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Speaker 1: Now here's a highlight from Coast to coast AM on iHeartRadio.

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Speaker 2: Frank Milburn, you strike up a conversation starting in twenty

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Speaker 2: twenty one with Amy Eskridge, who's a scientist working and

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Speaker 2: living in Huntsville, Alabama, on some interesting ideas and technologies.

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Speaker 2: And now she's dead, can you give us a sense

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Speaker 2: of how what you described as systemic harassment started for her?

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Speaker 2: In what forms what she told you about what was

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Speaker 2: happening in her life.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, certainly, and then she started like a sort of

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Speaker 3: over and COVID surveillance embarrassment. For example, she would go

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Speaker 3: out of town for the conference or something. She'd come back,

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Speaker 3: the door of her vehicle be opened, the batter would

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Speaker 3: be run down, they'd be social engineering attempts in public.

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Speaker 3: She'd go into a bar to have a drink, and

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Speaker 3: then they'd be like a group of like two to

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Speaker 3: six people who come and bombard her with questions about

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Speaker 3: her work and about her parents, and you know, seemed

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Speaker 3: to know everything about her. And then you know, one

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Speaker 3: of them would pay sort of good cop back. One

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Speaker 3: of them would be annoying and then and insult her,

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Speaker 3: control her, and then another one would come and try

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Speaker 3: and grab her hand and sort of apologize. And this

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Speaker 3: happened on like a number of occasions, and it actually

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Speaker 3: got so worrying because they say, oh, do you want

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Speaker 3: to go and talk about it, you know, somewhere else.

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Speaker 3: He's like, no, no, hey, I'm going it with any

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Speaker 3: of you lot right now. She actually, she actually started

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Speaker 3: carrying around it an act of pin combo pen autojet,

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Speaker 3: which is what in the military you used for to

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Speaker 3: counter nerve agent poisoning, because she was worried that you know,

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Speaker 3: somebody was going to, you know, try and jab her.

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Speaker 3: And she actually had an experience where, you know, somebody

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Speaker 3: like patted her on the back and she ended up

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Speaker 3: having like a pin prick on her body. And then

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Speaker 3: it got worse. She'd be followed around, she'd have vehicle

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Speaker 3: tampered with. She went once to have a gynecological examination,

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Speaker 3: and she got back in her vehicle and then in

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Speaker 3: the footwell of the driver's side found a box and

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Speaker 3: it had exactly the same make and type of a

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Speaker 3: speculum that had been used on her in the gynocological exam. So,

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Speaker 3: you know, that really freaked her out. And then also

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Speaker 3: as well, friends that had been targeted in Harris. He

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Speaker 3: an ex partner of her as a boyfriend, went out

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Speaker 3: of town and he ended up getting drugged and roofeed,

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Speaker 3: and then she was sent pictures which I've got and

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Speaker 3: also emails saying, no, I was talking to your friend.

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Speaker 3: He was very shabby about you. Her boyfriend came back,

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Speaker 3: he couldn't remember anything that had happened, so that was

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Speaker 3: very worrying. Other friends of hers colleagues they were kidnapped

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Speaker 3: as well, rooffeed, and one of them actually they received

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Speaker 3: head injuries and it took about a year for them

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Speaker 3: to recover and they were very, very frightened as a

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Speaker 3: result of that. Another friend of hers and their family

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Speaker 3: they were poisoned once from eating a takeout. On the

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Speaker 3: takeout bag it had written like Amy s. Gridge. And

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Speaker 3: then another time that's those same people. They had their

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Speaker 3: vehicle sort of vandalized and all the tires slashed. Amy

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Speaker 3: woke up the next day hundreds of miles away in

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Speaker 3: Alabama from from the other state where this occurred, and

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Speaker 3: there was an upright tire, an upright wheel with the

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Speaker 3: tire in the in her yard and the attack on her,

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Speaker 3: on her, on her friend. It happened, you know, just

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Speaker 3: the night before. So that was very, very worrying for her.

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Speaker 3: And then it kind of got worse with the directed

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Speaker 3: energy attacks with which I documented and which I put

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Speaker 3: on social media on x If anybody wants to check

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Speaker 3: my timeline, they can search for Amy es Bridge and

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Speaker 3: it details like all the kind of attacks and with

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Speaker 3: photos as well where she was actually being hit with

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Speaker 3: directed energy weapons. And I've had another scientist as well

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Speaker 3: approachingly saying that the same thing happened to them being

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Speaker 3: followed around another one vehicles being tampered with, another one

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Speaker 3: hit with a directed energy weapon. And this is all documented.

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Speaker 3: There's photos, there's videos, there was actually I've got videos

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Speaker 3: of a of another witness, another scientist who was actually

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Speaker 3: present with her when she got hit by directed any weapons.

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Speaker 3: And it took you know, a massive toll on her health,

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Speaker 3: you know, burns down her body, gastro intestinal problems for life,

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Speaker 3: Parkinson type symptoms. When I was speaking to her, she'd

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Speaker 3: kind of be like, you know, be shaking at times,

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Speaker 3: and you know, she was only thirty four. And one

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Speaker 3: time she told me as well that her the the

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Speaker 3: spinal fluid in her spinal the spinal fluid actually expanded

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Speaker 3: due to all the aggressive micro directed microwab energy attacks

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Speaker 3: and actually popped, and she's got all this salty liquid

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Speaker 3: going down the back of her throat, which burnt the

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Speaker 3: back of her throat. So those are types of things

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Speaker 3: that happened to her, and those are types of things

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Speaker 3: that other other scientists have detailed to me as well.

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Speaker 3: You know, the the the social engineering approaches, being hit

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Speaker 3: with either acoustic or direct energy weapons, break being tank

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Speaker 3: tampered with, overt surveillance where they're being followed around, and

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Speaker 3: and it's really obvious and also as well Amy, you know,

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Speaker 3: certainly pictures of you know, breakings at her, you know, windows,

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Speaker 3: broken doors, she needs, all those types of things were

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Speaker 3: happening with her. And then again there was a you know,

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Speaker 3: a massive hacking effort against her as well. She ended

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Speaker 3: up at the end in one of the videos that

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Speaker 3: I've got where she's being attacked the directed energy weapon.

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Speaker 3: She actually was using a computer because she was working

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Speaker 3: on some stuff for a government agency. So she's working

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Speaker 3: on a computer which doesn't have a Wi Fi card.

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Speaker 3: Did it because she didn't want to be hacked that way,

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Speaker 3: and she believed that direct energy weapons were also used

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Speaker 3: to map out what she was actually typing as a

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Speaker 3: way of, you know, trying to trying to find out

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Speaker 3: what she was working on. Those are the types of

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Speaker 3: things that were happening to her, and those are the

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Speaker 3: types of things that have been reported to me by

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Speaker 3: IT by numerous other people.

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Speaker 2: Looking at some of the messages she shared with you,

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Speaker 2: it sounded like she would sit down to type something

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Speaker 2: related to the technologies and ideas she was working on,

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Speaker 2: and that's when it really hit her, like they could

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Speaker 2: whatever the system was, it could tell when she was

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Speaker 2: sitting down to focus on what seemed to be a

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Speaker 2: forbidden topic, and that's when it would blaster.

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Speaker 3: Yeah. One of her she worked with some very high

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Speaker 3: powered people and she said, my EXCIA weapon star and

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Speaker 3: my team saw my hands where they were burned really

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Speaker 3: badly a couple of months ago. He saw the window

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Speaker 3: pane in person. He said that he had built things

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Speaker 3: like that and it was most likely an RFK band

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Speaker 3: admit a run by five car battery strung together from

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Speaker 3: inside a vehicle. When I asked you would do something

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Speaker 3: like that, and his honest answer was, I hate to

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Speaker 3: tell you this. It is most likely domestic most likely

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Speaker 3: contractor who sees your IP intellectual property as capable of

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Speaker 3: eating their lunch. That seems like the worst case scenario

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Speaker 3: to me, is what she said.

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Speaker 2: You know, I've heard these stories about gang stocking. I

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Speaker 2: get emails almost every day from people who described these

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Speaker 2: horrendous situations, and it never made much sense to me

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Speaker 2: where somebody who's just a retired accountant or store clerk

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Speaker 2: has what they think is fifty or sixty people following

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Speaker 2: them around, invading their house, bugging their TVs. It never

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Speaker 2: made my sense why there'd be so much effort put

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Speaker 2: by so many people into just messing with somebody's head.

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Speaker 2: For her, though, I could see where maybe it would

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Speaker 2: make sense if somebody wanted a driver crazy or driver

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Speaker 2: to suicide to prevent her from going further with the

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Speaker 2: kind of research that she was doing.

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Speaker 3: Right, Yeah, exactly exactly. I mean she worked with the

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Speaker 3: next general as well. Both he and then the XCIA

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Speaker 3: guy were saying, well, they've got experience of these types

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Speaker 3: of issues, and they said, it's someone who's familiar with

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Speaker 3: the technical details of your work. And you know, they

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Speaker 3: both think it's a private industrial source who has hired

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Speaker 3: contractors to follow you around and harass you and leaving

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Speaker 3: a trailer break comes to make you think that it's like,

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Speaker 3: you know, some kind of foreign into hostile intelligence service.

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Speaker 3: So I mean, that's very, very worrying. And then another one, sorry,

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Speaker 3: another one. There's the CIA guy again, and he said,

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Speaker 3: you know, she was showing him like some of the

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Speaker 3: most recent technical pages in her notebooks, and he looked

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Speaker 3: at what the page. He just said, well, this is

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Speaker 3: definitely why it makes sense to me, well worth the

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Speaker 3: budget for the right identity. And then he said, don't

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Speaker 3: let that notebook out of my sight because it's obviously

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Speaker 3: a decent budget. Following me around to look for an

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Speaker 3: opportunity to swipe it off the table. So you know,

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Speaker 3: somebody was after her work. It was either as sort

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Speaker 3: of a you know, two main objectives. One to try

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Speaker 3: and get her to desist from doing the work, and two,

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Speaker 3: with these attacks, with the harassment and the attacks, the

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Speaker 3: directed energy weapon attacks, to actually stop her, to debilitate

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Speaker 3: her so that she was unable to do the work.

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Speaker 2: Frank, let's talk about habana syndrome. You know, for a

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Speaker 2: long time I would hear these reports. I'm sure you

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Speaker 2: heard the same kind of things. Who was being targeted,

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Speaker 2: mostly CIA types agents, State Department people representing the US

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Speaker 2: government who seemed to be hit. The assumption was it

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Speaker 2: must be the Russians using whatever this technology is, some

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Speaker 2: sort of direct energy weapons DW you com you know,

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Speaker 2: and until sixty minutes jumped into it. They've done several

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Speaker 2: reports on it. I think that our government tried to

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Speaker 2: ignore it. Can you tell me what you know about

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Speaker 2: direct energy weapons Havana syndrome? Who has this technology and

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Speaker 2: ability and who might have used it against her contractors?

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Speaker 2: Could be that? But is there is it possible there's

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Speaker 2: a government involvement as well?

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Speaker 3: Yeah, well that's very interesting. I mean the havanas in Rome,

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Speaker 3: that's really I mean it's been going on. I mean,

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Speaker 3: you had the Mosco signal the nineteen sixties and seventies.

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Speaker 3: This is something that the Russians have been doing for

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Speaker 3: a long long time. And recently there was a guy

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Speaker 3: arrested in the States. You had links to GIU Soviet

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Speaker 3: military intelligence. And I think the attacks on both American

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Speaker 3: and Canadian diplomats from everywhere from Havana to Kazakhstan and

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Speaker 3: to other areas, it looks to me definitely orchestrated by

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Speaker 3: an actor like the Russians and possibly the Chinese who

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Speaker 3: would have access to this type of technology. And I

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Speaker 3: think it's been fairly well established now. There was recent

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Speaker 3: rational hearing where experts were tested to the fact that

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Speaker 3: this was like a gru unit that was involved in

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Speaker 3: these attacks on you know, high flyers in the in

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Speaker 3: the FBI and the Defense Intelligence Agency as well. And

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Speaker 3: then of course the key question is well, how did

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Speaker 3: they know who were the high flowers high flowers flyers

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Speaker 3: and how to target them?

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Speaker 1: Right?

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Speaker 3: So that's the other thing. Did what I understand from

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Speaker 3: Havanas and Drome and I talked a lot about this

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Speaker 3: with doctor Robert MacGuire. He actually said in public because

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Speaker 3: he was a kind of like a I call him

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Speaker 3: Bob mcgeiser.

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Speaker 1: He was working at.

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Speaker 3: The Institute of Defense and Melocies for many years, so

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Speaker 3: he was actually advising you know, the the US government

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Speaker 3: and all kinds of you know, technical countermeasures. He actually

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Speaker 3: said in public that he'd been in Russia in the

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Speaker 3: nineties in Moscow and he'd actually seen you know, like

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Speaker 3: the antennas and the kid that was pointed at the

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Speaker 3: US embassy to direct these autoustic signals effectively, because I

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Speaker 3: believe with with with the Havanas and drome as directed

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Speaker 3: against the US government personnel, those have mainly been acoustic

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Speaker 3: energy weapons, you know, high frequency and also you know,

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Speaker 3: another scientist I spoke to said that she was hit

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Speaker 3: with one of those and was actually able to measure it.

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Speaker 3: So that's my understanding of the have Honis and Drone.

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Speaker 2: Some of the notes that she had sent to you

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Speaker 2: and that you've shared with me and put online or

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Speaker 2: are pretty telling, she writes. In one point, giving a

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Speaker 2: CIA agent a headache in a hotel is kind of like,

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Speaker 2: why is it even worth the effort? Why would you

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Speaker 2: expose your capabilities just to do that? But targeting a

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Speaker 2: scientist and giving them a damn seizure every time they

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Speaker 2: sit down to type about a certain topic, now that

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Speaker 2: will impede progress on that topic pretty effectively.

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Speaker 1: She says.

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Speaker 2: My pain definitely is worse when I was working on

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Speaker 2: something interesting. It definitely always worse when I have a

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Speaker 2: deadline to submit a paper that's intriguing. I mean, how

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Speaker 2: would they know that that's what she's working on and

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Speaker 2: that's a good time to hit her with it?

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Speaker 3: Well, I mean it would be uh yeah, yeah, I

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Speaker 3: think it would be a case of you know, you

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Speaker 3: do the hacking, and they would have identified her, targeted her,

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Speaker 3: and then it would just the a case of just

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Speaker 3: bombard her, you know, with the harrassment with the director

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Speaker 3: as weapons, all the rest of it. I mean, there's

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Speaker 3: an interesting there's an interesting a declassified paper from the

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Speaker 3: National Security Agency talking about this guy Beck who was

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Speaker 3: hit with high powered microad energy system. So that's from

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Speaker 3: the DA so said. The twenty twelve intelligence information indicated

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Speaker 3: that this weapon is designed to bay the target's living

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Speaker 3: quarters and microwaves, causing numerous physical effects, including a damaged

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Speaker 3: nervous system. So, but that they're saying that, you know

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Speaker 3: that there's no evidence that such a weapon was associated

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Speaker 3: with a hostile country in the nineteen nineties. But I mean,

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Speaker 3: I think now we're well past that in terms of

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Speaker 3: what's been told to Congress that definitely there are hostile actors,

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Speaker 3: hostile government actors using these kind of technologies. And the Americans,

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Speaker 3: you know, the Brits, you know, there won't be any

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Speaker 3: in the Israelis won't.

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Speaker 1: Be any different.

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Speaker 3: They'll have access to these things as well. I mean,

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Speaker 3: if you look at the campaign that the Israelis have

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Speaker 3: been launching since they kind of like, you know, two

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Speaker 3: thousand and nine, twenty ten against the Ranian scientists.

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Speaker 2: I mean, do they be.

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Speaker 3: Doing harassment, bombings, targeted assassinations. It's not something that's unique

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Speaker 3: to you know, like you know, Russia.

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Speaker 2: But it's not just governments that have this capability. What

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Speaker 2: you're describing as some corporations, some private entities who've got

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Speaker 2: it here and are using it. I would think you'd

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Speaker 2: want to keep that technology under wraps, but contractors, private

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Speaker 2: companies seem to have it. If your suspicions about what

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Speaker 2: happened to Amy are true, well, I think it's.

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Speaker 3: The technology too pervasive now because before you know, used

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Speaker 3: to have of your suv as a Mecia guy said,

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Speaker 3: you know, like hooks up to five car batteries. So,

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Speaker 3: you know, I think we're at the point where even

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Speaker 3: any sort of like any hostile actor where they were

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Speaker 3: terrorist organizations, as long as they had the scientists know how,

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Speaker 3: then they could probably get their hands or something like that.

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Speaker 3: And certainly if it were contractors, domestic contractors, which if

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Speaker 3: I believe you know, which is who I believe were

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Speaker 3: targeting Amy and certainly the people that the ex military

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Speaker 3: intelligence people who are around Amy believed that it was

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Speaker 3: domestic contractors. They certainly have access to technology like that

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Speaker 3: working for the people that they work for.

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Speaker 2: Well, she shared this, as you said, with some former

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Speaker 2: agency people. Did they help her, did they try to

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Speaker 2: figure out who was doing this?

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Speaker 3: Yeah, I mean I actually put her in touch with

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Speaker 3: I actually put her in touch with somebody from an

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Speaker 3: intelligence agency to try and get it stopped, because you know,

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Speaker 3: given where she was in Huntsville, right, I mean in

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Speaker 3: a hunts school, she said that this is kind of

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Speaker 3: normal that the foreign intelligence agencies they'll target you in school.

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Speaker 3: They'll they'll identify you in school, in university, and you know,

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Speaker 3: Huntsville which has you know, all these like NASA and

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Speaker 3: military and scientific facilities and private companies, it's going to

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Speaker 3: be a prime location for the attentions of a hostile

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Speaker 3: foreign intelligence service. So I think from her perspective, it

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Speaker 3: was really, well, you know, I'm being targeted. Initially she

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Speaker 3: thought that it was you know, Russians. We discussed all

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Speaker 3: this and then my theory was that we came up

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Speaker 3: with a theory we said, well, you know, based on

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Speaker 3: what your ex CIA weapons guy said, based on what

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Speaker 3: you know, the the the extra form of colonel. Sorry,

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Speaker 3: the former the US Air Force general who's working with

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Speaker 3: you is saying, it would be very hard for a

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Speaker 3: foreign intelligence service to have that amount of people on

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Speaker 3: the ground over a period of years without getting noticed

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Speaker 3: by domestic agencies. So I put her in touch with

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Speaker 3: somebody from intelligence community who got the FBI onto her.

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Speaker 3: She said that the FBI initially were very interested, and

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Speaker 3: then they spoke to her for a few weeks, and

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Speaker 3: then she said they turned around and said to her, sorry,

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Speaker 3: but we don't have jurisdiction in this case. That's what

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Speaker 3: she was told.

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Speaker 2: Well, pretty clearly, whoever was doing it wanted her to

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Speaker 2: know that they were messing with her, making it pretty

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Speaker 2: obvious they'd been in her house or car and were

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Speaker 2: moving things around, leaving things that she couldn't help. But notice,

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Speaker 2: did she ever get a specific warning that said, hey,

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Speaker 2: back off from this or else this continues.

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Speaker 3: No, not specifically that per se, but I mean she

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Speaker 3: had these, you know, these social engineering attempts where people

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Speaker 3: would be bombarding her with information that they knew about

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Speaker 3: her and asking her about her work. So it became

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Speaker 3: pretty obvious to her that that's what they they they

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Speaker 3: wanted her to desist from doing.

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