1 00:00:01,360 --> 00:00:04,440 Speaker 1: I'm John Cipher and I'm Jerry O'Shea. I was a 2 00:00:04,480 --> 00:00:07,840 Speaker 1: CIA officer stationed around the world in high threat posts 3 00:00:07,840 --> 00:00:09,520 Speaker 1: in Europe, Russia, and in Asia. 4 00:00:09,600 --> 00:00:12,640 Speaker 2: And I served in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East 5 00:00:12,760 --> 00:00:16,840 Speaker 2: and in war zones. We sometimes created conspiracies to deceive 6 00:00:16,880 --> 00:00:17,799 Speaker 2: our adversaries. 7 00:00:18,040 --> 00:00:21,720 Speaker 1: Now we're going to use our expertise to deconstruct conspiracy 8 00:00:21,760 --> 00:00:23,520 Speaker 1: theories large and small. 9 00:00:23,800 --> 00:00:26,280 Speaker 3: Could they be true or are we being manipulated? 10 00:00:26,800 --> 00:00:28,840 Speaker 1: This is mission implausible. 11 00:00:31,520 --> 00:00:35,640 Speaker 3: Let's return to our conversation with Clemson University's Darren Linnville, 12 00:00:35,800 --> 00:00:40,440 Speaker 3: the expert on the intersection of social media and conspiracy theories. 13 00:00:42,120 --> 00:00:44,680 Speaker 1: Much of what you look at in this story about 14 00:00:44,680 --> 00:00:46,760 Speaker 1: social media and how it's being weaponized and such as 15 00:00:46,800 --> 00:00:49,760 Speaker 1: a negative story. Is there any reason for optimism? Are 16 00:00:49,800 --> 00:00:52,000 Speaker 1: we doing better than we did a few years ago. 17 00:00:52,640 --> 00:00:54,840 Speaker 4: That's a difficult question to answer because I think in 18 00:00:54,920 --> 00:00:58,760 Speaker 4: most ways we're probably doing worse because we backed off 19 00:00:58,960 --> 00:01:04,920 Speaker 4: from trying to moderate social media to any degree. A 20 00:01:04,920 --> 00:01:08,320 Speaker 4: lot of that we've seen after Musk's purchase of X 21 00:01:08,720 --> 00:01:11,000 Speaker 4: he backed off from moderation and the other platforms did 22 00:01:11,000 --> 00:01:13,560 Speaker 4: as well because there was just no political impetus to 23 00:01:13,600 --> 00:01:16,839 Speaker 4: do so anymore. We've seen a lot of social media 24 00:01:17,480 --> 00:01:22,200 Speaker 4: fracture into smaller platforms, a lot of private platforms, like 25 00:01:22,240 --> 00:01:26,400 Speaker 4: I said earlier, like Telegram, and that increases the potential dangers. 26 00:01:26,800 --> 00:01:31,240 Speaker 4: But if there is a potential hope, I think it's 27 00:01:31,520 --> 00:01:35,080 Speaker 4: ironically tied to one of the bigger dangers, which is AI, 28 00:01:35,520 --> 00:01:39,080 Speaker 4: because while AI can potentially do a lot of harm, 29 00:01:39,319 --> 00:01:41,360 Speaker 4: I think it can still be used as a defensive 30 00:01:41,360 --> 00:01:46,000 Speaker 4: tool as well. It can be used to identify malign influence, 31 00:01:46,040 --> 00:01:49,600 Speaker 4: it can be used to respond to malign influenc There's 32 00:01:49,600 --> 00:01:52,280 Speaker 4: a recent study that came out that looked at the 33 00:01:52,400 --> 00:01:57,840 Speaker 4: use of artificial intelligence to engage with conspiracy theorists and 34 00:01:58,360 --> 00:02:00,440 Speaker 4: talk them off the ledge. It was actually found to 35 00:02:00,440 --> 00:02:03,480 Speaker 4: be very effective because it can respond so fast. So 36 00:02:03,520 --> 00:02:06,000 Speaker 4: if you're if you're talking to a conspiracy theorist, they 37 00:02:06,080 --> 00:02:10,560 Speaker 4: are steeped in their conspiracy theory, they know everything before 38 00:02:10,600 --> 00:02:13,520 Speaker 4: you can respond, and they know how to respond to 39 00:02:13,560 --> 00:02:18,000 Speaker 4: your response. But AI is even faster, and it can 40 00:02:18,400 --> 00:02:22,600 Speaker 4: pull that you know, very specific counter argument deep out 41 00:02:22,600 --> 00:02:25,200 Speaker 4: of the ether and give it to the conspiracy theorist, 42 00:02:25,480 --> 00:02:28,480 Speaker 4: and it was found to be very effective at reducing 43 00:02:28,560 --> 00:02:29,120 Speaker 4: belief in. 44 00:02:29,160 --> 00:02:30,840 Speaker 5: Very various conspiracy theories. 45 00:02:31,320 --> 00:02:33,000 Speaker 4: So I think that if there is a hope, it 46 00:02:33,080 --> 00:02:35,640 Speaker 4: is the thing that many people fear most, and that 47 00:02:35,760 --> 00:02:36,320 Speaker 4: is AI. 48 00:02:36,720 --> 00:02:39,000 Speaker 2: So Suckerberger Musk are going to save us. 49 00:02:38,919 --> 00:02:39,400 Speaker 6: In the end. 50 00:02:39,680 --> 00:02:42,040 Speaker 5: Oh, I definitely didn't say that, Sam Altman. 51 00:02:42,400 --> 00:02:45,320 Speaker 4: I guess the real question is whether AI destroys us 52 00:02:45,440 --> 00:02:48,239 Speaker 4: before it saves us, to bur the village to save it. 53 00:02:48,320 --> 00:02:50,320 Speaker 2: Yeah, So I was wondering if you could comment on 54 00:02:50,960 --> 00:02:53,359 Speaker 2: this is blatantly political, but I still got to ask 55 00:02:53,680 --> 00:02:59,040 Speaker 2: people in the administration who are openly parroting Russian disinformation, 56 00:02:59,240 --> 00:03:02,079 Speaker 2: I mean Russian talking points coming right out of RT 57 00:03:02,760 --> 00:03:06,320 Speaker 2: Senior people in this administration. Are they being influenced by 58 00:03:06,360 --> 00:03:10,680 Speaker 2: what they read. Is they've got huge bureaucracies and they 59 00:03:10,720 --> 00:03:14,600 Speaker 2: have AI, they have access to truth. And it goes 60 00:03:14,639 --> 00:03:17,240 Speaker 2: from on the one hand, ludicrous like is their gold 61 00:03:17,280 --> 00:03:20,000 Speaker 2: and Fort Knox. It's like, well you friggin run it right, 62 00:03:20,040 --> 00:03:21,160 Speaker 2: you know, just go cout. 63 00:03:21,280 --> 00:03:22,240 Speaker 6: Yeah, I mean, you know. 64 00:03:22,280 --> 00:03:26,680 Speaker 2: To other things like congressmen saying that the US is 65 00:03:27,360 --> 00:03:31,040 Speaker 2: sponsoring bio labs in Ukraine and that gives the Russians 66 00:03:31,040 --> 00:03:33,760 Speaker 2: the right to attend complete utter bunk them. 67 00:03:34,360 --> 00:03:37,040 Speaker 4: I think that the most likely answer is just that 68 00:03:37,600 --> 00:03:42,280 Speaker 4: Russia has become very effective at seamlessly integrating their talking 69 00:03:42,320 --> 00:03:47,080 Speaker 4: points into the conversation, influencing the broader conversation, and because 70 00:03:47,720 --> 00:03:51,520 Speaker 4: all of these political leaders are in that conversation, are 71 00:03:51,560 --> 00:03:54,000 Speaker 4: steeped in that conversation. I mean, we see how much 72 00:03:54,040 --> 00:03:58,240 Speaker 4: time people like Musk and Trump spend on social media. 73 00:03:58,320 --> 00:04:00,760 Speaker 4: They pick it up organically. When we were talking about 74 00:04:01,000 --> 00:04:04,360 Speaker 4: usaid what was that two months ago now being shut down, 75 00:04:04,880 --> 00:04:09,400 Speaker 4: Musk actually retweeted a Russian made video from the Matroishka 76 00:04:09,400 --> 00:04:13,400 Speaker 4: campaign Matrioshka campaign, and helped spread that video. It was 77 00:04:13,440 --> 00:04:16,840 Speaker 4: a video that was made by the Russians, disseminated by 78 00:04:16,839 --> 00:04:21,080 Speaker 4: the Storm fifteen sixteen campaign, and Musk red spread that video. 79 00:04:21,120 --> 00:04:23,200 Speaker 4: And it's not because he was paid to do so, 80 00:04:23,279 --> 00:04:27,200 Speaker 4: it's because he picked it up organically from that broader conversation. 81 00:04:27,680 --> 00:04:30,159 Speaker 4: We've seen that with a number of different narratives that 82 00:04:30,200 --> 00:04:32,880 Speaker 4: the Russians have made. You talked about the yacht story 83 00:04:32,880 --> 00:04:36,359 Speaker 4: from Storm fifteen to sixteen earlier. Jade Vance repeated that 84 00:04:36,440 --> 00:04:39,040 Speaker 4: narrative before he was vice president. So I think they've 85 00:04:39,120 --> 00:04:42,640 Speaker 4: really just become extremely The Russians, I mean had become 86 00:04:42,760 --> 00:04:44,640 Speaker 4: very good at their job. This is very different than 87 00:04:44,680 --> 00:04:46,640 Speaker 4: what they did back in twenty sixteen when they were 88 00:04:47,040 --> 00:04:51,720 Speaker 4: operating these sort of artisanally created social media accounts and 89 00:04:51,839 --> 00:04:55,599 Speaker 4: trying to become part of the conversation. Now they're just 90 00:04:56,040 --> 00:04:59,680 Speaker 4: paying existing influencers. And the benefit of that is a 91 00:05:00,480 --> 00:05:03,280 Speaker 4: they're not running anything themselves, nothing's going to get suspended. 92 00:05:03,560 --> 00:05:06,800 Speaker 4: But the much bigger benefit is they're not trying to 93 00:05:06,839 --> 00:05:10,280 Speaker 4: be part of the conversation. They're just leading the conversation. 94 00:05:10,360 --> 00:05:13,560 Speaker 4: They're paying the people who are leading the conversation to 95 00:05:13,680 --> 00:05:15,320 Speaker 4: say what they want them to say. 96 00:05:15,240 --> 00:05:19,479 Speaker 1: Or even just amplifying malign actors exactly obviously what we're 97 00:05:19,480 --> 00:05:22,000 Speaker 1: seeing now obviously with this protests on ice raids in 98 00:05:22,040 --> 00:05:25,800 Speaker 1: Los Angeles and probably expanding to other places. It's a 99 00:05:25,800 --> 00:05:30,440 Speaker 1: place that's ripe for disinformation or misinformation to be spread. 100 00:05:31,920 --> 00:05:34,880 Speaker 1: If you follow like you know, some media outlets and 101 00:05:35,240 --> 00:05:37,719 Speaker 1: pictures and things can make you think LA is on fire, 102 00:05:37,839 --> 00:05:40,080 Speaker 1: like it's a massive people you know here I'm talking 103 00:05:40,080 --> 00:05:42,240 Speaker 1: about it's an insurrection and all these type of things. 104 00:05:42,680 --> 00:05:45,080 Speaker 1: I recall, for example, when I lived in Moscow when 105 00:05:45,120 --> 00:05:47,720 Speaker 1: the parliament was stormed by tanks and things like that 106 00:05:47,960 --> 00:05:50,760 Speaker 1: in the early nineties. I remember, you know, my family 107 00:05:50,800 --> 00:05:52,760 Speaker 1: and others calling and like, oh my god, you know, 108 00:05:52,800 --> 00:05:54,640 Speaker 1: I watch it on TV. It looks like, you know, 109 00:05:54,680 --> 00:05:56,560 Speaker 1: you're in the middle of a war and everything. But 110 00:05:56,600 --> 00:06:00,280 Speaker 1: if you weren't within one or two block radius, you'd 111 00:06:00,279 --> 00:06:01,520 Speaker 1: be in this massive city. 112 00:06:01,800 --> 00:06:03,839 Speaker 6: You could be going to museums, you could be shopping. 113 00:06:03,839 --> 00:06:05,919 Speaker 6: You wouldn't even know that this was going on. But 114 00:06:05,960 --> 00:06:06,680 Speaker 6: if you're in those. 115 00:06:06,520 --> 00:06:10,080 Speaker 1: Two block radius, yeah, it was pretty it was pretty dicey. 116 00:06:10,400 --> 00:06:12,320 Speaker 1: And I think that's what we're seeing in places like LA. 117 00:06:12,640 --> 00:06:14,920 Speaker 1: You know, as a block or two around one federal building, 118 00:06:15,279 --> 00:06:18,240 Speaker 1: but the story becomes that La is on fire, and 119 00:06:18,279 --> 00:06:21,599 Speaker 1: so that certainly allows bad actors to spread misinformation. 120 00:06:21,800 --> 00:06:25,280 Speaker 4: I think that this kind of the false story is 121 00:06:25,279 --> 00:06:27,920 Speaker 4: spread in a few different ways, and the main way 122 00:06:27,960 --> 00:06:30,240 Speaker 4: that they spread, the first way that they spread is 123 00:06:30,400 --> 00:06:34,520 Speaker 4: just like your relatives who were concerned about your safety, 124 00:06:34,600 --> 00:06:39,040 Speaker 4: it's people who received some piece of information out of context, 125 00:06:39,080 --> 00:06:43,599 Speaker 4: and social media facilitates this. Social media is a game 126 00:06:43,640 --> 00:06:46,800 Speaker 4: of telephone and people are getting information out of context 127 00:06:46,880 --> 00:06:51,560 Speaker 4: all the time. So, you know, regarding the ongoing riots 128 00:06:51,600 --> 00:06:55,400 Speaker 4: in LA, for instance, I saw an example of an 129 00:06:55,400 --> 00:07:00,479 Speaker 4: individual who shared a video of created from this video 130 00:07:00,480 --> 00:07:03,760 Speaker 4: game called Arma. It's this really ultra realistic video game 131 00:07:04,080 --> 00:07:06,480 Speaker 4: where with an aircraft flying through the air and being 132 00:07:06,480 --> 00:07:08,240 Speaker 4: shot at from the ground, and they claimed, oh, look, 133 00:07:08,279 --> 00:07:11,120 Speaker 4: the protesters are shooting at aircraft. It was very clearly 134 00:07:11,160 --> 00:07:13,400 Speaker 4: not that, and I think that user was making a 135 00:07:13,520 --> 00:07:16,960 Speaker 4: joke because this video game has been used to create 136 00:07:17,000 --> 00:07:20,280 Speaker 4: a lot of false videos about the war in Ukraine 137 00:07:20,480 --> 00:07:23,200 Speaker 4: and to the point where in certain communities it's it's 138 00:07:23,320 --> 00:07:27,160 Speaker 4: just become a joke. But you take it out of 139 00:07:27,160 --> 00:07:30,840 Speaker 4: the context of that person's account, and which happened very quickly, 140 00:07:31,240 --> 00:07:34,280 Speaker 4: and suddenly there's hundreds of thousands of people believing that 141 00:07:34,400 --> 00:07:37,520 Speaker 4: video because they just didn't understand the context. 142 00:07:37,600 --> 00:07:39,280 Speaker 5: And we see that repeatedly. 143 00:07:40,280 --> 00:07:43,440 Speaker 2: We're using the term social media, which usually defind I 144 00:07:43,560 --> 00:07:46,400 Speaker 2: think as a sort of smaller you know, account, and 145 00:07:46,520 --> 00:07:49,120 Speaker 2: yet you know, there's sort of an American provda out there. 146 00:07:49,120 --> 00:07:51,840 Speaker 2: I'll just say it. You know Fox News, which is 147 00:07:52,000 --> 00:07:54,840 Speaker 2: not really social media. It's it is as mainstream that 148 00:07:55,000 --> 00:07:57,640 Speaker 2: you can get. I do look at Fox's every day 149 00:07:57,800 --> 00:08:00,600 Speaker 2: and the narrative coming out of that is that Los 150 00:08:00,640 --> 00:08:05,080 Speaker 2: Angeles is inflames. So it's not just social media sounds 151 00:08:05,120 --> 00:08:07,040 Speaker 2: to me like micro but this is really. 152 00:08:06,800 --> 00:08:10,400 Speaker 4: A macro thing, absolutely, but it happens at both the 153 00:08:10,440 --> 00:08:12,080 Speaker 4: micro and the microcro level. 154 00:08:12,080 --> 00:08:13,200 Speaker 5: Absolutely. I absolutely agree with you. 155 00:08:13,280 --> 00:08:16,360 Speaker 4: And this is the second sort of way that false 156 00:08:16,400 --> 00:08:19,840 Speaker 4: messages spread is when somebody is trying to engage with 157 00:08:19,840 --> 00:08:23,160 Speaker 4: with a particular audience. That might be, you know, an 158 00:08:23,160 --> 00:08:27,560 Speaker 4: audience of viewers that are of a particular partisan persuasion 159 00:08:28,240 --> 00:08:29,920 Speaker 4: that they know they're trying to reach, or it might 160 00:08:29,960 --> 00:08:34,679 Speaker 4: be a particular conspiratorial group who they see something and 161 00:08:35,040 --> 00:08:38,600 Speaker 4: they make assumptions about it. Years ago, we saw the 162 00:08:38,640 --> 00:08:41,640 Speaker 4: same thing happened the story of Palata bricks show up 163 00:08:41,679 --> 00:08:46,040 Speaker 4: at protest sites. It's clear that, oh, that pallett of 164 00:08:46,040 --> 00:08:48,200 Speaker 4: bricks is there because George Soros paid for it to 165 00:08:48,240 --> 00:08:50,720 Speaker 4: be there, and that story spreads across social media. We 166 00:08:50,760 --> 00:08:52,960 Speaker 4: saw this in the past week in la as well, 167 00:08:53,240 --> 00:08:57,440 Speaker 4: and that's because again, people are communicating with very specific audiences, 168 00:08:57,520 --> 00:09:01,280 Speaker 4: very specific communities, and specific communities are sort of attuned 169 00:09:01,360 --> 00:09:03,839 Speaker 4: to expect that message and spread that message when they 170 00:09:04,240 --> 00:09:06,800 Speaker 4: want to believe that message, like we were saying earlier, 171 00:09:06,800 --> 00:09:10,720 Speaker 4: and when when an audience wants to believe something, they're 172 00:09:10,720 --> 00:09:13,440 Speaker 4: going to believe it, and they're very likely gonna going 173 00:09:13,520 --> 00:09:14,040 Speaker 4: to share it, and. 174 00:09:13,960 --> 00:09:15,880 Speaker 1: They're too lazy to go take a picture of real 175 00:09:16,000 --> 00:09:17,520 Speaker 1: pill out of bricks in Los Angeles. 176 00:09:17,720 --> 00:09:18,600 Speaker 5: No, they. 177 00:09:21,000 --> 00:09:24,040 Speaker 4: Yeah, these things pallets of bricks, they're they're ubiquitous. We 178 00:09:24,120 --> 00:09:26,920 Speaker 4: ignore them when there's not a riot, but suddenly there's 179 00:09:26,920 --> 00:09:27,920 Speaker 4: a riot there everywhere. 180 00:09:28,160 --> 00:09:31,640 Speaker 2: So it's dangerous telling the truth in an authoritarian regime, 181 00:09:31,679 --> 00:09:34,440 Speaker 2: where John and I have both lived in authoritarian regimes. 182 00:09:34,440 --> 00:09:37,920 Speaker 2: And and Dan, what you're doing now, you know, trying 183 00:09:37,920 --> 00:09:43,000 Speaker 2: to trying to deal with disinformation. Do you find that 184 00:09:43,559 --> 00:09:46,160 Speaker 2: there's any pressure on you or you're being attacked or 185 00:09:46,160 --> 00:09:49,079 Speaker 2: your colleagues are being attacked for you know, for pushing 186 00:09:49,160 --> 00:09:55,679 Speaker 2: back on Russian disinformation or on certain political persuasions, pushing. 187 00:09:55,920 --> 00:09:59,679 Speaker 6: Some people call misinformation. You know, your First Amendment right 188 00:09:59,679 --> 00:10:00,559 Speaker 6: here taking. 189 00:10:00,400 --> 00:10:03,439 Speaker 1: Away our limit rights to lie about things, which I 190 00:10:03,480 --> 00:10:04,000 Speaker 1: guess I had. 191 00:10:04,160 --> 00:10:06,680 Speaker 4: Yeah, And to an extent, you know, I agree with 192 00:10:06,720 --> 00:10:09,559 Speaker 4: that perspective. You know, I think people have always said 193 00:10:09,600 --> 00:10:11,439 Speaker 4: things that are wrong and always will say things that 194 00:10:11,480 --> 00:10:15,079 Speaker 4: are wrong. You know, my research hasn't by and large 195 00:10:15,120 --> 00:10:19,520 Speaker 4: focused on misinformation. It's more focused on line influence, purposeful 196 00:10:19,559 --> 00:10:22,560 Speaker 4: lying rather than just people saying things that are wrong. 197 00:10:22,600 --> 00:10:25,640 Speaker 4: It's very, very hard to stop that. Certainly, though, Jerry, 198 00:10:25,679 --> 00:10:29,079 Speaker 4: We've had pressure. I've had to share my emails with 199 00:10:29,559 --> 00:10:34,040 Speaker 4: various offices in both Senate and Congress, answered a lot 200 00:10:34,040 --> 00:10:38,480 Speaker 4: of Foyer requests. I was part of the Twitter files 201 00:10:38,960 --> 00:10:42,800 Speaker 4: ongoing story. So certainly we've we've felt that influence recently 202 00:10:42,840 --> 00:10:45,640 Speaker 4: had at an NSF project that was shut down by 203 00:10:45,640 --> 00:10:46,360 Speaker 4: the administration. 204 00:10:48,040 --> 00:10:50,080 Speaker 5: National Science Foundation project got shut down. 205 00:10:51,840 --> 00:10:53,920 Speaker 4: But compared to a lot of my colleagues, we've we've 206 00:10:53,920 --> 00:10:57,800 Speaker 4: got enough very light colleagues. At Stanford, the standard of 207 00:10:57,920 --> 00:11:02,920 Speaker 4: infanet At Observatory waspletely shut down after a series of lawsuits. 208 00:11:03,600 --> 00:11:07,560 Speaker 4: Work at the Harvard Kennedy School has been interrupted, which 209 00:11:07,600 --> 00:11:10,960 Speaker 4: is why I'm still so vocal. If I can't be 210 00:11:11,040 --> 00:11:14,559 Speaker 4: vocal as a straight white man with tenure who can 211 00:11:14,640 --> 00:11:16,199 Speaker 4: be vocal fair enough. 212 00:11:17,760 --> 00:11:19,680 Speaker 1: Bellfull, we go much further down the rabbit hole. 213 00:11:19,760 --> 00:11:21,079 Speaker 6: It's time for a quick bring. 214 00:11:26,880 --> 00:11:28,599 Speaker 1: And we seem to be have learned a lot in 215 00:11:28,640 --> 00:11:31,760 Speaker 1: the last few years about Russian malign influence. You know, 216 00:11:31,800 --> 00:11:34,000 Speaker 1: some people studied it for a long time. Others are 217 00:11:34,080 --> 00:11:35,880 Speaker 1: just coming to learn about that. What are we learning 218 00:11:35,920 --> 00:11:38,000 Speaker 1: about the Chinese how is that? How are they different 219 00:11:38,000 --> 00:11:38,640 Speaker 1: in this space? 220 00:11:38,880 --> 00:11:42,440 Speaker 4: They are entirely different. They are the polar opposite of 221 00:11:42,440 --> 00:11:44,800 Speaker 4: what Russia is. And Russia is the best in the 222 00:11:44,800 --> 00:11:47,560 Speaker 4: world at what they do, and China is the best 223 00:11:47,600 --> 00:11:49,680 Speaker 4: in the world at what they do. I think a 224 00:11:49,679 --> 00:11:52,080 Speaker 4: lot a lot of researchers that have looked at the 225 00:11:52,120 --> 00:11:57,240 Speaker 4: way that Chinese operations differ have been critical of it. 226 00:11:57,280 --> 00:12:01,360 Speaker 4: You know, it doesn't get any engagement, it doesn't you know, nobody. 227 00:12:01,400 --> 00:12:02,880 Speaker 5: It's culturally unaware. 228 00:12:03,559 --> 00:12:07,120 Speaker 4: But I think some of those critiques don't fully appreciate 229 00:12:07,520 --> 00:12:11,320 Speaker 4: what it is that China do. So Russia promotes ideas, 230 00:12:11,679 --> 00:12:13,400 Speaker 4: and they're very, very good at that. You know, they 231 00:12:13,440 --> 00:12:16,960 Speaker 4: use influencers, They want you thinking about ideas. They want 232 00:12:17,080 --> 00:12:19,520 Speaker 4: certain things to be more palpable, to be more real 233 00:12:19,840 --> 00:12:24,559 Speaker 4: to particular communities, particular audiences. What China does is they 234 00:12:24,559 --> 00:12:28,600 Speaker 4: want to demote ideas, especially ideas that are critical of China, 235 00:12:29,160 --> 00:12:32,400 Speaker 4: and they do that in a few ways that I 236 00:12:32,400 --> 00:12:34,520 Speaker 4: think are very effective. And I think both of these 237 00:12:34,559 --> 00:12:38,559 Speaker 4: things are sort of rooted in how each of these 238 00:12:38,559 --> 00:12:42,080 Speaker 4: countries have operated in the information space historically. You know, 239 00:12:42,160 --> 00:12:46,560 Speaker 4: like in Russia, they have a long history of active measures, 240 00:12:46,360 --> 00:12:49,000 Speaker 4: as you were saying earlier, John, and we see that 241 00:12:49,040 --> 00:12:51,800 Speaker 4: today they continue to apply some of those same approaches, 242 00:12:51,840 --> 00:12:55,960 Speaker 4: Whereas in China we see them having complete control of 243 00:12:56,040 --> 00:12:59,120 Speaker 4: their own media space. You know, you can't even post 244 00:12:59,160 --> 00:13:02,120 Speaker 4: a picture of winning the poo in China because it 245 00:13:02,120 --> 00:13:04,719 Speaker 4: looks too much like President She. And they apply that 246 00:13:04,880 --> 00:13:09,240 Speaker 4: same sort of mindset to the Western information space. So 247 00:13:09,360 --> 00:13:13,520 Speaker 4: what they'll do is, for instance, they especially target members 248 00:13:13,559 --> 00:13:16,800 Speaker 4: of the Chinese diaspora. So if we worked with New 249 00:13:16,880 --> 00:13:21,280 Speaker 4: York Times on a story last summer about a Chinese 250 00:13:21,320 --> 00:13:25,079 Speaker 4: dissident named Dong who was critical of She. He wrote 251 00:13:25,160 --> 00:13:30,400 Speaker 4: for places like Foreign Policy, writing articles that were critical 252 00:13:30,400 --> 00:13:33,240 Speaker 4: of the administrative of the Ship presidency in the PRC, 253 00:13:33,520 --> 00:13:38,400 Speaker 4: and so he was targeted by fake accounts that were 254 00:13:38,480 --> 00:13:41,640 Speaker 4: critical of him. But it wasn't just him that was targeted. 255 00:13:41,640 --> 00:13:45,640 Speaker 4: They started to target his teenage daughter, which angered me personally. 256 00:13:45,679 --> 00:13:49,439 Speaker 4: I have teenage daughters, and they targeted them with messages 257 00:13:49,679 --> 00:13:54,400 Speaker 4: suggesting that this young girl was a prostitute, with messages 258 00:13:54,480 --> 00:13:59,320 Speaker 4: that offered her services, that they made posts offering a 259 00:13:59,360 --> 00:14:03,480 Speaker 4: reward to harm her, And they made these posts on 260 00:14:03,559 --> 00:14:08,319 Speaker 4: her school's social media accounts, so they weren't getting any engagement. 261 00:14:08,600 --> 00:14:09,240 Speaker 5: That's true. 262 00:14:09,400 --> 00:14:12,840 Speaker 4: You know, nobody was hitting retweet on any of these posts, 263 00:14:13,160 --> 00:14:13,760 Speaker 4: but they. 264 00:14:13,679 --> 00:14:15,920 Speaker 6: Had needed to get the message. We're getting the message. 265 00:14:15,640 --> 00:14:18,880 Speaker 4: The people that they had an audience of one, and 266 00:14:18,960 --> 00:14:21,520 Speaker 4: it was it was this girl's father. And they didn't 267 00:14:21,560 --> 00:14:23,360 Speaker 4: just post it on social media, they also posted it 268 00:14:23,440 --> 00:14:28,480 Speaker 4: places like trip advisor. Trip Advisor has worked for years 269 00:14:28,880 --> 00:14:32,760 Speaker 4: to up where they land on a Google search, and 270 00:14:33,360 --> 00:14:35,400 Speaker 4: so if you were to search this young girl's name, 271 00:14:35,800 --> 00:14:38,720 Speaker 4: absolutely trip Advisor would be the thing at the top 272 00:14:38,720 --> 00:14:42,480 Speaker 4: of the rank. And it's only because you know, we 273 00:14:42,480 --> 00:14:44,520 Speaker 4: were able to work with these companies to get these 274 00:14:44,560 --> 00:14:46,720 Speaker 4: posts taken down that that's not the case for the 275 00:14:46,760 --> 00:14:49,680 Speaker 4: rest of this young girl's life. And so the Chinese 276 00:14:49,720 --> 00:14:52,240 Speaker 4: are very good at that. They also engage in these 277 00:14:52,280 --> 00:14:57,480 Speaker 4: same kind of similar tactics, not just targeting people, but 278 00:14:57,520 --> 00:15:01,320 Speaker 4: also targeting ideas. So they'll flood a hashtag so that 279 00:15:01,360 --> 00:15:06,320 Speaker 4: it becomes unusable by sending thousands of accounts using that 280 00:15:06,400 --> 00:15:12,760 Speaker 4: hashtag and completely unrelated ways. So they don't target ideas 281 00:15:12,800 --> 00:15:14,480 Speaker 4: so much as they target systems. 282 00:15:14,640 --> 00:15:17,560 Speaker 1: And is it one organization, is it a variet organizations 283 00:15:17,600 --> 00:15:20,520 Speaker 1: operating sort of going in the same direction, or what's 284 00:15:20,560 --> 00:15:21,800 Speaker 1: the bureaucratic piece behind. 285 00:15:21,880 --> 00:15:25,200 Speaker 4: Yeah, just like Russia, it's multiple organizations going in the 286 00:15:25,240 --> 00:15:28,600 Speaker 4: same direction. The main organization in China that we know 287 00:15:28,880 --> 00:15:31,600 Speaker 4: the most about is the Chinese State Police. It's a 288 00:15:31,640 --> 00:15:38,600 Speaker 4: campaign usually called spamouflage, sometimes Dragonbridge, depending on the organization 289 00:15:38,680 --> 00:15:41,800 Speaker 4: that's naming it. But it's the Chinese State Police that 290 00:15:42,400 --> 00:15:46,200 Speaker 4: target these members of the diaspora community abroad. But there's 291 00:15:46,200 --> 00:15:50,680 Speaker 4: other campaigns as well. Individual states all have an inside 292 00:15:50,720 --> 00:15:53,800 Speaker 4: of China. For instance, we'll have marketing companies that will 293 00:15:54,120 --> 00:15:59,520 Speaker 4: sporadically run propaganda or disinformation operations. But of course, probably 294 00:15:59,560 --> 00:16:03,600 Speaker 4: the single, I guess and most expensive piece of the 295 00:16:03,800 --> 00:16:09,880 Speaker 4: Chinese influence operation, just like Russia, is state media. China 296 00:16:10,000 --> 00:16:14,600 Speaker 4: runs a huge, multi billion dollar state media operation, and 297 00:16:14,640 --> 00:16:17,680 Speaker 4: a lot of that isn't necessarily targeting their own people 298 00:16:17,840 --> 00:16:21,000 Speaker 4: who can't even view it or read it, but targeting 299 00:16:21,040 --> 00:16:22,080 Speaker 4: the Chinese diaspora. 300 00:16:22,280 --> 00:16:25,640 Speaker 2: Do you have any questions about CIA or the agency that. 301 00:16:25,680 --> 00:16:28,840 Speaker 4: You'd like, Yeah, I mean, I am endlessly fascinated in 302 00:16:28,880 --> 00:16:33,840 Speaker 4: the sort of influence operations that the US has engaged in. 303 00:16:34,120 --> 00:16:37,440 Speaker 4: Probably only a few of them are public at this point, 304 00:16:37,960 --> 00:16:38,720 Speaker 4: there a few that I know. 305 00:16:38,960 --> 00:16:39,520 Speaker 6: I don't think the. 306 00:16:39,520 --> 00:16:42,360 Speaker 1: US does it much or very well anymore. I mean, 307 00:16:42,440 --> 00:16:44,840 Speaker 1: obviously in the fifties and sixties, in the period of 308 00:16:44,880 --> 00:16:46,480 Speaker 1: time when we were trying to play the same game 309 00:16:46,520 --> 00:16:48,240 Speaker 1: and we found out that we were bad at it 310 00:16:48,320 --> 00:16:51,040 Speaker 1: and that maybe the truth was a better weapon. And 311 00:16:51,280 --> 00:16:54,320 Speaker 1: after the reforms of the seventies, I think the military 312 00:16:54,800 --> 00:16:56,840 Speaker 1: gets involved in some sort of leader what they think, 313 00:16:56,880 --> 00:17:01,080 Speaker 1: battlefield misinformation whatever you want to call sciops. 314 00:17:01,200 --> 00:17:04,320 Speaker 2: With siops, I think you might find that the agency 315 00:17:04,520 --> 00:17:09,000 Speaker 2: was trying to understand like the question about community, what 316 00:17:09,240 --> 00:17:12,840 Speaker 2: is the jihadist community or what do they look like, 317 00:17:12,960 --> 00:17:15,720 Speaker 2: how do they organize, how do they get their message out? 318 00:17:15,880 --> 00:17:19,200 Speaker 2: How do we get inside their messaging? And so there 319 00:17:19,200 --> 00:17:21,200 Speaker 2: were things I think I can say this, There were 320 00:17:21,240 --> 00:17:23,639 Speaker 2: things like, okay, so you know, if you want to 321 00:17:23,760 --> 00:17:26,760 Speaker 2: impact on how al Qaeda messages it right, and so 322 00:17:26,800 --> 00:17:30,000 Speaker 2: it's kill Americans killed Jews. Okay, So if you commit 323 00:17:30,080 --> 00:17:33,040 Speaker 2: and say no, we should be nice to Americans. First 324 00:17:33,080 --> 00:17:34,679 Speaker 2: of all, no one's going to listen to you. You 325 00:17:34,720 --> 00:17:37,840 Speaker 2: can't even get inside the community. But if you commit 326 00:17:37,960 --> 00:17:41,760 Speaker 2: and say something like yeah, okay, Americans aren't very good 327 00:17:41,800 --> 00:17:45,040 Speaker 2: but let's talk about how come none of bin Vaden's 328 00:17:45,040 --> 00:17:48,240 Speaker 2: family members, no Saudis are going out there, No senior 329 00:17:48,280 --> 00:17:52,120 Speaker 2: Alqaeda members are out there. Their kids are blowing themselves up. 330 00:17:52,359 --> 00:17:55,360 Speaker 2: They just get us Egyptians to blow ourselves up. What's 331 00:17:55,440 --> 00:17:57,440 Speaker 2: up with that? You know, there are ways to get 332 00:17:57,440 --> 00:18:00,920 Speaker 2: inside the community to sort of saying what the Russians 333 00:18:00,920 --> 00:18:05,840 Speaker 2: were saying, to tweak or to pry at weaknesses that 334 00:18:05,960 --> 00:18:08,959 Speaker 2: are extant and real inside of a community. 335 00:18:09,359 --> 00:18:11,920 Speaker 1: It's also not meant to be publicly facing. 336 00:18:11,640 --> 00:18:14,240 Speaker 2: Right, No, no, no, And in fact it's we're crippled to 337 00:18:14,280 --> 00:18:17,040 Speaker 2: do that. I don't think we do it well simply 338 00:18:17,080 --> 00:18:19,200 Speaker 2: because we're not allowed to operate in English. 339 00:18:19,200 --> 00:18:20,040 Speaker 3: For example, right. 340 00:18:19,960 --> 00:18:23,040 Speaker 2: Because we're not allowed to, it's not allowed to wash 341 00:18:23,280 --> 00:18:28,359 Speaker 2: into US politics or narratives or community. So you know, 342 00:18:28,400 --> 00:18:30,680 Speaker 2: we can't do it in English, even though they may 343 00:18:30,720 --> 00:18:33,440 Speaker 2: do it in English. So we have to take special 344 00:18:33,600 --> 00:18:38,720 Speaker 2: care not to impact on information that Americans could consume 345 00:18:38,760 --> 00:18:42,320 Speaker 2: our Westerners. So as a democracy, I think we understand. 346 00:18:42,800 --> 00:18:46,040 Speaker 2: As an intelligence community, we understand how important these things are. 347 00:18:46,640 --> 00:18:50,560 Speaker 2: But the way our democracy is structured, we're never going 348 00:18:50,640 --> 00:18:52,840 Speaker 2: to be able to nor should we be able to 349 00:18:52,880 --> 00:18:55,960 Speaker 2: do the sort of thing that Russia does or China does. 350 00:18:56,040 --> 00:18:58,320 Speaker 4: Tit for tat becauses is to have to fight with one 351 00:18:58,400 --> 00:19:00,920 Speaker 4: arm tied behind our back, which is good. 352 00:19:00,960 --> 00:19:01,480 Speaker 5: I don't worry that. 353 00:19:01,600 --> 00:19:05,080 Speaker 4: Yeah, no, I would prefer that fight, but certainly it 354 00:19:05,880 --> 00:19:07,200 Speaker 4: makes it for a more difficult place. 355 00:19:07,240 --> 00:19:09,960 Speaker 1: But the fight we were better at, Like we talked 356 00:19:09,960 --> 00:19:12,280 Speaker 1: about radio for Europe and that type of stuff was 357 00:19:12,440 --> 00:19:14,879 Speaker 1: using the truth as a weapon in places where What 358 00:19:14,920 --> 00:19:17,920 Speaker 1: I worry about now is our politics. Our leaders are 359 00:19:18,520 --> 00:19:24,000 Speaker 1: openly using falsehoods and misinformation for purposes, so we are less, 360 00:19:24,320 --> 00:19:25,600 Speaker 1: we have less credibility. 361 00:19:26,040 --> 00:19:28,960 Speaker 4: Probably the other piece that I'm worried about is that 362 00:19:29,320 --> 00:19:31,840 Speaker 4: we don't even have Hollywood as much of a weapon 363 00:19:31,920 --> 00:19:33,560 Speaker 4: as we did in the past. You know, we're now 364 00:19:33,600 --> 00:19:37,919 Speaker 4: making movies for China and following the dictates of China 365 00:19:37,960 --> 00:19:40,680 Speaker 4: for what appears in our movies rather than Rocky four. 366 00:19:41,200 --> 00:19:44,040 Speaker 4: I've always felt that if more politicians went and watched 367 00:19:44,119 --> 00:19:45,600 Speaker 4: Rocky four, we'd all be better off. 368 00:19:45,920 --> 00:19:48,560 Speaker 2: It is a former agency officer a brickbit I would 369 00:19:48,560 --> 00:19:51,560 Speaker 2: throw it at Hollywood. Is this trope where there's always 370 00:19:51,600 --> 00:19:55,400 Speaker 2: like the rogue CIA agent who's good, but like the 371 00:19:55,480 --> 00:19:59,640 Speaker 2: institution is bad or the you know, the senior leadership 372 00:19:59,720 --> 00:20:02,600 Speaker 2: is BA. There's always some sinister force, which I get 373 00:20:02,720 --> 00:20:05,080 Speaker 2: is like, I get it's a fun trope, but you know, 374 00:20:05,320 --> 00:20:08,640 Speaker 2: institutions thousands of like beer crads who aren't paid very 375 00:20:08,640 --> 00:20:11,400 Speaker 2: well trying to do the right thing, and it just boring. 376 00:20:11,080 --> 00:20:15,200 Speaker 4: Though it's Yeah, most of real world is unfortunately boring, 377 00:20:15,480 --> 00:20:17,879 Speaker 4: which is why we have conspiracy theories. 378 00:20:18,040 --> 00:20:20,639 Speaker 1: Yeah, you know, we're fighting a losing battle. But Darren, 379 00:20:20,680 --> 00:20:22,960 Speaker 1: thank you so much for your time. It's really interesting 380 00:20:23,000 --> 00:20:24,840 Speaker 1: and we're really glad what you're doing. I know there's 381 00:20:24,880 --> 00:20:27,080 Speaker 1: pressure on you for doing that, but I think we 382 00:20:27,119 --> 00:20:29,439 Speaker 1: all need to try to push. You know, a post 383 00:20:29,440 --> 00:20:31,639 Speaker 1: truth world is not a good world for the United States, 384 00:20:31,680 --> 00:20:32,200 Speaker 1: I don't think. 385 00:20:32,320 --> 00:20:35,040 Speaker 2: And we all need to take spot Patrol, right, we 386 00:20:35,080 --> 00:20:37,159 Speaker 2: all need to take the new updated version. 387 00:20:37,280 --> 00:20:39,919 Speaker 4: Yeah, come August, it'll be out and I'll be excited 388 00:20:39,960 --> 00:20:40,320 Speaker 4: to share it. 389 00:20:40,440 --> 00:20:41,520 Speaker 2: Where do people find it? 390 00:20:41,800 --> 00:20:43,200 Speaker 5: Spotdatrol dot com. 391 00:20:43,520 --> 00:20:45,159 Speaker 6: And we're over sixty so that's a problem. 392 00:20:45,520 --> 00:20:48,000 Speaker 5: You'll need to take it twice than a going flip. 393 00:20:49,640 --> 00:21:01,800 Speaker 3: We'll take a quick break. We'll be right back, John 394 00:21:01,840 --> 00:21:04,760 Speaker 3: and Jerry. This is your producer, John rejoining you and 395 00:21:04,920 --> 00:21:08,520 Speaker 3: also your producer Rachel Harner. Hey, everyone, I thought it'd 396 00:21:08,560 --> 00:21:10,719 Speaker 3: be fun to take Daron up on his offer and 397 00:21:10,880 --> 00:21:14,960 Speaker 3: let's try playing spot the troll. Guys. Pull upspotthtrol dot 398 00:21:15,000 --> 00:21:20,520 Speaker 3: com on your computers. Okay, click on profile one Chloe Evans. 399 00:21:20,560 --> 00:21:21,919 Speaker 2: She seems so nice. 400 00:21:22,080 --> 00:21:24,640 Speaker 3: So this is Chloe Evans. She's a student in Atlanta. 401 00:21:24,720 --> 00:21:27,840 Speaker 3: She joined in June twenty fourteen. She has a lot 402 00:21:27,840 --> 00:21:31,840 Speaker 3: of posts here about Obama being responsible for a chemical 403 00:21:31,880 --> 00:21:35,280 Speaker 3: plants explosion, quotes about how life is terrible. 404 00:21:35,720 --> 00:21:38,000 Speaker 6: What do you guys think, I'm going to a troll? 405 00:21:38,040 --> 00:21:40,640 Speaker 2: She says. She used to be a model, so I'm 406 00:21:40,680 --> 00:21:43,359 Speaker 2: going with troll. I don't think that's I don't think 407 00:21:43,440 --> 00:21:44,000 Speaker 2: that's true. 408 00:21:44,240 --> 00:21:47,199 Speaker 7: Rachel, Yeah, I'm getting some troll vibes from this. 409 00:21:48,400 --> 00:21:52,400 Speaker 3: She's a troll. Hundreds of Twitter accounts like Chloe were 410 00:21:52,440 --> 00:21:57,560 Speaker 3: activated through twenty fourteen twenty fifteen. Based in Saint Petersburg, Russia. 411 00:21:57,920 --> 00:22:01,760 Speaker 3: Oh nice, and some of the signs are she pushed 412 00:22:01,800 --> 00:22:05,880 Speaker 3: hoax events that never happened. Her profile images of an 413 00:22:05,880 --> 00:22:10,080 Speaker 3: attractive woman, something that always works. According to the site 414 00:22:10,119 --> 00:22:12,159 Speaker 3: and my own personal experience, there. 415 00:22:12,040 --> 00:22:13,600 Speaker 2: Was nothing in there, and that's sort of true she 416 00:22:13,720 --> 00:22:16,520 Speaker 2: was or anything? Is I am a model? Like English 417 00:22:16,520 --> 00:22:17,680 Speaker 2: speakers don't talk like that. 418 00:22:17,720 --> 00:22:20,120 Speaker 3: Well, that's another thing it says is that there were 419 00:22:20,119 --> 00:22:23,960 Speaker 3: no personal posts. It was all political. She had nothing 420 00:22:23,960 --> 00:22:26,520 Speaker 3: to say about her own personal life, and that was 421 00:22:26,560 --> 00:22:31,320 Speaker 3: suspicious profile too. Harmonie Anderson, the college girl who managed 422 00:22:31,359 --> 00:22:34,720 Speaker 3: to say stay conservative. This is my second account where 423 00:22:34,760 --> 00:22:38,840 Speaker 3: I share my political and social views. She's from Ankonny, Iowa, 424 00:22:39,040 --> 00:22:42,600 Speaker 3: and she joined in September twenty nineteen, and she posts 425 00:22:42,640 --> 00:22:46,800 Speaker 3: here about Pennsylvania vote rigging. A lot of things here 426 00:22:46,840 --> 00:22:51,080 Speaker 3: about how the two thousand election was rigged, legals voting. 427 00:22:51,640 --> 00:22:54,639 Speaker 3: Here's something about how great Milania Trump is, how she 428 00:22:54,640 --> 00:22:57,320 Speaker 3: should have been on the cover of Vogue, how Biden 429 00:22:58,000 --> 00:22:59,080 Speaker 3: was losing his mind. 430 00:22:59,400 --> 00:23:02,760 Speaker 2: Oh, she found James Wood, the wacko Hollywood actor. 431 00:23:03,080 --> 00:23:03,719 Speaker 7: So what is she? 432 00:23:04,040 --> 00:23:06,760 Speaker 2: You know what? She could be real, but just like 433 00:23:07,520 --> 00:23:11,040 Speaker 2: in the club, she's killing people with this bullshit. But 434 00:23:11,400 --> 00:23:14,200 Speaker 2: this seems more real. But it seems like she's also 435 00:23:14,359 --> 00:23:15,359 Speaker 2: like deeply maga. 436 00:23:15,680 --> 00:23:17,800 Speaker 7: She uses a semi colon at one point, which she 437 00:23:17,840 --> 00:23:19,679 Speaker 7: feels a little I don't know, what do. 438 00:23:19,680 --> 00:23:20,840 Speaker 2: You gotta get semi colons? 439 00:23:21,080 --> 00:23:22,360 Speaker 6: I voted troll. 440 00:23:22,240 --> 00:23:25,240 Speaker 3: I stopped using semi colons because a semi colon does 441 00:23:25,240 --> 00:23:27,560 Speaker 3: what a period does, So just use a period. Malcolm 442 00:23:27,560 --> 00:23:29,600 Speaker 3: Gladwell taught me that not personally. 443 00:23:29,680 --> 00:23:32,200 Speaker 2: She follows Milania Trump, so who would do that? I'm 444 00:23:32,200 --> 00:23:32,879 Speaker 2: going with troll? 445 00:23:33,359 --> 00:23:35,439 Speaker 7: Yeah, I do feel I feel like it's a troll. 446 00:23:35,720 --> 00:23:38,520 Speaker 3: Harmony is a troll. We attributed to the Russian Internet 447 00:23:38,560 --> 00:23:41,680 Speaker 3: Research Agency in March twenty twenty, and then they worked 448 00:23:41,680 --> 00:23:45,440 Speaker 3: with Twitter to have her account suspended. Lack of personal 449 00:23:45,480 --> 00:23:51,439 Speaker 3: info again, nothing about family, schoolwork, friends, pets, another attractive photo. 450 00:23:51,880 --> 00:23:56,360 Speaker 3: Troll Accounts like Harmony often retweet prominent voices. These may 451 00:23:56,400 --> 00:24:00,960 Speaker 3: include positive and uplifting content to gain credibility connect with 452 00:24:01,000 --> 00:24:02,000 Speaker 3: their target audience. 453 00:24:02,600 --> 00:24:06,520 Speaker 2: Also, their grammar is really good but very simple in 454 00:24:06,680 --> 00:24:09,520 Speaker 2: both right. I mean it's like you've run it through chat, 455 00:24:09,680 --> 00:24:10,680 Speaker 2: GPT or something. 456 00:24:10,760 --> 00:24:14,680 Speaker 3: This is a CIA analysis. Now, now you're getting into 457 00:24:14,960 --> 00:24:19,159 Speaker 3: a level of reading a person. Okay, Profile three Christopher 458 00:24:19,240 --> 00:24:24,080 Speaker 3: Warwick lives in Columbia County, Indiana, and he is reposting 459 00:24:24,240 --> 00:24:28,040 Speaker 3: a lot of tweets about stand with the soldiers and 460 00:24:28,200 --> 00:24:31,800 Speaker 3: a lot of pro military tweets. They don't seem particularly political. 461 00:24:32,200 --> 00:24:35,560 Speaker 3: Here's a selfie of him and his daughter in a tractor. 462 00:24:35,840 --> 00:24:39,280 Speaker 3: Here's something of Jesus praying for the world. Here's a 463 00:24:39,280 --> 00:24:42,560 Speaker 3: photo of a barbecue place he recommends for lunch. And 464 00:24:42,760 --> 00:24:45,639 Speaker 3: here's a tweet of meme. It's a picture of I 465 00:24:45,640 --> 00:24:48,000 Speaker 3: guess God saying I didn't say the end of the 466 00:24:48,040 --> 00:24:53,240 Speaker 3: world would be signaled by trumpets. I said trump slash Pence. 467 00:24:53,760 --> 00:24:56,600 Speaker 3: So if Trump Pence signals the end of the world, 468 00:24:57,000 --> 00:24:59,040 Speaker 3: are they good? Are they bade? 469 00:24:59,359 --> 00:25:00,760 Speaker 2: I don't think is there anymore? 470 00:25:00,840 --> 00:25:01,640 Speaker 1: Is he good? 471 00:25:01,920 --> 00:25:03,520 Speaker 7: There's also put up about COVID. 472 00:25:03,680 --> 00:25:07,000 Speaker 6: Yeah, so I'm saying he's real. What do you say, Rachel? 473 00:25:07,040 --> 00:25:09,720 Speaker 7: I mean there are more kind of those family cues. Right, 474 00:25:09,760 --> 00:25:12,439 Speaker 7: there's the photo of his daughter in a truck. It 475 00:25:12,480 --> 00:25:14,720 Speaker 7: looks like the same kid that we see in the 476 00:25:15,200 --> 00:25:17,320 Speaker 7: first photo that we don't get a good picture of 477 00:25:17,359 --> 00:25:21,320 Speaker 7: his face. He only has ninety four friends, which I 478 00:25:21,359 --> 00:25:24,400 Speaker 7: don't know. Maybe seems low to me, but I think 479 00:25:24,400 --> 00:25:26,240 Speaker 7: I'm going to go legit on this one. 480 00:25:26,440 --> 00:25:29,560 Speaker 3: He's real. He has a kind husband and father living 481 00:25:29,600 --> 00:25:32,800 Speaker 3: in Columbia City, Indiana. We can confirm he is real 482 00:25:32,880 --> 00:25:36,160 Speaker 3: because we know him personally. He has posts about his 483 00:25:36,200 --> 00:25:39,120 Speaker 3: life and his community, like the lunch spot. He does 484 00:25:39,160 --> 00:25:43,200 Speaker 3: not push out constant messages supporting extreme views. For example, 485 00:25:43,240 --> 00:25:45,800 Speaker 3: while some of his political posts are right leaning, he 486 00:25:45,920 --> 00:25:49,679 Speaker 3: also pokes fun at President Trump, like the trump Pets 487 00:25:49,960 --> 00:25:54,879 Speaker 3: all right, profile four, Power to women, American feminist. She 488 00:25:55,000 --> 00:25:58,040 Speaker 3: needed a hero, so that's what she became. Also a 489 00:25:58,080 --> 00:26:00,720 Speaker 3: lot of memes, how would you just these means? 490 00:26:00,840 --> 00:26:03,600 Speaker 6: Bernie memes feminism, a lot of feminism. 491 00:26:03,240 --> 00:26:06,440 Speaker 7: Stor this is much more like a liberal, less leaning account. 492 00:26:06,520 --> 00:26:07,400 Speaker 6: For sure, we. 493 00:26:07,359 --> 00:26:09,720 Speaker 3: Are going to fight to pass the long overdue Equal 494 00:26:09,800 --> 00:26:14,879 Speaker 3: Rights Amendment, Senator Bernie Sanders. What purpose would the Russians 495 00:26:14,920 --> 00:26:17,600 Speaker 3: have of or would a troll have of putting out 496 00:26:17,600 --> 00:26:22,000 Speaker 3: this message? Are they trying to make it so over 497 00:26:22,040 --> 00:26:26,720 Speaker 3: the top with its liberal messages that it kind of 498 00:26:27,160 --> 00:26:30,320 Speaker 3: mocks itself that it will turn people off to those 499 00:26:30,400 --> 00:26:32,160 Speaker 3: liberal and feminist points of view. 500 00:26:32,200 --> 00:26:34,399 Speaker 1: Well, I think there's a benefit if you're a foreign 501 00:26:34,440 --> 00:26:38,000 Speaker 1: actor to just get communities fighting each other to move 502 00:26:38,040 --> 00:26:42,160 Speaker 1: people to the extremes. Right, So the country arguably works 503 00:26:42,200 --> 00:26:44,520 Speaker 1: best when there's sort of both parties are more towards 504 00:26:44,560 --> 00:26:47,520 Speaker 1: the middle. So your goal is to move people to 505 00:26:47,600 --> 00:26:50,199 Speaker 1: the extremes on both extremes, and in fact you know 506 00:26:50,200 --> 00:26:52,120 Speaker 1: in the twenty sixteen election, that was part of the goal. 507 00:26:52,160 --> 00:26:54,520 Speaker 1: They were trying to get black voters, who they saw 508 00:26:54,560 --> 00:26:56,480 Speaker 1: as liberal voters, to be so upset with the system 509 00:26:56,520 --> 00:26:59,119 Speaker 1: that they just didn't vote. Because both sides are the same. 510 00:27:00,000 --> 00:27:02,720 Speaker 1: Same time, they were pushing hard on the right to 511 00:27:02,760 --> 00:27:05,119 Speaker 1: get people who never voted before to get so angry 512 00:27:05,200 --> 00:27:07,000 Speaker 1: to come out and vote. So they were trying to 513 00:27:07,000 --> 00:27:10,600 Speaker 1: support the Trump campaign by appealing to both sides. And 514 00:27:10,680 --> 00:27:12,920 Speaker 1: I think that's what you might be going on here 515 00:27:12,960 --> 00:27:13,840 Speaker 1: if you think it's a troll. 516 00:27:13,960 --> 00:27:16,639 Speaker 2: But these are like calling for violence, and they're not 517 00:27:16,720 --> 00:27:19,720 Speaker 2: all they're not completely wacky. You know, let's pass the 518 00:27:19,720 --> 00:27:22,120 Speaker 2: Equal Rights Amendment. You can be forwarder against it. That's 519 00:27:22,160 --> 00:27:22,960 Speaker 2: not huge. 520 00:27:23,520 --> 00:27:25,840 Speaker 7: But read that that caption because it has a lot 521 00:27:25,880 --> 00:27:27,480 Speaker 7: of typos and weird syntax. 522 00:27:27,880 --> 00:27:30,520 Speaker 2: Okay, well typeo's and syntax means that they either went 523 00:27:30,560 --> 00:27:32,320 Speaker 2: to school down south or they're Oh. 524 00:27:34,080 --> 00:27:36,399 Speaker 7: Even even the last line, how cool would this be? 525 00:27:37,119 --> 00:27:39,240 Speaker 7: It just feels a little it's a little too formal. 526 00:27:39,280 --> 00:27:41,320 Speaker 7: There's a typo right up the top. What's going on 527 00:27:41,359 --> 00:27:44,760 Speaker 7: with this country, imagine is dozens of women women gathered 528 00:27:44,760 --> 00:27:49,760 Speaker 7: to make decisions on men's health like ineffective trolling. Yeah, 529 00:27:49,840 --> 00:27:50,480 Speaker 7: I say troll. 530 00:27:50,960 --> 00:27:52,359 Speaker 6: I said Reo, But I'm wrong. 531 00:27:52,640 --> 00:27:56,239 Speaker 3: You guys are right. John's wrong, Russian troll. She has 532 00:27:56,280 --> 00:27:59,879 Speaker 3: an affinity group with no clear organizer power to women, 533 00:28:00,080 --> 00:28:03,000 Speaker 3: presents itself as an affinity group rather than a person. 534 00:28:03,680 --> 00:28:06,960 Speaker 3: This is likely because Instagram and Facebook users don't typically 535 00:28:07,080 --> 00:28:12,199 Speaker 3: follow non famous strangers for or against. It takes advantage 536 00:28:12,240 --> 00:28:17,000 Speaker 3: of its followers passion to encourage extreme polarization and suggests 537 00:28:17,080 --> 00:28:20,200 Speaker 3: that compromise is impossible. So that's what you were saying. 538 00:28:20,480 --> 00:28:26,400 Speaker 3: Create conflict profile five Amy g daughter sister, proud black American. 539 00:28:26,920 --> 00:28:29,720 Speaker 3: I tend to get political New York, New York. Joined 540 00:28:29,760 --> 00:28:34,399 Speaker 3: January twenty, nineteen, thirteen thousand followers, and it says no 541 00:28:34,560 --> 00:28:37,600 Speaker 3: bad vibes. Well, how would you describe what we see 542 00:28:37,680 --> 00:28:38,800 Speaker 3: in her posts here? 543 00:28:38,840 --> 00:28:42,480 Speaker 2: So this is tricky because she's got the halshtag. Trump 544 00:28:42,560 --> 00:28:46,600 Speaker 2: is a Russian asset, Russian interference. So with the Russians 545 00:28:46,800 --> 00:28:50,320 Speaker 2: put out stuff that says that they are responsible for 546 00:28:50,600 --> 00:28:52,240 Speaker 2: you know the people who have to be careful of 547 00:28:52,320 --> 00:28:53,280 Speaker 2: Russian interference. 548 00:28:53,600 --> 00:28:56,400 Speaker 3: Here's something negative about Roger Stone. It's hard to think 549 00:28:56,440 --> 00:28:57,600 Speaker 3: of something positive though. 550 00:28:57,840 --> 00:29:00,960 Speaker 7: Yeah, it is a really wide spectrum of that she's 551 00:29:01,200 --> 00:29:05,120 Speaker 7: talking about. Right, it doesn't seem very targeted. You know, 552 00:29:05,200 --> 00:29:08,840 Speaker 7: we have the kind of joke about Trump at the top, 553 00:29:09,080 --> 00:29:11,960 Speaker 7: and then we have a Michelle Obama quote. Right, then 554 00:29:12,000 --> 00:29:15,280 Speaker 7: we have the Trump is a Russian asset quote, and 555 00:29:15,320 --> 00:29:19,000 Speaker 7: then yeah, we go into to Roger Stone and then 556 00:29:19,080 --> 00:29:21,120 Speaker 7: about something about a six year old being held at 557 00:29:21,120 --> 00:29:24,960 Speaker 7: a mental health facility without their parents' permission. It seems 558 00:29:25,120 --> 00:29:27,360 Speaker 7: very I don't want to say nuanced is the right word, 559 00:29:27,840 --> 00:29:30,320 Speaker 7: but it does seem like this account is kind of, 560 00:29:30,560 --> 00:29:33,160 Speaker 7: at least, if nothing else, copying and pasting from a 561 00:29:33,200 --> 00:29:35,520 Speaker 7: wider variety of sources than some of the other trolls 562 00:29:35,520 --> 00:29:37,400 Speaker 7: that we've seen. If this is indeed a troll. 563 00:29:37,440 --> 00:29:38,880 Speaker 2: It's boring, but I think it's real. 564 00:29:39,440 --> 00:29:40,560 Speaker 7: I'm gonna go with real. 565 00:29:40,840 --> 00:29:43,040 Speaker 3: I also said real when I saw this, and we 566 00:29:43,080 --> 00:29:45,440 Speaker 3: were all wrong Russian from the account. 567 00:29:45,760 --> 00:29:46,880 Speaker 7: Wow, they're getting better. 568 00:29:47,400 --> 00:29:50,040 Speaker 3: Amy pretends to be a left leaning black woman, a 569 00:29:50,080 --> 00:29:53,560 Speaker 3: common tactic of controls. Amy's strategy is to engage with 570 00:29:53,600 --> 00:29:57,400 Speaker 3: the black community and other left leaning users, gain followers 571 00:29:57,440 --> 00:30:01,320 Speaker 3: among those users, and then use her influence to manipulate users' 572 00:30:01,360 --> 00:30:05,600 Speaker 3: conversations and push particular political agendas, so kind of a 573 00:30:05,640 --> 00:30:06,760 Speaker 3: false flag situation. 574 00:30:07,240 --> 00:30:12,040 Speaker 2: Yeah, it's also interesting that Darren Storm fifteen sixteen, the 575 00:30:12,120 --> 00:30:18,040 Speaker 2: Russian troll House, they seem to specialize with Black American grievances, 576 00:30:18,160 --> 00:30:20,920 Speaker 2: and one that they seemed to push really hard was 577 00:30:21,000 --> 00:30:23,239 Speaker 2: someone who said that they were a black American and 578 00:30:23,320 --> 00:30:27,200 Speaker 2: he was tired of people ripping down his Trump side 579 00:30:27,280 --> 00:30:29,880 Speaker 2: and that basically you know that that he no one 580 00:30:29,920 --> 00:30:33,360 Speaker 2: could stop him from backing Trump. And apparently this got 581 00:30:33,520 --> 00:30:36,760 Speaker 2: a lot of responses from whites as well. So interesting. 582 00:30:36,880 --> 00:30:38,760 Speaker 3: All right, well thank you for playing guys. 583 00:30:39,120 --> 00:30:41,600 Speaker 2: So Mission Implausible is this? 584 00:30:41,680 --> 00:30:42,520 Speaker 6: Are we trolls? 585 00:30:42,560 --> 00:30:44,280 Speaker 2: People can't really see us? 586 00:30:44,440 --> 00:30:45,040 Speaker 6: Are we real? 587 00:30:45,200 --> 00:30:47,360 Speaker 2: What do you think, Rachel, I didn't see us. 588 00:30:47,560 --> 00:30:49,800 Speaker 7: John's a troll on Bluse, guys. I mean he's also 589 00:30:49,840 --> 00:30:51,160 Speaker 7: a troll on Blue Guy than he was on he 590 00:30:51,200 --> 00:30:51,640 Speaker 7: was on Twitter. 591 00:30:51,880 --> 00:30:54,360 Speaker 2: But so he's legit. But he's also a troll. But 592 00:30:54,480 --> 00:30:55,800 Speaker 2: real people cantrol. 593 00:30:56,520 --> 00:30:59,200 Speaker 1: It's a verb anoun. 594 00:30:59,640 --> 00:31:04,720 Speaker 3: Mission Implausible is produced by Adam Davidson, Jerry O'shay, John Seipher, 595 00:31:05,040 --> 00:31:09,440 Speaker 3: and Jonathan Stern. The associate producer is Rachel Harner. Mission 596 00:31:09,440 --> 00:31:13,440 Speaker 3: Implausible is a production of Honorable mention and abominable pictures 597 00:31:13,560 --> 00:31:14,880 Speaker 3: for iHeart Podcasts.