the history can be condensed really easily into

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Speaker 1: They had state secrets back in ancient times too, but

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Speaker 1: back then it was a lot easier to keep secrets

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Speaker 1: because there was no technology and there was no bureaucracy generally,

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Speaker 1: So if the autocratic or semi autocratic leader said it

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Speaker 1: was a secret, then it was a secret, and that

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Speaker 1: was kind of the end of it. Um, things changed

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Speaker 1: because of technology and because of bureaucracy, and because of

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Speaker 1: the development of nuclear weapons when there was truly something

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Speaker 1: so kind of world ending at stake that things needed

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Speaker 1: to be ratcheted up. And this all started with a

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Speaker 1: series of acts and even more so a series of

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Speaker 1: presidential executive orders over the years to really sort of

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Speaker 1: put these executive orders in place to vaguely say who

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Speaker 1: can know what and how we're gonna do it. And

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Speaker 1: then the acts come into play to say how are

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Speaker 1: we going to punish people who do it the wrong

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Speaker 1: way or don't do it? Yeah, and um, it's like

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Speaker 1: you said, the executive orders are where the kind of

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Speaker 1: classification and how thing are classified, how they become declassified,

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Speaker 1: how that got all sorted out. But Congress has largely

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Speaker 1: been left to figure out how to punish people who

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Speaker 1: transgress against those those um sharing that information. And that

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Speaker 1: whole thing started with the Defense Secrets Act of nineteen eleven, appropriately,

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Speaker 1: which evolved into the Espionage Act. But you hit you.

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Speaker 1: You use the word um that I think is really um,

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Speaker 1: really important and really describes one of the big problems

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Speaker 1: with the classification system in the United States, which is um,

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Speaker 1: it's vague. The descriptions, the explanations, the rules are very

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Speaker 1: vague and nebulous, and so there's a lot of room

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Speaker 1: for objectivity, and there's a lot of room to just say,

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Speaker 1: I don't really know what this is, so I'm just

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Speaker 1: gonna put it on the highest possible level of secrecy

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Speaker 1: that I can. Yeah, this is interesting because I think

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Speaker 1: the vagueness is definitely a problem that leads to part

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Speaker 1: of the bigger problem with classification and over classification, which

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Speaker 1: we're gonna talk a lot about. But I also think

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Speaker 1: that in a lot of cases like this, vagueness like

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Speaker 1: this is one area where human uh what was the

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Speaker 1: word he used? Error objectivity where human subjectivity kind of

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Speaker 1: has to come into play. Uh. And this is jumping

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Speaker 1: ahead a little bit, but like, as far as you

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Speaker 1: know what to classify something, like the way they decide

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Speaker 1: that is how bad will it hurt America? Is it grave?

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Speaker 1: Danger um? What was the second one? Um? Sort of

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Speaker 1: like medium grave and then just danger and that's and

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Speaker 1: it's you know, people can have complained that like, well

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Speaker 1: that's not really spelled out, But I don't know if

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Speaker 1: you can codify that to a t like of how

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Speaker 1: dangerous something is. I don't know. I believe that human

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Speaker 1: subjectivity has to come into play. I'm not defending over classification,

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Speaker 1: but I don't know. This is one of those things

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Speaker 1: that can be bureaucracized and legislated to the to the

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Speaker 1: nth degree. You know, well, it's that's ironic because the

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Speaker 1: whole reason this exists like this is because of bureaucracy.

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Speaker 1: You know, yes, but you you make a good point,

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Speaker 1: and I think that is ultimately the reason the driving

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Speaker 1: force behind keeping things vague, because you couldn't possibly describe

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Speaker 1: every situation and say, well, if this happens, then it

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Speaker 1: would cause grave danger and you want to make a

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Speaker 1: top secret, etcetera. Right, But like you said, the Espionage

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Speaker 1: Act in nineteen seventeen was brought upon by the advent

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Speaker 1: of World War One, and this basically um like they

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Speaker 1: also they already storted from the nineteen eleven version had

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Speaker 1: the vague terms that said, you know, you can't provide

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Speaker 1: this information related to national defense to people who shouldn't

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Speaker 1: have it. Uh, started out vague, but this is where

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Speaker 1: the teeth came in as far as punishment goes, because

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Speaker 1: it was during wartime, so it was super harsh. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: I remember we've talked before about Eugene Debs, who was

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Speaker 1: the Socialist candidate for president in the can't remember what election,

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Speaker 1: but around World War One, and he ran his campaign

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Speaker 1: from prison because he was put in prison for basically

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Speaker 1: denouncing the US war effort during World War One. And

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Speaker 1: you could not speak out against the United States military,

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Speaker 1: the United States itself, the United States Constitution. You couldn't

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Speaker 1: say anything critical about it or you could be put

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Speaker 1: in prison. And people were put in prison because of it.

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Speaker 1: And they walk that stuff back, the First Amendment violations back.

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Speaker 1: But the point is is a big part of it was.

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Speaker 1: It grew out of this idea that if you share

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Speaker 1: state secrets you can be seriously harshly punished like the

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Speaker 1: Julius and Ethel Rosenberg's were. They were actually put to

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Speaker 1: death under the Espionage Act and it's still around today. Um,

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Speaker 1: Chelsea Manning, Reality Winner, Edward Snowden, all of them were

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Speaker 1: prosecuted under the Espionage Act of nineteen seventeen, which basically says,

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Speaker 1: if you share any state any classified information, you can

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Speaker 1: be severely punished and lose years of your life in

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Speaker 1: prison or again ultimately put to death. I'm not sure

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Speaker 1: if that's still on the books, but it very well maybe.

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Speaker 1: So we should also talk about this other sort of

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Speaker 1: precursor to what we have today, the system we have today,

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Speaker 1: which was in eighteen sixty nine, and this addresses the

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Speaker 1: technology kind of for the first time. Um, the War Department. Uh,

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Speaker 1: they brought out General Order number thirty five, so cute

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Speaker 1: back then, number thirty five ledge. Uh. What they basically said, Hey,

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Speaker 1: there are cameras now that exist, so you can't be

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Speaker 1: in a fort, uh and take pictures of the fort

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Speaker 1: or above the fort or around the fort, like no

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Speaker 1: pictures basically anymore. And so they're acknowledging technology for the

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Speaker 1: first time. And the other big thing was this is

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Speaker 1: a peace time move, so it's the first time like

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Speaker 1: we weren't at war and sort of putting these rules

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Speaker 1: into place. Yeah, because there are rules about that kind

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Speaker 1: of thing, like even dating back to the Revolutionary Army

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Speaker 1: and the Continental Congress about this stuff. But this was

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Speaker 1: a that was a peace time one, and that was

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Speaker 1: significant because the classification system is a peace time and

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Speaker 1: now largely civilian system, but it found its roots in

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Speaker 1: the military quite rightfully. I mean even still today, even

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Speaker 1: people who are highly critical of the American classified information

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Speaker 1: system say it should basically be kept to military maneuvers,

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Speaker 1: maybe state department negotiations, and even then it should be

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Speaker 1: a very short time. But the general consensus is, yes,

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Speaker 1: you would not want anyone understanding or knowing what your

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Speaker 1: military was doing basically. Right. The first time that they

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Speaker 1: sort of or at least somebody started to say the

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Speaker 1: word over classification and and the fact that they needed

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Speaker 1: a sort of a tiered system was Brigadier General Arthur Murray,

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Speaker 1: who was Chief of Artillery at the time. He wrote

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Speaker 1: a letter to the Secretary of War that basically said, listen,

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Speaker 1: all we've got is this one classification. It's confidential, and

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Speaker 1: they're stamping everything confidential even if it shouldn't be confidential,

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Speaker 1: and that just you know, if if everything is being

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Speaker 1: stamped this way, then it loses its meaning. So we

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Speaker 1: have to And they didn't call it over classification at

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Speaker 1: the time. Really, I think that was just sort of

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Speaker 1: the first person to mention this. But he said, what

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Speaker 1: we really need is a tiered system of how classified

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Speaker 1: it should be. And they're already doing this in Britain. Uh,

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Speaker 1: they have their four tiered system for your eyes only only,

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Speaker 1: Moonraker Live and Let Die and gold remember no gold

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Speaker 1: member Old Finger gold Member was a good one. Now

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Speaker 1: for your eyes only is the actual classification. Then you

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Speaker 1: have for the information of commission officers only for official

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Speaker 1: use only and not for publication. And the chiefs of

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Speaker 1: Staff said, you know what, I think it's a great idea.

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Speaker 1: This four tiered system is probably something we should use,

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Speaker 1: but not these not the way you're doing it. We

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Speaker 1: need to be able to kind of make this up

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Speaker 1: as we go to It seems way too tea and

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Speaker 1: crumpets stuffs, so we need to I'm up with something

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Speaker 1: else well, I think too rigid. It sounds like they

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Speaker 1: wanted to be able to decide be a little nimble

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Speaker 1: with how they classified things as they went. Yeah, because

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Speaker 1: they the system they initially came up with was to

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Speaker 1: just basically put at the preface of say like a

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Speaker 1: manual or a document that says, this is only for

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Speaker 1: you know, this division or this this um armed services,

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Speaker 1: or this type of officer, this whatever, and then it

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Speaker 1: should not be it should not be given to anybody

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Speaker 1: else beyond them, um. And you could conceivably just do

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Speaker 1: that for every single document. But the problem is that

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Speaker 1: this was stuff that they were talking about in nine

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Speaker 1: seven in America was still fairly small federal government wise.

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Speaker 1: I mean it was, it was growing big time after

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Speaker 1: the Civil War, but compared to today, like the bureaucracy

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Speaker 1: was just nothing like it is. And so you could

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Speaker 1: conceivably do that in the armed forces. But as as

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Speaker 1: things grew and the bureaucracy grew and the government crew, um,

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Speaker 1: it became impossible to come up with this kind of

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Speaker 1: thing for every single document, and much easier to just

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Speaker 1: say this is this category, this is that category, and

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Speaker 1: this is that category, right, and those we should mention

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Speaker 1: as a little sidebar. There was even one debate for

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Speaker 1: a short time where they were coming up with the

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Speaker 1: different classification levels where they wondered if they should even

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Speaker 1: make up words. There weren't words, I guess to make

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Speaker 1: it even more confidential or confusing. But then they said,

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Speaker 1: oh wait a minute, this is this is more confusing

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Speaker 1: to us even and we don't want someone you know,

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Speaker 1: high on the totem pole which really means low, uh,

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Speaker 1: not understanding what this word even means, and then making

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Speaker 1: a mistake because of that. Yeah, so like, let's use

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Speaker 1: real word. Private piles like red turtle doesn't sound very important.

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Speaker 1: I'm sure I can tell everybody about that, that's right.

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Speaker 1: So when you say private pile, do you mean gilmer

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Speaker 1: pile or full metal jacket? Take your pick. Okay, so

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Speaker 1: I'm both doing that. Should we take a break, Yeah,

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Speaker 1: all right, we'll take a break and we'll talk about

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Speaker 1: the atomic age and how that played in right after this. Okay, chuck.

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Speaker 1: So it was all just kind of willy nilly and

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Speaker 1: the Armed Forces of America we're figuring out how to

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Speaker 1: set up their own classification system, and it was actually

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Speaker 1: supported and codified starting with one of those executive orders

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Speaker 1: that came from President Franklin Roosevelt EOE, and it basically said,

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Speaker 1: everything the military is doing is right. Um, they've got

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Speaker 1: some great terms over there, we've got some secret, we

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Speaker 1: got restricted, we've got confidential. Let's keep going with that.

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Speaker 1: And it just kind of was it was. It was

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Speaker 1: mainly coming out of the military, and the military was

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Speaker 1: figuring it out. But then, like you said, the atomic

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Speaker 1: age came along and the stakes became exponentially higher because

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Speaker 1: we had different countries conceivably working on an atomic weapon,

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Speaker 1: the likes of which had never been seen, the destructiveness

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Speaker 1: of which had never been seen ever in the history

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Speaker 1: of humanity. And like its just things got real and

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Speaker 1: the need for secrecy got real, so much so that

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Speaker 1: even before the Manhattan Projects started, the scientists that were

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Speaker 1: working on atomic research, we're keeping their research secret to themselves,

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Speaker 1: like by their own by their own like consensus, Like

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Speaker 1: they're like the public, we can't we have to be

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Speaker 1: careful publishing papers about this. Yeah, I think that's interesting

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Speaker 1: that they just sort of knew to shut up about it,

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Speaker 1: even I would imagine within their own families. That was

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Speaker 1: probably back in the day where they were like daddy

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Speaker 1: doesn't talk about what he doesn't work kind of stuff.

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Speaker 1: And finally, when the Manhattan Project, the man i Hatta

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Speaker 1: Project excuse me, officially got going, there was a dude,

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Speaker 1: one one lone man, General Leslie Groves that kind of

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Speaker 1: controlled the set of rules for secrecy and things got

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Speaker 1: a little more codified at that point through him basically saying,

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Speaker 1: you know, I'm gonna use whatever means I have under

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Speaker 1: the law and even outside the law to make sure

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Speaker 1: this stuff stays a secret. Um. But it wasn't until

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Speaker 1: these executive orders started rolling in. I think they called

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Speaker 1: stuff like restricted data and stuff like that former restricted data,

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Speaker 1: which actually was the progenitor of what would become declassification.

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Speaker 1: But uh, it's you know, it was still a little

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Speaker 1: willy nilly in that it took the these executive orders

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Speaker 1: and eventually Congress to really make this stuff law. And

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Speaker 1: at the time, even within the Manhattan Project, it was

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Speaker 1: still like this one guy saying, here, we can't we

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Speaker 1: gotta keep her to secret or I'm gonna do something

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Speaker 1: bad to you. Well, he was like the uh, like

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Speaker 1: the ultimate project manager. He was the sole person on

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Speaker 1: the planet who understood everything that was going on with

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Speaker 1: the Manhattan Project. Even the top scientists didn't fully have

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Speaker 1: like the entire picture. Only Leslie Groves did. Um. He

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Speaker 1: wouldn't let some of like the top physicists working on

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Speaker 1: the bomb talk to each other about their work. There

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Speaker 1: was a tremendous amount of compartmentalization. Mail was read and censored.

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Speaker 1: There's just tons of stuff that this guy was basically saying,

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Speaker 1: we have to do these extreme measures to keep this

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Speaker 1: under wraps. And once we enter the atomic age, you

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Speaker 1: can't go back. So that his ideas about the secrecy needed,

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Speaker 1: uh and the measures you needed to take to protect

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Speaker 1: atomic secrets eventually became the the the inspiration for how

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Speaker 1: America's classified information system like that was created. He he

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Speaker 1: created it inadvertently. He just basically came up with such

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Speaker 1: a great tight set of rules that when the Atomic

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Speaker 1: Energy Act of ninety forty six was created and they

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Speaker 1: took basically atomic research and put it to like a

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Speaker 1: government funded civilian research from the military, they said, basically

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Speaker 1: everything grows was doing, We're just going to keep doing

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Speaker 1: that and codify it. Yeah, and you know how I

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Speaker 1: mentioned that he kind of inadvertently created declassification with the

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Speaker 1: former restricted data. Uh. He also inadvertently created the derivative

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Speaker 1: classified designation, which is basically, if part of this project

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Speaker 1: we're working on is classified, then it's all classified. Um.

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Speaker 1: And you know, we'll get into the different layers of

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Speaker 1: classification later, but it was it was like, you know,

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Speaker 1: this whole thing is a big secret. It's not just

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Speaker 1: you can't talk about this one thing, and everything else

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Speaker 1: is just uh, you know whatever talk about in the

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Speaker 1: country club. It's no big deal. Um. And so after that,

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Speaker 1: so you've got um, Congress setting the punishment for sharing

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Speaker 1: state secrets UM. And then you've got Leslie Groves coming

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Speaker 1: up with the kind of the framework for how to

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Speaker 1: how to carry out a classified information system and protect information.

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Speaker 1: And then you've got the President's a succession of presidents

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Speaker 1: starting with Roosevelt and then picked up by Truman in

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Speaker 1: ninety one, issuing executive orders that really kind of spell

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Speaker 1: out how these classification systems are meant to work. And

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Speaker 1: Truman at a top secret the top secret category in

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Speaker 1: nineteen fifty one. And then the big one, UM was

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Speaker 1: Executive Order one oh two ninety UM, which was also

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Speaker 1: issued in in nineteen fifty one that said, hey, it's

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Speaker 1: not just the military who has secrets that they need

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Speaker 1: to keep. Basically, all of the Executive Branch needs to

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Speaker 1: be able to to create secret and top secret information classifications.

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Speaker 1: And he extended that power to classify information to UM

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Speaker 1: basically every agency there was, including like the Department of

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Speaker 1: Agriculture and the Department of Education UM to create to

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Speaker 1: say Nope, this is classified, this can't be this can't

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Speaker 1: be released. Yeah. They had to walk that back a

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Speaker 1: couple of years later a little bit because people were

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Speaker 1: worried that it was too broad and that too many

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Speaker 1: people were classifying things and had access to it. So

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Speaker 1: they reduced the number of agencies UH in nineteen fifty

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Speaker 1: three with another executive order and then what we ended

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Speaker 1: up with was top secret, secret, confidential, UH and restricted

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Speaker 1: And should we should we talk a little bit about

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Speaker 1: what you sent over, like how it literally works in practice. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: I think that's a good spot for it. All right.

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Speaker 1: So if you get a document and you you know,

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Speaker 1: let's say one day you get your through a FOIA

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Speaker 1: requests which we'll talk about later Free to Information Act.

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Speaker 1: If you get your hands on a document and it says,

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Speaker 1: you know, uh, it might have the title right there

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Speaker 1: with the letter you saying that it's unclassified at this point.

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Speaker 1: But with that, yeah, within the document, you're gonna have

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Speaker 1: different paragraphs, are gonna have designate aations, Like one might

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Speaker 1: say secret, one might say confidential, one might say top secret,

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Speaker 1: And this whole thing rolls up to its initial top classification.

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Speaker 1: So if part of it is top secret, then all

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Speaker 1: of it is top secret. But I guess the deal

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Speaker 1: is is for future declassification, they want those sub designations

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Speaker 1: in there, is that, right, Yeah, to make it easier

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Speaker 1: for the person you know, um sending the document out

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Speaker 1: for a foyer requested blackout. You know, any any paragraphs

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Speaker 1: that are secret confidential because part of me is like,

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Speaker 1: if it's all rolls up to top secret, if one

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Speaker 1: part is top secret, then what's the point of even

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Speaker 1: subcategorizing it? But that doesn't make sense. So in this case,

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Speaker 1: so you said that, they might have the letter you

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Speaker 1: next to the title. In that case, they're saying, you

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Speaker 1: can acknowledge the existence of this document and the title

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Speaker 1: of this document, but the document itself is considered top secret,

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Speaker 1: so you wouldn't No one would be able to see

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Speaker 1: it without a top secret clearance, right, And then depending

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Speaker 1: on what agency here with. They also have different terms.

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Speaker 1: I think the State Department says sensitive but unclassified. Uh,

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Speaker 1: the d O D and Homeland Security might use for

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Speaker 1: official use only uh. And I guess the Parks Department

381
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Speaker 1: says it would be a whole lot cooler if you

382
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Speaker 1: didn't mention this is that from parks and wrecks from

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Speaker 1: my brain just now. Oh, I liked it a lot, Chuck,

384
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Speaker 1: I like my friend. So, um, those those ones you

385
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Speaker 1: just said, sensitive but unclassified, these basically made up ones.

386
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Speaker 1: Those are to keep people like you and me from

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Speaker 1: being able to see this stuff. Which is a big problem,

388
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Speaker 1: as we'll see with with classified information and over classification,

389
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Speaker 1: is that the public is basically looped out by this

390
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Speaker 1: whole thing, but they have a stamp. This is no

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Speaker 1: dopes right, no grass, no forget so. Um. So, one

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Speaker 1: of the other things that we should say is that

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Speaker 1: there be you talked about derivative classification, which we'll talk

394
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Speaker 1: more about in a second. There's also original classification, and

395
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Speaker 1: an original classification says this new thing that we're talking about.

396
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Speaker 1: Let's say somebody comes up with a new gun, right,

397
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Speaker 1: somebody along the way will say, we don't want anybody

398
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Speaker 1: to know about this gun. We certainly don't want to

399
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Speaker 1: know how it works. So I'm going to deem this

400
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Speaker 1: gun top secret. There's only a handful of people in

401
00:23:21,600 --> 00:23:23,520
Speaker 1: the country you can do that, and it sounds like

402
00:23:23,560 --> 00:23:25,160
Speaker 1: a lot, But when you really step back and think

403
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Speaker 1: about it, Um, it's not that many federal officials typically

404
00:23:29,800 --> 00:23:35,320
Speaker 1: work in the executive branch. Um can can declare something

405
00:23:35,400 --> 00:23:40,520
Speaker 1: originally classified. That's just the original classification. Yeah, and just

406
00:23:40,680 --> 00:23:45,280
Speaker 1: quickly by the numbers that's people can classify. But uh,

407
00:23:45,320 --> 00:23:48,800
Speaker 1: and this is numbers, But more than four million people

408
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Speaker 1: have security clearances, including one point three million with top

409
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Speaker 1: secret clearance. So those people, those other four four million

410
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Speaker 1: people who can see class of information, they're the ones

411
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Speaker 1: usually who make derivative classifications. So when they start, when

412
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Speaker 1: they come along and they say they're tasked with creating

413
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Speaker 1: a handbook or an instruction manual on using that new

414
00:24:13,760 --> 00:24:17,520
Speaker 1: gun that just got a top secret classification. When they're

415
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Speaker 1: making that manual because they're talking about a top secret gun,

416
00:24:22,840 --> 00:24:27,400
Speaker 1: that manual is top secret. Yes, that's a derivative classification. Now,

417
00:24:27,480 --> 00:24:32,240
Speaker 1: let's say you're emailing your coworker about the progress on

418
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Speaker 1: the manual, that email is top secret because you're talking

419
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Speaker 1: about a manual that's top secret because it's talking about

420
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Speaker 1: the thing that was this gun that was originally deemed

421
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Speaker 1: top secret. Now, if you're talking about millions of people

422
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Speaker 1: with access to secret and top secret information and they're

423
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Speaker 1: all talking to one another trying to make all this

424
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Speaker 1: stuff work, you can see how quickly that derivative classific

425
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Speaker 1: is classified information can explode exponentially. In an fact, it

426
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Speaker 1: actually has over the years. Yeah, I mean, I guess

427
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Speaker 1: we could go through them. Are you talking about the

428
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Speaker 1: overclassification numbers? Yeah, yeah, so, Uh, the Security the Information

429
00:25:12,920 --> 00:25:16,760
Speaker 1: Security Oversight Office reported, uh, six years ago that cabinet

430
00:25:16,840 --> 00:25:22,640
Speaker 1: level agencies alone uh this is not the military, right,

431
00:25:23,000 --> 00:25:26,359
Speaker 1: classified more than fifty five million documents. And then the

432
00:25:26,359 --> 00:25:32,320
Speaker 1: Public Interest Declassification Board estimates that the intelligence community just

433
00:25:32,359 --> 00:25:36,760
Speaker 1: by themselves classifies multiple peta bytes of data every year,

434
00:25:37,359 --> 00:25:40,439
Speaker 1: which is about a petabyte is about eighty six billion

435
00:25:40,480 --> 00:25:45,080
Speaker 1: pages billion pages of either text or you know. It

436
00:25:45,160 --> 00:25:47,199
Speaker 1: points out a lot of that could be photographs and videos,

437
00:25:47,240 --> 00:25:50,239
Speaker 1: but the point is lots and lots and lots and

438
00:25:50,280 --> 00:25:53,080
Speaker 1: lots and lots of stuff. Yes, and that's just the

439
00:25:53,119 --> 00:25:56,760
Speaker 1: classification there's an entire other process for declassifying, and that

440
00:25:56,800 --> 00:26:01,960
Speaker 1: can be pretty nebulous too. Um Supposedly now nowadays if um,

441
00:26:02,000 --> 00:26:05,120
Speaker 1: if somebody doesn't doesn't get ahold of this, and very

442
00:26:05,119 --> 00:26:08,600
Speaker 1: few people are authorized to declassify stuff. Apparently the president

443
00:26:08,840 --> 00:26:11,960
Speaker 1: can declassify anything at any time, but there's procedures for

444
00:26:12,000 --> 00:26:15,800
Speaker 1: other like agency heads to declassify stuff. Um, if they

445
00:26:15,840 --> 00:26:18,399
Speaker 1: don't get ahold of a document and decided to declassify

446
00:26:18,440 --> 00:26:21,760
Speaker 1: it after ten years, if it's not that big of

447
00:26:21,760 --> 00:26:26,000
Speaker 1: a deal, it can automatically be declassified if it's very sensitive.

448
00:26:26,080 --> 00:26:29,200
Speaker 1: And again none of this is defined. Um, they're not saying, like,

449
00:26:29,359 --> 00:26:33,880
Speaker 1: you know, really sensitive like the Myli massacre documents, Um,

450
00:26:34,359 --> 00:26:36,159
Speaker 1: that kind of stuff you want to hang onto for

451
00:26:36,200 --> 00:26:40,199
Speaker 1: twenty five years. So um, there's like a system and

452
00:26:40,400 --> 00:26:44,200
Speaker 1: involved or in place, but it's not a very good system.

453
00:26:44,480 --> 00:26:47,520
Speaker 1: And even still you're saying, like, what is the stuff

454
00:26:47,560 --> 00:26:50,680
Speaker 1: that can just be automatically declassified after ten years? Should

455
00:26:50,680 --> 00:26:52,800
Speaker 1: it even be classified in the first place, which is

456
00:26:52,840 --> 00:26:55,639
Speaker 1: something we'll talk about two. Yeah, And the whole thing

457
00:26:55,640 --> 00:26:59,280
Speaker 1: with the twenty years is like what they're basically saying

458
00:26:59,440 --> 00:27:02,479
Speaker 1: is we want to wait long enough to where a

459
00:27:02,520 --> 00:27:06,000
Speaker 1: lot of the people may be dead, a lot of

460
00:27:06,480 --> 00:27:10,480
Speaker 1: maybe the Statute of Limitations could be up for any crime. Uh,

461
00:27:10,600 --> 00:27:13,160
Speaker 1: or maybe people hopefully have just gotten over to enough

462
00:27:13,200 --> 00:27:17,920
Speaker 1: to where they're not super mad about something. It's really interesting. Um,

463
00:27:17,960 --> 00:27:23,760
Speaker 1: all this comes out of uh shockingly, the last executive

464
00:27:23,840 --> 00:27:27,000
Speaker 1: order on this kind of thing was from President Obama,

465
00:27:27,720 --> 00:27:31,600
Speaker 1: which was in two thousand nine. Executive Order thirteen thousand

466
00:27:32,160 --> 00:27:37,600
Speaker 1: five six replaced all previous orders as far as classification goes,

467
00:27:38,280 --> 00:27:42,800
Speaker 1: and UH shocked that it wasn't thrown out and uh

468
00:27:42,840 --> 00:27:45,960
Speaker 1: and redone. It was a little shocking, isn't it. Yeah,

469
00:27:46,000 --> 00:27:48,480
Speaker 1: I was just I guess no one told the last

470
00:27:48,480 --> 00:27:52,280
Speaker 1: president that Obama had the last word on that, because UM, yeah,

471
00:27:52,280 --> 00:27:55,800
Speaker 1: I'm not sure how that got through. But um, that

472
00:27:55,960 --> 00:27:58,720
Speaker 1: is when it it class It moved things into top secret,

473
00:27:58,760 --> 00:28:02,040
Speaker 1: secret and confidential. And then that's when it talked about

474
00:28:02,119 --> 00:28:04,440
Speaker 1: you know, whether it was grave damage, serious damage, or

475
00:28:04,520 --> 00:28:09,280
Speaker 1: damage and uh stuff like that. So that's that's sort

476
00:28:09,280 --> 00:28:11,600
Speaker 1: of the last word on it. Um. We also should

477
00:28:11,640 --> 00:28:15,000
Speaker 1: mention there is a level above top secret called sensitive

478
00:28:15,040 --> 00:28:19,520
Speaker 1: compartmented information, and this is with when you're within if

479
00:28:19,560 --> 00:28:22,199
Speaker 1: you have top secret clearance, they're like, yeah, but you

480
00:28:22,240 --> 00:28:26,119
Speaker 1: can't even know this. Only people, these very few people

481
00:28:26,119 --> 00:28:28,159
Speaker 1: that deal with this thing specifically can even know this,

482
00:28:28,920 --> 00:28:32,400
Speaker 1: Like that is an sci designation. Sure, and that makes

483
00:28:32,440 --> 00:28:35,320
Speaker 1: total sense, And it's a very general Leslie Groves idea

484
00:28:35,760 --> 00:28:39,600
Speaker 1: compartmentalization of of of information, so that if you have

485
00:28:39,640 --> 00:28:42,520
Speaker 1: top secret clearance and you're in the Department of Energy,

486
00:28:43,040 --> 00:28:45,240
Speaker 1: they're like, uh, no, you can't have access to this

487
00:28:45,320 --> 00:28:48,120
Speaker 1: top secret weapons information has nothing to do with your job.

488
00:28:48,440 --> 00:28:51,560
Speaker 1: You can have all access to the top secret information

489
00:28:51,640 --> 00:28:56,320
Speaker 1: about the Department of energies new like cold nuclear fusion

490
00:28:56,800 --> 00:29:00,240
Speaker 1: reactor that we're secretly building, but no, we're you can't

491
00:29:00,240 --> 00:29:03,240
Speaker 1: see this this new gun design, which makes a lot

492
00:29:03,280 --> 00:29:05,080
Speaker 1: of sense, but it really just kind of goes to

493
00:29:05,080 --> 00:29:08,600
Speaker 1: show you how compartmentalized this classified information is, even in

494
00:29:08,640 --> 00:29:12,720
Speaker 1: the echelons of top secret clearance. Yeah, and within that

495
00:29:12,760 --> 00:29:15,320
Speaker 1: Obama order, there are eight types of information that can

496
00:29:15,360 --> 00:29:18,600
Speaker 1: be classified. I don't know if we need to go

497
00:29:18,720 --> 00:29:21,400
Speaker 1: through all these doing no, not necessarily, but they generally

498
00:29:21,440 --> 00:29:24,360
Speaker 1: all make sense to me though, like there's not anywhere

499
00:29:24,400 --> 00:29:26,880
Speaker 1: I'm like, oh, this one doesn't doesn't make military stuff,

500
00:29:26,920 --> 00:29:32,560
Speaker 1: weapons stuff, foreign government stuff, un vulnerability of infrastructures, just

501
00:29:32,680 --> 00:29:35,520
Speaker 1: things you would not want an enemy to to understand,

502
00:29:35,560 --> 00:29:39,120
Speaker 1: which it makes sense. And yet this executive order, it

503
00:29:39,120 --> 00:29:41,960
Speaker 1: may have cleaned up the process some, but it hasn't

504
00:29:42,000 --> 00:29:47,280
Speaker 1: helped It seems like, should we take another break? All right,

505
00:29:47,280 --> 00:29:49,080
Speaker 1: I'm an agreement on that, by the way, I don't

506
00:29:49,080 --> 00:29:52,320
Speaker 1: want to keep people in the suspense. And then we're

507
00:29:52,320 --> 00:29:54,600
Speaker 1: going to come back and talk about what some of

508
00:29:54,600 --> 00:29:57,280
Speaker 1: the problems are with over classification. And there's a lot

509
00:29:57,320 --> 00:30:21,880
Speaker 1: of them, all right. So over classification is a thing.

510
00:30:21,960 --> 00:30:24,760
Speaker 1: We talked about how many documents are classified each year,

511
00:30:26,240 --> 00:30:30,040
Speaker 1: how many peta bites and billions and billions of pages

512
00:30:30,880 --> 00:30:35,680
Speaker 1: of information and video and photos are classified. And there

513
00:30:35,800 --> 00:30:39,440
Speaker 1: is a worry that's obviously been around for a long

514
00:30:39,520 --> 00:30:43,280
Speaker 1: time that people are and there's a lot of reasons

515
00:30:43,360 --> 00:30:45,760
Speaker 1: and costs for over classification, but one of the big

516
00:30:45,800 --> 00:30:48,360
Speaker 1: reasons is that I think a lot of people don't

517
00:30:48,360 --> 00:30:51,880
Speaker 1: want to be on the hook for it, so they'll

518
00:30:51,880 --> 00:30:54,880
Speaker 1: just default to classifying something. Uh. And one of the

519
00:30:54,880 --> 00:30:57,960
Speaker 1: things the Obama order did was you had to have

520
00:30:58,040 --> 00:31:00,880
Speaker 1: your name on it if you classified it, so at

521
00:31:00,960 --> 00:31:03,360
Speaker 1: least they knew who it was and they could go

522
00:31:03,400 --> 00:31:06,560
Speaker 1: back to when it came to challenging that classification, right,

523
00:31:06,560 --> 00:31:10,120
Speaker 1: which makes sense. That's good, they added some kind of

524
00:31:10,120 --> 00:31:14,800
Speaker 1: accountability to it, right, But what are some of these costs. Well,

525
00:31:14,840 --> 00:31:16,840
Speaker 1: one of the big ones is corruption, Like if you

526
00:31:16,920 --> 00:31:20,400
Speaker 1: keep secrets and you classify everything, like it's really fun

527
00:31:20,440 --> 00:31:25,160
Speaker 1: to go look for examples of absurd over classification. Um,

528
00:31:25,200 --> 00:31:29,440
Speaker 1: there's apparently some facetious plot to overthrow Santa clause and

529
00:31:29,520 --> 00:31:34,400
Speaker 1: some report on it was classified. They routinely classify menus

530
00:31:34,480 --> 00:31:38,120
Speaker 1: at state dinner banquets, just stuff that does not need

531
00:31:38,200 --> 00:31:42,680
Speaker 1: to be classified. It reveals just how if everything is classified,

532
00:31:42,720 --> 00:31:45,360
Speaker 1: it makes it really easy to classify, which means that

533
00:31:45,440 --> 00:31:48,560
Speaker 1: you can cover up just about anything by classifying it.

534
00:31:48,600 --> 00:31:52,360
Speaker 1: And so it's a real breeding ground for corruption. Of course,

535
00:31:53,000 --> 00:31:57,560
Speaker 1: it's a real breeding ground for authoritarianism as well, because

536
00:31:57,600 --> 00:31:59,680
Speaker 1: if you're allowed to do what you want and then

537
00:31:59,720 --> 00:32:02,440
Speaker 1: cover it all up and make secrets, uh, and keep

538
00:32:02,480 --> 00:32:06,160
Speaker 1: those secrets then hide what you're doing essentially, then that

539
00:32:06,280 --> 00:32:09,640
Speaker 1: that's just a breeding ground, that's a peatrie dish for authoritarianism. Well,

540
00:32:09,680 --> 00:32:13,800
Speaker 1: I saw another really interesting UM explanation about how it

541
00:32:13,880 --> 00:32:17,720
Speaker 1: can breed authoritarianism from the outside to from a guy

542
00:32:17,800 --> 00:32:21,440
Speaker 1: named um Sean Holman. He was a professor at Mount

543
00:32:21,560 --> 00:32:25,080
Speaker 1: Royal University in Calgary, and he basically said, when you

544
00:32:25,160 --> 00:32:28,760
Speaker 1: have a government that has overtly has a mountain of

545
00:32:28,840 --> 00:32:33,040
Speaker 1: secrets that the public knows about, it creates uncertainty, and

546
00:32:33,080 --> 00:32:36,440
Speaker 1: so people look for certainty, even if it's not truthful.

547
00:32:36,720 --> 00:32:39,400
Speaker 1: They'll they'll they'll they want it, they seek it out.

548
00:32:39,680 --> 00:32:42,040
Speaker 1: So anybody can come along and make up whatever they

549
00:32:42,040 --> 00:32:45,520
Speaker 1: want about what the government's really doing or filling in

550
00:32:45,560 --> 00:32:48,320
Speaker 1: the blanks and in the in the public's knowledge, and

551
00:32:48,360 --> 00:32:50,320
Speaker 1: people will hunger for that and listen to what that

552
00:32:50,400 --> 00:32:55,200
Speaker 1: person is saying, and that can breed authoritarianism as well. Yeah,

553
00:32:55,280 --> 00:32:57,360
Speaker 1: and you know another thing we failed to mention and

554
00:32:57,480 --> 00:33:01,280
Speaker 1: is a problem with overclassification is they so far with

555
00:33:01,360 --> 00:33:05,280
Speaker 1: the Manhattan Project that Russia was tipped off because all

556
00:33:05,280 --> 00:33:08,480
Speaker 1: of a sudden there was no science, no scientific papers

557
00:33:08,520 --> 00:33:11,360
Speaker 1: coming out. And Russia was like that can also be

558
00:33:11,400 --> 00:33:13,880
Speaker 1: a bad thing because they were like, all of a sudden, uh,

559
00:33:13,960 --> 00:33:16,080
Speaker 1: or the Soviet Union, I guess, was like, m this

560
00:33:16,160 --> 00:33:19,000
Speaker 1: is very interesting. They're they're actually that's been very quiet

561
00:33:19,040 --> 00:33:21,520
Speaker 1: over there lately. So my spiy sense is going off,

562
00:33:21,560 --> 00:33:23,680
Speaker 1: they haven't used the word Adam in quite some time.

563
00:33:25,640 --> 00:33:28,520
Speaker 1: Another thing is that Hinder's research. Of course, Um, we

564
00:33:28,600 --> 00:33:32,600
Speaker 1: talked about the science. Science should be shared, and I

565
00:33:32,680 --> 00:33:35,480
Speaker 1: know that people on I know firsthand the people on

566
00:33:35,480 --> 00:33:39,680
Speaker 1: the Manhattan Project were frustrated by Groves and the fact

567
00:33:39,720 --> 00:33:43,440
Speaker 1: that they couldn't even share stuff with other science departments. Yeah,

568
00:33:43,520 --> 00:33:46,320
Speaker 1: like he just banned them from speaking. When they're finally

569
00:33:46,360 --> 00:33:51,520
Speaker 1: relented and let Oppenheimer hold like um, like weekly symposiums

570
00:33:51,520 --> 00:33:54,880
Speaker 1: trying to hammer out problems that were just intractable. Um.

571
00:33:54,920 --> 00:33:58,040
Speaker 1: But even still they were closely watched and it was

572
00:33:58,200 --> 00:34:00,600
Speaker 1: it was a difficult research client meant from what I

573
00:34:00,600 --> 00:34:04,840
Speaker 1: can tell, Uh sure. And it's also it's also a

574
00:34:04,920 --> 00:34:08,799
Speaker 1: challenge when you're a when you're an agency like the

575
00:34:08,840 --> 00:34:11,799
Speaker 1: c i A, and you're not sharing information and things

576
00:34:11,840 --> 00:34:16,239
Speaker 1: like nine eleven happened possibly because agencies aren't sharing information,

577
00:34:17,120 --> 00:34:19,560
Speaker 1: or that they're not sharing that there were no weapons

578
00:34:19,560 --> 00:34:22,600
Speaker 1: of mass destruction and we end up in war. So

579
00:34:22,760 --> 00:34:27,400
Speaker 1: sharing of information between agencies is it is something that

580
00:34:27,680 --> 00:34:30,640
Speaker 1: needs to happen more. I think yes, that was also

581
00:34:30,680 --> 00:34:33,600
Speaker 1: a big problem on nine eleven. Um. I remember seeing

582
00:34:33,719 --> 00:34:37,000
Speaker 1: on a few documentaries that came around around the twentie

583
00:34:37,080 --> 00:34:41,800
Speaker 1: anniversary of this past September, where there was like real

584
00:34:41,960 --> 00:34:45,520
Speaker 1: knowledge about a couple of the hijackers being in the

585
00:34:45,600 --> 00:34:47,840
Speaker 1: United States and that they were a problem and we

586
00:34:47,840 --> 00:34:50,840
Speaker 1: should be keeping tabs on them, and the information was

587
00:34:50,920 --> 00:34:54,359
Speaker 1: just not properly passed along. And I think the nine

588
00:34:54,440 --> 00:34:59,520
Speaker 1: eleven commission um settled on the idea that that had

589
00:34:59,760 --> 00:35:04,520
Speaker 1: had this over classification not hindered information sharing, there's a

590
00:35:04,560 --> 00:35:07,200
Speaker 1: possibility that nine eleven would have been thwarted before it

591
00:35:07,200 --> 00:35:12,040
Speaker 1: could have been carried out. Sure. Uh. Leaks is another

592
00:35:12,080 --> 00:35:14,480
Speaker 1: big one, because you know when you when you control

593
00:35:14,520 --> 00:35:17,239
Speaker 1: the information and have all the information kept secret, you

594
00:35:17,239 --> 00:35:20,040
Speaker 1: can also leak out bits of that information to to

595
00:35:20,080 --> 00:35:23,400
Speaker 1: wield as a weapon against a political enemy, and that

596
00:35:23,920 --> 00:35:26,160
Speaker 1: you know, we've we've seen that happen time and time again. Yeah,

597
00:35:26,200 --> 00:35:29,120
Speaker 1: like Valerie playing right with Dick Cheney when he outed

598
00:35:29,160 --> 00:35:34,160
Speaker 1: her to punish her husband for criticizing the Iraq war. Yeah.

599
00:35:34,160 --> 00:35:37,440
Speaker 1: I think some of the Obama executive order is to

600
00:35:37,760 --> 00:35:41,000
Speaker 1: protect whistleblowers too, I'm not mistaken. Yeah, and also to

601
00:35:41,040 --> 00:35:44,680
Speaker 1: protect people who who say this this document is being

602
00:35:44,719 --> 00:35:47,319
Speaker 1: overclassified with they bring it up to their superior. They

603
00:35:47,520 --> 00:35:50,359
Speaker 1: should not be punished for that, right. And I think

604
00:35:50,360 --> 00:35:53,200
Speaker 1: it even and I think the Executive Order even encourages

605
00:35:53,280 --> 00:35:57,400
Speaker 1: people to um, not protests, but to to question the

606
00:35:57,440 --> 00:36:01,520
Speaker 1: classification of your superiors and to be allowed to bring

607
00:36:01,560 --> 00:36:05,320
Speaker 1: that up. Yeah, you're supposed to be like, that's way off.

608
00:36:05,400 --> 00:36:08,680
Speaker 1: You really screwed that one. Uh. There's one other thing,

609
00:36:08,760 --> 00:36:13,920
Speaker 1: Chuck two about leaks is that UM over classification in

610
00:36:13,920 --> 00:36:18,160
Speaker 1: a climate where we're prosecuting leakers and whistleblowers like never before.

611
00:36:19,400 --> 00:36:23,880
Speaker 1: UM that that if we if we are classifying things

612
00:36:24,520 --> 00:36:29,680
Speaker 1: that somebody would feel morally obligated to put their own

613
00:36:29,880 --> 00:36:34,200
Speaker 1: self at risk to release to the public, should that

614
00:36:34,239 --> 00:36:37,640
Speaker 1: stuff be classified? Should we be classifying that? And the

615
00:36:37,640 --> 00:36:41,799
Speaker 1: answer is probably not. Um, that it's probably being covered up,

616
00:36:41,880 --> 00:36:44,480
Speaker 1: is what the classification is being used for. And yet

617
00:36:44,600 --> 00:36:48,640
Speaker 1: under the letter of the law, because this is classified information,

618
00:36:48,920 --> 00:36:52,440
Speaker 1: that 'spionage Act says that you can be prosecuted and

619
00:36:52,480 --> 00:36:56,919
Speaker 1: spend years in jail for following your conscience. Yeah, that's

620
00:36:56,920 --> 00:37:01,319
Speaker 1: another problem with leaks and over classification. Yeah, and you know,

621
00:37:01,400 --> 00:37:06,239
Speaker 1: to fight over classification is you know, I guess Ed

622
00:37:06,320 --> 00:37:08,359
Speaker 1: points it out very kind of plainly, like as an

623
00:37:08,600 --> 00:37:12,680
Speaker 1: as a president, you're kind of in a known situation.

624
00:37:13,320 --> 00:37:17,040
Speaker 1: If one of your big mandates is to uh make

625
00:37:17,080 --> 00:37:21,600
Speaker 1: a lot less things classified, like you might win over

626
00:37:21,840 --> 00:37:25,560
Speaker 1: you know, some some freedom of information enthusiasts, But as

627
00:37:25,600 --> 00:37:28,520
Speaker 1: a general, as a general rule, you're not going to

628
00:37:28,600 --> 00:37:30,719
Speaker 1: do yourselves any political favors by going in there and

629
00:37:30,719 --> 00:37:32,160
Speaker 1: being like, hey, you know what we need to do

630
00:37:32,560 --> 00:37:35,080
Speaker 1: is declassify a lot of stuff and not classified nearly

631
00:37:35,120 --> 00:37:38,520
Speaker 1: as many things. You're also gonna upset the intelligence community greatly.

632
00:37:38,600 --> 00:37:40,600
Speaker 1: I would assume, yeah, well it's a big part of it.

633
00:37:41,120 --> 00:37:43,200
Speaker 1: So but some people have said, okay, well there's got

634
00:37:43,200 --> 00:37:45,800
Speaker 1: to be some stuff we can do. Um time limits

635
00:37:45,840 --> 00:37:49,000
Speaker 1: is a big one. Yeah. There's a guy named Irwin

636
00:37:49,120 --> 00:37:53,279
Speaker 1: Griswald who I found in Washington post op ed. He

637
00:37:53,320 --> 00:37:56,640
Speaker 1: wrote he was the guy who prosecuted the Pentagon papers

638
00:37:56,680 --> 00:37:59,080
Speaker 1: on behalf of the government. So he prosecuted, like to

639
00:37:59,160 --> 00:38:02,520
Speaker 1: that time, the biggest leak of government secrets ever. And

640
00:38:02,600 --> 00:38:06,640
Speaker 1: he came around years later and said we're way over classifying.

641
00:38:06,920 --> 00:38:09,440
Speaker 1: He basically said, like, there may be some basis for

642
00:38:09,520 --> 00:38:13,040
Speaker 1: short term classification while plans are being made or negotiations

643
00:38:13,040 --> 00:38:15,720
Speaker 1: are going on, but apart from details of weapons systems.

644
00:38:15,760 --> 00:38:18,640
Speaker 1: There is very rarely any real risk to current national

645
00:38:18,680 --> 00:38:22,080
Speaker 1: security from the publication of facts relating to transactions in

646
00:38:22,080 --> 00:38:25,120
Speaker 1: the past, even the fairly recent past. So to put

647
00:38:25,120 --> 00:38:28,920
Speaker 1: a time limit, especially a short time limit on classified material,

648
00:38:29,160 --> 00:38:31,880
Speaker 1: that would help a lot. Yeah. I mean, is he

649
00:38:32,000 --> 00:38:34,719
Speaker 1: also the guy that said if you know a lot

650
00:38:34,760 --> 00:38:37,919
Speaker 1: about this system, then it's pretty clear that a lot

651
00:38:37,960 --> 00:38:41,000
Speaker 1: of these classifications are to cover up embarrassments. Yeah, he's

652
00:38:41,000 --> 00:38:45,120
Speaker 1: one and the same. So that's that's not good. That's like,

653
00:38:45,120 --> 00:38:47,680
Speaker 1: oh boy, this doesn't look good, so let's just classify it.

654
00:38:48,200 --> 00:38:51,480
Speaker 1: And depending on who you talked to, estimates are anywhere

655
00:38:51,480 --> 00:38:55,200
Speaker 1: from ten percent to nine of classified information can be

656
00:38:55,440 --> 00:38:58,759
Speaker 1: put in the overclassified bucket. Yeah, and be one of

657
00:38:58,800 --> 00:39:01,160
Speaker 1: the things that that he saying and that that Statistics

658
00:39:01,160 --> 00:39:04,520
Speaker 1: says is that a lot of the reason classified material

659
00:39:04,719 --> 00:39:08,000
Speaker 1: is classified is to loop the public out, either because

660
00:39:08,200 --> 00:39:11,640
Speaker 1: Congress is being fed a load of bs by some

661
00:39:11,680 --> 00:39:14,520
Speaker 1: lobbyists that don't want public input about what they're telling

662
00:39:14,560 --> 00:39:18,680
Speaker 1: Congress or um there's a real concern that a lot

663
00:39:18,680 --> 00:39:22,640
Speaker 1: of federal agencies can protect or do protect some of

664
00:39:22,640 --> 00:39:28,080
Speaker 1: the corporations that they um that they regulate from public scrutiny. Um,

665
00:39:28,160 --> 00:39:31,000
Speaker 1: that could be a really big issue too, right, Oh

666
00:39:31,040 --> 00:39:33,279
Speaker 1: for sure. Like I think the FCC in the early

667
00:39:33,320 --> 00:39:36,239
Speaker 1: two thousands said that they weren't going to allow UM

668
00:39:36,360 --> 00:39:40,359
Speaker 1: reports about outages among wireless car carriers to be made

669
00:39:40,360 --> 00:39:42,960
Speaker 1: public out of a fear of being a threat to

670
00:39:43,040 --> 00:39:46,160
Speaker 1: national security. Which yeah, I mean there's a lot of

671
00:39:46,160 --> 00:39:49,680
Speaker 1: that stuff. The the other one with the protecting the

672
00:39:50,120 --> 00:39:54,279
Speaker 1: the Department of Agriculture protecting I guess it depends on

673
00:39:54,480 --> 00:39:56,280
Speaker 1: you talked to if you want to think it's protecting

674
00:39:56,320 --> 00:40:00,560
Speaker 1: but um food producers from if they produce a food

675
00:40:00,560 --> 00:40:03,239
Speaker 1: board and illness into the food supply, like, they might

676
00:40:03,280 --> 00:40:05,920
Speaker 1: not allow that information on like who it was to

677
00:40:05,960 --> 00:40:08,960
Speaker 1: be released as a protective measure. And that's when it

678
00:40:09,000 --> 00:40:11,160
Speaker 1: gets a little dicey that in the f CC, it's like,

679
00:40:12,000 --> 00:40:14,319
Speaker 1: I don't know, I mean, these this is these are

680
00:40:14,600 --> 00:40:17,120
Speaker 1: big public companies and you're talking about the public good,

681
00:40:18,239 --> 00:40:20,560
Speaker 1: but you're throwing like a shield around it, and maybe

682
00:40:20,640 --> 00:40:22,759
Speaker 1: that's not the best thing to do. And even still,

683
00:40:22,840 --> 00:40:24,840
Speaker 1: you can take it to an even more extreme degree,

684
00:40:25,000 --> 00:40:28,279
Speaker 1: right up to the CIA's doorstep and say, um, I've

685
00:40:28,320 --> 00:40:32,880
Speaker 1: seen people argue that that you by looping the American

686
00:40:32,920 --> 00:40:37,040
Speaker 1: public out about the secret torture program, the the ghost

687
00:40:37,160 --> 00:40:42,520
Speaker 1: prisons program. Um. It kept the public from being able

688
00:40:42,560 --> 00:40:44,719
Speaker 1: to hold the debate on whether this is something we

689
00:40:44,760 --> 00:40:47,719
Speaker 1: want America to be doing or not. And that's a

690
00:40:47,800 --> 00:40:49,680
Speaker 1: huge part of it, Chuck. I mean, like the basis

691
00:40:49,719 --> 00:40:52,759
Speaker 1: of democracies, the public being looped in and then the

692
00:40:52,800 --> 00:40:56,040
Speaker 1: government carrying out the wishes of the public. If you're

693
00:40:56,080 --> 00:40:59,280
Speaker 1: looping the public out, then that's just the government operating

694
00:40:59,280 --> 00:41:03,000
Speaker 1: and deciding on your behalf without any input from you whatsoever,

695
00:41:03,040 --> 00:41:05,719
Speaker 1: because you're being completely kept in the dark. That is

696
00:41:05,760 --> 00:41:09,480
Speaker 1: a huge basis of the classification system in America. Sadly.

697
00:41:10,000 --> 00:41:12,920
Speaker 1: Oh yeah, I mean the the agencies in the military,

698
00:41:13,560 --> 00:41:16,279
Speaker 1: I think firmly believe that the public is better off

699
00:41:16,520 --> 00:41:19,640
Speaker 1: if they don't have any knowledge of this stuff and

700
00:41:19,960 --> 00:41:22,879
Speaker 1: any opinion on what we're doing behind closed doors. Yeah,

701
00:41:22,920 --> 00:41:24,319
Speaker 1: And I mean they're like, what do you want to know?

702
00:41:24,400 --> 00:41:26,920
Speaker 1: Where where water boarding people? And I think a lot

703
00:41:26,960 --> 00:41:28,759
Speaker 1: of people would say, yeah, I would have liked to

704
00:41:28,760 --> 00:41:30,600
Speaker 1: have known that so I could vote it. Whoever was

705
00:41:30,640 --> 00:41:33,759
Speaker 1: supporting that right out of office, because I don't support waterboarding,

706
00:41:33,840 --> 00:41:37,600
Speaker 1: even terrorists. No one was given that opportunity the public,

707
00:41:37,960 --> 00:41:40,640
Speaker 1: even the people who agreed with it. We're giving the

708
00:41:40,640 --> 00:41:45,400
Speaker 1: opportunity to debate the merits of it in public because

709
00:41:45,440 --> 00:41:49,400
Speaker 1: everyone was kept in the dark. Yeah, and you might think, okay,

710
00:41:49,440 --> 00:41:52,360
Speaker 1: well I actually do agree with water boarding terrorists. Well

711
00:41:52,360 --> 00:41:55,279
Speaker 1: that that was that was something the CIA kept that

712
00:41:55,400 --> 00:41:57,360
Speaker 1: you agreed with. What about all the other things that

713
00:41:57,400 --> 00:41:59,600
Speaker 1: are kept secret that you don't agree with? That as

714
00:41:59,680 --> 00:42:03,759
Speaker 1: being kept out of your ability to debate? Yeah, the

715
00:42:03,840 --> 00:42:08,160
Speaker 1: quick movie recommendation on that note, The new Paul Trader movie,

716
00:42:08,360 --> 00:42:13,239
Speaker 1: The Card Counter Fantastic. Oh yeah, won't give away too much,

717
00:42:13,280 --> 00:42:17,240
Speaker 1: but Oscar Isaacs plays a sort of a very solitary

718
00:42:17,280 --> 00:42:21,520
Speaker 1: gambler poker player who is haunted by his pass as

719
00:42:21,560 --> 00:42:25,080
Speaker 1: a former prison guard at Abu Grabe. Oh wow, okay,

720
00:42:25,120 --> 00:42:27,040
Speaker 1: I'll check that out. So there. And you know, pauls

721
00:42:27,040 --> 00:42:31,680
Speaker 1: Traders still making this really really, he's still being Paul Traders,

722
00:42:31,719 --> 00:42:35,080
Speaker 1: so tough, challenging hardcore movies. What else has he done?

723
00:42:36,080 --> 00:42:40,239
Speaker 1: He wrote Taxi Driver. Um. He also made a movie

724
00:42:40,280 --> 00:42:44,000
Speaker 1: called Hardcore Back and I think the eighties about it's

725
00:42:44,040 --> 00:42:48,879
Speaker 1: always just very grizzly, grizzly stuff. And he also did

726
00:42:48,920 --> 00:42:51,960
Speaker 1: Meet Me in St. Louis. Like the last movie he

727
00:42:52,000 --> 00:42:54,919
Speaker 1: did before this one was first Reformed, the Ethan Hawk

728
00:42:55,000 --> 00:42:57,680
Speaker 1: movie where he played the priest. I don't know if

729
00:42:57,719 --> 00:43:00,480
Speaker 1: you saw that, but because these are seen any of

730
00:43:00,520 --> 00:43:03,279
Speaker 1: his movies, I saw a taxi driver. I thought that

731
00:43:04,920 --> 00:43:07,360
Speaker 1: he used to write more movies and now he directs

732
00:43:07,520 --> 00:43:10,200
Speaker 1: quite a bit. But he also wrote. I mean he

733
00:43:10,200 --> 00:43:12,800
Speaker 1: wrote less Sentation of Christ and oh wow, this guy's

734
00:43:12,840 --> 00:43:16,160
Speaker 1: good raging bowl American Giggilo stuff like that. I love

735
00:43:16,200 --> 00:43:19,000
Speaker 1: his stuff. Yeah, you know, Pultrator, you just don't know him.

736
00:43:19,080 --> 00:43:24,120
Speaker 1: I got you anyway, great movie recommendation. But we were

737
00:43:24,120 --> 00:43:28,680
Speaker 1: talking about secret prisons and it felt relevant. So I mean,

738
00:43:29,040 --> 00:43:32,240
Speaker 1: there's like a lot of things that that people say, Okay,

739
00:43:32,280 --> 00:43:35,120
Speaker 1: you know, here's some fixes we can do. But it

740
00:43:35,160 --> 00:43:37,280
Speaker 1: seems like it all kind of comes down to Chuck

741
00:43:37,719 --> 00:43:42,359
Speaker 1: putting time limits on classified material and really raising the

742
00:43:42,400 --> 00:43:45,440
Speaker 1: bar for what qualifies as a classified material or not,

743
00:43:45,880 --> 00:43:49,640
Speaker 1: and then in conjunction with that, making the act of

744
00:43:49,719 --> 00:43:55,080
Speaker 1: classifying material um accountable, like saying like like like if

745
00:43:55,120 --> 00:43:58,000
Speaker 1: you if you over classify, you're in trouble, Like there's

746
00:43:58,040 --> 00:44:00,000
Speaker 1: something you're doing your job wrong and you're gonna get

747
00:44:00,000 --> 00:44:03,600
Speaker 1: fired and replaced. Um that those three things seem to

748
00:44:03,680 --> 00:44:05,600
Speaker 1: kind of be the bottom line, and there seems to

749
00:44:05,680 --> 00:44:08,719
Speaker 1: be almost no movement whatsoever on it. Yeah, And I

750
00:44:08,760 --> 00:44:11,520
Speaker 1: think the other two that are could be pretty impactful

751
00:44:11,640 --> 00:44:16,239
Speaker 1: is make make declassification a real thing, sort of like

752
00:44:16,280 --> 00:44:18,880
Speaker 1: a practice and less like well someone has to submit

753
00:44:18,880 --> 00:44:22,279
Speaker 1: a Fourier request or really bug us. And then within

754
00:44:22,360 --> 00:44:24,719
Speaker 1: that system, I mean, we could do an episode on

755
00:44:24,760 --> 00:44:27,680
Speaker 1: Foyer request because they don't want you to find out something.

756
00:44:27,719 --> 00:44:30,279
Speaker 1: They can They can stand bag you for years, they

757
00:44:30,280 --> 00:44:32,759
Speaker 1: can put you off. They can release a document that

758
00:44:33,400 --> 00:44:36,640
Speaker 1: is redacted, like of it is redacted and go like here,

759
00:44:37,520 --> 00:44:41,839
Speaker 1: here's here's a bunch of adjectives. Uh. So, you know,

760
00:44:41,960 --> 00:44:45,719
Speaker 1: I think making that real would help. But I don't

761
00:44:45,719 --> 00:44:48,719
Speaker 1: know if anyone's gonna have the the guts to kind

762
00:44:48,719 --> 00:44:51,040
Speaker 1: of stand up to this stuff because it's not a

763
00:44:51,120 --> 00:44:54,600
Speaker 1: very electable position. You know, Well, my friend, I'm going

764
00:44:54,640 --> 00:44:56,680
Speaker 1: to do you one better. We actually have done an

765
00:44:56,680 --> 00:45:01,480
Speaker 1: episode on for you, did we I'm gonna double check, but, um,

766
00:45:01,480 --> 00:45:03,959
Speaker 1: but I believe we did. I know we've talked about

767
00:45:04,000 --> 00:45:07,960
Speaker 1: it extensively. We have, we probably did. Yeah, so you know,

768
00:45:08,320 --> 00:45:09,799
Speaker 1: we don't even have to do that. We can just

769
00:45:09,840 --> 00:45:13,360
Speaker 1: go back and listen to yep, how foy it works. Okay, Well,

770
00:45:13,840 --> 00:45:15,960
Speaker 1: in my defense in in April, everyone, it will be

771
00:45:16,000 --> 00:45:19,200
Speaker 1: fourteen years that's true. And this is from like four

772
00:45:19,280 --> 00:45:21,640
Speaker 1: or five years ago. So don't don't, right man. I

773
00:45:21,640 --> 00:45:24,759
Speaker 1: thought you were gonna say, like last week, right, you

774
00:45:24,840 --> 00:45:27,200
Speaker 1: got anything else? I got nothing else. This is a

775
00:45:27,200 --> 00:45:30,640
Speaker 1: good one, yeah, agreed. Um, Well, thanks to the grabster

776
00:45:30,760 --> 00:45:32,840
Speaker 1: and to all the people who wrote the articles that

777
00:45:32,880 --> 00:45:35,839
Speaker 1: we use for research here. Um. And if you want

778
00:45:35,840 --> 00:45:39,520
Speaker 1: to know more about over classification, seriously, if this struck

779
00:45:39,560 --> 00:45:41,920
Speaker 1: you is at all interesting, there's a whole world out

780
00:45:41,960 --> 00:45:44,160
Speaker 1: there of debate about what should be classified and what

781
00:45:44,200 --> 00:45:46,520
Speaker 1: shouldn't and how to fix this, uh, that you might

782
00:45:46,560 --> 00:45:50,360
Speaker 1: find interesting. And since I said you might find it interesting,

783
00:45:50,520 --> 00:45:58,160
Speaker 1: it's time for listener mail. I'm gonna call this court reporter. Oh.

784
00:45:58,239 --> 00:45:59,880
Speaker 1: I like this one. This is a good one. This

785
00:45:59,920 --> 00:46:01,440
Speaker 1: is a little lengthy, but I cut it down some.

786
00:46:01,719 --> 00:46:03,440
Speaker 1: Hey guys, I'm sitting at my desk in the courthouse

787
00:46:03,440 --> 00:46:05,840
Speaker 1: in North l A County and just finished listening to

788
00:46:05,920 --> 00:46:08,280
Speaker 1: unsung Heroes of the Court, and I am still beaming.

789
00:46:09,160 --> 00:46:11,839
Speaker 1: I am a court reporter. Stenographer. I went to court

790
00:46:11,840 --> 00:46:15,040
Speaker 1: reporting straight out of high school after taking a speed

791
00:46:15,080 --> 00:46:17,720
Speaker 1: running class. Just like Chuck, I learned about court reporting

792
00:46:17,719 --> 00:46:20,320
Speaker 1: from a Career day speaker. I spoke to our class

793
00:46:20,320 --> 00:46:22,239
Speaker 1: and knew immediately that this was the job for me.

794
00:46:22,680 --> 00:46:24,920
Speaker 1: I learned how to type on an old manual typewriter

795
00:46:24,960 --> 00:46:27,440
Speaker 1: in seventh grade. Took typing every year because it was

796
00:46:27,480 --> 00:46:29,919
Speaker 1: an easy a By the time I graduated, I could

797
00:46:29,920 --> 00:46:33,160
Speaker 1: type sixty five words per minute. A couple of years later,

798
00:46:33,160 --> 00:46:36,240
Speaker 1: I got my California court reporting license the age of nineteen.

799
00:46:37,000 --> 00:46:39,879
Speaker 1: I turned fifty five next month, so thirty five plus

800
00:46:39,960 --> 00:46:43,040
Speaker 1: years later, I'm still loving my career. UH. We court

801
00:46:43,080 --> 00:46:45,640
Speaker 1: reporters are truly unsung heroes in the courtroom. I often

802
00:46:45,680 --> 00:46:49,160
Speaker 1: compare my job to a wedding photographer. Once everything is

803
00:46:49,200 --> 00:46:53,080
Speaker 1: said and done, the transcript we create is all that remains, uh,

804
00:46:53,080 --> 00:46:55,040
Speaker 1: and we're fairly invisible, so make sure you have a

805
00:46:55,040 --> 00:46:58,880
Speaker 1: good one. Our Stuno machines are incredibly high tech, equipped

806
00:46:58,880 --> 00:47:03,239
Speaker 1: with bluetooth communication for real time simultaneous transcription to laptops,

807
00:47:03,719 --> 00:47:07,440
Speaker 1: iPads and the Internet. We can access the transcript immediately

808
00:47:07,480 --> 00:47:10,800
Speaker 1: for readback and clarification for the record, which is extremely

809
00:47:10,880 --> 00:47:14,160
Speaker 1: useful to assist the lawyer's parties, the judge and juries.

810
00:47:14,800 --> 00:47:18,080
Speaker 1: That said, we are in desperate need of more court reporters. Guys.

811
00:47:18,520 --> 00:47:21,600
Speaker 1: Tech schools lost their luster in an era where everyone

812
00:47:21,680 --> 00:47:23,880
Speaker 1: felt the need to have a college degree. But just

813
00:47:23,920 --> 00:47:26,960
Speaker 1: like bailiffs that we cherish in our own courthouses, court

814
00:47:27,000 --> 00:47:31,239
Speaker 1: reporting school doesn't require a college degree. It just requires

815
00:47:31,239 --> 00:47:34,440
Speaker 1: hard work and a dedication to your profession and nerves

816
00:47:34,440 --> 00:47:38,240
Speaker 1: of steel. That's right. I have never regretted my career choice.

817
00:47:38,239 --> 00:47:42,000
Speaker 1: And I thank you Josh, Chuck and Livia Olivia's first

818
00:47:42,000 --> 00:47:46,560
Speaker 1: shoutout for highlighting uh we court reporters in the crucial

819
00:47:46,600 --> 00:47:50,240
Speaker 1: role we play in the courtroom. That is from Linda Davidson,

820
00:47:50,360 --> 00:47:54,040
Speaker 1: l a superior court official, court reporter and proud of it.

821
00:47:54,640 --> 00:47:56,800
Speaker 1: Very nice. Thank you, Linda. That was a great email.

822
00:47:56,880 --> 00:47:59,080
Speaker 1: I appreciate that one big time. That was a great

823
00:47:59,120 --> 00:48:02,759
Speaker 1: idea for an episode to Chuck. It turned out to

824
00:48:02,800 --> 00:48:05,319
Speaker 1: be pretty pretty good, and we heard from I haven't

825
00:48:05,360 --> 00:48:08,440
Speaker 1: heard from a bailiff yet, but we've heard from actually

826
00:48:08,440 --> 00:48:11,040
Speaker 1: just a couple of court reporters. No sketch rads, right,

827
00:48:11,400 --> 00:48:13,880
Speaker 1: they're quiet, Yeah, they're quiet. Oh, but get this, I

828
00:48:13,920 --> 00:48:17,880
Speaker 1: was watching Oh what case? I think the Gillaine Maxwell case,

829
00:48:18,400 --> 00:48:23,480
Speaker 1: and clearly the sketch artist who had drawn that Tom

830
00:48:23,480 --> 00:48:27,160
Speaker 1: Brady one that went viral she was producing sketches for.

831
00:48:27,239 --> 00:48:33,040
Speaker 1: I think NBC's UM National News recognized her style. I

832
00:48:33,080 --> 00:48:35,560
Speaker 1: was just looking at the one for the Elizabeth Holmes

833
00:48:35,920 --> 00:48:39,440
Speaker 1: case this morning, and now when I see those, I'm like, Okay,

834
00:48:39,520 --> 00:48:43,479
Speaker 1: nice work, it looks good. Yeah right right, well, thanks again, Linda.

835
00:48:43,520 --> 00:48:44,920
Speaker 1: If you want to be like Linda and get in

836
00:48:44,960 --> 00:48:46,759
Speaker 1: touch with us, you can send us an email to

837
00:48:47,040 --> 00:48:53,760
Speaker 1: stuff Podcast at iHeart radio dot com. Stuff you Should

838
00:48:53,760 --> 00:48:56,759
Speaker 1: Know is a production of iHeart Radio. For more podcasts

839
00:48:56,800 --> 00:49:00,000
Speaker 1: my heart Radio, visit the iHeart Radio app, Apple podcast,

840
00:49:00,320 --> 00:49:05,040
Speaker 1: or wherever you listen to your favorite shows. H